Page 1 of 38 IV. Certificate of Title.
EMETERIA LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012
FACTS:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space” as defined in P. D. 1216.
RULING:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.”
The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities.
Ejusdem generis - states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible.
Page 2 of 38 (GINA MAE DULNUAN)
Oliveros vs. San Miguel Corp. 664 SCRA 618 (2012)
FACTS:
In 1986, Ramitex consolidated and subdivided its 17 lots including the disputed LOT 1131 into six lots. By virtue of this consolidation, The Caloocan RD cancelled Ramitex’ individual title to Lot 1131 (TCT No. T-18460) and issued a new title, TCT No. T-137261, for consolidated Lot 4 which included Lot 1131.
Meanwhile, Oliveros filed a petition before the RTC for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-17186, his alleged title over Lot 1131. He claimed that the original copy was destroyed in the fire that gutted the office of the Bulacan RD on March 7, 1987.
Ramitex filed its opposition to Oliveros’ petition*8+ asserting that TCT No. T-17186 never existed in the records of the Bulacan RD and cannot therefore be reconstituted.
In light of Ramitex’ opposition and ownership claims over Lot 1131, Oliveros filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of Ramitex’ title over Lot 1131. Oliveros claimed that he bought the subject property sometime in November 1956 from the spouses Domingo De Leon and Modesta Molina, and pursuant to such sale, the Bulacan RD issued TCT No. T-17186 in his favor on November 14, 1956.
After trial, the trial court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Oliveros’ TCT No. T-17186 does not exist. It gave due credence to the certification of the LRA that Bulacan RD never possessed the Judicial Form used in issuing Oloveros’ purported TCT.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision. After reviewing the factual findings of the trial court, the CA agreed that there is no evidence that Oliveros’ title came from official sources.
Hence this petition.
Petitioners insist that the mere existence of Oliveros’ earlier title negates the conclusiveness of Ramitex’ title.*75+ Oliveros’ TCT No. T-17186, as the older title, should enjoy presumptive conclusiveness of ownership and indefeasibility of title. Corollarily, Ramitex’s title being a later title should have the presumption of invalidity. Thus, SMC has the burden of overcoming this presumption.[76] Oliveros argues that SMC failed to prove the validity of its title, which should be cancelled accordingly.
Respondent SMC (which substituted Ramitex) argues that the principle of indefeasibility of titles applies only to an existing valid title to the litigated property. In the instant case, SMC showed that Oliveros’ title, while claiming priority, is actually spurious; thus, between SMC and Oliveros, it is only SMC which has a valid title and in whose favor the doctrine of indefeasibility of title applies.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in applying the doctrines of indefeasibility and conclusiveness of title in favor of respondent SMC;
2. Whether the decisions of the CA and the trial court allowed a collateral attack on Oliveros’ certificate of title.
Page 3 of 38 RULING:
1. NO. The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there are two apparently valid titles over a single property. The existence of the earlier valid title renders the subsequent title void because a single property cannot be registered twice. As stated in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals,[81] which petitioners themselves cite, “a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence.” Clearly, a mere allegation of an earlier title will not suffice. Since petitioners allege that they have a title which was issued earlier than SMC’s title, it was their burden to prove the alleged existence and priority of their title. The trial and appellate courts’ shared conclusion that petitioners’ TCT No. T-17186 does not exist in the official records is a finding of fact that is binding on this Court. Without a title, petitioners cannot assert priority or presumptive conclusiveness.
2. NO. The prohibition against collateral attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent titles, since such titles do not enjoy indefeasibility. “Well-settled is the rule that the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. In view of these circumstances, it was as if no title was ever issued in this case to the petitioner and therefore this is hardly the occasion to talk of collateral attack against a title.”+
Moreover, the attack on Oliveros’ title was not a collateral attack. “An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or to enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, it is indirect or collateral when, in an action or proceeding to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.”*86+
Here, SMC/Ramitex assailed the validity of Oliveros’ title as part of its counterclaim in an action to declare SMC/Ramitex’s title a nullity. A counterclaim is essentially a complaint filed by the defendant against the plaintiff and stands on the same footing as an independent action.*87+ Thus, Ramitex’s counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on Oliveros’ title.
(FAITH ECLEO) Durawood v. Bona G.R. No. 179884, January 25, 2012 (JEREMY MAGPAYO) Corpuz v. Agustin G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012
Page 4 of 38 (EMYROSE REAS)
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 123346, December 14, 2007 FACTS:
The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities within Metropolitan Manila, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.
CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLT’s claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title derived from Estelita Hipolito. Hipolito’s title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that Dimson’s title, the proximate source of CLT’s title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source OCT No. 994.
The trial court ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title issued in the name of CLT valid.
HELD:
It is evident from all three titles─CLT’s, Hipolito’s and Dimson’s—that the properties they purport to cover were " originally registered on 19 April 1917” in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed. CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it did not.
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.
Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before the trial court.
As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April 1917.
Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into the Original Certificate of Title. Thus, such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect. It appears that the transcription of the decree was done on the date it was received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917.
Page 5 of 38 There is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title is made by the register of deeds. The certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. It was stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry.
Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title is to take effect.
Hence, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing on their respective titles.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the case on remand.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make further determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Page 6 of 38 (CZARINA MARTINEZ)
REPUBLIC vs. NILLAS
G.R. No. 159595, January 23, 2007 FACTS:
On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.On 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered a decision, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. One of these lots was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion and Engracia Calingacion. Nillas' parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale, acquired the said lot through various purchases they effected from the Eugenia and her heirs between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra. In turn, Nillas acquired the lot from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision, no decree of registration has ever been issued. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration.
On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases. In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations.
ISSUE:
WON prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and instead affirmed the assailed rulings of the lower courts.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases.
Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial
Page 7 of 38 duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the first place.
Section 39 of PD No. 1529 lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review. The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can.
The ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal. Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Page 8 of 38 (DAN WILLIAM BADIQUE)
PADCOM CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs. ORTIGAS CENTER ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No. 146807, May 9, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation (hereafter PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla Office Condominium Building (PADCOM Building) located at Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The land on which the building stands was originally acquired from the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (OCLP), by Tierra Development Corporation (TDC). Among the terms and conditions in the deed of sale was the requirement that the transferee and its successor-in-interest must become members of an association for realty owners and long-term lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas Center. Subsequently, the said lot, together with improvements thereon, was conveyed by TDC in favor of PADCOM. Respondent Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (hereafter the Association) was organized to advance the interests and promote the general welfare of the real estate owners and long-term lessees of lots in the Ortigas Center. It sought the collection of membership dues from PADCOM, however, the latter refused to pay contending that it is a stock, non-profit association, and for it to become a special member of the Association, it should first apply for and be accepted for membership by the latter’s Board of Directors. No automatic membership was apparently contemplated in the Association’s By-laws. PADCOM added that it could not be compelled to become a member without violating its right to freedom of association. And since it was not a member of the Association, it was not liable for membership dues, interests and penalties. In view of PADCOM’s failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues, including interests and penalties thereon, the Association filed a complaint for collection of sum of money.
Issue:
Whether PADCOM can be compelled to join the association pursuant to the provision on automatic
membership appearing as a condition in the Deed of Sale and the annotation thereof on Transfer Certificate of
Title.
Held:
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court sees no reason to disturb the assailed decision. The petition should be denied.
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 mandates that:
SEC. 44. Statutory liens affecting title. – Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
xxx
Under the Torrens system of registration, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law, existing against the land binds the holder of the title and the whole world. It is undisputed that when the land in question was bought by PADCOM’s predecessor-in-interest, TDC, from OCLP, the sale bound TDC to comply with automatic membership with the association clause of the covenants, conditions and restrictions of the Deed of Sale. This is so because any lien annotated on previous certificates of title should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. Such lien is inseparable from the property as it is a right in rem, a burden on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding
Page 9 of 38 a change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is disregarded. As emphasized earlier, the provision on automatic membership was annotated in the Certificate of Title and made a condition in the Deed of Transfer in favor of PADCOM. Consequently, it is bound by and must comply with the covenant.
Moreover, Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Since PADCOM is the successor-in-interest of TDC, it follows that the stipulation on automatic membership with the Association is also binding on the former.
Page 10 of 38 (CORA SEGUI)
SPOUSES RAMON and ESTRELLA RAGUDO vs. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No. 146823, August 9, 2005
FACTS:
All the tenants occupying portions of the Fabella Estate were asked to join Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc. (FETA) as a pre-condition for the loan from National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the latter’s Community Mortgage Program. The spouses Ramon Ragudo and Estrella Ragudo who were occupying the lot subject matter of this controversy, consisting of about 105 square meters of the Fabella Estate, refused to join the Association. Consequently, the portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs. Miriam De Guzman, a qualified FETA member.Later, and with the help of the city government of Mandaluyong, FETA became the registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2902 issued in its name by the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong in 1989.The spouses Ragudo continued to occupy despite the earlier award thereof to Mrs. Miriam de Guzman, FETA filed against them a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City.
The MeTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the ground that it was an improper remedy because the Ragudos had been occupying the subject portion for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of the complaint, hence the proper action should have been one for recovery of possession before the proper regional trial court. FETA appealed the dismissal to the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City, which affirmed the same. FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of possession against the Ragudos. In their Answer, the spouses interposed the defense that they have already acquired ownership of the disputed portion since they have been in occupation thereof in the concept of an owner for more than forty (40) years. They further argued that FETA’s title over the entire Fabella Estate is fake because as appearing on TCT No. 2902, it was originally registered as OCT No. 13, a title which has been previously adjudged null and void by RTC-Pasig in a much earlier case involving different parties. Finally, they insist that FETA’s right to recover has been barred by laches in view of their more than 40-year occupancy of the portion in question.
The trial court rendered judgment in FETA’s favor, ordering *spouses Ragudo+ to vacate the premises in question and to turn over possession thereof to [FETA].
The Court of Appeals dismissed Ragudos’ appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT "ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND EQUITABLE LACHES" HAD SET IN TO WARRANT THE CONTINUED POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT BY RAGUDO AND WHETHER THE SAME PRINCIPLES HAD CREATED A "VESTED RIGHT" IN FAVOR OF RAGUDO TO CONTINUE TO POSSESS AND OWN THE SUBJECT LOT.
HELD:
Petitioners next contend that acquisitive prescription and equitable laches had set in, thereby vesting them with a right to a continued possession of the subject lot. The contention holds no water.
It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Appellants’ claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
Page 11 of 38 registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential.
The lower court found that petitioners’ possession of the subject lot was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioner’s occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
(ANA BORCENA)
Ingusan v. Heirs of Reyes
(JAQUELINE RICASIO) Fil-Estate v. Trono
Page 12 of 38 (MARGREIN GREGANA)
Erasusta, Jr. vs CA
G.R. No. 149231, July 17, 2007 Facts:
A mix up in the identity of two of four lots occasioned by the fact that said two lots were then merely identified by their respective locational street addresses on Maria Luisa Street, Sampaloc, Manila when transfer of rights over one of said two lots was made; a mortgage conveyance in favor of a lender bank executed by a convicted swindler who fraudulently succeeded in securing transfer certificates in his own name over 3 of the 4 lots and using said titles as collaterals; and a foreclosure proceeding involving the three lots spawned the present litigation. Benjamin Valenzuela deceived De Los Reyes into entrusting to the former the documents evidencing her rights over the 3 lots. Valenzuela said that he would assist de los Reyes in transferring the titles of said lots to her 3 children. Unfortunately Valenzuela, thru a forged deed of assignment, fraudulently transferred the rights over three lots to his own name. Thereafter, Valenzuela mortgaged the 3 lots to respondent Bank as collaterals for a loan obtained by him.
Issue:
Whether or not the Bank is a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith
Held:
No, while it is a familiar doctrine that a forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if the property has been transferred from the name of the owner to that of the forger, the same does not always hold true. The doctrine likewise emphasizes that only a person who deals with registered property in good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title. It is a matter of judicial notice that a banking institution before approving a loan, sends its representative to the premises of the land offered as collateral, and investigates who are the true owners and actual possessors thereof. At the case at bar the evidence is wanting that the respondent Bank did make any such investigation. Neither Valenzuela nor the seller was in possession of the lots mortgaged or sold to the respondent Bank. If anything else, this should aroused the suspicion on the part of the respondent Bank. Thus the bank was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith bad was not a mortgagee in good faith within the contemplation of the law.
Page 13 of 38 (ISIDRA ALON-ALON)
Heirs of Diaz v. Virata 498 SCRA 141
Facts:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners Heirs of Enrique Diaz, represented by Aurora T. Diaz, seek the reversal of the Decision and Resolutionof the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72907, dated 27 August 2003 and 4 February 2004, respectively, which affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Imus, Cavite, in Civil Case No. 1399-96, dated 25 May 2001.
On 13 September 1996, respondent Elinor Virata, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Antenor Virata (Antenor), filed with the RTC a Complaint with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction against Enrique Diaz (Enrique), John Doe, Richard Doe, and all others taking rights or title under him, praying for the declaration of the validity of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 4983, 4984, 4985, 4986, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5031, 5032, and 5033, all issued in the name of Antenor S. Virata (Antenor) and registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite.
In her Complaint, respondent averred, inter alia, that: sometime in 1959, the deceased Antenor purchased from Miguela Crisologo, in good faith and for consideration, two parcels of land located in Palico, Imus, Cavite, covered by TCTs No. (T-3855) RT-2633 and NO. (T-11171) RT-1228, and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite; by virtue of the sale, the specified titles were cancelled, and in its place were issued TCTs No. 517 and No. 518, likewise, in the name of Antenor; the two lots covered by the aforementioned titles were thereafter subdivided by Antenor into several lots, and titles were issued thereon in Antenor’s favor, viz: TCTs No. 4983, 4984, 4985, 4986, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5031, 5032, and 5033; and that sometime in March 1992, Enrique filed a claim with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous possession of the same lots owned by Antenor. Respondent further proffered that the claim of Enrique over the subject properties created a cloud which may be prejudicial to the titles issued in the name of Antenor, and now managed by his Estate.
In support of her application for restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent alleged, inter alia, that: Enrique had fenced the subject properties and had constructed a driveway thereon; despite respondent’s demand to desist from fencing the properties and using the same as driveway, Enrique persisted in his occupation of the subject properties; and respondent will suffer irreparable injury by the continued occupation, use, and construction of the driveway traversing the subject properties.
In sum, respondent prayed that Enrique be ordered to pay jointly and severally with the other defendants (herein petitioners), reasonable rental for the use of the subject properties from the time the suit before the DENR was filed in April 1992, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and cost of suit.
On 23 October 1996, Enrique filed his Answer with Counter-Claim, and asserted, among others, that he filed with the DENR a protest action to enforce his valid and legitimate rights over the subject properties. He denied respondent’s allegation that the subject properties were purchased by Antenor. Moreover, he interposed that his ancestors and predecessors-in-interest had been in actual and continuous possession of the subject properties since time immemorial In opposition to respondent’s application for preliminary injunction, Enrique argued that the driveway and the fence are within the boundaries of the lots exclusively owned by him and his heirs, and covered by TCTs No. T-304191 and No. T-66120, respectively.
By way of special and affirmative defense, Enrique averred that the subject properties, since time immemorial, was publicly recognized as their family’s ancestral land; that their actual and peaceful occupation over the
Page 14 of 38 subject property was uninterrupted until sometime in 1962, when Antenor claimed a portion of the same, on the ground that he purchased said portion from one Miguela Crisologo, who acquired the same from a certain Simeon Marcial; and that both Miguela Crisologo and Simeon Marcial recognized and respected his ownership over the subject properties.
Consequently, Enrique sought for the dismissal of the Complaint, and prayed that respondent be ordered to pay attorney’s fees, including moral, exemplary and actual damages.
Issues:
1. IS WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF’S TITLE*S ARE VALID AND WERE THE ONLY ONES ISSUED OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTIES;
Held
First. The determination of the circumstances leading to Antenor’s acquisition of the subject properties is a factual matter.
The court a quo found that in 1959, Antenor purchased from Miguela Crisologo two parcels of land located at Palico, Imus, Cavite, and covered by TCTs No. T-3855 and No. T-11171. Antenor paid for the aforesaid properties in installment, and after having fully paid for the same, TCTs No. T-3855 and No. T-11171 in the name of Miguela Crisologo were cancelled, and TCTs No. T-517 and No. T-518 were issued to Antenor. In 1963, the properties were subdivided and, therefrom, TCTs No. 4983, 4984, 4985, 4986, 5027, 5028, T-5029, T-5030, T-5031, T-5032 and T-5033, all in the name of Antenor were issued. On 4 May 1982, respondent was appointed administratrix of the Estate of Antenor.
Second. Antero’s certificates of title, as found by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court, were issued as early as 22 October 1959. Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. The validity of Antero’s titles were upheld by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals and were not found to be tainted with any defect. Even as Enrique possessed certificates of title over certain portions of the subject properties, these were issued only on 7 March 1973 and 6 March 1991. On this matter, we do not find basis to digress from the ruling articulated by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
“Well-established is the principle that the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title. Absent any muniment of title issued prior to 1959 in favor of appellants [Enrique, et al.] which could prove their ownership over the contested lots, this Court is left with no other alternative but to declare appellants’ claim over the properties as void.”
A collateral attack on respondent’s title over the disputed properties cannot be allowed.
By express provision of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack, thus:
SEC. 48. – Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Page 15 of 38
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
In the case at bar, petitioners sought to file an Amended Answer, attacking the validity of Antenor’s title. Therein, it was alleged that Enrique discovered a certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite which purports to signify that there was no valid reconstitution of Antenor’s title. Otherwise stated, they sought to assert that the aforesaid certification shows that TCT No (T-11171) RT-1228, in the name of Miguela Crisologo, appeared to have been reconstituted; however, no record in the Primary Entry Book of said Registry, relative to such administrative reconstitution can be found. As submitted, petitioners maintained that the lack of record is a vital defect, not only to the validity of the reconstitution of Miguela Crisologo’s title but also to Antenor’s title, which was derived therefrom.
The Court of Appeals said that respondent could not be faulted for having instituted the action several years after the dismissal of a case commenced by Antenor himself because it was only in 1982 that the administratrix for his Estate was appointed, and respondent allowed petitioners to peacefully vacate the premises. Moreover, the appellate court said that laches cannot lie against respondent on the ground that petitioners cannot feign ignorance of the possibility of respondent’s action for quieting of title because from the time of the dismissal of the case for recovery of possession in 1969, they knew that another action would be instituted by respondent since the dismissal of the prior case was without prejudice to the filing of a subsequent action.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72907, dated 27 August 2003 and 4 February 2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Page 16 of 38 V. Subsequent Registration A. Voluntary Dealings 1. General Provisions Secs. 51-56, RA 1529 (LOREMER RECTO)
Manotok IV et. al. vs Heirs of Barque G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, (2005) FACTS:
Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.') represented by Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177. TCT was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall. In support, Barque, Sr. submitted the owner's duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.
Manotok et al., filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is spurious.
Atty. Bustos, Reconstituting Officer of LRA, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the ground that TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate TCT No. RT-22481 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al and Fls-3168-D is a spurious document.
The Heirs of Barque filed an appeal with the LRA.
LRA ruled that under LRA Circular No. 13 only the owner's or co-owner's duplicate of an original or transfer certificate of title could be used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the submission of documents other than the owner's duplicate of the TCT.
However, LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 could only be reconstituted after a court of competent jurisdiction has cancelled TCT No.RT-22481.
Manotok, et al. filed a petition for review before CA praying for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 without prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 by a court of competent jurisdiction.
CA ruled ordering the RD to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177.
Hence, this case Manotok, et. al., contended that the LRA has no authority to annul their title and the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners’ title
ISSUE:
Page 17 of 38 HELD:
Yes, LRA has authority to annul Manotok's title under RA 26 Sec 3 which provides that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is adjudicatory in nature – it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the reconstitution.
The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
==================================== (2008)
After the promulgation of the decision, the Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the 1st Division but these were all DENIED.
When the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc.
The Court promulgated an en banc and REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA, and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings.
The Court ruled that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the annulment of the Manotoks’ title. It reasoned under PD 1529 Sec 48 which provides that “a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding.
CA does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.
================================ (2010)
In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of the said lot, which was a Friar Land. The Barques and Manahans were likewise allowed to present evidence on their respective claims that may have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title.
The “core issue” identified and resolved by the Court was: Does the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks warrant the annulment of their title?
Page 18 of 38 The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE and held that the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks’ predecessor-in-interest warrants the annulment of the Manotok title.
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 provides: No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
The Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government in the first place. Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 purportedly on file with the DENR-LMB, conspicuously lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Considering that none of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the provisions of Act No. 1120, as amended, the court adopted the recommendation of the CA declaring the Manotok title as null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of the patrimonial property of the Government.
========================================= (2012)
The Court decided on the sole issue of whether SC has the power to cancel/annul the certificate of title HELD:
Yes. Indeed, both the LRA and CA erred in ruling that the Barques had the right to seek reconstitution of their purported title. Reevaluation of the evidence on record likewise indicated that the Manotoks’ claim to title is just as flawed as that of the Barques. Following the approach on several cases, the majority resolved to remand the case for reception of evidence on the parties’ competing claims of ownership. Given the contentious factual issues, it was necessary for the Court to resolve the same for the complete determination of the present controversy. It was thus not the first time the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the CA.
The Court deemed it proper to give all the parties full opportunity to adduce further evidence, and in particular, for the Manotoks to prove their presumed just title over the property also claimed by the Barques and the Manahans. As it turned out, none of the parties were able to establish by clear and convincing evidence a valid alienation from the Government of the subject friar land. The declaration of ownership in favor of the Government was but the logical consequence of such finding.
(MARCK CAIDLANG) Fernandez v. CA 189 SCRA 780
Page 19 of 38 (REY MALDO)
GURBAX SINGH PABLA & CO., GURBAX SINGH PABLA, BELA SINGH PABLA, OJAGAR SINGH, DHARAM SINGH, TALOK SINGH and CIPRIANO TAN ENG KIAT
vs.
HERMOGENES REYES and TEODORA TANTOCO G.R. No. L-3970, October 29, 1952
Facts:
John Tan Chin Eng is the owner of the land covered by Certificates of Title Nos. 8071 and 8072, and on July 23, 1948, he entered into a contract with the petitioner-appellees, under the terms of which petitioners-appellees were to construct thereon a three-story building of concrete and of strong materials valued at from P80,000 to P90,000. This contract of lease was filed and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 10, 1948. At the time that the contract was entered into there was an existing mortgage over the land in favor of Jose Calvo and Carlos Calvo for the sum of P110,000. This mortgage in favor of the Calvos was cancelled, and a new mortgage was executed by the owner in favor of respondents-appellants herein, Honorable Hermogenes Reyes and his spouse Teodora Tantoco, dated March 8, 1949, which was registered on the same date in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On May 25, 1949, counsel for petitioners-appellees wrote respondents-appellants requesting them to allow him to take the certificates of title to the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila for the annotation of the contracts of lease entered into by the owner with them. On June 16, 1949, respondents-appellants' son wrote the owner of the land (Exhibit M) demanding the payment of the overdue interest on the mortgage. The petitioners-appellees filed a motion in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying that an order issue to the owner for the delivery of the owner's duplicates of transfer certificates to the petitioners in order that the Register of Deeds of Manila may be able to make the annotation thereon of the contract of lease. Against this petition Hermogenes Reyes and Teodora Tantoco filed an opposition, alleging that they had no knowledge whatsoever of the contract of lease or of its amendments and that the execution of the amendment violated the express provision of the mortgage, to the effect that the owner could not sell, assign, or encumber the mortgaged premises without the written consent of the mortgages.
Issue:
Whether petitioners have a right to have said deeds registered.
Held:
The purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all persons (section 51, Act No. 496); it is not intended by the proceedings for registration to seek to destroy or otherwise affect already registered rights over the land, subsisting or existing at the time of the registration. The rights of these parties, who have registered their rights, are not put in issue when an instrument is subsequently presented for registration; nor are its effects on other instruments previously registered put in issue by the procedure of registration. Thus, the objections raised by respondents-appellants that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease, before the property was mortgaged to them, or that the same violates their contract of mortgage with the owner of the land — these are not passed upo\n by the order for the registration of petitioners-appellees' contract of lease. The objections, as well as the relative rights of all parties who have registered their deeds, shall be decided in the proper suit or proceeding when the opportune occasion arises; but they are not now in issue, nor may they be adjudicated upon, simply because petitioners-appellees have applied for the registration of their contract of lease.
Page 20 of 38 (REY MALDO)
PACIFICO GARCIA vs.
BENJAMIN M. GOZON, TECLA GUTIERREZ, ROSARIO FELIX, PAULINO D. BUENAVENTURA, RAYMUNDO DIONISIO, VIRGILIO AUSTRIA and MARCEON VICENCIO
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), CAROLINA LAPUZ- GOZON, assisted by her husband BENJAMIN M. GOZON, TECLA GUTIERREZ, ROSARIO FELIX, PAULINO D. BUENAVENTURA, RAYMUNDO DIONISIO, VIRGILIO AUSTRIA and MARCEON VICENCIO
G.R. Nos. L-48971 & 49011, January 22, 1980 Facts:
This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different persons for the same lots, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was allegedly not cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were issued to replace the original title.
On August 9, 1918, a deed of sale for two parcels of land, E and G of the Hacienda Maysilo, located in Malabon, Rizal and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 983, was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus a bona fide occupant thereof.
The deed of sale was presented for registration at two-twenty five in the afternoon of January 15, 1920 and was recorded as Primary Entry No. 7710.
However, it seemed that, contrary to the foregoing entry and the official routine or standard operating procedure, the deed of sale was not annotated on OCT No. 983 and that, consequently, that title was apparently not cancelled. Why that annotation did not appear in OCT No. 983 and why there was no notation of the cancellation of that title, as it appeared in 1962, is a mystifying circumstance in this case.
As a result of the registration of that deed of sale, Transfer Certificate of 'Title No. 4910 was issued to Lapus for the two parcels of land, E and G, and I Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4911 was issued for the remaining five lots covered by OCT No. 983.
Lapus on different occasions mortgaged the two parcels of land to secure his obligations to the Philippine National Bank, the Government and the Philippine Trust Company. He died in 1951. The two parcels of land were inherited by his daughter, Carolina Lapuz-Gozon. She became the registered owner of the two lots. Lapus and his successors-in-interest have been in possession of the two parcels even before 1910 or for more than seventy years.
Meanwhile, in 1962, certain. alleged heirs (collectively known as the Rivera’s filed a motion in Land Registration Cases Nos. 4429 and 4496 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, alleging that they were deprived of their participation in the Hacienda Maysilo covered by OCT No. 983 and for other titles and that, since only OCT No. 983 was supposedly unencumbered, all the land covered by that title should be adjudicated to them. The court granted the motion. It should be stressed that OCT No. 983 appears to have remained uncancelled
Page 21 of 38 notwithstanding the sale to Lapus of two parcels covered by it and the fact that it had been replaced by TCT Nos. 4910 and 4911.
On June 7, 1963, OCT No. 983 was definitely cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112236 was issued to the Rivera’s. Later, Lots 5 and 7 of the said title (corresponding to parcels E and G) were assigned by Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia and TCT Nos. 112743 and 112742 were issued to Cruz and Garcia, respectively. Thus, two sets of transfer certificates of title for Lots E and G or 5 and 7, originally covered by OCT No. 983, were issued, one to the heir of Ismael Lapus and another set to the successors-in-interest of the Rivera’s.
The Rivera’s and their successors-in-interest have never set foot on the disputed lots.
Mrs. Gozon later learned that the Rivera’s and their successors-in-interest had acquired the land covered by OCT No. 983. Her lawyer and a surveyor informed her that parcels E and G, which she inherited from her Land Titles and Deeds RBM Page 2 of 4 pages father, were identical to Lots 5 and 7 which were conveyed to Cruz and Garcia. She registered adverse claims on the titles covering Lots 5 and 7. On December 27, 1965 she and the persons to whom she had transferred portions of parcels E and G filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City against the Rivera’s and others an action to quiet title and for damages.
The trial court in its decision of July 30, 1975 declared valid TCT Nos. 141802 to 141855 and 143512 issued to Mrs. Gozon and her co-plaintiffs. It voided TCT No. 112235 issued to the Rivera’s and all titles and transactions emanating therefrom insofar as those titles covered the lots embraced in plaintiffs' titles. The Rivera’s were ordered to pay the plaintiffs twenty thousand pesos as attorney's fees.
That judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of May 25, 1978.
Issue:
Whether the 1920 title issued to Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should prevail over the 1963 title issued to the Rivera’s and the subsequent titles derived from it.
Held:
The title of Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should be given effect. The title of the Riveras and the titles springing from it are void. There can be no doubt that Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value.
"The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevail, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate" (Hogg, Australian Torrens System 823, citing cases and cited in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595).
"Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than once certificate is issued in respect of a party estate or interest in land, the Person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof " (Niblack, Analysis of the Torrens System page 237, cited in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, supra, pages 595-6).
And the rule that in case of double registration the owner of the earlier certificate is the owner of the land applies to the successive vendees of the owners of such certificates. "The vendee of the earlier certificate
Page 22 of 38 would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate" (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, supra, pages 597-9). It is settled that in this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land registration matters (La Urbana vs. Bernardo, 62 Phil. 790, 806).
Page 23 of 38 (LOREMER RECTO)
Spouses Abrigo vs De Vera G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004 FACTS:
Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located in Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go.
RTC in Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid.
Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the vendees declared the lot in their name.
Unknown to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land.
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo. Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera and Romana registered the sale and transfer cartificate if title was issued in her name.
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to her. They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value.
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act, and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED (Justice E. Paras)
ISSUE:
Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in question?
HELD:
Respondent's registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344.
It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent. It was later cancelled by TCT also in Villafania’s name. As a consequence of the sale, TCT under Villafania was subsequently cancelled and a new TCT thereafter issued to respondent.
Registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners’ registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective.
Page 24 of 38 Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
Applying this principle, the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.
Page 25 of 38 (ARNOLD VALENZUELA)
CARMELITA FUDOT vs. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., VELASCO, JR. 533 SCRA 350
FACTS:
Respondent asked someone to check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it intended to buy from the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect on the titles, respondent and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties . The Register of Deeds, Atty. Narciso dela Serna, refused to actually annotate the deed of sale on the titles because of the existing notice of attachment in connection with Civil Case No. 3399 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The attachment was eventually cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their attaching creditor which was brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of the nine (9) lots were issued, but the Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining three (3) lots , because the titles covering the same were still unaccounted for.
On 23 January 1995, petitioner presented for registration before the Register of Deeds the owner’s copy of the title of the subject property, together with the deed of sale purportedly executed by the Tecsons in favor of petitioner on 19 December 1986
On 5 May 1995, respondent filed its Complaint6 for Quieting of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. On 26 June 1995, Asuncion filed a complaint-in-intervention, claiming that she never signed any deed of sale covering any part of their conjugal property in favor of petitioner. She averred that her signature in petitioner’s deed of sale was forged thus, said deed should be declared null and void.
The trial court rendered its decision:
(i) quieting the title or ownership of the subject land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale between petitioner and spouses Tecson invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent;
(iv) dismissing respondent’s claim for damages against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency of evidence;
(v) dismissing Asuncion’s claim for damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi) dismissing petitioner’s counterclaim for lack of the required preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied her motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. BETWEEN 2 BUYERS OF REGISTERED LAND, WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT-IS IT THE FIRST BUYER WHO WAS GIVEN THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE TCT TOGETHER WITH A DEED OF SALE IN 1986, OR THE SECOND BUYER IN 1992 WITH ONLY A DEED OF SALE.
2. IS A BUYER OF REGISTERED LAND WHO DID NOT DEMAND OR REQUIRE THE DELIVERY OF THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE TCT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.
3. IN SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION OF REGISTERED LANDS, AS BY SALE, WHICH LAW SHALL GOVERN, ARTICLE 1455 OF CIVIL CODE OR P.D. 1529 OR TORRENS SYSTEM.
Page 26 of 38 HELD:
1. First issue : The Civil Law provision on double sale is not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found to be fraudulent. The Court held that despite the fact that one deed of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other vendee should prevail.
Thus, under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent.
The act of registration does not validate petitioner’s otherwise void contract. Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument.
2. On the second issue:
Art. 1544. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
The Court declared that the governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights, except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first as provided by the afore quoted provision of the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar him from availing of his rights under the law, among them to register first his purchase as against the second buyer. However, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.
That respondent was a buyer in good faith, in its desire to finally have the title to the properties transferred in its name, it persuaded the parties in the said case to settle the same so that the notice of attachment could be cancelled.
3. Third issue: The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land. On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein.
