LABOR CASE DIGEST TERMINATION - JUST CAUSE Serious Misconduct
Maribago Resort vs. Dual, July 20, 2010 G.R. No. 180660 July 20, 2010
Facts: On January 5, 2005, a group of Japanese guests and their companions dined at Maribago Beach Resort’s Poolbar/Restaurant. Captain waiter Alvin Hiyas took their dinner orders comprising of 6 sets of lamb and 6 sets of fish. As per company procedure, Hiyas forwarded one copy of the order slip to the kitchen and another copy to Nito Dual. Pursuant to the order slip, fourteen (14) sets of dinner were prepared by the chef. Hiyas and waiter Genaro Mission, Jr. served 12 set dinners to the guests, and another 2 sets to their guides free of charge (total of 14 sets of dinner). After consuming their dinner, the guests paid the amount indicated in their bill and thereafter left in a hurry. The receipt show that only P3,036.00 was remitted by cashier Dual corresponding to 6 sets of dinner. A discrepancy was found between the order slip and the receipt issued which prompted petitioner Maribago to ask for an explanation from Dual and the waiters why they should not be
penalized. Clarificatory hearings were made and it was found out that the guests gave P10,500.00 to Mission as payment for the bill of P10,100.00. It was discovered later that only P3,036.00 was entered by Dual in the cash register. The rest of the payment was missing. The original transaction receipt for P10,100.00 was likewise missing and in its place, only a
transaction receipt for P3.036.00 was registered. Upon verification, it was also found out that the order slip was tampered by Alcoseba to make it appear that only six (6) set dinners were ordered. Respondent Dual was found guilty of dishonesty for his fabricated statements and for asking one of the waiters (Mission) to corroborate his allegations. He was terminated for dishonesty based on his admission that he altered the order slip.
Dual then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that respondent’s termination was without valid cause and ruled that respondent is entitled to separation pay. The NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals however reversed the decision and resolution of the NLRC. Finding no sufficient valid cause to justify respondent’s dismissal, the Court of Appeals ordered petitioner to pay respondent full backwages and separation pay. Thus a petition for review under Rule 45 was filed in the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.
HELD: No. Petitioner’s evidence proved that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and of stealing money entrusted to him as cashier. Instead of reporting P10,100.00 as payment by the guests for their dinner, respondent cashier only reported P3,036.00 as shown by the receipt which he admitted to have issued. Respondent’s acts constitute serious misconduct which is a
just cause for termination under the law. Theft committed by an employee is a valid reason for his dismissal by the employer. Although as a rule this Court leans over backwards to help workers and employees continue with their employment or to mitigate the penalties imposed on them, acts of dishonesty in the handling of company property, petitioner’s income in this case, are a different matter.
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Mangagawa sa Keihin v. Keihin Phils Corp., GR No. 171115, August 9, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioner Helen Valenzuela (Helen) was a production associate in
respondent Keihin Philippines Corporation (Keihin), a company engaged in the production of intake manifold and throttle body used in motor vehicles manufactured by Honda.
It is a standard operating procedure of Keihin to subject all its employees to reasonable search before they leave the company premises. On September 5, 2003, while Helen was about to leave the company premises, she saw a packing tape near her work area and placed it inside her bag because it would be useful in her transfer of residence. When the lady guard on duty inspected Helen’s bag, she found the packing tape inside her bag. The guard confiscated it and submitted an incident report dated September 5, 2003 to the Guard-in-Charge, who, in turn, submitted a memorandum regarding the incident to the Human Resources and Administration Department on the same date.
The following day, or on September 6, 2003, respondent company issued a show cause notice to Helen accusing her of violating F.2 of the company’s Code of Conduct, which says, "Any act constituting theft or robbery, or any attempt to commit theft or robbery, of any company property or other associate’s property. Penalty: D (dismissal)." Helen’s supervisor, called her to his office and directed her to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against her.
Helen, in her explanation, admitted the offense and even manifested that she would accept whatever penalty would be imposed upon her. She, however, did not reckon that respondent company would terminate her services for her admitted offense.
On September 26, 2003, Helen received a notice of disciplinary action
informing her that Keihin has decided to terminate her services. On October 15, 2003, petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay, with a prayer for reinstatement and payment of full backwages, as well as moral and exemplary damages. Petitioners alleged that Helen’s act of taking the packing tape did not
constitute serious misconduct, because the same was done with no malicious intent. Keihin, on the other hand, maintained that Helen was guilty of
serious misconduct because there was a deliberate act of stealing from the company.
The Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision dismissing the complaint of illegal dismissal. He brushed aside petitioners’ argument that the penalty imposed on Helen was disproportionate to the offense committed, and held that she indeed committed a serious violation of the company’s policies amounting to serious misconduct. The Labor Arbiter further held that Keihin observed the requirements of procedural due process in implementing the dismissal of Helen. He ruled that the following circumstances showed that the company observed the requirements of procedural due process: a) there was a show cause letter informing Helen of the charge of theft and requiring her to submit an explanation; b) there was an administrative hearing giving her an opportunity to be heard; and c) the respondent company furnished her with notice of termination stating the facts of her dismissal, the offense for which she was found guilty, and the grounds for her dismissal.20
On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the appeal of the petitioners and affirmed in toto the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that petitioners admitted in their Position Paper that Helen took the packing tape strewn on the floor near her production line within the company premises. By the strength of petitioners’ admission, the NLRC held that theft is a valid reason for Helen’s dismissal.
However, in a Resolution dated November 2, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition outright for not having been filed by an indispensable party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether, in taking the packing tape for her own personal use, Helen
committed serious misconduct, which is a just cause for her dismissal from service. (substantive aspect of the case)
2. Whether the petition of petitioners is out rightly dismissible for not having been filed by an indispensable party in interest (procedural aspect of the case)
HELD:
1. Yes. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for
termination. Misconduct is defined as "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." For serious misconduct to justify dismissal under the law, "(a) it must be serious, (b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer."
In the case at bar, Helen took the packing tape with the thought that she could use it for her own personal purposes. When Helen was asked to explain in writing why she took the tape, she stated, "Kumuha po ako ng isang
packing tape na gagamitin ko sa paglilipat ng gamit ko sa bago kong
her part to benefit herself when she attempted to bring home the packing tape in question.
It is noteworthy that prior to this incident, there had been several cases of theft and vandalism involving both respondent company’s property and personal belongings of other employees. In order to address this issue of losses, respondent company issued two memoranda implementing an
intensive inspection procedure and reminding all employees that those who will be caught stealing and performing acts of vandalism will be dealt with in accordance with the company’s Code of Conduct. Despite these reminders, Helen took the packing tape and was caught during the routine inspection. All these circumstances point to the conclusion that it was not just an error of judgment on the part of Helen, but a deliberate act of theft of company
property.
The petitioners also argue that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh and disproportionate to the offense committed since the value of the thing taken is very minimal. Petitioners cite the case of Caltex Refinery Employees
Association v. National Labor Relations Commission where Arnelio M. Clarete (Clarete) was found to have willfully breached the trust and confidence
reposed in him by taking a bottle of lighter fluid. In said case, we refrained from imposing the supreme penalty of dismissal since the employee had no violations "in his eight years of service and the value of the lighter fluid is very minimal compared to his salary.
After a closer study of both cases, we are convinced that the case
of Caltex is different from the case at hand. Although both Clarete and Helen had no prior violations, the former had a clean record of eight years with his employer. On the other hand, Helen was not even on her second year of service with Keihin when the incident of theft occurred. And what further distinguishes the instant case from Caltex is that respondent company was dealing with several cases of theft, vandalism, and loss of company and employees’ property when the incident involving Helen transpired.
Regarding the requirement of procedural due process in dismissal of
employees, petitioners argue that the first notice failed to explain the charge being leveled against Helen. According to the petitioners, the notice was vague and lacked sufficient definitiveness.
2. It is clear that petitioners failed to include the name of the dismissed employee Helen Valenzuela in the caption of their petition for certiorari filed with the CA as well as in the body of the said petition. Instead, they only indicated the name of the labor union Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA) as the party acting on behalf of Helen. As a result, the CA rightly dismissed the petition based on a formal defect.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness.31 It is "precisely
be dismissed.’ The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present."32 The purpose of the rules on
joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.
Loss of Trust and Confidence
Century Canning Corp., et. al. v. Ramil, GR No. 171630, August 8, 2010 FACTS:
Petitioner Century Canning Corporation, a company engaged in canned food manufacturing, employed respondent Vicente Randy Ramil in August 1993 as technical specialist. Prior to his dismissal, his job included, among others, the preparation of the purchase requisition (PR) forms and capital
expenditure (CAPEX) forms, as well as the coordination with the purchasing department regarding technical inquiries on needed products and services of petitioner's different departments.
On 3 March, 1999, respondent prepared a CAPEX form for external fax modems and terminal server, per order of Technical Operations Manager Jaime Garcia, Jr. and endorsed it to Marivic Villanueva, Secretary of Executive Vice-President Ricardo T. Po, for the latter's signature. The CAPEX form,
however, did not have the complete details and some required signatures. The following day, with the form apparently signed by Po, respondent transmitted it to Purchasing Officer Lorena Paz in Taguig Main Office. Paz processed the paper and found that some details in the CAPEX form were left blank. She also doubted the genuineness of the signature of Po, as appearing in the form. Paz then transmitted the CAPEX form to Purchasing Manager Virgie Garcia and informed her of the questionable signature of Po.
Consequently, the request for the equipment was put on hold due to Po's forged signature. However, due to the urgency of purchasing badly needed equipment, respondent was ordered to make another CAPEX form, which was immediately transmitted to the Purchasing Department.
Suspecting him to have committed forgery, respondent was asked to explain in writing the events surrounding the incident. He vehemently denied any participation in the alleged forgery. Respondent was, thereafter, suspended on 21 April 1999. Subsequently, he received a Notice of Termination from Armando C. Ronquillo, on 20 May 1999, for loss of trust and confidence. Respondent, on May 24, 1999, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees against petitioner and its officers before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
LA Potenciano S. Canizares rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Aggrieved by the LA's finding, respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC First Division in its Decision set aside the ruling of LA Canizares. The NLRC declared
respondent's dismissal to be illegal and directed petitioner to reinstate respondent with full backwages and seniority rights and privileges. It found that petitioner failed to show clear and convincing evidence that respondent was responsible for the forgery of the signature of Po in the CAPEX form. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. To respondent's surprise and dismay, the NLRC reversed itself and rendered a new Decision upholding LA Canizares' dismissal of his complaint. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC.
Frustrated by this turn of events, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent and reinstated the earlier decision of the NLRC. It ordered petitioner to reinstate respondent, without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and to pay respondent full backwages from the time his
employment was terminated up to the time of the finality of its decision. The CA, likewise, remanded the case to the LA for the computation of backwages of the respondent. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent was validly dismissed.
RULING: Yes.
Petitioner's main allegation is that there are factual and legal grounds constituting substantial proof that respondent was clearly involved in the forgery of the CAPEX form. Petitioner insists that the mere existence of a basis for believing that respondent employee has breached the trust and confidence of his employer suffices for his dismissal. Finally, petitioner maintains that aside from respondent's involvement in the forgery of the CAPEX form, his past violations of company rules and regulations are more than sufficient grounds to justify his termination from employment.
However, the record of the case is bereft of evidence that would clearly establish Ramil's involvement in the forgery. They did not even submit any
affidavit of witness or present any during the hearing to substantiate their claim against Ramil.
Respondent alleged in his position paper that after preparing the CAPEX form on 3 March 1999, he endorsed it to Marivic Villanueva for the signature of the Executive Vice-President Ricardo T. Po. The next day, respondent received the CAPEX form containing the signature of Po. Petitioner never controverted these allegations in the proceedings before the NLRC and the CA despite its opportunity to do so. Petitioner's belated allegations in its reply filed before this Court that Marivic Villanueva denied having seen the CAPEX form cannot be given credit. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.
Thus, if respondent retrieved the form on March 4, 1999 with the signature of Po, it can be correctly inferred that he is not the forger. Had the CAPEX form been returned to respondent without Po's signature, Villanueva or any officer of the petitioner's company could have readily noticed the lack of signature, and could have easily attested that the form was unsigned when it was released to respondent.
Furthermore, while employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the services of employees who perform functions which by their nature require the employers' full trust and confidence and the mere
existence of basis for believing that the employee has breached the trust of the employer is sufficient, this does not mean that the said basis may be arbitrary and unfounded.
The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause. Loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid cause for dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and
convincingly established, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
necessary. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whim, caprice or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer.
G.R. No. 164640 June 13, 2008 CYNTHIA GANA, petitioner,
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ABOITIZ HAULERS, INC., and CARL **WOZNIAK, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS: On December 1, 1996, Cynthia Gana (petitioner) commenced her employment as marketing manager of Total Distribution and Logistics System, Inc. (TDLSI), another sister company of Aboitiz Transport, Aboitiz Container and Aboitiz Haullers, respondent company. As marketing manager, petitioner received a monthly salary of P20,000.00 plus a monthly allowance of P15,000.00; and she availed herself of the company car plan.
On August 15, 1997, petitioner was transferred from TDLSI to respondent company retaining the same position as marketing manager.
On April 21, 1998, petitioner was required by private respondent Carl Wozniak (Wozniak), the Senior Vice-President and General Manager of Aboitiz Haulers, to explain in writing why she should not be penalized for having violated company rules on offenses against company interest.
Wozniak directed her to appear in an investigation to be conducted by the company and defend herself with respect to the electronic mails (e-mails) she sent to an official of Trans-America, divulging various confidential information about the business operations and transactions of Aboitiz Container which are detrimental to the said company.
On April 24, 1998, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter to Wozniak denying the charges against her.
In a letter dated May 22, 1998, Wozniak informed petitioner that her explanations during the investigation with respect to the charges leveled against her were found to be unacceptable; that she was found guilty of Betrayal of Confidential Information which constitutes sufficient reason for the company to lose the high degree of trust and confidence which it
reposed upon her as its manager; and that as a result, her employment with respondent company has been terminated.
Petitioner then filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Quezon City. On June 14, 1999, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision finding respondent company guilty of illegally dismissing petitioner.
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the Decision of the LA. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in its Order promulgated on May 3, 2002.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the Decision and Order of the NLRC.On April 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its presently assailed Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and affirming the questioned Decision and Order of the NLRC.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated July 26, 2004.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner is illegally dismissed. HELD:
HELD: NO. Petitioner relies on the conclusion of the LA that there is no sufficient evidence to justify petitioner's termination from employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. However, evidence shows otherwise. The LA cited private respondent's letter terminating petitioner from her employment to prove that respondent company failed to show sufficient evidence to establish the charges against petitioner. Contrary to the conclusion of the LA, it is very clear in the said letter that respondent company enumerated the facts and circumstances upon which petitioner's termination was based. Pertinent portions of the letter are as follows:
Last April 22, 1998, an investigation was conducted in order to give you the chance to present your side of matters that were contained in the letter to explain dated April 21, 1998 that was sent to you and which you received last April 21, 1998 also.
During the said investigation, it was established that:
a) You sent email messages/reports to Leslie Leow of Transamerica last March 9, 1998 and March 25, 1998 regarding the company's internal problems with the truckers, depot and special permit to load (spl) and the rates charge[d] by ACSI to its customers.
b) You sent again email message last April 16, 1998 to Leslie Leow
concerning the complaints of Mr. Carmelo Garcia regarding the company's poor services which puts the company's credibility to deliver good service in question.
c) You have literally provided Transamerica information about the
inefficiencies and inflexibility of the company in catering to the needs of the customer.
d) The Officers of the company only learned of the complaints of Mr. Carmelo Garcia because of your email messages to Transamerica.
e) You declared that your loyalty is to Transamerica and not to your employer, AHI.
The settled rule is that the mere existence of a basis for believing that a managerial employee has breached the trust of the employer justifies dismissal.
Petitioner does not deny having sent the subject e-mails to Trans-America. The Court finds no error in the conclusion of the CA that petitioner's intention in sending these e-mails was to inform Trans-America of the supposed
inefficiency in the operations of respondent company as well as the company's poor services to its clients. These pieces of information
necessarily diminish the credibility of respondent company and besmirch its reputation. In fact, Trans-America wrote Wozniak expressing its
disappointment in the services that the Aboitiz companies were rendering. Hence, respondent company cannot be faulted for having lost its trust and confidence in petitioner and in refusing to retain her as its employee
considering that her continued employment is patently inimical to
respondent company's interest. The law, in protecting the rights of labor, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer company
which itself is possessed of rights that must be entitled to recognition and respect.
Santos vs. Shing Hung Plastics Co., Inc., Sept. 29, 2008
MICHAEL V. SANTOS, Petitioner,- versus -SHING HUNG PLASTICS, CO., INC. and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents. Facts:
Respondent Shing Hung Plastics Co., Inc. hired Michael V. Santos (petitioner) as administrative assistant whose responsibilities included purchasing
equipment and supplies of the corporation.
He was, by Memorandum, asked to explain within 24 hours why, in the
purchase of silkscreen and paint thinner from JPN, Inc., only acknowledgment receipts, instead of official receipts, were received and recorded by the
corporation’s accounting department.
Petitioner explained that the purchase of the above-stated items were urgent, and the thinner was purchased from JPN Inc., instead of the
corporation’s then supplier Alto Chemicals, because the former charged a lower price.
On March 11, 2002, Chueh ordered him to rent a forklift and crane to move a 26-ton machinery of the corporation, hence, he asked the firm Bormahueco for a quotation thereof. The quotation given by Bormahueco was found to be too high by Chueh who thus ordered him to get one from another firm. Roos Industrial Construction, Inc. (Roos) quoted a lower rental rate of P28,000, hence, he, on the instruction of Chan and Chueh, asked the accounting department to issue a check for the purpose.
On April 2, 2002, he was informed of the termination of his employment on account of "money involvement with suppliers like JPN and Roos etc."
The corporation went on to claim as follows:
Upon investigation by Chueh, it was found out that petitioner manipulated the price of purchased items and earned commissions therefrom; that
petitioner had been an employee of JPN, Inc. "but was forced to resign due to some irregularities" and that petitioner refused to sign the termination letter and to receive his salary and other benefits, and had not been reporting for work since April 3, 2002.
By Decision of January 30, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. He thus ordered the corporation to reinstate petitioner and pay his full backwages, unpaid salary, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
On appeal,the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by Resolution of August 20, 2004, found petitioner’s dismissal for just cause but that due process requirements were not complied with. The NLRC thus set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision but awarded petitioner "one (1) month salary as indemnity, and his unpaid salary."
Issue: Whether petitioner was dismissed for just cause.
Held: Yes.By its evidence, the corporation duly established the acts imputed to petitioner which rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded of his position.
Petitioner further claimed that JPN, Inc. sold thinner at P500 per gallon lower than the P1,500 price of the corporation’s usual supplier, Alto Chemicals. The corporation controverted this claim, however, by presenting a document from Alto Chemicals quoting the price of thinner at P300 per gallon. In administrative proceedings, the law does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence suffices. The Court finds that the corporation had established reasonable grounds-bases of its decision finding petitioner unworthy of the trust and confidence his position demands.
Petitioner, at all events, argues that respondent failed to prove its claim that he is a confidential employee, hence, his tenure depended not on the trust and confidence he enjoyed from it. He advances that he is "not involved in the labor relation matter[s] in the respondent company."
Petitioner’s position fails. For the purpose of applying the provisions of the Labor Code on who may join unions of the rank-and-file employees,
jurisprudence defines "confidential employees" as those who "assist or act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations." However, for the
purpose of applying the Labor Code provision on loss of confidence as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, jurisprudence teaches that:
x x x [L]oss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving
employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property. To the first class belong managerial
employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and [to] the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated early on, petitioner’s duties included purchasing supplies and equipment of the corporation.
Enriquez vs. BPI, February 12, 2008 Enriquez vs. BPI
Feb 12, 2008 FACTS:
Enriquez and Sia were the branch manager and assistant branch manager, respectively of the BPI- Bacolod Singcang Branch. Enriquez had been an employee thereon for 32 years and Sia for 29 years.
On December 27,2002, their branch experienced a heavy volume of transactions owing to the fact that it was the last banking day of the year.
When banking hours came to a close, teller Geraldine Descartin (Descartin) purportedly discovered that she had a cash shortage of P36,000.00. It was later admitted by a co-teller Fregil that the shortage was incurred because Descartin had temporarily borrowed the money that week to pay her
financial obligations but intended to return the same on the first week of January. Teller Fregil reported the matter to Sia and Enriquez, both of whom suggested that teller Descartin fill the shortage with a loan from her family. Teller Descartin replied that her family did not have the money, she instead borrowed the amount from her in-laws. Thus, at 5:21 p.m., teller Descartin posted the unsigned withdrawal slip for the amount of P36,000.00 against the joint account of her parents-in-law. As the amount exceeded the floor limit for tellers which would require the approval of a superior officer, either Enriquez or Sia approved the transaction at 5:22 p.m. as reflected on the account records. Teller Descartin thereafter left the bank to secure the
signature of her mother-in-law Remedios and returned at past 7:00 p.m. with the signed withdrawal slip.
An investigation was made by the BPI head office and petitioners were directed to show cause to explain in writing why they should not be
sanctioned for conflict of interest and breach of trust. Later on, petitioners were dismissed from employment on grounds of breach of trust and
confidence and dishonesty.
Hence, a complaint was filed for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision that petitioners had been illegally dismissed ordering respondents to pay full backwages and moral and exemplary damages amounting to more than 7million pesos. On appeal, The NLRC reversed the decision but ordered respondents to give petitioners financial assistance equivalent to one-half month’s pay for every year of service.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
HELD: No. There is no denying that loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground for termination of employment. Hence, the basic requisite for
dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence or is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property. Moreover, the breach must be related to the performance of the employee’s function. Also, it must be shown that the employee is a managerial employee, since the term “trust and confidence” is restricted to said class of employees. The failure of
petitioners to report the cash shortage of teller Descartin, even if done in good faith, nonetheless resulted in their abetting the dishonesty committed by the latter. Under the personnel policies of respondent bank, this act of petitioners justifies their dismissal even on the first offense. Even assuming the version of petitioners as the truth, the fact remains that they willfully decided against reporting the shortage that occurred. As a result, in either
situation, petitioners’ acts have caused respondents to have a legitimate reason to lose the trust reposed in them as senior managerial employees. Their participation in the cover-up of the misconduct of teller Descartin makes them unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by their positions.
Willful Disobedience
Tongko vs. The Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co., Inc. November 7, 2008 G.R. No. 167622, November 07, 2008
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.), Inc. (Manulife) is a domestic corporation engaged in life insurance business. Renato A. Vergel De Dios was, during the period material, its President and Chief Executive Officer. Gregorio V. Tongko started his professional relationship with Manulife on July 1, 1977 by virtue of a Career Agent's Agreement (Agreement) he executed with Manulife.
In the Agreement, it is provided that:
It is understood and agreed that the Agent is an independent contractor and nothing contained herein shall be construed or interpreted as creating an employer-employee relationship between the Company and the Agent. The Company may terminate this Agreement for any breach or violation of any of the provisions hereof by the Agent by giving written notice to the Agent within fifteen (15) days from the time of the discovery of the breach. No waiver, extinguishment, abandonment, withdrawal or cancellation of the right to terminate this Agreement by the Company shall be construed for any previous failure to exercise its right under any provision of this Agreement. Either of the parties hereto may likewise terminate his Agreement at any time without cause, by giving to the other party fifteen (15) days notice in writing.
In 1983, Tongko was named as a Unit Manager in Manulife's Sales Agency Organization. In 1990, he became a Branch Manager. As the CA found, Tongko's gross earnings from his work at Manulife, consisting of
commissions, persistency income, and management overrides. The problem started sometime in 2001, when Manulife instituted manpower development programs in the regional sales management level. Relative thereto, De Dios addressed a letter dated November 6, 2001 to Tongko regarding an October 18, 2001 Metro North Sales Managers Meeting. Stating that Tongko’s Region was the lowest performer (on a per Manager basis) in terms of recruiting in 2000 and, as of today, continues to remain one of the laggards in this area.
Other issues were:"Some Managers are unhappy with their earnings and would want to revert to the position of agents." And "Sales Managers are doing what the company asks them to do but, in the process, they earn less." Tongko was then terminated.
Therefrom, Tongko filed a Complaint dated November 25, 2002 with the NLRC against Manulife for illegal dismissalIn the Complaint. In a Decision dated April 15, 2004, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of an employer-employee relationship.
The NLRC's First Division, while finding an employer-employee relationship between Manulife and Tongko applying the four-fold test, held Manulife liable for illegal dismissal. Thus, Manulife filed an appeal with the CA. Thereafter, the CA issued the assailed Decision dated March 29, 2005, finding the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and deeming the NLRC with no jurisdiction over the case. Hence, Tongko filed this petition.
Issue:
1. WON Tongko was an employee of Manulife 2. WON Tongko was illegally dismissed.
Held: 1. Yes
In the instant case, Manulife had the power of control over Tongko that would make him its employee. Several factors contribute to this conclusion. In the Agreement dated July 1, 1977 executed between Tongko and Manulife, it is provided that:
The Agent hereby agrees to comply with all regulations and requirements of the Company as herein provided as well as maintain a standard of
knowledge and competency in the sale of the Company's products which satisfies those set by the Company and sufficiently meets the volume of new business required of Production Club membership.Under this provision, an agent of Manulife must comply with three (3) requirements: (1) compliance with the regulations and requirements of the company; (2) maintenance of a level of knowledge of the company's products that is satisfactory to the company; and (3) compliance with a quota of new businesses.
Among the company regulations of Manulife are the different codes of conduct such as the Agent Code of Conduct, Manulife Financial Code of Conduct, and Manulife Financial Code of Conduct Agreement, which
demonstrate the power of control exercised by the company over Tongko. The fact that Tongko was obliged to obey and comply with the codes of conduct was not disowned by respondents.
Thus, with the company regulations and requirements alone, the fact that Tongko was an employee of Manulife may already be established. Certainly, these requirements controlled the means and methods by which Tongko was to achieve the company's goals.
More importantly, Manulife's evidence establishes the fact that Tongko was tasked to perform administrative duties that establishes his employment with Manulife.
Additionally, it must be pointed out that the fact that Tongko was tasked with recruiting a certain number of agents, in addition to his other administrative functions, leads to no other conclusion that he was an employee of Manulife. 2. Yes
In its Petition for Certiorari dated January 7, 2005[26] filed before the CA, Manulife argued that even if Tongko is considered as its employee, his employment was validly terminated on the ground of gross and habitual neglect of duties, inefficiency, as well as willful disobedience of the lawful orders of Manulife. Manulife stated:
In the instant case, private respondent, despite the written reminder from Mr. De Dios refused to shape up and altogether disregarded the latter's advice resulting in his laggard performance clearly indicative of his willful disobedience of the lawful orders of his superior. As private respondent has patently failed to perform a very fundamental duty, and that is to yield
obedience to all reasonable rules, orders and instructions of the Company, as well as gross failure to reach at least minimum quota, the termination of his engagement from Manulife is highly warranted and therefore, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.
It is readily evident from the above-quoted portions of Manulife's petition that it failed to cite a single iota of evidence to support its claims. Manulife did not even point out which order or rule that Tongko disobeyed. More importantly, Manulife did not point out the specific acts that Tongko was guilty of that would constitute gross and habitual neglect of duty or disobedience. Manulife merely cited Tongko's alleged "laggard
performance," without substantiating such claim, and equated the same to disobedience and neglect of duty.
Apropos thereto, Art. 277, par. (b), of the Labor Code mandates in explicit terms that the burden of proving the validity of the termination of
employment rests on the employer. Failure to discharge this evidential burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified, and, therefore, illegal.
The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just cause and this must be supported by substantial evidence. The settled rule in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings is that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the legality of an employer's dismissal of an employee, and not even a preponderance of evidence is necessary as substantial evidence is considered sufficient. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
Here, Manulife failed to overcome such burden of proof. It must be reiterated that Manulife even failed to identify the specific acts by which Tongko's
employment was terminated much less support the same with substantial evidence. To repeat, mere conjectures cannot work to deprive employees of their means of livelihood. Thus, it must be concluded that Tongko was
illegally dismissed.
Moreover, as to Manulife's failure to comply with the twin notice rule, it reasons that Tongko not being its employee is not entitled to such notices. Since we have ruled that Tongko is its employee, however, Manulife clearly failed to afford Tongko said notices. Thus, on this ground too, Manulife is guilty of illegal dismissal.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),
G.R. No. 157870, 3 November 2008 VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing
laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
ISSUE:
Whether or not paragraph (d) Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional?
RULING: Yes.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 contains provisions specifically directed towards
preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."
The random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
G.R. No. 164774 April 12, 2006
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA, Respondents.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading – principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
Respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the company. Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995, viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their
employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.
Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy. Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella
pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.
The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of
whatever nature.
Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to
recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work on December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She was denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the
memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the explanation, she was
nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorney’s fees. They averred that the
aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their union membership.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on January 11, 2002.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent court via Petition for Certiorari. In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the
Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision.
On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
ISSUE: Whether the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code
HELD: YES.These courts find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business. They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the
reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employee’s spouse. This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Petitioners’ sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the
Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.
The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic. As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on the singular fact that her resignation letter was written in her own
handwriting. Both ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus valid. The respondent court failed to categorically rule whether Estrella voluntarily resigned but ordered that she be reinstated along with Simbol and Comia. Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was dismissed due to her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign the termination papers but she was forced to tender her resignation letter in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she got impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked about as immoral is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all. Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrella’s dismissal is declared illegal.
Gross and Habitual Neglect of Duty
School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City vs. Taguiam, GR NO. 165565, July 14, 2008
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165565, July 14, 2008]
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY AND/OR SR. CRIS PINA A. TOLENTINO, S.SP.S., PETITIONERS, VS. CORAZON P.
TAGUIAM, RESPONDENT. DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.: Facts:
Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City. On March 10, 2000, the class president, wrote a letterto the grade school principal
requesting permission to hold a year-end celebration at the school grounds. The principal authorized the activity and allowed the pupils to use the
swimming pool. In this connection, respondent distributed the parent's/guardian's permit forms to the pupils.
Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federico's permit form was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.
Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. Petitioners issued a Notice of Administrative Charge to respondent for
alleged gross negligence and required her to submit her written explanation. Thereafter, petitioners conducted a clarificatory hearing which respondent attended. Respondent also submitted her Affidavit of Explanation.
Petitioners dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence.
In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter declared that respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. He opined that Chiara Mae drowned because respondent had left the pupils without any adult
supervision. He also noted that the absence of adequate facilities should have alerted respondent before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool. The Labor Arbiter further concluded that although respondent's
negligence was not habitual, the same warranted her dismissal since death resulted therefrom.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which ruled in her favor. The appellate court observed that there was insufficient proof that respondent's negligence was both gross and habitual
Issue: Whether respondent's dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid.
Held: Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time,
depending upon the circumstances.
Our perusal of the records leads us to conclude that respondent had been grossly negligent. First , it is undisputed that Chiara Mae's permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.
The purpose of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the parents have allowed their child to join the school activity involved. Respondent cannot simply ignore this by resorting to assumptions. Respondent admitted that she was around when Chiara Mae and her mother arrived. She could have requested the mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least called her up to obtain her conformity.
Second, it was respondent's responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she should have
coordinated with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.
As it turned out, since respondent was the only adult present, majority of the pupils were left unsupervised when she followed the two pupils who sneaked out. In the light of the odds involved, respondent should have considered that those who sneaked out could not have left the school premises since there were guards manning the gates. The guards would not have allowed them to go out in their swimsuits and without any adult accompanying them. But those who stayed at the pool were put at greater risk, when she left them unattended by an adult.
Notably, respondent's negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however, we are in agreement that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent. This is not the first time that we
have departed from the requirements laid down by the law that neglect of duties must be both gross and habitual. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, we ruled that Philippine Airlines (PAL) cannot be legally compelled to
continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross
negligence in the performance of his duties although it was his first offense. In that case, we noted that a mere delay on PAL's flight schedule due to aircraft damage entails problems like hotel accommodations for its
passengers, re-booking, the possibility of law suits, and payment of special landing fees not to mention the soaring costs of replacing aircraft parts. In another case, Fuentes v. National Labor Relations Commission, we held that it would be unfair to compel Philippine Banking Corporation to continue employing its bank teller. In that case, we observed that although the teller's infraction was not habitual, a substantial amount of money was lost. The deposit slip had already been validated prior to its loss and the amount reflected thereon is already considered as current liabilities in the bank's balance sheet. Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the
resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee. In this case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.
Analogous Cases
John Hancock Life Insurance Corp. vs. Davis, September 3, 2008 G.R. No. 169549 September 3, 2008
FACTS:
Respondent Cantre, an agency administration officer of petitioner corporation was accused of qualified theft for stealing Patricia Yuseco’s
credit card which the latter used to purchase items in various stores in the City of Manila. The NBI identified Cantre in a security video obtained from Abenson’s Robinsons Place where a proposed transaction was disapproved for giving the wrong information upon verification. However, the complaint was dismissed by the prosecutor because the affidavits presented by the NBI was not properly verified.
Meanwhile, petitioner placed respondent under preventive suspension and instructed her to cooperate with its ongoing investigation. Instead of doing so, however, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal alleging that petitioner terminated her employment without cause. The Labor Arbiter found that the respondent committed serious misconduct thus there was a valid cause for dismissal. Respondent appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the assailed decision. The CA found that the labor arbiter and NLRC merely adopted the findings of the NBI regarding respondent's
culpability. Because the affidavits of the witnesses were not verified, they did not constitute substantial evidence. The labor arbiter and NLRC should have assessed evidence independently as "unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations and conclusions of employers (did) not provide legal justification for dismissing an employee."
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid cause for termination HELD: Yes. Article 282 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 282. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobendience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representatives in connection with his work; (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Misconduct involves "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." For misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be:
1. of grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant and
2. connected with the work of the employee.
In this case, petitioner dismissed respondent based on the NBI's finding that the latter stole and used Yuseco's credit cards. But since the theft was not committed against petitioner itself but against one of its employees, respondent's misconduct was not work-related and therefore, she could not be dismissed for serious misconduct.
Nonetheless, Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those which are susceptible of comparison to another in general or in specific detail. For an employee to be validly dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article 282, the cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the employee.
A cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act or omission attesting to an employee's moral depravity. Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct.
Yrasuegui vs. PAL October 17, 2008 G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5'8") with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the company's weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.After meeting the required weight,
petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioner's weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty
effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his
grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division. On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given
another set of weight check dates. Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight
requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL
discriminated against him because "the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated."
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately." His motion for reconsideration having been denied,petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter ruledthat petitioner was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are
