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Israel Affairs
ISSN: 1353-7121 (Print) 1743-9086 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fisa20
The evolution of Arab psychological warfare:
towards ‘nonviolence’ as a political strategy
Irwin J. Mansdorf
To cite this article: Irwin J. Mansdorf (2015) The evolution of Arab psychological
warfare: towards ‘nonviolence’ as a political strategy, Israel Affairs, 21:4, 648-667, DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1076186
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2015.1076186
Published online: 29 Oct 2015.
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The evolution of Arab psychological warfare: towards
‘nonviolence’ as a political strategy
Irwin J. Mansdorf*
Israel-Arab Studies Programme, Jerusalem Centre of Public Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel Psychological warfare is a ‘soft power’ technique used to attain strategic objectives. In the Israeli – Palestinian dynamic, psychological warfare has evolved to where it now shares goals with ‘public diplomacy’ as a means of influencing policy and politics. Arab strategy has moved from ineffective attempts to influence the Israeli public to credible and cynical strategies that often involve a disregard for and exploitation of civilian casualties and the appearance of embracing ideology associated with revolutionary figures and human rights. ‘Non-violent resistance’ invoking Gandhi, Mandela and King as models for Palestinian Arab strategy is now common and serves to attract sympathy. Despite claiming a philosophy of nonviolence, the goal of many anti-Israel groups remains the dissolution of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.
Keywords:psychological warfare; public diplomacy; asymmetric warfare; psyops; propaganda; nonviolence; de-legitimization
Defining the problem
Military strategy has traditionally included both physical and psychological tactics. When Jacob’s sons plotted (Genesis 34:1 – 19) to avenge the defilement of their sister Dina, they first offered ‘peace’ to their enemies, claiming that they wished to offer their sister in marriage, but only after the males of the tribe undergo ritual circumcision, as was the custom of the Hebrews. After their adversaries agreed and were weakened and recuperating from the procedure, Simon and Levi attacked, wiping out the entire enemy tribe.
Throughout history, psychological deception has been part of military operations. When the United States Army activated the fourth Special Operations Regiment (the Psychological Operations Regiment) in 1998, some have suggested that the symbol they chose for the unit (highlighted by a Chess ‘knight’) was the ‘Trojan Horse’, a reference to the centrepiece of Odysseus’ scheme to infiltrate the city of Troy under the guise of surrender.1
It is clear today that, just as military tactics and strategy evolve through the attainment of knowledge and technology, so do psychological techniques evolve with greater knowledge of human behaviour. As conflicts throughout the world
q 2015 Taylor & Francis
*Email:[email protected]
Vol. 21, No. 4, 648–667,http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2015.1076186
take on characteristics of asymmetric struggles, and with the inevitable use of media to distribute images, messages and events related to these struggles, the use of psychological warfare takes on added and perhaps even primary significance. In recent years, the nature of psychological warfare has expanded beyond its historical role as aiding military tactics to now also being part of strategy associated with policy and diplomacy.
This has been brought into focus with particular clarity in the Israeli – Arab dynamic. The ramifications of the dynamics of new behaviours and attitudes in public diplomacy call for a rethinking of policy.
Confronting the military – political reality when looking at Israel and its Arab neighbours involves examining the role of psychological factors in the relationship between the parties themselves as well as between the parties and other groups and countries. When considering the function of psychological warfare, the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) needs to be especially considered. As shown by Gerald Steinberg, a host of organizations that are ostensibly apolitical have adopted policies that in reality stake out a very clear political position.2Since many of these groups are perceived as objective and neutral, their involvement has been used to promote positions that support a specific side in the conflict. Playing to these groups and, in turn, using them to advocate a particular position is now commonplace.
The emergence of active non-governmental actors may have expanded the ‘market’ for psychological warfare. The very presence of organizations that have the potential to exert pressure on international bodies sets the stage for psychological techniques to influence these organizations, their perceptions and their behaviour.
In studying the issues related to psychological warfare, behavioural, political, cultural and military factors all interact to present a fertile field for researchers and scholars to better understand how societies in conflict manipulate both information and circumstances in order to gain an advantage over their adversaries. Some questions can be definitively answered but some critical information that would help us understand aspects of these issues is not readily available to investigators, leaving us with the prospect of answering some hypotheses while continuing to investigate others.
What is ‘psychological warfare’?
Psychological warfare or PSYOP (psychological operations) is operationally defined as ‘planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign target audiences (TAs) to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals’.3The function of psychological warfare was originally to lower enemy morale and, in so doing, aid military objectives. Ron Schleifer, an Israeli authority on the subject, refers to psychological warfare as an example of ‘soft power’, in line with Joseph Nye’s classification of political methods
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designed to attract and persuade rather than force and compel.4In June 2010, the US Army introduced the term MISO, or ‘Military Information Support Operations’ to their psychological operations command, stating that the purpose of MISO is ‘to disseminate truthful information to foreign audiences in support of US policy and national objectives’.5
The target of psychological warfare has traditionally included enemy soldiers, non-combatant enemy civilians and, ultimately, enemy governments or decision makers.
Today, however, there may be a need to modify and expand the definition of psychological warfare to include much of what is being practised under the term ‘public diplomacy’. Take, for example, what is described by the State Department as the mission of American public diplomacy: ‘The mission of American public diplomacy is to support the achievement of US foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world’.6 While not specifying a method (e.g. propaganda) the description of public diplomacy clearly specifies goals – i.e. ‘informing and influencing foreign publics’ – that are consistent with psychological warfare techniques.
In targeting individuals and groups that are not necessarily ‘enemies’, what differentiates psychological warfare from standard public diplomacy is the application of scientifically tested or researched techniques of procedure. Whereas public diplomacy may involve efforts that are created on the basis of conventional wisdom or political considerations, ‘PSYOP’ or ‘MISO’ is approached scientifically, with clear rationale determined by evidence-based logic as opposed to personal opinion and individual judgement. As Harry Speier noted shortly after World War II, psychological warfare was once viewed as requiring no planning, training or research. Operations were entrusted to ‘men with experience in furnishing news, opinions, advertisement and entertainment’.7 This changed through the period of the cold war. Christopher Simpson writes how social scientists began making significant contributions to psychological warfare practice that ‘demanded scientific accuracy and academic integrity, to be sure, but [was also] applied research tailored to achieve narrowly defined political or military goals’.8
From a rational and empirical perspective, sophisticated public diplomacy efforts are best grounded on techniques of scientifically based research. For many in public diplomacy, however, this is not the case, and their efforts are often determined simply (and often expediently) on the basis of like-minded people sitting around a table deciding what makes sense to them, logically and politically. Eytan Gilboa bemoans the lack of both ‘awareness and under-standing’ of the role of public diplomacy (PD) as well as the lack of an ‘adequate PD programme’ and its effect on Israel’s ability to carry out effective strategy.9 While such efforts may be popular with people who need not be persuaded,
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effective public diplomacy without a research-based and tested rationale may ultimately fall short of any goals involving non-domestic or unsympathetic populations and targets. The need for solid scientific models and research for public diplomacy is also discussed in a separate paper by Gilboa, who writes:
Progress in public diplomacy research is highly needed because of the central place it is now occupying in foreign policy and diplomacy. Public diplomacy research cannot be sufficiently accumulated without theory design and implementation, and the best way to promote theory is to initiate a new scientific program dedicated to this effort.10
The parallel with international law and asymmetric warfare
The expanded use of psychological warfare is linked to a question that has been raised in the last few years with regard to international law. With the entry of non-state actors and the increase in asymmetric warfare, are the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), originally drawn up to deal with the conventional wars of the early twentieth century, still relevant?
This is a matter that concerns many and one which was the subject of a conference held in 2010 at the US Naval War College on ‘International Law and the Changing Character of War’. In the concluding address of the conference, Yoram Dinstein warned that activities of non-state actors, rogue states and terrorist groups have become ‘more insidious because they have adopted lawfare as one of the most effective weapons wielded against us’.11He described how countries can win military battles and end up losing a war because of public opinion turning negative. In a twist of logic, Dinstein described how international law is turned on its head by rogue actors who subvert it and, with the help of human rights NGOs, use it against legitimate states as a means of pursuing their agendas.
This new reality with regard to LOAC has also changed the targets of psychological warfare. Just as in issues related to international law, the participation and influence of human rights organizations has created an opening for psychological warfare to develop in the conflict between Israel and its Arab opponents. Israel now faces an Arab enemy that uses psychological means to reach outside of the conflict to influence broader political objectives. While this is done primarily through methods associated with public diplomacy, it has been successful also as an adjunct to military strategy. One consequence of civilian casualties, for example, has been the resultant pressure on Israel to prematurely cease military operations, a consequence noted in an article by Anne Penketh and Donald Macintyre.12As explained elsewhere,13and elaborated on later in this article, a key component in this strategy has been the exploitation of civilian casualties to meet these objectives. This more unconventional form of psychological warfare, which relies on the reactions of human rights NGOs to affect the conduct of war, is now standard practice in confrontations with Israel. More recently, psychological operations have been introduced in actions ranging from the unilateral attempts to declare a Palestinian state to several
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attempts at a Gaza ‘flotilla’ to organized efforts at BDS (boycott, divestment, sanctions) against Israel. In all these examples, ‘soft power’ is prominently displayed, with the goal of using political power rather than military strength in confronting Israel.
While the specific psychological mechanisms and targets have changed over time, the overriding goal of Arab psychological warfare remains securing victory, militarily or politically, over Israel.
Arab psychological warfare against Israel: from to comical to credible The Arab states have used multiple forms of psychological warfare in their conflict with Israel. For many years Arab governments broadcast Hebrew ‘news’ to Israel, a service that BBC News notes has now gone ‘online’14with Egypt’s Nile TV.15 Along with threats made by many Arab leaders and Palestinian terrorist organizations, these approaches were considered by most Israelis to be unreliable to the point of being humorous.16 The lack of credibility of Arab threats created a perception of Arab bravado lacking integrity that some feel led to erroneously discounting Sadat’s 1973 warnings of a decision to take military action against Israel.17
As noted by Moshe Shemesh, boastful declarations seen as radical (such as Shuqayri’s alleged boast of driving the Jews into the sea) generated a backlash in the Arab world and were perceived as creating sympathy for Israel in the international community.18Years later, the threats of Saddam Hussein prior to the 1991 Gulf War to ‘burn half of Israel’ were also, as noted by Meron Benvenisti, seen as ‘more... baseless bravado’.19
The use of psychological warfare took a perceptible turn with the entry of Hezbollah into the picture. Journalists such as Neil Macfarquhar of the New York Times have noted that, in contrast to the often empty threats of Arab leaders, Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah is viewed differently.20Rather than being regarded as unreliable and humorous like Arab leaders, Nasrallah managed to create an image in which he was regarded as a trustworthy, albeit disliked figure who created anxiety precisely because his threats, as noted by Israeli commentators such as Yossi Avdi, were viewed as reliable.21
In fact, the action that sparked the 2006 Israel – Lebanon war with Hezbollah, the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, was dubbed by Hezbollah ‘Operation fulfilled promise’. Nasrallah stressed the issue of ‘honour’ in carrying out the operation and specifically stated (on 12 July 2006): ‘We kept our promise to kidnap soldiers [to secure] the release of prisoners’.22
The expansion of psychological warfare: exploiting civilians to influence military outcomes
Whereas classic psychological warfare focuses on influencing behaviour through indirect ‘persuasion’ (e.g. propaganda), Arab groups have used more direct and
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active mechanisms not only to affect emotions and attitudes, but also strategically, by attempting to modify and impact on military results in the field. As noted by Amos Guiora,23one of the challenges of asymmetric warfare is the dilemma of dealing with the risks that military operations create for non-combatant civilians, an increasingly common scenario in the confrontation between Israel and non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah which operate out of densely populated areas.
These groups realize that they cannot ‘win’ a military victory but they can survive a military confrontation, inflicting as much damage as possible while psychologically weakening Israeli resolve and strengthening the perception of home front resistance. A RAND report by David Johnston notes that, ‘just by surviving and showing that it could continuously launch rockets at Israel, Hezbollah was able to claim victory’.24 Understanding this, both Hamas and Hezbollah employ psychological measures to influence the behaviour of the enemy, namely the Israeli public, as well as sometimes unwitting neutral parties, such as the United Nations, the European Union and some media outlets, in order to reach its strategic goals.
This psychological arsenal consists of unconventional measures that include manipulation of battlefield situations in order to effect a specific result. This involves exploiting civilians and using them as unwitting soldiers against Israel. Hamas and Hezbollah operate out of heavily civilian-populated areas, blend in with the population and use them as cover to take advantage of Israel’s reluctance to be responsible for high civilian casualties. For militant Islamic groups, a high civilian death count as a result of collateral damage not only is inconsequential but, on the contrary, can actually serve their strategic goals.
During the Israel – Lebanon War of 2006, a Voice of America editorial reflecting US policy noted that Hezbollah was using the local population as ‘human shields, putting rockets in their houses and radars on their barns, saying, in effect, if you’re going to fight against us, you’re going to have to go after civilians’.25 Hezbollah realized that despite Israeli attempts to limit damage, civilians would inevitably fall.
During Israel’s Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in 2008 – 2009, the RAND report notes,
Hamas has no incentive to verify Israeli efforts to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties. Indeed, Hamas had an opposite aim in its efforts to shape international opinion during the conflict: It wanted to portray IDF attacks in as bad a light as possible.26
In the case of the Lebanon War, the high civilian casualty rate, especially following the Qana attack, resulted in a suspension of Israeli air attacks and a premature end to the war.27In Operation Cast Lead, despite Israel’s efforts and claims regarding civilian casualties, including statements made by non-Israelis such as the former Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan Colonel Richard Kemp,28the Goldstone Report provided yet another major psychological victory for Hamas. While the belated retraction29of Judge Goldstone may mitigate some
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of the report’s long-term impact, the short-term damage to Israel’s image was severe, with one New York Times report noting that many questioned whether the damage to Israel could be undone.30
Attempts to weaken the Israeli home front
Influencing the Israeli home front involves inflicting as much damage and causing as many human casualties as possible so as to lower morale and bring about pressure from within Israel to cease hostilities. As noted by Yaakov Amidror and Dan Diker, Hezbollah’s Nasrallah viewed Israeli resolve ‘weaker than a spider’s web’ and saw an opportunity to weaken this resolve by inflicting damage on a home front that historically had been immune from attack from outside Israel.31 According to Hezbollah’s adopted psychological strategy, by increasing home front (and military) casualties, the ‘weak’ resolve would fail, pressuring Israel to halt any operations before attaining its goal. Indeed, this very strategy by Hezbollah was instrumental in bringing about Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, as groups such as ‘four mothers’ were believed to have brought pressure for such a withdrawal in the face of a consistent and mounting military casualty toll.32
Arab non-state actors have used and continue to use Israelis as unwitting partners in psychological warfare. The ‘four mothers’ movement is often cited as a prime example of an anti-war movement that clearly used psychological pressure on the Israeli public to influence Israeli government policy with regard to Lebanon.33The sensitivity of the Israeli public to these messages creates an understanding among Israel’s enemies that increasing pressure on the Israeli public will serve their strategic goals as well. Ronen Sebag discusses how Hezbollah adapted its operations, especially its use of videotapes of ambushes and attacks, to take advantage of the psychological messages being sent by the anti-war movements in Israel at the time.34More recently, the effects of sustained emotional pressure on the Israeli public clearly led to the decision to release prisoners ‘with blood on their hands’ in the Shalit deal.35This type of emotional pressure was exemplified by a video message that goaded the Israeli public with animated images of what would happen to Gilad Shalit and his family if the Israelis refused to complete a deal with Hamas.36
Psychological warfare: the move to nonviolence
A more recent trend in psychological warfare is the adoption by various pro-Palestinian groups of a mantra of nonviolence. This is accompanied by concurrent efforts such as ‘lawfare’37 and sloganeering to tarnish Israel’s reputation and to project an aura of social legitimacy. The use of hunger strikes as a method of nonviolent resistance has also borne fruit,38and continues to be used by Palestinian Arab prisoners, despite ostensive agreements made with Israeli authorities to end the strikes.39The effectiveness of this technique may have been
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demonstrated when one Palestinian prisoner agreed to end his ‘on again off again’ hunger strike only after a promise of an early release.40
By far the most visible and recurring attempt at employing nonviolence as a strategy is the repeated invoking of ‘Gandhi, King and Mandela’ to provide a mantle of legitimacy for Palestinian Arab groups. While data actually shows younger Palestinian Arabs favouring more radical positions,41the public face of organizations such as the BDS movement present their goals under the cloak of a quest for civil rights,42consistent with the actions of more respected civil and human rights leaders of the past 50 years.
The psychological underpinnings of a political strategy
Adopting a position that espouses nonviolence is not surprising, and could be reasonably linked to two factors. First, there is the association that many have between Palestinian Arabs and their use of violence, as Ethan Bronner notes in a New York Times.43 Second, the findings that attitudes regarding Palestinians show ‘abysmally low... numbers [that] point to their continuing failure to engage public opinion in the US’.44It would appear that the association between violence and Palestinian Arabs may reduce sympathy for the Palestinian Arab cause. Reversing that association and improving public opinion in a country as important as the United States and by extension other countries in the West would thus involve altering this impression and creating a new association with Palestinian Arabs; namely nonviolence in the pursuit of a just peace.
The adoption of nonviolence as a strategy of psychological warfare, however, is separate from the actual Palestinian attitude towards the use of this approach vis-a`-vis Israel. Surveys have shown Palestinian attitudes towards violence fluctuating, with Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki noting in 2006 that, ‘Palestinian opposition to violence increases when diplomacy proves effective. Public support for violence increases in an environment of greater pain and suffering and decreases when threat perception is reduced’.45
Unlike ideological adherents of nonviolence who eschew violence in principle, the Palestinian Arab use of nonviolence appears to be functional rather than dogmatic or an article of faith. According to one blogger, Mustafa Barghouti, one of the major proponents of using nonviolence as a strategy, argued that
many people understand and realize now that nonviolent resistance is much more effective than military actions... and... it is a very good way of linking the Palestinian struggle to international solidarity with a clear aim, which is to change the parameters of the struggle and of the conflict and change the balance of power.46
It thus appears that if military action had in effect been more effective and if international solidarity was not important, the tactical use of nonviolence may not have been so attractive.
As a result of this strategy, we see Palestinian Arab demonstrations with international support that highlight a marching Gandhi, King and Mandela,47
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BDS events that speak of the ‘legacy’ of Mandela and King,48and debates where the Palestinian Arab protagonist opens by comparing his approach to that of King and Gandhi.49 The constant mantra-like repetition of claiming to follow in the footsteps of Gandhi, King and Mandela serves to link Palestinian Arab ‘resistance’ movements with more socially justified and historically acceptable leaders and allows them to appear to maintain distance from the other, more mainstream Palestinian Arab movements and leaders that have and continue to use and promote violence.
The functional exploitation of nonviolence as a strategy for eliminating Israel
Many of the Palestinian Arab proponents of nonviolence seek to maintain an air of civility and peacefulness while never unconditionally rejecting specific violent behaviour or accepting responsibility for violence perpetrated. From a psychological perspective, classic defence mechanisms such as intellectualiza-tion, rationalizaintellectualiza-tion, denial and projection contribute to a strategy whose aim is to maintain ideological purity while avoiding accountability and continuing to attack the enemy.
For example, while there have been examples of rejections of violence on the part of Palestinian Arab leadership or individuals, many of these rejections appear to be intellectualized as conditional or functional – i.e. linked to a concomitant condemnation of Israel rather than condemning violence outright. For example, after the incident in Itamar where five members of a single family were brutally murdered, Khaled Abu Toameh reported that Palestinian Authority President Abbas issued a condemnation of ‘all violence directed against civilians, regardless of who was behind it or the reason for it’.50This indirect reference to Itamar was not a specific unconditional condemnation of this attack, nor did it imply acceptance of any responsibility for it. The failure to accept responsibility for violent behaviour or be accountable for it even when it is fairly clear who committed it at times strains credulity. For example, despite widespread reported feelings in the Palestinian Arab street expressing outrage at the attack,51an urban legend developed that the murders were not committed by Arabs, but rather by Thai or Chinese workers who held a grudge against the family.52
When the Palestinian Popular Committees against the Wall and Israeli Settlements issued a condemnation of the Itamar incident, it placed the responsibility not on those who actually committed the act, but rather projected it onto Israel’s policies. Here is what they had to say:
Palestinian Popular Committees against the Wall and Israeli Settlements express their deep sadness and sorrow concerning the killing incident in the Itamar colonial settlement. The Popular Committees view the killing incidence as a part of the escalation generated and mobilized by the policies and actions of the Israeli occupation. These policies created the circumstances for committing these heinous actions. Therefore, we believe that the Israeli government bears full responsibility for the occupation and its consequences.53
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Refusing accountability: absolving the ‘victim’
The ostensible repudiation of violence even while failing to accept responsibility for specific (even well-known) violent actions by Palestinian Arabs is a central part of the psychological strategy employed by groups associated with the popular resistance. At the core of this behaviour is an ideology, consistent with the philosophy first promulgated by William Ryan,54that allows a psychological defence against any wrongdoing by playing the role of victim and, in so doing, excusing if not outwardly justifying ‘victim-generated’ violence. While ‘blaming the victim’ may be political taboo in the West, it is common and even normative behaviour in Arab society.55Thinking that automatically excuses victims from responsibility for their behaviour is not Arab or Islamic in basis but rather has its roots in the ideological left of Western societies and is attractive and acceptable to those who accept this ideology. Applied to the Palestinian Arabs, it rationalizes that they are victims, that the Israelis are oppressors and that there is a societal responsibility to come to the victim’s aid. Once the label of ‘victim’ is attached, those victims, namely Palestinian Arabs, are blameless, and any violence they engage in is considered ‘different’, justifiable and excusable.
Ofer Zur notes that, as opposed to Middle Eastern societal norms, the Western approach is that the victim is always morally right.56 This is an accepted and politically sensitive ‘given’ and may account for the failure to explore if ‘victims’ may bear any responsibility for their plight. The axiom that the victim is always right has led to a blind acceptance of certain ‘victim rights’ without any victim accountability. Any suggestion that a victim bears any personal responsibility or liability for their fate is unthinkable in progressive circles and indeed in much of Western society.
Amnon Rubenstein sees this theme as also resulting in a morally tarnished ‘human rights industry’ that has created a ‘counterfeit product’ by failing to apply any standards of relativity to alleged violations of human rights and thus unwittingly justifies terrorist attacks.57 Palestinian Arab groups understand this phenomenon well and play to it constantly. This has resulted in what Dan Schueftan describes as becoming ‘addicted to the pose of the ultimate victim, which involves de-legitimization of the Jewish State’s existence’.58
The psychological strategy of asserting nonviolence and absolving victim responsibility has been effective even with Jewish groups that ideologically identity with the Palestinian Arab struggle. One such group (Jews for Justice for Palestinians) responded to the Itamar attack by re-posting a blog claiming ‘there is no symmetry between the Palestinians, the occupied, and the Israelis, the occupiers’.59 Just as ‘sacred rights of the weak’ has been invoked when discussing slavery60and women’s rights,61here it is used by those who preach nonviolence while at the same time excusing and even justifying it. Even while taking the approach that ‘strong is wrong’, violence, even extreme and brutal violence, is psychologically excused by claiming asymmetry between the alleged victim and the accused oppressor.
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Hunger strikes: the latest psychological warfare technique
A more recent Palestinian Arab addition to the armoury of psychological warfare is the hunger strike. Undertaken by Arab security prisoners in Israeli jails to protest at conditions and to demand specific privileges, it was eventually resolved in a signed agreement between representatives of the prisoners and the Israeli prison service.62
While psychological warfare techniques that claim ‘nonviolent resistance’ often involve (at times, predominantly) international participants other than Palestinian Arabs, the hunger strike represents a method undertaken purely by rather than on behalf of Palestinian Arabs. Historically used by others who considered themselves political prisoners (e.g. Bobby Sands against the British in 1981, Natan Sharansky against the Soviets in 1983), it is the ultimate expression of ‘power of the weak’ and its use avoids any harm to others while focusing on the striker as willing to engage in self-sacrifice for a legitimate cause. Its use in the Palestinian Arab arena is especially relevant as a tool of psychological warfare. Whereas self-sacrifice as a mode of resistance in Islam (shahada) is considered noble, it almost always involves taking the lives of others, usually innocents. With the hunger strike, the potential shahid engages in self-sacrifice, but without creating any harm or destruction for others.
The avoidance of overt violence serves to achieve a goal in a manner that is not in keeping with traditional Arab or Islamic means of resistance. Mordechai Kedar of Bar-Ilan University notes that traditional Arab thinking values survival and is opposed to capricious demonstrative acts of self-sacrifice where no tangible result is realized.63Starving oneself to death in a hunger strike would seem to be nothing more than a lone act that results in the death of the striker but achieves little else. However, there is now heightened awareness that using methods that appeal to a Western population is highly functional in achieving broader goals. The psychological utility of the hunger strike in bringing pressure to bear on Israel from the West has resulted in acceptance of a means (self-sacrifice) based on a method (nonviolence) that causes no direct harm to the enemy.
Dealing with the new nonviolent approach: recognizing the goals
Both Israel and the Arab world have employed psychological techniques against one another. As Palestinian Arabs continue to realize the importance of enlisting Western opinion to support their demands, they naturally seek to use methods that appeal to the West in promoting their message. While in the past this has focused on exploiting civilian deaths to enlist support by engendering sympathy and identification, efforts that emphasize ‘nonviolence’ are now moving up in the arsenal of psychological warfare. This approach, however, is purely functional and not an ideological imperative for Palestinian Arabs as it was for adherents of Martin Luther King or Gandhi. Its appeal to an intellectual, Western and liberal audience makes it a central mechanism in efforts at challenging Israel. Appearing to promote freedom, equality and human rights as one’s primary concern is thus
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linked to the Palestinian Arab cause. Within the framework of a psychological tactic, it can also be used as a cover for less noble motives and behaviour.
This cover is used at times to make statements that strain the limits of credulity. In a debate held at New York University in January 2012, Mustafa Barghouti responded to a charge made by Dore Gold that Hamas, as represented by Khaled Meshal, is dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Barghouti flatly denied the charge, saying, ‘what we have achieved, actually, through the most recent negotiations is that Hamas officially declared, in the words of Khaled Meshal, that they are committed to nonviolence’.64Thus through a ‘watch what we say not what we do’ approach and despite the continued use of violence and threats of violence by Hamas against Israel, even using Hebrew to broadcast their message,65recognized Palestinian figures such as Barghouti intentionally make statements that are patently incorrect, but appeal psychologically to the Western ear.
Palestinian Arab rights groups are thus employing strategies based on thinking that is clearly anchored in a socio-cultural norm that would be attractive to a liberal Western population. Some have gone so far as to suggest that the mere declarative adopting of a tactic of nonviolence by Palestinian Arabs should be enough for Israel to agree immediately to an independent Palestinian state.66In a pilot study looking at BDS strategy, a group of random college students read a brief introduction to the BDS movement and asked afterwards if they would be able to support the goals. The students, few of whom heard of BDS beforehand, read about the BDS focus on “human rights” and the ending of “discrimination.” In an indication of the appeal of the strategy of nonviolent emphasis on “rights”, an inordinate amount of students (about 70%) indicated they could support the movement based simply on reading these statements. The strategy of nonviolence, however, is far from benign and far from an approach that would bring peace through reconciliation and coexistence.
Palestinian Arab advocacy efforts focusing on nonviolence are almost always connected to talk of Israel as an ‘apartheid’ state. Since an apartheid state is an immoral and untenable entity, its dissolution is a moral imperative. A link between nonviolence, a seemingly compassionate behaviour, and the practical destruction of Israel by means other than military action is thus established. It allows for a continuation of the goals shared by many Arab groups – i.e. ending the existence of Israel as an independent Jewish state.
Despite clams of support for a theoretical ‘two-state’ solution by some Palestinian Arab proponents of nonviolence, this is almost always accompanied by a codicil which says that such a solution is either too late, too impractical or now unworkable, always laying the blame at Israel’s doorstep.67Moreover, the steadfast refusal to acknowledge directly the linchpin of what ‘two states’ should consist of, namely Israel as a distinctly Jewish state, continues to be part of this strategy of psychological evasiveness.68
Language is used to soften and mask what is essentially the goal of destroying Israel. But since use of the term ‘destruction’ connotes an active, violent approach, advocates of nonviolence prefer using language that appears to show
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civility and a respect for human rights, even though their goals are indeed damaging for Israel.
For example, the ultimate purpose of these movements is, in their own words, to serve as ‘a central form of civil resistance to Israeli occupation, colonialism and apartheid’.69 As even strident opponents of Israel’s policies like Norman Finkelstein realize, this is essentially ‘code’ for eliminating Israel’s identity as the expression of Jewish self-determination and substituting ‘one-state’ for all, Jews and Arabs alike.70 When Finkelstein called out BDS activists as being intellectually dishonest in not clearly stating their true intentions, other activists tried rebutting his claim, but their words speak for themselves. Take, for example, American activist Ali Abunimah of the Electronic Intifada, who, in a piece entitled, ‘Finkelstein, BDS and the Destruction of Israel’, challenges those that claim BDS or the ‘one-state’ solution is tantamount to the ‘destruction’ of Israel. Using language that avoids the term ‘destruction’ but says the same thing, Abunimah states that the goal of the movement is transformation of Israel into a state where ‘Jews would have no separate right of self-determination’.71
California State University political science professor As’ad AbuKhalil, however, uses even more direct and non-evasive language and cuts through the rhetoric to state the obvious:
Finkelstein rightly asks whether the real aim of BDS is to bring down the state of Israel. Here, I agree with him that it is. That should be stated as an unambiguous goal. There should not be any equivocation on the subject. Justice and freedom for the Palestinians are incompatible with the existence of the state of Israel.72
This sober analysis is consistent with the belief expressed by some analysts, such as Nathan Thrall, that the outbreak of a third (violent) ‘intifada’ is only a matter of time.73
The origins of the new approach
What appears to be a ‘new’ approach to Arab psychological warfare may not be new at all. Joel Fishman explains that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has strong Marxist – Leninist roots that spawned a philosophy of resistance whose strategy calls for both a military and a political war against the enemy, namely Israel. Fishman notes that under a philosophy of a ‘people’s war’, ‘political conflict is more important, especially the de-legitimization of an adversary and the division of his society’. This, according to Fishman, is ignored by Israel, which, by focusing exclusively on a narrow military strategy, fails to appreciate the strategic aspects of political deception the PLO has been historically engaging in.74
On a practical level, we have seen this in the continued practice by the PLO-led Palestinian Authority (PA) of ostensibly favouring a negotiated settlement with Israel, all the while promoting vehemently anti-Israel messages to its own people in the media and in education. While officially accepting Israel’s existence, the PA continues an internal campaign of incitement and de-legitimization. Examples of themes that ignore the historical reality of Israel’s existence include denying the
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right of Jews to immigrate to Israel and consistently referring to pre-1967 territory in Israel as ‘Palestine’.75These and similar messages continue to be disseminated in Palestinian society.
The denial of Jewish ties to the land essentially casts Jews (specifically Zionist Jews) as foreign invaders, making resistance consistent with a common post-modernist theme, namely the rejection of colonialism and support for those oppressed by colonialists. According to Raphael Danziger, the Palestinian leadership learned to adopt this theme, as well as other revolutionary strategies, from the Algerian Arab experience of resistance to French colonialism.76In a 1972 interview with Edmund Ghareeb, Muhammad Yazid, the UN spokesperson for the Algerian National Liberation Front, made this point exceptionally clear:
We believe the basic feature of the conflict between the Arabs and the Zionists is the colonialization of Palestine by the Zionists and the subsequent occupation of the surrounding Arab territories, leaving the Arabs the problem of liberating their occupied land.77
Yazid continues using revolutionary language, speaking of ‘oppression’, ‘imperialism’ and the need for ‘resistance’, which he clearly frames in violent terms. ‘So-called peaceful solutions will never recognize the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination.’78
The history of affinity of the Palestinian Arab leadership with revolutionary themes was also reflected in the friendly relationships established with Communist leaders. These relationships may have served to help develop the strategy that the PLO used in its relationship with the West. Ion Mihai Pacepa, a former intelligence official in Communist Romania, recounts a meeting between Yasser Arafat and Nicolae Ceausescu where Ceausescu asks Arafat ‘How about pretending to break with terrorism?’, adding ‘The West would love it . . . [they] may even become addicted to you and the PLO’.79
Salah Khalaf (aka Abu Iyad), in his role as the PLO’s deputy chief and head of intelligence, recounts his meetings and visits to China, Vietnam and Cuba in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While the basis of all strategy was revolutionary thinking, he learned that it was also important to appear moderate in order not to alienate potential ideological allies from the left. Abu Iyad relates one story where he was obliged to produce a ‘watered-down’ version of a joint communique´ with North Vietnam that supported Palestinian self-determination so as not to offend American Jews, who were perceived as supporters of the anti-war movement at the time in the United States. The lesson he drew from this experience, and one that appears to inform even Palestinian Arab strategy up to today, is the need to ‘sacrifice the detail so as to preserve the essential’.80
Conclusion
The conflict between Israel and the Arab world has often focused on religious, political or national issues, but one factor that hovers over everything is the psychological aspect of the relationship between Jews in Israel and Arabs in the
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Palestinian Authority and elsewhere. This relationship is complex and always evolving, but one element of it has been how the two sides use psychological means to achieve their respective goals. Indeed, what those goals are can be deduced more easily from how the sides approach each other more than what they actually say about each other. So while official pronouncements of ‘two-state solutions’ are common, the actual psychology of the situation, especially on the Palestinian Arab side, still seems to see everything in terms of a zero-sum game approach where actual compromise is a strategy of last resort.
As a challenge to Israel, the actual goals of the current Palestinian Arab strategy of advocating nonviolence are no different from the goals of those Arab groups and countries that in the past engaged in conventional and unconventional warfare and violence; namely to bring about the end of an independent Jewish state in the region. By adopting a psychological strategy of nonviolence they act as a wolf in sheep’s clothing, attracting those who would confuse peaceful coexistence with misleading and vague promises of equality for all. Their insistence to limit Judaism’s definition to being only a religion as opposed to also being a nation or a people invalidates the Jewish right to self-determination.81They also have yet to explain how Jews, as a minority, would not suffer the same fate as other ethnic minorities in the region if the vision of ‘one state’ comes to pass. Nevertheless, as a psychological tactic, nonviolence serves a critical role and the aura of social responsibility has borne fruit, as seen by the downgrade of Caterpillar by ratings agency MSCI from its list of socially responsible companies, because of ‘use of the company’s equipment in the occupied Palestinian territories’.82
The Palestinian Authority has regularly adhered to messages that negate the rights of the Jewish people to an independent homeland and has broadcast and published communications that negatively portray Jews and that encourage resistance, including violence against Israel.83 The consistency of the PA’s message to its own people often stands in sharp contrast to the messages sent to the international community. One interesting example of this is the difference between the PA’s reporting of a soccer tournament held in Los Angeles between Israeli and Palestinian children and the PA’s stated attitude towards ‘normal-ization’ through sports. According to the official Palestinian newspaper al-Hayat Al-Jadida, Jibril Rajoub, chairman of the Palestine Football Association, said that ‘the term normalization [of relations with Israel] does not exist in the Palestinian sports lexicon’.84 Contrast this with another report in the same paper that positively described a friendly tournament between Israeli and Palestinian children held in Los Angeles and sponsored by then Real Madrid coach Jose Mourinho. Reporting on the event, the paper said that
it aims to create a warm atmosphere in order to draw the nations together, and support peace between them... Mourinho’s influence may be much stronger than the influence of the governments, and football is capable of achieving what political agreements and treaties have been unable to achieve.85
While the inconsistency between the two reports may reflect cracks in the policy of the Palestinian Authority with regard to the public demonization of
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Israel, it is more likely that it represents another example of differentiating the goals of communications to its own people as opposed to communications with the broader international community. Pointing this out is important as a counter-measure to the psychological warfare goals of Palestinian organizations when they use the nonviolent messages of Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi. It appears that this is now recognized by the Israeli government, with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement that the record of public demonization of Israel by the PA needs to be brought to the attention of the international community, including the UN.86
The goals of psychological warfare today involve persuading key target groups to support one narrative over another. It has been suggested that the ‘swing vote’ population of independent, left-leaning and fair-minded Westerners who are not ideologically committed to either an Israeli or Arab narrative are the natural targets for efforts by both sides. An effective, research-based strategy for pro-Israel public diplomacy would require two major actions. First, to determine how and when to react (or not react) to one’s adversary only after realistically and scientifically assessing the impact of different types of information presented to this population and, second, to determine mechanisms that would result in people adopting attitudes and behaviour that support a narrative consistent with peaceful relations within the context of the Jewish nation’s right to self-determination in its historic homeland, Israel.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Irwin J. (Yitzhak) Mansdorf is Director of the Israel – Arab Studies Programme, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, Israel.
Notes
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32. Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Israel and Lebanon After the Withdrawal,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 4, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 17 – 31.
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35. Yossi Klein Halevi, “Everyone’s Son,” Tablet, October 12, 2011.
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37. Anne Herzberg, “NGO ‘Lawfare’,” NGO Monitor Monograph Series (Jerusalem, 2010), http://www.ngo-monitor.org/data/images/File/lawfare-monograph.pdf
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38. Elior Levy, “Shin Bet: Palestinian Prisoners End Hunger Strike,” YNET News.com, May 14, 2012.
39. Maan News Agency, “PalHunger: Several Prisoners Still on Hunger Strike in Israeli Jails,” May 17, 2012, http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com/2012/05/17/palhunger-several-prisoners-still-on-hunger-strike-in-israeli-jails/(accessed May 21, 2013) and Khader Adnan Wins ‘Battle of Empty Stomachs’ in Israel. Al-Jazeera.com July 12, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/israel-releases-palestinian-prisoner-hunger-strike-150712014702904.html(accessed July 23, 2015).
40. Jack Khoury and Reuters, “Palestinian Prisoner to End Hunger Strike in Exchange for Early Release,” Haaretz, April 23, 2013.
41. David Jaeger et al., “The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds,” Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012): 354 – 68.
42. http://www.bdsmovement.net/bdsintro.
43. Ethan Bronner, “Poll Shows Most Palestinians Favor Violence Over Talks,” New York Times, March 19, 2008.
44. James Zogby, “New Poll on American Attitudes Toward the Israeli – Palestinian Conflict,” Huffington Post, March 17, 2010.
45. Khalil Shikaki, Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process, Special Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 158.
46. Elsa Rassbach, “Dr. Mustafa Barghouti: Nonviolent Resistance Is More Effective,” þ972, entry posted April 16, 2012, http://972mag.com/dr-mustafa-barghouti-nonviolent-resistance-is-more-effective/42160/(accessed May 21, 2013).
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50. Khaled Abu Toameh, “Mahmoud Abbas Condemns Itamar Attack,” Jerusalem Post, March 12, 2011. http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id¼211849 (accessed May 21, 2013).
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52. Khaled Abu Toameh, “Itamar Killings Carried Out by Foreign Worker,” Jerusalem Post, March 14, 2011.
53. “Palestinian Popular Committee Response to Itamar Incident,” Alternative News of the Palestine/Israel Conflict & Middle East (emphasis added). Politicshttp://www. alternativenews.org/english/index.php/component/content/article/28-news/3397-palestinian-popular-committee-response-to-itamar-incident-.html(accessed May 21, 2013).
54. William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (New York: Pantheon, 1971).
55. Khawala Abu Baker and Marwan Dwairy, “Cultural Norms Versus State Laws in Treating Incest: A Suggested Model For Arab Families,” Child Abuse and Neglect 27, no. 1 (2003): 109 – 23.
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57. Amnon Rubinstein, “The Counterfeit Human Rights Industry,” Haaretz, March 21, 2004.
58. Dan Schueftan, “Addicted to Victimization,” YNET, October 13, 2009.
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61. E.B. Clark, “The Sacred Rights of the Weak: Pain, Sympathy and the Culture of Individual Rights in America,” Journal of American History 82 (1995): 463 – 93. 62. Isabel Kershner, “Palestinians in Jails End Hunger Strike,” New York Times, May 14,
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63. Mordechai Kedar, in discussion with the author, May 18, 2013.
64. Intelligence Squared Debates, “The U.N. Should Admit Palestine as a Full Member State” (debate, New York University, New York, January 10, 2012), http:// intelligencesquaredus.org/images/debates/past/transcripts/palestine.pdf (accessed May 21, 2013).
65. Yoav Zitun, “Iron Dome Shoots Down 5 Gaza Rockets,” YNET News.com, June 23, 2012.
66. “Israel and Palestine,” Economist, May 17, 2011 and Mansdorf, I.J., Young, M., Samilow, J., Skootsky, S., and Eisenberg, Y. BDS on the American Campus: understanding the problem. Presentation at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 27, 2015.
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68. Democracy Now!, “Netanyahu’s Speech to Congress Dashes Palestinian Hopes of a Just Mideast Peace Agreement,” http://www.democracynow.org/2011/5/25/ netanyahus_speech_to_congress_dashes_palestinian(accessed May 21, 2013). 69. “Palestinian BDS National Committee,” BDS Movement, http://www.
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71. Ali Abunimah, “Finkelstein, BDS and the Destruction of Israel,” Aljazeera, February 28, 2012.
72. As’ad AbuKhalil, “A Critique of Norman Finkelstein on BDS,” Alakhbar English, February 17, 2012.
73. Nathan Thrall, “The Third Intifada Is Inevitable,” New York Times, June 22, 2012. 74. Joel Fishman, “Ten Years since Oslo: The PLO’s “People’s War”: Strategy and Israel’s Inadequate Response,” Jerusalem Viewpoints 503 (September 2003),http:// jcpa.org/article/ten-years-since-oslo-the-plos-peoples-war-strategy-and-israels-inadequate-response/(accessed September 7, 2015).
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76. Raphael Danziger, “Algeria and the Palestinian Organizations,” in The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict, ed. Gabriel Ben-Dor (Tel Aviv: Turtledove, 1979), 347 – 73.
77. Interview, “Muhammad Yazid on Algeria and the Arab – Israeli Conflict,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972): 1.
78. Ibid., 10.
79. Ion Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu’s Crimes, Lifestyle, and Corruption (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1990), 25. 80. Abu Iyad and with Eric Rouleau, My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian
Struggle (New York: Times Books, 1981), 70.
81. Consistent with Article 20 of the Palestinian National Charter, which states: ‘Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong’. Despite the supposed revocation of this article in accordance with the letters of agreement between the PLO and Israel in 1993, this belief remains widespread and the claim has been repeated multiple times by Palestinian Authority figures who continue to refuse to endorse the concept of a ‘Jewish’ state.
82. Naomi Zeveloff, “Israel Was ‘Key’ Issue in Caterpillar Dump: Boycott Israel Groups Claim Win in Ratings Downgrade,” Forward, June 25, 2012.
83. “Incitement Index Shows Pa Facilitates Demonization of Israel,” Israel Hayom, August 13, 2010.
84. PMW, “Israeli – Palestinian Peace through Football,”http://palwatch.org/main.aspx? fi¼157&doc_id ¼ 7238(accessed May 21, 2013).
85. Ibid.
86. “PM Netanyahu Responds to the ‘Index of Incitement’ and the Culture of Peace in the Palestinian Authority,” Prime Minister’s Office,http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/ MediaCenter/Spokesman/Pages/spokehasata120812.aspx(accessed May 21, 2013).
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