1.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION
(G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989)
FACTS:
Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between Pioneer and petitioner Aboitiz.
The crane owned by Pioneer was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days thereafter.
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation as the exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz.
Whether or not Aboitiz is negligent and is thus liable for the death.
HELD:
Yes.
x x x [T]he victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but it was the negligence of Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the
arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. 12 The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and
therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The primary
factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of
comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
2.
La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals (17 SCRA 739)
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a La Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not
unloaded. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. While the father was still on the running board awaiting
for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over and killed.
Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which
was affirmed by CA, holding La Mallorca liable for quasidelict and ordering it to pay P6,000 plus P400. La
Mallorco contended that when the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the contractual obligation
between the parties ceases the moment the passenger alighted form the vehicle.
Held: On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the child who was already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the contract of carrier, still persists, we rule in the affirmative. It is a recognized rules that the relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said passenger near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists. Averment of quasidelict
is permissible under the Rules of Court, although
incompatible with the contract of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not (Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art. 2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised in the briefs can be passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of P3,000.00 the increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot be sustained.
4.
CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. vs. Unknown Owner
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V “NATIONAL HONOR,” NATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER SERVICES, INC.
[G.R. No. 161833. July 8, 2005]
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC) is the insurer of a shipment on board the vessel M/V “National Honor,” represented in the Philippines by its agent, National Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP).
The M/V “National Honor” arrived at the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT). The International Container Terminal Services, Incorporated
(ICTSI) was furnished with a copy of the crate cargo list and bill of lading, and it knew the contents of the crate. The following day, the vessel started
discharging its cargoes using its winch crane. The crane was operated by Olegario Balsa, a winchman from the ICTSI, exclusive arrastre operator of MICT.
Denasto Dauz, Jr., the checker-inspector of the NSCP, along with the crew and the surveyor of the ICTSI, conducted an inspection of the cargo. They
inspected the hatches, checked the cargo and found it in apparent good condition. Claudio Cansino, the stevedore of the ICTSI, placed two sling cables on each end of Crate No. 1. No sling cable was fastened on the mid-portion of the crate. In Dauz’s experience, this was a normal procedure. As the crate was being hoisted from the vessel’s hatch, the mid-portion of the wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air, about five feet high from the vessel’s twin deck, sending all its contents crashing down hard, resulting in extensive damage to the shipment.
PCIC paid the damage, and as subrogee, filed a case against M/V National Honor, NSCP and ICTSI. Both RTC and CA dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of negligence is applicable in the instant case.
HELD: No.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. he Court has defined extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods as follows:
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required
precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and “to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.”
The common carrier’s duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance, by the person entitled to receive them.] >When the goods shipped are either lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable. To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence.
However, under Article 1734 of the New Civil Code, the presumption of negligence does not apply to any of the following causes:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity; 2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; 5. Order or act of competent public authority.
It bears stressing that the enumeration in Article 1734 of the New Civil Code which exempts the common carrier for the loss or damage to the cargo is a closed list. To exculpate itself from liability for the loss/damage to the cargo under any of the causes, the common carrier is burdened to prove any of the aforecited causes claimed by it by a preponderance of evidence. If the carrier succeeds, the burden of evidence is shifted to the shipper to prove that the carrier is negligent.
“Defect” is the want or absence of something necessary for completeness or perfection; a lack or absence of something essential to completeness; a deficiency in something essential to the proper use for the purpose for which a thing is to be used. On the other hand, inferior means of poor quality, mediocre, or second rate. A thing may be of inferior quality but not
necessarily defective. In other words, “defectiveness” is not synonymous with “inferiority.”
x x x
In the present case, the trial court declared that based on the record, the loss of the shipment was caused by the negligence of the petitioner as the
shipper:
The same may be said with respect to defendant ICTSI. The breakage and collapse of Crate No. 1 and the total destruction of its contents were not imputable to any fault or negligence on the part of said defendant in handling the unloading of the cargoes from the carrying vessel, but was due solely to the inherent defect and weakness of the materials used in the fabrication of said crate.
The crate should have three solid and strong wooden batten placed side by side underneath or on the flooring of the crate to support the weight of its contents. x x x
3.
G.R. Nos. 66102-04August 30, 1990
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., respondents.
Santiago & Santiago for petitioner.
Federico R. Vinluan for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated July 29, 1983 in AC-G.R. Nos. CV-65885, CV-65886 and CV-65887 which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan dated December 27, 1978; and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 denying the motion for reconsideration.
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this principle is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court (see Sabinosa v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47981, July 24, 1989) in which case, a re-examination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken. This is Our task now.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
About 11:00 o'clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective homes. Although they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that day because the buses were full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip. The
not controverted by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the jeepney, with contrary
evidence. Purportedly riding on the front seat with Manalo was Mercedes Lorenzo. On the left rear passenger seat were Caridad Pascua, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right rear passenger seat were Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales. After a brief stopover at Moncada, Tarlac for refreshment, the jeepney proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes. Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos Reyes, or after stopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by
Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. What could have been a festive Christmas turned out to be tragic.
The causes of the death of the three jeepney passengers were as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
The deceased Catalina Pascua suffered the following injuries, to wit: fracture of the left parietal and temporal regions of the skull; fracture of the left mandible; fracture of the right humenous; compound fracture of the left radious and ullma middle third and lower third; fracture of the upper third of the right tibia and fillnea; avulsion of the head, left internal; and multiple abrasions. The cause of her death was shock, secondary to fracture and multiple hemorrhage. The fractures were produced as a result of the hitting of the victim by a strong force. The abrasions could be produced when a person falls from a moving vehicles (sic) and rubs parts of her body against a cement
road pavement. . . .
Erlinda Mariles (sic) sustained external lesions such as contusion on the left parietal region of the skull; hematoma on the right upper lid; and abrasions (sic) on the left knee. Her internal lesions were: hematoma on the left thorax; multiple lacerations of the left lower lobe of the lungs; contusions on the left lower lobe of the lungs; and simple fractures of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th ribs, left. The forcible impact of the jeep caused the above injuries which resulted in her death. . . .
The cause of death of Erlinda or Florida Estomo (also called as per autopsy of Dr. Panlasiqui was due to shock due to internal hemorrhage, ruptured spleen and trauma. . . .
Caridad Pascua suffered physical injuries as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
. . . lacerated wound on the forehead and occipital region, hematoma on the forehead, multiple abrasions on the forearm, right upper arm, back and right leg. . . .
The police investigators of Tacpal and policemen of San Manuel, Tarlac, Tarlac, upon arrival at the scene of the mishap, prepared a sketch (common exhibit "K" for private respondents "19" for Rabbit) showing the relative positions of the two vehicles as well as the alleged point of impact (p. 100, Record on Appeal):
. . . The point of collision was a cement pave-portion of the Highway, about six (6) meters wide, with narrow shoulders with grasses beyond which are canals on both sides. The road was straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of collision are visible and unobstructed. Purportedly, the point of impact or collision (Exh. "K-4", Pascua on the sketch Exh. "K"-Pascua) was on the western lane of the highway about 3 feet (or one yard) from the center line as shown by the bedris (sic), dirt and soil (obviously from the undercarriage of both vehicles) as well as paint, marron (sic) from the Rabbit bus and greenish from the jeepney. The point of impact encircled and marked
with the letter "X" in Exh. "K"-4 Pascua, had a diameter of two meters, the center of which was about two meters from the western edge of cement pavement of the roadway. Pictures taken by witness Bisquera in the course of the investigation showed the relative positions of the point of impact and center line (Exh. "P"-Pascua) the back of the Rabbit bus (Exh. "P"-1-Pascua"), the lifeless body of Catalina Pascua (Exh. "P-2 Pascua"), and the damaged front part of the Rabbit bus (Exh. "P-3 Pascua"). No skid marks of the Rabbit bus was found in the vicinity of the collision, before or after the point of impact. On the other hand, there was a skid mark about 45 meters long purportedly of the jeepney from the eastern shoulder of the road south of, and extending up to the point of impact.
At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles
following the jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair.
After conducting the investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of San Manuel, Tarlac, a criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. At the preliminary investigation, a probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo, thus, his case was elevated to the Court of First Instance. However, finding no sufficiency of evidence as regards the case of delos Reyes, the Court dismissed it. Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Not having appealed, he served his sentence.
Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. In Civil Case No. 1136, spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf. In Civil Case No. 1139, spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda Meriales. In Civil Case No. 1140, spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento also sued as heirs of Adelaida Estomo.
In all three cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc.
was also impleaded as additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1136 only.
For the death of Catalina Pascua, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1136 sought to collect the aggregate amount of P70,060.00 in damages, itemized as follows: P500.00 for burial expenses; P12,000.00 for loss of wages for 24 years;
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees. In the same case, plaintiff Caridad Pascua claimed P550.00 for medical expenses; P240.00 for loss of wages for two months; P2,000.00 for disfigurement of her face; P3,000.00 for physical pain and suffering; P2,500.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
In Civil Case No. 1139, plaintiffs demanded P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of Erlinda, P63,000.00 for loss of income; P10,000.00 for moral damages and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees or total of P80,000.00.
In Civil Case No. 1140, plaintiffs claimed P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of Adelaide, P56,160.00 for loss of her income or earning capacity; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees.
Rabbit filed a cross-claim in the amount of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim in the amount of P6,168.00 for the repair of the jeepney and P3,000.00 for its non-use during the period of repairs.
On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 113-114, Record on Appeal):
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds:
1) That defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo thru their negligence, breached contract of carriage with their
passengers the plaintiffs' and/or their heirs, and this Court renders judgment ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs —
a) In Civil Case No. 1136, for the death of Catalina Pascua, to pay her heirs the amounts of P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her life; P41,760.00 for loss of earnings; P324.40 for actual expenses and P2,000.00 for moral damages;
b) In the same Civil Case No.1136 for the injuries of Caridad Pascua, to pay her the amounts of P240.00 for loss of wages, P328.20 for actual expenses and P500.00 for moral damages;
c) In Civil Case No.1139 for the death of Erlinda Meriales, to pay her heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 — for indemnity for loss of her life; P622.00 for actual expenses, P60,480.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral damages;
d) In Civil Case No. 1140, for the death of Erlinda (also called Florida or Adelaida Estomo), to pay her heirs (the plaintiff the amount of P12,000.00 for indemnity for the loss of her life; P580.00 for actual expenses; P53,160.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral damages.
2) The defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having contracted to ensure and answer for the obligations of defendants Mangune and Carreon for damages due their passengers, this Court renders judgment against the said defendants Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., jointly and severally with said defendants (Mangune and Carreon) to pay the plaintiffs the amount herein above adjudicated in their favor in Civil Case No. 1136 only. All the amounts awarded said plaintiff, as set forth in paragraph one (1)
hereinabove;
3) On the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the
defendant, Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earning.
All of the above amount, shall bear legal interest from the filing of the complaints.
Costs are adjudged against defendants Mangune, Carreon and Manalo and Filriters Guaranty.
SO ORDERED
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-quoted decision by finding delos Reyes negligent, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 55-57, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the lower court's decision is hereby REVERSED as to item No. 3 of the decision which reads:
3) On the cross claim of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earnings.
and another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants Casiana Pascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad Pascua, ordering the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos Reyes to pay the former jointly and severally damages in amounts awarded as follows:
For the death of Catalina Pascua, the parents and/or heirs are awarded
Civil Case No. 1136 —
b) Loss of Salaries or earning capacity — 14,000.00
c) Actual damages (burial expenses) — 800.00
d) For moral damages — 10,000.00
e) Exemplary damages — 3,000.00
f) For attorney's fees — 3,000.00
—————
Total — P38,200.00 (sic)
For the physical injuries suffered by Caridad Pascua:
Civil Case No. 1136
a) Actual damages (hospitalization expenses) — P550.00
b) Moral damages (disfigurement of the
face and physical suffering — 8,000.00
—————
Total — P10,550.00
For the death of Erlinda Arcega Meriales. the parents and/or heirs:
Civil Case No. 1139
a) Indemnity for loss of life — P12,000.00
b) Loss of Salary or Earning Capacity — 20,000.00
c) Actual damages (burial expenses) — 500.00
d) Moral damages — 15,000.00
e) Exemplary damages — 15,000.00
f) Attorney's fees — 3,000.00
—————
Total — P65,500.00
Civil Case No. 1140
a) Indemnity for loss of life — P12,000.00
b) Loss of Salary or Earning capacity — 20,000.00
c) Actual damages (burial expenses) — 500.00
d) Moral damages — 3,000.00
e) Exemplary damages — 3,000.00
f) Attorney's fees — 3,000.00
—————
Total — P41,500.00
With costs against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
The issue is who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
The trial court, in declaring that Manalo was negligent, considered the following (p. 106, Record on Appeal):
(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger plaintiff Caridad Pascua that a long ways (sic) before reaching the point of collision, the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning: that the right rear wheel was detached causing the jeepney to run to the eastern shoulder of the road then back to the concrete pavement; that driver Manalo applied the brakes after which the jeepney made a U-turn (half-turn) in such a manner that it inverted its direction making it face South instead of north; that the jeepney stopped on the western lane of the road on the right of way of the oncoming Phil. Rabbit Bus where it was bumped by the latter;
(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who, upon responding to the reported collission, found the real evidence thereat indicate in his sketch (Exh. K, Pascua ), the tracks of the jeepney of defendant Mangune and Carreon running on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact;
(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road and indicated in the sketch (Exh. K-Pascua) was shown by skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel was removed;"
(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (Exh. 24-Rabbit) upon the criminal Information by the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac (Exh. 23-Rabbit), as a result of the collision, and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (Exh. 25-Rabbit) upon the finality of the decision and his failure to appeal therefrom; and
(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar (sic) attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured (sic) on the right of way of the Phil. Rabbit Bus.
The respondent court had a contrary opinion. Applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless
contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test. concluded that delos Reyes was negligent.
The misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the laws by the respondent court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and resolution.
We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." This was Our ruling in Anuran, et al. v. Buño et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 224. 1 Thus, the respondent court erred in applying said doctrine.
On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the respondent court said (p. 49, Rollo):
. . . the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time of impact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving. The spirit behind the presumption of guilt on one who bumps the rear end of another vehicle is for the driver following a vehicle to be at all times prepared of a pending accident should the driver in front suddenly come to a full stop, or change its course either through change of mind of the front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is given the responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is in
a position to observe the vehicle in front of it.
The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt (Exhibit "K," Pascua). The jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters from the
eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit "K" Pascua). Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. The respondent court did not realize that the presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.
With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the respondent court that (p. 52, Rollo):
. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable
(Restatement, Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also
because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney.
The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):
According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag, Ilocos Norte, at 4:00 o'clock A.M. and the accident took place at approximately around 12:30 P.M., after travelling roughly for 8 hours and 30 minutes. Deduct from this the actual stopover time of two Hours (computed from the testimony of the driver that he made three 40-minute stop-overs), We will have an actual travelling time of 6 hours and 30 minutes.
Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route (365 kms.) driving at an average of 56 km. per hour would take 6 hours and 30 minutes. Therefore, the average speed of the bus, give and take 10 minutes, from the point of impact on the highway with excellent visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms. per hour, as this is the place where buses would make up for lost time in traversing busy city streets.
Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90
kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025
seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him. As the trial court remarked (pp. 107-108, Record on Appeal):
. . . They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de los Reyes, could have taken either of two options: (1) to swerve to its right (western shoulder) or (2) to swerve to its left (eastern lane), and thus steer clear of the Mangune jeepney. This Court does not so believe, considering the existing exigencies of space and time.
As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit's evidence is convincing and unrebutted that the Western shoulder of the road was narrow and had tall grasses which would indicate that it was not passable. Even plaintiffs own evidence, the pictures (Exhs. P and P-2, Pascua) are mute confirmation of such fact. Indeed, it can be noticed in the picture (Exh. P-2, Pascua) after the Rabbit bus came to a full stop, it was tilted to right front side, its front wheels resting most
probably on a canal on a much lower elevation that of the shoulder or paved road. It too shows that all of the wheels of the Rabbit bus were clear of the roadway except the outer left rear wheel. These observation appearing in said picture (Exh P-2, Pascua) clearly shows coupled with the finding the Rabbit bus came to a full stop only five meters from the point of impact (see sketch, Exh. K-Pascua) clearly show that driver de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney (see picture Exh. 10-A-Rabbit) must have been due to
limitations of space and time.
Plaintiffs alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane. Such a claim is premised on the hypothesis (sic) that the eastern lane was then empty. This claim would appear to be good copy of it were based alone on the sketch made after the collision. Nonetheless, it loses force it one were to consider the time element involved, for moments before that, the Mangune jeepney was crossing that very eastern lane at a sharp angle. Under such a situation then, for driver delos Reyes to swerve to the eastern lane, he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside.
After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this
disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's) conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra. The negligence of spouses Mangune and Carreon was likewise proven during the trial (p. 110, Record on Appeal):
To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before the collision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain, much less establish, it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. . . .
In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. 4 Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver, 5 contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. 6
We affirm the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court, except with respect to the indemnity for loss of life. Under Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code, the amount of damages for the death of a passenger is at least three thousand pesos (P3,000.00). The prevailing
jurisprudence has increased the amount of P3,000.00 to P30,000.00 (see Heirs of Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 51165, June 21, 1990 citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co., G.R. Nos. L-35697-99, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated July 29, 1983 and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 are SET ASIDE. The decision of the Court of First Instance dated December 27, 1978 is REINSTATED MODIFICATION that only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims or their heirs and that the amount of indemnity for loss of life is increased to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino JJ., concur. 5.
[G.R. No. L-8937. November 29, 1957.]
OLEGARIO BRITO SY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MALATE TAXICAB & GARAGE, INC., Defendant-Appellant; MALATE TAXICAB & GARAGE, INC., third-party plaintiff-appellant, v. JESUS DEQUITO Y DUPY, third-party Defendant-Appellee.
Paredes, Gaw & Acevedo for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PRE-JUDICIAL QUESTION, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — Pre-judicial is understood in law to be that which precedes the
criminal action, or that which requires a decision before final judgment is rendered in the principal action which said question is closely connected. Not all previous questions are pre-judicial, although all pre-judicial questions are necessarily previous. (Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837.) In the present case, the third-party complaint is not a pre-judicial question, as the issue in the main action is not entirely dependent upon those in the third-party complaint; on the contrary, it is the third-party complaint that is dependent upon the main case in the amount of damages which defendant-appellant seeks to be reimbursed in its third-party complaint. Furthermore, the
complaint is based on contractual obligation of transportation of passenger which defendant-appellant failed to carry out, and the action is entirely different and independent from that in third-party complaint which is based on alleged tortious act committed by the third-party defendant. The main case, therefore, is entirely severable and may be litigated independently. Moreover, whatever the outcome of the third-party complaint might be would not in any way affect or alter the contractual liability of the appellant to plaintiff. If the collision was due to the negligence of the third-party defendant as alleged, then defendant-appellant may file a separate civil action for damages based on tort ex-delicto or upon quasi-delict, as the case may be.
2. COMMON CARRIERS; OBLIGATION TO TRANSPORT PASSENGER SAFELY CARRIER PRESUMED NEGLIGENT WHEN PASSENGER IS INJURED; HOW TO OVERCOME PRESUMPTION. — In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is
therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised
Code. In the case at bar, however, the defendant carrier failed to present any evidence at all to overcome and overwhelm the presumption of negligence imposed upon it by law; hence , there was no need for the lower court to make an express finding that the carrier was responsible to the collision, in view of the provision of the aforementioned Article 1756 of the new Civil Code.
D E C I S I O N
ENDENCIA, J.:
On June 26, 1952, at Dewey Boulevard in front of the Selecta Restaurant, Olegario Brito Sy engaged a taxicab bearing plate No. Taxi-1130, owned and operated by the Malate Taxicab and Garage, Inc. and driven by Catalino Ermino, to take him to his place of business at Dencia’s Restaurant on the Escolta where he was the general manager. Upon reaching the Rizal
Monument, he told the driver to turn to the right, but the latter did not heed him and instead countered that they better pass along Katigbak Drive. At the intersection of Dewey Boulevard and Katigbak Drive, the taxi collided with an army wagon with plate No. TPI-695 driven by Sgt. Jesus Dequito, as a result of which Olegario Brito Sy was jarred, jammed and jolted. He was taken to the Santa Isabel Hospital suffering from bruises and contusions as well as a fractured right leg. Thereafter he was transferred to the Gonzales Orthopedic Clinic and was accordingly operated on. He spent some P2,266.45 for medical bills and hospitalization.
On September 30, 1952, Sy filed action against the Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc., based upon a contract of carriage, to recover the sums of P7,200 as actual or compensatory damages, P20,000 as moral damages, P15,000 as nominal and exemplary damages, and P3,000 a attorney’s fees. On October 2, 1952, a copy of the complaint was served on and received by the
defendant, but the latter filed its answer only on October 20, 1952, wherein it alleged that the collision subject of the complaint was not due to the
negligence of its driver but to that of Sgt. Jesus Dequito, the driver of the army wagon; and, by way of counterclaim, sought to recover the sum of P1,000 as damages caused by the alleged malicious and frivolous action filed against it.
The record reveals that upon plaintiff’s motion filed on October 23, 1952, the lower court ordered on October 25, 1952 that the answer which was filed by defendant out of time be stricken out, and declared the Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. in default. Thereafter, on October 30, 1952, plaintiff presented his evidence, and on November 20, 1952 judgment was rendered awarding plaintiff the sum of P14,000 as actual, compensatory, moral, nominal and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees and costs, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the action. Defendant then filed a motion on December 17, 1952, for relief from the order of default and for new trial, which was granted. Hence, plaintiff filed his reply to defendant’s answer and counterclaim, and by leave of court, the latter filed on February 24, 1953 a third-party complaint against Sgt. Jesus Dequito alleging that the cause of the collision between the taxicab and the army wagon was the negligence of the army sergeant, and praying that whatever amount the court may assess against it in the action filed by plaintiff, be paid to said third-party plaintiff, plus an additional amount of P1,000 representing attorney’s fees. It appears, however, that the summons and copy of the third-party complaint were never served upon third-party defendant Dequito in view of his continued
assignment from place to place in connection with his army duties, and for this reason the main case was set for trial on May 10, 1953, obviously for the sole purpose of disposing of the issue arising from plaintiff’s complaint. On the day of the trial, defendant failed to appear, whereupon plaintiff presented his evidence, and judgment was rendered against the defendant in the total sum of P4,200 representing actual, compensatory and moral damages, as well as attorney’s fees, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the action, plus costs of suit. Against said judgment defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned in its brief two errors of the lower court, namely:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The trial court erred in not finding that the third-party complaint involves a prejudicial question, and therefore, the main complaint cannot be decided until the third-party complaint is decided.
2. The trial court erred in not deciding or making an express finding as to whether the defendant-appellant Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. was
responsible for the collision, and hence, civilly responsible to the plaintiff-appellee."cralaw virtua1aw library
Finding the quoted assignment of errors as involving a purely question of law, the Court of Appeals, by virtue of the provisions of section 17, paragraph 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, certified the case to this Court for adjudication, in its Resolution of February 7, 1955.
We find no merit in the first assignment of error that the third- party
complaint is a pre-judicial question. As enunciated by this Court in Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837, "Pre-judicial question is understood in law to be that which precedes the criminal action, or that which requires a decision before final judgment is rendered in the principal action with which said question is closely connected. Not all previous questions are pre-judicial, although all pre-judicial questions are necessarily previous." In the present case, the third-party complaint is not a pre-judicial question, as the issue in the main action is not entirely dependent upon those in the third-party complaint; on the contrary, it is the third-party complaint that is dependent upon the main case at least in the amount of damages which defendant-appellant seeks to be reimbursed in its third-party complaint. Furthermore, the complaint is based on a contractual obligation of transportation of passenger which defendant-appellant failed to carry out, and the action is entirely different and
independent from that in the third-party complaint which is based on alleged tortious act committed by the third-party defendant Sgt. Dequito. The main case, therefore, is entirely severable and may be litigated independently. Moreover, whatever the outcome of the third- party complaint might be would not in any way affect or alter the contractual liability of the appellant to plaintiff. If the collision was due to the negligence of the third-party defendant, as alleged, then defendant-appellant may file a separate civil action for damages based on tort ex-delicto or upon quasi-delict, as the case may be.
Coming to the second assignment of error that the lower court erred in not making an express finding as to whether defendant- appellant was
responsible for the collision, we find the same to be unjustified. The pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code under the heading Common Carriers, are the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
"ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers to safety as far as human cars and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755." (Italics supplied.)
Evidently, under these provisions of law, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the plaintiff, for the action initiated therefor is based on a contract of carriage and not on tort. When plaintiff rode on defendant-appellant’s taxicab, the latter assumed the express obligation to transport him to his destination safely, and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, supra). This is an
exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it was therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code. It is noteworthy, however, that at the hearing in the lower court defendant-appellant failed to appear and has not presented any evidence at all to overcome and overwhelm the presumption of negligence imposed upon it by law; hence, there was no need for the lower court to make an express finding thereon in view of the provisions of the aforequoted Article 1756 of the new Civil Code.
Wherefore, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed with cost against the Appellant.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J. B. L., J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur for the additional reason that the concurrent negligence of a third person will not exempt the appellant from responsibility; in other words, if the driver of the taxicab was negligent and thereby caused the collision, the fact that another driver’s negligence also contributed thereto will not exempt the taxicab company. Hence, the negligence of the other driver is not a
prejudicial question to the present action. 6.
CONRADA VDA. DE ABETO, CARME0000LO ABETO, CECILIA ABETO,
CONCEPCION ABETO, MARIA ABETO, ESTELA ABETO, PERLA ABETO, PATRIA ABETO and ALBERTO ABETO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INCORPORATED, defendant-appellant.
Quijano, Arroyo & Padilla Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako, Belo and Associates for defendant-appellant.
RELOVA, J..
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding that defendant-appellant "did not exercise extraordinary diligence or prudence as far as human foresight can provide ... but on the contrary showed negligence and indifference for the safety of the passengers that it was bound to
transport, …" and for the death of Judge Quirico Abeto, defendant- appellant was ordered to pay plaintiffs, the heirs of Judge Abeto, the following:
1st — For the death of Judge Quirico Abeto, the amount of P6,000.00;
2nd — For the loss of his earning capacity, for 4.75 (4 ¾) years at the rate of P7,200.00 per annum in the amount of P34,200.00;
3rd — For moral damages in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum of P10,000.00;
4th — For actual damages in the sum of P2,000.00 minus P400.00 received under Voucher Exhibit 'H' the amount of Pl,600.00;
5th — For attorney's fees, the sum of P6,000.00 and/or the total sum of P57,800.00 and; To pay the costs of this proceedings.
Plaintiff's evidence shows that about 5:30 in the afternoon of November 23, 1960, Judge Quirico Abeto, with the necessary tickets, boarded the Philippine Air Lines' PI-C133 plane at the Mandurriao Airport, Iloilo City for Manila. He was listed as the No. 18 passenger in its Load Manifest (Exhibit A). The plane which would then take two hours from Iloilo to Manila did not reach its
destination and the next day there was news that the plane was missing. After three weeks, it was ascertained that the plane crashed at Mt. Baco,
Province of Mindoro. All the passengers, including Judge Abeto, must have been killed instantly and their remains were scattered all over the area. Among the articles recovered on the site of the crash was a leather bag with the name "Judge Quirico Abeto. " (Exhibit C.)
Judge Abeto, prior to the plane crash, was a Technical Assistant in the Office of the President receiving an annual compensation of P7,200.00; and before that, has held the various positions in the government, namely: Municipal President of Iloilo; Provincial Fiscal of Antique, Negros Occidental and Cebu; Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Secretary of Justice. He was in good health before the incident even if he was already 79 years old at that time.
Plaintiff-appellee Conrada Vda. de Abeto was appointed administratrix of the estate of Judge Abeto. The other plaintiffs-appellees are the children of the deceased. When they received the news of the plane crash, Mrs. Abeto was shocked and until it was ascertained that the plane had crashed three weeks after, she could not sleep and eat. She felt sick and was miserable after that. The members of the family also suffered.
Personal belongings which were lost amounted to P300.00. Burial expenses of the late judge was P1,700.00.
When defendant-appellant would not hear demands for settlement of damages, plaintiffs-appellees were compelled to hire counsel for the institution and prosecution of this case.
Defendant-appellant tried to prove that the plane crash at Mt. Baco was beyond the control of the pilot. The plane at the time of the crash was airworthy for the purpose of conveying passengers across the country as shown by the certificate of airworthiness issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). There was navigational error but no negligence or malfeasance on the part of the pilot. The plane had undergone 1,822 pre- flight checks, 364 thorough checks, 957 terminating checks and 501 after maintenance checks. These checks were part of the quality control operation of defendant airline Further, deviation from its prescribed route was due to the bad weather conditions between Mt. Baco and Romblon and strong winds
which caused the plane to drift to Mt. Baco. Under the circumstances, appellant argues that the crash was a fortuitous event and, therefore,
defendant-appellant cannot be held liable under the provisions of Article 1174 of the New Civil Code. Besides, appellant tried to prove that it had exercised all the cares, skill and diligence required by law on that particular flight in question.
The trial court, finding for the plaintiffs, said:
The Court after a thorough perusal of the evidences, testimonial and
documentaries submitted by both parties has come into the conclusion that the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs have established the following significant facts which proved the negligence of the defendant's pilot of the plane on that flight- in question.
1st — That the Pilot of the plane disobeyed instruction given in not following the route of Amber 1 prescribed by the CAA in Violation of Standard
Regulation.
Second — The defendant failed to perform the pre-flight test on plane PIC-133 before the same took off from Mandurriao Airport to Manila in order to find out a possible defect of the plane.
Third — When the defendant allowed during the flight in question, student Officer Rodriguez on training as proved when his body was found on the plane's cockpit with its microphone hanging still on his left leg.
Fourth — When the Pilot during the flight in question failed or did not report his position over or abeam Romblon which is a compulsory reporting point.
These facts as established by the evidence of the plaintiff lead to the inevitable conclusion that the defendant did not exercise extraordinary
diligence or prudence as far as human foresight can provide imposed upon by the Law, but on the contrary showed negligence and indifference for the
safety of the passengers that it was bound to transport. By the very evidence of the defendant, as shown by the deposition of one Jose Abanilla, dated December 13, 1963, Section Chief of the Actuarial Department of the Insular Life Insurance Company regarding life expectancy through American
experience, the late Judge Abeto at the age of 79 would still live or have a life expectancy of 4.75 years.
Appealing to this Court, defendant claimed that the trial court erred:
I
... in finding, contrary to the evidence, that the appellant was negligent;
III
... in not finding that the appellant, in the conduct and operation of PI-C133, exercised its statutory obligation over the passengers of PI C133 of
extraordinary diligence as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person with due regard for all the circumstances and in not finding that the crash of PI-C133 was caused by fortuitous events;
... in awarding damages to the appellees; and
IV
... in not finding that appellant acted in good faith and exerted efforts to minimize damages.
The issue before Us in this appeal is whether or not the defendant is liable for violation of its contract of carriage.
The provisions of the Civil Code on this question of liability are clear and explicit. Article 1733 binds common carriers, "from the nature of their business and by reasons of public policy, ... to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance ... for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case." Article 1755
establishes the standard of care required of a common carrier, which is, "to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Article 1756 fixes the burden of proof by providing that "in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." Lastly, Article 1757 states that "the responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers ... cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise."
The prescribed airway of plane PI-C133 that afternoon of November 23, 1960, with Capt. de Mesa, as the pilot, was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila, denominated as airway "Amber l," and the prescribed elevation of the flight was 6,000 ft. The fact is, the plane did not take the designated route because it was some 30 miles to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco. According to defendant's witness, Ramon A. Pedroza, Administrative Assistant of the Philippine Air Lines, Inc., this tragic crash would have not happened had the pilot continued on the route indicated. Hereunder is Mr. Pedroza's testimony on this point:
Q Had the pilot continued on the route indicated, Amber A-1 there would have been no crash, obviously?
A Yes, Your Honor
ATTY. HILADO:
Q Because Mt. Baco is 30 miles from Amber I?
A Yes,sir.(TSN,p.75,Oct.22,1963 hearing)
xxx xxx xxx
And, Assistant Director Cesar Mijares of the Civil Aeronautics Administration testified that the pilot of said plane was "off course."
Q But the fact is that you found him out, that he was off course?
A Yes, sir.
Q And off course, you mean that he did not follow the route prescribed for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the route for him to follow was Amber A-l?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the route for Iloilo direct to Manila, is passing Romblon to Manila?
A Yes, passing Romblon to Manila.
Manila?
A Yes, sir.
Q You know Mr. Witness that a disregard or, violation, or disregard of instruction is punishable by law?
A Yes,sir. (TSN,pp.247-248,Dec. 20, 1963)
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that the pilot did not follow the designated route for his flight between Romblon and Manila. The weather was clear and he was supposed to cross airway "Amber I" over Romblon; instead, he made a straight flight to Manila in violation of air traffic rules.
At any rate, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation by appellant as to how the accident occurred, the presumption is, it is at fault.
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved. (Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal, 22 SCRA 171.)
The total of the different items which the lower court adjudged herein
appellant to pay the plaintiffs is P57,800.00. The judgment of the court a quo is modified in the sense that the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the said
amount to the plaintiffs, with legal interest thereon from the finality of this judgment. With costs against defendant-appellant.
7. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC et al JULY 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC et al G.R. No. 132805 Feb. 2, 1999
FACTS: Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company. He was assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic and was on duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to have his dinner at his residence, which was abou t5-minute drive away. A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services. One of its employeeshad suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty, Mr. Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of the
emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the hospital. When Dr. Fabros reached the clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the patient to the hospital. The patient died the following day.
Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to conduct an investigation. In his explanation, Dr. Fabros asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that he
immediately left his residence upon being informed by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at the clinic a few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio panicked and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for him.
Finding private respondent’s explanation unacceptable, the management charged private respondent with abandonment of post while on duty. He denied that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said that he only left the clinic to have his dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the evening upon being informed of the emergency.
After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, he was given a suspension for three months effective December 16, 1994.
Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.
On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the suspension of private respondent illegal. It also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the amount equivalent to all the benefits he should have received during his period of suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts on record and the law on the matter. The NLRC likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON the nullifying of the 3-month suspension by the NLRC erroneous.
