• No results found

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 08/19/ :23 AM INDEX NO /2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 51 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 08/19/2016

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 08/19/ :23 AM INDEX NO /2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 51 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 08/19/2016"

Copied!
16
0
0

Loading.... (view fulltext now)

Full text

(1)

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY

TRAVELZOO INC.,

Plaintiff, -against-

FRESH JETS, INC., FRESH TRIPS LLC, SAN DIEGO TRAVEL GROUP, INC., TIMOTHY WOZNIAK, GEORGE

WOZNIAK and FROSCH GLOBALPOINT LLC,

Defendants.

Index No. 651008/2016 MOTION SEQ. NO. 2 J. RAMOS

PLAINTIFF TRAVELZOO INC.’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT SAN DIEGO TRAVEL GROUP, INC.’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

HUNG G. TA, ESQ. PLLC Hung G. Ta, Esq.

JooYun Kim, Esq.

Natalia D. Williams, Esq. 250 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, New York 10177 Tel: (646) 453-7288 Email: hta@hgtlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Travelzoo Inc.

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 08/19/2016 10:23 AM

INDEX NO. 651008/2016

(2)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... ii  PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ... 1  STATEMENT OF FACTS ... 2  LEGAL ARGUMENT ... 4 

I.  STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS ... 4 

II.  THE COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER SAN DIEGO TRAVEL ... 4 

A.  San Diego Travel Is Bound By The Forum Selection Clauses In The CM Agreement And Newsflash Agreement ... 5 

B.  The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over San Diego Travel Under CPLR 302(a) ... 7 

1.  The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(a)(1) ... 7 

2.  The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(a)(3) ... 9 

3.  Due Process Requirements Are Satisfied ... 11 

(3)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page No(s). CASES 

511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co.,

98 N.Y.2d 144 (2002) ... 4 A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda.,

24 A.D.2d 326 (1st Dep’t 1966) ... 8 Am. SS Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Boat Co., LLC,

No. 11 Civ. 6804 (PAE), 2012 WL 527209 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 17, 2012) ... 5 Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Inv.,

7 N.Y.3d 65 (2006) ... 8 Indosuez Int’l Fin. B.V. v. Nat’l Reserve Bank,

98 N.Y.2d 238 (2002) ... 6 Jacobson v. Princess Hotels Int’l, Inc.,

101 A.D.2d 757 (1st Dep’t 1984) ... 9 LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co.,

95 N.Y.2d 210 (2000) ... 10 Leon v. Martinez,

84 N.Y.2d 83 (1994) ... 4 New Media Holding Co. LLC v. Kagalovsky,

97 A.D.3d 463 (1st Dep’t 2012) ... 8 People ex. Rel. Cuomo v. H & R Block, Inc.,

58 A.D.3d 415 (1st Dep’t 2009) ... 4 Peterson v. Spartan Indus.,

33 N.Y.2d 463 (1974) ... 4 Quantum Corporate Funding, Ltd. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP,

45 A.D.3d 505 (1st Dep’t 2007) ... 7 Rational Strategies Fund v. Hill,

40 Misc.3d 1214(A) (N.Y. Co. 2013) ... 4 Sterling Nat’l Bank as Assignee of NorVergence, Inc. v. E. Shipping Worldwide, Inc.,

(4)

Walden v. Fiore,

134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) ... 11 RULES 

CPLR 302(a)(1) ... 7, 8 CPLR 302(a)(3) ... 9

(5)

Plaintiff, Travelzoo Inc. (“Travelzoo”) submits this memorandum of law in opposition to Defendant San Diego Travel Group, Inc.’s (“San Diego Travel”) motion to dismiss1 Travelzoo’s Complaint.2

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

San Diego Travel allowed the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants3 to act under the cloak of its authority. As a result, the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants flagrantly breached their agreements with Travelzoo and engaged in a fraud that left Travelzoo holding the bag for the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants’ misconduct. San Diego Travel now seeks to distance itself from the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants on the sole ground that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it. However, as explained in detail below, San Diego Travel is subject to the forum selection clauses (consenting to jurisdiction of the New York courts) in the two agreements that it entered into with Travelzoo. Alternatively, and additionally, San Diego Travel is subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a). Moreover, San Diego Travel’s motion rests entirely on factual arguments introduced through an affidavit by its chief executive officer and principal shareholder, and another affidavit by their attorney. These factual arguments are improper at the pleading stage, and at the very least require that San Diego Travel’s motion be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and that Travelzoo be afforded the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

1 See Doc. Nos. 33-37.

2 “Complaint” or “Compl.” refers to Travelzoo’s Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 9).

3 Defendants Fresh Jets, Inc. (“Fresh Jets”), Fresh Trips LLC (“Fresh Trips,” and together with Fresh

Jets, the “Fresh Defendants”), Timothy Wozniak (“T. Wozniak”) and George Wozniak (“G. Wozniak,” and together with T. Wozniak, the “Wozniaks”). The Fresh Defendants and Wozniaks are collectively referred to as the “Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants.”

(6)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Travelzoo, San Diego Travel and the Fresh Defendants entered into an agreement, dated November 17, 2015 (“CM Agreement”) under which a promotion for Mexican hotels (the “Royal Resorts”) (the “Promotion”) would be published on Travelzoo’s website on Cyber Monday (November 28, 2015). ¶¶ 18-234;Compl. Ex. A. In negotiating the CM Agreement, T. Wozniak represented to Travelzoo that the Promotion was approved by San Diego Travel and that he was authorized to execute an agreement on San Diego Travel’s behalf. ¶ 20. T. Wozniak also represented that they had the ability to fulfill the Promotion. ¶ 58.

San Diego Travel’s involvement was important to Travelzoo. Travelzoo had successfully completed prior transactions with San Diego Travel. ¶¶ 43-44. In connection with some of these transactions, G. Wozniak held himself out as the President on behalf of San Diego Travel and purported to sign on its behalf. ¶¶ 45-57; Mealiffe Aff.5 Ex. 7. Additionally, G. Wozniak also authorized his son, T. Wozniak to act on behalf of San Diego Travel. See, e.g., Mealiffe Aff. Ex. 3.

In reliance on these representations, on November 17, 2015, Travelzoo entered into the CM Agreement with the Fresh Defendants and San Diego Travel. ¶ 21. Travelzoo was to be paid $12,000 for the Promotion. Compl. Ex. A. San Diego Travel was identified as the “Advertiser” of the Promotion in the CM Agreement, and was to be billed for the Promotion. T. Wozniak signed the CM Agreement, confirming that he was “authorized to execute this agreement on behalf of [San Diego Travel].” Fresh Jets was identified as the contact and Fresh Trips was identified as the provider of the deal advertised in the Promotion. ¶ 22; Compl. Ex. A.

4 All references to “¶” are to the paragraphs in the Complaint, unless otherwise specified.

5 “Mealiffe Aff.” Refers to the Affidavit of Paul Mealiffe, sworn to August 17, 2016, submitted in

(7)

Travelzoo satisfied its obligations under the CM Agreement by publishing the Promotion on Cyber Monday. ¶ 23. However, in deliberate breach of the CM Agreement, the Wozniaks/ Fresh Defendants accepted payments from customers under the Promotion, but failed to complete the bookings with the Royal Resorts. ¶¶ 26-27. As a result, Travelzoo (on whose websites the Promotion was advertised) was inundated with calls and emails from customers who did not receive hotel booking confirmations. ¶ 29. Some travelers only found out when they arrived at the Royal Resorts that Fresh Trips had not booked a hotel room for them. Id.

The Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants failed to fix the mess that they created. To the contrary, Fresh Trips directed travelers to contact Travelzoo for “alternative resort options.” ¶ 34. As a result of the Fresh Defendants’ breach of the CM Agreement, Travelzoo was forced to do what the Fresh Defendants should have done: Travelzoo paid for the travelers’ alternative accommodations and otherwise made customers whole.

Separately, on September 23, 2015, T. Wozniak, acting on behalf of San Diego Travel, entered into the Newsflash Agreement6 for an email promotion to be distributed by Travelzoo to hundreds of thousands of email recipients. Travelzoo’s fee for the service was $15,000. ¶ 41; Compl. Ex. G. Travelzoo performed its duties under the Newsflash Agreement, and sent an invoice, dated September 29, 2015, for the $15,000 payment. However, Travelzoo has not been paid its $15,000 fee, or interest and expenses incurred. ¶ 42.

6 “Newsflash Agreement” refers to the agreement with Travelzoo, dated September 23, 2015. See

(8)

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I. STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction.” Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88 (1994). The court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.” Id. (citations omitted). A motion to dismiss “must be denied if from the pleadings’ four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law.” 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 152 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

II. THE COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER SAN DIEGO TRAVEL

As San Diego Travel concedes (SDTG MTD7 at 5), “[i]n opposition to a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(8), a plaintiff is not required to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, but need only make a ‘sufficient start’ establishing that personal jurisdiction may exist and that the basis for personal jurisdiction is not frivolous.” Rational Strategies Fund v. Hill, 40 Misc.3d 1214(A), at *2 (N.Y. Co. 2013); see also Peterson v. Spartan Indus., 33 N.Y.2d 463, 467 (1974); People ex. Rel. Cuomo v. H & R Block, Inc., 58 A.D.3d 415, 416 (1st Dep’t 2009). Here, Travelzoo has done more than shown a “sufficient start” for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction.

As set forth in detail below, San Diego Travel is bound by the forum selection clauses in the CM Agreement and the Newsflash Agreement and, thus, is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court. In addition, San Diego Travel is subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to the

7 “SDTG MTD” refers to San Diego Travel’s memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss

(9)

arm statute in CPLR 302(a). Through their agents, the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants, San Diego Travel has transacted business in New York, and has committed torts causing injury in the State.

A. San Diego Travel Is Bound By The Forum Selection Clauses In The CM Agreement And Newsflash Agreement

“When a forum selection clause is found valid and enforceable, ‘it is not necessary to analyze jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute or federal constitutional requirements of due process.’” Am. SS Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Boat Co., LLC, No. 11 Civ. 6804 (PAE), 2012 WL 527209, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 17, 2012) (citation omitted); Sterling Nat’l Bank as Assignee of NorVergence, Inc. v. E. Shipping Worldwide, Inc., 35 A.D.3d 222, 222 (1st Dep’t 2006) (“the very point of forum selection clauses, [ ] is to avoid litigation over personal jurisdiction, as well as disputes arising over the application of the long-arm statute”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, in the CM Agreement and Newsflash Agreement, the parties “consent[ed] to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of New York with respect to any legal proceeding arising in connection with the Insertion Order/General Terms.” Compl. Ex. A § 13; Ex. G § 13.

San Diego Travel does not contest that this lawsuit falls under the forum selection clauses in the CM Agreement and Newsflash Agreement. Rather, San Diego Travel argues that the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants were never authorized to act as their agent and, thus, were not authorized to execute the CM Agreement and Newsflash Agreement on San Diego Travel’s behalf. San Diego Travel’s attempt to distance itself from this lawsuit must be rejected because the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants acted with San Diego Travel’s apparent authority.

Under New York law, a principal is liable to a third party if the principal’s agent acted with apparent authority. “The existence of ‘apparent authority’ depends upon a factual showing that the third party relied upon the misrepresentation of the agent because of some misleading conduct

(10)

on the part of the principal—not the agent. Moreover, a third party with whom the agent deals may rely on an appearance of authority only to the extent that such reliance is reasonable.” Indosuez Int’l Fin. B.V. v. Nat’l Reserve Bank, 98 N.Y.2d 238, 245-46 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (finding that third party reasonably relied on agent’s apparent authority where, among other things, the agent executed five prior transactions on principal’s behalf). Here, San Diego Travel’s conduct led Travelzoo to reasonably rely on the appearance of the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants’ authority as San Diego Travel’s agent. As alleged in the Complaint:  In an April 14, 2015 newsflash agreement, Travelzoo published an advertisement for San Diego Travel for trips to Mexico. Travelers could book the advertised trip through a link to Carefree Vacations (which is, along with San Diego Travel, a travel division of Frosch8). ¶ 44.

 In connection with the April 14, 2015 newsflash agreement, G. Wozniak held himself out as having the authority to act on behalf of San Diego Travel, and claimed that Carefree Vacations was the vacation operations of San Diego Travel. ¶ 45.

 Despite knowing that G. Wozniak was acting on their behalf, neither San Diego Travel nor Carefree Vacations informed Travelzoo that the April 14, 2015 newsflash agreement was not executed at their request, or that G. Wozniak was not authorized to purchase the advertisement. ¶ 46.

 To the contrary, the Design Director for Frosch/Carefree Vacations sent an email to a designer working with G. Wozniak and Travelzoo, with copies to San Diego Travel employees. The Design Director provided a Carefree Vacations logo for use in connection with the April 14, 2015 newsflash agreement. San Diego Travel/Frosch thus authorized G. Wozniak to use and provide the Carefree Vacations corporate logo to Travelzoo. ¶ 47.

 Although San Diego Travel was well aware that G. Wozniak was providing to Travelzoo the Carefree Vacations logo in connection with an advertisement, San Diego Travel/Frosch never objected or clarified that G. Wozniak was not authorized to act on their behalf. ¶ 47.

(11)

Based on San Diego Travel’s conduct and deafening silence when it knew the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants were purporting to act on its behalf, Travelzoo reasonably relied on the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants’ apparent authority. San Diego Travel cannot now disclaim liability when it failed to act months before the CM Agreement and Newsflash Agreement were executed.

In any event, as the First Department has explained, “whether [an agent] had the apparent authority to execute the [agreement] on defendant’s behalf and whether plaintiff’s reliance thereon was reasonable … cannot be resolved at this early stage of the proceedings,” that is, on a motion to dismiss. Quantum Corporate Funding, Ltd. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP, 45 A.D.3d 505, 506 (1st Dep’t 2007) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss where defendant argued lack of personal jurisdiction and finding that it could not be said, “as a matter of law,” that agent was not authorized to enter into agreement binding defendant to the forum selection clause contained therein). Accordingly, San Diego Travel’s motion to dismiss should be denied on this basis alone.

B. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over San Diego Travel Under CPLR 302(a)

As discussed above, there is personal jurisdiction over San Diego Travel because it is subject to the forum selection clauses in the CM Agreement and the Newsflash Agreement. Separately and additionally, this Court has personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a).

1. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(a)(1)

This Court has personal jurisdiction over San Diego Travel based on New York’s long-arm statute. CPLR 302(a)(1) confers personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciled defendant “who in person or through an agent” “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” CPLR 302(a)(1) is a “single act statute” and “proof of one transaction is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York,

(12)

so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted.” Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Inv., 7 N.Y.3d 65, 71 (2006). Under CPLR 302(a)(1), a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the New York courts based on the conduct of its agent. CPLR 302(a)(1); A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda., 24 A.D.2d 326, 328 (1st Dep’t 1966) (agent’s acts in New York “suffice to establish jurisdiction of the action against the defendant”). The agency relationship need not be a “formal” one as long as the agent “acted purposely in New York for their benefit and with their knowledge and consent….” New Media Holding Co. LLC v. Kagalovsky, 97 A.D.3d 463, 464 (1st Dep’t 2012).

As explained in further detail in the Complaint and in Plaintiff Travelzoo’s memorandum of law in opposition to the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants’ motion to dismiss, dated August 19, 2016 (“MTD Opp.”), the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants’ conduct establishes personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a). MTD Opp. at Section II.B.1. Among other things, T. Wozniak negotiated and executed the CM Agreement and Newflash Agreement through numerous emails and phone calls with Travelzoo, which is headquartered in New York. ¶¶ 18, 20. Contrary to the factual assertions of its chief executive officer, Tim Smith (see Affidavit of Tim Smith in Support of Motion to Dismiss, sworn to July 14, 2016 at ¶ 9), San Diego Travel entered into several other agreements with Travelzoo prior the CM Agreement and the Newsflash Agreement, all of which were also negotiated and executed by the Wozniaks on San Diego Travel’s behalf. All of these agreements also had New York forum selection clauses.

San Diego Travel does not dispute that the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants’ conduct is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), or that this lawsuit arise from that conduct. Rather, San Diego Travel only argues that the Wozniaks were not authorized to act

(13)

on its behalf, and thus, there is no personal jurisdiction over them under CPLR 302(a)(1). See SDTG MTD at 8. However, for the same reasons why San Diego Travel is bound by the CM Agreement and the Newsflash Agreement (see supra Section II.A), San Diego Travel is subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) based on the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants’ conduct. By remaining silent when it knew that the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants were acting on its behalf, San Diego Travel cloaked them with the apparent authority to enter into the CM Agreement and the Newsflash Agreement. Travelzoo reasonably relied on the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants’ apparent authority to act for San Diego Travel.9

2. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(a)(3)

San Diego Travel relies on the same arguments it makes to oppose personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), to oppose personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3). SDTG MTD at 10. For the same reasons stated above (see supra Section II.A and II.B.1), in Travelzoo’s opposition to the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants’ motion to dismiss (see MTD Opp at Section II.B.2) and below, there is personal jurisdiction over San Diego Travel pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3).

CPLR 302(a)(3) confers personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciled defendant who “commits a tortious act” outside New York “causing injury … within the state … if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial

9 San Diego Travel also argues that the conduct of Frosch cannot be used to establish personal

jurisdiction over San Diego Travel. SDTG MTD at 8-9. However, San Diego Travel concedes, “Travelzoo may have alleged several indicia of domination and control in the Complaint ….” SDTG MTD at 9. Moreover, the Complaint alleges that Frosch dominated San Diego Travel with respect to the CM Agreement and the Newsflash Agreement. Frosch (along with San Diego Travel) effectively authorized George Wozniak to act on its behalf, as well as on behalf of Frosch’s subsidiaries San Diego Travel and Carefree Vacations. ¶¶ 44, 47. San Diego Travel was used to commit wrongs against Travelzoo, including breaches of the CM Agreement and Newsflash Agreement. ¶¶ 48-52, 98-103. These allegations are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to pierce the corporate veil, and to establish personal jurisdiction over both San Diego Travel and Frosch. Jacobson v. Princess Hotels Int’l, Inc., 101 A.D.2d 757, 757 (1st Dep’t 1984).

(14)

revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” “The conferral of jurisdiction under this provision rests on five elements: First, that defendant committed a tortious act outside the State; second, that the cause of action arises from that act; third, that the act caused injury to a person or property within the State; fourth, that defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in the State; and fifth, that defendant derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 N.Y.2d 210, 214 (2000). Each of these elements is satisfied here.

As alleged in the Complaint, San Diego Travel, through its agents the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants committed tortious acts by, among other things, making fraudulent representations about their ability to satisfy the terms of the Promotion. ¶¶ 57-61, 61-66; see also MTD Opp. at Section II.B.2. San Diego Travel also remained silent when it knew the Wozniaks were acting on its behalf, thereby conferring apparent authority on the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants. ¶ 47. Travelzoo’s claims in this lawsuit indisputably arise from these tortious acts. ¶ 32. The tortious conduct injured Travelzoo, which is headquartered in New York. San Diego Travel reasonably should have expected that, by allowing Travelzoo to believe that the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants had the authority to act as San Diego Travel’s agent, the tortious acts of its agent would cause injury to Travelzoo in New York. Finally, San Diego Travel likely derives a significant amount of revenue from interstate commerce. San Diego Travel, through the Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants, entered into several other contracts with Travelzoo, which is headquartered in New York. ¶¶ 43-47; see, e.g., Mealiffe Ex. 7. Additionally, as alleged in the Complaint, Frosch completely dominated, and was the alter ego of San Diego Travel. ¶¶ 12-13. Frosch’s travel division Global

(15)

Point Travel Solutions, which has the same office location, same principal, same officers, same employees and the same agent for service of process in California as San Diego Travel does (¶ 12), claims to provide travel “services to corporations throughout the United States.” See

http://www.globalpointtravelsolutions.com/.

3. Due Process Requirements Are Satisfied

To satisfy the due process requirements required for long-arm jurisdiction, “the nonresident generally must have certain minimum contacts [] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Those requirements are satisfied here. Among other things, the San Diego Travel, through their agents Wozniaks/Fresh Defendants, advertised to Travelzoo’s members who reside in New York and previously conducted business with Travelzoo knowing that Travelzoo is headquartered in New York. Mealiffe Aff. ¶ 4, Exs.1-4, 7. Accordingly San Diego Travel should have reasonably expected to be subject to New York courts.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, San Diego Travel’s motion to dismiss should be denied in its entirety. Alternatively, Travelzoo should be afforded the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery as to San Diego Travel.

(16)

DATED: August 19, 2016 New York, New York

HUNG G. TA, ESQ. PLLC

By: /s/Hung G. Ta Hung G. Ta, Esq. JooYun Kim, Esq.

Natalia D. Williams, Esq. 250 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, New York 10177 Tel: (646) 453-7288 Fax: (646) 453-7289 Email: hta@hgtlaw.com

jooyun@hgtlaw.com natalia@hgtlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Travelzoo Inc.

References

Related documents

If coverage provided to the additional insured is required by a contract or agreement, the most we will pay on behalf of the additional insured is the amount of insurance:. Required

NOW, upon the Post Trial Decision and Order, dated June 18, 2019 (Main Action, Dkt. 43), awarding Plaintiffs Center for Specialty Care, Inc3. and 50 East 69* Street Corporation

Moreover, even if one of the subsections to CPLR 3117(a) is satisfied, the statute still mandates that the evidence may only be admitted “so far as admissible under

Denial of plaintiffs’ request is consistent with the criteria set forth in Leader, which permits the Court to consider: (1) a plaintiff’s diligence, or lack thereof, in attempting to

Course: Accounting Capstone Project/Assignment: Financial Analysis project Success is based on financial analysis of business entity with grade of 80% or better.. Number of

So long as Defendant uses those licensed brands on the products it manufactures and sells, the agreement obligates Defendant to pay CAS Marketing quarterly commissions based

nuclear power plant. Nuclear generators such as Waterford 3 are expected to remain extremely competitive on a variable cost basis. Based on typical inflation

Roseann Carrera being duly sworn, deposes that he/she is principal clerk of Staten Island Advance; that Staten Island Advance is a public newspaper published in the city of New