T
HE
R
EVISED
R
ULES
ON
E
VIDENCE
:
Codal Provisions,
Special Laws &
Jurisprudence
Class of 3-C
2003-2004
Atty. Francis Edralin Lim
Ateneo De Manila School of Law
Project Heads
Glenn Q. Albano
Ma. Lourdes O. Dino
Frances Joanne D. Miranda
Ma. Cristina P. Salvatierra
Jose C. Salvosa
Project Members & Contributors
Frank John S. Abdon
Madeleine G. Avanzado
Giovanni Bautista
Jazel Anne G. Calvo
Arnaldo M. Cariño
Elon Cris C. Culangen
Oliver S. Faustino
Jose Miguel A. Fernandez
Abigail Joy D. Gamboa
Serene A. Go
Raymond Joseph R. Ibon
Jonas S. Khaw
Katherine L. Larios
Jaydee Justine B. Legaspi
Antonio Paolo S. Lim
Romeo D. Lumagui, Jr.
Ryan D. Mancera
Gary Jay R. Maramag
Marvin V. Masangkay
Clarence Rommel C. Nanquil
Emerson U. Palad
Giancarlo M. Puyo
Rodolfo V. Reyno III
Aaron Roi B. Riturban
Anne Perpetual S. Rivera
Jose Marmoi F. Salonga
Trina B. San Diego
Anna Lyne P. San Juan
Beverly L. Santiago
Jeovert Lesmes S. Solanoy
Christian H. Sorita
Marie Angeli P. Uy
Evidence Project Volumes
Volume 1:
I. Admissibility of Evidence
II. What Need Not Be Proved
III. Real Demonstrative Evidence
IV. Best Evidence Rule
Volume 2:
V. Parole Evidence Rule
VI. Interpretation of Documents
VII. Qualifications of Witnesses
VIII. Privileged Communications
Volume 3:
IX. Admissions & Confessions
X. Conduct & Character
Volume 4:
XI. Hearsay Rule
XII. Opinion Rule
Volume 5:
XIII. Burden of Proof & Presumptions
XIV. Presentation of Evidence (Part. A.,
B. , C. 1. to 7.)
Volume 6:
XIV. Presentation of Evidence (Part C.
8. to 10., D., E.)
XV. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence
I. Admissibility of Evidence A. Rule 128, Sections 1-4.
1. Reyes vs. CA 2. People vs. Turco B. Relevance
1. Rule 128, Sections 3 & 4. 2. Bautista vs. Aperece 3. Lopez vs. Heesen 4. State vs. Ball C. Competence
1. Rule 128, Section 3.
2. Exclusionary Rules Under 1987 Constitution (a) Art. III, Sections 2 & 3.
(b) Art. III, Section 12. (c) Art. III. Section 17. 3. Statutory Rules of Exclusion
(a) Tax Reform Act of 1997, Section 201
(b) RA 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits (RA 7653, §135)
(c) RA 4200, Anti-Wiretapping Act (i) Ganaan vs. IAC
(ii) Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA (iii) Ramirez vs. CA
II. What Need Not Be Proved A. Rule 129, Sections 1-4.
Rule 10, Section 8. B. Cases
1. Judicial Notice
(a) City of Manila vs. Garcia (b) Baguio vs. Vda. De Jalagat (c) Prieto vs. Arroyo (d) Yao-Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales (e) Tabuena vs. CA (f) People vs. Godoy (g) BPI-Savings vs. CTA 2. Judicial Admissions
(b) Torres vs. CA (c) Bitong vs. CA III. Real and Demonstrative Evidence
A. Rule 130, Sections 1 & 2. B. Cases
1. People vs. Bardaje 2. Sison vs. People
3. Adamczuk vs. Holloway 4. State vs. Tatum
IV. Best Evidence Rule A. Rule 130, Sections 2-8
Rule 132, Sections 25 & 27.
Electronic Commerce Act (RA 8792), Sections 5, 6-15. Rules on Electronic Evidence, Rule 2, Sections 1, 3, 4. B. Cases
1. Air France vs. Carrascoso 2. Meyers vs. United States 3. People vs. Tan
4. Seiler vs. Lucasfilm 5. People vs. Tandoy 6. US vs. Gregorio
7. Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Reyes 8. Vda. De Corpus vs. Brabangco
9. Compania Maritima vs. Allied Free Workers 10. Villa Rey Transit vs. Ferrer
11. Michael & Co. vs. Enriquez 12. De Vera vs. Aguilar
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
A. RULE 128, SECTION 1-4:
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Evidence defined. – Evidence is the means, sanctioned
by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)
SECTION 2. Scope. – The rules of evidence shall be the same in all
courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a)
SECTION 3. Admissibility of evidence. – Evidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
SECTION 4. Relevancy; Collateral Matters. – Evidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
CASES:
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals 216 SCRA 25 (1993)
Rule 128, Sec. 1-4
FACTS:
Juan Mendoza, the father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, devoted to the production of palay. The lots are tenanted and cultivated by Julian de la Cruz, the husband of plaintiff Eufrocina de la Cruz.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of her husband, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant. However, Olympio in conspiracy with the other defendants prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers from entering and working on the farm lots. Defendants likewise refused to vacate and surrender the lots, which prompted Eufrocina to file a case for the recover of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.
The petitioners in this case, the defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, are duly elected and appointed barangay officials of the locality, who denied their interference in the tenancy relationship existing between Olympio and Eufrocina. Olympio, for his part, raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent, and non-payment of rentals as his defenses.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the agrarian court’s decision with modification, which ordered the defendants to restore possession of the farm lots to plaintiff Eufrocina. The CA likewise ruled that the petitioners are solidarily liable to pay to Eufrocina the value of cavans of palay until they have vacated the area.
On appeal, the petitioners questioned the favorable consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson, since the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave favorable consideration to the affidavits of plaintiff, even if the affiant was not presented and subjected to cross-examination. RULING:
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court did not err when it favorable considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the “Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.” The same provision states that “In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence,” Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. Thus, this case is an application of the rule with regard the scope of the Rules on Evidence which states that “The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise provided by law (ex. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946) or these rules.”
By: Frances Joanne D. Miranda
People vs. Turco 337 SCRA 714 (2000)
Rule 128, Sec 1-4
FACTS:
Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (a.k.a. “Totong”) was charged with the crime of rape. The prosecution alleged that the victim, Escelea Tabada (12 yrs and 6 months old at the time of the incident) and accused Turco were neighbors. On the night of the incident, upon reaching her home, Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice to be Turco’s since they have been neighbors for 4 years and are second cousins. When she opened the door, the accused with the use of a towel, covered the victim’s face. Then the accused bid the victim to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, the accused laid the victim on the grass, went on top of her an took off her short pants and panty. The victim tried to resist by moving her body but to no avail. The accused succeeded in pursuing his evil design by forcibly inserting his penis inside the victim’s private parts.
Upon reaching home, the victim discovered that her short pants and panty were filled with blood. For almost ten days, she kept to herself the harrowing experience, until she had the courage to tell her brother-in-law, who in turn told the victim’s father about the rape of his daughter. Thereafter, they did not waste time and immediately asked the victim to see a doctor for medical examination. After the issuance of the medical certificate, they went to the Isabela Municipal Station and filed a compliant against the accused charging him with rape.
The trial court convicted the accused, stating that the defense of “sweetheart theory” was a mere concoction of the accused in order to exculpate him from criminal liability. Appealing his conviction, the accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred because no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the medical certificate in evidence, although the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to testify on it.
RULING:
Conviction affirmed. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules (Section 3, Rule 128) or is competent. Since
admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it
may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.
However, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself, which standing alone even without the medical examination, is sufficient evidence. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
By: Frances Joanne D. Miranda B. RELEVANCE:
1. SECTIONS 3 AND 4, RULE 128
SECTION 3. Admissibility of evidence. – Evidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
SECTION 4. Relevancy; Collateral Matters. – Evidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nJon-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
CASES:
Bautista vs. Aparece 51 O.G. 805 (1995)
Relevance
FACTS:
As owner of the lot subject of the case, Nicolas Anasco sold the same to Valentin Justiniani. In the same year, Valentin sold this property to Claudio Justiniani, In October 12, 1935, Claudio Justiniani executed a public instrument whereby he sold the same property for P100 to Apolonio Aparece in whose name it was assessed since 1935. While Aparece was in possession, Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered a part of the land and took possession thereof. Thus, Aparece file a complaint with the guerilla forces then operating in the province of Bohol. When the case was called for hearing, and after inspection was made by a guerilla officer, Bautista executed a public instrument wherein he promised to return the land to Aparece in good will, and recognized Aparece’s lawful ownership over the land. Thus, possession of the land was restored to Aparece.
However, claiming that the property belongs to him, and alleging that with the aid of armed men and pretending to be owner, usurped the land, Bautista filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bohol. The CFI rendered judgment declaring Aparece as owner of the land.
On appeal, Bautista raised as defense the error of the trial court in admitting the public instrument which he executed as evidence. He argued that the document was executed under duress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it was executed, had no jurisdiction over the matter.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public document executed before an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter.
RULING:
This argument is beside the point. The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a
certain document is whether or not it is relevant, material or competent. The public document
is not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership between the parties litigants. Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in ac action. And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competent evidence is one that s not excluded by law in a particular case.
With these criteria in mind, we hold that the mere fact that the public document was executed before a guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the main issue raised in the pleadings. The public document, considered together with the other evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies the Court that the portions of land in question really belong to defendant Aparece.
Lopez vs. Heesen 365 P.2d 448 (1961)
Relevance
FACTS:
Appellee Heesen, an air Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51 30.06 rifle from the store of appellee Sears. The rifle has a bolt action known as a “Mausser type action” with a “Class 1” safety mechanism. At the time of the purchase, Heesen was given an instruction pamphlet which he read, explaining the composition of the rifle and gave operating instructions, including the method to be pursued to make the gun “safe”.
Immediately after the purchase, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park. He placed a live cartridge in the chamber and placed the gun on safety position. He traveled a good deal during the hours before the shooting and on one of two occasions, he discovered the gun off safety position. This occurred when he had come down a long hill covered with rocks and boulders. Heesen was not aware that the rifle moved from “safe to fire’ position at least twice before the shooting. Ten minutes before the accident began, he left the knoll and he was carrying the gun on his shoulder.
He later heard a rustle and saw a deer go between some trees. When he followed the deer, his left foot went down hard on the ground on one side of a log and his right foot slipped on the grass. This brought the rifle down and the rifle discharged, the bullet hitting appellant Lopez, who was nearby.
Lopez brought suit against Heesen for allegedly unlawfully assaulting him, thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds. He also included as party-defendant, the designer, manufacturer and seller of the rifle, Sears, for allegedly negligently designing and manufacturing the rifle bought by Heesen.
Defendants presented expert testimony on the general reputation of other firearms companies who use the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51. Lopez objected to this evidence on the ground that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case. He likewise objected on the introduction of testimony on the “poundage pressure” required to move the safety levers from safe to fire position on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality. Lastly, he objected to the introduction of opinion evidence regarding the design of the safety mechanism, on the ground that it was a subject which is within the province of the jury to determine.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not expert testimony on the general reputation of other firearms companies using the same safety device is material and relevant.
(2) Whether or not testimony on the “poundage pressure” required is relevant and material. (3) Whether or not the design of the safety mechanism was a proper subject of expert
testimony. RULING:
(1) The expert testimony is admissible. The allegations on the ultimate facts in issue involve whether the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent manufacture, in that the safety mechanism moved re4adily from “safe” to “fire”
position. This is an issue, the proper understanding of which, requires knowledge or experience and cannot be determined independently merely from deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge. Moreover, the conduct of others is proper evidence for a jury to consider, in determining whether the tendency of the thing is dangerous, defective, or the reverse. Considering these principles, the Court held that the testimony as to the reputation of other firearms companies using the same safety device is material and relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. (2) The testimony was introduced under Lopez’s contention that the Higgins model was
unsafe and thus, the issue arose as to the “poundage pressure’ required to move the safety lever from safe to fire. It was then proper for Sears to show the amount of pressure required to move the safety lever as this was relevant to the issue posed.
(3) Expert testimony is admissible because the expert testimony was upon the ultimate issue of whether or not the safety device was dangerous and defective. It was the proper subject of expert testimony. It does not usurp the functions of the jury as the latter may still reject these opinions. Said opinion evidence is not binding on the jury.
By: Frances Joanne D. Miranda
State vs Ball 339 S.w2d 783 (1960)
Relevance
FACTS:
Ball appeals from an order of the trial court, convicting him of robbery.
At about 2:30 in the afternoon, two colored men, one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase, the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the same day, at around 5:30 p.m., as John Krekeler was placing the rings and watches in the safe preparing for the closing of the store, the two men who had been in the store at 2:30, entered the store. They were immediately recognized by Krekeler, especially the taller man’s narrow-brimmed tall hat, brown jacket, gray short and particularly a scar on his face.
The shorter man walked behind the counter and as Krekeler tried to intercept him, the man hit Krekeler on the face using a 0.38 long barreled pistol. With the gun on his back, the two men directed Krekeler to go to the watch repair department, then to the restroom, where he was positioned, facing the wall. Thereafter, he could hear jewelry being dumped in a bag, and the “jingle” of the car register. After hearing the door slam, Krekeler call the police. He reported that the two men took $4,455.21 worth of watched and rings, and $140 in cash.
Three weeks later, Ball was arrested by Officers Powell and Ballard while walking in the street. Ball shoved Officer Powell over and ran down the avenue. The officers ran after him and he was only pacified when the Officer’s fired a bullet which fell in his back. Ball claims that this evidence of “flight” was not material or relevant, since it was too remote from the date of the robbery (3 weeks later), to indicate a consciousness of guilt. Ball likewise
objected to the admissibility of the following articles found in his person during the arrest on grounds of immateriality and irrelevance: a brown felt hat, a brownish windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoes, and $258.02 in currency and two pennies.
ISSUES(S)
(1) Whether or not the evidence of flight is inadmissible for reason of remoteness to the time of the commission of the crime.
(2) Whether or not the articles found in the person of the accused at the time of his arrest are inadmissible for being irrelevant and immaterial.
RULING:
(1) Unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed commission of the crime is a relevant circumstance. The remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.
(2) In identifying Ball, Krekeler was impressed with and remembered the brown ensemble, particularly the tall brown hat. These items were of course relevant and admissible in evidence and there is no objection to them.
However, the money is inadmissible. The proof of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of the offense. However, Krekeler was not able to identify the money or any of the items on Ball’s person as having come from the jewelry store so that in fact, they were not admissible in evidence. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here, nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 and in all these circumstances “the mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of the money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable.”
By: Frances Joanne D. Miranda C. COMPETENCE:
1. SECTION 3, RULE 128
SECTION 3. Admissibility of evidence. – Evidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
2. EXCLUSIONARY RULES UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
SEC. 2, Article III
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3. Article III
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
(b) SECTION 12, ARTICLE III
Section 12, Article III
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
(c) SECTION 17, ARTICLE III SEC. 17.
3. STATUTORY RULES OF EXCLUSION
1. SECTION 201, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1997
SEC. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. - An
instrument, document or paper which is required by law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.
(b) RA 1405, LAW ON SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS
LAW ON SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS Republic Act No.1405, as amended
AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION AND
PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR
Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give
encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country.
Sec 2.1 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions
in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except when the examination is made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank and is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, or when the examination is made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank, or upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (As amended by PD No.1792, January 16, 1981)
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a bank to disclose
to any person other than those mentioned in Section Two hereof, or for an independent auditor hired by a bank to conduct its regular audit to disclose to any
person other than a bank director, official or employee authorized by the bank, any information concerning said deposits. (As amended by PD No.1792)
Sec 4. All acts or parts of Acts, Special Charters, Executive Orders, Rules
and Regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Sec 5. Any violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to
an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
Sec 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
APPROVED, September 9, 1955.
__________
1 This Section and Section 3 were both amended by Pres. Decree No.1792, issued January
16, 1981, PD 1792 was expressly repealed by Sec. 135 of Rep. Act No.7653, approved June 14, 1993. The original Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.1405 are hereby reproduced for reference, as follows: "Sec. 2 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written per- mission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials. or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation," "Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits."
( c ) R.A. NO. 4200 WIRETAPPING ACT
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
SECTION 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid,
permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
SECTION 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it
unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear,
intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
SECTION 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or accordingly amended.
SECTION 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
CASES:
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
Competence (Anti-Wiretapping Act)
FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Montebon, were in the living room of complainant’s residence, discussing the terms from the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed against Laconico. After they decided on the conditions, Atty. Pintor made a phone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned Atty. Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case.
When Atty. Pintor called, Laconico requested Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Twenty minutes later, Atty. Pinto called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico agreed. An amount of P5,000 as settlement money was agreed upon. He was instructed to give the money to give the money to Atty. Pintor’s wife at the office of the Department of Public Highways. However, Laconico insisted that Atty. Pintor himself should receive the money. However, when Atty. Pintor received the money, he was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
On the following day, Atty. Gaanan executed an affidavit that he heard complainant Atty. Pintor demand P8,000 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit to the complaint for robbery/extortion which he filed against Atty. Pintor. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without Atty. Pintor’s consent, Atty. Pintor charged Atty. Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200).
Atty. Gaanan and Laconico were found guilty by the trial court. The decision was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) stating that the “extension telephone” which was used to overhear the telephone conversation was covered in the term “device” as provided in R.A. No. 4200.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited device in Section 1 of the Anti-Wiretapping Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
RULING:
The main issue revolves around the meaning of the phrase “any other device or arrangement.” The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the
spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other device enumerated un Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
The phrase “device or arrangement”, although not exclusive to that enumerated, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more.
An extension telephone is not among such device or arrangements covered by Section 1 of R.A No. 4200.
By: Frances Joanne D. Miranda
Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of Appeals 235 SCRA 111 (1994)
Competence (Anti-Wiretapping Act)
FACTS:
Rafael Ortañez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against his wife Teresita Salcedo-Ortañez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of Teresita. Among the exhibits offered by Rafael were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when Rafael allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
Teresita objected to Rafael’s oral offer of the said tapes. However, the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Quezon City admitted the tapes into evidence. Teresita filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA upheld the lower court’s order for two reasons: (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. hey are admissible depending on how they are presented and offered and how the trial judge utilizes them and (2) Certiorari is inappropriate since the order admitting the tape into evidence is interlocutory. The order should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and through the special civil action of certiorari.
Hence, Teresita filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court (SC). ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not the recordings of Teresita’s phone conversations, made and obtained through wiretapping are admissible as evidence (not per se inadmissible)
(2) Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the appropriate remedy to question an order admitting the tapes into evidence
RULING:
(1) The tape recordings are inadmissible. Relevant provisions of R.A. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act) provides that:
Section 1: It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all parties to any
private conversation or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone, or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described x x x
Section 4. Any communication, or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained, or secured by any person in violation of the preceding section of this Act shall not be admitted in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Hence, absent any clear showing that both parties consented to the recording, the inadmissibility of the tapes is mandatory under R.A. No. 4200
(2) Certiorari was the appropriate remedy. Generally, the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of a trial court. The proper remedy is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in the said appeal the grounds fro assailing the interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
By: Aaron Roi B. Riturban
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals 248 SCRA 590 (1995)
Competence (Anti-Wiretapping Act)
FACTS:
Ester Garcia filed a criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act) against Socorro Ramirez, for secretly taping their confrontation. Socorro filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay granted, agreeing that the facts charged did not constitute an offense under R.A. No. 4200 since the law refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. After which, Ester filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling of the lower court. Hence, Socorro filed this instant petition where she raised three ISSUES:
(2) That R.A. No. 4200 does not apply to the taping of the conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that R.A. 4200 only refers to unauthorized taping of a conversation of a person other than those involved in the conversation.
(3) That the substance or contents of the cnvesation must be alleged in the information; otherwise, the facts charged will not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 4200.
(4) That R.A. No. 4200 penalizes the taping of “private communication” not a “private conversation” and that, consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with Ester was not illegal under the said Act.
RULING:
(1) R.A. No. 4200 applies to recordings by one of the parties to the conversation.
authorized by all parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, the CA was correct in concluding that “even a person privy to a communication, who records his private conversation with another without knowledge of the latter, will qualify as a violator under R.A. No. 4200.” A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports such conclusion.
(2) The substance of the conversation need not be alleged in the information. The
nature of the communication is immaterial. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 As the Solicitor General pointed out, “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”
(3) “Private communication” includes “private conversation”. The word
communicate comes from the Latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart”. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes an act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation (“process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols”). These broad definitions are likely to include the confrontation between Socorro and Ester. Moreover, any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are put to rest by the fact that Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill used “communication” and “conversation” interchangeably.
II. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
A. RULE 129, SECTIONS 1-4;
RULE 129
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)
SECTION 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)
SECTION 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on the request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (n)
SECTION 4. Judicial Admissions. – An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
RULE 10, SECTION 8
SECTION 8. Effect of amended pleadings. An amended pleading
supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.
CASES:
1. JUDICIAL NOTICE
City of Manila vs. Garcia 19 SCRA 413 (1967)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
Finding that it was necessary to expand the school grounds of Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, Manila’s City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor’s directive, ordered the illegal occupants/squatters (defendants) to vacate the property contiguous to the school. The defendants refused to vacate, thus, prompting the City of Manila to file a suit to recover possession over the land. The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila favored the plaintiff.
Consequently, the squatters appealed and questioned the lower court’s finding that the city needs the premises for school purposes. The city’s evidence on this point was the certification of the Chairman Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. The certification recites that the amount of P100,000 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-63 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the elementary school. The said document was originally deemed inadmissible, but was, subsequently, admitted into evidence by the lower court. Hence, the defendants appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or
not the CFI of Manila had properly found that the City of Manila needs the premises for school purposes (considering that it had a contradictory stance regarding the admissibility of the evidence of the City on this point).
RULING:
The CFI of Manila properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. Such was done here. The defendants’ remedy was to bring the attention of the court to its contradictory stance. Not having done so, the Supreme Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. Anyway, elimination of the certification as evidence would not benefit the defendants. For in reversing his stand, the trial judge could have well taken – because he was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires that all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.
Baguio vs. . Vda de Jalagat 42 SCRA 337 (1971)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
GABRIEL BAGUIO filed for the quieting of title to real property against TEOFILA JALAGAT and her minor children with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Misamis Oriental. The Jalagats filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the present complaint is barred by a previous judgment rendered by the same court. The previous case involved practically the same property, the same cause of action, and the same parties, with Melecio Jalagat (Teofila’s deceased husband and predecessor in interest) as the defendant. The previous case was terminated with the court dismissing Baguio’s complaint.
Acting on the motion and taking judicial notice of its previous judgment, the lower court dismissed the present complaint on the ground of res judicata. Consequently, Baguio appealed the order of dismissal. He claimed that for the ground of res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI of Misamis Oriental was correct in finding that there was res
judicata by taking judicial notice of its previous judgment.
RULING:
THE CFI OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL WAS CORRECT IN TAKING JUDICIAL OF ITS PREVIOUS JUDGMENT. It ought to be clear even to the appellant that under the
circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly, such an order is not contrary to law. The Supreme Court quoted Chief Justice Morgan, who said: “Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not the previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration.”
By: Aaron Roi B Riturban
Prieto vs. Arroyo 14 SCRA 549 (1965)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
ZEFERINO ARROYO and GABRIEL PRIETO were registered owners of adjoining lots in Camarines Sur. After Zeferino died, his heirs had a new certificate of title registered in their names. Subsequently, the heirs discovered that the technical description set forth in their transfer certificate of title and in the original certificate of title did not conform with that embodied in the decision of the land registration court (which registered the land in Zeferino’s name), and was less in area by 157 square meters. They, therefore, filed a petition for the
correction of the said description in their titles. Thereafter, the court issued an order directing the correction of the technical description of the land covered by their title.
Gabriel filed a petition to annul the order granting the correction claiming that the 157 square meters were unduly taken from his lot. However, his petition was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thus, Gabriel filed a second petition containing similar allegations. As expected, the court dismissed his second petition on the ground of res judicata.
Hence, Gabriel appealed to the Supreme Court to question the dismissal of his second petition. He insisted that there was no res judicata since the dismissal of his first petition was erroneous. He claimed that the lower court should have not dismissed his first petition for failure to prosecute because “no ‘parole’ evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged being part of the records land registration proceedings, which were well within the judicial notice and cognizance of the court.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Sur (in dismissing the first petition of Gabriel) erred in not taking judicial notice of the parts of the records of the land registration proceedings that would have supported Gabriel’s allegations, thus, making the dismissal for failure to prosecute erroneous.
RULING:
THE CFI OF CAMARINES SUR WAS CORRECT IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORDS THE LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of the cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or actually pending before the same judge. Besides, if Gabriel really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect. For failing to do so in the appropriate time, the dismissal of the first petition is now valid and binding on him. Thus, the dismissal on the ground of res judicata must be sustained.
By: Aaron Roi B Riturban
Yao-Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales 167 SCRA 736 (1988)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died intestate, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines. AIDA SY-GONZALES and the other children of Sy with Asuncion Gillego filed a petition for the settlement of his estate. YAO KEE filed her opposition to the petition claiming that she is the legitimate wife of Sy. The probate court sustained the validity of Yao’s marriage to Sy, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the lower court’s decision and held that the petitioner’s and Yao’s children were all of illegitimate status. The CA ruled that the marriage between Yao and Sy was not proven to be valid under the Chinese laws.
Hence, Yao filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court claiming that the CA erred in holding that the validity of the foreign marriage between Yao and Sy had not been proven. To support this contention, Yao claimed that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the Chinese laws on marriage which show the validity of her marriage to Sy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice of foreign laws (i.e. Chinese laws on marriage), thus, relieving Yao of her duty of proving the validity of her marriage under Chinese laws.
RULING:
COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS. Under the Philippine jurisprudence, to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. Though Yao may have established the fact of marriage, she has failed to prove the Chinese laws on marriage that would show the validity of her marriage to Sy.
Well-established is the rule that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws or customs. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. On this point, Yao cannot rely on a the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia (16 Phil. 137 (1910)) to prove her case. The ruling that case did not show that the court took judicial notice of Chinese laws on marriages. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the court did take judicial notice of Chinese laws or customs on foreign marriages in that case, Yao still failed to show that the law assumed to recognized in Sy Joc Lieng case (wherein the marriage was celebrated in 1847) was still applicable during the time of her marriage to Sy, which took place 84 years later. Hence, the CA was correct in considering that the validity of the marriage between Yao and Sy has not been established.
By: Aaron Roi B Riturban
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals 196 SCRA 650 (1991)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land of about 440 sq. meters in Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership was filed by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. After trial, the court ordered Tabuena to return the property to Tabernilla.
At the trial, it was found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. in 1926 to Tabernilla while they were in the United States. Upon Tabernilla’s return to the Philippines in 1934, Damasa Timtiman, mother of Juan Peralta acting upon Juan’s instructions conveyed the land to Tabernilla. Upon her request, she was supposedly allowed by Tabernilla to remain in the said lot provided she paid the realty taxes on the property which she did do so. She remained on the lot until her death and, thereafter, the property was taken possession by Tabuena. This complaint was filed after a demand for Tabuena to vacate was made.
The trial court rejected his defense that the subject of the sale was a different lot and that he was the absolute owner of the said property by virtue of the inheritance he acquired
from his deceased parent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, rejecting therein his claim that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of Exhibits “A”, “B”, & “C’ which had been marked but not formally offered in evidence by Tabernilla.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not it was proper for the CA and trial court properly took cognizance of the exhibits even if they were not formally offered during trial?
(2) Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Tabuena’s testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it?
RULING:
The SC reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Tabuena.
(1) No. The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits “A,” “B,” and “C” were marked at pre-trial but this was only for identifying them and not for making a formal offer. It is during the trial that the party presenting the marked evidence decides whether to offer the evidence or not. In case they don’t, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.
An exception was given in People vs. Napat-a, wherein the court ruled that evidence even if not offered can be admitted against the adverse party if: first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. In this case, these requirements had not been satisfied. The documents were indeed testified to but there was no recital of its contents having been read into the records.
(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals conceded that as a general rule, “courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such events have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.” Nevertheless, it applied the exception that “in the absence of objection,” “with the knowledge of the opposing party,” or “at the request or with the consent of the parties,” the case is clearly referred to or “the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives” and admitted as part of the record of the case then pending. These conditions however, were not established in this case. Tabuena was completely unaware that the court had taken judicial notice of Civil Case no. 1327. Thus, the said act by the trial court was improper.
People vs. Godoy 250 SCRA 676 (1995)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC in view of the death sentence imposed upon Danny Godoy, who was charged in two separate informations with rape and another for kidnapping with serious illegal detention.
Complainant Mia Taha alleged that Godoy, her Physics Teacher and a married man raped her first on Jan. 21, 1994 in her cousin’s boarding house wherein upon entering the back door, Godoy pointed a knife at her. As Godoy removed her panties and brought out his penis to rape her, a knife was pointed at her neck. As such, she was not able to resist. The next day, Godoy came by their house and asked the permission of her parents if she can join him in soliciting funds, since Mia was a candidate for Ms. Palawan National School (PNS). Mia’s parents allowed her to go with Godoy and she was allegedly brought to the Sunset Garden Motel where she was repeatedly raped again. After three days, they transferred to Edward’s subdivision where she was kept in a lodging house and was again raped.
During this time, a police blotter had already been placed for the missing Mia. She was later released by Godoy after a certain Naem interceded and only after her parents agreed to settle the case. It was after Mia’s return that her parents accompanied her to a medico-legal which found lacerations in her vagina concluding that “she just had sexual intercourse.” She and her mother Helen went to the police and executed sworn statements stating that the accused Godoy had raped and abducted Mia.
Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex with her and that they indeed stayed in Sunset Gardens and in Edward’s Subdivision, but it was because they were lovers and that Mia had consented to their having sex. To support his claim that they were lovers, he presented two letters supposedly delivered to him in the provincial jail while he was detained by Mia’s cousin Lorna. There Mia explained that it was her parents who forced her to testify against him.
The delivery of the letter was denied by Lorna but the defense presented the provincial jail guard on duty on the supposed date of the delivery and testified that indeed Lorna had visited Godoy on said date. Several witnesses were also presented including two former teachers of Mia who knew the handwriting on the two said letters as belonging to Mia having been their former student and where thus familiar with her handwriting particularly those made in her test papers. Other witnesses were presented by the defense attesting that they saw the two together in a manner that was affectionate and cordial, prior to the said “kidnapping” and even during such.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused
RULING:
The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy .
Three guiding principles in the appellate review of the evidence of the prosecution for the crime of rape, namely: a) while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind
that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent; b) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. In taking judicial notice, the Supreme Court said that it is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim of the complainant of having been threatened appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge. But it had not been duly corroborated by other evidence nor proved that the accused indeed always carried a knife.
The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas (such as in Palawan) young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. It could precisely be that complainant’s mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter’s indiscretion and escape wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
By: Frank John Abdon
BPI-Savings vs. Court of Tax Appeals 330 SCRA 507 (2000)
Judicial Notice
FACTS:
This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing BPI’s tax withheld for the year 1989. BPI’s 1989 Income Tax Return (ITR) shows that it had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in this present controversy. However, BPI declared in the same 1989 ITR that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
On October 11, 1990, BPI filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00 with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount to its 1990 Annual ITR or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year. Without waiting for the CIR to act on the claim for refund, BPI filed a petition for review with the CTA, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00.
The CTA dismissed BPI’s petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual ITR for 1990 to establish the fact that BPI had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 to its 1990 income tax liability. BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CTA. The CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition.
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner called the attention of the Court to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897 involving its claim for refund for the year 1990 wherein the Tax Court held that “petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990.” Respondent, however, urges the Supreme Court not to do so.
