BY STEPHEN R. BOUGH AND M. BLAKE HEATH1
Stephen R. Bough
Current Issues in Underinsured and
Uninsured Insurance Coverage in Missouri
Motorists traveling on Missouri
highways are supposed to carry at least some liability insurance. All too often, however, a motorist either has no insurance or not enough liability insurance to cover the losses he caused in the accident.2 When a motorist
is uninsured or underinsured, the injured party’s only hope for recovery may depend on her own insurance policy.
In Missouri, every automobile policy must provide at least the state minimum in liability coverage for uninsured motorist coverage and an insured has the option of contracting for underinsured motorist coverage.3
As the Insurance Research Council so aptly noted, “the recent economic downturn is expected to trigger a sharp rise in the uninsured motorist rate.”4 This rise in the uninsured
motorist rate will inevitably drive up the number of uninsured motorist claims. The economic downturn will likely produce a similar spike in underinsured motorist claims since motorists may decide to decrease costs by opting to pay for the state minimum coverage and forgo the premiums of higher coverage. What this means for lawyers representing both injured victims and insurance companies is that their clients will face more litigation involving uninsured and underinsured motorist claims.
While the general principles behind uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages seem straightforward
enough, any lawyer who has dealt with the issues surrounding uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage can attest that the coverage issues are anything but simple. In fact, Judge Daniel Scott of the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District recently stated, “As things now stand, even legally sophisticated persons may find it practically impossible to know their UIM coverage for such scenarios, which cannot be a desirable situation.”5
Currently, two of the most litigated issues when dealing with uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage are
Current Issues in Underinsured and
Uninsured Insurance Coverage in Missouri
I. Uninsured Motor Vehicle
Uninsured motor vehicle coverage (UM) provides a minimum level of recovery for those injured by an owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.6 Uninsured motor
vehicle coverage is required in each automobile liability policy by § 379.203, RSMo. Missouri law requires a minimum level of coverage of $25,000 bodily injury or death coverage per person in any one accident, $50,000 bodily injury or death coverage for two or more persons in any one accident, and $10,000 property damage coverage for any one accident.7 Whether issued
by the same insurer or different insurers, the public policy expressed in the statute mandates that each automobile liability policy contain at least the statutory minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage.8
Uninsured motorist coverage is different from liability insurance.9
Uninsured motorist coverage is a form of bodily injury insurance.10 Unlike
liability insurance, uninsured motorist coverage does not inure with a
particular motor vehicle.11 Uninsured
motorist coverage protects against bodily injury caused by an uninsured motorist’s negligence.12
This coverage cannot be limited by terms of the insurance policy.13 It does
not matter if the coverage for more than one automobile is consolidated into one policy or if the insurer issues
each automobile a separate policy.14
Either way, the insured has purchased uninsured motorist coverage for each automobile and is covered by each.15 The insurer may not limit
by policy provisions the uninsured motorist coverage contained within a consolidated policy or within separate policies.16 Each must cover the insured
for the statutory minimum amount and all must provide coverage.17
The strong public policy of mandated uninsured coverage affects the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. “Stacking” is the ability of the insured to collect insurance coverage from multiple insurance policies.18 The key decision by the
Supreme Court of Missouri on stacking uninsured motorist coverage was in Cameron Mutual Insurance
Company v. Madden.19
The insured in Cameron had two cars, with each car listed separately on the declaration page of the policy. Uninsured motorist coverage was listed for each car, and a $3 premium was charged for uninsured motorist coverage on each car ($6 total).20
Each provided $10,000 coverage for each person and $20,000 coverage for each accident.21 The insured’s
wife was killed while driving one of these insured cars in an accident with an uninsured driver.22 The insured
incurred more damages than the $10,000 coverage limit for one car.23
The insured claimed he could recover the issues of “stacking” and “setoffs.”
For the most part, the issues have been well-settled in the context of uninsured motorist coverage, but several recent decisions from the Missouri Court of Appeals addressing stacking and setoffs for underinsured motorist coverage show the issues are anything but settled. The purpose of this article is to help practitioners navigate through the issues of
up to $20,000 in damages, while the insurer claimed his recovery was limited to $10,000 because the two coverages could not be stacked.24
The insurer argued that the policy language was clear and unambiguous in limiting coverage to whichever insured vehicle was in the accident and, as that coverage met the statutory minimums, it did not violate the statute limiting the recovery.25
The Supreme Court followed the reasoning in Galloway v. Farmers
Insurance Company, Inc., where the
Western District ruled an insured could stack his uninsured coverage.26
In Galloway, the insured had two separate insurance policies for two different cars.27 Each policy had
uninsured motorist coverage with $10,000 per person limits.28 The
Galloway court concluded that public
policy as expressed in § 379.203 required that each policy contain at least the statutory minimum amounts of coverage, which could not be reduced by provisions in the insurance policy.29 Whether different insurers or
the same insurers issued the policies was irrelevant; each must provide minimum coverage and must be stacked.30
Accepting this premise from
Galloway, the Supreme Court found
that the form of a policy should not affect this premise.31 If uninsured
coverage issued by one insurer in the form of two separate policies must be stacked, then uninsured coverage issued by one insurer in the form of one combination policy covering more than one vehicle must also be stacked.32 The Court did not
consider whether the language was unambiguous because any language limiting stacking in the insurance policy would violate public policy.33
Public policy mandated the stacking of the insured’s two sets of uninsured motorist coverage within the same insurance policy.34
B. Uninsured Status
Barring legislative amendments to the statute, the requirement in
Cameron to stack uninsured motorist
coverage is unlikely to change. As UM is statutorily required, insurers must allow insureds to stack each policy up to the statutorily required minimums even when the policies are issued by the same insurance carrier or take the form of a combined policy listing multiple automobiles.35 Cases
on other topics occasionally reference it, but the mandatory stacking of uninsured motorist coverage seems to be largely accepted and not a frequent subject of litigation.36
II. Underinsured Motor
The purpose of underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) is to provide additional coverage for those injured by a negligent motorist where that motorist’s liability coverage does not fully pay for the injured party’s actual damage.37 Underinsurance coverage
is floating insurance that follows the insured rather than a particular vehicle.38 No statutory requirement
mandates an insured purchase
underinsured motorist coverage.39 The
definition of an underinsured motor vehicle is dictated by the terms of the policy.40 Previous court decisions
determining UIM coverage are not controlling unless the insurance policy language is identical.41 The policy
language will determine whether stacking underinsured coverage is permissible and whether an insurer is entitled to a setoff.42
Three recent Missouri Court of Appeals cases are instructive. Lynch
v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
and Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
v. Straw both contain UIM language
that the Southern District found unambiguous and, therefore, the insured could not stack the coverage and the insurer was allowed to set off from the limits of the coverage
(rather than from the total amount of damages) for previously recovered damages.43 In contrast, in Long v.
Shelter Insurance Companies, the
Western District found the UIM language ambiguous and, therefore, the insured could stack the coverage and the insurer could not set off previously recovered damages against coverage limits.44 Comparing the
language from the three insurance policies in these cases provides indicators for what courts may find ambiguous in future cases.
Stacking insurance coverage allows the insured to obtain coverage from more than one policy.45 Multiple
policies can exist in the form of separate policies for separate vehicles or from a combined policy with multiple vehicles under one policy.46 The ability to stack
underinsured coverage stems from the contract policy language.47 As
there is no statutory requirement for underinsured coverage, no public policy prohibits the insurer from including provisions preventing stacking within the insurance policy.48
Therefore, unambiguous anti-stacking provisions are enforceable.49
Conversely, ambiguous anti-stacking provisions are construed against the insurer and the insured will be allowed to stack the policies.50
1. Lynch v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
Lynch v. Shelter Mutual Insurance
Company provides an example of an
anti-stacking underinsurance clause that the Southern District found to be unambiguous.51 In Lynch, the insured
sued Shelter seeking UIM benefits under four policies she had purchased from Shelter.52 Lynch sought to stack
her four underinsurance policies.53
“LIMIT OF OUR LIABILITY” provision together with the “OTHER INSURANCE” provision.54 Lynch
maintained that the “LIMIT OF OUR LIABILITY” section was ambiguous because the first sentence of the “OTHER INSURANCE” provision of her policies limited stacking only when the insured was “occupying the described auto.”55
The “LIMIT OF OUR LIABILITY” provision did not specify that Lynch had to be “occupying the described auto.”56 The relevant policy language
LIMIT OF OUR LIABILITY The limit of liability for this Coverage will be the limit of liability stated for this particular endorsement number in the Declarations, subject to the following limitations:
. . .
(5) Regardless of the number of: (a) vehicles involved in the accident,
(b) persons insured, (c) claims made, or (d) premiums paid, the limits for this Coverage may not be added to,
combined with, or stacked onto the limits of other underinsured motorists coverage to determine the total limit of underinsured motorists coverage available to any insured for any one accident.
OTHER INSURANCE If an insured’s claim under this Coverage arises out of bodily injury sustained while occupying the described auto, no other policy of underinsured motorist insurance, issued by us will apply to such a claim. However, the insurance provided by this Coverage will apply as excess insurance over any other company’s underinsured motorists insurance available to the insured as a result of the same accident. The insurance under this policy will then apply only if the total of the limits of all such other insurance is less than the limit of liability of this Coverage. In that instance, we will be liable, under this Coverage, for only that amount by
which its limit of liability exceeds the total limits of all such other insurance.57
Lynch believed this inconsistency created an ambiguity in her policies permitting stacking.58
The Southern District disagreed with Lynch’s position and found that the anti-stacking language contained in subsection (5) under the “LIMITS OF OUR LIABILITY” provision was unambiguous.59 The Southern District
went on to explain that the “OTHER INSURANCE” provision provided excess UIM coverage in a situation where the insured was “occupying the described auto” and there is UIM coverage by “any other company.”60
As there was no ambiguity, the court did not allow Lynch to stack the UIM coverage.61
2. Long v. Shelter Insurance Companies
In Long v. Shelter Insurance Companies, the Western District
Court of Appeals found the policy language was ambiguous and allowed the plaintiff to stack the UIM policies.62 In Long, the insured sued
husband.63 The insured sustained at
least $450,000 in damages and had previously received $50,000 from the tortfeasor’s insurer.64
The Longs had $100,000 per person UIM coverage with Shelter for the vehicle involved in the accident.65
The Longs had six other Shelter polices, each with $50,000 per person UIM coverage.66 Shelter claimed
its obligation was satisfied with a payment of $50,000 because only the driven vehicle policy was applicable and that the $100,000 coverage limit was subject to a setoff of $50,000 for the money previously paid on behalf of the tortfeasor.67 Long claimed
that, as the policy was ambiguous, she could stack all seven policies and Shelter could not set off the previous proceeds.68
The Western District decision on stacking was based on the ambiguity created by the Shelter policy in promising coverage in one provision and taking it away in another.69 Long
argued the “‘OTHER INSURANCE’ Excess Clause promise[d]” the UIM coverage was “excess coverage over all other UIM benefits, including other UIM benefits sold by Shelter,” but then the “anti-stacking language in the ‘OTHER INSURANCE IN THE COMPANY’ paragraph” took the coverage “away; and this conflict [created] an ambiguity” that “entitl[ed] Long to stack the UIM coverage.”70
Shelter claimed the pro rata clause in the “Other Insurance” section fixed any ambiguity the excess clause created.71 The Western District found
this argument contrary to rules regarding ambiguity.72 Specifically,
the court noted that it must look at the policy provisions as a whole rather than in isolation.73 Furthermore, any
provisions that, read in isolation, prohibit stacking, while others allow stacking, create an ambiguity that is resolved in favor of the insured.74
Shelter also argued the policy in
Long was unambiguous, just as the
Shelter policy was in Lynch.75 Again,
the Western District disagreed and found the Long policy distinguishable from the Lynch policy.76 The policies
had “substantially similar” insuring agreement language.77 Nonetheless,
“the UIM ‘Limit of Liability’ provision … in Lynch specifically stated” the coverage could not be stacked while the Long policy had no such provision.78 (See Chart 1 on page
Additionally, “the ‘Other Insurance’ clauses [in the two polices were] substantially different.”81 In the
Lynch policy, “the ‘Other Insurance’”
expressly prohibited stacking and specified that the UIM coverage was “excess over any other company’s [UIM]” coverage, but this specificity was lacking in the Longs’ policy.82 (See
Chart 2 on page 216).
An ambiguity was created by the appearance of coverage in one clause with another clause indicating coverage was not provided.85
Therefore, the court ruled against the insurer and allowed Long to stack the UIM policies.86
3. Underinsured Stacking Status
With no statutory public policy expressed, the insurer can limit the insured from stacking underinsured coverage. To do so, in order to be unambiguous, the insurer must clearly state the coverage cannot be cumulative and should specifically use the word “stack” in the prohibition. Any ambiguity will allow the insured to add the multiple underinsured policies up to the amount of uncompensated damages.
A “setoff” is a reduction in coverage based on previous recovery.87 Within
underinsured motorist coverage, setoff clauses that deduct from coverage
limits rather than from total damages are permissible when plain and unambiguous language is used.88
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Missouri looked at two separate setoff provisions and found that both provisions were ambiguous.89 In
Ritchie, the Supreme Court looked at
whether Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Company was entitled to a setoff against its total liability under UIM coverage based on the amount paid to its insured by the tortfeasor’s liability insurer.90 The relevant
portions of the Allied policy read: Limit of Liability
A. The limit of liability shown
in the Declarations for each person for Underinsured Motorists coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for cause, loss of services, or death arising out of “bodily injury” sustained by any one person in any one accident.
. . .
B. The limit of liability shall be
reduced by all sums: . . . [p]aid because of ‘bodily injury’ or by or on behalf of persons organizations who may be legally responsible.91
Allied contended that the language in subsection B entitled it to a $60,000 setoff since that was the amount paid by the tortfeasor.92 The
Supreme Court disagreed.93 Citing its
earlier decision in Jones, the Supreme Court ruled against Allied because its policy promised coverage at one point and then tried to take it away in another.94 Using the same analysis
it used in Jones, the Supreme Court in
that coverage is provided up to $100,000 per person, $300,000 per accident, for each of the three vehicles the Ritchies owned and, in multiple places, states that “this is the most we will pay” and that this limit of liability is the maximum it will pay. Yet, as Allied’s corporate representative conceded below, Allied in fact never will pay out its full amount under its interpretation of “limit of liability” subsection B. It always will be reduced by the amounts already paid, even where, as here, the plaintiffs still had $1.74 million in damages unpaid.95
The Ritchie Court, still following Jones, reasoned that the setoff
language would be applicable in situations where the insured had not suffered damages to the full extent of coverage.96 For instance, if the insured
suffers $140,000 in damages and recovers $60,000 from the tortfeasor, then the insurer would only be liable for $80,000.97 In cases where the
insured’s damages far exceed the total amount of coverage provided by the insurer, then the setoff provision does not apply unless it plainly states that the amount payable in UIM coverage is the difference between the policy limits and the amount recovered from the tortfeasor.98
1. Lynch v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
Looking at setoffs in Lynch, the Southern District found the setoff provisions were plain and unambiguous and consequently allowed the insurer to set off from the coverage limits.99 Lynch had a
$50,000 coverage limit in her Shelter UIM coverage and she had previously received $100,000 payment from the tortfeasor’s insurer.100 She suffered
more than $300,000 in damages from
the accident.101 With a setoff, she
would not be entitled to any payment from Shelter.102
Lynch argued the definition of “uncompensated damages” dictated that she would be compensated for damages exceeding the total amount paid by the tortfeasor.103 The term
was defined as: “Uncompensated damages means the portion of the damages which exceeds the total amount paid or payable to an insured by, or on behalf of all persons legally obligated to pay those damages.”104 The Southern District
found this reasoning faulty, as the definition contained no promise of compensating her for these damages.105
The court found a promise of compensation in:
INSURING AGREEMENT FOR COVERAGE E-1 If an insured sustains bodily injury as a result of an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle, and is entitled to damages from any person as a result of that bodily injury, we will pay the uncompensated damages subject to the limit of our liability stated in this endorsement.106
“[T]he ‘subject to’ clause immediately” following the phrase “uncompensated damages” indicated the coverage was “not absolute.”107 The “LIMIT
OF OUR LIABILITY” section specified, “The limit of liability stated in the Declarations will be reduced by all amounts paid or payable to the insured making the claim by, or on behalf of, all persons legally obligated to pay any portion of the damages to that insured.”108 With
the clear “subject to” clause and the subsequently expressed limitations, the court found “an ordinary person
of average understanding” would understand these provisions reduced coverage amounts based on recovery from other liable parties.109 As Shelter
“never state[d] or even implie[d] that [it] promise[d] to pay the full amount of its coverage limit,” the policy was clear.110 With no ambiguity
or misleading text, the Southern District found the setoff provision was properly applied by Shelter.111 Lynch
was not entitled to any payment under her UIM coverage.112
2. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company v. Straw
In Shelter Mutual Insurance Company v. Straw, the Southern
District found the limits of insured’s liability clause language to be nearly identical to that in Lynch and, therefore, unambiguous and enforceable.113 In Straw, Loyd
Straw was injured in an automobile collision caused by Paula Heiskell.114
Straw received $100,000 from Heiskell’s liability insurer, Farmers Insurance Group.115 Straw also had an
underinsured motorist policy with a $100,000 limit with Shelter Mutual Insurance Company.116
Shelter filed a declaratory judgment motion to determine whether their insurance policy provided UIM coverage for Straw for this collision.117
Shelter argued the policy contained a setoff provision reducing the coverage limit by the amount of other damages paid to the insured.118
With a $100,000 coverage limit and $100,000 in damages already paid to Straw by Farmers Insurance, Shelter would not owe Straw anything.119
Straw.120 The trial court could reach
no other result.121 The trial court ruled
for Straw and found Shelter owed him $100,000 because of a layperson’s reasonable interpretation that an offset would come from total damages rather than from the policy limits.122
Shelter appealed and the Southern District found for Shelter, largely due to the precedent it had set in
Lynch.123 The court compared the two
policies and found “only insignificant variations in language.”124
While the court was “inclined to agree” with Straw that an average person would likely believe he or she had $100,000 in UIM coverage, the policy language in this case was nearly identical to that in Lynch.125
Therefore, the precedential reasoning of Lynch applied with the “subject to” clause in the limits of liability provision clearly indicating limits on recovery and the provision further specifying the policy limits would be reduced by other amounts the insured received for damages.126 Noting the
permissibility of setoff provisions that deduct from coverage limits as long as appropriate language is used, the court found the Shelter policy limited UIM damages to $100,000 minus the $100,000 previously recovered from Farmers; consequently, Shelter did not owe Straw for his uncompensated damages.127
3. Long v. Shelter Insurance Companies
In the Long case, from the Western District, the court reached the opposite decision from the Southern District in Lynch and Straw and found the insurer could not set off UIM coverage based on payments by the tortfeasor.128 The insurer, Shelter,
argued that the policy allowed for a $50,000 setoff under each policy for the $50,000 in damages already paid on behalf of Dray.129 As six of
the seven policies only had $50,000
limits, the setoff would eliminate any recovery under those six policies.130
The Long Court found, as with the stacking language, that the Shelter policy’s UIM language on setoffs was ambiguous.131 The court reached this
decision by going through the policy to follow the applicable definitions given in the policy, as an insured would have to do.132 The UIM
endorsement contained three promises to pay, with subsequent language attempting to take away the promised coverage.133
First, the insuring agreement stated, “we will pay the uncompensated damages, subject to the limit of our liability stated in this coverage.”134 As
a bold type phrase, “Uncompensated damages” was defined by the policy as: “Uncompensated damages means the portion of the damages that exceeds the total amount paid or payable to an insured by, or on behalf of, all persons legally obligated to pay those damages.”135 The court found the
ordinary insured would understand this to mean that UIM coverage was excess over what the insured received from others.136
Second, the insured would also understand the right to “uncompensated damages [was] subject to the limit of Shelter’s liability stated in [this] coverage.”137 This was
different than in Lynch, where the agreement stated Shelter would pay “subject to the limit of [Shelter’s] liability stated in this endorsement.”138
With no numbers provided in the “Limits of Liability” section of the Longs’ UIM endorsement, the “Limits of Liability” language tells the insured to look to the Declarations.139
Looking at the Declarations page would tell the “insured the UIM ‘coverage’ is $100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident.”140 (See
Chart 3 on page 216).
Third, the UIM endorsement language stated, “The limits of liability for this coverage are stated
in the Declarations. . . .”143 The
use of the same language in the insuring agreement and the limits of liability section would lead the insured to believe the amounts stated in the Declarations were available to the insured for UIM coverage.144
Following these steps directed the “ordinary insured” to believe he had a “$100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident” UIM coverage to provide recovery for any excess damage “over and above those paid by others” and would leave the ordinary insured with no reason to look further in determining UIM coverage.145 The
definition of underinsured motor vehicle reinforced this conclusion.146
The policy attempted to take away these promises in the UIM endorsement “Limits of Liability” sentence with some limiting language.147 The sentence contained
the phrase, “and are subject to the following limitations. . . .”148 “[T]his
create[d] an ambiguity in that ‘where one provision of a policy appears to grant coverage and another to take it away, an ambiguity exists that will be resolved in favor of coverage.’”149 The
court, rather than simply resolving the ambiguity in favor of coverage, construed the limiting language in the UIM endorsement as intending to prevent a double recovery by allowing a setoff from the total damages.150
As a result, with $450,000 of total damages and only $50,000 in
damages previously paid, Shelter owed Long $350,000: the $400,000 limit of its stacked UIM coverage, without any setoff, but with a credit for the $50,000 Shelter had already paid.151
4. Underinsured Setoff Status
Without clear and unambiguous language stating a previous recovery will be set off from policy limits, the insurer may only set off from the total damages. Ambiguity is apt to be found in the conflicting provisions in the insuring agreement, UIM coverage, and other insurance language.
The rule requiring the stacking of uninsured motor vehicle coverage is reasonably firm, barring any statutory changes. Without any statutory requirement, however, underinsured coverage is subject to differing results on stacking and setoffs depending on the language of the policy and the ability to convince the court of its similarity to the policy language in prior decisions or the ability to distinguish it. The outcome to these questions will always depend on the language of the insurance contract.
1 Stephen R. Bough is a graduate of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, where he served as the editor-in-chief of the UMKC Law Review. M. Blake Heath is also a graduate of UMKC Law School and served on the UMKC Law Review. Their practice is limited to representing plaintiffs in complex personal injury cases and insurance coverage disputes. The authors wish to thank Jane Francis for her invaluable work as a law clerk on this article.
2 The Insurance Research Council estimates that in 2008-2009 one in seven drivers was uninsured nationwide. Press Release, Insurance Research Council, Recession Marked by Bump in Uninsured Motorists (April 21, 2011); available at http://www.insurance-research.org/sites/default/files/downloads/ IRCUM2011_042111.pdf (last visited June 6, 2012).
3 Section 379.203, RSMo (2000).
4 Press Release, Insurance Research Council, Economic Downturn May Push Percentage of Uninsured Motorists to All-Time High (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.insurance-research.org/sites/default/files/downloads/ IRC_UM_012109.pdf (last visited June 6, 2012).
5 Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Straw, 334 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (Scott, J., dissenting) (addressing when “stacking” or combining multiple underinsured motorist
policies is applicable and when the insurer is entitled to a setoff for monies already paid by tortfeasors).
6 Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co., 992 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999).
7 Section 303.030.5, RSMo (2000). 8 Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Mo. banc 1976). 9 Id. at 543. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. at 542. 14 Id. at 543. 15 Id. at 543. 16 Id. at 544. 17 Id. at 545.
18 Long v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 351 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
19 Cameron Mut. Ins.Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. banc 1976). 20 Id.at 539. 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. at 539-40.
26 Id. at 541 (citing Galloway v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 523 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Mo. App. W.D. 1975)). 27 Cameron, 533 S.W.2d at 541. 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. at 543-44. 32 Id. at 544-45. 33 Id. at 545. 34 Id. at 544-45.
35 Blumer v. Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 340 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (allowing the insured to stack the $25,000 statutory minimum from two uninsured policies for a $50,000 recovery, but not requiring stacking of the full coverage limit contained in each policy).
36 See First Nat. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 899 S.W.2d 520, 521-22 (Mo. banc 1995) (discussing liability coverage); Shepherd v. Am. States Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Mo. banc 1984) (disallowing an exclusion for named insured in uninsured coverage and reaffirming Cameron); Long v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 351 S.W.3d 692, 697 n.4 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (discussing underinsured coverage); Harris v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 141 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (discussing underinsured coverage); Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co., 992 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) (discussing underinsured coverage); Nolan v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 851 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993) (discussing underinsured coverage).
37 Long v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 351 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
39 Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc. 2009). 40 Harris v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 141 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). 41 Long, 351 S.W.3d at 702. 42 Id.
43 Straw, 334 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011); Lynch, 325 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010). 44 Long, 351 S.W.3d at 701, 704-05. 45 Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 135. 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. 49 Id.
50 Id. (holding an ambiguity existed that allowed the insured to stack where the insurance policy contained conflicting policy provisions); Chamness v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 226 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ragsdale, 213 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006); Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co., 992 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999); Hopkins v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995); Nolan v. Am. States Preferred Ins., 851 S.W.2d 720, 723-24 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993). 51 325 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010). 52 Id. at 533. 53 Id. 54 Id. at 540. 55 Id. 56 Id. 57 Id. at 539-40. 58 Id. at 540. 59 Id. at 540-41. 60 Id. at 541. 61 Id. 62 351 S.W.3d 692, 701, 704-05 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). 63 Id. at 695. 64 Id. 65 Id. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. at 701. 70 Id. at 699. 71 Id. 72 Id.
80 Lynch, 325 S.W.3d at 534. 81 Long, 351 S.W.3d at 700. 82 Id. at 701. 83 Id. at 698. 84 Lynch, 325 S.W.3d at 534. 85 Long, 351 S.W.3d at 701. 86 Id. 87 Id. at 701.
88 Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Straw, 334 S.W.3d 592, 598 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (citing Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 141 n.10 (Mo. banc 2009)). 89 See Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 687 (Mo. banc 2009); Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132 (Mo. banc 2009).
90 Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 139. 91 Id. at 136-37.
92 Id. at 139. 93 Id. at 139-41.
94 Id. at 140 (“But, Jones noted, if a contract ‘promises something at one point and takes it away at another, there is an ambiguity . . . [and if] policy language is ambiguous, it must be construed against the insurer.’”). 95 Ritchie, 307 S.W.3d at 140. 96 Id. at 141.
97 Id. 98 Id.
99 Lynch v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010). 100 Id.
101 Id. at 533.
102 Id. at 539. 103 Id. at 535.
104 Id. at 533 (quoting Lynch’s Shelter policy).
105 Id. at 535.
106 Id. at 533 (quoting Lynch’s Shelter policy). 107 Id. at 536. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. at 537. 111 Id. at 539. 112 Id. 113 334 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011). 114 Id. at 594. 115 Id. 116 Id. 117 Id. 118 Id. at 595. 119 Id. at 597-98. 120 Id. at 594. 121 Id. 122 Id. 123 Id. at 596. 124 Id. 125 Id. 126 Id. at 597. 127 Id. at 596-98.
128 Long v. Shelter Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 692, 705 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). 129 Id. at 701. 130 See id. at 695. 131 Id. at 704. 132 See id. at 702-04. 133 Id.
134 Id. at 702 (quoting the Longs’ Shelter policy) (bold emphasis in the original). 135 Id. (quoting the Longs’ Shelter policy) (bold emphasis in the original).
136 Id. 137 Id.at 700. 138 Id. at 705 n.16. 139 Id. at 702-03. 140 Id. at 703. 141 Id. at 702. 142 Lynch, 325 S.W.3d at 533 (emphasis added). 143 Long, 351 S.W.3d at 704. 144 Id. 145 Id. at 703. 146 Id. 147 Id. at 704. 148 Id.