The Communist Party of Australia 1920-35 : policy and organisation

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF AUSTRALIA 1920•)5' POLICY AND ORGAIIS~IOH

A. B. DAVIDSON

A Theaia submitted tor the degree of Doctor of Ph1loaoph)r

Th1s thesis 1• ent1relf 11111 own work.

u

13

?---·

While ibis thesis is all

m:r

own vork it would be

churlish to deny that many people have inspired,

encouraged and commented on lfT work. l cannot acknovledge all here but I should like to thank 11'1 supervisors,

Dr. Erto Fry of the Hlatory Department 1n the Sehool

ot

General St'Ud1es at the AIU and Professor J .D

.:a.

Miller, Protestor of lntematlonal Relations in the Institute ot

Advanced Stu.dlea at the same un1vera1ty; 1 should. 11ke

w

thank Dr. R. Gollan. and Professor Mann.iq Clark

or

the ANU, .and Dra. M1rlma Roberta and Ian tu.mer of Monash Un1 ve:r&i t7 a.a vellt others who mu.st be mentioned ue Mr. Roger Coates

and the late Mr. lfonan Jeffrey who provided valuable

documents and reatniacence

s

and tin&llJ I should lilt• to thank all the amber• past and present of the CollmW11st

Put1 and the labour movement who talked to • about the

Part,., 111 fellow student• Daphne Gollan,

c.

F. Yong and

Sim.on Proctor of the Laudl'f Block, Old Hospital Bu.1ld1ng₁ AIU, and . , wife Joan who made sure that the slouch of

CHAPTER

CONTENTS.

SYNOPSIS

INTRODUCTION ABBREVIATIONS

PART 1

Page

1

xi

Xi

1 BEGINNINGSt The Formation of the Comintern The Formation of the Communist

Party of Australia

1 2 l 7 8 9

THE UNITED FRONT t The Comin tern

The C .,p .A.

PART II

THE NEW LINE:The Comintern

The Party

BOLSHEVISAT~ AND ITS EFFECTS 1

. / Bolshevisa.t!on

Personnel

Nucleus Organisation

Rank and File Activity

THE POLICY OF SOCIAL FASCISM THE PARTY GROWS

PART III EARLY TRADE UNION WORK

THE MILITANT MINORITY MOVEMENT

TWO CASE STUDIES#

The Miners• Federation

The Pastoral Workers• Industrial

29

80

95

173

191

21~

..

22~

231

261

29<

31l

Union of Australia 37

CONTENTS (cont'd)

Page

PAHT IV

CHAPTER

10 THE °FRONT0 _{ORGANISATION 393}

11 TWO CASE STUDIES:

The League Against Imperialism 403 and Movement against War and

Fascism

The Friends of the Soviet Union 425

PART V

12 CONCLUSIONS

APPENDICES A B c D E F G

Twenty One Conditions

Biographical Notes

Principles and Objects

or

Socialist Party of Victoria

?irst Statement of the Aims of the SPA

30/10/-1 920

List of Certain Communists, N.s.w., 1930-31.

Programmatic Declaration of the Communist Party.

Bibliography

Corrigendum

Frontispiece

Between pp.107-108

213-214

392•393

-...

Jock Garden

The United Front?

1

§1D2P•i1

The ob~ect of th1s thesis is to determine what was tbe polley and organisation ot the Co1111UDiat Party

ot

Auatra.11a (CPA) between 1920•3; and what effect tbia pol1oy

and. organ1aa:t10n had, especially on the CPA'• relative

failure as a political party.

Naturally, aa the Communist International (Com.intern) decided both policy and organisation for the CPA in this period, the history of tbe Coas.nt.em and of Com1ntern

relations with the CPA at crucial tiua 1n party hiato17 is examined as well aa tb.e histo17 of th• CPA itself, though

not 1n u great detail.

The theaia ia divided into five parts. Part l covers tlrst the formation of the Comintern and tbe formation of

the CPA, together with the early years to 1921. It ls established that the Com.intern demanded the adoption. of a world revolutionary progra.me by all parties belonging to

1t, and the adoption of tbe organisational 87atem of

democratic central.lam. Aecord1ng to tbe Comlntem, all

communist parties were to foster what the Comintern olaiaed va1 already a violently revolut1onarr situation with a v1ew to overth:roving cap1tal1aa and establishing

social.lam• independently of and 1n hostility to, all other labour parties. In 1920 it aa1d that th.is could onlr be

achieved if the communist parties were centralised in

11

Finally, the Com.1.ntem establ18bed ita own right to

determine both poliey an.ct organ1aat1on for all communist parties.

When the CPA wu formed it did not fully underatand these Coatntern decie1ons aad contact had not been made w1 th the Comin.tem. there wore already several soc1aliat parties ln Australia in. 192-'J. Their policies bad been

determ.1ne4 by the reality that the Australian. Labor· Part7,

which waa not str1ctl7 soc1al11t, commanded al.mat all

worldng claaa npport ( waiah did Mt 10 to anti •labour parties) 1n Auatral1a. Broadly the sociallat parties had

either entered the 1wu1 party to try to convert 1 t to

socialla

troa

w1thln, or competed w1th tt; w1\hout auecesa

1n the elec't1ona. Generally, failure in. the last poller

foi-cefl aoc1al1ata to be content with p.:ropagan41a1nc. After

•ch bickering, the CPA, at1ll not bou.n.4 b7 the Com.intern• ad.opted the pollc7 of workiag 1na1de the ALP 1n 1921 • The CPA

waa

still lnformal.17

orgao.1ae4.

Part I of the thea1s alao oovers the period of the

united front { 1921-28). F1rat contact between the CPA and

tb.e Comtntem was made 1n 1921 and resul.ted 1n formal

aft111at1on and recognition by the Coaintem in 1922.

Henceforth the CPA wu bOWld to accept Comi:ntem directions. Comlntem d1:rect1ona changed at the Third Congress 1n 1921.

It was then recognised by the Com1ntern that world

111

were encouraged to enter the maea labour parties and

affiliate with th.em to win their supporters awq trom them

and destroy them. Independence, not Mrger, was wanted. Thes• instructions were carried back to Ji.ust:ral1a in

1921 and became quite clear in 1922. They were not the

swae

as

the traditional social.1st policy of bor1ag from.

within, vhleh. waa designed to refurbish the ALP t not to destroy it. the CPA, whtle tollovlng the sociallst policy,

had met some sucoeaa 1n New south Wales before 1 t came under Com1ntem dlrect1ona. CPA m.ell.\bera participated 1n

torci.flg the ALP to adopt a soa1al1aat1on objeet1ve an4 in

1923

tb.ree were even

elected to the

N.s.w.

ALP

executive

and the ALP agreed to allow the CPA to atflliate to it. However, ALP awueaeae that

the

CPA vu coaU'olle4 fHm.

Moacow mt4 1ntent on. deatro71n.g the ALP led to the •xPulslon

ot

all eomanlst1 trom the usa party after 1923. the CPA started to d.ecl1ne and apl1t over the appropriateness of the united fl!'Ont policy. So• •llber• ea14 comm.untsts should

hid• their pol1t1oal 1dcmtttr to continue YOrk 1n the ALP. Others said that this would effect1-vely mean merger and demanded that all eo~ists in tb.e ALP declare themselves

and challenge the ALP to expel them. One member even

suggested that the CPA liquidate itaelt and that membere enter the ALP aa 1.ndivldua.l.s. Failure in attempting

1v

independent Political machine. Consequentlf t at least two

thirds of the members of the CPA lett the party or were

expelled. Reduced to a tiny sect in 1926 and led by a new leadert Jack Kavanagh., \'/ho favoured the proposition that the workers could be educated to believe in socialism, the CPA limped along until 1929 without any political influence.

It was 1n breach of dihipl!.ne !&I A I&I the Com.intern

1n not oonceat:ratlng on further atteapts to get into the

ALP. In 1929 this inaetion wa• changed.

Part II of the thesis covers

1928•35.

In 1928 the

Com1ntem again changed its policy. It declared that there

was a renewed wave of revolution aad reverted to pol1e1.•a

akln to those of before 1921t s.neludtng attacking the labour

parties. Kavanagh retuaed to follow the independent

co1quet1t1Te aotion in elections demanded.

bf

the Comlntem, claiming that

lt

waa 1nappropr1ate 1n Auatral1a. A power straggle developed in th• party between him and hle

follow-ers and tho.ae whO teaanded that the CPA follow Comln.tem po11c1ea wi •twut question. By various mach1nat1ona th•

opposi t1o.n group came to power as the new leader a of the

CPA and it.11mediately 1.mpleaented Coaintern directions. The

f 1rst of these was that tbe party adopt the system of

de•cratlc centralism as its organisation. This had never

v

introduction of the system. The kernel of the system waa the introduction of factory nuclei a1 the party baais.

Since Kavanagh bad favoured tne educatocy policy, he had neglected factory organisation between 1926·29. l:his ia one reaaon why the party took so long to introduce this

system o! organisation. At first, the opposition to Kavanagl ha4 centred on bia retuaal to introduce democratic centralis1

so in 1931 a new oon•t1tut1on was introduced. It waa drawn up b7 a fl.ft ComJ.ntern delecate, Herbert Moore. The

first llmaediate result ot this raorgan1aat1on waa the

exp\lls1on of Kavanagh and his most powerful follower•, a.s

a cardinal rule of demooratie c•ntral1sm was 'that there

should he no oppos1t1ona 1n COllllU'liat putiea. A further result wa1 'the establisbmen:t

ot

120 taotory nuclei by 19)~.

Thia put a third of the part7 members organised 1n factories

and industries. above all in minlng, waterside, and tranapoz"

industries. Ii"or the first time sine• 1921 the CJ>A omae

into

direct o:rgan1H4 con\aot with the proletariat in ita plaee

ot work..

Yet a further result was a vaatl7 more active party due to the increaaed eapae1ty to PinPoint &n4 control members• activity; a part7 vh1ch held its new member• better than before and which worked hard to extend itself.

On the other hand, the polio7 ot attacking the ALP, the

usoo1a1-tasoists11_, as the worst ene111 of the working class

waa totally inappropriate in Australia. The CPA• :s aim was

vi

the A.LP. It lnd1ser1m1nately attacked both the rank and

file and the leaders of that party, thus greatly deprec1at·

1ng its eha.Qees ot recruitment. Furthermore, although

there waa sev-ere depression between 1929•33 ln Australia there was no revolutionarr "upsurge". The CPA cried trom the rooftops that there was an°upsurge" and alienated much srapathy. Depression eondltiona did, indeed, result

in a polltlcal radical1aat1on of the Australian masses, but the CPA deliberately cut 1taelf off from sueh radical

move'O'lents, aa they were u.eually led by ALP meabers. The

CPA asserted that

it

was the only true revolutionary part7.

It made no attempts to ingratiate 1taelf with the leaders

of these radical mcveents and thus win aupport. When these aonments collapsed

tev

ot their members went into

the CPA..

When the Coa1ntem again deeree4 a united front a•

revolution had once more not eventuated, the ALP attacked

the CPA u "ina1noen" and refused to ha.Ye anyttilng to do

v1th the pJtOposal. Had not the CPA been reviling the ALP

for the pa1t four years?

Yet despite tb.e n!n.ous nature of this pol1ey during

1929·3~, due to the depression the CPA grew in membership, areas of influence 1 electoral support and in newspaper

c1reulat2,on. It spread into rural areas, among women and

youth. It was still aall 1n 1935 but it was a firmly

V11

as it had 1n the twenties.

Part III of this thesis deals 'With CPA activity in the trade unions. Defore contact with the Comintern and its

trade union. wing, the Red International of Labour Unions

(RILU) , the CPA followed a policy of nwh1 te•anting" in

unions, that 1s, establishing communist groups in the unions

with a view to alienating the aympathy or the union members

trom their leaders. lt did not have much success and

J. Garden, a communist leader, who was already secretary of the NSW Labor · Council, followed by nearly all the otbe:r members of' the Council (they too became communists when he

did), decided that the Waf to w1n the trade unionists and

unions to a communist poliey was to gain contl"ol of

Aust:ral.la •a labour :co.unc ils . These were the co""'ordinatinl bod1,ea

ot

the Australian trade union movement. As Garden was leade:r of the CPA a.t thls time, true CPA conducted no

ruther organised work in the unions in 1922-;U,. Due to

the small s1ze of the party Kavan.agh₁ nis auccessor, conducted no work in the unions either. So the pa.rt1 in

these 7~ars held virtually no positions on union executives.

The onlf fora.al contact with the proletariat wu via the

NGW Labor Council. Even thili contact disappeared in 1926 llhen Garden left the party. Deapite Garden's ela1m&1

which were made in 1922, that the

war

to power in Anglo•saxon countries was v1a control of the Labor Councils, control of

viii

The new leadership of 1929 turned to a different vehicle to establish contact with unionists after th.e Labor Council

had been condemned s.s "soe1al•fascist". It utilised the

Militant M1nor1ty Movement (MMM?' ,whjeh had limped along

sinee 1928 when it was formed under Kavanagh. the MMM w.as

a unon--party" body which. unionists were encouraged to ~oin

and work in together with comiaunists, who, as has been seen,

vere organising 1n the factories at thle time. It advocated

direct industrial action and control by the rank and file

ot

uniona of aD.1" strlltes which oecurred. Aa union leader• were responsible for tallurea in several strikes at about

this time, the MM won qu1te a following. It met 1nlt1al

sucoeaa in the northern coaltd.nera • lockout of 1929•30 an4 although 1t tell on bad days 1n 193~33 due, once again, to

the 1Jtappropriatene11 of nvolution&rJ Pol1c1•• 1n a

non•nvolut1onarr env1ronment, by

1935'

communists had

influence ln several large trade unions and had laid the fo1.Uidat1ons for the capture of many more.

Due to 11.mited apace only two ease studiee have been made • commu.niat polic7 and organ1sat1on in the Miners• Federation, where eommun1sta worked thro\llh the MMM, and aomun1st activity with the Pastoral \t.iorkers• Industrial

Un.1on1 a union which broke away from the Australian Workers•

Union and came under co118Un1st and militant leadership.

It emergea from the case studies that good organisation vas responsible for communist success and inappropriate

ix

Many unionists came into the CPA via membership in the MMM.

Pa.rt IV of the thesis covers the CPA policy of

establish-ing ••front" organisations. The motives for establ1sh1rL~ these "fronts0 _{are covered extensively. Basically, their aim was}

to bring comm.un.ists and non-communists together in the same

organisation where they both worked tor some common ideal (e.g. against var and tase1sm)₁ and thus to allow communists

to perceive potential recruits and win members. They were also intended to bring mass support for communist, and

therefore USSR, foreign policy and other principles. Despite

allegations to the contrary, they were not usually controlled

1n an underhand way by col8llW'11ats and frequently communists

If ..

could not retain control of this or that front, although they usually held the key otf1e1a1 positions.

T-wo cue studies are made• the Movement against war and

Fascism; the Friends of .the soviet Union. Botb. were great

successes by 19);, haYing thousands of adherents. Although

1n the case of tb.e MAW.AF and the FOSU the CPA could not

retain full control of their operations, many CPA members

appear to have come into the party via act1vit.1es in the "fronts". They suoceastully spread communist ideas 1n

journals and newspapers-with combined circulations of over

100,000, 1u1.rq ot which were circulated free. The ttfrontstt

were the biggest communist success of the thirties.

The 1'1nal chapter of the thesis, Part V, draws conclusions.

x

directions in policy the J1Gre it met failure. Initially when it followed traditional Australian socialist policy

it met some success; after that it met failure.

1na.ppropr1ateneea of its policie:i was certainly a reason

why it failed to recruit more followers and indeed why :nembers already in the CPA left 1t. Orge.iiJt1t1onally,

"bolsheviaatlon" improved party activity and to some extent cancelled out the damage of inappropriate policy. Where,

as 1n the trade unions, and eapec1ally the "fronts••,

Comintern control was leas and the CPA went its own way

more, and where organisation waa more important than policy, the party experienced much greater success.

This thesis concludes, then, that inappropriate policy

had a damaging effect on the CPA but that democratic

AJ.

IHTRODUC'J:IOH

The Communist Party of Australia has never heen very successful. Between 1920 and 1135 all the party 4on&titut•

ions asserted that the CPA'a aim was to overthrow by force the existing capitalist atate and establish a dictatorship

of the proletariat. pending the introduction o! a commun1st

society. The CPA never made any attempt to earry out tnis policy. there ia a simple reaaon for suon inaetiont the

party had also indicated 1n the same constitutions that the

prerequisite for such an overthro~ waa workers• support, though 1t never indicated how much support would be

considered sufficient. !he required aupport was presumably

never won, although the hi1tor1 ot the CPA before 193S

included a continuous attempt to recruit the support neoeas· ary for a sueceastul re~lution. Naturally,the question 1n CPA hi1to17 which haa received the most attention 1• why there was ao little popular support for Australian eomsun.1a•, desp1\e all ettorta of tlle party to attract it.

Various answers b.ave been

given.

~he)' have oft.en been

influeneed by political or social esotiona and not by the

.spirit of scholarly enquiry. It has been said tbat

Australian communism waa "a hothouse flower in Antarctica", 1

and that communism waa ••repugnant to our national sentimentn t

1

ReJ?9rt

ot

tl'\1

l~sJeg!J,,

22a,ea::ensuh

Al«P, ( 1924

>,

P35 .. 2 S .. M. Bruce,

Bgiaaev&sI

Ml

Au,tra6J..!t

9/9/2~, National

x11

and that without n,. •• the depression there would have been

no communism in Australia",.3

ciuch answers see communist failure in terms of hor:.t.ility,

disinterest or apathy of the 1~ustra.lian people towards

communism, from the I'$clplenta' point of view rather than

that of the proponent.

It does seem highly probable that the greatest obstacle

to communist success in recruitment and winning support has been the hostility, disinterest or apathy of the Australian

people which the polemiclstl;j quoted above fastened on as_an

explanation. It can be roughly gauged from the lack of

electoral support for the CPA. No scholarly surveys of'

popular attitudes to Australian communism before 1935' hLve

yet been made. The lack of initial popular enthusiasm for communism was perhaps due to the absence of a strong

revolutionary tradition in Australia. No conversion en -~·~·

to communism was possible as had been the case 1n some

European countries. ?be importance of a preceding

revolut-ionary tradition in conditioning the amount or support for

a new communist party is a possible subJect for tuture research by another student.

Besides the popular hostility explanation• it bas been communist practice to blame the party's failure on its own

errors and not on popular and, sometimes, not even on

x111

seetlonal hostilities. The CPA has 'been forced, for reasons

which will emerge in the thesis, to l1m1t 1ts crit cis,i to

its personnel and not direct it to p'arty policies or

organisation, except after the policies or organisation had

led to gross f a1lure which was acknowledge as due to such

policies or organisation.

So both these explanations neglect to take into account

the positive contribution of the C?A to its own failure

through following inappropriate policies or adopting

inappropriate organisation.

One object of this thesis is to !111 this lacuna in the

explanations. It aims to discover whether the policies and

organisation of the CPA contributed to its failure to win

mass support through their inappropriateness. It also aims

to discover what other effects policy and organisation had

on the CPA's history. Two lines

or

enquiry are followed

in this thes1ss first, what were the policies and

organisation between 1920-35, and, secondly, what were the

effects provoked by such policies and organisation?

Such enquiry demands an examination of the history of

the Communist International at certain times, as well as

that of the CPA, as the Comintern decided what CPA policy

ALP ills ABU ABU ASP AW BS 00

CE OPA

oom1n.um

CPSU(I)

i'OSU

Baa Coll

ISO lSLP lUPL lft LAI MAW.AP ML

Australian Gouneil ot Trade Unions

Alolstraliail Labor Party

.Australian National LibraFY

Australian National University

Australian RailWIQ's Union

Australian Soeialiet Part¥

Austn11aa Wol'keN' Union

Bruoe Sbiltld• 001leet1on

Oentral comm.1 the

xiv

central becutive Communist Part7 of Australia

Oomm\Uliet Into:r&at1onal

O~i:Jt Par'l7 of Australia

O~weal-th Parlia.ntai-7 Debatee

0~1et Part¥ of the Soviet Wnioa

(:Bolshevik)

Exe01lt1Ye Oomd.ttee of the C~st lnte~:tional

Friends of th• Soviet Unioa

w ..

l~k.Collec\1.a

International Socialist Olub

In4uetr1al Soo1a11st Labor Party

Industrial Un.ion Propapn4a League

In4uatrial Worke~s of the World

League Against Imperialism

ltnement Against War

ana

Fascia

0l3U

PWIU

R&'Wling Coll

RILU

SLP

SMH

SPA

TUSL

UWM

VS?

~wF

xv

Militant J:.t1nority Movement

Manuscripts

Militant Women's Movement

vne Big Union

Pasto»al ',vorkers' Industrial Gnion

J .N. Rawling Collection

Red International of Labour Unions

Soc1al1st 1''ederat1on of Australia Socialist Labor Party

&yd.ney Morning Herald

Socialist Party of Australia

Trade Union Educational League

Unemplo1ed workers' Movement

Victoria.."\ Socialist Party

1

CHAPTER 1 BEGINNINGS

1 a . T,Ae Fozm..at&Pn. o,f., late pomJ,ntru:n •

On 2~ January 1919 a radio message went out from Moscow. It invited selected revolutionary groups of other countries to attend the inaugural. meeting

or

the Communist

International 1n March. lt was aent on the 1n1t1at1ve ot

the communists who held f)Owei- in Russia. The message was

published in only a tew Western newspapers and in

mutilated form. 1 Among the revolutionan p-oups invited was the Industrial Workers

or

the World ( I~JW) of Australia. 2 Lenin, the leader of the Russian party, had ex.pressed h1a

contempt for the Australian Labor: Party (ALP) 1n 1912, al.though 1 t was th.e largest politic al party of labour and

the largest party 1A Austral.1a.3 The Australian IWW

d1sda1ntullf refused the 1.n.vitation and was not pre•ent at

the inaugural meeting

or

the Com.intern..

li-t1 ttle vas said in this invitation about the purpose Qr aims or the new organ.isation.. Thoae groups which dld

1 _{P. Dutt,}

_1ne

_tw2.

_{~n$tD4aS12D!J.lt}

_{(1920), p22.}

2

_DJ4!

p67. i J. D•gru,

T~ ~P!ll9D¢!:t.

lnl•mSitiona;i.

12.12.

~la DOl!M!!!rl!t \19 ), I, p •

3 V.I. Lenin,

"In

Australia" in 2.A Bg:,i,t§.Mtt {Moscow),

pp168-70.

4

_fDdllfS~!\A

SoJoiststtz,

26/7/19201

\ro111ar1~,

11211919.

'he ww waa actual y called the In erna 1ona Industrial Workers to avoid an act banning the IW'W J

So.1Jrd1£lHt

atte.nd launched a tuan1feato on 6 :March 1919 from the congress,

indicating why the Comintern had been fonned.5 The document said that the collapse of capitalism which Karl Marx and

Frederick Engels had augured 72 years before wa& occurring in 1919. It described a Europe "covered with debris and amold.n.g ruina'* as

a

result of tbe Firat. world

war,

tor

which

the "criminal bour1eoiaie" weJ-e reaponsible. It deaor1bed

a conapirac1 of the ruling classes of Fr&Bee, England,

Italy and the United Sta tea of Amer lea to cum.a• war to

tiestro1 tb.e rival Oer11U7. the motive an4 cause had. been the laaatiable greed of the property owning classes, who found tl:uaualvea rival• for tl\e worlcl'a auk.eta. The Manifesto went on that as n Jl'esult or th~ war the

contrad1etiona Gf th• eapitali•t system confronted mankind

1n the shape ot the paags of hunger, exb.a.ustion from cold,

ep14ea1ca and m.oral aavagery. The one and onlf queat1on

waa who wo\lld take over the "atate•i••dlf economy created la the wu ... the proletariat OJ' the imperialists? the

workers wst be adv1aed not to go back to ••bourgeoia

demoerao7", to nationalism. Civil war was developlng

between the elaeaes aa the bourgeoisie attempted to resist tne progress of the proletariat~ These toiling maaaes

had to return blow for blow it they did not wish to

assure the masses• victory 1n this civil war.

"Our taak ia to generalise the revolutionary experience ot the working class, to purge the

movement of the eorrodl.ng admixture ot opp<:>rtun.1am and social patriotla, to unify the.efforts of all

genuinel1 revolutionary parties of the world

proletariat aad thereby facilitate and hasten the

victory of the Co111Un1st revolution throughout the

world,"

said the Comin.tern.6

It aeema a matter of faith whether there actuallJ was

a revolut 1onarr situation, as deaeribed bf the Comintern,

1n Europe in 1919.7 In the ease of Australia the deaer1pt1on d1d not hOl.4.

When Auatralia•s troops aa1le4 back b.Ome 1n their

thousand• alt.er the flrat World war they retamed to a

oountl'Y totallf different from war-ravaged Europe.

Auatralla l!IU entering a new era, an era ot unprecedented

proaperi'Y• For While up to that time the Australian

COltllW11ty had had to work hard to maintain. 1ta average

standard of living at the old level, from the war until

the Great Depresa1on Australtana pew more and more prosperoua.8 From 1918 until 1921, when there

wu

a

--·---slight recession, employment was full and wages steady if

not improving. The economy as a whole th.rived in the twenties.

The prosperity was secured by a new policy of eco.nomlc

development :for Australia. There was no longer much land

to sell so the new policy bad the slogan °raen, money, markets". A series of imperial agreements between Great

Britain and Australia in 1922, 192S and 1926 all.owed the acqu1s1t1on of the first two items 1n the slogan. First,

by the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, the British Govcarnment promised to lend up to £3,000,000 a year for fifteen years

to promote Empire settlement. Secondly, in 192$ there was the "£3~,ooo,ooo Agreement" between Great Britain and the Commonwealth or Australia, wn1eh allowed this sum to be lent to the States over ten yeara 1t they settled an aas11ted immigrant for every

£7S

received. A Coma1sa1on for

Development and Migration was set up in 1926. 323,000 migrants arrived between 1921•29. In addition 100,000 people moved. out of the country into tb.e towns. Between

1919-20 and 1926-2? the number• employed 1n 1nduatry

increased by about

9S,ooo.

The value of industrial capttal equipment more than doubled and a system of government

preference for Auatralia.n mmuf acturea started operat1.n1. The pattern of Australian lite was starting to change.

6~% between 1919-27. Australia was becoming an industrial nation. Skilled labour was short and employment was full when compared with the thirties, although lower than in prewar years.

Australia waa prosperous. Over £300 million was easily borrowed between 1920 and 1929, mostly from Britain and the USA. It was spent sometimes with reckless abandon and orten

shortsightedly. New but uneconomic industries were fostered

by means of imperial preference ta.rifts and by subsid1siag sueh industries so that they could compete on the world

market. Excessive expansion on the basis of boom conditions and failure to diversity 1n primary produce because some

products were fetchln.g high prices in post war years spelt disaster when the boom stopped. This did not prevent

Australia's future from seeming rosy to its inhabitants. There was certainly no economic reason for revolution in the decade after 1917.

Immediate post""War Australia d1tfered froa Europe in another way, too. Often the decimated troops of the old -world had limped home with promises ot land and care, made

in wartime b7 their governments, ringing in their ea.rs.

urorgotten heroes"• Preference in emplo)'ment was alao guaranteed to the returned aoldler, vbo was glor1f1edt and Returned servicemen's Leagues sprang up to perpetuate the

aura of' glory. This was balm to the soul of the "digger". so, while in Russia e.X-$0ldiera supported the bolshevik

revolution, and while in Italy ex-soldiers carried out the

f'a.sc1st reYOlut1on, in Australia the ex-soldier became a defender of the status quo.

Ot course, the prosperous Australia of 1918•20 had 1ta

mill taner f so mu.ch so that one wr1 tar haa called 1919-20

the "Year of Strike•"· Indee4₁ trade unions were m111tant but 1t appears that the union 1trike otfene1ve was dictated

by a. desire to have a slice

ot

the cake and not by an abject poverty and nf'fering derived from the collapse of capitalism, which the Com1ntern said were the causes of the ~111tancy 1n the world v1d• revolut1on

it

forecast.

In sum, Australia was not experiencing the same social, economic and political chaos as Europe and the Comlntern's

description of th• collapse

ot

worl4 oap1ta.l1a did not

The way Trotsky rationalised Australia's inclusion 1n the

of the world wide collapse of cap1tallam was complicated

but not unbelievable. The revolution was an ex.pandiJlg

phenomenon, beginning 1n the east with Rusaia and spreading towuds the west. Thia, he wrote, developing on Lenin• s

argument in ln~r!.11&11• tbe

HJ.mst .PJ:Y•

og

Ca;e&ial&Bh

had n.ot been expected but it was ao. It was due to the fact that the countries which had 1nduslr1al1Md first had had sutfic1ent p:rotlta to "bribe" the upper layer of their

working classes. The reason why the revolution dld not

(

.

stop at Russia• s national borders and could not be oonta1ne4

was that capitalism had developed international ?rgan1c

links. Capitalism was an "eoonoalc process which first

evolved a typioal national form ed which then outgrew this national framework and evolved world t1••". This was wey Australla wu part rot the process. Its economic bas•

vu

an organic part of the world capitalist system which was

oollapslng at the heart, in Europe. Auatre.11a was like

Russia. He wrote that the railwqs which out ao:roaa

Australia v•re not the natural outgl'Owth of the'l1v1ng

eond1t1on1 either of the Australian aborigines or ot the

f1rst generation of malefactors who W_!&Ht beginning w1 th

the epoch of the French revolution, shipped

ott

to Australia

by the mqnanlmou English "metropolises". The capitalist development Of Australia 'WELi natural only trom the

stand-point of the hlstor1cal process taken on a world scale.

was, aenerall7 apeaJd.nfh 1atpoaa1ble to anal7ae a single oae of the major aoeial aan.1festat1ons of the e:poc.b..

The blpl1oat1on tor the apparently proapeJ'O'Qa Au•tralla

wat cibvio\ui. At the strlolu•n oouatJ'1ea

ot

Eu.rope collap•M

before the fore•• of

revolatlon,

Australia's ow capltal11a would

ntrer

and so •.nlld her workers, untll the1

too

were re4u.ced to a state where th•J would revolt.

This thM'7 wae at \be eon of the Comlntern th1nk1ng

tor

•llA7

1ear1 and

wlthout

hMllbel'iftg

the notion ot a

exp&ncH.ng nwlutlon

nor

of tile Coalnt.a • e deo1e!ona

an

1ncomprenens1ble, It ex.plaltta

whJ'

the Comlatern would uke

general1tJatloaa about ex11t1.ng s1tu.at1otta 1ft the world which

even tbe

utra1ned

•1•

could

see

d14

not fit tbe

preclae altuat.1on 1n this or that. cou\'17' at. the tlm.e they were made. The Coa1atem offlcia.18

mew

th1a but they

~

expeoted that sooner or later the

faot1

would

tit th• aaomaloui euapl••• Of encial traportace la the b1ato17

ot _,.

coaaist

panr

waa tnat

ta.

wbolt th.017 appeua

to han

been

wron1,

aasulng t!ult the

aoa•appearaace ot

worl4 revolution la proof ot th1a. Thia

••t

tbat ln mmq

cases 1.proprta\e

dlreet1ona

reaa1a.e4

1napprcppr1ate

instead

ot

becoaln.g appropriate aa the situation cheqd

to eon.ton

w1th

tile Coaibtem'• theory. It

alao

uant

th.a'

the whole

oo~l•t move.eat went thl'ough stages where

it seemed to sit back and wait tor sosethlq to happen whieh

b.iatory

ot

lost hopea and miaguided upectations. Indeed, had the Comunist Party of Australia come imucliately, and

alwaya stayed, under the control ot the Comintem, 1tB

history misht have been conaidered aolely aa the histo17 of the Inappropriate.

Tho•e groups which attended the f 1rat Comintem congress

vere a motle7 and \UU'epreaentative CX"Owi, 'both from the

national and the aoeiallat poJ.nt o! view. Of 17 groupa onlJ'

six eame from. weatem Europe or elsewhere overaeut

GeN81'q', Gena.n Austrta1 Sweden., Swlt~erltm.dt uerica an4

the Fnnoh Zi.aerwald Left. 10 lone of the large aoc1al1st putiea of the Weat sent repreacm.tat1v1ua. those who moved

the formation of the Co.mtntem aa1d it wu neeeauu.u•yi

(1) because the aeceasltJ of fighting for the dictatorship of the proletariat .required a Wtited, elo$e banded

in.te:rnatiOnal organ1aat1on of all cowaua1st1o elements

ataadin.g on tbat platfOl'llt (2) to oppose the nvival of

the Sacoad International at .Berne, {l) to avoid

'1ilC&••t1ona

that $0c1al1at toreea were di1un1tea. The new boq stated,

on the ba•i• of theaea presented to the ooagreaa by

Len.in,

that 1t c~nsldered 1t th• duty of ooamun1st pal'tie• to

enlighten the broad uaa on the neceasity

tor

the proletar1ai :revolution,

t<>

build up councils (soviets) 1n industry, the

10. co11D1W1iat ma.Jorit7 1n the councila.11 Little attention was paid to organising tb.e new comtlW.'11st parties and, a.a the

second Congress report aa.td• "the 1st Congress was onl7 a eongreaa of public propaganda •• •" 12

Indeed, the f1rat fear

ot

Com.intern activity wae devoted

ma1n.J.y to propaganda and $logan1ai0& via the new communist parties which belonged to it. The Com1ntern wu sure that

the new world revolution had arrived and repeatedlf

announced that it had. *'Couun1am ha.a coae into the stneta.

The eommuniatic revolution is growin& before our e1es." 1l

Slogans were the order of the day • "Worlaaan'• Counc111.

ln. hoc vi.noes" - and aasertions "The Great CollllW:l1st International was born 1n 1919. The Great lntemat1onal

soviet

Republic will be born 1n 1920.•• 1

'+

lnitiall.7 there wa.1 some Justification tor this op,lll111A. The first isiUe or the ott1cial organ of the Comintern,

£:SlllD&IS ialilEDlai-tauJ.t pointed out that 1n May 1919 tb.er• were three 1oviet republ1cuu Russia, liungUJ, where a

eomramJ.st part7 had

t.uen

power, an4 Ba'faria, where

comm.unista an.d &Jilpathlsera were also 1n power. The

Com1n.tern could also list a full'ther eleven countries where

11

_1lU:it

_{col 127.}

12 jg

iefl!;jRftf'lli

°'t;atttfftfi

ftf'iatt&ouJt, (as

J'epor . .

erpn

. ·

e o . c newspapers

ot

Soviet Rua ala) ₁ PeU'ograd-Moscow 19 July - 7 Augu.at 1920,

(Washington, 1y20)₁ PJO•

13 QillDllil)

lai!Ea&)JaDllit

1/5/1919, col

2,.

it saw a revolutiol'UU.')' proceaa golng oa.1

5

For eoll'llWllsts th.is vas an era of grea'\ expectatlona. Before the apparent

triwaph of oomraunia, •d the Russian revolution wu indeed the f'irat time the prolet.ar1at had seemingly ta.ken power,

the large soo1alist putiea

ot

Western Evope, who had ignored the original invitation to fora the Com1n.tem,

began to desert th• reoreatecl Seeond Interaat1on.al and make

approaches to the new bodJ•

While the Comln.te.:n had exteaded ita original 1nvitat1on

to disparate pol1t1eal ·and soo1al1at groups, from th• outaet

it

vu ho•t.ile to the second (Aasterda) In.teraat1onal,

to

WbiQb. moat of the 1nv1teea belonged. Ia 1919 this bod7 was

4eeayin.g th.rough lta J.netfeetualitJ'• Although it had

eondemed. wo i1etere 1911t, wbea vu broke out all 1'8 partle1,exc ept in. Ital.J, Russ.a, Holland and Balgu1a₁ b.ad npported the war, expl1o1tlf or iaplleltly. 16 A.a a naul.t, Len1n'•

posit.l.on duriq a4 after the war was t.b.at the Seoond

Intemat1onal was deadJ that it had siped 1ta own death

warrant oa

l+ Au.pet

1911+

whea

the

Fnaeh M4 Geaan

0_{eoo1al ""'patr1ota'* vow4 the war e"41ta, that 1a, "ea.a' 1n}

theJ.r lot w1tb illper1al1at •laq,htertt.17 Dvlng th• war

th• Second lnternat1on.al stopped fuo.ot1on1ng aa aoc1al1sta

1

_s

_.DJA,

_col

_2s.

16

.a.,

~-j.~9.bt

111 Slit P19.

fought tor slogans they had tormerl.7 condemned. But, aa Lazitob. points out 1A h1a excellent book on Lenin and the

Third Interna:tional, Lenin• s attitudes towards the war

received little supp<>rt either, and he was virtually alone

in his a4vooacy of a

uw

International to replace the

·-·

second. lfot 8\U'prisln11Y; the socia11ata moved into oppoait•

ion to the war u lt dragged on with frightful and unforeseen

alaup:ter and after the war a:tt.empted to revive the second

International. at the Bene conference. The meeting waa

boycotted

b1

the Swiss, IiaUans, Serbs, Rumanian• and

Russians. Hatred dating rrom the vu split tboae that were

left. Ultlaately the conference reconf 1rme<t the policy

ot

workJJtg through parllaaeat, whlch the Com1nte.m had

condemaed from 1 ta toru.tlon. ~he soelaliata thus contl.rmed the praotlce of all soolal.iat parties a1nce 1901+ u the

irrevocable bue

ot

au aoe1al1st policy.

so

tb.ough the

boue of Kvopean soclal1aa vu shaky it still stood.

Thia wu one reason why the tou.ndation oongreaa of the Co11.lftten vu so uuepreaentative and luge count.rles sueh

u Germ,any ad Austria

were

»•presented only bJ delegate•

who had no man.date from the aase aociallat parties to speak on theiJ' behalf. 18

BJ

the end of 1919 this 1aolat1on of the Coaintem bad changed.

1.3

after al.It.oat unanimous agreement at ' its Bologna conference

Tne French were at .tirat t.mdee1ded but in April voted 727 to

270 to remain in the Second International. Theft the German

Independent soc1al-Dem.ocrat1o Party (USPD) left the Second

International and

put

out definite feelers towards the

com.J.ntem with a p:ropoaal for a united International

(Leipsic, 30 Noveaber 1919).19 Influenced b)' th1a, the

!"renoh left the Second International with virtual tmanila1t7 tor the action

(t..,330

to 337) • tho'qh t.bey did not

laed1a'917 .joln the Coaintem.

This atteatlon posed. a problem tor the Comintem of how

to cope vi th appl1oat1ons for 11ellberahtp from put lea 'Vblch

had not from the outset supported it. this, cou.pled with

other pro'bleu wh1oh had u1un dur!ng the year, neeeaa1t• ated sore attention to

orgaa1aat1on,

although the

eloga111ng wont on. ln this question

ot

organisation 'the domtnaaee of the Ruaslan Co8W'list Part1 1n. the Comintem wu very alp!ficant. It 1• thereto.re 1mpertaat to deaoJtibe

MW the Ituss1&aa obtained ..eb an eUl.F JUll'mlOUAtey.

The Russian.a called the f1rat con.gnaa of tbe or-gu1aat1< Thia made th.em host nat1on and naturally leading spokeama

in the 1nit1al eta.pa of Com.intern lite, as onl.1 they knew

1n any diaµute which woul.d arise• At the f irat congress the Rua•iaas were the largest nation in attendance. Of the a1gnator1ea of the Manifesto even soe

or

those who

signed for other countries were member• of the Communist

Party of the soviet Union (Bolshevik). These were Sk1"1Pnik who signed tor the Ukraine, Rakovsky tor the Balkans, and

Balaban.ova for the French Zimmerwald Lett. 20 The major doouaenta of the t1rat ooqnas were drawn. up by Lenin, Trotaky aod Bukharin ot the Russian puty. Then, du.e to

poor eontaots w1tb the weat, 'between the First and second

Congreaaea, the leading body consisted, 1n gene.ral m.erelf of a group of Ruaa1ans. The f1rat ed1 t1on of QQllHP,1$

IAllmtllstlfM.

enn aaidt "For a t1se • certainlJ a ver:y

lhort

t!M • the

1upnuc1

ot

the proletarian revolut1onal'7 I.ntematlonal beloqe

w

tb.e

Rtuua1ana".

21 There

1•

little

do\lbt that they in.tended to traaater it to the West when

the revolu\lon waa nceesstu.l then. 22 This does not invalidate \he assertion 'that the Ru.ssiena were dominant in 1919 an4 1920. '?bey

treei,

admitted it theuelvea.

fheU.• own experience of how to organise thenf<>r• l>eoaae ve17 important. In the Len1n1at tradition, tor a variety

ot

nuona,

the line between organ1satlon and

20 /

B. Lultch, LIA&Dth Rlh

l&lu

pp98•9.

21

i=t~fl itrlti~t~1?~3~1lt,~t,3:!.a.

z1nov1ev,

22 _{L. Trotsky, U1}

_1l•·

pr1no1ple or 1deolog had been very t1ne. The Bolsheviks

had been preoccupied with organisation as they saw in

organisation the road to suocesa. The • s t important factor wn1ch had made the Russian eommun1et party thws preoccupied.

was the Russian revo1ution1U7 trad1t1on, vh1eh, aa a result of Taar1at oppreaaion, had become oonap1ratarial, limited

to small groups₁ and therefore glven to violent solutions

to prohlau. The Russian Haniata who formed the Bolshevik

party embod1•4 these traits. They therefore d1ttere4 t~•

the Western European M&l'Xieta tn

at

lea.at one s1gn1f 1otlftt

way.

In EUl\'tpe₁ w1thout the equivalent repression, large tollowlnga oc<t,lJ.d be, atl4 were, opem.l.J' won an4 ao all members d1d not have to he active workers. In Rwui1a, due to IJIAll put7 rmahers, evel')' ... :r had to be aot1ve and active 1n the

••ript•

w97 to gal.T&nlze the inert

ausea.

Orgaalsat1on

of party acrt!vlty became a tetlsh. One ot Lenin. 's earliest and moat laportant writings was

Mild

&1

19 lM!

ll.9a1?

(1902)t Which la14 down the organ.1aat1onal task.a

ot

the Russian

Social Democratie Party (later the CPSU{B)). ..Lenin

re3ected

the theo17 'that the

muses

would apentaneously reuh tbelr own adver•• oonclue1ons about tb.e capitalist system ao.d overthrow it. (This waa basically the belief

ot

the European Muxista.) He asserted that oni, a aaall

~

ellte coUld understand Marxism and that tt would brin.&

these Muaiat teachings to the maaaea and thus indicate to

...

suggeated various organisational fons ror the party. Instead.

ot

a federal form of party organisation he proposed an

extremei,r eentralized partyt tunet1on1ng on the lln.es of a m1lltar1 command. After a dee1s1on was made by the central

body of the party it was to be carried out with.out question right through the chain of eormaan.d to the lowest organs of

the party. Any dispute over a policy had to precede the deot.sion, therefore it was not to be questioned, even verbally. ThS.a made the central co•1 ttee of the

partr

etreettwl.7 stl'Onger \ban

th•

rank

and

tile.

Lenin

also

vaated. his party 1181lbers to be proteaalonal revolut1onar1es,

that is, full tlae part7 workers. These methods made a party ftm.etlon. etf1o1eatly, he sald. Although this

organlaation, krlovn aa democratic central.lam, waa adopted

b1 the Russian party, this arul1 other taot1ea split it in.to

two 1d.nga, the Mensheviks and Dolaevlka, tb.e latter

ot

whloh supported Lenin.

The Rueslan party, alone among the parties of the Second I.numatloaal.₁ adopted th.la mode

ot

oJ'gM1sat101i. 23 Lee41ng

European. aoo1allat• au.eh aa Rosa Lwtembt.arg oon.demn.e4 these organ1sat1onal methods, In 190lf. Luxerabu.q wrote ill

... al&S

an article now k:.Qown u "Len1n1sm or Marxism?"

She Pointed out that the ldeaa 1a

waas

11

St

12!

PIM?

ancl

another Leninist paphlet,

9M

sw

r.tau:d

!A(l

bi

S)!R!

i.Ublldt

wen a :reaPonae to the au.toerat1c eondttio.rua 1n

2

1 'i

Russia,

bu.t

she st111 condemned the elite doctrine and the so•oalled democratic centralism, as these would lead to a

rigid author! tarlaniaa 1r.t the ~uurt7 and possibly a

d1etatorah1p

or

the party over the people if 1t took p0wer. She wrote that, except

tor

the general pr1llc1plea of the

struggle, there d1d not ex1st

tor

Social Demoera.07 detailed

sets

ot

tactics which a Central comi ttee coUld teaeh the party membership in the same wa7 as troops wen instructed

1n their tral.D.J.ng

camps.

2

~

While it ia not the ob3ect ot th.ls thesis to elaborate the h1atory or the role of organisation in the Russian

PArt7t or the hostility its Methods aroused outside Russia, what baa beeo. aa1d indicates adequa:tely a pattern which

e.xlsted in Rus:dan party b.iatoryJ a pn<>oeupatlon with orgaa1sat1on Which was seen as a

neee1aa1'7 prerequisite

tor

carrylng out the revolution, and was in put due to Ruaslan oond1t1oaa. (There waa tempor1U:7 aeglaot

ot

organ1sat1.on

in th• first 7ear of the Comlntem, and poas1bl7 durin.g the war,

thoueh

this po1nt could not be preaaed too tu. 2

S>

When. orgaaiaat1ond pJObl- arose in the Comlntem the

Rus1ma nterred baolt to their own politloal experience

2lt

~Jff~f~~-

i

~ii

2_{' Thia appears ao t:roa}

_o.

Q:aakla atid

a.

_F1aher1 JM.

for solutions. 2

6

Firat, they had to

cop~

wlth the collapse

of the Hungarian and Bavarian soviet Republics ln the

middle of 1919, and establish illegal parties.21 Presumably,

organ1sat1on on a Russian llOdel was advised. Cet>tainly,

when the Comintem had to cope with the problem of

parl1tA.11lellt-arians 1n some of its

new

part1e• it referred back to the Russian party's experience

ot

u.tilising parliament and in

a circular letter advised member paJ!t1es to base their

attitude on that or the Bolsheviks. Soon tbis trickle

ot

problems becmae a spate aa the ComlAtem gnw and stuted

to m.eet with setbaob. Al.moat inva.riablf it advised an

appl1eat1on.

ot

Russian methods. This vu \1U1okly noticed bf a leading Weatem Marxist, Karl Kautaky, an4 co.n.demed

by hia. Lenin and Trotslq wrote def enoes of the Russian

methods in

r•p17.28

In early 1920 a further extension

or

Russian ta.ot1es resulted 1n the first aer1ous clash with tke European

pat1es which now belonged

to,

or were eona1der1ng joloin&, tbe Com.intern..

once

more it concerned the :role

ot

parl1aaeatartan.1sm in revolutionary partlea. In April

in which he condemned outright the rejeet1on of parliament• ar1an1sm, as advocated by Berdiga of the Italian Soclalist Partys advised the various Brlttsb. Oomintern affiliates

to att111ate with th• uas Brit1ah Labour Partyf and told

the Germans that a eomprom1ee with the left wing of the

G~marLsoc1a11st party ( USPD) was necessary and useful. These eaggeations met with considerable oppos1t1on.2

9

Thia

marked the beginning of a sb.ort-llve4 oppoaltlon to Russian dominance 1n the

Comln.tem.

lt was concluded at the Second.

Congress of the Comlntem 1n Juiy-Au.guat 1920 • and. centred.

on further organ1sat1onal Um.ovation.a which the Russians sought to ifttroduee.

ln

Wt:\i&u gtllBIUI

Lenin had claimed that the necess

of the Russian revolution had depended on Rusaiao. organ1sat• J.on and espec1all7 on the system of

democratic

eentral.J.sm.30

He also aaW that others ahould. learn fl'Om

the Russians.

Ae La.aitch

•ar•t

••While the revolu.tic:>nal'J' m.oftant wu

ma.kine

awq with Russia and the rest of EW!'Ope, Lenin eont1n.ued to wrq only about praot1oal aetlon... So the

Corumn1st. Intematlanal ann.ouncea 1tt. June that

ih•

secon.4

Coagresa of the Collll\Ullat

International will show the workers of all the wcurld the shortest

way to vlotory owr tb.e 'bourgeo1a1e.

31

29 See

:a.

Pellln&t · . . · .

Eafilfl,

(Lt:uidoa, ·· t PP • .1 • t ~...-illillllrt

billl.i ..

c2auaa1s1

l&IJ.ilD2•

<M11an, 195'8>, P

30

_v,··

Lenia>'

LtfUUar

92amia1 a

&ltmiJ.•.

PSssa:&tu,

Moscow ,

j'f

R.

Given !Anin • • belief that the t:r·iurnph of the Huaaio.ns was owed to their organisation, t.h1e a.nno14nce•nt meaAt the

e~ten$1on of Russian. uthoda to t-.ll the p&rti0s of the

Wh.ore the early Cominhrn had ext$nded ita 1nv1tatlcm :i..n. to all

aorta

of revolutionary groups, new the

,pl"'ecise organ1.ln1.t1orull llmlta of thta body had to be t.'.lef'in•d

aa ptU"t1ea eontaintn.g "trai\ors'* to the working elUlt aucb. as K. Cr1sp1en, nov Hiahe4 to JoJ.n on their own teru.

~inoviev said, nwe iauat. look 'the door wUS plaff a truetwor-guaro at tbe gate of the C0Jm1W11.st. In.tema,tionaJ.fl.32

It 'WU llui.nounee" that the Chief taek of the coming

eongrcuur. was to determine clearly and preo!sel;y the praetteal

pol101 of the Coaun1at Intt1mat101ull1 to conaol1date the

Tb.11.'4 lxitemationu,

aa

an orgaa1sat1on.

ot

irue

par\isan.a

having . .

-l

am&r.1111.a

I

ill. · -

i111-J.llb IQd llJID&

!kill Iat1 Slit, DwM {M7 emphu1s)

Among the d.elega:tea from 41 eou.ntries, bes1dea the

i;~reneh aad Ge:ntaa aoc1il1ats who h*Mt not yet Joined \be

Coaintern, tbeJr• waa one other d.•legate who la of interest !or tb.1• thG:Jia. this was Paul Freeman, vh.o had been

s-agled Uuou,gh Otrll&IQ'

bJ

the idla'Ch1•ta, and wbo claimed,

w1\Mut Juat1f1ca:t1on, to

npneeat

the

Au,truiaa

Iw'W •

.33

JI

111&4,

eol

2t1~.

~I•

Thia mtU"ked the f'irst tenuoua personal contact between Australian socialism and the Com1ntern. J!'reem.an had been departed rrom Austral.la some yea.rs before and had no

credentia\s i he therefo:r·e received no voting rights at the conf

~rence.

31'" However, he had been qu1 te prominent in

.r:ust.1,aliun socialist circles end appears to have quickly

sought favour with Simon LoaOV$ky, a prominent Russian

:trade unionist. But u he had loat con.ta.et with A.u21tral1a,

h1a presence at the Comlntern had ve17 little a1gn1f 1eance at this stage of the histor7 of the

eomrmmiat

movement.

To cope with the problem

ot

parties which wished to join but contained ant1-comm.u.nista, and to bolahevise the disparate paJtties which belonged t.o the Com1nttrn₁ the

Comintern introduced 21 conditions (originally 19), which had to be tult1ll•d before mer.o.berah1p would be granted.

(See Appendix A) '.l'hese 21 conditions contained two main condition& precede,nt to Joining the Comintem. First• COJ'lll\Ulist part1ea had to expel all reformista, centrists

or moderatea from controlling positions. A complete break

with prev1oua reforldst Marxist traditions had to be made.

The new cowmmtst parties were to cut tb.euelvea oft completely tram their secialiet p:N~decessors; one vu

either communist or ant1-~ommunist. seoondl7, it iapcsed str1et centralised control

bf

the Com.intern. In demanding

3'+

this la&t po1ntt Len1nt who drafted the conditions, waa

motivated by the apparently sincere belief, shared by

others in his party, that the main reason that the

revolution had not eventuated 1n many countries was the

absence of communist parties in each oountey.35 The

comlntern said that, 1n order to direat the working class successfully during the long,stubborn. c1v1l war, the

communist party must establish the strictest military d1acipl1ne within its OVll ranks.36 The theses introduced

at the Congreas therefore extended the peculiar Russian organ.1sat:ton to the other parties ot tb.e Com1ntem.

Dem.ocratlc centralism• as proposed by the Comintern, took

the fon of an extreme central1sat1on of authority. It said that the chief princlples

ot

democratic eentrallsm were: the el•ctive character

ot

the lower groups, the abaolute b1n41n1 character ot all directions ot a higher

body for the subordinate groupa, and the existence of a powerful party

eentre

of unquestionable authorit,' tor all the leaders of the party lite fl"Om congress to

congreas.l7

At the apex of this pyraa1dal organisation waa the

Executive Comaittee

ot

the Coaintern (ECCI), and naturallf

35

_See

_{illi&\4 &;oacr:t1•}

_{llRQ&:t, iUh e&S..t PP}

_2ta.-5.

36

_{gamnwa11~.k1'1•r-11iwnalt}

_{June•Ju.ly 1920, ool 211+.;.}

no autonomy would be allowed to member part1es.l8

The Oom,intern also adopted its .first statutes. These

said that the Comintern was establi~hed to organise the

proletariat and to overthrow capitalism. All parties

belonging to 1 t were to be called "Commun.1st Party of such m.1ch a country {section of the Communist International)"•

The suprEH1e authority of the Comintern was the world congress 'Which met each year. Thia congress elected the lxecut1ve

Comittee which conducted the entil"e work of the Comintern.

between eoncress,·:uu published ita otrtclal organ 1n tour

languages and issued 1nstnctions wh1ob wen binding on all

parties aa4 organisations belongtnc to it. !he ECCl had the r1gbt to de?laftd the expulsloa from all meiaber part1ea

of th.on

wno

offended against 1ntemat1onal d1scipl1n•t and

to expel the parties themaelvea for aiatlar contraYEtntions ..

Appeals could be made to the world congress. Th.e ECCI h.ad the right to co•opt non-Com1ntern members to its co•1ttee. The preaa of all parts.es had to publish the decisions of the Com!ntem. Parties wen to prepare for illegality 1n all countries. All oommunlaations were to be made

throu.ah

the ECCl. Trade union, wonn and y-outh section$ of the

Comintern were likewise aubordlnate to the ECCI and were

organlaed by the eentral body. Every JH11ber

ot

the

Comlntem who aoved f'l'Om one country to another was to

,_

These Jtatutes applied with slight modifications, unt11 1928

\hen new statutes were introduced. The theme of th~se

statute$ of 1920 was summed up thus:

The Commu.n1st International must, in tact and deed, be a single co11111U.n1at party of the entire

world. . The parties working in the. val'10U§

0

oountrlea are but it• separate sections. Jy

While these theses were tbe main lnnovations of the second Congress, the principles 1n

.ktft.-W.W

COBID&& were al.so

endorsed as theses; u a corollary to the de.aal'Ml tor

Russian-type puties, bodies such as the lWW were 4eaer1bed. as backward and a decision was taken

to

set up a trade

union aection. The congress also demanded that there shoul.4 be only one OOtm'IWlS.at party in each co'W'lt17,40

At the congress the oppos1t1on to all then •aauna

centred arouwt K. Criaplen and

w.

Dittaamt

ot

the German

soc1a11ata,

who

wen

seeking admission to the Coalf\t.e:rn.

'?hey oppQae4 the central.lsed control dell.8D4e4 in the 21

condltioaa. Lenin 14entif1e4 C:rl•pien•a attitude wtth that

of Kautaky t and the USPD waa retuaed adalaas.on. Bllt G •

seiorat1 of the Italian soelallat Part7 had eupported their ent:ey and waa aubsequen.tl7 :reprowd. '?he Br1t1ah delegates also shoved some oppoa1t1on to the pi-opoaal that they

aff111ate wlt.b the British

Labo~

Par,,,41 aa4 .Bol'd1ga•a

39

9011Y&1$

Intem1t&on!Ja,

.rune•July 192<>', eol 2221

tt.

ltO

st..9mn&1S

&i1&3'1'11·

o.t.

Re191ut!an1 21?•

st~.,

pp13·14. 41

suggestion that the experience of the Russians was not alway:

applicable to li.urope aroused HUS$1M ire.42 Lenin₁ perceiv-ing that Bord!ga. sought to ju.atlfy his belief that commun1st1

shouJ..d abstain from parliamental7 activity; replied

crushingly that if the l taliana were too weak to conduct pa1'liamentar7 a.ctlvit1t how did they propose to carry out

the dictatorship of the proletariat? One of the suggestions

\>fh.ich troubled nea.rl1 all of the Europeans was the demand

for an immediate expulsion of reformists from their ranks. In mS!1J cues these :eformiste were the grand old en of

socialist politic• 1n their own countries. to expel them

wu to expel the fath.erG of soc1a.l1am in .Prance, Italy and Germ~.

Still, despite the opposition, the dominance of the Ruas181'>.$ and their $Upporters at the Congress

ensu.rea

that

all their suggestions were adoptea.

4

3

Ho doubt their ,

Gtature aa the first revolut10nuy government made others

leas inclined to op1>0ee them. It should be remembered that

on the day the congreas concluded the Red ArllJ was outside

Warsaw and it appeared that tb.e f1nal onslaught on capital""'

ism. waa about to begin. 44 In J"u.ly-August 1920 world revolution could still a;eem probable.

f4hen the delegates went home th$y knew the meaning of

42 _{lb1.Q, p58.}

43

ll.14,

p39.

44

_"imMl.ii

_{ID:tctrut10~, Juru.~·July}

G:.V.

the Coraintern. Trots.k.y had told them clearly what all these

theses and conditions had meant when he wrote

the ve~y essence of the Communist International •••• ta

not

a sillple ar1\hmet1cal. SW1 of all labor 8.lld

. socialist associations ext.sting in the various countries but t-epresenta a wt1f1ed, iAdependent,

1ntctrnat1onal organization, pursuing definite and prec1ael1 tormul.ated aims through def!Jlite

revolutionary means.

so no protests about instructions from outside would be

allowed, nor would affiliates be allowed autonoal1 of action. 4

5

In practice this structure meant that at any time the proletariat 1n one country might be sacrificed 1n the interest of the whole world proletariat, or the cu:rrent policy ot the Com1ntem might be unreal in a. particular

country as it was based on a concept of expanding revolution, and the countey would be bound to accept the inappropriate

directions.

·rhe major soelalist parties, those of France, German1

and Italy, believed 1.n a theory of' evolutionary

Marx1am

and did not look on the class struggle as something transcend 1ng

national. boundaries. When the delegates of these countries went home, rebellion against the bolshevik theory as

expressed 1n the 21 conditions and summed up by Trotsky manifested itself. Basically it centred on a denial that world revolution was at the stage the Bolsheviks claimed 1t was 1n the countries of Europe, and on 'Which they based

tne1r demands in the 21 points, and on the demand of the

45 ..