“BROTHERHOOD” LABOR UNITY MOVEMENT vs HON. ZAMORA (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioners-members of “Brotherhood Labor Unit Movement of the Philippines” (BLUM), worked as “cargadores” or “pahinante” since 1961 at the SMC Plant. Sometime in January 1969, the petitioner workers – numbering 140 organized themselves and engaged in union activities.
Believing that they are entitled to overtime and holiday pay, the petitioners aired their gripes and grievances but it was not heeded by the respondents. One of the union member was dismissed from work. Hence, the petitioners filed a complaint of unfair labor practice against respondent SMC on the ground of illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, SMC argued that the complainant are not or have never been their employees but they are the employees of the Guaranteed Labor Contractor, an independent labor contracting firm
Labor Arbiter Nestor Lim rendered a decision in favor of the complainants which was affirmed by the NLRC
On appeal, the Secretary set aside the NLRC ruling stressing the absence of an employer-employee relationshipIssue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent San Miguel Corporation
HELD: YES
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It is the called "control test" that is the most important element
In the CAB, petitioners worked continuously and exclusively for an average of 7 years for the company. Considering the length of time that the petitioners have worked, there is justification to conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary or desirable in the usual business of trade of the respondent. Hence, petitioners are considered “regular employees.”
Even assuming that there is a contract of employment executed between SMC and the said labor contractor, the court ruled that Guaranteed and Reliable Labor contractors have neither substantial capital nor investment to qualify as an independent contractor under the law. The premises, tools and equipments
used by the petitioners in their jobs are all supplied by the respondent SMC. It is only the manpower or labor force which the alleged contractors supply, suggesting the existence of a "labor only" contracting scheme prohibited by law
It is important to emphasize that that in a truly independent contractor-contractee relationship, the fees are paid directly to the manpower agency in lump sum without indicating or implying that the basis of such lump sum is the salary per worker multiplied by the number of workers assigned to the company.
In the CAB, the alleged independent contractors were paid a lump sum representing only the salaries the workers were entitled to, arrived at by adding the salaries of each worker which depend on the volume of work they had accomplished individually. Therefore, there is no independent contractor-contractee relationship.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.
HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY vs GULMATICO (1994)
FACTS:
Respondent-Union, the National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trades, filed an action against petitioner Hawaiian Phil Co. for claims under RA 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952). Respondent Union alleged that they have never availed of the benefits due them under the law.
Under the said act: “the proceeds of any increase in participation granted to planters under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborers in the following proportions. 60% of the increase participation for the laborers and 40% for the planters.
Petitioner argued that respondent Labor Arbiter Gulmatico has no jurisdiction over the case considering their case does not fall under those enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code which provides the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Further, petitioner contends that it has no ER-EE relationship with the respondent sugar workers and that respondent union has no cause of action because it is the planters-employers who is liable to pay the worker’s share under LOI No. 854.Issue1: Whether public respondent Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against petitioner
HELD: NO
While jurisdiction over controversies involving agricultural workers has been transferred from the Court of Agrarian Relations to the Labor Arbiters under the Labor Code, said transferred jurisdiction is however, not without limitations. The controversy must
fall under one of the cases enumerated under the Labor Code which arise out of or are in connection with an ER-EE relationship
In the CAB, there is no ER-EE relationship between petitioner company and respondent union. Hence, respondent Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against petitioner.
Issue1: Whether respondent union has a cause of action
HELD: NO
To have a cause of action, the claimant must show that he has a legal right and the respondent a correlative duty in respect thereof, which the latter violated by some wrongful act or omission.
In the instant case, it would show that the payment of the worker’s share is liability of the planters-employers, and not of the petitioner milling company. It is disputed that petitioner milling company has already distributed to its planters their respective shares. Hence, it has fulfilled its part and has nothing more to do with the subsequent contribution by the planters of the worker’s share.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED. DAYAG vs HON. CENIZARES, JR. (1998) FACTS:
Petitioners were hired to work as tower crane operators by one Alfredo Young, a building contractor doing business in the name of Young’s construction. In 1991, they were transferred to Cebu City to work for Young’s Shoemart Cebu Project. Petitioner William Dayag asked permission to go to Manila to attend family matters and was allowed to do so but was not paid for January 23-30 due to his accountability for the loss of certain construction tools. The other petitioners left due to harassment by Young. Thereafter, petitioners banded together and filed a complaint against Young before the NCR Arbitration Branch NLRC which was assigned to Labor Arbiter Cenizares.
Young filed a “Motion to transfer the case” to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region VII of the NLRC. He contended that the case should be filed in Cebu City because there is where the workplace of the petitioners.
Petitioners opposed the same, arguing that all of them are from Metro Manila and that they could not afford trips to Cebu. Besides, they claimed that respondent’s main office is in Corinthian Garden in QC.
Labor Arbiter Cenizares GRANTED Young’s “motion to transfer the case in Cebu.”
Petitioners appealed to NLRC but it was dismissed. Hence, they filed a MFR and this timethe Commission SET ASIDE it’s previous decision and remanded the case to the original arbitration branch of the NCR for further proceedings.
Young filed his own MFR and the NLRC reinstated it’s first decision directing the transfer of the case to Cebu City.
Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained Young’s motion to transfer
HELD: NO
The SC ruled that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not technicalities. Petitioners were able to file an opposition on the “motion to transfer case” which was considered by Labor Arbiter Cenizares. Hence, there is no showing that they have been unduly prejudiced by the motion’s failure to give notice and hearing.
However, Young cannot derive comfort from this petition. The SC held that the question of venue relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case. This is to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witness and to promote the ends of justice under the principle that “the State shall afford protection to labor.” The reason for this is that the worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party, the nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other party is not to be given the choice of another competent agency sitting in another place as this will unduly burden the former
In the instant case, the ruling specifying the NCR Arbitration Branch as the venue of the present action cannot be considered oppressive to Young because his residence in Corinthian Gardens also serves as his correspondent office. Hearing the case in Manila would clearly expedite the proceedings and bring speedy resolution to the instant case.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES vs LAZARO (1988)
FACTS:
The Commercial Bank and Trust Company entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Commercial Bank and Trust Company Union, representing the file and rank of the bank with a membership of over 1,000 employees
In 1980, the union, together with the National Union of Bank EEs submitted to bank management proposals for the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement. The following day, however, the bank suspended negotiations with the union. The bank entered into a merger with BPI whichassumed all assets and liabilities.
The Union went to the CFI Manila, presided over by respondent Judge Lazaro, and filed a complaint for specific performance, damages, and preliminary injunction against private respondents.
Private Respondent filed a “Motion to Dismiss” on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint partook of unfair labor practice dispute and jurisdiction over which is vested in the labor arbiter.Issue: Whether courts may take cognizance of claims for damages arising from labor controversy
HELD: NO
The SC sustained the dismissal of the case and held that the act complained of involves collecting bargaining which is categorized to be an unfair labor practice. Under the Labor Code, “all cases involving unfair labor practices shall be under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.”
As correctly held by the respondent court, an unfair labor practice controversy is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not necessarily by the nature of action. In the CAB, PD No. 442, as amended by Batas Blg. 70, has vested jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiters, a jurisdiction the courts may not assume.
WHEREFORE, PETITION DENIED DY vs NLRC (1986) FACTS:
Private Respondent Carlito H. Vailoces was the manager of the Rural Bank of Ayungon (Negros Oriental). He was also a director and stockholder of the bank.
In 1983, a special stockholder’s meeting was called for the purpose of electing the members of the bank’s Board of Directors. Petitioner Lorenzo Dy was elected president. Vailoces was not re-elected as bank manager.
Vailoces filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Ministry of Labor and Employment against Lorenzo Dy asserting that Dy, after obtaining control of the majority stock of the bank, called an illegal stockholder’s meeting and elected a Board of Directors controlled by him; and that he was illegally dismissed as manager, without giving him the opportunity to be heard first. Dy denied the charge of illegal dismissal and pointed out that Vailoces’ position was an elective one, and he was not re-elected as bank manager because of the Board’s loss of confidence in him brought about by his absenteeism and negligence
in the performance of his duties
The Executive Labor Arbiter ruled that Vailoces was illegally dismissed because he was not afforded due process of law. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter because of the appeal of the petitioners was filed late.Issue: Whether the election of the Directors were validly held
HELD: YES
Under PD No. 902-A, “Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations, are explicitly declared to be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.”
In the CAB, it shows that the controversy between the parties is intra-corporate in nature because it revolves around the election of directors, officers or managers of the Rural Bank of Ayungon, the relation between and among its stockholders, and between them and the corporation. It is well settled that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.
Therefore, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are void for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED ESPINO vs NLRC and PAL (1995) FACTS:
Petitioner Leslie W. Espino was the Exec. Vice President-Chief Operating Officer of respondent Phil Airlines (PAL) when his service was terminated in 1990 as a result of the findings of the panels created by then President Corazon C. Aquino to investigate the administrative charges filed against him. It appears that petitioner and other several senior officers of PAL were charged for their involvement in 4 cases, labeled as “Goldair,” “Robelle,” “Kabash/Primavera,” and “Middle East.”
The PAL Board of Directors issued separate resolutions wherein Espino was considered resign from the service effective immediately for loss of confidence
Espino filed a complaint for “illegal dismissal” against PAL with the NLRC, Arbitration Branch, NCR. PAL argued that board resolutions cannot be reviewed by the NLRC and that the recourse of the petitioner Espino should have been addressed by way of appeal, to the OP.
Labor Arbiter Cresencio J. Ramos rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Espinois null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter as it is the SEC, and not the NLRC which has jurisdiction over involving dismissal or removal of corporate officers.
NLRC promulgated a resolution and this time ruled in favor of PAL on the ground of lack of jurisdiction Petitioner Espino contended that it is the NLRC that has jurisdiction over the case as it involves the termination of a regular employee and involves claim for backwages and other benefits and damages
Issue: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the petitioner for illegal dismissal HELD: NO
Under P.D. No. 902-A, it is the Securities and Exchange Commission and not the NLRC that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the removal from employment of corporate officers. Under the said decree, the SEC has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving “Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.”
It has been ruled that a corporate officer’s dismissal is always a corporate act and/or an intra-corporate controversy and that nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action. Evidently, this intra-corporate controversy must be place under the specialized competence and expertise of the SEC. The fact that petitioner sought payment of his backwages, other benefits, as well as damages and attorney's fees in his complaint for illegal dismissal will not operate to prevent the SEC from exercising its jurisdiction under PD 902-A. As to the contention of Espino that PAL is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the NLRC, it is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised anytime even on appeal.
WHERFORE, PETITION IS DENIED
MAINLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. vs MOVILLA (1995)
FACTS:
Ernest Movilla, who was a CPA during his lifetime, was hired by Mainland in 1977. Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of Administrative Officer. He has a monthly salary of P4,700.00/month and he was registered with SSS as an employee of petitioner corporation
In 1991, The DOLE conducted a routine inspection on petitioner corporation and found thatit committed some irregularities in the conduct of its business. On the basis of its findings, DOLE ordered petitioner corporation to pay its 13 employees, which included Movilla, an amount representing their salaries, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay differentials, unpaid wages and 13th month pay. All the employees
listed in the DOLE’s order were paid by petitioner except Movilla.
Movilla filed a case against petitioner with the DOLE in Davao City. However, in 1992, Movilla died while the case was being tried. Hence, he was substituted by his heirs, private respondents herein.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the controversy is intra-corporate in nature hence it is the SEC who has jurisdiction over and not the Labor Arbiter.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and ruled that the case was one which involved a labor dispute, thus the NLRC has jurisdiction to resolve the caseIssue: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the controversy and not the SEC
HELD: YES
The NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders and the corporation does not necessarily place the dispute within the jurisdiction of SEC. In order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that every conflict between corporation and its stockholders can only be resolve by the SEC.
In the CAB, the claim for unpaid wages and separation pay involves a labor dispute. It does not involve an intra-corporate matter, even when it is between a stockholder and a corporation. It relates to an ER-EE relationship which is distinct from the corporate relationship of one with the other. Therefore, since the complaint of Movilla involves a labor dispute, it is the NLRC which has jurisdiction over the CAB.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DENIED
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY vs HON. MARTINEZ (1982)
FACTS:
Respondent Abraham Tumala, Jr. was salesman petitioner company in Davao City. In the annual “Sumakwel” contest conducted by the company, he was declared the winner of the “Lapu-Lapu Award”
for his performance as top salesman of the year, an award which entitled him to a prize of a house and lot. Petitioner company, despite demands, have unjustly refused to deliver said prize.
It was alleged that in 1980, petitioner company, in a manner oppressive to labor and without prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor, arbitrarily and illegally terminated his employment. Hence, Tumala filed a complaint in the CFI Davao and prayed that petitioner be ordered to deliver his prize of house and lot or its cash equivalent, and to pay his back salaries and separation benefits.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent Tumala maintains that the controversy is triable exclusively by the court of general jurisdictionIssue: Whether it is the court of general jurisdiction and not the Labor Arbiter that has exclusive jurisdiction over the recovery of unpaid salaries, separation and damages
HELD: NO
SC ruled that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt.
Under the Labor Code, the NLRC has the exclusive jurisdiction over claims, money or otherwise, arising from ER-EE relations, except those expressly excluded therefrom. The claim for the said prize unquestionable arose from an ER-EE relation and, therefore, falls within the coverage of P.D. 1691, which speaks of “all claims arising from ER-EE relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code. To hold that Tumala’s claim for the prize should be passed upon by the regular courts of justice would be to sanction split jurisdiction and multiplicity of suits which are prejudicial to the orderly of administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED. SAN MIGUEL CORP. vs NLRC (1988) FACTS:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) sponsored an Innovation Program which grant cash rewards to all “SMC employees who submit to the corporation ideas and suggestions found to beneficial to the corporation. Private Respondent Rustico Vega, who is a mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC submitted an innovation proposal which supposed to eliminate certain defects in the quality and taste of the product “San Miguel Beer Grande.”
Petitioner Corporation did not accept the saidproposal and refused Mr. Vega’s subsequent demands for cash award under the innovation program. Hence, Vega filed a complaint with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment in Cebu. He argued that his proposal had been accepted by the methods analyst and was implemented by the SMC and it finally solved the problem of the Corporation in the production of Beer Grande.
Petitioner denied of having approved Vega’s proposal. It stated that said proposal was turned down for “lack of originality” and the same, even if implemented, could not achieve the desire result. Further, petitioner Corporation alleged that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the claim of Vega is “not a necessary incident of his employment” and does not fall under Article 217 of the Labor Code. However, in a gesture of compassion and to show the government’s concern for the working man, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay Vega P2,000 as “financial assistance.” Both parties assailed said decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered SMC to pay complainant the amount of P60,000Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter and the Commission has jurisdiction over the money claim filed by private respondent
HELD: NO
The Labor Arbiter and the Commission has no jurisdiction over the money claim of Vega.
The court ruled that the money claim of private respondent Vega arose out of or in connection with his employment with petitioner. However, it is not enough to bring Vega’s money claim within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
In the CAB, the undertaking of petitioner SMC to grant cash awards to employees could ripen into an enforceable contractual obligation on the part of petitioner SMC under certain circumstances. Hence, the issue whether an enforceable contract had arisen between SMC and Vega, and whether it has been breached, are legal questions that labor legislations cannot resolved because it’s recourse is the law on contracts.
Where the claim is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement BUT by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and NLRC.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED SUARIO vs BPI (1989)
FACTS:
Petitioner Leonardo D. Suario was the head of the loan section of respondent BPI in 1976. During his employment he pursued his studies of law with the consent of the BPI
Sometime in March 1976, Suario verbally requested the then VP and Branch Manager, Mr. Armando N. Guilatico, for a 6-month leave of absence without pay in order for him to take the pre-bar review in Manila. Mr. Guilatico informed Suario that there would be no problem as to the requested leave of absence. Sometime in May 1976, Suario received a verbal notice from the new Branch Manager, Mr. Vicente Casino, that he was approved only a 30 day LOA. However, Mr Guilatico, then assigned in Head Office as VP advised Mr. Casino to inform Suario to avail the 30-day LOA and proceed to Manila since the request would be ultimately granted. Suario availed the 30-day LOA and proceeded to Manila. During the 1stweek of August, he received a letter ordering him to report back for work since his request was disapproved. He decided not to report back because of the considerable expenses already incurred in Manila. Hence, he received a application for a clearance to terminate on the ground of resignation/or abandonment. Suario failed to file his opposition because he was busy taking up the review
During the 1st week of December 1976, Suariowent to respondent BPI but was verbally informed that he was already dismissed. He wrote a letter to the respondent bank requesting for a written and formal advise as to his real status. The lawyers of BPI replied that his services is terminated. Therefore, Suario filed a complaint for separation pay, damages and attorney’s fees against the BPI on the ground that he was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter ordered BPI to pay Suario’s claim for separation pay. His claim for damages and attorney’s fee were dismissed for lack of merit On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
Issue1: Whether NLRC has no authority to entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages
HELD:NO
P.D. 1691, a decree which substantially reenacted Article 217 of the Labor Code in its original form, nullified P.D. 1367 and restored to the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from ER-EE relationship. Issue2: Whether petitioner Suario is entitled to his claim for moral damages
HELD: NO
Although it is already settled that Labor Arbiters are allowed to award moral and other forms of damages arising from ER-EE relations, it is consistently ruled that in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded
The SC did not find any bad faith or fraud on the part of the bank officials who denied the petitioner’s request for 6 months’ leave of absence without pay. He was merely given personal assurances which could be reconsidered in later developments. There is no evidence that they meant to deceive the petitioner. Therefore, the fact that petitioner’s request was denied, does not entitle him to damages.
WHEREFORE, PETITION DENIED.
SOCO vs MERCANTILE CORP. OF DAVAO (1987) FACTS:
Respondent Mercantile Corp is engaged in the sale and distribution of Ice Cream in Davao. Petitioner, who was employed as driver of respondent’s delivery van, was the President MERCO Employees Labor Union, an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).
An investigation was conducted due to reports that Soco was carrying on his union activities during working hours. It appears that on January 1979, Soco was ordered to deliver ice cream at Imperial Hotel and Your Goody Mart, but he deviated from his usual route and went to his co-employee, who was then off duty. The personnel officer advised Soco to report to his office to explain his unauthorized deviation but Soco did not comply. MERCO wrote to FFW asking for a grievance conference but Soco refused to attend in his belief that such in unnecessary. Hence, MERCO suspended Soco for 5 days for violation of Company Rule No. 19(a).
On February 13, 1979, Soco, after making deliveries of ice cream, went to the Office of the SPFL Union. The Manager of MERCO saw the company vehicle parked along the street. He called two of his co-employees and took out the rotor of the van. When Soco came out of the building, he was unable to start the engine and called for company assistance. Again, he was advised to report to the office to explain but refused to do so. He also refused to attend in the grievance conference. Soco filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against MERCO alleging that the 5 days suspension imposed on him was on account of his union activities. On the other hand, MERCO filed an “application for clearance to terminate the services of Soco.” These 2 cases were consolidated and tried jointly as agreed by the contending parties The Regional Director granted MERCO’s application to terminate employment of petitioner and dismissed the Soco’s complaint for unfair labor practice
On appeal, the Deputy Minister of Labor affirmed
Petitioner Soco argued that under Policy No. 6 of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), the Regional Director has no jurisdiction to hear and decide unfair labor practice cases because such belongs to the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office of the MOLE. In short, such cases should be first resolved by the Labor Arbiter and not the Regional Director. Furthermore, Soco asserts that the Deputy Minister of Labor violated the constitutional provision of security of tenure of employees and that assuming that he violated the company rule, he cannot be dismissed because his violation only minimal and did not hamper the operations of MERCO.Issue1: Whether the Regional Director has no authority to decide the unfair labor practice cases HELD1: NO
After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it’s too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or the power of the court.
In the CAB, in the initial hearing conducted by the Regional Director, it was agreed by the parties to consolidate the 2 cases considering that both cases concern the same parties and the issues involved are interrelated. Petitioner Soco obviously accepted the jurisdiction of the Regional Director by presenting his evidence. By having asked for affirmative relief, without challenging the Regional Director's power to hear and try his complaint for unfair labor practice, he cannot rightfully now challenge the resolution made in said cases by the same Director, based on the latter's alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Issue2: Whether petitioner can avail the security of tenure
HELD2:
It is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. A rule prohibiting employees from using company vehicles for private purpose without authority from management is, from our viewpoint, a reasonable one.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that petitioner has, as he says, been employed with petitioner Company for eighteen (18) years. On this singular consideration, the Court deems it proper to afford some equitable relief to petitioner due to the past services rendered by him to MERCO. Thus, it is but appropriate that petitioner should be given by respondent MERCO, separation pay, equivalent to one month salary for every year of his service to said Company.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DENIED but MERCO is nevertheless, ordered to grant Soco his separation pay.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs NLRC (1993) FACTS:
Petitioner DOA and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said government entity. In September 13, 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13thmonth pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DOA and the Sultan Security Agency before the Regional Arbitration Branch in Cagayan De Oro City
The Labor Arbiter found DOA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Agency for the payment of money claim of the guards
The Labor Arbiter issued a “Writ of Execution” commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the DOA and Sultan. The City Sheriff levied on execution 3 motor vehicles of the DOA
Petitioner DOA filed a “petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction” with the NLRC Cagayan De Oro. It argued that the writ of execution was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the DOA. Hence, its decision was null and void. It also pointed out that the attachment of its property would jeopardize its governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good
NLRC --- dismissed the petition for injunction for lack of basis and a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of 2 months but not extendible.
DOA charges NLRC for grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. It argued that money claims against the Department falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Further, the DOA asserts that the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.NLRC, on the other hand, argue that petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency
Issue: Whether the DOA can be sued HELD:
Under the Constitution, it says that “the State cannot be sued without its consent.” This simply means that a sovereign is exempt from suit on the ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. This doctrine is also called “the royal prerogative of dishonesty” because it grants the State the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply
invoking its non-suability
This rule is not really absolute for it does not say that state may not be sued under any circumstances. The State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or special law. On the other hand, Implied consent is when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract
In the CAB, the claims of the security guards arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Under Act No. 3083, a general law, the State consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED
HAGONOY WATER DISTRICT vs NLRC (1988) FACTS:
Private Respondent Dante Villanueva was employed as service foreman by petitioner Hagonoy when he was indefinitely suspended and thereafter dismissed for abandonment of work and conflict of interest Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and underpayment of wages and emergency cost of living allowance against Hagonoy with the Ministry of Labor and Employment in San Fernando, Pampanga
Petitioner Hagonoy moved for dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Being government entity, its personnel are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. And the protests concerning the lawlessness of dismissal from service fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on favor of Villanueva
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. A “Writ of Execution” was issued by the Labor Arbiter to garnish petitioner Hagonoy’s deposits with the planters Development Bank. Hagonoy filed a “Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction”. NLRC denied the application.
Issue: Whether local water districts are GOCC whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law
HELD: YES
The Labor Arbiter, in asserting that it has jurisdiction over the employees of Hagonoy, relied on P.D. No. 198, known as “Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973” which exempts employees of water districts from the
application of the Civil Service Law. However, the Labor Arbiter failed to take into account that P.D. 1479 wiped away the said exemption
Moreover, the NLRC relied upon Article 9, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “[T]he Civil Service embraces ... government owned or controlled corporations with original charters.”
At the time the dispute in the CAB arose, and at the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision (which is on March 17, 1986), the applicable law is that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to render a decision that he in fact rendered. By the time the NLRC rendered its decision (August 20, 1987), the 1987 Constitution has already come into effect. The SC believes that the 1987 Constitution does not operate retroactively as to confer jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to render a decision, which was before outside the scope of its competence.
Therefore, a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter without jurisdiction over the case is a complete nullity, vesting no rights and imposing no liabilities. Villanueva, if he so wishes, may refile this complaint in an appropriate
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED
Facts:
Petitioner was dismissed from work by private respondents who are owners of Vega & Co., private recruitment agency, with assignment at respondent PKI. He filed a complaint for reinstatement and backwages with the DOLE in Cagayan de Oro City. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Sadol and ordered respondents to pay petitioner’s separation pay “at one month for every year of service.” Both parties appealed but respondent’s appeal was filed out of time. The appeal of respondent was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Issue: Whether the respondent has lost the right to appeal
HELD: YES
A party, who failed to appeal on time from a decision of the Labor Abiter to the NLRC, may still participate in a separate appeal timely filed by the adverse party by a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC decision. In the CAB, there is no question that respondents failed to file a timely appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, having lost the right to appeal, the respondent may choose to file a Motion for Reconsideration instead.
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC and B. Aricayos (1998)
Facts:
P. respondent was dismissed from work by petitioner for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Hence, a complaint was filed for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Petitioner argued that respondent was not its employee. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship between the parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Held: YES
The Supreme Court clarified and stressed that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment is that the special civil action of certiorari was and still the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be availed of only under compelling and exceptional circumstances.
To further explain, (1) the way to review NLRC decision is through the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; (2) the jurisdiction of such action belongs both to the SC and CA; but (3) in line with the doctrine of hierarchy, of courts, the petition should be initially presented to the lower court of the two courts, that is the Court of Appeals.
Sunshine Transportation Inc. vs NLRC and R. Santos (1996)
Facts:
P. respondent Santos was dismissed from work as a bus driver by Petitioner for failing to submit a written explanation why he failed to report for his scheduled trip. Respondent filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner and dismissed the complaint. This was affirmed by the NLRC but granted Santps money claims. Unsatisfied with the decision, petitioner elevated the
case to the SC charging the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether the petitioner may avail the special civil action for certiorari?
Held: NO
A petition for certiorari should be preceded by exhaustion of administrative remedies. Under said doctrine, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special action for certiorari may be availed of. In the case at bench, the petitioner make a claim that it filed a motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision before it came to us through this action.
Midas Touch Food Corp. vs NLRC and Iris Fe Isaac (1996)
Facts:
Respondent Iris Fe Isaac was dismissed as operations manager by petitioner for alleged lack of self confidence. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter which rendered a decision in favor of petitioner finding the said dismissal to be valid. However, petitioner was ordered to pay the complainants there separation pay, etc. Both parties appealed to the NLRC and the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed, this time ruling in favor of Isaac. Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the SC assailing the decision of the NLRC. Issue: Whether the petitioner may avail the special civil action for certiorari?
Held: YES
The rule requiring motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari “admits of certain exceptions, among which is the finding that under the circumstances of the case, a motion for reconsideration would be useless.”
In this case, the Supreme Court found it quite impossible for the NLRC to reverse itself under the foregoing facts and so, a motion for reconsideration will be deemed useless.
Alindao vs Hon. Hoson (1996) Facts:
Petitioner applied for employment for Saudi Arabia through private respondent Hisham General Services Contractor. She paid a placement fee of P15,000.00 without receipt. When she arrived in Saudi arrived in Saudi Arabia, she was made to work as a domestic helper. Because of unfair working conditions, she worked at several residences until she saved enough money to return home. When she arrived in the Philippines, she filed with POEA a complaint against Hisham for breach of contract. The POEA rendered a decision suspending Hisham and to pay petitioner her money claims. Hisham appealed to the NLRC and filed a MFR with the POEA. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA. Hisham now argues that the order cannot be enforced because the MFR was still pending with the POEA. Respondent POEA administrator Joson find the MFR of Hisham to be meritorious. Hence, petitioner elevated this case to the SC
Issue: Whether the petitioner may avail the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration?
Held: YES
It has been held that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in the following instances: (1) when the issue raised is one purely of law; (2) where public interest is involved; (3) in cases of
urgency; and (4) where special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.
On the other hand, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies are: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
The petition involves a pure question of law and the challenged order is void for want of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Joson.
Metro Transit Organization vs. CA, et al. (2002) Facts:
Respondent Ruperto Evangelista, a cash assistant in the treasury division of the petitioner, was dismissed from work for being alleged to be responsible for the loss of tokens. He was terminated for lack of trust and confidence. Evangelista filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor and ordered his reinstatement with payment of full backwages. This was affirmed by the NLRC. Hence, petitioner directly filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA, on the other hand, affirmed the ruling of both the labor arbiter and NLRC, holding that a motion for reconsideration is necessary before resorting to a petition for certioarari.
Issue: Whether the petitioner may elevate the case before the CA without first filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC?
Held: NO
Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule:
(1) when the issue raised is one purely of law; (2) where public interest is involved; (3) in cases of urgency; and (4) where special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.
On the other hand, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies are: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
To dispense with a motion for reconsideration, there must a be concrete, compelling and valid reason for the failure to comply with the requirement.
MAI Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al (1987) Facts:
The Regional Director declared that petitioner illegally dismissed its Customer Engineering Manager Rodolfo Nolasco. It ordered petitioner to reinstate Nolasco and to pay him his full backwages. The petitioner complied to pay Nolasco but declined to reinstate him. Nolasco filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter to recover damages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for being a duplication of the earlier labor case involving the same parties. Nolasco received the notice of the Labor Arbiter’s decision 12 days after. He filed an appeal before the NLRC. Petitioner opposed the appeal and contended that it should be dismissed because it was filed out of time. NLRC ruled that since the order of the Regional Director requiring reinstatement of Nolasco with full back wages had already become final and executory, attacks against
that order "on the merits or in substance can no longer be entertained
Issue: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: YES
The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take account of the fact, as shown in the record, that the appeal of Nolasco was late because it was not filed within the reglementary period
No acceptable reason has been advanced by Nolasco, and none appears upon the record, to excuse his tardiness in the taking of the appeal. Petitioner's opposition to the appeal should have been sustained, and the NLRC should never have taken cognizance of the appeal.
PAL vs. NLRC (1989) Facts:
Private respondent Dolina completed his training course with PAL as pilot. He was given temporary appointment for 6 months as Limited First Officer. He applied for regularization as First Officer and undergoes the required psychological examination wherein his "Adaptability Rating" was found to be "unacceptable" and the Pilot Acceptance Qualifications Board finds him not qualified for regular employment in the Company. Dolina was placed under preventive suspension; hence he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of Dolina justified, hence, PAL discontinued the payment of Dolina’s salary. Dolina objected on the ground that the discontinuance an “earlier agreement” that he would be kept in the payroll until the case was finally resolved by arbitration. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but ordered the company to continue paying Dolina’s salary since the arbitration case was not yet over. Issue: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Dolina was entitled to his salaries "until this case is finally resolved."
Held: YES
The order of the NLRC to continue paying Dolina his salary was an abuse of discretion. The clause "pending final resolution of the case by arbitration" should be understood to be limited only to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, such that when the latter rendered his decision, the case was finally resolved by arbitration.
Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC (1990) Facts:
In the case of Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC (1988), the SC dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. The entry of judgment having been effected, the NLRC, in the process of execution, made a computation of the award to the private respondents. Petitioner filed a “motion to stay execution/reconsideration citing supervening events that affect the computation of the award” as follows:
(1) The computation on separation pay did not consider the length of service of each complainant as borne out from the records; (2) The computation did not consider the wage exemptions granted the petitioner-respondent company; (3) The computation included payment of awards to a respondent who had already been recalled to active duty, one who was already paid in a case separately filed, and another who was already paid; (4) All the capital
assets of the petitioner have already been attached and/or otherwise foreclosed.
The NLRC denied the motion and ordered immediate implementation of the partial writ of execution
Issue: Whether the execution of a final judgment of the NLRC may be stayed in view of supervening events. Held: YES
Generally, one a judgment becomes final and executory, it canno longer be disturbed, altered or modified. The principle, however, admits of exceptions as in cases where, because of supervening events, it becomes imperative, in the higher interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances or whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice.
There can be no question that the supervening events cited by petitioner would certainly affect the computation of the award in the decision of the NLRC. It is the duty of the NLRC to consider the same and inquire into the correctness of the execution, as such supervening events may affect such execution.
Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. vs. CA (2002) Facts:
Petitioner contended that a sheriff of the NLRC “erroneously and unlawfully levied” certain properties which it claims as its own. It filed a 3rd party claim with
the Labor Arbiter and recovery of property and damages with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case. In the CA, the court dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping and that the proper remedy was appeal in due course, not certiorari or mandamus. Petitioner filed a MFR and argued that the filing of a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria with the RTC was proper because it is a remedy specifically granted to an owner (whose properties were subjected to a writ of execution to enforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in which it was not a party). The MFR was denied. Hence, petitioner filed this appeal.
Issue: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the case Held: YES
A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of.
Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:
a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and
b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC.
Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper action with a competent court to recover ownership of the property illegally seized by the sheriff.
The filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC did not preclude the petitioner from filing a subsequent action for recovery of property and damages with the Regional Trial Court. And, the institution of such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of forum shopping.
Nova vs. Judge Sancho Dames II (2001) Facts:
Complainant Greogorio S. Nova filed with the NLRC complaint for illegal dismissal against R.A. Broadcasting Corporation represented by its Vice President for Operations Vilma J. Barcelona and Station Manager Deo Trinidad. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Nova and ordered R.A. Broadcasting to pay his separation pay and full backwages. NLRC affirmed such decision and denied the MFR filed by R.A. Construction on the ground that it was filed out of time. The NLRC issued an alias writ of execution and the property of Sps. Barcelona was scheduled in an auction sale. The said spouses filed with the RTC Camarines Norte action for damages with prayer of TRO to restrain the NLRC from conducting the scheduled public auction. The RTC granted the TRO. Nova argued that under the Labor Code, issuance of the TRO or preliminary injunction in a case arising from labor dispute is prohibited.
Issue: Whether the RTC cannot issue injunction against NLRC?
Held: YES
Regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the DOLE. Corollarily, any controversy in the execution of the judgment shall be referred to the tribunal which issued the writ of execution since it has the inherent power to control its own processes in order to enforce its judgments and orders.
True, an action for damages lies within the jurisdiction of a regional trial court. However, the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue a TRO in labor cases. The SC finds respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
TOYOTA MOTOR PHIL. CORP vs. TOYOTA MOTOR PHIL. CORP LABOR UNION (1997)
FACTS:
Toyota Motor Phil Corp. Labor Union filed a petition for certification election with Dept. of Labor, for all rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Petitioner seek the denial of the holding of the certification election on 2 grounds: (1) the union, being “process of registration” had no legal personality to file the same as it was not a legitimate labor organization at the time the petition was file; and (2) that the union was composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees in violation of the law. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election in favor with the grounds stated by petitioner. However, on appeal, the Secretary of Labor set aside the decision of the Me-Arbiter and ordered the holding of the certification election contending that the union was already a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of the petition evidenced by a certificate of registration.
Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the certification election Held: YES. Petition Granted.
A labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a
legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.
In the given case, as respondent union's membership list contains the names of at least 27 supervisory employees in Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to purging itself of its supervisory employee members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification election. The union's composition being in violation of the Labor Code's Prohibition of unions composed of supervisory and rank-and-file employees, it could not possess the requisite personality to file for recognition as a legitimate labor organization.
ATLAS LITHOGRAPHIC SERVICE vs. LAGUESMA (1992)
FACTS:
A petition for certification election was filed by private respondents “Kampil-Katipunan” on behalf of the “supervisors union”, a union where the supervisory, administrative personnel, production, accounting and confidential employees of the petitioner were affiliated. Petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that Kampil Katipunan cannot represent the supervisory employees for the purpose of collective bargaining because said Kampil Katipunan also represents the rank-and-file employees union. The Med-Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. Petitioner now argue that to allow the supervisory employees to affiliate with the Kampil Katipunan is tantamount to allowing the circumvention of the “principle of the separation of unions” under Art. 245 of the Labor Code.
Issue: Whether a local union of supervisory employees may be allowed to affiliate with a national federation of labor organizations of rank-and-file employees for purpose of CBA?
Held: NO. Petition Granted
We agree with the petitioner's contention that a conflict of interest may arise in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and strikes. Members of the supervisory union might refuse to carry out disciplinary measures against their co-member rank-and-file employees.
Under Article 245 of the Labor Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715 provides:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization: right of supervisory employees. — Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
The Court construes Article 245 to mean that supervisors shall not be given an occasion to bargain together with the rank-and-file against the interests of the employer regarding terms and conditions of work. Thus, if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank and-file or where the supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting interests, then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in union activity in the company.
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR vs. HON. FERRER-CALLEJA (1989)
FACTS:
Petitioner SPF filed with the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of private respondent Apex Minong Co. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition and directed the holding of the certification election. During the pre-election conference, petitioner union objected to the inclusion in the list of workers prepared by Apex the following: (1) employees occupying the positions of Supervisor I, II and III; (2) employees under confidential/special payrolls; and (3) employees who were not paying dues. According to petitioner, the mentioned employees were disqualified from participating in the certification election since the Supervisors were managerial employees while the last two were disqualified by virtue of their non-membership in the Union and their exclusion from the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement. After the certification of election was conducted, respondent Union filed an “urgent motion to open the challenged ballots.” The Med-Arbiter granted the motion and directed the challenged ballots be opened and inventoried. Petitioner appealed to the BLR wherein respondent Director Ferrer-Calleja dismissed said appeal and affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered that the 197 ballots should be opened and canvassed. As a consequence of the opening and canvass of the challenged ballots, the Med-Arbiter Issue: Whether respondent Director committed grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the 197 employees from voting in the certification election
Held: NO
The functions of the questioned positions are not managerial in nature because they only execute approved and established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement the said policies or not. The respondent Director, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner's appeal from the Med-Arbiter's Order to open and count the challenged ballots in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in certifying the respondent Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of respondent Apex .
As regards the employees in the confidential payroll, the petitioner has not shown that the nature of their jobs is classified as managerial except for its allegation that they are considered by management as occupying managerial positions and highly confidential. Neither can payment or non-payment of union dues be the determining factor of whether the challenged employees should be excluded from the bargaining unit since the union shop provision in the CBA applies only to newly hired employees but not to members of the bargaining unit who were not members of the union at the time of the signing of the CBA. It is, therefore, not impossible for employees to be members of the bargaining unit even though they are non-union members or not paying union dues.
GOLDEN FARMS INC. vs. HON. FERRER-CALLEJA (1989)
FACTS:
The National Federation of Labor (NFL) filed a petition for certification election in behalf of certain employees and foreman of petitioner before the DOLE. Petitioner opposed said petition arguing that
The NFL appealed but it was dismissed. Hence, it re-filed the petition for certification which was also dismissed. Issue:
Held:
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. vs. HON. TORRES (1974)
FACTS: Issue: Held:
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS vs. HON. TORRES (1994)
FACTS:
Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the “exclusive bargaining representative” of respondent’s bank employees occupying supervisory positions. The Bank moved to dismiss on the ground that said supervisory employees were actually managerial/confidential employees, thus, they are ineligible to join, assist or form a union. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition and directed the holding of the certification election. The Bank appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Said court partially granted the appeal ruling that the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers are declared managerial employees and cannot join the union of the supervisors.
Issue: Whether Held:
Petitioner concludes that subject employees are not managerial employees but supervisors. Even assuming that they are confidential employees, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union. A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified.
MERALCO vs. HON. QUISUMBING (1999) FACTS:
A petition for certification election was filed by the labor organization of staff and technical employees of MERALCO seeking to represent regular employees of MERALCO. MERALCO contended that those in the Patrol Division and Treasury Security Service Section, since these employees are tasked with providing security to the company, they are not eligible to join the rank and file bargaining unit. The Med-Arbiter ruled that having been excluded from the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement for rank and file employees, these employees have the right to form a union of their own, except those employees performing managerial functions. The Secretary of Labor affirmed said order.
Issue: Whether security guards may join rank-and-file or supervisors union
Held:
Under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor organization of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory employees,