08reflectionsdonor.pdf

CarolinaPlanning

Reflections

on

Donor

Coordination:

An

Attempt

to

Establish

a

Microcomputer-based

Development

Project

Directory

in

Sudan

Dale

Whittington

Craig

Calhoun

The

World

Bank and

USAID

have

encouragedthecoordination of Third

World donor

organizations as aworthwhile

and

feasibleendeavor.

However,

the authors' experience in

Sudan

illustratesthat, despite theavailabilityof

microcom-puters

and

the tacit agreement of the

donor

organizations themselves,

donor

coordination is noteasily obtained.

In the

summer

of 1987, the

government

of

Sudan

ex-pelled several private voluntary aid organizations

from

thecountry

and

prohibited

them from

futureoperations

in Sudan.

The

international press reported thisevent as

another inexplicable

example

of erratic behavior

by

an

Africangovernment. Infact,these

and

other aid

organiza-tions

had

been operating in

Sudan

as if there

were

no

sovereign

government

inthecountry. Representatives of

these donors

were

flying in

and

out of

Khartoum,

the

country's capital, without the slightest pretense of

co-ordinatingtheir activitieswiththe

Sudanese government

orother aid organizations.

The

recentaction of the

gov-ernment

of

Sudan was an

understandable attempt to

obtain at ieast

some

minimal

knowledge

of

and

control

over

donor

activities.

Ironically, the

World Bank

recently cited

Sudan

as a

country

which

has

made

significantprogressinimproving

donor

coordination (IBRD, 1984, p. 42).

Our

own

work

in

Sudan

suggests, however, that the

problem

of

donor

coordinationisindeedserious

and

islikely toprove

much

more

intractablethan is

commonly

realized. Inthe

sum-mer

of 1984,

we

initiated a project in

Sudan funded by

theUnitedStates

Agency

for International

Development

(USAID)

to

work

withthe

Sudanese

MinistryofFinance

and Economic

Planning

(MOFEP).

The

purpose of the

project

was

to establish microcomputer-based decision

support

and

management

information systems.

One

of

several

components

of our effort

was

to create a

com-puterizeddatabaseofallongoing,planned

and

completed

development

projects in

Sudan which would

assist the

MOFEP,

and

thedonors withtheplanning

and

manage-ment

of

development

assistance.

The

Ministry

and

USAID

conceivedof thisproject as apreliminarystep to

promote

donor

coordination;it

was

toprovideafast, easy

way

for a

donor

to find out

what

otherdonors

had done

or

were

doingina particular

sec-tor or region. This article describes the failure of the

donorstoprovidetheinformationrequired forthis

proj-ect data base to function effectively.

We

offer several

explanationsof thedonors'failure tocooperate with the

MOFEP

and

discuss the implications ofthis experience

for future attempts at

donor

coordination.

Background

There has for

some

time

been

a

growing

awareness

among

both bilateral

and

multilateral donors that lack of

donor

coordination isa

major

problem. It is at least

partlyresponsible for thefailureofAfrican

economies

to

effectively utilize their

development

assistance. In its

report

Toward

Sustained

Development

in

Sub-Saharan

Africa, the

World

Bank

paints acomprehensive, sobering

picture of theregion's

economic

problems,

and

outlines

a series of policy measures necessary for its

economic

rehabilitation.

Two

of the report's central

recommenda-tionspertaintotheneedfor

improved

national

economic

management and donor

aid coordination.

The

reportcalls

for

more

strategic

and

flexiblepublic sectorplanning

by

national governments. In addition, it calls for explicit

commitments from both

donors

and

recipient

govern-ments

to

implement

their responsibilitiesunder an agreed

economic

recoveryprogram. Specifically, the

World Bank

callsfor (1) strengthening

management

information

sys-temsinplanning

and

finance ministriesinorderto facil-itate timely policy analysis

and

strategic planning,

and

(2) providing high-quality technical assistance to those

governments

interested in building

up

such capacity

AFRICA

The

World

Bank

reportpaysparticular attentiontothe

need for

improved

donor

coordination.

Aidadministrationisaparticularlyimportantareafor institutional reform. Basicinformation on aid flows

isoften lacking; responsibility fordonorcontactand

negotiationisunclear;linksseldomexistbetweenthe plan, the budget, sector ministries, project entities, and donoractivities. . ..The weaknessesof

uncoordi-natedaid are increasinglyrecognizedbyAfrican

gov-ernments and donors.

More

consultative groups,

UNDP-sponsoredroundtables,andotherarrangements

have beensetuptocoordinateaid. .. .However,

con-sultative groups have generally suffered from two majorweaknesses. First, the commitments

made

by

both governmentsanddonorson programcontentand

financialsupport have notbeenfirmenough. Second,

thegroupshavefailed togetmoreinvolvedin detail

—

priorities and assistance for particular sectors,

pro-grams,andprojects,orspecificchangesinpricingand

other incentive policies (IBRD, 1984, pp. 39-43).

Such

increasedinvolvement

by donors

inthe details of

aidadministrationisdependent

upon

improved

accessto

information

on

both

government and donor

development

activities.

Our

project

was an

attempt to

work

toward

improvements

in these areas in Sudan.

The World

Bank'scallfor

improved

donor

coordina-tion

and

public sector planning certainly preceded the

publication ofthisreport,

and

Sudan

was one

of thefirst

countriesin Sub-SaharanAfrica toinitiateseriousefforts

alongtheselines.

At

thesixthConsultative

Group

Meeting

for

Sudan

heldinParisinJanuary1983, severaldonors,

including theUnited States

and

the

European Economic

Community

(EEC),calledfortheformationofsubgroups

ofdonors

and government

representatives, organized

by

sector,

which

would

meet

in

Khartoum

and monitor

the

implementationofSudan's

economic

recoveryprogram.

The

idea forthese sectorsubgroups developed

from

the

World

Bank'scountry implementation reviewprocess,in

which

Bank

and government

representatives

meet

to

review progress

on

Bank

investment programs.

At

the

January 1983Consulative

Group

meeting, thechief

World

Bank

representative

and chariman

of the Consultative

Group

reaffirmed the Bank'ssupportfor such

monitor-ingactivities

and welcomed

the inclusion of otherdonors

in such discussions.

The

discussions held during this Consultative

Group

meetingledtotheestablishment oftheJointMonitoring

Committee (JMC)

in1983.

The

JMC

was

chaired

by

the

Minister ofFinance

and Economic

Planning

and

included

the resident representatives of the

World

Bank,

Interna-tional

Monetary Fund and

concerneddonors. Its

primary

purpose

was

toprovide alocal

forum

for

more

detailed

discussions of

how

donor

assistancecouldbe better

co-ordinated with Sudan's

economic

policies

and

investment program. It

was

originallyenvisionedthatthe

JMC

would

meet

quarterly in

Khartoum,

and

the

JMC

Secretariat,

consisting ofstaff

from

theplanning

wing

of the

MOFEP,

would

prepare progress reports

and

analyses for the

quarterlymeetings

and

fortheannualConsultative

Group

meeting.

The

JMC

met

three timesin 1983

and by

theseventh

Consultative

Group

Meeting

in

December

1983, it

was

clear tothe

donors

thatadditional technicalstaff

needed

to be assignedto the

JMC

Secretariatif the

work

of the

JMC

was

to be productive. Getting

donors

and

govern-ment

representatives together

was

beneficial, but they

needed

information

and

analysis

on

the

problems

they weretodiscuss. Still,

members

of the seventh Consultative

Group

Meeting wereenthusiasticaboutthe potential

con-tribution of the

JMC. The

chairman's report notes that

there

was

a consensus that the

JMC

was

performing a

usefulfunction

and

that donors should supportit inthe

coming

year.

The

representative of the Netherlandssaid that the

JMC

was

a

good

start toward

donor

coordina-tion in

Sudan and

thatitmight haveapplicability inother

Africancountries.

The

EEC

representativesupportedthe

work

of the

JMC

and hoped

that the coordinationthat

had

been started

would

be intensified

and

extended.

Finally, the

Sudanese

Minister of Finance

and Economic

Planningatthe timepromiseda strengthening of the

_JMC

and

notedthatthelocal

donor

representatives

would

need

timelyinformation

on

commitments and

disbursements

from

theircentral offices in order to support its work.

10 Carolina Planning

severalmatterstoexamine, the

most

importantof

which

was

aiddisbursement.

The

Minister of

MOFEP

suggested thatacomprehensive reviewof

donor

disbursement

pro-cedures

needed

to be conducted in order to understand

the reasons for the

slowdown

in disbursement of

com-modity

aid.

The

representativesof the

Arab

Fund and

the

African

Development

Bank

expressed the

view

that the

issue of undisbursed project assistance should be

ex-amined

toseeif

ways

couldbe

found

toincrease theflow

ofpreviously

committed money,

and

also

recommended

thatthistaskbegiventotheJointMonitoringCommittee.

Thus, in

December

1983, there

was

ostensibly strong

supportfor

improved

donor

coordinationin

Sudan

and

for the

work

of the

JMC,

when

quiteindependently

we

proposed

to the

USAID

Khartoum

mission director that a

microcomputer

data base of

development

projects in

Sudan

beestablished.

Our

initialidea

was

tocreateadata

base using commercially available software (dBase III);

eachrecordinthedata base

would

contain variouskinds

ofinformation

on

aspecific

development

project. Users couldeasily search the projectdatabases for projects of acertaintype(e.g.,allagricultural

and

irrigationprojects

in a particular region, or all energyprojects

funded

by

Western

European donors

which

are behind schedule).

As

originally envisioned, this computerized project

directory

was

to serve

two

primaryobjectives.First, a

cen-tralized, easily accessibleprojectdata base

would

provide an overview of donor-financed

development

activities,

and promote

the dissemination ofinformation

on

proj-ects

among

donors.

The

MOFEP

staff could prepare

reports in response to specific requests

from donors

or

government

agencies for projectinformation.

Although

conceptually simple, theimportance of this objective of

information storage

and

dissemination should not be underestimated.

The

institutional

memory

of

donor

or-ganizationsincountriessuchas

Sudan

isquiteshort

due

to brief staffassignments, so there isan urgent needfor

basicdata

on

projectactivities. Paperrecords arepoorly

maintained,

and

projectreports arenotwidelycirculated.

The

secondobjective,

and

ultimately the

more

impor-tant one,

was

to begin to establish a project data base

which

would

supportan

improved

planning

and

budget-ingsystem withinthe

MOFEP.

An

up-to-date, centralized

project data base is essential for (1) the preparation of

the

development

budget, (2) sectoral planning, (3) the

estimation of recurrent costs,

and

(4)projectmonitoring

and

evaluation.

One

major

goal

was

toprovidethe

Min-istrywith an early

warning

systemfor implementation

and

financial

problems

on development

projects.

The

needfor a centralized setofdata

on development

projects

was

widely recognized within the

MOFEP

and

the

donor community.

The

April, 1984

World

Bank

report, Sudan: Planning

and

BudgetingforRecovery,

by

R. Ridker, called for the establishment of a centralized

projectdirectory,

and

actually

proposed

two

projectdata

forms

for useinsystem design

and

data collection.

The

MOFEP

itself

had

made

several attemptstocollect

proj-ectdata,

and

various

forms

were

availableinthe

Minis-try. For example,

when

we

began

our project in the

summer

of 1984,

we

were

shown

a collection of

hand-writtenindex cards

which

containedlimitedproject

infor-mation. Inaddition, the

UNDP

Advisorstothe

MOFEP

had

drafted

forms

tobe used to collect information

on

project activities.

This discussiondemonstratesthat, althoughthe

com-puterization of a project directory

may

have been

some-what

originalin

Khartoum,

theneedfora centralfileof

information

on development

projects

was

widely

recog-nized, both

by

the

MOFEP

and

the

donor community.

In our opinion, however, the actualphysical processing

and

management

oftherecords forapproximately250

on-going,donor-financeddevelopmentprojects

and

750loans

and

grants proved a

major impediment

to

both

simple

dataanalysis

and improved

planning

and

budgeting

pro-cedures.

A

computer

data base

was

the

most

practical

way

to efficiently

manage

this

much

information ina timely

manner. Inthe

summer

of 1984,

we

arrivedin

Khartoum

to attempt to create such a data base.

Data

Collection Efforts

The

development

ofthesoftwareforthe project

direc-tory

was

quite straightforward.

By

farthe

most

difficult

part of establishing the project directory

was

the

collec-tion ofthedata toputinto thesystem. There

were

three

primaryplaces

where

projectdata couldbelocated:

donor

offices, theMinistry ofFinance

and Economic

Planning

itselfandtheimplementingagencies. Thissectiondescribes

the efforts to collect data

from

the

donor community.

At

the July1984meetingof theJointMonitoring

Com-mittee, the Undersecretary of Planning formally

an-nounced

that

USAID

had

agreed tofund our project to establish a microcomputer-based

development

project

data base.

He

requested the donors' assistance in this

work, reminding

them

ofdiscussionsalong theselines at

the

December

1983 Consultative

Group

Meeting.In

Au-gust1984, togetherwithstaff

from

the Secretariat of the

JMC,

we

personally visited the representatives of the

major

bilateral

and

internationaldonorsin

Khartoum

to

explain thenatureof the

proposed

projectdirectory

and

to elicit theirhelp in completing

two

data

forms

which

had

been designed to collect information

on

donor-financed

development

projects.

We

paid personal visits

to the

Khartoum

representatives of thefollowing donors:

UNDP,

World

Bank,

EEC,

France, United

Kingdom,

Fed-eral Republic of

Germany,

Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland

and

USAID.

These visits

were

followed

up

by

a formal written request to twenty-two

donors

from

theUndersecretaryofPlanningin

August

1984,in

which

he requested their assistance in completing these

two

forms. Inadditiontotheeleven

donors

noted above, this

letter

was

sent to the

Embassy

of

Denmark,

African

Development

Bank,

OPEC

Fund

forInternational Devel-opment,

Kuwait

Fund

for

Arab

Economic Development,

Islamic

Development

Bank,

Abu

Dhabi

Fund

for

Eco-nomic and

SocialDevelopment,

Abu

Dhabi Government,

Saudi

Fund

for

Development,

Arab

Fund

for

Economic

and

SocialDevelopment,

UNCDF

and

International

Fund

for Agricultural

Development.

Tothe bestofour knowledge, theUndersecretary never

received a replytohisletter

from

the

World

Bank,

UNDP,

EEC,

Federal Republic of

Germany,

Italy, Netherlands,

Switzerland,

Kuwait

Fund

for

Economic

Development,or

the

Arab Fund

for

Economic and

Social

Development.

Contrary to theexpectations of theWestern donors,

by

far the

most

complete, thorough

and prompt

responses

werereceived

from

the

Arab

donors.

Most

of the

major

Western donors never even botheredto

answer

the

Under-secretary's letter; even

among

the respondents, several

replied in a superficial

and

incomplete manner.

In

November

1984

and

in January 1985,

we

again

visited the

Khartoum

officesof

many

of these donorsto

request theircooperationin this effort.

The

Undersecre-tary ofPlanning also sent afollow-up letter in January

1985, noting the importance of this

work

for the

JMC.

By

the

summer

of 1985, theUndersecretary

had

received

only

two

replies to hissecondrequest for projectprofiles

fromthedonors: aletterfromtheFederalRepublic of

Ger-many

informingtheundersecretarythatthey didnothave

timetofillouttheforms,

and two

projectdataforms

from

the Swiss Embassy.

What we

find extraordinary about this experience is

that themajorityof the

donors

didnotevenfeelobliged

to

answer

theUndersecretary'sletters,aseemingly simple

courtesy.Perhapsthe experiencewiththe

World

Bank

best

illustratesthelack of

donor

cooperationinthiseffort.

As

noted, thiseffort

was

directlyresponsiveto

World Bank

policy objectives in

Sub-Saharan

Africa.

The World

Bank's

own

mission to

Sudan

in

March

1984 called for theestablishmentofacomputerized data baseinSudan.

World

Bank

staffinboth

Khartoum and

Washington were

contacted personally

on

severaloccasionsto

make

specific

suggestions for changes in the project directory.

These

were

incorporated into the system design.

World Bank

staffcontinually

promised

tocooperatewiththe

MOFEP

and

USAID

to support this effort. Yet the

World Bank

did not complete the data

forms

nor did it

answer

the

letters

from

the Undersecretary.

Reasons for the Donors' Failure to

Cooperate

In their recent book,

Does

Aid

Work?

(1986), Robert

Cassen

and

his associates note three

main

reasons for

donors' reluctancetoundertakemeaningfulaid

coordina-tion efforts:

a. Coordination is likely to impair the

freedom

with

which donors

can pursuetheir political

and

commer-cial interests through their aid programs.

b.

Donors

know

thatthere arebothideological

and

tech-nicalsubjects

on which

they arelikely todisagree,

and

aid coordination

would

create conflicts.

c.

Aid

coordination canbecostlyinadministrative time

and money.

Although

theseexplanationscertainlyhavemerit, based

on

ourexperiencein

Sudan

the

problem

of

donor

coor-dination seems likely to be

more

invidious than these

reasons suggest.

We

found

both related

and

additional

explanations for the failure of the donors to cooperate withthe

MOFEP

and

USAID

toestablishacentral deposi-toryofinformation

on

projects.

We

havecategorized

them

into threegroups:(1)reasonsinternaltothe

donor

bureau-cracy, (2) donors' impressions of the external planning environment,

and

(3) donors' impressions of the

micro-computer

technology itself.

Each

of these explanations

was

informally profferedto us

by donor

representatives

themselves in follow-up interviews

we

conducted in the

summer

of 1985.

First, even if donors' intentions are good, there is a

varietyoforganizational pressures

which

mitigate against

12 CarolinaPlanning

to

promote

aid coordination.

There

are

few

bureaucratic

incentives to individuals within

donor

bureaucracies to

work

with other donors.

As

the

World Bank

hasnoted,

donor

coordination is administratively

demanding and

time

consuming

and

itisrarelyrewardedintermsof

pro-fessional evaluation or

promotion

(1984, p.43). Both

ex-ecutives

and

juniorstaff areevaluated

by

central offices

which

havelittleawareness ofefforts

by

their field staff

to

work

withotherdonors.Infact,central officepersonnel

evaluation procedures often fostercompetition

between

donors.

An

enterprising

program

officer

who

letsothers

know

some

ofhis"best"projectideas

may

well find

them

funded

by

other donors.

On

the otherhand,

many

donors

make

most

of their

major

programming

decisionsat the

central headquartersso that individualsinthefield typi-callyfeelthereislittletheycan

do

to

promote

donor

coor-dination, evenifthey

wanted

to.Finally, thedonors'field

officesare typicallyunderstaffedrelative tocentral

head-quarters,

and

the individuals

from

whom

we

requested

assistance

were

often extremely busy.

The

second set of explanations concerns the donors'

perceptions of theirexternalplanningenvironment. Given

the pressures

on

their time,

donor

representatives

were

forcedto

make

a

judgment

astothelikelihood of success

ofoureffort toestablishacomputerizedprojectdatabase,

and

the effectiveness of such a system if it

were

estab-lished.

Too

often, the subjective probability assigned to

both of these events

was

low.

The

likelihood that

we

would

succeedincreating thesysteminthefirstplace

was

perceived to below, in part becauseeach

donor

felt the

otherdonors

would

notcooperate.Therefore, individual

donors

saw

little reason to participate in the data

col-lection effort themselves.

The

Western bilateral donors,

in particular, felt that the

Arab donors

would

not

coop-erate. Thisisaclassic "freerider"

problem which

we

had

hoped

to address

by

reaching a collective agreement in

the

JMC

to supportthis effort. In the end, however, the

JMC

failed to meet regularly. Moreover, little informal

pressure could,be exerted

on donors

who

did not

par-ticipate.

The

donorsalso

had

littleregard for theefficacyof the

planning

wing

oftheMinistry.

To

many

donor

represen-tatives, the planning

wing

was

so ineffective as to be

irrelevant to theirobjectives. Theirprimaryinterest inthe

Planning Ministry

had

become

finding theeasiest, fastest

means

of getting theirprojects

approved

and

theirfunds

disbursed.

An

effectiveplanningoperationinthe

MOFEP

would

inevitablyentaillessdiscretion

on

thepart of the

donors in

programming

their aid and, in the short run

at least, this

was

perceivedtobe anobstacle totheiraid

program

rather than a necessary step in institutional

development. It

was

thus not clear to donors that the

The capital cityof Sudan, Khartoum.

MOFEP

wanted

theeffort tosucceed.

As

one

representa-tive of a private voluntary organization put it,

I don't reallythink youwillbeableto establishthis

microcomputerdatabase,butwhathappensifyoudo?

I see more problems for

me

than advantages.

Why

should I want to give the Planning Ministry the

in-formation to meddlein ouraffairs?

Another

relatedreasonforthedonors'failure to

coop-erate

which

pertained totheir impressionof the external

planningenvironment

was

that the project

was

perceived

to be too closely tied to

USAID.

For the planning

wing

ofthe

MOFEP

tohaveacentralizeddata baseof

develop-ment

projects

was bad

enough;for

USAID

tobetheonly

donor

with suchcentralizedinformation

was

even worse.

At

the July1984

JMC

meeting, thisproject

was announced

to thedonors.

Both

USAID

and

MOFEP

representatives

assured the other donors that the data in the project

directory

would

beavailabletoall.

However,

thedonors'

skepticism is understandable in

an environment

where

dataisscarce

and

istypicallytreatedas proprietary.There

was

a fear that the planning

wing

of

MOFEP,

and

in-directly

USAID, would

have

much

greater access to the

projectdatabase. Forat least

one

donor

representative,

there

was

alsoan underlying apprehension aboutcreating

the institutional capabilityin

what

was

then a military

dictatorshiptocreate

and

manage

centralizeddatabases.

(This concern

was

not entirely unwarranted. Within a

matterofjust afew

weeks

afterthe creation of the

new

Management

InformationSystemUnitinthe

MOFEP,

one

of the

USAID-supplied

computers

was

commandeered

by

the security police

whose

stated objective

was

to set

up

a data base of automobile license plates in

Khartoum).

A

third setofreasons for thedonors' lack of

coopera-tion relates to theirimpressionsof the technologyitself.

Individuals

working

for

donor

agencies in a place like

Sudan

can hardlybeexpectedtobeup-to-dateinthelatest

they

were

not. Forthisreason, they

were

unable to

real-isticallyevaluate the

magnitude

of thesoftware

develop-ment which

we

proposed

and

the likelihoodthatit

would

succeed.

Many

had had

frustratingexperienceswith main-frame computers of

some

sort

and

tendedto extrapolate

theirhorrorstories to microcomputers.

We

encountered

a

wide

rangeof skeptical

comments

about computersin general.

At

least five individuals independently offered

us that sage advice, "garbagein; garbage out," implying

thatthe

whole

effort

was

futile.

The

message

was

really thatcomputerswere

an

inappropriatetechnologyinsuch

a data-poor environment; that this

was

simply another

example

of a capital-intensive technology being

pushed

by

donors without regard to the needs

and

capabilities

of thelocaleconomy.

We

disagreewiththislineof

reason-ing, but it certainly deserves serious examination (see

Calhoun,

Drummond

and

Whittington, 1987).

Incontrastto

hardware

issues, several

donor

represen-tativesfelt thatthesoftwaredevelopmentapplications

we

proposed

were

far too sophisticated. Inreality, the

soft-ware development

was

theeasiest,

most

tractable

and

least

time

consuming

part ofourassignment.Maintaining

soft-ware

and

training people in itsuse,

on

the other hand,

is an important issue.

Implications for Future

Donor

Coordination Efforts

To

date, the

campaign

for

donor

coordinationhasbeen

carried out at a fairly superficial level. It is

one

more

exercise in

what

Robertson (1985)hastermedthe"ritual ofplanned development."

Many

of thedonorsthat

rheto-ricallycallforcoordinationsimply

do

not

want

it.

More-over,

many

Western

donors

adopta patronizing attitude

towardsthe

whole

process.Theirattitudeisalso asource

ofmisunderstandingabouttheir

own

and

others'

perfor-mance.

At

thecenter of thispatronizingattitudeisabelief in their

own

bureaucraticefficiency

and

intheinefficiency

of the host country's bureaucracy.

Although

donors suchas the

World Bank

supportthe

idea of

improved donor

coordination, their

representa-tives

do

notreally

know

what

this entails intermsofdata

management

and

analysis.

Most

donor

coordination

efforts have not proceeded

beyond

the level of general

discussions because

donors

place data

management

de-mands upon

theministriesoffinance

and

planning

which

eventhedonors themselves

do

not

know how

toaddress.

Few donor

representativeshave thought seriouslyabout

how

they

would

manage

theflowof

paperwork

associated

with

hundreds

of millions of dollars of aid

from

thirty

donor

agencies

—

allwithdifferentaccountingprocedures,

currencies

and

priorities

—

withthe limitedbudget

avail-able to a minister of finance or planning in an

aid-dependent

economy

such as Sudan's.

Ironically, donors'

demands

for information

on

the

recipientgovernment's

development

projects

and

policies

may

begreatestprecisely in thosecases

where

the

govern-ment

isleastabletorespond

and where

the

development

plans are least likely to be effective.

Such

demands

can

contribute to the destruction of host country planning

institutions(Morss, 1984).Thissuggeststousthatthefield

staff of

donor

agencies concerned with aid administra-tion need to spend less time giving advice to ministries

of finance

and

planning about data

management

and

planning

problems which

they themselves have never

faced,

and

more

time actually

working

withthese

bureau-cracies to

improve

their

management

information

and

decisionsupportsystems. Inourexperience,

many

ofthe

staffofthe

MOFEP

want

to

do

abetterjob

managing and

coordinating

donor

assistance,butitisacomplicatedtask

with

which

they need help

—

particularly in the area of

microcomputer

applications.

Donors

tendtoberatethem, butofferlittle inthe

way

ofideasorconcreteassistance.

Moreover, donors

do

notadequatelyappreciate thenature

of the data

management demands

they themselves are

placing

on

the

development

planning enterprise.

Calls for

improved

donor

coordinationarelikely tofail

unlessunderlyingorganizational

and

attitudinal issuesare

addressed

more

directly

and

seriously. Part of the

prob-lem

issimply thatall donors

want

tocoordinate, but

no

one wants

to be coordinated. Based

on

our experiences

in Sudan,

we

believe future

improvements

in thearea of

donor

coordination

depend

in large part

upon more

explicit policy directives

from

top

management

in both

multilateral

and

bilateral

donor

agencies.

Almost

without

exception, the

donor

representatives in

Khartoum

with

whom

we

dealt treated

donor

coordinationasa peripheral

concern.Typically, theirprimaryresponsibility

was

tosee

thatthebudgettargetsfortheiraidallocationswerespent,

notthat they

were

effectively coordinatedwithnational

government

priorities

and

the

work

of other donors.

Top managers

in

donor

agencies

must change

the

in-centive structure

which

theirstafffaces, inorderthattime

spent

on

coordinationwithotherdonorsisrecognized

and

rewarded in personnel evaluations

and

advancement.

Until then, real progressin

donor

coordination will be

slow.

We

suggestthat

management

experiment with

ways

ofobtaining written evaluations ofstaffjobperformance

from

national

government

counterpartsinthe ministries

with

which

theydeal.

Management

must

also realize that

donor

coordination efforts are time

consuming

and

re-quire a long-term

commitment

to the institutional

de-velopment

of both the

donor agency and

the national

government. If serious attention isgiven to the issue of

14 Carolina Planning

REFERENCES

Calhoun,

C; Drummond,

W.;andD. Whittington.

"Computer-izedInformation

Management

inaSystem-Poor Environment:

Design and Implementation of a Computer System for the

Sudanese PlanningMinistry."ThirdWorldPlanningReview,Vol.

9, No. 4, 1987. pp. 347-365.

Cassen, R.andassociates.DoesAidWork?Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1986.

IBRD. TowardSustainedDevelopmentinSub-SaharanAfrica:

A

JointProgramof Action. Washington,

DC:

IBRD, September

1984.

Morss, E.R."InstitutionalDestruction ResultingfromDonor and

Project ProliferationinSub-SaharanAfrican Countries."World

Development, 12(4). (1984). pp. 465-70.

Pinckey, T.C.;J.M. Cohon; andD.K. Leonard."Kenya'sUseof

MicrocomputerstoImproveBudgetingandFinancial

Manage-mentinan OperatingMinistry:

An

UpdatedReport."

Develop-mentDiscussion PaperNo. 169. Cambridge,

MASS:

Harvard

Institute for International Development, 1984.

Robertson, A.F. People and the State:

An

Anthropology of

Planned Development. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,

1984.

Whittington, D.; C.Calhoun;andW.

Drummond.

DraftFinal

Report to

USA1D

KhartoumMission on the

Management

In-formation SystemProjectwith theMinistryofFinanceand

Eco-nomic Planning, Government of Sudan. Washington,

DC:

USAID, Contract No. 650-0071-C-00-4031, June1986.

DaleWhittington teachesinthenewconcentration.Planningin

Develop-ing Areas, inthe Department ofCityand Regional Planning at the University ofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill.Hismajorfieldsof research arepublicinvestment theoryandwaterresourceeconomicsin

develop-ing countries.

CraigCalhounteachesintheDepartmentofSociologyattheUniversity ofNorth CarolinaatChapelHill. Hisfieldsofresearchincludesocial

theory andthesocialimplications ofcomputertechnologies.

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