i
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY (SADC) PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE KINGDOM
OF LESOTHO: A CASE STUDY
N.M. BUKAE
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Nelson
Mandela Metropolitan University
MARCH 2012
Promoter/Supervisor: Dr L Snodgrass
Co-Promoter: Prof P Cunningham
ii
DECLARATION
I, Nkosi Makhonya Bukae: 206038275 hereby declare that the thesis for students‘ qualification to be
awarded is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for assessment or completion of any
postgraduate qualification to another University of for another qualification.
Nkosi Makhonya Bukae
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My sincere gratitude goes to my Promoters Dr Lynne Snodgrass and Prof Peter Cunningham for the
immeasurably immense contribution they made throughout this study. The successful completion of this
thesis would not have been possible without their informed insights, inputs and guidance. They were
always readily available to assist.
Many thanks are also due to all my sources of information for having accorded me the opportunity to
conduct interviews which formed the core of this thesis. I also want to thank my cousin, Colonel Emang for
linking me to some of the retired Botswana Defence Force soldiers who participated during the Lesotho
interventions. I am also highly indebted to the University of Botswana for giving me the opportunity and
material support to pursue a doctoral programme.
I want to also extend my sincere gratitude to colleagues in the Department of Languages and Social
Science Education at the University of Botswana for the motivation they offered. Special thanks go to Dr
Dinama and Dr Boikhutso who read some of my chapters and provided invaluable inputs and guidance.
Your spirit of camaraderie is highly appreciated.
Last but not list, I convey immense appreciation to my wife Patricia for the unwavering support and
ecnouragments during the programme. Her understanding and resilience during my prolonged absence
and engagements were equal to none. My sisters Pedzisani Khani and Thulugang Adam also made
immense contributions to the completion of this thesis by taking over different roles in the family during my
absence. To them I say thank you very much.
ii
DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my wife Patricia Bukae for the unrelenting support she accorded me throughout
my doctoral programme. It is also dedicated to my late parents who provided both the financial and moral
support throughout my primary and tertiary education.
iii
ABSTRACT
The focus of this study is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) preventive diplomacy
interventions in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. The core aim of the study was to evaluate the efficacy of
the SADC security mechanism (the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in conflict prevention,
management and resolution on the basis of the Lesotho experience.
Data for this qualitative case study was collected through interviews and document analysis. The twenty
four participants for the study were drawn from the SADC OPDS unit, Lesotho political parties, Civil Society
Organisations (CSOs), Academics from the University of Botswana (UB) and the National University of
Lesotho (NUL), retired Botswana Defence officers who participated in the Lesotho missions and office of
the post-2007election dispute dialogue facilitator in Lesotho. Documents on the SADC Treaties, Protocols,
Communiqués and interventions in other set ups were used to highlight its operational policies, mandate,
structures, successes and challenges. Lesotho was chosen as a case study because SADC employed both
non-coercive (SADC Troika and Eminent Person mediation, 1994 and 2007 respectively) and coercive
measures (the 1998 military intervention).
The findings of the study revealed that SADC as a regional body had its own successes and challenges.
Different perceptions on the SADC interventions in Lesotho emerged mainly between the participants from
the ruling party and the opposition parties. While the former commended SADC for successfully mitigating
the calamitous effects of 1994, 1998 and 2007 post-electoral violence, the opposition parties viewed the
regional organisations as engaged in illegal interference in the domestic affairs of the country to defend the
incumbent governing party. It also emerged from the study that the SADC security mechanism has
numerous structural and operational flaws. There were several unanswered questions revolving around the
legality and mandate of some of the missions. For instance, no concrete evidence emerged as to whether
the 1998 military intervention was authorised by the SADC.
The study also revealed that SADC has learnt valuable lessons from the Lesotho missions. Some of the
reforms which the SADC has introduced in the OPDS such as the establishment of the SADC Stand by
Force, Early Warning structures, the Mediation Unit, and a panel of expert mediators emanated mainly from
the Lesotho experiences.
The study recommends that SADC needs to harmonise the efforts of its OPDS structures such as the
Mediation Unit; the Troika; the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); the Inter-State
Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Summit of Heads of States and Governments for rapid,
coherent and well coordinated interventions in future regional preventive missions.
It is also recommended that SADC should focus on identifying and mitigating underlying causal factors
such as underdevelopment; poverty; deprivation of freedoms, marginalisation and other forms of social
stratifications and oppression in its preventive diplomacy missions if durable peace is to be achieved in
Lesotho and any other future cases.
iv
LIST OF KEY ACRONYMS
ABC
All Basotho Convention
ACRI
African Crisis Response Initiative
AAFC
Allied Armed Forces Council
ADF
Allied Democratic Front
ANC
African National Congress
ASEAN
Association of South East Asian Nations
AU
African Union
APEC
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
BAC
Basotho African Congress
BCP
Basotho Congress party
BCP
Botswana Congress Party
BDF
Botswana Defence Force
BDNP
Basotho Democratic National Party
BNF
Botswana national Front
BNP
Basotho National Party
CARICOM
Caribbean Community
CCL
Christian Council of Lesotho
CMA
Common Monetary Area
COMESA
Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa
CMOC
Civil Military Operation Centre
CSOs
Civil Society Organisations
DA
Democratic Alliance
DACOECD
Development Assistance Committee of
the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development
DRC
Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG
ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS
ECONOMIC Community of West
African States
EU
European Union
FEWER
Forum of Early Warning and Early
Response
FLS
Front Line States
FPTP
First Past The Post
FRELIMO
Mozambique Liberation Front
GPA
Global Political Agreement
HCNM
High Commissioner on National
Minorities
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICG
International Crisis Group
IEC
Independent Electoral Commission
v
Development
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IPA
International Peace Academy
IPA
Interim Political Authority
ISDSC
Inter-State Defence and Security
Committee
ISPDC
Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy
Committee
KBP
Kopanang Basotho Party
LCD
Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LDF
Lesotho Defence Force
LLB
Lekhotla La Bafo
LCCI
Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and
Industry
LCNGO
Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental
Organisation
LLP
Lesotho Labour Party
LNCM
Lesotho Network for Conflict
Management
LPC
Lesotho Peoples‘ Congress
LRA
Lord Resistance Army
LURD
Liberians United for Peace and
Democracy
LWP
Lesotho Workers Party
MDC
Movement for Democratic Change
MDP
Mutual Defence Pact
MERCOSUR
Southern Cone Common Market
(Mercado Comun del Sur)
MFP
Marematlou Freedom Party
MLC
Movement for the Liberation of Congo
MMP
Mixed Member Proportion
MODEL
Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC
United Nations Mission in Congo [DRC]
NAFTA
North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCF
National Consultative Forum
NEPAD
New Economic Partnership for African
Development
NGOs
Non-Governmental Organisations
NIP
National Independence Party
NPP
National Progressive Party
NUL
National University of Lesotho
OAS
Organisation of American States
OAU
Organisation of African States
ODIHR
Office of the Democratic Institution and
Human Rights
vi
Organisation
OSCE
Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe
PAC
Pan Africanist Congress
PFD
Popular Front for Democracy
PMU
Police Mobile Unit
PODEMO
Peoples Democratic Movement
PR
Proportional Representation
PSC
Peace and Security Council
PUSO
Peoples‘ United Socialist Organisation
RRF
Rapid Reaction Force
RECAMP
Reinforcement of the African
Capabilities for Peacekepeeing
RENAMO
Mozambique National Resistance
RUF
Revolutionary United Front
SACU
Southern African Customs Union
SADC
Southern African Development
Community
SADCC
Southern African Development
Coordinating Conference
SIPO
Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on
Politics, Defence and Security
SANDF
South African national Defence Force
SDC
Sefhate Democratic Congress
SOFA
Status of Force Agreement
SPLA
Sudan Peoples‘ Liberation Army
TRC
Transformation Resource Centre
UAP
United Action Party
UB
University of Botswana
UDP
United Democratic Party
UN
United Nations
UNAMIL
United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNAMSIL
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDESA
United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs
UNDPA
United Nations Department of Political
Affairs
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO
United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organisation
UNHCR
United Nations High Commission for
Refugees
UNICEF
United Nations Children‘s Fund
UNITA
National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola
UNOCHA
United Nations Office for the
vii
UNOSAA
United Nations Office of the Special
Adviser on Africa
UNPREDEP
United Nations Preventive Deployment
Force
UNRF
Ugandan National Rescue Front
USA
United States of America
USIP
United States Institute for Peace
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WANEP
West African Network for Peace
WNBF
West Nile Bank Front
WHO
World Health Organisation
ZANU-PF
Zimbabwean African National Union-
Patriotic Front
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgement... ………. i
Dedication... ……… ii
Abstract... ……… iii
List of key Acronyms... ……… iv
Table of contents... …..
viii
CHAPTER ONE
... ……..
1
Overview of the Study
...
1
1.1
Introduction... ……… 1
1.2
Background to the Study...
1
1.3
Conflicts in Africa... ………. 2
1.4
Preventive Diplomacy: Conflicts Prevention, Management and Resolution... 5
1.5
Research problem...
11
1.6
Objectives of the Study... …….. 12
1.7
Research Questions...
12
1.8
Significance of the Study...
13
1.9
Theoretical Framework... …….. 14
1.10
Research Methodology... …….. 15
1.11
Scope of the Study... ……… 16
1.12
Limitations of the Study... ……… 16
1.13
Structure of the Study... ………. 17
CHAPTER TWO
... …… 19
Conflicts; Definitions; Causes; Dynamics and Consequences
...
19
2.1 Introduction... ……. 19
2.2 Definition of Conflicts... ……. 19
2.3 Inevitability of Conflicts... ……. 22
2.4 Classification of Conflicts... …….. 24
2.4.1 Latent Conflicts... ……… 24
2.4.2 Manifest Conflicts... ……. 25
2.4.3 Frozen Conflicts... ……. 25
2.5 Antecedents of Conflicts...
26
2.5.1 Sources of Conflicts in Africa...
27
2.5.2 The Colonial Legacy...
28
2.5.3 Colonial Boundaries and Conflicts in Africa...
28
2.5.4 Border Disputes...
29
2.5.5 Secessionist Conflicts...
30
2.5.6 Ethnicity as a Source of Conflicts in Africa...
31
2.5.7 The Cold War and Conflicts in Africa...
33
2.6 Politics; Power and Governance in Africa...
36
ix
2.8 Conflict Processes; Trends and Dynamics...
48
2.8.1 The Phase model of Conflicts...
49
2.8.2 The Conflict Spiral Model... ……... 53
2.9 Consequences of Conflicts... ……. 55
Social Outcomes... ……. 57
2.9.2 Economic Outcomes... ……. 58
2.9.3 Political Outcomes... …….. 60
2.10 Conclusion... ……… 62
CHAPTER THREE
... …… 63
Theoretical Framework on Conflicts and Preventive Diplomacy
...
63
3.1 Introduction... …… 63
3.1.1 Biological and Psychological Theories...
64
3.1.2 The Frustration-Aggression Theory...
66
3.1.3 Human Needs Theories...
66
3.1.4 Attribution Theory... ……. 75
3.2 Social Processes Theories... ……… 76
3.2.1 Interactional Theory (Symbolic Interaction)...
77
3.2.2 Systems Theory-Functionalist Perspective...
78
3.2.3 Social Exchange /Equity Theory...
79
3.2.4 Transformational Theory...
80
3.3 Social Structural Theories...
81
3.3.1 Marxist-Class Theory...
82
3.3.2 Social Stratification as causes of conflicts...
85
3.3.3 Realism and Neo-Realism...
86
3.4 Conflict Prevention; management and Resolution...
92
3.4.1 Preventive Diplomacy...
93
3.4.2 Developmentalist; Preventive and War Diplomacy...
95
3.4.3 Timing of Preventive Diplomacy Interventions...
95
3.4.4 Preventive Diplomacy Instruments...
101
3.4.5 Preventive Diplomacy and Early warning Systems...
105
3.5 Conflict Prevention... …… 109
3.6 Conflict Management... ……. 120
3.6.1 Mediation... ……. 122
3.6.2 Peacemaking... ……. 122
3.6.3 Peacekeeping... ……. 123
3.7 When is best time to intervene in a Conflict?...
124
3.8 Conflict Resolution... …..
129
3.9 Conclusion...
..
137
CHAPTER FOUR
... ……. 138
Regional Integration: Theoretical framework
...
138
4.1 Introduction...
138
4.2 Regional Cooperation and Integration...
138
4.3 Origins of Regional Organisations...
139
4.3.1 Factors which Influence Regional Integration...
140
x
4.4.1 The Systemic Theories...
141
4.4.1.1 Neo-Realism...
141
4.4.1.2 Structural Interdependence and Globalisation...
145
4.5 Regionalism and Interdependence Theories...
145
4.5.1 Neo-Functionalism...
146
4.5.2 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism...
148
4.5.3 Constructivism... ……… 151
4.6 Domestic Level Theories...
153
4.7 The Security Complex/regime and Community Theories...
155
4.7.1 Security Complex Theory...
157
4.7.2 Security Regime Theory...
157
4.7.3 Security Community Theory...
159
4.7.4 SADC: A Security Complex; Regime or Community...
162
4.8 The New Regionalism Theory...
167
4.9 The Significance of Regional Organisation in Preventive Diplomacy...
169
4.10 Challenges of regional Organisations in Preventive Diplomacy Missions...
180
4.10.1 Interventions without UN Authorisation...
197
4.10.2 Impartiality of Intervening Powers...
200
4.10.3 Contravention of Peacekeeping Mandates...
202
4.10.4 Engagement in Unprofessional Conduct...
203
4.11 Conclusion... …….. 206
CHAPTER FIVE
... …….. 207
The Evolution of SADC and its Preventive Diplomacy mechanism
...
207
5.1 Introduction... ……. 207
5.2 History of the SADC... …….. 207
5.2.1 SADC during the Cold War... ……. 212
5.2.2 Post-Cold war SADC... …….. 214
5.3 The Evolution of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDs)...
216
5.3.1 The Chairpersonship of the Organ (Troika)...
217
5.3.2 The Ministerial Committee...
218
5.3.3 The Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee...
219
5.3.4 The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee...
219
5.3.5 The SADC Secretariat... ……. 220
5.3.6 Objectives of the Organ...
222
5.3.7 The Mutual Defence Pact... …..
222
5.3.8 The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO)...
225
5.3.9 Power Struggle in the Organ 1996-2001...
226
5.4 The SADC Preventive Diplomacy Missions in the DRC and Zimbabwe...
230
5.4.1 Introduction... ..
230
5.4.2 SADC and the Conflict in the DRC... …
231
5.4.3 The 1998 DRC Conflict... .
231
5.4.4 The SADC Military Intervention in the DRC... …… 233
5.4.5 Effects of the Military Intervention... ..
234
5.4.6 SADC (South Africa) Multilateral Approach to the DRC Conflict... ….
238
5.4.7 Factors which hampered resolution of the DRC Conflict...
239
xi
5.5.1 The Zimbabwean Crisis; 2000 to the Present...
244
5.5.2 Political effects of the Zimbabwean Crisis...
247
5.6 The Response of the International Community and SADC to the Zimbabwean Crisis... 250
5.6.1 Response of the European Union and USA to the Zimbabwean Crisis... 250
5.6.2 SADC and Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe...
253
5.6.3 Reasons for South Africa‘s adherence to Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe... 255
5.6.4 The SADC Diplomatic Initiatives in Zimbabwe...
256
5.7 The 2008 Elections and the Government on national Unity in Zimbabwe... 259
5.8 Quiet Diplomacy: A Success or Failure in Zimbabwe...
262
5.9 Conclusion...
268
CHAPTER SIX
... ……… 269
The SADC Preventive Diplomacy Missions in Lesotho
... 269
6.1 Introduction... ……… 269
6.2 Background to the Lesotho Conflicts and SADC Interventions...
269
6.2.1 Lesotho Political Contestations and Conflicts 1965 to 2007...
271
6.2.2 The 1965 Elections and Lesotho Independence...
273
6.2.3 The 1970 Elections and the Basotholand National Party Coup... 274
6.2.4 The Lesotho Security Establishment and Lesotho Politics...
276
6.2.5 The Monarchy and Lesotho Politics...
278
6.2.6 The Lesotho Economy and the Kingdoms; Conflictual Politics... 280
6.2.7 The 1993 Elections and the SADC Intervention...
284
6.2.8 The SADC Intervention in Lesotho 1994...
291
6.2.9 The 1998 Lesotho Crisis and SADC Military Intervention...
298
6.2.9.1 The Media Criticism of Operation Boleas...
306
6.2.9.2 General Criticism of the Military Intervention...
309
6.2.9.3 Merits of the Military Intervention...
316
6.2.10 The 2002 Elections in Lesotho...
318
6.2.11 The 2007 Elections... …… 321
6.2.11.1 The SADC Preventive Diplomacy; Post 2007 Elections...
323
6.3 Conclusion...
327
CHAPTER SEVEN
... ……… 328
Methodology
... ……… 328
7.1 Introduction... ……… 328
7.2 Research Design... ……… 328
7.3 The Case Study Approach...
331
7.3.1 Merits of the Case Study Approach...
332
7.3.2 Limitations of the Case Study Approach...
333
7.4 Study Population and Selection Procedure...
334
7.5 data Collection Instruments...
336
7.5.1 Interviews...
336
7.5.2 Document Studies...
338
7.6 Validation of Research Instruments...
340
7.7 Ethical Consideration...
341
7.8 Data Analysis and Presentation...
342
xii
CHAPTER EIGHT
………...
344
Discussions and Presentation of the indings
... 344
8.1 Introduction...
344
8.2 Justification and Motives for the Interventions...
345
8.2.1 Intervention: A Response to Threats to Democracy...
345
8.2.2 SADC as Guarantor of Lesotho Democracy...
346
8.2.3 Intervention to Restore Law and Order...
347
8.2.4 Interventions to Thwart Violence...
348
8.2.5 Government Requested SADC Interventions...
349
8.3 Opposing Views on the Motives and Justifications of the Interventions...
354
8.3.1 SADC Intervention: An Intrusion in the Domestic Affairs of Lesotho...
354
8.3.2 SADC Inconsistency in its Preventive Diplomacy Missions...
356
8.3.3 SADC Intervention: A Violation of Lesotho Sovereignty...
358
8.3.4 Questions on the Legitimacy of the SADC Military Intervention...
360
8.3.5 Questions on the Payments of 1998 Mission‘s Costs...
363
8.3.6 SADC Intervention Motivated by National Interests...
364
8.3.7 Interventions to defend the LCD Government...
366
8.4 Views that the 1998 Mission was mandated by the UN...
371
8.4.1 SADC has the Mandate to intervene in regional Conflicts...
371
8.4.2 Intervention was mandated by SADC...
374
8.4.3 SADC Intervention for Humanitarian Reasons...
376
8.4.4 Intervention was requested by the Government of Lesotho...
377
8.4.5 Intervention for Defence of National Interests...
378
8.4.6 South Africa played its Role as a Regional hegemon...
380
8.5 Perceptions that the Intervention was motivated by Lesotho‘s weak politico-Economic status.. 382
8.5.1 Why Did South Africa and Botswana oppose Military Intervention in the DRC?... 385
8.6 Role Played by Civil Society Organisations in the Lesotho Preventive Diplomacy Missions... 387
8.6.1 Perceptions that SADC did not officially involve the Civil Society Organisations... 390
8.6.2 Perceptions that SADC involved the Civil Society Organisations...
391
8.7 Challenges faced by SADC during the Lesotho Interventions...
396
8.7.1 The Challenge of quenching violence and Restoration of Order... 397
8.7.2 Failure to invite Opposition parties during its Summits...
399
8.7.3 Government accusation of SADC as Pro-Opposition...
399
8.7.4 Perceptions that the 1998 intervention was Illegal...
403
8.7.5 SADC Operational Flaws...
405
8.7.6 Lack of sufficient Intelligence Information...
406
8.7.7 Poor Coordination of Intervening Troops...
406
8.7.8 Challenges of dealing with a Politicised Security...
408
8.7.9 Poor Communications about the Missions...
409
8.7.10 SADC Failure to enforce Intervention Resolutions...
410
8.7.11 SADC lack of Expert Mediators...
413
8.7.12 Failure to address Lesotho Structural Economic Problems... 416
8.8 Successes of the SADC Missions in Lesotho...
419
8.8.1 Restoration of Democracy in Lesotho...
420
8.8.2 Interventions saved Lesotho from Full-scale Civil War...
421
xiii
8.8.4 Re-training of the Lesotho Defence Force...
422
8.8.5 Establishment of an Inclusive Interim Government in 1998...
424
8.8.6 Electoral Reforms...
425
8.9 Lessons from the Lesotho Missions...
429
8.9.1 Need for Early Warning Systems and Pro-active Responses... 430
8.9.2 Establishment of a Standing Regional Peacekeeping Force... 432
8.9.3 Need to focus on Non-coercive Measures...
433
8.9.4 Involvement of all Stakeholders in Peace Missions...
435
8.10 Conclusion...
437
CHAPTER NINE
... …….. 438
Conclusions and Recommendations
...
438
9.1 Introduction...
438
9.2 Summary of the Findings...
438
9.3 Recommendations for Improvement of the SADC Preventive Diplomacy Mechanism... 439
9.4 Recommendations for Future Research...
441
9.5 Conclusion...
442
Bibliography
...
443
Appendices
... ………. 531
Appendix A, Map showing SADC Member states...
531
Appendix B, SADC Organogram...
532
Appendix C, Objectives of the Organ on Politic, Defence and Security...
533
Appendix D, Interview Schedule: Standard Questions...
534
Appendix E, Interview Questions for the Lesotho Dialogue Facilitator...
536
Appendix F, Interview schedule for Former Security Officers (Retired)... 537
Appendix G, Interview Questions for the Organ Officials, Academics and Party Representatives .. 539
1
CHAPTER ONE Overview of the Study 1.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the background to the study, the problem statement, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, theoretical framework, research methodology, scope of the study, limitations and a summary outline of each chapter.
1.2 Background to the Study
This study is an analysis of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. In order to have a full grasp of the persistent conflicts in Lesotho and the resultant SADC interventions, it is imperative to give a picture of how the world, especially post-Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa, became a centre stage for protracted intra-state conflicts necessitating regional responses and solutions by different regional organisationsand solutions. The SADC missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho should be located and understood within this global conflict environment.
Throughout history, the world has grappled with conflicts and wars in their different manifestations, intensity, scope and consequences. All continents of the world have experienced conflicts in one way or the other. Isard (1992: 1) highlights the inevitability of conflicts in human society in his statement that ―[t]he history of human kind and the rise and fall of civilisations is unquestionably a story of conflict. Conflict is inherent in human activities. It is omnipresent....‖ This is evidenced by conflicts in spite of the existence of international, regional and civil society organisations for the maintenance of international peace and security. The sources of conflict in most cases are multidimensional and multifaceted, encompassing historical, external and internal social, economic and political factors such as the colonial legacy of ill-defined borders, ethnic, religious and cultural marginalisation or domination, struggle for limited resources, struggle for power, underdevelopment, crippling indebtedness, globalisation, skewed distribution of resources, corruption, undemocratic governance, administrative failures and collapsed states, military dictatorships, weak systems and institutions of governance, flawed electoral systems and electoral fraud, erosion of the state power and crises of legitimacy in governance.
The post-Cold War era experienced more destructive regionalised intra-state conflicts which threatened global peace and stability when numerous conflicts culminating in immense human casualties and material destruction consumed different parts of the world. In this regard, Joseph (1999: 9) comments, ―[t]he anticipation of enhanced possibilities for international peace, security and co-operation at the end of the Cold War has given way to confusion and disillusionment as a result of the intensifying conflicts in parts of Africa, Asia and Europe.‖ Despite the demise of the Cold War politics which constrained their interventions, the United Nations Security Council, regional organisations
2
and the international community appear to be paralysed in that they have failed to act decisively in the face of the numerous conflicts, as is evident in the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Burundi, Sudan, Rwanda, Angola, Uganda, The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic to mention a few. Lamenting the plight of this conflict-ridden world Annan (2000a: 173) stated that ―[i]f I were a doctor examining the health of the world today, I would be greatly alarmed at the state of my patient The international community, vibrant in its resolve to achieve a strong, stable and a healthy political environment as the post-Cold War began, was drained and weakened by one bout after another of conflict during the last decade... It has had to weather the massive displacement of people, extensive loss of life, and irreparable damage which are conflict‘s concomitants."
1.3 Conflicts in Africa
The Sub-Saharan region is the most conflict-ridden area in the world. The post-Cold War period has seen the continent becoming the home for the highest number of devastating, deep-seated and intractable intra-state conflicts (Azar and Moon 1988, Onyeani 1990, Buzan 1991, Chabal 1992, Annan 1998, 2000a, 2005, Adedeji 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, Rugumamu 2002, Field 2004, Cilliers 2004, Commission on Human Security 2005, Dindelo 2006, Swart 2008). The consensus among different scholars on conflict is that ―Africa is in crisis‖ (Chabal 1994: 3). The ―[i]nsecurity and instability in much of Africa has become a single complex interrelated problem that is an intrinsic part of the debate about the nature or capability of the African state‖ (Cilliers 2004: 21).
In the last decade conflicts have been raging in Lesotho, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Somalia; border disputes were looming between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula (the contested territory, has since been handed to Cameroon in 2006), Ethiopia and Eritrea, Botswana and Namibia over Sedudu Islands, (the dispute was resolved by the International Court of Justice at the Hague), secessionist conflicts looming in Nigeria the Niger Delta), Senegal (Casamance), Ethiopia, and Namibia (Caprivi Strip) and latent conflicts due to autocratic regimes in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. North Africa experienced political upheavals in the opening months of 2011 culminating in the collapse of long-time autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Sorbo (1999: 199) highlights the image of Africa as a continent in which many states are ―candidates for state collapse or civil war and (in which) there are a host of other countries where present low level ethnic and political conflicts remain unresolved.‖
The SADC region did not escape this scourge that bedevilled most regions of Africa. Southern Africa experienced devastating anti-colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. After attaining their independence in 1975, Angola and Mozambique were ravaged by more than two decades of civil war. Both the wars were fuelled by the Cold War ideological rivalry between the East and the West and it was very difficult to find a
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lasting solution. Lesotho, which is the case study in this thesis, has also faced incessant post- election conflicts since attaining independence in 1966. The 1970 elections were won by the opposition Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), and the incumbent Basotho National Party (BNP) hijacked the democratic dispensation by launching a coup, banning the opposition parties and forcing their leaders into exile. The dictatorial regime of Leabua Jonathan polluted the political climate in the region until it was halted by a military coup sponsored by apartheid South Africa. This was mainly because the Leabua Jonathan government did not comply with the apartheid regime‘s directives such as expelling the liberation activists from Lesotho and signing non-aggression pacts with South Africa (Matlosa, 1993, 1995). The landlocked Kingdom of Losotho went through a process of democratisation with multi-party elections in 1993 and 1998 won by the BCP and the Lesotho Coongress for Democracy (LCD) respectively. The election triggered violent confrontations with the losing parties contesting the elections as fraudulent. The 1993 and 1998 elections were followed by coups launched by the monarchy, the military and opposition parties. The electoral model, the First Past the Post (FPTP) did not help the situation as it promoted winner takes all. In this situation, the opposition, which was voted for by a significant portion, felt marginalised as far as representation in parliament was concerned. Lesotho also went for national elections in 2007 through a new electoral model, the Mixed Member Proportion (MMP), but some political parties defrauded the model by forming alliances with smaller parties. In so doing, they distorted the proportional allocation of seats in parliament, leading to upheavals in which the opposition protested that the ruling LCD government had contravened the MMP regulation. These conflicts in Lesotho attracted the attention of SADC, which intervened in 1994, 1998 and 2007. During 1994 and 2007, SADC intervened through non-coercive means while in 1998; the regional body launched a military operation to restore law and order in the Kingdom.
These wars as will be indicated later in the study had devastating and catastrophic social, economic and political effects on the continent. All the above conflicts have constrained Africa‘s development efforts and growth potential. There is an indisputable link between political stability and economic development. Economic prosperity cannot be realised in a conflict-ridden continent like Africa, as the already limited resources are diverted from productive use to sponsoring the war effort, and the obvious disruptions of conflicts on the economic activities. The conflicts also resulted in fragmentation of several African states, for example, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Another worrying trend of African conflicts is that they have become regionalised and spread to destabilise several countries in the continent, for example the Great Lakes region (the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda), West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast) and the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan). Therefore, they may require regional solutions (Zartman 1989, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, de Waal 2003, International Crisis Group Africa Report No 62, 2003, Ajulu, 2004). This position is justified in view of the ineffective and indecisive interventions by the United Nations and the international community in African conflicts. Joseph (1999: 9) summarises the inaction by the developed world
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thus; ―[i]n Africa, it appears that the more intense and destructive the conflicts ...the greater the paralysis of international community in acting decisively to bring an end to the violence.‖ Worse still, according to Rugumamu (2002), while the international community paid less attention to the turbulent security crisis in Africa, the continental institutional and organisational conflict prevention, management and resolution capabilities have not developed at the same rate to counter the pervasive and escalating conflicts. It is in this light that it has become increasingly apparent and necessary that Africa should muster its resources and political will and commitment, to develop its capacity to deal with its growing and destructive security realities. In line with this, regional organisations formed security organs to intervene in their regional conflicts, as evidenced by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the (DRC), Lesotho and Zimbabwe.
In this study, the SADC preventive missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in the Kingdom of Lesotho will be used as case studies to examine the efficacy and capabilities of the SADC‘s preventive diplomacy mechanism in preventing, managing and resolving regional conflicts. The SADC is an inter-governmental body comprising mainly Southern African states and a few others outside the geographical region such as Tanzania, the DRC, Mauritius and the Seychelles. The regional block was formed in April 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to coordinate economic development and integration among the independent Southern African states of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Angola. SADCC was later joined by Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa after they had attained their independence. In the 1980‘s, the regional body‘s political solidarity and support to those countries which were struggling for their independence was championed through its political wing; the Frontline States. Apartheid South African destabilisation incursions in the regional member states drove them to form a solid economic and political bulwark against the pariah state. The post-Cold war era political climate forced the regional body to redefine its objectives and operational institutions. In 1992 at its Windhoek Summit of Head of States and Governments, the SADC Treaty was signed by member states, transforming it from a co-ordination conference to a development community. The realisation that economic development can only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and stability moved the regional body to form the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in 1996. The Organ and Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) protocols were ratified in 2001 and 2003 respectively. The Organ and MDP were bolstered by the establishment of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) in their cardinal task of promoting, maintaining and sustaining regional peace and security. The regional body pledged to intervene through peaceful diplomatic means in both regional intra and inter-state conflicts. It also emphasised the need for the use of coercive measures as a last resort where peaceful means failed or where gross violation of human rights and genocide was perpetrated.
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As will be indicated in detail in chapters five and six, SADC intervened in the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar and Lesotho conflicts through both coercive and non-coercive measures. The SADC interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho in the current study are used as a case study to determine the efficacy of the regional block‘s preventive diplomacy mechanism. The Lesotho case has been chosen because it was in Lesotho that SADC intervened through both coercive and non-coercive measures. As such, it was envisaged that Lesotho could be a reasonable case to determine the regional block‘s strengths and weaknesses in regional peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building operations.
1.4 Preventive Diplomacy; Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution
Several scholars on conflict concur on the inevitability of conflicts in human society. However, what is of importance is not whether conflict is indispensable but how conflicts can be prevented, managed and resolved, or what institutions can be put in place for the resolution of conflict. As Darby asserts ―the real issue is not the existence of conflict but how it is handled‖ (cited in Stewart 1998: 13). War is a practical problem that requires appropriate theory and mechanisms for understanding, mastering and dealing with it (Sandole 1999, Adedeji 1999). These positions emanate from the fact that conflict seems to be a permanent feature of human society and it cannot be totally eradicated, but measures can be taken to contain their persistence and mitigate their terrible outcomes. The experience of World War One and World War Two have been an eye opener to the international community on the importance of establishing international and regional organisations to maintain international peace and security. The League of Nations (1918-1939) and the United Nations (UN) organisation are the two international organisations that were formed at different historical epochs to shoulder the task of maintaining international peace through preventive diplomacy. The concept of preventive diplomacy was coined by a former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskold during the Cold War in order to deter the escalation of conflict with the danger of involving the heavily armed and polarised East-West blocks. The concept was later broadened by another UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to embrace regional and international efforts to thwart the outbreak of conflict (conflict prevention), escalation or spread of conflict where they occurred (conflict management) and the recurrence of conflict where they were addressed (conflict resolution). Preventive diplomacy may be through coercive measures (military intervention, economic sanctions, cutting of diplomatic relations, isolation, expulsion) and non-military measures (peace envoys, peace and good offices missions, pledges for economic and political assistance, reconstruction and many other reconciliation and rehabilitation measures). However, efficient application of preventive diplomacy has remained elusive as conflicts rage on in spite of the UN‘s attempts, in partnership with the regional organisations, at addressing them.
As an international organisation, the UN, through the Security Council, is responsible for the maintenance of global peace and security. From a global perspective, the UN is seen as the only institution with depth, width and a unique
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claim on legitimate authority and mandate on international peace and security (Henrikson 1995, Doyle 1998, Annan 1998, Van Nieuwkerk 2000). Since its inception, the UN has been engaged in conflict prevention, management and resolution in different parts of the globe and has roped in the assistance of regional organisations and civil society organisations in its bid to eradicate the misery caused by conflicts in human society.
In Africa, numerous UN Peacekeeping missions were instituted albeit with varying successes and challenges. Some of the missions were in the Congo (1960s), Namibia (the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group) 1990, Mozambique 1994, Liberia (the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL), Sierra Leone (the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, (UNAMSIL) Angola (the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola), Somalia (the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNISOM) and in the DRC (United Nations Mission in Congo).
However, as successive UN Secretary Generals have observed, the task of maintaining international peace is a mammoth and overwhelming challenge. Conflicts have erupted and persisted in spite of the UN‘s efforts. The multidimensional and complex nature of today‘s conflicts requires partnership between the UN and different regional organisations (Ghali 1992, 1995, Henrikson 1995, Rothchild 2000, Berman 2000, Annan 1998, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, Adedeji 1999, Berman 2000, International Peace Academy 2001). Thus the United Nations Charter chapter viii (Articles 51-54) accommodated the formation of regional organisations (arrangements) to complement the UN efforts in international peacekeeping as they have a comparative advantage in their respective regions. Subsequently, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, numerous regional organisations emerged in different continents for collective action in economic, political and security challenges within their respective regional zones. Some of the regional organisations which emerged are North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Comecon (the WARSAW PACT), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union), Organisation of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN), the Arab League and many others including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa, (COMESA), and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These regional organisations have established security organs in their founding treaties and security protocols to ensure peace and security in their respective regions through preventive diplomacy. For example, the SADC treaty and its protocols for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) and the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) pledge to collectively address regional conflicts through preventive diplomacy measures. Most of these organisations in the Third World were formed in the 1970s and 1980s mainly with an economic agenda. The operations of these organisations were constrained and even shaped by the Cold War bipolar politics. For example the SADC could not effectively intervene and resolve conflicts in Angola and Mozambique because the different parties in the conflicts were backed by the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United
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States of America (USA) to serve their conflicting ideological interests (Boutrous Ghali, 1992, 1995, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, International Peace Academy 2001, Berman 2000, Levit 2003, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, and Rothchild 2001, Hurrell and Fawcett 1995, Henrikson 1995, Nathan 1995, Field 2004, Ngoma 2005). Boutrous Ghali conceded in his report ―An Agenda for Peace‖ that the ideological tensions between the East and West, coupled with the veto power wielded by the permanent members of the Security Council hampered the UN in its task of maintaining world peace. This has resulted in protracted conflicts especially in Third Word countries such as in Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cambodia, South Africa and Namibia. In this sense, regional countries did not see the necessity and incentives for co-operation or making peace with each other as long as they enjoyed financial and military support from the two ideological blocks. In fact, according to some observers, the US and Europe often acted to undermine regional integration, as they believed it would limit and constrain their roles as power brokers.
The end of the Cold War in the 1990s heralded in a period of new regionalism in which the existing regional organisations reorganised themselves in content, scope, structure and purpose. They became multidimensional in their approach to the social, economic, political and security ills engulfing their regions. The post-Cold War political order demands new approaches to conflict resolution that are a precondition for economic and social development, democratisation and good governance (USIP 1994, Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, Terriff, Croft, James and Morgan 2004, Buzan 1990). In Africa, leaders and governments became more committed to reorganising and consolidating regional organisations due to two factors. Of utmost importance was the realisation that the demise of the Cold War politics also marked the loss of Africa‘s strategic value to the Western governments, and by extension, the United Nations Security Council. The disengagement of superpowers from the African continent was marked by the eruption of numerous intra-state conflicts. The undemocratic regimes which prevailed during the Cold War era due to the backing of superpowers collapsed under internal resistance and uprisings. Many other conflicts erupted as a result of the vacuum created by the evacuation of the superpowers. Secondly the end of the Cold War was marked by calculated reluctance by Western powers and the Security Council in committing military resources for intervention in the escalating conflicts in Africa (Rugumamu 2002). This was mainly experienced after the 1991 abortive UN intervention in Somalia and the indifference of the international community and the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Western governments started sponsoring the policy of ―African solutions to African problems.‖ The shift was also reflected by Western powers initiatives to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities by providing military training to African peacekeeping forces to take over the responsibility for peace and security in the continent. This came in the form of training a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), the African Crises Response Initiative (ACRI) by the USA, the Reinforcement of African Capabilities for Peacekeeping (RECAMP) by France, and a variety of other military initiatives by Britain and other European powers. The United
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States of America Congress passed the African Conflict Resolution Act of 1994 calling for the provision of material and technical assistance to institutionalize African conflict resolution capabilities (USIP 1994, Berman 2000, Adebayo and Gelin- Adam 1999, Miall etal. 2001, Levit 2003, International Peace Academy 2001, 2002, Mortimer 2000, Martin 2002, Rugumamu 2002, de Waal 2003).
In view of this reluctance and disengagement by the international community and the Security Council, African leaders and governments realised the cardinal responsibility of maintaining peace through re-organisation of regional organisations in the continent. The above stated sentiments were shared by the co-ordinator of the defunct Conflict Prevention and Research Division of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), William Nhara, that ―[r]egional organisations should realise that there is a need to take on the primary responsibility for their own problems especially those relating to issues of peace, security and stability. This is necessary as Africa‘s partners are increasingly less enthusiastic about sharing its problems‖ (cited in Herbst 2000: 310).
African regional organisations established security mechanisms for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in their respective regions. For example, in 1993, the OAU which for decades dismally failed to stem conflicts in the continent established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, formation of a more revitalised continental organisation, the African Union and its Peace and Security Council unrestricted by its predecessor‘s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. ECOWAS established a peace-keeping force, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1998, through which the organisation successfully intervened and restored peace and stability in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1993 and 1998 respectively. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) developed a programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management in its zone. The organisation was instrumental in mediating conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. While in 1992 at the Windhoek Summit, the SADC Treaty was signed and SADCC transformed to SADC with broadened objectives and operational mandates. It was buttressed by the entrance of South Africa which had attained majority rule in 1994 after decades of apartheid tyranny and regional destabilisation. In 1996 it formed the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security which was tasked with security issues in the region. Through its preventive diplomacy mechanism, the SADC intervened to restore stability in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. All these changes reflect African countries‘ commitments to combating conflicts through regional organisations (Joseph 1999, Levit 2003, Berman 2000, Adebayo and Adam 1999, Field 2004, Van Nieuwkerk 2000, Ngoma 2005, International Peace academy 2000, 2001, 2002, Onyango 2002, Nathan 1995, Malan and Cilliers 1997, de Coning 1999, Collier 1999, De Vries 1999). As Joseph correctly noted: ―[t]he first responsibility for mitigating conflicts in Africa should be with the Africans themselves and their collective organisations‖ (1999: 10). In fact, the United States Institute (1994) suggested a division of labour in which regional organisations would focus on conflict
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prevention and peacemaking while the UN focuses on peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This scenario would ensure active involvement of regional structures in conflict mediation, resulting in ownership of the outcomes and effects which are necessary ingredients in conflict resolution.
Furthermore, African leaders have always expressed a keen willingness to play a leading role in the prevention, management and resolution of their own problems, as embedded in the Pan Africanist ideology. Herbst (2000: 309) presents this sentiment thus: ―within Africa there had always been a desire to have African-led interventions…foreign military interventions by ex-colonial powers and others highlighted the fragility of the newly won political power and served to strengthen the historic memory of colonial domination,‖ that is, by pooling the continental resources for the resolution of the continent‘s problems without relying on external sources. Although it did not achieve the goal, the Organisation of African Unity was founded on the Pan African ideology in 1963 to struggle for social, economic, political and security independence in Africa. Henrikson (1995) mentions how the organisation wanted to Africanise the 1960 Congo crisis through a commission of 10 OAU members led by the first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, but failed due to interventions by Britain, USA and Belgium.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century there are many African leaders such as the former Presidents of Nigeria and South Africa, Obassanjo and Mbeki respectively, who championed what Mazrui termed ―Pax Africana‖ a doctrine that Africa should stop depending on the international community to resolve their conflicts, but must marshal the continent‘s resources and resolve to shoulder the responsibility of African solutions to African problems. As the former OAU Secretary, General Salim Ahmed Salim, noted in his keynote address to the International Peace Academy at the Vienna Seminar (1995) on Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, the prime role of regional organisations is to ―devise regional solutions to regional problems and should take primary ownership of their problems‖ (cited in Joseph, 1999: 11). In a bid for continental sovereignty in management of its affairs, Mbeki championed the idea of African Renaissance, while Obasanjo proposed a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation through which Africans can dialogue over the problems bedevilling the continent including conflicts. The two leaders were also at the forefront in championing the establishment of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) all of which are geared towards development of the African continent‘s political, military and economic capability to address its problems. It was within this framework that the NEPAD Abuja meeting of African Heads of States in October 2001 resolved that ―African leaders have learnt from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development…‖ and they pledged ―to work, both individually and collectively to promote these principles in their countries, sub-regions and the continent‖ at large (cited in Cilliers 2004: v).
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It is therefore argued that a study on the role of regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution (in which the SADC interventions in Lesotho fall) is necessary because most of the African conflicts today are intra-state and regionalised in origin, character and effects as evidenced in West Africa, (Liberia, Guinea–Bissau, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast), the Horn of Africa region, (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea; Sudan), the Great Lakes region, (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi). Regional organisations would be best suited for timely interventions as they are the most immediately affected by the spill-over effects of the conflicts. It would be in their urgent interest to mitigate conflicts and preserve regional peace, security and stability. One other important advantage is that regional members are in a better position to comprehend the historical, cultural and contextual dynamics of the conflict, which may result in fruitful dialogue and resolution of the conflict based on regional and leaders‘ personal trust (Henriksen 1995, Mortimer 1999, Hettne 2001, Rugumamu 2002, International Peace Academy, 2002). Among other things, the end of the Cold War has brought about fundamental shifts in global and regional alignments, definitions and thinking on security. The new security thinking is no longer restricted to military matters. It embraces a wide range of non-military issues such as human security, human rights, environmental protection, democracy and good governance, and economic security, some of which require regional approaches and solutions (Buzan 1991, Nathan 1995, Archaya 1994, Vita 2001, Rugumamu 2002, Munyae 2000, Terriff etal. 2004, Swart and du Plessis 2004, Solomon 2004, Hammestard 2004, Ngoma 2005). In their reports, the UN Secretary Generals Ghali (1992, 1995) and Kofi Annan (1998) lamented the untapped potentials of regional organisations in the maintenance of world peace and security. They pleaded the imperative necessity of partnership between the UN and regional organisations in combating conflicts and building durable global peace. The SADC interventions in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007 should be viewed within this post-Cold War political climate.
Although there is relative peace in the SADC region, after the demise of apartheid in South Africa, conflicts are looming, threatening regional peace and stability in several countries. The region faces the challenges of the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe and Madagascar, and the latent political crisis against King Mswati‘s autocratic regime in Swaziland. The DRC has been enmeshed in conflict since 1997 and the situation has not fully stabilised. Lesotho has experienced post-election violence since independence in 1966, and despite SADC‘s past intervention, the political atmosphere remains volatile as the Kingdom prepares for national elections in 2012. Therefore, this study seeks to examine the efficacy of SADC‘s preventive diplomacy machinery in view of the Lesotho interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007. The study analyses SADC, in terms of its structures, strategies, political commitments, successes, challenges encountered, lessons learnt and future prospects for resolving regional conflicts. This investigation emanates from differences among the SADC member states that resulted in uncoordinated and disjointed interventions in the DRC and Lesotho by different camps of the SADC community. It was not clear whether it was SADC or individual countries‘ interventions. This left a cloud of suspicion hanging over
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the legality of the missions as regional peace operations. The study intends to establish whether SADC has a functioning security mechanism that can deal with the security challenges of the post-Cold War world. This is premised on the fact that the regional organisation seems to lack a clear basis on how and when to effectively apply its preventive diplomacy mechanism. The continued post-electoral conflicts in Lesotho despite the SADC preventive missions raise questions on the efficacy of the regional organisations‘ preventive diplomacy mechanism, application modalities and post-conflict peace-building measures. The study therefore seeks to establish why the application of preventive diplomacy has been so elusive in the Lesotho conflict context.
1.5 Research Problem
―If it is not clear what causes and conditions of war are, or how war can be prevented or otherwise dealt with, then war is a research problem‖ (Sandole 1999: 1). The SADC region was one of the most turbulent regions during the Cold War. The region experienced liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Although the post-Cold War period saw relative peace in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. However, the region has not enjoyed durable peace. In fact, Lesotho, which is the focus of the current research, has never enjoyed peace since attaining independence from Britain in 1966. The country has been beset by numerous post-election conflicts as experienced in 1966, 1970, 1994, 1998 and 2007. The SADC treaty has pledged to employ preventive diplomacy in preventing, managing and resolving regional conflicts. As such, the regional organisation has intervened in the DRC, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Lesotho. It is in Lesotho that the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism was mainly engaged. In the 1994 and 2007 preventive interventions; the SADC employed non-coercive diplomacy while in the 1998 it employed coercive measures through military intervention. However, in spite of SADC‘s preventive missions, peace and stability remain elusive. Lesotho remains volatile as SADC appears to have failed to comprehensively address the structural sources of conflicts prevalent in the country despite its three preventive diplomacy missions.
The current study is based on the assumption that regional organisations should play a leading role in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts and threats to security in their respective regions. This is because most of the African conflicts have become so regionalised that regional institutions would best address them before outside intervention is instituted. It is also believed that regional bodies are well placed for intervention in regional conflicts because they command better knowledge of the historical and cultural context of the conflicts. The experience of SADC in Lesotho, despite the hiccups encountered, provides lessons that regional organisations are capable of restoring peace and stability in their respective zones through preventive diplomacy. Further to that, several African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Botswana, South Africa, and Tanzania have participated in the United Nations Peacekeeping missions and can carry the experiences and lessons acquired to their regional organisations‘ peace missions. It is further envisaged that the United Nations should come in at the invitation of, or to complement