CASE 1: In The Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973
FACTS: In 1970, the Supreme Court created the Commission on Bar Integration (CBI) to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. In 1971, the Congress passed HB 3277 (An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor). President Marcos signed it and it became RA 6397.
In 1972, the CBI submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation to ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. The Report, alongside the proceedings in Administrative Case 526 and the views and sentiments of the Board of Consultants and the Philippine Bench and Bar, prayed for such integration.
ISSUE/S: WON the integration of the Bar is constitutional. HELD: Yes. The integration of the Bar is constitutional.
RATIO: The CBI Report defines the Bar Integration as the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines, requiring membership and financial support of every lawyer as sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys. It is based on the recognition that a lawyer is an officer of the court. It improves the position of the Bar as an instrument of justice and rule of law. It fosters cohesion among lawyers and ensures the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession.
The constitutionality of the Bar Integration hinges on the constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech. As the practice of law is a privilege vested with public interest, it can best discharge its public responsibilities through collective action. Collective action can only be done through an organized body.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an Integrated Bar does not violate his constitutional freedom to associate because integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. Integration only provides an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Also, an Integrated Bar serves to elevate the educational and ethical standards of the Bar with the goal of improving
the quality of the State‘s legitimate interest. Even assuming that a lawyer is compelled to join the Integrated Bar, it is still a justified compulsion as it is an exercise of the police power of the State in regulating and controlling the legal profession. Also, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate it.
NOTE: This case falls under Canon 7 but this Canon is not explicitly provided for in the case. However, the relation can be seen. Canon 7 provides that ―a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.‖ In using the word ―shall,‖ this Canon makes it mandatory for all lawyers to: (1) uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and (2) support the activities of the Integrated Bar. In being a member of the Integrated Bar, a lawyer has certain responsibilities, which, if complied with, will uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Therefore, it is neither unlawful to have a Bar Integration nor be a member of an Integrated Bar.
CASE 2: In Re: 1989 elections of the IBP
FACTS: On June 3, 1989, the IBP held its election however, the winning candidates were not allowed to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989 due to some reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements.
The records of the Philippine National Bank show that Sec. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. Of the DENR borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol Cabinet Officers for Regional Development Assistant,
Undersecretary Antonio Tria. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989. Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles, a voting delegate, to whom he gave four round-trip tickets from Iligan City to Manila and back. Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters, to be occupied by his staff and the IBP delegates. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills. The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Atty. Nisce, on the one hand, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74.
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government, Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made.
ISSUE/S: WON the candidates violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through their in campaigning for the election. HELD: Yes. The three candidates employed means that are contrary to the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the said By-Laws.
RATIO: The setting up of campaign headquarters by Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo in five-star hotels; the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls and lawyers to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility).
CASE 3: Santos, Jr. v. Llamas
FACTS: On Feb. 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr. a member of the bar, filed a complaint against Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. Santos claimed that Llamas, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data in his pleadings, as the latter only indicates ―IBP Rizal 259060‖ for at least three years already, as show by the pleadings filed by Llamas in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997.
On April 18, 1997, Santos filed a certification by the then IBP president of the IBP that respondent‘s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present.
On July 7, 1997, Llamas was required to comment on the complaint and in his comment, Llamas alleged that he was exempt from payment of IBP dues under R.A. 7432, Sec. 4, for being a senior citizen since 1992 and that he was engaged only in ―limited‖ practice of law. Llamas, also added, that if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties.
On Dec. 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.
ISSUE/S: WON Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD: Yes, Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RATIO: Llamas violated Canon 7 which states that ―A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.‖ Although Llamas‘ failure to pay his IBP dues may be in good faith, his act of indicating ―IBP- RIZAL 259060‖ in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts the he had paid his IBP dues is contrary with the duty of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Llamas‘ failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of his advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, the Court ruled to impose the penalty of one year suspension upon Llamas from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.
CASE 4: Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. Requesting Exemption From Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005
FACTS: On September 22, 2004, Atty Cecilo Arevalo, Jr. sought the exemption from the payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 in the years between 1977-2005. Atty. Cecilio Arevalo‘s contention is that when he was admitted in the Philippines Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippines Civil Service from 1962 to 1986, and then migrated to and worked in, the USA until his retirement in 2003. He maintained that he cannot be made to pay the IBP dues because, when he is working in the Philippine Civil Service, the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice off one‘s profession while in the Government service, also when he was in the USA the IBP dues cannot extend to him.
On November 16, 2004, the IBP submitted its comment, that the membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the roll of attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP board of governors; the policy of the IBP board of governors of no exemption of payment of annual dues is but an implementation of the Court‘s directives for all members of the IBP to help defray the cost of integration of the Bar. It is maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption, of payment of annual dues as requested by Atty Arevalo, what is allowed is the voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. What he could have done was to inform the secretary of IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, reliving him from his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped.
On February 25, 2005, in reply to the letter of the IBP, Atty. Arevalo questions the policy of the IBP board of governors of the non-exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. Asserting that the said policy is a suffers constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he was inactive in the practice of law.
HELD: NO. The Integration of the Philippines Bar means that official unification of the entire lawyer population, which requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and retention of his name in the Roll of attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The Court stated that there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in integration of the Philippine Bar. The fee required by the IBP is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP for the integration of the Philippine Bar to defray the expenses of regulation of the profession, Lawyers, which no one is exempt.
CASE 5. In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao v. Severino G. Martinez, A.C. No. 244, March 29, 1963
FACTS: Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars: (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
ISSUE/S: WON Diao be admitted to the Bar despite his misrepresentation. HELD: No.Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations.
RATIO: Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
CASE 6: Evangeline Leda vs. Atty. Trebonian Tabang, A.C. No. 2505, February 21 1992
FACTS: Tabang and Leda contracted marriage at Iloilo and was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code as marriage of exceptional character. Both of them kept their marriage a secret until Tabang finishes his law studies, they had not yet lived as husband and wife.
Tabang, having finished his law studies, declared in his application to take the bar that he was ―single‖. After Tabang passed the bar, Leda blocked him of taking his oath by instituting a complaint, Bar Matter No. 78, that he acted fraudulently in filling out his application. Thus, Tabang should be considered as unworthy to take the lawyer‘s oath for lack of good moral character. Tabang admitted that he ‗legally married‖ Leda but that the marriage ―was not yet made and declared public‖ so that he could properly take the Bar exams and ensure their future. Bar Matter No. 78 was dismissed because Tabang said that it just arose out of misunderstanding between him and Leda.
Leda, in response to this, instituted the present Administrative Case praying Tabang‘s disbarment on grounds of using his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with Leda, misrepresented himself as single, and for lack of good moral character.
It was found out that the marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, or the five-year minimum cohabitation before celebration of marriage and that they were both twenty years old when they got married, below the required minimum age of twenty-one years old.
He contended that he and Leda agreed not to disclose that their marriage was void from the beginning because he wanted to finish his studies and take the bar first. He also believed that when he applied for the Bar, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single. ISSUE/S: WON Tabang committed gross misrepresentation of his status HELD: Yes. Tabang committed gross misrepresentation of his status.
RATIO: Tabang‘s declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Tabang‘s protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to Leda was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Tabang cannot assume that his marriage to Leda is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed. Tabang is SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders
CASE 7: In Re Investigation of Angel Parazo for Alleged Leakage of Questions in Some Subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations
FACTS: The defendant, Angel Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general publication wrote in the front page of a newspaper where it states in bold letters- ―CLAIM LEAK IN LAST BAR TEST‖ followed by another in slightly small letters- ―Applicants in Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed: One School Favored‖. According to this article, the leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part of the test to the Star Reporter. Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the tests. The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding around the city. Thereafter, Justice Padilla, by the authority of the court, instructed Mr. Jose Dela Cruz with assistance of Mr. E. Soriano to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning. In September 18, 1948, the investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted, on which he testified under oath. He admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish their identities revealed. The investigators urged Mr. Parazo to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in the position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for this alleged irregularity, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation. In the meantime, Justice Montemayor issued a resolution dated October 7, 1948 authorizing Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the court requires him to reveal the source of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court. Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, he could be given an extension. On October 15, 1948, Mr. Parazo appeared before the court but still declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and
ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section provides that The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state.
ISSUE/S: WON the court can compel Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants
HELD: Yes, the court may demand the respondent to reveal the sources of his information, in refusing to make the revelation which the Court required of him, he committed contempt of court. The court orders his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of 1 month.
RATIO: RA No. 53 provides immunity to be accorded to a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute that under no circumstances could he be compelled to reveal his source of information or news report. The committee however, inserted an amendment by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause ―unless the court finds such revelation is demanded by public interest‖. The court is satisfied with that the present case easily comes under the phrase ―interest of the state.‖ Under Article VII, section 13 of the Constitution, the SC takes charge of the admission of members of the Philippine Bar. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance.
CASE 8: Saburnido v. Madrono
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent, Atty. Florante Madrono, file by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido. Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three administrative cases against the respondent: (1) A. M. No. MTJ-90-383, charges of grave threats and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary against respondent; (2) A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC, respondent granted and reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to the prosecution; (3) A.M. No. MTJ-90-486 respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Respondent was found guilty on these charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.
After sometime the respondent lawyer then filed numerous complaints against the petitioners, to which they allege that this is already a form of harassment or a way of getting back to them.
ISSUE/S: WON the multiple cases file by the respondent lawyer against the petitioners is a ground for his disbarment.
HELD: No. The Court finds that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline the respondent.
RATIO: Rule 7.03. -- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondent‘s act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait
whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were instrumental in respondent‘s dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondent‘s tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
Respondent‘s action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. Xxx
CASE 9: Zaguirre v. Castillo
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met while working in the NBI, the latter had been courting the former and had promised to marry her while representing himself to be single.Eventually, the two had an affair sometime around 1996 and 1997. During that time, respondent was preparing for his bar examinations, which he passed. On May 10, 1997, respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar and it was also around the first week of May that petitioner knew about respondent‘s marriage when she was confronted by the wife of the respondent.
On Sept 10, 1997 respondent issued an affidavit admitting his relationship with the petitioner and that he is the father of her unborn child. Upon petitioner‘s giving birth however, respondent started to deny the paternity of the child and refused to give any support to the child. Respondent claims that he never courted petitioner and that their affair was only mutual lust. He likewise denied having represented himself as single as he was known as a married man with children while working in the NBI. As to the paternity of the child, he denied being the father since petitioner allegedly was seeing other men during that time. He also avers that he signed the said affidavit only to save the petitioner from embarrassment.
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law. ISSUE/S: WON respondent has committed gross immoral conduct. HELD: Yes. Respondent‘s actions amount to gross immoral conduct. RATIO: The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
―CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.‖ ―Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.‖
The court held that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer. Moreover, his denial of the affidavit earlier executed by him shows a conduct, which is highly censurable and unbecoming of a member of the Bar. While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant, he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that ―men by nature are polygamous,‖ and that what happened between them was ―nothing but mutual lust and desire.‖ The Court was not convinced and in fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent. His illicit relationship with the respondent was prior to his admission to the bar and it would be impossible for respondent not to know that he is required to have good moral character, and that the same is not only a condition precedent to admission but also a continuing requirement. Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly. However, as held by the Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser penalty could be given. Thus, herein respondent was held GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
FACTS:This case refers to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent for the Resolution dated Feb. 6, 2002, finding the respondent guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession and ordering his disbarment. The respondent reiterates his innocence by denying the authorship and participation in the falsification of the subject deed of donation. He however admits his negligence and expresses remorse for his failure to diligently perform his duties as notary public.
Aside from the guilt of being remiss on the performance of his duties, he was also found guilty of harassing the occupants of the property subject of the donation by asking Meralco to disconnect its services to the property and by posting security guards to intimidate the said occupants. The IBP Investigating Commissioner found no proof as to the participation of the respondent on the falsification of the signature of Cesar Flores on the document. The criminal case filed by the complainant found no reason to indict the respondent as well.
ISSUE/S: Do the actions of Atty. Garcia reflect adversely on this fitness to practice law and transgressed Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD: Yes. Without a doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. However, the totality of the acts of misconduct committed by the respondent, his admission of negligence, plea for compassion and that the fact that this is his first offense, the Court finds it proper to reinstate him as a member of the bar and suspend him to the practice of law and from his commission as a notary public for three years.
RATIO: Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. By engaging in acts that undermine recognition of and respect for legal processes, respondent clearly committed conduct that adversely reflects in his fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
CASE 11:Mila Virtusio, vs. Atty. Grenalyn Virtusio, A.C. No. 6753, September 5, 2012
FACTS: Sometime in 1991, Atty. Virtusio convinced herein petitioner, Mila Virtusio, to buy a house in Quezon City from its developer Stateland Investment Corporation. Mila agreed for Atty. Virtusio to use her personal checks in paying the seller with Mila reimbursing her. Under this arrangement, Mila gave her a total of P441,000.
However, Mila started receiving letters from Stateland demanding that she make good the dishonored checks that it got. Mila confronted Atty. Virtusio regarding the matter, and the latter assured her that she would take care of the problem. The demand letters persisted.
For fear of losing the property, Mila dealt with Stateland directly, discovering that her obligation had come close to P200,000. Mila and her husband settled their overdue obligation with money borrowed at high interest.
Upon demand, Atty. Virtusio refused to return the money she had misappropriated. Only when Mila threatened to file an action against her did she agree to pay her by executing a deed of sale in Mila‘s favor covering her Mazda car.
Despite the sale, Atty. Virtusio refused to give up the car, which prompted Mila to file a replevin case which was decided in the latter‘s favor. But, Atty. Virtusio had managed to register the car in her children‘s name and sold the same to a third person. Mila filed an estafa case against her apart from the present disbarment case.
Mila agreed after some financial settlement to withdraw her complaint against Atty. Virtusio.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her acts of gross misconduct. HELD: Yes. The Court finds Atty. Virtusio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes upon her the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one year.
RATIO: Lawyers are, as officers of the court and instruments for the administration of justice, expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, and fair dealing. Atty. Virtusio has admitting misusing the money that Mila has entrusted to her. Her use for personal purposes the money entrusted to her constitutes
dishonest and deceitful conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility under Rule 1.01 (shall not engage in xxx dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Rule 7.03.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. CASE 12: Javier v. Cornejo
FACTS: Silverio Q. Cornejo, a practicing lawyer of Lipa, Batangas, is charged with malpractice (a) for trying to collect from a brother attorney a sum of money by means of threat, and (b) for having instigated Severina Paz Teodoro to file a complaint against Atty. Benedicto M. Javier, for malpractice knowing fully well that the charges therein alleged were malicious, flimsy and unfounded.
Atty. Javier, in support of his charge, refers to a letter dated December 2, 1935, in which demand was made upon him by Atty. Cornejo, for the delivery of P195 which was the amount collected and received by Javier by virtue of a judgment rendered in a certain case in the CFI of Rizal wherein Severina Paz Teodoro was the judgment creditor and Atty. Javier was her counsel. In the same letter, Atty. Javier was given 10 days within which to turn over the said P195, otherwise a complaint would be filed against him in this court. He was also urged to settle the matter for the preservation not only of his good name but also that of the legal profession.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Silverio Cornejo violated Canon 8, for executing harassing tactics against his opposing counsel
HELD: No. He did not execute harassing tactics. The letter was not improper. Prior to the alleged instigation, clients had already been demanding from Atty Javier the return of the money.
RATIO: We find nothing improper in this letter of Atty. Cornejo to Atty. Javier. The letter was an extra-judicial demand for the payment of a sum of money which Severina Paz Teodoro had represented to Atty. Cornejo as owing to her and which she sought to recover through his professional services. It was an honest effort on the part of Atty. Cornejo to serve the interest of his client. The lawyer owes entire "devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and
exertion of his utmost learning and ability", to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. As to second ground, it is alleged that the Atty. Cornejo in connivance with one Gregorio Tapia, induced Severina Paz Teodoro to accuse Atty. Javier before this court of malpractice. It appears that Atty. Javier was the respondent in another case (A.C. No. 757) of the unlawful conversion of a judgment fund amounting to P195 pertaining to his client, Severina Paz Teodoro, which was dismissed. Now, Atty. Javier comes back against Atty. Cornejo and charges him with having maliciously instigated the filing of the complaint in the mentioned case (A.C. No. 757). We find that A.C. No. 757 was instituted in this court on March 18, 1936 and Atty. Cornejo intervened as counsel for Atty. Javier on Dec 2, 1935. But long before these dates, Severina Paz Teodoro and her son Feliciano Pateña had already been demanding from Atty. Javier the return of the amount alleged to be due them. The last demand letter was made on March 23, 1931, and its receipt in the same month. This letter demanded the payment of the remaining balance of P166.50 from the sum which Atty. Javier had collected and received as judgment fund of his previous client Severina Paz Teodoro, and also advised that upon his failure to remit the amount demanded, the matter would be brought to the attention of this court.
It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickering and unjustifiable recrimination, between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court.
CASE 13: Manuel Y. Macias vs. Benjamin B. Malig
FACTS: This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Atty. Manuel Y. Macias against respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Malig for suspension or disbarment upon grounds of malpractice and violation of the lawyer's oath.
The charge by Atty. Macias in his sworn Complaint dated 14 June 1982, maybe summed up as follows:
1. He [Atty. Malig] acted as counsel for Rosario M. Llora in Special Proceedings No. 70878 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila although Atty. Macias was still her attorney of record.
2. He harassed Atty. Macias to withdraw his appearance in: (a) Special Proceeding No. 70878, and (b) Civil Case No. 73335 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, which became G.R. No. L-34395 of this Honorable Court; and he intimidated Atty. Macias into signing: (a) the Waiver (Exhibit "C"), (b) the Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 73335 (Exhibit "R"), and (c) the substitution of counsel in Special Proceeding No. 70878 (Exhibit "S").
3. He did not substitute Atty. Macias in Civil Case No. 65763 but claimed for Himself the attorney's fees of Atty. Macias.
4. He extorted from Atty. Macias, the sum of P10,000.00.
5. He corruptly induced the late Judge Joel Tiangco to lift Atty. Macias attachment on a property belonging to the Lloras without notice to Atty. Macias.
6. He actively assisted the Lloras to dispose of all their properties in the Philippines and remit the proceeds to Australia in fraud of Atty. Macias. In turn, respondent Atty. Malig in his "Comment with Countercharges" dated 1 September 1982 sought the disbarment of complainant Atty. Macias. The countercharges against Atty. Macias are the following: 1. Atty. Macias made an unethical solicitation of case-the settlement of the estate of Rosario Legarda de Valdes.
2. He instituted a patently baseless and malicious action, Civil case No. 109585, before the Regional Trial Court in Manila for attorney's fees and damage. against Antonio Ma. Llora, Rosario M. Llora and their family-owned corporations.
3. He maliciously and irresponsible charged Atty. Malig and his clients with having "exacted" and "extorted" from him the sum of P10,000.00
4. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and the late Judge Joel Tiangco with corruption in the lifting of an attachment.
5. He made an unethical representation of a client.
6. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and his clients, the Llora spouses, with fraudulent disposition of the latter's properties and salting the proceeds [in] Australia.
ISSUE/S: WON there was condor and fairness towards the other professional colleague.
HELD: YES both lawyers are guilty for the acts they did which are unbecoming to the other lawyer.
RATIO: The Court is not prepared to condone by passing over subsilentio the misconduct of which complainant and respondent are guilty one
vis-a-vis the other. Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to believe the other guilty of serious misconduct in the practice of the profession to which they both belong while vehemently asserting his own good faith. Each party here was too anxious and willing to make serious accusations against the other which the exertion of reasonable diligence along with simple courtesy would have shown to be unwarranted by the facts and the records. Each attorney here was too prone to use intemperate and offensive language in describing the professional behavior of the other. Complainant Macias insisted that respondent Malig "extorted" P10,000.00 from him. The dictionary meaning of "to extort" is "to obtain from an unwilling or reluctant person by physical force, intimidation or the abuse of legal or official authority" (Webster's Third New International [1981, ed.].) Clearly, extortion is an unethical act and may well be criminal. "Harassment" and "intimidation" are other similarly unethical and offensive acts that complainant Macias so freely ascribed to respondent Malig "Corruption" with which complainant in Macias accused both respondent Malig and the deceased Judge Tiangco is an even more deplorable term. Upon the other hand, respondent Malig was not to be outdone and referred to complainant Macias as "denizen" of a "jungle" who "prey[s] upon his brother lawyer [and] his [own] clients" and likened him to "a baneful snake biting the hand of the client who fed him" The Court would also take judicial notice of the fact that complainant Macias has more than once in the past been rebuked by this Court in relation to his conduct vis-a-vis clients and former clients. We hold that complainant Macias and respondent Malig are both guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the court. Lawyers must at all times treat each other, and as well their clients, former clients and the rest of the community, with that personal dignity, courtesy and civility rightly demanded of members of the ancient and learned profession of the law. CASE 14: Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao, vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro, A.C. No. 6396, October 25, 2005
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Castro went to Atty. Rosalie‘s (complainant) office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded to the MCTC. Atty. Castro was not the counsel of record of either party in the said civil case. Atty. Rosalie is the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya.
Atty. Rosalie informed Atty. Castro that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the
records to the court of origin. To this, Atty. Castro retorted scornfully, ―Who will certify the Court of Appeals‘ Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy?‖ Surprised at this outburst, Atty. Rosalie replied, ―Sir, it‘s in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be representing.‖ Atty. Castro then replied, ―Then you should have notified me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me.‖ Atty. Rosalie replied, ―It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.‖
Atty. Castro then answered, ―You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?‖ Atty. Rosalie responded, ―No, Sir, I mean, it‘s not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals‘ decision.‖ Atty. Castro angrily declared in Ilocano, “Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?” (―You mean to say you don‘t care anymore? Is that the way it is?‖) He then turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place. After a few minutes, Atty Castro returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at Atty. Rosalie and shouted, “Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah!” (―Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, don‘t turn your ire on me!‖) Atty. Rosalie was shocked at Atty. Castro‘s words but still managed to reply, ―I don‘t even know your client, Sir.‖ Atty. Castro left the office and as he passed by Atty. Rosalie‘s window, he again shouted,“Ukinnam nga babai!” (―Vulva of your mother, you woman!‖)
Atty. Rosalie suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff.
The Complaint-Affidavit was supported by an Affidavit signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was also filed. The CBD-IBP issued an Order requiring respondent to submit his answer to the complaint. The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set. However, on day of the hearing, only complainant appeared.
Atty. Rosalie filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view of respondent‘s public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Castro violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Castro violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely.
RATIO: Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.
In the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates. He thus violated Canon 8 of the CPR. The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the complainant and the latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.
CASE 15: Antonio A. Alcantara, vs. Atty. Mariano Pefianco, A. C. No. 5398, December 3, 2002
FACTS: On May 18, 2000, Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorney‘s Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, the incumbent District Public Attorney of the PAO in San Jose, Antique, saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room. At this point, Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying "Why do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake." Atty. Alcantara was surprised by the sudden outburst and advised him to cool off but, to no avail Atty. Pefianco continued to scold Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with Atty. Pefianco, Atty. Alcantara went inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in the PAO. Alcantara then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he heard Pefianco saying "Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what an idiot." Pefianco upon seeing Alcantara, pointed his finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear. Alcantara confronted Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to leave the office if he had no business there. Pefianco resented this and started hurling invectives at Alcantara. According to Alcantara, Pefianco even took a menacing stance towards him. The incident caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify Atty. Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take Pefianco out of the office, but before they could do so, he tried to attack Alcantara and even shouted at him, "Gago ka!" Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off Pefianco‘s blow and Alcantara was not harmed.
Atty. Alcantara filed a complaint against Atty. Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault him. Complainant Alcantara also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he resented the fact that complainant Alcantara had ordered a employee to put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys" from hanging round in the PAO.
Respondent Pefianco claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the woman‘s case Alcantara, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to get out of the PAO. He claimed that two security guards also came, and Alcantara ordered them to take him out of the office. Contrary to complainant‘s claims, however, Pefianco said that it was Alcantara who moved to punch him and shout at him, "Gago ka!"
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed by the said office.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent Atty. Pefianco should be reprimanded for his actions in the said case.
HELD: Yes, respondent Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: ―A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.‖
RATIO: The Court agrees with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP that respondent Atty. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation for his actions. The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco who provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of several disinterested persons confirm complainant‘s allegation that respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on the complainant.
Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.
In the case at bar, respondent‘s meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Atty. Mariano Pefianco was found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering it was his first offense, he was fined in the amount ofP1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more severely.
CASE 16: Yared v. Ilarde
FACTS: Estrella Yared, substituted by Carmen Tiongco because the former is now dead, and Jose Tiongco were opposing parties to a property in litigation. Carmen directly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Supreme Court because Judge Ilarde of the RTC ordered the cancellation of annotation of notices of lis pendens. The Supreme Court noticed and commented that Carmen has failed to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy and that she should have filed the petition in the CA first. However, the Supreme Court also noticed the improper and unethical language employed by Jose Tiangco, who was also a counsel for the private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both in SC and lower court. He described the counsel of the petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, ―a rambunctious wreastler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the court room like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar.‖ Jose Tiongco alleged that Atty. Deguma does that ―to please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily available Carmelo Tiongco, an unmarried mestizo who lives with Carmen.‖ He further described Atty. Deguma as ―an unmarried maiden of certain age‖ and a ―love-crazed female Apache who is ready to skin the defendant alive for not being a bastard‖ and a ―horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an Amazon.‖ He also stated that Atty. Deguma is using PAO as a ―marriage bureau for her own benefit.‖
ISSUE/S: W/N Jose Tiongco, being also one of the counsels of the defendants, violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Yes. With the language that he employed, he obviously violated Canon 8-A Rule 8.01 which states that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper. He also violated Rule 11.03 which says that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language before the courts. The SC also cited Romero vs Valle, ―although allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.‖ Jose Tiongco was merely warned.
Note: In the first part of the case, even the title of the case, it was not mentioned whether Jose Tiongco is a lawyer or not. Then, there‘s one sentence which addressed him ―Atty. Jose Tiongco.‖
CASE 17: Cerina B. Likong vs. Atty. Alexander H. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, August 17, 1994
FACTS: Complainant Cerina B. Likong executed a deed of assignment assigning to Geesnell L. Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the US government as a widow of a US pensioner. The deed of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until her loan is fully paid. Cerina likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get her pension checks from the post office.
About three months after the execution of the SPA, Cerina informed the post office that she was revoking the SPA. Yap filed a complaint for injunction against Cerina. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for Cerina.
Cerina and Yap filed a joint motion, which does not bear the signatures of Cerina's counsel, to allow the Yap to withdraw the pension checks. They likewise entered into a compromise agreement without the participation of Cerina's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant Cerina admitted an obligation to Yap and that they agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly installments.
Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions, she was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two lawyers as she was advised by Atty. Lim that it was not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything. She alleged that she was prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of
mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently or without authority, assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat. Atty. Lim argued that Cerina‘s counsel had abandoned her and it was upon her request that he made the compromise agreement. Atty. Lim states that he first instructed Cerina to notify her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
The compromise agreement prepared by respondent increased Cerina‘s debt to Yap and the terms contained therein are grossly prejudicial to Cerina.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Lim is guilty of misconduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year for violating Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, constituting malpractice and grave misconduct.
RATIO: Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint. There is no showing that Atty. Lim even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the trial court of the alleged abandonment of Cerina by her counsel.Instead, even assuming that she was really abandoned by her counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the compromise agreement which is grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to Cerina. Undoubtedly, Atty. Lim's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
CASE 18: Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. vs. Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 5768, March 26, 2010
FACTS: On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer for the following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff‘s counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.