39centralamerican.pdf

Julie

Locascio

In

the 1980s,"Central

America"

became

synonymous

withcivilwar,

economic

collapse,

human

rightsabuse,

and

refugee

movement. Because

ofthecomplexitiesof Central

American

politics, refugees

from

the region

have elicited a highly

mixed

response, ranging

from

humanitarianto indifferent to hostile. Individuals

and

agencies tryingtoservethese refugeesorresettle

them

are facedwith constraints thatare

more

political than

logistical.

Sincethe 1970s, 2-3 million refugeeshave

been

dis-placed

from

their

homes

inCentral America. Central

American

refugees have presented

an unprecedented

challengetoplanners,reliefworkers, economists, poli-ticians,administrators,

community

leaders,

and

others. Analysis ofthe refugee planningenacted sofar in the regionillustratesbothappallingand exemplary approaches

thatcanshedlight

on

refugeeplanningelsewhere.

History of International

Refugee Planning

The modern

system of international refugee

assis-tance evolved

from

themigration situations of

World

Wars

I

and

II.

The

U.N.

set

up

the Officeofthe

High

Commissioner

for

Refugees

to supervise the care of

refugees,

which

was

tobe entrustedto

asylum

nations.

The

birth of

UNHCR

was accompanied

by the 1951

Convention

on

Refugees,

which

pertained onlytothose

who

had

become

refugees because ofevents prior to

January1,1951 (even

though

UNHCR

was

authorized

JulieLocascioisa

May

1991recipientofaMastersdegree

inRegional Planning

from

the Universityof North

Caro-lina at

Chapel

Hill. In

May

1990, she spent a

month

in

Costa Rica

on

aTinkerFoundationresearchgrantto

work

onherDepartmentalPaper, "Central

American

Refugee-Planning: AnalysisoftheRegionalResponse(witha

Spe-cial

Focus on

Costa Rica)

and

Universal Lessons

on

Refugee-Planning." This articleis based

on

her

Depart-mentalPaper.

to assist anyrefugees).

The

1951

Convention

guaran-teed a refugee'srightto

make

an asylum

claim,butdid

notguaranteea refugee'srighttoreceiveasylum. It

...definedarefugeeas

someone

outsidehis country...,

unprotected by his

own

government and

having a

well-founded fear of persecution

on

political,

reli-giousor racial grounds should hereturn.

A

person

fitting this definition

had

legal protection against

refoulement[involuntary repatriation].1

The

High Commissioner

lobbiedfortheexpansion of

UNHCR's

work

beyond Europe, and

theenlarged

refu-gee

mandate was acknowledged

in the Protocol of 31 January1967.

General

Regional

Responses

Before the 1980s, extensive migration

had

existed

between

Central

American

countries, but

had

been

mostly temporary.

An

analysis of

why

refugee

move-ments

have

become

so

rampant

inCentral

America

over

thelast

decade

is

beyond

thescope ofthisarticle;suffice

it tosay thateachcountry'srefugeessharesimilar

and

dissimilarreasonsformigrating within or outside ofthe

region-reasons

which

include civil wars,

state-spon-soredterrorism,insurgent-sponsoredterrorism,

human

rightsabuses,

economic

chaos,

and

environmental deg-radation.

Though

theflightsofCentral

American

refugees are

based

on

similar circumstances, the treatment of the refugees

depends

on from where and

to

where

they are

fleeing.

The

UNHCR

has not succeeded in

depoliti-cizing refugee services in the region; therefore, the

myriads of other national

and non-governmental

or-ganizations

(NGOs)

respondingtorefugee needs have

been

vitaltorefugeesurvival.

po-liticized.Salvadoran,

Honduran

and

U.S.officialsinthe

1980s continuously asserted that Salvadoran refugee

camps

in

Honduras were

beingusedas guerillastaging

grounds.Thisofficialattitude

encouraged

local

Hondu-ran hostilitytothe refugeesaswell ashostility-to the pointofrape, beatings,

and

murders-among Honduran

soldiers"guarding" therefugee camps.2

_UNHCR

_was

notpermittedtoinvestigateany suchattacks.

Honduras

consideredtherefugees a

temporary

prob-lem

from

thestart,

and

neverdesiredanysolution short

of repatriation. In addition to a historic distrust of Salvadorans,

Honduras

has

shown

resentmentathaving

international agencies operating within its borders.3

Because

the

Nicaraguan

refugees ofthe 1980s

were

at

the other

end

ofthe political/refugee spectrum, they

were

notconsideredaninternal security threat

and were

thusallowedfree

movement

and

employment

in

Hon-duras. Ironicallyenough,theNicaraguanrefugeescaused

thedisplacement of

some

100,000

Hondurans,

but

con-tinued to receive preferential refugee treatment over

theSalvadoranrefugees.4

The

UNHCR

has struggledto

keep Nicaraguan

refugees

away from

the

Honduras/

Nicaragua border,

whereas

"the U.S...financed

camps

right

on

theborderfortheexplicit

purpose

ofaiding the contras."5

Mexico

currently"hosts"

more

refugees

from

Central

America

than any other regional actor (besides the

U.S.).Like

Honduras,

shedislikeshavinglarge

concen-trationsofrefugeesalong herborder,although

Mexico

has

more

legitimate securityconcerns since

Guatema-lan military forces have raided

and

bombed

refugee

camps

across the

Mexican

border.6

Mexico

also fears thatthepresence of

Guatemalan

refugees

among

kindred

Mexican

Indians mightelicit internal support forthe

Guatemalan

guerrillas.7

The

UNHCR

must

channel aid througha

Mexican

agency called

COMAR,

and

can only assist refugees

officiallydesignated by

COMAR.

The

vastmajorityof

refugeesin

Mexico

are notrecognized bythe

Mexican

government.

None

oftheSalvadoransarerecognizedat

all.

Mexico

has at times deported large

numbers

of Central

American

refugees, despite protests by the

UNHCR,

COMAR,

and

others.

Because

ofthe lackof

recognitionfor

most

refugeesinMexico, fewhave

been

allowedtowork.

Mexico, like

Honduras,

consideredrepatriation the best solution, and, barring that, decided to

move

the refugees

away from

the

Guatemalan

border.

Most

re-fusedtorelocate:

some

fledthe

camps

forotherpartsof

Mexico,

and

a few returned to

Guatemala.

Mexican

officials have taken extraordinary

measures

to coerce

relocation,including cuttingoff

camp

supplies,burning camps,interrogating

and

beatingrefugees,

and

detain-ingandinterrogating Catholic workers.8Press

and

human

rights officials

were

barred accessduring the

deporta-tionperiods,

and

UNHCR

itselfwasbarred

camp

access

forelevendays.

Mexico

hasrecently

begun

demonstrat-ing

more

concern overthe

human

rightsabusesfacedby

the

Guatemalans,

and

since 1988hasceasedpressuring

forrepatriation.

Nicaragua

under

the Sandinista

government

received

many

refugees

from

ElSalvador

and Guatemala,

aswell

asprovidinga safe

haven

to

many

ofthe

UNHCR's

most

"difficult-to-place"refugees.9Nicaraguaoffered

incen-tives toemployers ofrefugees,

and encouraged

Salva-doran-run agrarian cooperatives. It is unclear

which

refugeeswillwishtoorbe allowedtocontinue seeking asylum in Nicaragua

under

theunstable presidency of Violeta

Chamorro,

orifany such refugee

programs

have

been

continued, particularlysinceNicaragua is in the processofreceiving

many

returnees.

Inthe region,Costa Ricaisthefinalsignificanthost of Central

American

refugees.

Though

also holding

partisan views of the regional conflicts, Costa Rica's

refugee reception in the 1980s

was

markedly

more

humanitarian

and

less discriminatory than the recep-tion offered by the other host countries,

and

is thus

worth

acloser look.

Refugees

in

Costa Rica

Of

all the regional refugee hosts, Costa Rica has

perhaps

made

the greatest effort todepoliticize

assis-tance to Central

American

refugees.

Though

not

im-mune

from

national ideologies

and

securityconcerns,

Costa Rica has offereda relatively

more

tranquilhaven

forregional refugees.

Costa Rica isa tiny country(51,000 square

kilome-ters) with apopulation that onlyreached 3 million in

July 1990.

The

population changes

from

1973-1984 in

Costa Rica

were

extraordinary:

whereas

thetotal

popu-lationofCosta Ricarose29.1%,theCentral

American

alienpopulation of Costa Ricarose

86%.

By

April30,

1990, there

were

48,565officiallyregisteredrefugees in

Costa Rica (mostly Central American),

and

estimatesof 150,000to200,000

undocumented

refugees.

The

presidency ofOscarArias (1986-1990)was

marked

by heroicdiplomaticeffortsto settlethe regional

con-flicts, culminating in the Arias Peace Plan of 198710.

Costa Rica

and

Nicaragua subsequently signed the

Agreement

on

Voluntary Repatriationtobeginmutual

assistance to the Nicaraguansin Costa

Rican

territory

who

wished toreturnto Nicaragua,an

agreement

that

didnotsee

much

success until1990.

InCostaRica, nationalrefugeepolicyiscoordinated

by

DIGEPARE-the

General

DirectorateforRefugees.

The

General

Directorate oversees the refugee-related

activitiesoftheHealthMinistry, theEducation

Minis-try,

UNHCR,

embassies,

NGOs,

etc.,

and

evaluatesand approvesallrefugeeprojectsinCosta Rica.

As

of

May

1990, there

were

sixrefugee

camps

inCosta

Rica,administered bya varietyoforganizations.

normally picked

up

bytheCivil

Guard

and

takento

one

ofthetwo reception

camps

run bytheInternational

Red

Cross.

Refugees

receive assistanceineducation, nutri-tion,

and

health. Children

up

to theage of 16attend

school in the camps;

UNHCR

pays for supplies

and

teachersalaries forthe

camp

schools,

which

arerun by

theCosta

Rican

Ministry ofPublicEducation.

Theoreti-cally,refugees

remain

inCosta

Rican

reception

camps

only

one

month

(thoughinpracticeitoftenrunsashigh

as6months),

and

canthen

be

transferredtoTilardn-a

camp

run bythe International

Rescue

Committee

(IRC)--for a six-month transitory sojourn to get their legal status processed. Costa

Rican

immigration officials

interview the refugees to see if they are eligible for officialrefugeestatus

under

the1951

Convention

orthe

1967 Protocol.11

AfterTilar^n,refugees

may

move

to

IRC-run

Achote

toreceive physical

and

educational preparationfor

work

opportunities (agricultural

and

handicrafts, mostly).

Refugeesin

Achote

continuetoreceivehousing,water, health care, etc.,

and

general counseling

on

how

to integrate.

IRC

looks for

businessmen

or land

owners

willingtohirerefugee

employees

and

willingtopayfor theirSocialSecuritytax.

Those

who

stayinthe

camps

are

free to

work—

mostly

on

nearbycoffee,sugarcane,

and

otherfarms;however,theycannot

work

untiltheyhave

general

work

authorizationcards,as well aspermission

from

the

Labor

Ministry

and

the Social Security

Minis-tryforthespecificjobrequested.Intheory,the

culmina-tionof

camp

lifeis

supposed

tobeintegration intoCosta Rican society via cooperatives, associations, etc.

For

instance,severalformer Salvadorancamp-dwellersformed

a

permanent

cooperative settlementin

Guanacaste

that

has thrivedforseveralyears.

In reality,

most

refugees enteringCosta Rica never even go through the

camp

process; although

most

of

them

remain

undocumented

refugees,

some

eventually

do

go to the Immigration

Department

to apply for

asylum.Getting refugeestatusisaslow processinCosta Rica

and

cantake

up

to eightmonths.

Temporary

status

must

be

renewed

every threemonths, but entitles the refugees to a health examination

and

freehealth care

fromtheCosta

Rican government,

aswellas free

assis-tance

from

the

UNHCR.

Applying

for

work

authorization is a separate

and

equally lengthy process.

Refugees

usedtobe permitted

onlyto

work

injobs that didnot displace Costa Rican

workers.

However,

in January 1990, the Costa Rican

judiciary

announced

that refugees

meeting

any

one

of

the followingconditions

would

beeligible foranytypeof work:

had

been

in Costa Rica over three years,

were

marriedtoaCosta Rican, or

had

a childbornthere.

UNHCR

isnot indirectcontrol ofrefugee policies

and

programs

inCosta Rica butdoes providetechnical

and financialsupport,as wellasserveas liaison forthe

variety of refugee service-providers in Costa Rica.

The Costa RicanMinistryofPublicEducationrunsschoolsintherefugeecamp.

UNHCR's

total 1989budgetinCosta Rica was$6,072,000,

augmented

by $425,000

worth

of food donations

from

the

U.N.

World

Food

Programme

and

miscellaneous

assistance

from

the

UNDP.

In1989,

non-UNHCR

contributionstorefugee

work

inCosta Rica included the following: housing funding

from Sweden;

food

from

Japan, the

European

Eco-nomic

Community,

and

the ChristianAssociation for

ReliefEverywhere; medicalsuppliesfromCatholic Relief Services;

and hundreds

ofprojects

and programs

funded and/or run by a large assortment ofCosta

Rican

and

foreign

NGOs,

as well as other foreign governments. CostaRica'srefugeepoliciesoverallcanbe considered

fairlyeffective, humanitarian,

and

beneficial—

remark-able attributes given the recentvolatilityofthe region.

Despite thebreadth of refugeeservices availablein

CostaRica, the

most

satisfactoryrefugeeservice

avail-ablein

most

instances isvoluntaryrepatriation to the refugee'scountry oforiginatatime

when

itissafe

and

fruitful to

do

so. After the defeat of the Sandinista

government

inNicaragua,it

was

generally

assumed

that

armed

civilconflictthere

would

end.Since Nicaraguans

were

byfarthelargestrefugeepopulationinCostaRica,

UNHCR

began

gearing

up

for massive repatriation. Prior to

June

1990, fewer than 100 Nicaraguans per

month

were

voluntarily repatriating: as of

May

1990,

2,600 Nicaraguans

had

askedto repatriate.

Nevertheless, thesituationinNicaraguadidnotchange

enough

politicallyoreconomicallytomotivateallofthe refugees to repatriate.

Many

refugeeworkers inCosta Rica told

me

that Nicaraguans

were

still crossing the

border into Costa Rica,

and

that massive volunteer

repatriation

was

unlikelybecause too

many

uncertain-tiesremained.

Unfortunately for the Nicaraguans

and

other refu-gees, Costa Rica's

welcome

mat

is slowly being

com-ing,the

government was

verygenerous;aftereightyears, (a)theresourcesarelimited,

and

(b)therefugee

num-bershaveincreased."12

Though

receiving a substantial

amount

of international assistance for her refugee population, Costa Rica's

own

economy

is stagnating

(fora varietyofreasons),

and

she is

under

increasing

socialpressuretorepatriate refugees.

The

government

ofCostaRicahas,nevertheless,

been one

ofthe region's strongestadvocatesof continued

UNHCR

refugee-plan-ninginthe region.

International

Refugee

Agreements

Though

national security concerns have

dominated

regionalresponsestoCentral

American

refugee

move-ments,

most

ofthe region's

governments

have signed

onto

or otherwise recognizedat leastafew ofthe

U.N.

refugeeagreements.Countriesreceiving refugeesinthe

region haveadheredtothe principleofnonrefoulement,

though

in practice there have

been

many

problems:

access to the legalisticasylum-seekingprocess is diffi-cult inallthe countries; in

Honduras,

Salvadoran

refu-geeshave

been

attacked

and

killedby

Honduran

soldiers

whilecrossing the border, approachingthe

Honduran

camps,

and

eveninthecamps;inMexico,allrefugees are subjecttoexpulsionatany time withoutcause.

Steps towards improvinginternationalrefugee

coor-dination in the region have increasedin recent years,

startingwith the various refugee resolutions

incorpo-rated intothe"Central

American Peace

Plan" of 1984 (Esquipulus I) enacted by the

Contadora Group, and

theresolutions

on

refugeeprinciplessignedinthe

Cart-agena

Declaration of1984.

In1987, theAdvisory

Group on

PossibleSolutionsto

Central

American

Refugee Problems began

the process

ofregional intergovernmental planning

and

coopera-tion

on

refugeeissues. In

August

1987, Costa Rica,El

Salvador,Nicaragua,

Guatemala,

and

Honduras

signed

the"Arias

Peace

Plan" (Esquipulus II),further outlin-ing regional goals for refugeeassistance. In 1988, the

U.N. responded

to thepeace initiativeby approvinga SpecialPlan of

Economic

Cooperation

(PEC)

for

Cen-tral America.

PEC's

goals

were

to use

development

programs

to link social

and

economic

policieswiththe

long-term Central

American

peaceprocess.

An

important

component

of

PEC

receiving early

implementation

was

PRODERE-the

Development

Pro-gram

forDisplacedPersons,Refugees,

and

Returneesin

CentralAmerica. Draftedinlate1988,

PRODERE

has

usedgrassroots projects to

promote

sustainable

devel-opment

in Central America. Projects have included food aid,

community

organization, health

and

sanita-tion provisions,

promotion

of

economic

activity,

infra-structure

improvements, and

legalaid.It iscoordinated

by the

U.N.

Development

Program

(UNDP),

and

in-cludes

program

assistance

from

UNHCR,

the

Interna-tional

Labor

Organization,

and

the

World

Health

Or-ganization.

In

May

1989,

Guatemala

hosted the first

Interna-tional

Conference

on

Central

American

Refugees

(CIREFCA),

which

brought together representatives

from

UNHCR,

UNDP,

the principal

NGOs,

and

the principally affected countries.

CIREFCA

delegates reaffirmedprevious resolutions

on

Central

American

refugeeissues,as well as

recommending

the following:

developmentof a

North

American

convention

on

human

rights;recognitionofthe roleof

NGOs

inrefugee

assis-tance;assistancetorefugeehost nations;

and

supportof theAriasPeacePlan.

CostaRica, Nicaragua, ElSalvador,

Honduras,

Be-lize,

Guatemala, and Mexico

allsubmittedto

CIREFCA

specificproject requestsfor relief

and

development

for

refugee populations. This

commitment

of all of the region's

governments

tocooperate with each other

and

the

U.N.

indevelopment-oriented refugeeprojects

was

an admissionthat

no one was

expectingpeacetobreak out anytime

soon

in Central

America,

as well as a

recognition thatsuch

an

unlikelypeace

would

not, inany

case,bring about an

immediate

reversalof refugeeflows

or providefor

smooth

refugeereturns.

CIREFCA

was

conceived asa bridge to link emer-gency-oriented refugeeactivitiestolonger-term

devel-opment

initiatives.

CIREFCA

accomplished several

importantthings:

• _{allthe host countries seriously}evaluated_their

refu-gee problems;

- _thehistorictendency_tosubjugatehumanitarian

refu-geeissuestonational security

was

diminished;

• _{host countries}

made

_{firm refugee policy}

commit-ments;

• _{service-providers} developed

more

coordination _of

resources

and

services;

• _dialogue

among NGOs,

theU.N.,

and

host countries

improved;

• _{hostcountries}agreed_{thatsolutionsforthe displaced}

needed

to be long-term because the refugees had

become

a

major

structuralproblem;

and

•

UNDP

_linked

CIREFCA

_toportionsofits

PEC

man-date,therebyestablishingstrongties

between

UNDP

and

UNHCR

in theregionforthefirst time.13

With

technical assistance

from

CIREFCA

headquar-ters inCostaRica,

CIREFCA

delegates

produced

solid

documentation

on

theirrefugeeplansforhealth,

educa-tion,agriculturalproduction,

and

basic

community

in-frastructure.

CIREFCA

projects

were

not expected to

reachallofthe2million-plusrefugeesinthe region, but they

were

expected toaddressthe

most

urgentrefugee needs.

Though

internal strife persists in El Salvador,

definitelybrought

new hope

fororganized

humanitar-ian assistance to Central

American

refugees

and

af-fectedcommunities.

Refugees

in

Costa Rica

since

CIREFCA

Costa Rica hasalways

been

an active participantin

thelong-term

CIREFCA

process.

As

UNHCR

official Jose"Riera pointed outto

me

in

May

1990,Costa Rica probably administered

some

S35 million in

interna-tional refugeeaid

between

1981

and

1989: "If this

had

been injob-creation instead ofmaintenance, imagine

the

economic

development."14

Though

hoping

for sig-nificant refugee (especially Nicaraguan) repatriation,

Costa Rica recognized the potential benefits of

pro-ceeding with

CIREFCA.

CostaRica's request for

CIREFCA

fundingin

May

19S9

was S80

million.

Some

of the first

CIREFCA

projects

implemented

in Costa Rica included: a

low-income

housingproject,paidforby

Sweden;

the closing

oftheAlvaperal

camp,

paidforbySpain;

and

the closing

down

of the

Lim6n

refugee

camp

by giving all the residents the

means

to integrate into the

community

(housingmaterials,small businessloans,etc.),paid for

bythe

PRODERE

fund.

PRODERE

continued to fund refugee projects in

1990,with plans for"integrated rural

development

in different communities," targeting

some

300

refugee families

and 300 low-income

Costa

Rican

families.15In addition,CostaRicarequested

more

international fund-ingatthe

June

1990

CIREFCA

meeting. Costa Rica's

General Directoratefor

Refugees

drafteda totalof nine

project

and

program

requests,divided into three

catego-ries: institutional,economic,

and

social.

The

first institutional project

was

to bea National

Census

of

Undocumented

Aliens. Official

documents

would

be provided to the

undocumented, and

Costa Rica

would

studythepossibilityof allowing

them

access

tobasicCosta

Rican

local

governmental

services.This

documentation would

also serveas

work

authorization.

Relatedtothecensus

would bea

"Migratory Regulation andLegalizationof Refugees

and

Undocumented

Ali-ens":sixregionalmigration centers

would

beconstructed

and staffed to provide reception, regulate migration,

and administerrepatriation.

The

finalinstitutional

pro-gram

would

be a

"Reinforcement

of the Ministry of

Labour

forthe

Labour

Insertion ofRefugees

and

Un-documented

Aliens.. .intotheCosta

Rican

jobmarket". Coordinatedanalysisofrefugees

and

employment

op-portunities

would

result in theestablishment ofa

na-tional

employment

bureau

tobenefitbothrefugees

and

Costa Ricans lookingforwork.

Costa Rica submitted four social projects for

CI-REFCA

fundingin

June

1990.

The

first

was

"Strength-ening of National Health Services for Refugees

and

Undocumented

Aliens."This

was

tobea3-year project

to

expand

infrastructure

and programs

inthe sectorsof

primary health care, occupational safety

and

health, sanitation,nutrition,etc.,inareas highly populated by

refugees.

Second

was "Educational Infrastructure

Needs

to Benefit Refugees,

Undocumented

Aliens

and

Na-tionals"-also a 3-year project targeted for the areas heavilyinhabitedbyrefugees.

The

project

would

involve repairing40oldclassrooms;constructing

47

new

class-rooms,

49

new

bathrooms,

and 60

facultyhouses;

fur-nishing2,500desks;

and

providingmiscellaneous

edu-cational supplies.

The

third social

program

submitted

was

for

"Housing

Credit for

Refugees and

Nationals

The

commitment

of

all

_of

the

region's

governments

to

cooperated

with

each

other

and

the

U.N.

in

development-oriented

refugee

projects

was an

admission

that

no

one

was

expecting

peace

to

break out

anytime

soon

in

Central

America...

Participatingin

Mixed

ProductiveProjects."

The

goals

were

toprovidecredit torefugeesforthepurchase of

550

homes—

with

an emphasis on

self-constructionefforts—

at an average cost perunit of $3,000.

Housing

credits

were

expectedto assist100Costa

Rican

families

and 400

refugee families.

The

project

would

(in theory) allow

future repatriates to transfer their units to "another refugee family or to a Costa

Rican

family of similar

socio-economic standing"and,in effect,the repatriates

couldnegotiate gettingtheirloan

bought

out.Finally,a

social

program was

submittedfor"Child

Care

for

Refu-gee,

Undocumented,

and

Costa

Rican

Mothers."

The

plan included construction offour

new

daycarecenters

and

the expansion and/or repair of 13 others in the

Lim6n

and San

Joseareas.It

was

intendedtobenefit

640

children.

Daycare

centers arestill

uncommon

in Costa

Rica,

and

expansion of child care options is crucial,

particularly in light of Costa Rica's trend towards

fe-male-headed

households.

The

two

broad

economic

projectssubmittedfor fund-ing

were

"Training

and

Credit for

Refugees

in Costa Rica and/or ReturneesinNicaragua,"

and "Support

for

Productive

and

Communal

Activities to Attain

Self-Sufficiency

Among

the

Nicaraguan

Refugee

Population

Remaining

inCosta Rica."Inthe first,

Those

who

optforvoluntaryrepatriationwillreceive

job training, in coordination with Nicaragua....For

Refugees waitin lineatthe OfficeofMigrationofRefugeesinSanJose.

The

training

and

creditproject

was

intendedtohelp 6,590refugees (1,318heads of households). Thisproject

is to be run by

ACIAR,

a

NGO

which

already has substantial relevant experience.

Regarding

the second

Economic

program,

The

goalsofthis project,

which

will last3years,are the following:

economic

self-sufficiencyfor at least80

familiesthroughtheirincorporationintoproductive

agriculturalprojects;incorporation of

some

90 heads ofhouseholdsinto

permanent

salaried positionswith

agriculturalbusinesses

and

industries;establishment of smallfamilyproduction

and

servicebusinesses

and

shops for

40

families with semiskilled labor

who

require a little assistance to attain self-sufficiency;

integrationof90 heads of householdsaspartnersin

solvent existing small businesses

and

productive

or-ganizations;

and

guaranteedaccesstobasic

commu-nity public services (health, education, water, elec-tricity, etc.).

The

expectedbeneficiaries

would

be

300

rural

refu-gee

and

Costa

Rican

families"oflimitedmeans." Thisis

obviouslyanambitiousproject,butsimilar(albeit smaller-scale) projects have already

been

successfully

imple-mented

in CostaRica.16

Despite continued

CIREFCA

planning in 1990

and

1991,Costa Ricahasmaintained voluntaryrepatriation as her refugeepolicy ofgreatestimportance;

unfortu-nately,thedisappointing

numbers

of voluntary

repatri-ateshasfinallyledCosta Ricatoconsiderdeportation.

InJuly 1990,Costa Ricainitiateda

12-month

periodin

which

undocumented

refugees

were

asked to file for

residentialpermits,studentpermits,or other

appropri-atedocumentation.

Rosa

Eugenia

Castro ofthe

Gen-eralDirectoratefor

Refugees

told

me

on

April 1,1991,

thatifthe

undocumented

didnot applyforstatusbyJuly 1991, they

would

be deported.

Evidently, there arestill

many

refugeesafraid to

come

forwardtoattemptregistrationinCostaRica.

On

Feb-ruary2, 1991, the Raleigh

News

and

Observer reported

that Costa Rica

was

planning to deport 75,000 illegal aliens,

and

Luis

Guardia

oftheCosta

Rican embassy

in

Washington

confirmed

on

February22, 1991,that70,000

deportations

were

planned.

As

the

end

of 1991

ap-proached,this

number

ofdeportations

had

stillnotbeen

reached,

and

the future ofillegal aliens in Costa Rica remainsuncertain.

Costa Rica appearsto

be

atan importantcrossroads

inrefugee policy.In

many

ways,Costa Ricahasledthe

way

in careful

and

humanitarian planning for Central

American

refugees,aswellascooperation withtheU.N.

She

is evidently

worn

out economically, however, un-abletoobtain internationaldonationssufficienttocover the

economic and

social costsof trying to sustain, let

aloneintegrate,the

huge

numbers

ofrefugeesinsideher

borders.Costa Ricaisalsoledbya

new

presidentwith

lessinterestinregional

diplomacy

and

cooperation than

innational

economic

development.

Conclusions about Refugee Planning

The

international

community

canlearn

many

lessons

from

CostaRica'sfirst

decade

ofmassive refugee

recep-tion.

One

ofthe

most

importantlessonsisthatrefugee

needscannoteasily

be

separated

from

theneeds ofthe

restofthe country;evenrefugeesin

camps

willhave an

effect

on

local roads, water use, food consumption,

employment

patterns,

and

so forth. Refugees free to

move

and

work

where

theylike willhave an evenbigger

impact-an

impact that can be beneficial, or at least

neutral,ifwell-planned

and

aidedby outsidefunding.

A

humanitarian responsetorefugees alsoappearstohave

some

ameliorative effect

on

regional

peacemaking

ef-forts.Finally, the international

community

should not takeadvantage ofahost country's generosityby denying her adequatefinancial aid

and

planning assistancefor

her refugeeservices,nor byrefusingtoaccept afairshare ofrefugeesforresettlement.

Once

one

lookspastthepoliticalcomplexities,

refu-geeservicesrequire the basicelements of

development

planning.Thus,thefirsttaskof refugeeservice

provid-ersisto

minimize

thepoliticalconstraints

on

their

job--eitherbyindirectlobbying, international concessions,

or separationofcontroversialissues

from

main

resettle-ment

projects.

Once

politicalobstaclesare neutralized (orminimized), refugeeplanning should beintegrated into

comprehensive development

programs.

In a broader sense, the Central

American

refugee

crisishasdramatizedthe

need

toreassesstheresponse

gov-ernments

are reluctanttosee international assistance

go

torefugees ratherthancitizens,development-oriented

assistancecan provebeneficial toboththe refugeesas

wellas the surrounding communities. Writing forthe

Population Council, Charles Keely has taken this

ap-proach toa

more

radicallevel:

...refugeesare aproduct of

underdevelopment.

Since over95 percent oftheworld's refugees areinAfrica,

Asia,andLatinAmerica,

one

shouldquestionwhether

astrategy

emphasizing

camps

and

third-country

re-settlement that developedin a

European

contextis

becoming

increasingly unable to

cope

with current

realities....resourcesshould

be

channeled to

asylum

countriesto

make

refugeesself-sustaining,

and

there

should be

development

aid for indigenous

popula-tionsintheareas ofhost countries

where

refugees are givenasylum.17

Resettlement workers should foregothe

assumption

that refugees are only

temporary

residents,

and

make

medium-

orlong-termplans

on

their behalf.

Even

ifthey

were

torepatriate,theprocess

would

beslow,

and

thus

allow for a gradual phase-out of any programs, or a

transformation ofsuccessful

programs from

refugee-orientation to citizen-refugee-orientation(i.e., small-scale

en-terprisescouldbesoldor givento local citizens,housing couldbetransferred,etc.).Resettlementworkersshould,

iffinancialresources permit, give refugees accesstothe

full range ofsocial services necessary to

mainstream

them-housing,job

referrals,transportation,education,

etc.Thisisa productive use ofrelieffundsthat should

serve to enable refugees to

become

participatory

and

contributory

members

ofsociety,ifonlytemporarily. Integration

depends

on

local

economies

as well as

politicalattitudestowards the refugees.Planners

must

learntoviewrefugeesas residentswithspecial

needs-notasforeignerswith separate

needs-and

plan

compre-hensive policies

encompassing

them. Planners should

also involvethe refugeesintheplanningprocess.

Obstaclestosuccessfulpolicies forrefugee-planning

remain.Firstofall,thereisalwaysconcernthattreating

refugeestooweliwillencouragefurther migration.

Though

thispossibilitycannot beentirelydenied,

one must

not

forgetthatthe original

wave

ofmigration

was

notcaused by expectations of a cushy life

somewhere

else, but

rather

from

a desperate

need

to escape an unlivable situation in the country oforigin.

Few

people depart

their

homelands

withoutseriousemotional

trauma

and,

while

rumors

ofgreattreatment

on

theothersideofthe

border

may

beadecisive factorindecidingto leave,such

expectations

would

never bethe initialfactor

motivat-ing the migrants to go. In addition, development-ori-entedrefugeeplanningisaslowprocess

and

could not even beginlogisticallybeforeanalystshave had

enough

timetoassess

whether

or notthereisa

good

chancethat

therefugees will

be

able to return to their

homelands

"soon."

However,

in situations

where

development-oriented or integration-oriented refugee planning is

economically orpoliticallyunacceptable,thehost

coun-tryshould consider lobbyingforresettlementtoa third

country rather than leaving the refugees to languish

indefinitely incamps.

Ultimately,

no

matter

how

many

international

agree-ments

are signed,independentstates willnotyield sov-ereignty

when

it

comes

toimmigration.

Even

ifacountry

is

bound

bytreatynottodeport

someone

tothecountry

from which

he/shefled,thecountry

might

stillforcethe

refugeetogotoathirdcountry.

Even

the

most

rational

and

depoliticized planners cannot escapethepolitical

baggage attachedtorefugeeplanning.

Understanding

of

the issues involved is the key to doing as

much

as

possibleforthesepeople

who

havesufferedso

much.

[Editor'snote:This researchcoincided with the

inaugura-tionofa

new

CostaRicanpresident,

and

also

came

shortly after theinaugurationofa

new

Nicaraguan

president,

and

thereforepertained to refugeepolicies that

would

soon

thereafterundergosignificantchange.]

Notes

1

Gordenker, Leon. Reftigees inInternationalPolitics. CroomHelm: London,1987. P.31.

2_Lawyer's

CommitteeforInternational

Human

Rights.Honduras:

A

Crisison theBorder.Lawyer'sCommitteeforInternational

Human

Rights:

New

York,1985. Pp.3,47-48.

-*_Zolberg,Aristide,AstriSuhrke,andSergioAguayo. EscapeFrom

Violence: ConflictandtheRefugeeCrisis intheDevelopingWorld. OxfordUniversityPress:

New

York,1989. P.216.

"*

RefugeesInternational.RINewsletter:

A

Global Viewfor the World's Dispossessed3(1):2. Washington,

DC,

Winter1987.

5_{Zolberg, p.218.}

"_AmericasWatchCommittee. GuatemalanRefugeesinMexico 1980-1984. AmericasWatchCommittee:

New

York,1984. P.9. 7

Ibid,p.43.

°RefugeePolicyGroup. "SummaryofRefugeeConditionsinCosta Rica,Honduras,and Mexico." SchoolofAdvancedInternational Studies,JohnsHopkinsUniversity,CenterforPolicyAnalysisand ResearchonRefugeeIssues: Washington,DC,1987. Pp.71-73. 9 _{Riera, Jos£}

(Program Official for

CIREFCA

Support Unit,

UNHCR).

Personalinterview: SanJose,CostaRica, 5/11/90. 1^AlsoknownasEsquipulasII,detailedinthe next section. 11_{Thedefeatof the Sandinistas}

inNicaragua hasledCosta Rica to refuseallnewNicaraguanapplications forrefugeestatus.However, Costa Ricawillnotwithdrawofficialrefugee statusoncegranted,so Nicaraguansalreadyholding refugee status cannot, bylaw,be de-ported.

''•_{Alvarado Ugalde, Raul (Operations Coordinator, International}

RescueCommittee). Personal interview: SanJos£,CostaRica,5/ 17/90.

"

Rierainterview, 1990. 14

Ibid.

**_{"Summaryof the}

OfficialDocumentof theRepublicofCostaRica: First International Meeting of the Follow-Up

Committee/CI-REFCA."

New

York, June27-28,1990. 16_Ibid.

17