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ITRC Forum 2014 萬 雲 皆 有 險 : 雲 計 算 的 安 全 怎 影 響 你 的 管 理 概 念

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ITRC Forum 2014

萬雲皆有險

:

雲計算的安全怎影響你的管理概念

How Cloud Computing Can Rain on Your IT Management Strategy By Roger Lee

Presentation for ITRC Forum 2014 11 Dec 2014 (Thu)

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Agenda

Response to recent Anonymous Operation Hong

Kong

Challenges with Securing Clouds

Traditional Defense and management model fails

Cloud Security Defense in Depth

What should you do? 4 Key Ways of Management

Concepts to Reduce Risk

Some Specific Technologies Recommendations to

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Response to recent Anonymous

Operation Hong Kong

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DDoS

Targeting mostly Government and Political parties.

Most attacks do not last more than a few hours. Impacted

website are brought offline and some of those (.gov.hk sites)

have shown successful mitigation.

Recent Anonymous Operation Hong Kong

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Defacement (DNS hijack / admin leakage)

Websites got DNS hijacked, or leaked DNS admin account,

redirect to youtube link with Anonymous message

All were under admin of ONE Hosting provider:

http://2pitech.com/

Recent Anonymous Operation Hong Kong

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Injection attacks

Hackers using known SQL / MySQL injections to insert

message to webpages.

Admin can easily delete the item, patch it

Recent Anonymous Operation Hong Kong

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Challenges with Securing Clouds

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Elastic

Multi-Tenant

Application-Centric

Elsewhere

Leased

Challenges with Securing Clouds

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Traditional Defense and management

model fails

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Fundamental Risk Differences

Differences Between Traditional IT and Cloud Computing

Risk ‘Ownership’

When computing assets are owned by your

organization, you own the risk

When computing assets are purchased as-a-service,

uncertain

Control Vs Governance

Traditional IT: directly manages IT controls around

risk tolerance (Control over network, system, and application configuration)

Cloud Computing: indirectly manages risk through

governance (governance based on transparency, exposed controls, “stacked defenses”)

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Fundamental Risk Differences

Differences Between Traditional IT and Cloud Computing

Perimeter-based Vs Application-based

Traditional: network-based defenses

Cloud Computing: Application designed with security

Controls are rarely customer-exposed

laaS – vendor controls network configuration,

security

PaaS – vendor controls network and server

configuration, security

SaaS – vendor controls all aspects of security

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What should you do?

4 Key Ways of Management Concepts to

Reduce Risk

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4 Key Ways of Management Concepts

1. Architect for the cloud

2. Robust Identity, Access Management

3. Confirm Legal, Compliance obligations, Due

diligence

(應有的注意,盡職調查)

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(1) Architect for the Cloud

New Compute Paradigms

From Server to Service

Running on top of software virtualization

New Applications or services

Defense not dependent on the perimeter

Self-defending applications and services

Rethinking authorization & authentication

Resiliency across cloud(s) and traditional

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(1) Architect for the Cloud

Existing Applications or Services

Does the Security model of the application fit cloud?

Considerations for legacy applications or services

Security

Management of Security through ‘Security Groups’

Traffic shaping, IPS, monitoring devices must move to

virtual platforms

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(1) Architect for the Cloud

Security

‘Build Security In’ Applications

Inter-application/service communication

Self-defending applications and services

Rethinking authorization & authentication

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(1) Architect for the Cloud

Risk Revolves Around Data

Data Fundamentals

Strong Data Classification practice

Data Custodian

Data at rest

Store only what is necessary, for as little time as possible

Encryption

Data in use

Be usable by intended application or services

Data in transit

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(2) Robust Identity, Access Management

Cloud Identity Management

Federation of identity

Governance and monitoring

System/Service-level authentication

Certainty in machine-machine transactions at scale

Management of digital certificates, stores in the cloud

Administration of Systems – Understanding oversight

of privileged administrators and the controls over

their access

Vetting the people who operates your cloud(s) –

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(3) Confirm Legal, Compliance Obligations,

Due Diligence

Data Sovereignty

Must meet laws governing ‘location’ of citizen’s data Can your data be seized without notice?

Cloud is borderless, law is not

Privacy, security law and regulations vary by region – which to comply

with?

If your data is in a foreign nation, what rights do you have?

If your data is international, how is evidence, prosecution handled?

Legal liability for security risk-related issues

Who is liable in a cloud breach? laaS

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(3) Confirm Legal, Compliance Obligations,

Due Diligence

Compliance mechanisms

‘Compliant clouds’ – what assurance mechanisms do you have Is auditability allowed, or allowances made for testing

Does CSP keep up with latest regulations

Vendor due diligence to consider

Vendor Security Posture, willingness to share details with customer Open platform (OpenStack) which won’t lock you in

Security by default, or as add-on

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(4) Clear Responsibility

• Customer, CSP, or both?

• How much transparency/intelligence does CSP provide?

 Do you have visibility into your cloud environment (at least in logging level)?  Does CSP monitor intra-cloud, and extra-cloud activity for security issues?

Tenant-tenant hacking/intrusions

Tenant-Internet hacking, mis-use, intrusions

• Incidents in the cloud

In an incident, who is responsible for…

 Notifications

Incident-response Investigations

 Does CSP have response capability?

In the case of DDoS or other flood

Are there stops on metering and billing?  Is there any proof of capability?

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Some Specific Technologies

Recommendations to be more secure and

efficient management

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Cloud Based Attack Mitigation

Slide 27

Protected Online Services DefensePro AppWall Protected organization DefensePipe Scrubbing Center DefensePros Defense Messaging

Includes traffic baselines

ISP

Volumetric DDoS attack that blocks the Internet

pipe

ERT with the customer decide to divert the traffic

Clean traffic

Pipe Saturation Alert

includes essential information for attack

mitigation On-premises AMS

mitigates the attack

SSL based attacks Application level attacks

Low & slow attacks Network flood attacks

Known vulnerabilities Egress traffic attacks

ERT monitors and controls both cloud and on-premises devices

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Content-Aware DLP Solutions

Outbound Content (E-mail, Web, FTP,

Print, etc.) 0x9678A 0x59A06 Detection: Extract Algorithmic Conversion 01011100 11010011 00001011 00 100100 One-way Mathematical Representation 0x1678A 0x461BD 0x66A1A 0x6678A 0x4D181 0xB678A 010111001 101001100 00101100 100100 1000111 011101010 110101101 10011 0111101 Database Record or

Document

Algorithmic

Conversion Mathematical One-way Representation Fingerprint: 0xB6751 0xB61C1 0x37CB2 0x5BD41 0x190C1 0x93005 0x590A9

0xA0001 0xB6751 0xB61C1 0x37CB2 0x5BD41 0x190C1 0x93005 0x590A9 0xA0001 Extract Fingerprint Storage & Indexing 0x5BD41 0x190C1 0x93005 Fingerprint Creation Real-Time Fingerprint Comparison PreciseID Fingerprint Repository

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