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Cryptography and

Cryptography and

Network Security

Network Security

Chapter 15

Chapter 15

Fourth Edition Fourth Edition by William Stallings by William Stallings

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Chapter 15 –

Chapter 15 –

Electronic Mail

Electronic Mail

Security

Security

Despite the refusal of VADM Poindexter and LtCol North to Despite the refusal of VADM Poindexter and LtCol North to

appear, the Board's access to other sources of appear, the Board's access to other sources of

information filled much of this gap. The FBI provided information filled much of this gap. The FBI provided

documents taken from the files of the National Security documents taken from the files of the National Security

Advisor and relevant NSC staff members, including Advisor and relevant NSC staff members, including

messages from the PROF system between VADM messages from the PROF system between VADM

Poindexter and LtCol North. The PROF messages were Poindexter and LtCol North. The PROF messages were

conversations by computer, written at the time events conversations by computer, written at the time events occurred and presumed by the writers to be protected occurred and presumed by the writers to be protected

from disclosure. In this sense, they provide a first-hand, from disclosure. In this sense, they provide a first-hand,

contemporaneous account of events. contemporaneous account of events.

—The Tower Commission Report to President The Tower Commission Report to President Reagan on the Iran-Contra Affair, 1987

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Email Security

Email Security

 email is one of the most widely used and email is one of the most widely used and

regarded network services regarded network services

 currently message contents are not secure currently message contents are not secure

 may be inspected either in transit may be inspected either in transit

 or by suitably privileged users on destination or by suitably privileged users on destination

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Email Security Enhancements

Email Security Enhancements

 confidentialityconfidentiality

 protection from disclosureprotection from disclosure  authenticationauthentication

 of sender of messageof sender of message  message integritymessage integrity

 protection from modification protection from modification  non-repudiation of originnon-repudiation of origin

(5)

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

 widely used de facto secure emailwidely used de facto secure email  developed by Phil Zimmermanndeveloped by Phil Zimmermann

 selected best available crypto algs to useselected best available crypto algs to use  integrated into a single programintegrated into a single program

 on Unix, PC, Macintosh and other systems on Unix, PC, Macintosh and other systems  originally free, now also have commercial originally free, now also have commercial

(6)

PGP Operation –

PGP Operation –

Authentication

Authentication

1.

1. sender creates messagesender creates message

2.

2. use SHA-1 to generate 160-bit hash of use SHA-1 to generate 160-bit hash of

message message

3.

3. signed hash with RSA using sender's signed hash with RSA using sender's

private key, and is attached to message private key, and is attached to message

4.

4. receiver uses RSA with sender's public receiver uses RSA with sender's public

key to decrypt and recover hash code key to decrypt and recover hash code

5.

5. receiver verifies received message using receiver verifies received message using

hash of it and compares with decrypted hash of it and compares with decrypted

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PGP Operation –

PGP Operation –

Confidentiality

Confidentiality

1.

1. sender generates message and 128-bit sender generates message and 128-bit

random number as session key for it

random number as session key for it

2.

2. encrypt message using CAST-128 / IDEA / encrypt message using CAST-128 / IDEA /

3DES in CBC mode with session key

3DES in CBC mode with session key

3.

3. session key encrypted using RSA with session key encrypted using RSA with

recipient's public key, & attached to msg

recipient's public key, & attached to msg

4.

4. receiver uses RSA with private key to receiver uses RSA with private key to

decrypt and recover session key

decrypt and recover session key

5.

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PGP Operation – Confidentiality

PGP Operation – Confidentiality

& Authentication

& Authentication

 can use both services on same messagecan use both services on same message

 create signature & attach to messagecreate signature & attach to message  encrypt both message & signatureencrypt both message & signature

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PGP Operation –

PGP Operation –

Compression

Compression

 by default PGP compresses message by default PGP compresses message

after signing but before encrypting after signing but before encrypting

 so can store uncompressed message & so can store uncompressed message &

signature for later verification signature for later verification

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PGP Operation – Email

PGP Operation – Email

Compatibility

Compatibility

 when using PGP will have binary data to send when using PGP will have binary data to send (encrypted message etc)

(encrypted message etc)

 however email was designed only for texthowever email was designed only for text

 hence PGP must encode raw binary data into hence PGP must encode raw binary data into printable ASCII characters

printable ASCII characters  uses radix-64 algorithmuses radix-64 algorithm

 maps 3 bytes to 4 printable charsmaps 3 bytes to 4 printable chars

 also appends a CRCalso appends a CRC

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(12)

PGP Session Keys

PGP Session Keys

 need a session key for each messageneed a session key for each message

 of varying sizes: 56-bit DES, 128-bit CAST or of varying sizes: 56-bit DES, 128-bit CAST or

IDEA, 168-bit Triple-DES IDEA, 168-bit Triple-DES

 generated using ANSI X12.17 modegenerated using ANSI X12.17 mode

 uses random inputs taken from previous uses random inputs taken from previous

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PGP Public & Private Keys

PGP Public & Private Keys

 since many public/private keys may be in use, since many public/private keys may be in use, need to identify which is actually used to encrypt need to identify which is actually used to encrypt

session key in a message session key in a message

 could send full public-key with every messagecould send full public-key with every message

 but this is inefficientbut this is inefficient

 rather use a key identifier based on keyrather use a key identifier based on key  is least significant 64-bits of the keyis least significant 64-bits of the key

 will very likely be uniquewill very likely be unique

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(15)

PGP Key Rings

PGP Key Rings

 each PGP user has a pair of keyrings:each PGP user has a pair of keyrings:

 public-key ring contains all the public-keys of public-key ring contains all the public-keys of

other PGP users known to this user, indexed other PGP users known to this user, indexed

by key ID by key ID

 private-key ring contains the public/private private-key ring contains the public/private

key pair(s) for this user, indexed by key ID & key pair(s) for this user, indexed by key ID &

encrypted keyed from a hashed passphrase encrypted keyed from a hashed passphrase

 security of private keys thus depends on security of private keys thus depends on

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(17)
(18)

PGP Key Management

PGP Key Management

 rather than relying on certificate authoritiesrather than relying on certificate authorities

 in PGP every user is own CAin PGP every user is own CA

 can sign keys for users they know directlycan sign keys for users they know directly

 forms a “web of trust”forms a “web of trust”

 trust keys have signedtrust keys have signed

 can trust keys others have signed if have a chain of can trust keys others have signed if have a chain of signatures to them

signatures to them

 key ring includes trust indicatorskey ring includes trust indicators

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S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose

S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose

Internet Mail Extensions)

Internet Mail Extensions)

 security enhancement to MIME emailsecurity enhancement to MIME email

 original Internet RFC822 email was text onlyoriginal Internet RFC822 email was text only  MIME provided support for varying content MIME provided support for varying content

types and multi-part messages types and multi-part messages

 with encoding of binary data to textual formwith encoding of binary data to textual form  S/MIME added security enhancementsS/MIME added security enhancements

 have S/MIME support in many mail agentshave S/MIME support in many mail agents

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S/MIME Functions

S/MIME Functions

 enveloped dataenveloped data

 encrypted content and associated keysencrypted content and associated keys  signed datasigned data

 encoded message + signed digestencoded message + signed digest  clear-signed dataclear-signed data

 cleartext message + encoded signed digestcleartext message + encoded signed digest  signed & enveloped datasigned & enveloped data

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S/MIME Cryptographic

S/MIME Cryptographic

Algorithms

Algorithms

 digital signatures: DSS & RSAdigital signatures: DSS & RSA  hash functions: SHA-1 & MD5hash functions: SHA-1 & MD5

 session key encryption: ElGamal & RSAsession key encryption: ElGamal & RSA  message encryption: AES, Triple-DES, message encryption: AES, Triple-DES,

RC2/40 and others RC2/40 and others

 MAC: HMAC with SHA-1MAC: HMAC with SHA-1

(22)

S/MIME Messages

S/MIME Messages

 S/MIME secures S/MIME secures a MIME entity with a a MIME entity with a

signature, encryption, or both signature, encryption, or both

 forming a MIME wrapped PKCS objectforming a MIME wrapped PKCS object  have a range of content-types:have a range of content-types:

 enveloped dataenveloped data  signed datasigned data

 clear-signed dataclear-signed data  registration requestregistration request

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S/MIME Certificate

S/MIME Certificate

Processing

Processing

 S/MIME uses X.509 v3 certificatesS/MIME uses X.509 v3 certificates

 managed using a hybrid of a strict X.509 managed using a hybrid of a strict X.509

CA hierarchy & PGP’s web of trust CA hierarchy & PGP’s web of trust

 each client has a list of trusted CA’s certseach client has a list of trusted CA’s certs  and own public/private key pairs & certsand own public/private key pairs & certs

(24)

Certificate Authorities

Certificate Authorities

 have several well-known CA’shave several well-known CA’s

 Verisign one of most widely usedVerisign one of most widely used

 Verisign issues several types of Digital IDsVerisign issues several types of Digital IDs  increasing levels of checks & hence trustincreasing levels of checks & hence trust

Class

Class Identity ChecksIdentity Checks UsageUsage

1

1 name/email checkname/email check web browsing/emailweb browsing/email 2

2 + enroll/addr check+ enroll/addr check email, subs, s/w email, subs, s/w validate

validate

3

3 + ID documents+ ID documents e-banking/service e-banking/service access

(25)

Summary

Summary

 have considered:have considered:

 secure emailsecure email  PGPPGP

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