ACMA Determination Submission
Submission
Queensland Police Service response to an invitation to comment on the draft Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2009, issued June 2009.
Introduction
The Emergency Call Service (ECS) is a vital national process through which people throughout Australia, who require emergency assistance from Ambulance, Fire and/or Police services, can contact those services through a free of charge national telephone number (Triple Zero, 112 and, for hearing or speech impaired persons, 106).
Commonwealth legislation imposes obligations on telecommunications carriers, carriage service providers and emergency call persons to ensure that the ECS fulfills its critical purpose of connecting people who experience life threatening and time critical situations to emergency service organisations (ESOs).
As an ESO, the Queensland Police Service (QPS) is a key stakeholder in developments impacting on the ECS and on that basis makes this submission.
Background
Under the provisions of section 147 of the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999 the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) is responsible for making a written determination imposing requirements on carriers, carriage service providers and emergency call persons in relation to the ECS. Currently, the ACMA discharges that responsibility by regulating the ECS through the
Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2002.
In April 2008, the ACMA initiated a review of the 2002 Determination, which led to the development of a Consultation Paper – Proposed Amendments to Emergency Call Service Arrangements in June 2009. The consultation paper limits itself to a revision of the current ECS arrangements. The ACMA is seeking written submissions on the matters raised in the consultation paper by 21 August 2009.
The draft 2009 Determination proposes to continue the existing ECS arrangements with a number of alterations and clarifications, including:
• placing new requirements on VoIP-out only services;
• more specific IPND related requirements for mobile services; and • more assertive provisions for reducing misuse or abuse of the ECS.
On Tuesday 21 July 2009, the ACMA convened a meeting at its Sydney offices where an overview of the rationale for the draft new Determination was provided to key stakeholders, including the QPS.
This submission responds to the issues discussed in the consultation paper and provides input from a QPS perspective.
VoIP Services
Anecdotally, it is evident that take-up of ‘voice over internet protocol’ (VoIP) telecommunications devices continues to grow throughout Australia although current arrangements have not enabled the ECP to accurately quantify the volume of VoIP calls made to the ECS. VoIP technologies present the ECS with a number of difficulties, which the consultation paper endeavours to address.
The consultation paper highlights the four categories of VoIP services as classified by the European Regulators Group and describes the differences between each classification (p.6). The paper specifically proposes that new requirements be placed on Type 2 VoIP (out only) providers. The draft places an obligation on Type 2 VoIP providers to ensure that access to the ECS is provided, but then provides for an ‘opt out’ choice for providers as long as they obtain customer acknowledgement on this point. This proposal raises a number of significant operational concerns and complications. Under this proposal, with more and more VoIP devices being developed that physically resemble standard telephones (or allow standard telephone handset connectivity), a major concern is that a third party who may need access to the ECS and is not aware that the phone is a VoIP device with no ECS access, will be seriously delayed and likely denied access to the ECS in an emergency unless an alternative service can be located that will provide access.
Additionally, current VoIP devices, irrespective of classification, present no information regarding the location of the caller. These add to the presently unresolved substantial difficulties being experienced with caller location for those using mobile services. Unless the caller can provide sufficient location detail, ESOs are severely limited in the assistance they can provide.
As an ESO, the QPS strongly recommends that the issue of VoIP connections and any other connections that developments in technology may present in the future, be required to meet minimum standards before being authorized to operate within Australia. Those standards must, amongst other things, include a requirement to enable unrestricted access to the ECS, provide real time data about the location of the caller and provide ESOs with the ability to immediately call the caller back.
Any arrangements that do not meet these minimum requirements clearly will further compromise an already straining ECS. It is the QPS position that this type of ‘minimum standards’ approach would simplify an already complex set of arrangements and
provide more certainty in personal safety that a caller in an emergency will be able to obtain the necessary emergency assistance.
IPND Requirements for Mobile Services
After receiving the emergency call, the location of a caller is the next most critical element required by ESOs to ensure that an effective and efficient emergency response is provided to people in need. In the past, when fixed lines were the primary means by which to contact the ECS, the vast majority of caller location information was defined by the subscriber address. ESOs now operate in an environment where over 65% of ECS calls are via mobile services and no effective location information is provided.
More accurate IPND data, which is readily accessible to ESOs, is welcomed and will assist the provision of emergency response services in some instances; however, this is largely of little assistance in defining actual mobile service user location when the caller is not calling from the subscriber address.
It is the contention of the QPS that greater effort needs to be made towards the implementation of existing technology and processes aimed at identifying, as accurately as possible, the location of a caller using a mobile service as well as seeking to improve the accuracy of subscriber details in the IPND.
Reducing Misuse or Abuse of the ECS
Misuse of the ECS includes inadvertent calls (such as misdials), hoax/malicious and nuisance/mischievous calls (all unwelcome) as well as calls reporting matters that are not emergencies. The impact on the capacity of ESOs to effectively respond to genuine emergency calls continues to be significantly compromised by non-genuine calls, whether they are clearly unwelcome calls or simply calls for service for which the ECS was never intended.
The consultation paper proposes to amend sections for the Determination in order to further reduce the volume of non-genuine calls.
Inadvertent Calls
The QPS acknowledges recent improvements implemented by the ECP in responding to inadvertent non-genuine calls. It has been reported that the recent introduction of a recorded voice announcement, indicating to callers that they have connected to the ECS, has resulted in as much as a 15% to 20% reduction in non-genuine calls (presumably inadvertent connections) to the ECS. This is to be applauded.
Hoax/Malicious/Nuisance/Mischieveous Calls
In an attempt to redress the proportion of non-genuine calls, the ECP has also introduced, on a trial basis, a graded process to respond to repeat non-genuine calls. The trial involves the setting of an initial threshold number of calls per day that must be reached by a non-genuine caller prior to further stages of the response process being
activated (including contacting and cautioning the caller, referring the matter to police for investigation or blocking the caller’s access to normal mobile services). Given the public nature of this document, the specific threshold is intentionally not documented here.
The QPS is concerned that this approach is essentially reactive and increasingly unacceptably resource intensive for both the ECP and ESOs. The focus on waiting for unrealistically high thresholds of non-genuine calls to be received before responding forgoes proactive and preventative opportunities, which could act directly to lessen non-genuine volume and its negative impact on the ECS. Investigation of non-non-genuine calls is a necessary part of the proposed suite of responses that may apply to non-genuine calls, particularly for unwelcome calls, however such a response involves time and resources, which would need to be drawn away from the emergency response capacity of ESOs in the first instance.
Additionally, it is noted, in consultation with ESOs across Australia, that a significant number of non-genuine calls are being made from vulnerable persons (eg. people with mental health issues) for whom prosecution is not a preferred response nor likely to succeed. In these cases, the investigation and prosecution process is unlikely to achieve any deterrent effect for ECS misuse. The QPS clearly prefers a prevention based focus through continued education, the development of active relationships with social services and, if necessary, removal or limitation of access to the ECS for repeat offenders.
Another vulnerability being exploited by non-genuine callers is the limitation of current arrangements to identify or locate callers using SIM-less mobile services. Clearly, preventing SIM-less mobile devices from being able to access the ECS in the first place would be a significant preventative measure in ECS misuse. While this approach has been taken in other countries, there is a reluctance to introduce it in Australia or to overcome the technological implementation deficiencies here, which are allowing certain handset implementations to appear like SIM-less devices when making an emergency call.
This is an issue of operational concern, which requires resolution. Any reluctance to require this market correction needs to be balanced against the existing reality that the capacity of ESOs to provide emergency responses is already being compromised by the current high volume of non-genuine calls from SIM-less phones.
Misuse of the ECS, under the provisions of the Commonwealth Criminal Code 1995, is a criminal offence. Compromising the safety and security of the broader community can’t be ignored, and must be responded to appropriately, in line with community expectations. An indication of community expectations in Queensland is that breaches of the law which affect community safety are met with more robust responses. As an example, in most jurisdictions, people who negatively impact on the safety and security of the community through specific traffic offences can lose their driver’s licence and have their vehicle impounded immediately with all of the ramifications that can have.
Current and proposed arrangements in the consultation paper are that offenders are being supported in severely compromising the safety of others through very high thresholds of non-genuine calls to the ECS before any consideration is given to taking action against them, but only by ceasing their access to routine mobile services. It is of concern that at no stage does the proposal actually involve preventing an offender being able to make ongoing non-genuine calls to the ECS. The current arrangement is that even phones that have been prevented from accessing routine mobile services in response to high thresholds of non-genuine calls will still be permitted to call the ECS from that phone.
Non-emergency Calls
The QPS contends that the intended role of ESOs, in terms of the ECS, is to facilitate an emergency response to genuine emergency calls for service within its jurisdiction. The focus of ESOs should therefore be on emergency response and not on management of non-genuine calls. Regrettably, the resources of the QPS are increasingly being relied upon to distill genuine emergency calls from an overwhelming proportion of calls for policing and others services being presented by the ECP which do not meet the definition of an emergency call.
An ‘emergency call’ is defined in section 4 of the Determination (Dictionary) as:
A call made to an emergency service number, during which a response is sought from an emergency service organisation to deal with a time-critical event:
(a) that is perceived to threaten life; or
(b) that the organisation is established to respond to.
The outcome of this is that ESOs are being presented with large volumes of calls that are misusing the ECS. For example, in the Brisbane based Police Communications Centre, of the 4500 Triple Zero calls that are routinely presented to it by the ECP each week, little more that 100 of these calls will result in the need for an emergency response. Many of these calls may require some form of police response but they do not require an emergency response, which is the intended purpose of the ECS.
The QPS contends that the draft Determination should be significantly strengthened with respect to the intended purpose of the ECS by ensuring genuine emergency calls are presented to ESOs rather than simply calls for the which the caller indicates a desire to be connected with ambulance, fire or police.
In 2010 the QPS will open its non-urgent contact centre, Policelink, and join all but Victoria Police in adopting a national 131 444 number for non-urgent police matters. It is recommended that the ECP be able to refer calls for police assistance that do not meet the emergency call definition to the 131 444 service rather than to the emergency call numbers within police services.
Conclusion
The QPS welcomes the opportunity to respond to the consultation paper and acknowledges the contribution of ACMA, carriers, carriage service providers, the Emergency Call Person and ESOs in the development of the consultation paper and draft Determination.
The strong position of the QPS is that the essential focus of the ECS must at all times be on the primacy of an effective support service to members of our community when those members are faced with a genuine emergency. The role of the ECS (in the role of government discharging its responsibilities for the safety and security of its citizens), is to facilitate that support by placing clear minimum standards obligations on entities within the ECS and telecommunications industry more broadly to provide those citizens with timely, accurate and fully-assisted access to emergency service response.
Among the various roles and responsibilities within the ECS, there appears to be an opportunity to re-emphasise the primacy of the genuine caller in the emergency call relationship. The current concern of the ECS is only to the point of presentation to ESOs, and focuses essentially on the call and how it is processed rather than on the caller and their emergency situation.
The performance standards of the ECP focus on the time taken to answer a call and the time taken to pass the call onto the ESO or otherwise. Attempts have been made to apply similar performance measures to ESOs rather than considering the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall response to the emergency.
Emphasis must equally be placed on freeing up resources within ESOs to respond to genuine emergency calls and not on distilling emergency calls from non-genuine calls or tasking persons to conduct research in order to generate call data of interest to third parties.
The QPS encourages further review of the Determination and discussions behind its evolution to be adopted as an opportunity to redress serious limitations in the current end-to-end process and to set the ECS up for the future. The most significant current and future challenges for ESOs are in ensuring the identification of the location of genuine emergency callers, the ability to re-contact emergency callers (call back), reducing the overwhelming volume of non-genuine calls being presented to ESOs and in ensuring that these minimum standards are maintained and enhanced with the introduction of any developing technologies.
It is also evident that a number of issues of potential impact on the ECS and of particular strategic significance are also currently emerging. The interest of COAG in emergency warning systems, the outcomes of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, the Iredale Coroner’s Report (NSW), the National Broadband Network proposal, geospatial issues and national location markers are but a few of the issues which may present both challenges and opportunities for the ECS. The QPS recommends consideration of the broader strategic opportunities that may exist for a
more integrated approach to be taken to responding to emergencies and encourages ACMA to take a lead role in facilitating such dialogue.
It should also be noted that the QPS is an active member of the National Emergency Communications Working Group (NECWG), which is also making a collective submission on the draft Determination on behalf of its membership. The QPS acknowledges the significant contribution that has been made by the NECWG to issues impacting on emergency communications within Australasia over a number of years. The QPS recognises NECWG as a strong advocate for improvements to the ECS and endorses the submission of the NECWG as an informed contribution warranting careful consideration.
