NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT 18-P-511 COMMONWEALTH vs. ZITO Z., a juvenile.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28 The Commonwealth filed this interlocutory appeal from orders allowing the juvenile's motions to suppress his
statements made to a police detective. The Commonwealth now argues that the judge erroneously suppressed the juvenile's statements because the juvenile was not in custody during his interrogation by the detective. We disagree, and affirm.
Background. "Mindful that assessment of witness
credibility is the province of the motion judge, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact, supplementing them with uncontested testimony from the suppression hearing that the judge explicitly or implicitly credited." Commonwealth v.
student having sexual intercourse.1 The detective called the
juvenile's mother, who lives "a distance away," and asked her to bring her son to the police station to speak with the detective about a video. The mother agreed, and arrived at the police station "late at night." She first came into the station alone, and inquired into the "details about what was going on." The detective explained that he wanted to speak with the juvenile because the juvenile "had sent a video of himself and a girl having sex. They were both underage, and . . . he had sent it out on Snapchat to a group of people." Following this
conversation, the mother left the station and came back with the juvenile about ten minutes later.
The police station was locked from the outside, so the juvenile and his mother had to be "buzzed in," but they could leave the station by "push[ing] the door open." The detective brought the defendant and his mother into the front office of the station, where officers usually write reports. That office had a "full glass door," which the detective "shut . . . for privacy." The detective, the juvenile, and the juvenile's mother were the only people in the office. The detective sat
1 The detective had interviewed the student who reported the
against the wall opposite the door, while the defendant sat in the chair next to the door, and his mother sat to his right.
The detective was aware that the juvenile was fourteen years old at the time of the interview. The detective did not provide the juvenile with Miranda warnings before beginning the interview because he considered that the juvenile "was free to leave"; critically, however, the detective did not testify that he communicated that fact to either the juvenile or his mother. When the detective asked the juvenile if he knew why he was
brought down to the station by his mother, the juvenile said that he did. The detective then asked the juvenile if he still had the video. The juvenile said he didn't because he "deleted it." When the detective asked to see the juvenile's Snapchat account, the juvenile said he had deleted the application "[b]ecause he knew that [the detective] would want to look at it."
The interview lasted between fifteen and twenty minutes. The detective characterized the interview as "low-key" and "casual," describing the juvenile as "cooperative" throughout the interview, and that "[n]o one got upset." When the
have the video deleted in front of [him]." At the time the
interview ended, the juvenile was not charged with any crimes. Thereafter, in April 2017, a delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with (1) dissemination of a visual image of the sexual or intimate parts of a person without knowledge that the image was unlawfully obtained and without permission of the person; and (2) dissemination of material depicting sexual conduct by a child under the age of eighteen.2 In June 2017, a
second delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with videotaping an unsuspecting nude or partially nude person. The juvenile filed a motion to suppress his statements to the
detective in each case.
The judge allowed the motions from the bench after an evidentiary hearing, finding:
"I agree with [defense counsel] that the [d]etective had all the information he needed to charge [the juvenile] before he even brought him to the police station. So . . . any
questioning involving the video and this young man's involvement in the video would be likely to elicit an incriminating
response. So, I find that it is, in fact, interrogation. . . . We have a kid that's brought to the police station at the
request of the police by his adult supervisor, his mother. [He was] brought into a police station, placed in a separate office in the station, with the mother who brought him, and the
Detective who was investigating the case and asking [the] mother to bring him in. It is reasonable to believe, based on his
deletion of the Snapchat, etcetera, that this young man knew he might be in trouble, or possibly even a suspect. So, based on those issues, I find that the [juvenile] did not feel free to
2 The Commonwealth subsequently entered a nolle prosequi on the
leave, that Miranda did, in fact, attach. It was custodial interrogation, and the motion is allowed."
Discussion. When reviewing a judge's ruling on a motion to suppress, "we accept[] the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error, give[] substantial deference to the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law, but independently review[] the correctness of the judge's application of
constitutional principles to the facts found" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 158-159 (2019).
"Statements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation absent appropriate Miranda warnings ordinarily are inadmissible at trial" (citation omitted). Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 159. "It is the defendant's burden to establish that he was subject to custodial interrogation." Id. at 161, quoting
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 476 Mass. 725, 735 (2017). Here, where the parties do not dispute that the detective interrogated the juvenile, our inquiry focuses on whether the juvenile was in custody during his interview with the police detective.3 An
3 The Commonwealth concedes in its brief that the interview was
an interrogation. There is an additional requirement that "juveniles between fourteen and seventeen years old . . . be afforded the opportunity to consult with an interested adult" before waiving their Miranda rights (quotation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 Mass. 161, 165 (2015). In this case, however, where the detective did not read the juvenile his
interview becomes custodial "whenever [the person] is deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way"
(quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 617 (2018). "The critical question in determining whether an individual is in custody is whether a reasonable person in the individual's position would feel free to leave." Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 287 (2010). See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (subjective beliefs regarding custody irrelevant).
"On the question whether the juvenile was in custody, the test is how a reasonable person in the juvenile's position would have understood his situation." Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 160, quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 402 Mass. 275, 277
(1988). A defendant's age may "affect[] how a reasonable person in the [defendant's] position would perceive his or her freedom to leave" (quotation and citation omitted). J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 271-272. Although age is not determinative, children are
generally "less mature and responsible than adults," and "often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them," leaving them "more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures than adults" (quotations and citations omitted). Id. at 272. As a was an "interested adult," this issue is not in dispute on
result, "children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave" (citation omitted). Quinones, supra. Notably, a child's adult supervisor may constrain the child's ability to decline to speak with law enforcement officers. See A Juvenile, supra at 277-278 (interview custodial where juvenile under
"continuous supervision" and "[t]here was no realistic way" for juvenile to avoid questioning). Given children's inherently different perceptions of potentially custodial situations, a judge may consider age without "damag[ing] . . . the objective nature" of the custody analysis. Quinones, supra, quoting J.D.B., supra at 272.
The location of an interrogation may be relevant if the defendant is physically unable to leave. See Commonwealth v. Molina, 467 Mass. 65, 74 (2014) (police "standing almost over . . . the defendant" contributed to custodial nature of
interrogation); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 154 (2000) (presence of "three officers in a small room"
blocking path to "closed door" created "isolating and coercive" custodial environment [citation omitted]). The judge may also consider:
"(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the
officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the
influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the interview by
leaving the locus of the interrogation" (citation omitted). Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 617-618. The judge should "consider
whether all the objective circumstances add up to custody rather than evaluating the circumstances one by one." Bermudez, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 51.
Here, we discern no basis for disturbing the motion judge's conclusion that the juvenile was in custody during his
defendant in Bermudez, who was "a few months shy of his
eighteenth birthday . . . on the cusp of majority," 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 53, here, the juvenile was only fourteen years old, making him more susceptible to the "consequences of [his]
immaturity." Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 389 Mass. 128, 132 (1983).
The physical setting of the interview further impeded the juvenile's ability to leave. The juvenile and his mother had to be "buzzed" into the police station -- an act suggestive of a locked door -- and the detective then shut the door to the office before beginning the interview. Additionally, as the judge found, the interview took place "in a separate office in the [police] station, with the mother who brought [the
juvenile], and the [d]etective who was investigating the case and asking [the] mother to bring him in." Given the physical obstructions in the police station, and the close supervision of the juvenile's mother, it would have been reasonable for a
fourteen year old in the juvenile's position to conclude that he could not "end the interview" at his discretion. Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 618. See Molina, 467 Mass. at 74-75; A Juvenile, 402 Mass. at 277-278; Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 160; Bermudez, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 52; Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 154.
allowed to return home," here, the detective never told the juvenile or his mother that they were free to leave. 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 52. Rather, the detective strongly implied to the mother that the juvenile was a suspect by telling her that he needed to speak with the juvenile about "a video of [the
juvenile] and a girl having sex." The juvenile's decision to delete his Snapchat application prior to meeting with the detective further supported the judge's finding that the juvenile "knew he might be in trouble, or possibly even a suspect" at the time of the interview.
Considering these circumstances in the aggregate, we
discern no error in the motion judge's finding that the juvenile "did not feel free to leave."4 See Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct.
at 159-160. Accordingly, we affirm the judge's orders allowing
4 We think it insignificant that the judge did not express this
finding, dictated from the bench, in terms of an objective standard -- e.g., that "a reasonable person in the juvenile's position" would have felt he was not free to leave (citation omitted). Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 160. As we have said, based on this record, the judge's finding was entirely
the motions to suppress the juvenile's statements.
By the Court (Rubin, Milkey & McDonough, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: April 1, 2020.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
