Kyle Carswell
GEOG 4320 Dr. Amy Sumpter
HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE
REDEFINTION OF A CITY
New Orleans, Louisiana, is a bustling hive of trade and culture located in the
Southeastern United States. With a population of nearly 400,000, an economy centering around trade, shipping, and fishing, and the site of several important cultural events such as Mardi Gras, it would seem that New Orleans is one of those cities. A city that is capable of withstanding the test of time and the ravages of nature, no matter how severe they may seem. For a while, this was to be the case. However, on August 28-29, 2005 (Levitt and Whittaker 2), the city would face its greatest test, one which would continue to be felt in the years to come afterwards. New Orleans was struck on these days by Hurricane Katrina, a Category 4 (eventually downgraded to 3) (Congleton 5) hurricane, a hurricane which left massive amounts of flooding and devastation in the city, and left over 1,000 people dead. Even without the death toll and property damages, the racial and social consequences, among others, would be felt for years by the embattled city. However, it is from this devastation that changes were made, both to the city of New Orleans, and to the organizations which supplied aid and relief after the disaster.
Hurricane Katrina formed on August 23, 2005 (Levitt and Whittaker 1) just north of the Bahamas, and rapidly strengthened, attaining Category 5 status on August 28. The hurricane made landfall in New Orleans a day later (Congleton 5), releasing massive storm surges into the city. The levees meant to protect the city experienced a catstrophic failure, with over 50 levees failing across the city (Gibbens). With the failure of the levees, a storm surge entered Lake Pontchartrain and smashed clean into the city, with devastating consequences (Congleton 5). Devastating on account of 80 percent of Downtown New Orleans being left a flooded mess (Scoppetta 30), and many of the surrounding parishes were also flooded by the storms (Levitt and Whittaker 2). In terms of the cost to human life, it is estimated that 1,836 people were killed by Katrina itself and in the storms that followed (Levitt and Whittaker 2-3), which makes it one
of the deadliest storms in United States history. In fact, in regards to death toll alone, Katrina was costlier than the also devastating Hurricanes Harvey and Irma in 2017. In addition, the damage costs were estimated to be over 8.1 billion dollars (Levitt, Whittaker 3), one of the costliest storms in American history.
The main reason behind the damages caused to the city was, as stated earlier, the failure of the flood barriers and levees to hold out against the storm surges. Levees, for those unaware, are embankments along a river, designed to prevent the water from overflowing onto solid ground, whether they be natural or artificial. In New Orleans, the levees were designed to be capable of standing up to category 3 hurricanes, which Katrina was obviously more powerful than (Congleton 11). Unfortunately, the levees were not just insufficiently strong, but also improperly positioned. Canals of the man-made variety located along the Mississippi River as well as from Lake Pontchartrain to the Gulf of Mexico which were built to increase shipping allow the storm surges to get within striking distance of New Orleans. Worse, the canals that enter the city are the very same passages the storm surges used to flood New Orleans (Congleton 11). It was also another stroke of improper design that New Orleans also happened to be mostly below sea level, with only the oldest parts of the city being above sea level (Congleton 12). The closer at city is to sea level, the more susceptible it is to flooding. With that in mind, New Orleans was completely dependent on the levees for flood protection. The levees ended up overtopping due to water levels being too high, or in other sections, the soil, already weak from the wetlands of Louisiana, was eroded by the rushing waters. With the levee support system weakened, it did not take long for the system to experience a catastrophic failure (Vartabedian).
The hurricane itself was not the only suffering the embattled residents of New Orleans had to endure, for there were severe social consequences as a result of Katrina’s rampage. The
lowest lying regions of the city also were naturally the areas where low-income communities resided (Vartabedian). Said low-income communities typically housed minorities such as African Americans, and the low lying areas of New Orleans received the worst of the flooding. Naturally, the black population was amongst the worst affected by Katrina’s downpour, while the white/wealthy population had the chance to secure better homes that could somewhat stand up to the waters (Levitt, Whittaker 9-10) or even outright flee from the disaster, something the black/poor population could not do. Even the poor whites were better off than the poor blacks, since a survey showcased only 17% of poor whites without a car, comparted to 60% for blacks (Lavelle) In fact, New Orleans visitor Bryan K. Fair recounts “Katrina’s victims were and are America’s poor, black and nonblack…” (Levitt and Whittaker 36). But Katrina’s path did not just expose a racial divide within New Orleans, it also happened to induct a social sweep as well. The conditions post Hurricane Katrina were less than desirable, and combined with the damage dealt to homes, the end result was the entire 454,000 strong population of New Orleans was left displaced by Katrina, with at least half of it being displaced 1 year after Katrina (Gregory and Sastry 756). Astoundingly, such a vast portion of the African American population had been driven out, and the radio stations stopped playing rap or hip-hop, instead playing soft rock tunes (Lavelle). Even after the city was rebuilt into somewhat habitable conditions, many residents opted to not return on the grounds of their homes being destroyed, or their friends leaving New Orleans as well and therefore affecting the lines of communication between both parties
(Gregory and Sastry 757).
As is expected, whenever a natural disaster of some kind strikes, the government is obligated to help its citizens recover from the cataclysm. Katrina was no different in that regard. Where it was different, was the effectiveness of the government’s response to the tragedy. In
short, the response of FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) was unprepared for a hurricane of this magnitude. An official report from the Committee on Homeland Security states “that government officials failed to heed disaster warnings, made poor decisions before and after the hurricane hit, failed to provide effective leadership, and failed to develop the capacity to respond to catastrophic events.” (Levitt and Whittaker 208). Specifically, FEMA knew that a storm on the magnitude of Katrina was probable, but they failed to adequately prepare for it, in spite of performing a simulation with Katrina-level damage in 2004 (Edwards). Worse, FEMA also experienced a vast amount of red tape regarding the rescue efforts, with FEMA performing acts such as denying the Red Cross access into the Superdome to bring in emergency supplies, and refused to allow doctors to contribute their skills on the grounds that the names of said doctors could not be found in the government database (Edwards). FEMA also faced accusations of corruption and abuse of power, with billions of dollars of aid money being wasted, as well as immense amounts of bureaucracy and red tape delaying the shipments of rescue equipment (Edwards). Naturally, this led to immense anger within the populace of New Orleans towards the government for their inability to help, highlighted when CNN’s Anderson Cooper criticized Senator Mary Landrieu for her congratulating of FEMA without regards to the failings of the agency. Now, in some areas, the government was effective, with the Coast Guard sending in a vast amount of equipment and personnel, and the National Guard doing the same (Edwards). Nevertheless, FEMA came under criticism for their handling of Katrina, leading to major reforms for future incidents.
Post-Katrina, there have been a series of reforms undertaken by FEMA to ensure a lack of mistakes in future hurricanes. The staff was retrained, and FEMA has begun to work with local governments and law enforcement to promote more efficient and less confused
communication to avoid future breakdowns (Godfrey 5). FEMA also put into effect a citywide plan for recovery, consisting of 3 steps; “Revisioning, Neighborhood and Citywide Recovery Planning, and a Comprehensive Master Plan” (Godfrey 21). This most likely came from the multiple lawsuits that FEMA received as a result of their failures (Levitt and Whittaker 206-207). However, FEMA is not the only establishment to have undergone changes. The city of New Orleans itself has changed since FEMA. Gentrification of neighborhoods has become a reality in the segregated New Orleans, with many of the African American residents who chose to leave the city choosing to not return. This, therefore, paved the way for more wealthy peoples, including whites, to move into those previously black neighborhoods (Florida). More so, the wealth gap has ultimately widened, with wealthy residents becoming more well off and those below the poverty line (which has enlarged) continuing to struggle to survive (Scoppetta 37). As such, even though it may seem as if New Orleans has regenerated better than before to the uninformed observe, flaws still exist within the city. Flaws which can only be solved or
mitigated through preparedness, careful planning, and a desire to perform for the common good rather than self-interest.
Works Cited
Cecilia Scoppetta. “‘Natural’ Disasters as (Neo-Liberal) Opportunity? Discussing Post-Hurricane Katrina Urban Regeneration in New Orleans.” TeMA: Journal of Land Use, Mobility and Environment, no. 1, 2016, p. 25. EBSCOhost, doi:10.6092/1970-9870/3725.
Edwards, Chris. “Hurricane Katrina: Remembering the Federal Failures.” Cato Institute, 27 Aug. 2015, www.cato.org/blog/hurricane-katrina-remembering-federal-failures.
Florida, Richard. “How Natural Disasters Can Spur Gentrification.” CityLab, 12 Feb. 2019, www.citylab.com/environment/2019/02/gentrification-causes-new-orleans-natural-disasters-hurricane-katrina/582499/.
Gibbens, Sarah. “Hurricane Katrina, Explained.” Hurricane Katrina Facts and Information, 16 Jan. 2019, www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/natural-disasters/reference/hurricane-katrina/.
Godfrey, Nessa P. Hurricane Katrina : Impact, Recovery and Lessons Learned. Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 2009. EBSCOhost,
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Lavelle, Kristen. “Hurricane Katrina: The Race and Class Debate.” Monthly Review, 25 Jan. 2018, monthlyreview.org/2006/07/01/hurricane-katrina-the-race-and-class-debate/.
Levitt, Jeremy I., and Matthew C. Whitaker. Hurricane Katrina : America’s Unnatural Disaster. University of Nebraska Press, 2009. EBSCOhost,
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Roger D. Congleton. “The Story of Katrina: New Orleans and the Political Economy of Catastrophe.” Public Choice, no. 1/2, 2006, p. 5. EBSCOhost,
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Sastry, Narayan, and Jesse Gregory. “The Location of Displaced New Orleans Residents in the Year After Hurricane Katrina.” Demography, vol. 51, no. 3, June 2014, pp. 753– 775. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1007/s13524-014-0284-y.
Vartabedian, Ralph. “Army Corps Admits Design Flaws in New Orleans Levees.” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 2 June 2006, www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-jun-02-na-levee2-story.html.
