P : L C, R A M, G O, G R,  G U “A R OUGH G UIDE ” FOR THE P RACTI T IONER ROGRAMMING IN THE N IGER D ETLA E XPLORING C ONFLICT S ENSITIVE P

E ^XPLORING C ^ONFLICT S ^ENSITIVE P ^{ROGRAMMING IN THE} N ^IGER D ^ETLA

“A R ^OUGH G ^UIDE ” ^{FOR THE} P RACTITIONER

P : L C,

R A M, G O,

G R,  G U

Copyright © 2008 by Peacebuild

1 Nicholas Street, Suite 1216, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 7B7

Peacebuild

Peacebuild is a network of Canadian non-governmental organizations, institutions, and individuals actively involved in peacebuilding practice and policy development. Peacebuild’s working groups are intended to bring together members interested in particular thematic areas such as Children and Armed Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Gender and Peacebuilding, Peace Operations, and Small Arms and Light Weapons. Additionally, the network works on other peacebuilding-related topics, such as the Emerging Issues Project.

The Conflict Prevention Working Group

The Conflict Prevention Working Group consists of academics, activists and practitioners who aim to advance civil society and government conflict prevention policy and practice, further the prevention aspects of existing and emerging policy and operational frameworks, support regional and multilateral conflict prevention mechanisms and develop partnerships with regionally based networks of conflict prevention practitioners, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and North America, for collaboration in field-based conflict prevention activities, information exchange, lessons learned and good practices.

Other Peacebuild publications in the Conflict Prevention series include:

Exploring Conflict Sensitive Programming in the Niger Delta: A “Rough Guide”

For the Practitioner

Introduction

This document is meant to serve as a preliminary guide to practitioners interested in undertaking conflict sensitive programming in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It is by no means a comprehensive review of the dynamics in the Delta or a complete guide for action. Rather, it is meant to offer a brief overview of the situation in the Delta in early 2008 and to provide a starting point for further thinking and discussion about how conflict sensitive programming could be applied to help strengthen communities and reduce violence. Specific initiatives will of course have to be driven by the local actors, local conditions and local objectives of the community in question.

The document is divided into three main sections. The first section presents a snapshot of current conflict dynamics in the Delta. The second section offers some reflections on the central dynamics and key issues currently at play in the Delta that must be considered when undertaking conflict sensitive programming.

The third part considers some of the existing openings for conflict sensitive programming in the future, as well as key mitigating strategies for overcoming challenges. Finally, to provide readers some basic details about one conflict sensitive methodological approach, Annex I contains an overview of the central tenants of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA).

This document is based on literature reviews of conflict sensitive development work and corporate social responsibility activity, as well as recent reports, news clippings and stakeholder statements from the Delta, supplemented by a field survey with key stakeholders from the Otujeremy kingdom in Delta State, undertaken by a project consultant in February 2008. The literature reviews and field survey report appear in annex.

Part I: Conflict Dynamics: The Current Situation in the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta is the source of Nigeria’s petroleum wealth. Petroleum fuels the nation at all levels, political, corporate and social. Rather than driving

development, industrialization and diversification of the national and local

economies, it has, for the most part, driven corruption, rent-seeking, tribalism

and conflict. The most extreme example was the attempted secession by Biafra,

the Igbo-dominated area of the southeast, in the 1960’s, which left more than a

million dead. The vastly disproportionate revenue generated by the sector has, for fifty years, sapped energy and investment from other sectors, most notably agriculture, turning Nigeria from a net food exporter into a net food importer and destroying the once world-dominating peanut and cocoa sub-sectors.

The federal government of Nigeria depends on petroleum revenues for 90% of its budget, earned through production-sharing agreements between multinational oil producers and the national petroleum corporation. The proportion of

revenues from on-shore production going to the federal government is very high, based on a cost-plus formula paid to the producers. Off-shore revenues are more evenly distributed between producers and the government. Despite its

dependence on oil revenue, the presence of the federal government in the region is very light and primarily focused on the security of the industry.

Access to the revenues from petroleum dominates constitutional discussion and lies behind Nigeria’s highly centralized version of federalism, under which the federal government owns all natural resources and allocates revenues to the state governments. Under this regime, oil-producing states, while receiving only 17%

of petroleum revenues under the concept of “derivation”, are immensely richer than those that receive only a federally allocated budget and have enjoyed windfall revenues amounting to billions of dollars in recent years. These state governments, however, have very low levels of public investment in both

infrastructure and services, and very high levels of corruption and rent-seeking, leaving the great majority of residents of the region at poverty or subsistence levels, while elites are ostentatiously wealthy.

The chronic sense of grievance created by this highly unequal distribution of resource revenues, both to and within in the region, has been exacerbated by chronic negligence on the part of both oil producers and governments with respect to environmental protection and a failure on the part of producers to create local employment and support local entrepreneurship. These grievances gave rise in the 1990s to a number of regionally or ethnically based political

movements, such as the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)

and the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). Some of these, like MOSOP, have diminished

in importance, while others have evolved into either violent groups that retain

some ideological roots, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger

Delta, or essentially criminal organizations, tied to a greater or lesser extent to

politicians at the state level, such as the Icelanders/Niger Delta Vigilantes and the Outlaws, both of Rivers State.

Current levels of violence, driven by criminality, impunity and corruption, are very high. The immediate causes of violent conflict, while rooted in the issues noted above, can be very local and demand specific analysis.

It is in this context of chronic grievance, rent-seeking and officially sponsored criminality that development efforts take place in the Niger Delta. Given the utter failure of government at federal, state and local levels to provide even a modest level of public services, most such efforts are driven by oil producing companies seeking both to facilitate their operations in the region through the earning of local goodwill and to respond to national, international and

shareholder pressure for greater corporate social responsibility. They tend to be piecemeal, addressing a single problem or set of problems in a highly localized context, with limited regard to long-term sustainability, impacts on neighbouring communities or the root causes of poverty.

A serious development strategy seeking to address the entire region, or even a single state in the Delta, would require identification of the macro-roles of senior federal, state and local government officials, national and multinational oil companies, security services, large political movements and criminal

organizations and a multitude of local actors. In the absence of both the political will and the public sector capacity to take on such an effort, it can be assumed that such development initiatives as are undertaken will be at a very local level, requiring an equally localized approach to the analysis that might inform a conflict-sensitive development strategy.

Most successful development initiatives in the region appear to involve addressing the needs of a traditional community unit, normally a kingdom composed of a number of towns and villages. Assuming this to be the most likely case, successful project development requires the most broad-based

consultation and consensus-building possible. This requires the identification of

key actors, any one of which may be either a conflict or a peace actor, depending

on the particular circumstances and motivations in play.

The question of whether to conduct this consultation process through a locally developed Peace and Conflict Impact Analysis, or through more traditional forms of consultation, is itself a subject for consultation and consideration in the local context. What is clear is that consultation and the building of a sense of genuine participation and ownership is key to success.

While circumstances may vary slightly from community to community, the key community stakeholders who must be engaged in consultation from inception to realization of any development initiative in the region will include the following:

the chairman of the community

the oldest man in the community

the president-general

the king, who may summon other categories of chiefs for consultation

the community’s executive committee (EXCO)

the community development committee

the official community spokesman

influential community members that are resident outside

community’s youth leadership/militants (where accessible)

community’s women leadership

the community liaison officer

the resident security service

recognized resident community key informants and

some resident government workers External stakeholders:

key informants from a neighbouring community

the local government authorities

local and international NGOs that have good records in the community

community liaison officers of the oil companies active in the area

influential political/opinion leader who are non-indigenes

Federal and State politicians with a direct interest in the community

the Joint Task Force headquarters (Armed forces group responsible for

security in the Delta)

Part II: Analyzing Realities: Challenges to Undertaking Conflict Sensitive Programming in the Niger Delta

If a common theme emerges from the assessment of successful projects, it would be that success is achieved when all stakeholders, and most particularly the oil company involved, not only pay lip service to the concept of broad consultation, but actually ensure that it is carried out at all stages of project identification, planning and implementation.

Godwin Unumeri on reasons for successful projects at Otujeremy, p15.

Conflict sensitive programming requires actions and initiatives that are locally defined, context bound and supportive of existing and indigenous conflict- reducing practices. A number of realities must be considered and addressed by any initiative that hopes to have positive, long-term conflict-reduction impacts.

Based on a literature review, field survey and recent reports from the region the following section offers some reflections on the dynamics and key issues

currently at play in the Delta that must be considered when undertaking

programming. It should be underscored that these are general comments on the Niger Delta, and conditions will vary from community to community and over time. To be effective and successful conflict sensitive programming demands extensive knowledge of the context, dynamics and actors in the particular community where an initiative is being considered. This document is at best an overview of some general issues and forces at work.

High levels of violence and insecurity

In addition to ongoing conflict and grievance created by corruption, inequity and severe underdevelopment that have plagued the area for decades, in the last five years active gang warfare has been waged on the streets and in the communities of River State and throughout the Niger Delta. This violence has ebbed and flowed with various levels of intensity since the Rivers State 2003 state elections, when gangs sponsored by Rivers politicians to help them rig and win elections began fighting against each other for the patronage spoils of state connections.

In the most recent outbreak of violence in July and August 2007 Human Rights

Watch

estimates that at least several dozen civilians in Port Harcourt (capital of

Rivers State) were killed, deliberately or in the crossfire, by warring gangs;

approximately 150 other civilians were shot and injured in the violence.

In reaction to this outbreak the federal government ordered the Joint Task Force (JTF), combined of police, military and State Security Service, to intervene to stop the violence in August 2007. While the JTF did manage to put an end to gang violence and brought reprieve to the local population, the forces also engaged in human rights abuses of their own, including arbitrary arrest, looting and

extrajudicial killing.

Further, JTF action has only limited current violence by pushing gang members underground, failing to eradicate the gangs themselves, or deal with the root causes or underlying dynamics of the conflict. As a result the current situation can be seen as only a temporary reprieve from active violence and insecurity. Such high levels of aggression and volatility cause obvious challenges for conflict sensitive programming, limiting the ability of external actors to support community initiatives, but more importantly, making the situation for communities working for peace and reconciliation even more difficult and dangerous.

Culture of corruption and kleptocracy

The level and pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria is well documented.

Although rampant among politicians and officials who siphon, hoard and squander huge oil rents, corruption has also become an unavoidable way of life for ordinary Nigerians, who must participate in relationships of patronage and undertake acts of corruption to operate and survive in their day to day lives. The complex webs of corruption that are required to fulfill basic needs also create cycles of debt and dependence that can render people reliant on those in power and compliant to their circumstances. Relationships and dynamics that revolve around corruption also contribute to infighting, fractionalization and power struggles within communities, making the communication and trust required for change difficult. Moreover, initiatives to promote change in this context will also threaten power structures and patronage relationships, leaving communities without access to resources, and/or protection, and in worst case scenarios, targets of violence and murder. For conflict sensitive programming to be

1 Human Rights Watch. March 2008. Nigeria Politics as War: The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election Violence in Rivers State, Nigeria. P30.

successful it must be driven in every sense by those on the “inside” of a

community working together, however the incentives and divisions created by a culture of corruption work against this type of collaboration and solidarity.

When considering conflict sensitive programming the logics, realities and dangers generated by a pervasive system of corruption must be considered.

“Development” initiatives undertaken with short time frames and mixed motivations

Corruption and abysmal governance on the part of all levels of government (federal, state and local levels) has failed to provide public services or development efforts to citizens of the Delta. As a result, most development initiatives or service provision are provided by the oil companies operating in the area. In supporting “development” projects, the oil companies are often seeking to facilitate their operations in the region by earning local goodwill, while responding to national, international and shareholder pressure for greater corporate social responsibility. As a result of the nature of the actors and their motivations, initiatives tend to be piecemeal, addressing a single problem or set of problems in a highly localized context, with limited regard to long-term sustainability, impacts on neighbouring communities or the root causes of poverty. Specifically, development initiatives with short time frames and short- sighted objectives tend to promote immediate gratification, undermining

positive sustainable change in the community, while projects that only respond to the needs of selected communities (and a small group of individuals within those communities) can exacerbate intra and inter group conflict

. While the projects may provide basic services (roads, schools, community centres) for communities, according to the field survey undertaken for this project it seems that these “development” initiatives are often done in ways that run contrary to the spirit and principles of conflict sensitive programming.

The gap between rhetoric versus reality

Documents gathered for this project demonstrate that many of the actors (NGOs, oil companies, community leaders, etc) in the Niger Delta have adopted the language of “development” and “conflict sensitive programming” when discussing with objectives, methodologies and approaches of their initiatives.

However, while the rhetoric and official policy around conflict sensitivity

abounds, in reality the practice has been different: “Conflict Sensitive Development (CSD) was seen, at least in operational terms, as a process of fulfilling obligatory consultations with community and other stakeholders prior to implementing a project”

As a result, the opportunistic use of “consultation”

and “conflict sensitive” language has had several negative impacts. On one hand, cursory and perfunctory consultations have resulted in projects that have, at best, been of limited benefit to communities as a whole (sometimes only providing benefits to key individuals within the communities, excluding youth and women), and at worst poorly planned and executed projects have exacerbated inter- and intra-conflict dynamics.

“On paper, the Companies have very beautiful project consultation and deployment strategies but in practice they have not been fair, nice or thorough in this regard. Truth is that one is confused, could it be that it is the agencies they contract that are probably not doing the right things? It is difficult for me to understand. Because, I feel if you really see the comprehensive nature of the paper work they have in their office it is difficult for projects that have been based on such paper to generate crises. Because if you need to see the chiefs, families, individuals and community organisations they are all accessible and willing to reach mutual agreement with anyone that seeks to develop their community. But quite often you see projects that are meant to better mankind leading to intensely chaotic situations.”

Comment by a local government official in

Otujeremy, as reported by Godwin Unumeri, p10.

A second, and perhaps a more troubling result of co-optation of conflict sensitive language and the disconnect between what is said and what is actually done is that unhelpful and sometimes detrimental projects are legitimized using the

“correct” language of consultation and participation. This split between the language and professed objectives of conflict sensitivity and the actual results and impacts of such initiatives generates confusion and ambiguity, while at the same time undermining the potential of truly conflict sensitive strategies from reaching their intended consequences of promoting societal change and

transformation.

Selecting a Methodology or Consultation Approach

To be successful at reducing conflict and building peace, initiatives must be based on local objectives and understandings; as a corollary to that, the strategies that are used to define, plan and implement such initiatives must be derived from local language, custom and images. While there are several useful methodologies available to help facilitate conflict sensitive programming and peace and conflict assessment (see literature review) these are also often framed and designed by North Americas or Europeans, using specific language, logics, understandings and definitions of peace, conflict, participation, consultation etc.

In the context of the Niger Delta it is uncertain if these tools can be exported wholesale, or if modification is required based on context and the community where initiatives are being undertaken. The need to tailor tools to local context is also underscored by the fact that the Niger Delta itself is not homogeneous in terms of language, ethnic or culture makeup. For example in Rivers State, just one of several states in the Delta, is pluri-ethnic and comprised of at least ten different cultural groups, with at least six major languages, each with their own range of distinct dialects.

As a result, location specific approaches should be considered when working with different communities in the region.

Consider intra and inter-community conflict dynamics

When considering working on conflict sensitive programming in the Delta it is also imperative to pay close attention to the intra and inter-community dynamics at work. Currently there are struggles between different levels of leadership – state, local and traditional – for power and influence. Additionally, there are intergenerational conflicts within communities, as youth are seen by elders as disrespectful and troublesome, while the youth leaderships “continue to consider community leaders as weak and a greedy lot who do not want them to partake in the national cake – money that accrues to the community by way of royalty...”

Finally, there are ongoing conflicts between women and men for power and decision-making responsibilities, as women believe that “their views are hardly taken into consideration in a male-dominated society”.

In terms of “conflict sensitive programming” it seems that in the Delta until now much of the emphasis has been placed on “consultations” within the community, with little emphasis focused on how development in one community will affect

5 Gianna Rinaldi. March 2008. Background document prepared for Conflict Sensitive Programming in the Niger Delta project.

inter-community relations or regional dynamics. There must be additional emphasis placed on how potential projects can affect community relations, while steps must taken to bring communities together to discuss the inter-community implications and how these potential problems can be addressed and mitigated in the design and implementation of the project.

We have had project-based conflicts with our neighbours, for instance, Otorogu once had problems with Igwreka community due to inequitable sharing of jobs at our gas plant. Presently Igwreka, Edjovwe and Erevwhie communities are locked in crises as a result of the same gas plant. In order for these problems to be resolved the affected communities have resorted to litigation besides sustaining the options of dialogue at the community EXCO levels, which they had earlier started to resolve the problems.

Comment of a Chief in Otujeremy, as reported by Godwin Unumeri, p11

The Black Elephant: The Overwhelming Power of Oil

Nigeria derives 90% of its national income from oil, with this vast wealth produced in the Niger Delta. Oil is the main – and only – source of wealth in a context of subsistence. The centrality of oil has provided power and influence to both the oil companies and those politicians and officials that engage with them.

This is a reality that is not likely to change in the near to mid-term, and must be dealt with in any conflict sensitive programming. What realities does this situation present? How can one work effectively in this context?

Part III: A Way Forward for Conflict Sensitive Programming in the Niger Delta

The absence of political will at all levels to address the root causes of poverty and the root causes of conflict in the Niger Delta renders a macro-level approach to the problem untenable. While some state-sponsored agencies, such as the Niger Delta Development Commission, may become more effective over time in the delivery of community-based, conflict sensitive programming, most effective work will continue to be done by bilateral or multilateral donors, working through by civil society organizations and carefully selected local government authorities. Despite the self-interested nature of their involvement, the

multinational oil companies will also continue to play a direct development role,

drawing with greater or lesser conviction, on the processes of conflict sensitive development.

Much work remains to be done to identify applicable tools and processes, such as PCIA, for effective use by Delta communities, particularly for complex projects addressing multiple issues. There is a need for more in-depth analysis of what has succeed and why, but for the purposes of this admittedly “rough guide”, practitioners could do much worse that to take note of the reasons that Godwin Unumeri’s study of Otujeremy kingdom indentified as being fundamental to the success of very modest projects:

The choice of the projects was made by the community.

The projects that clearly responded to the needs of all segments of the society.

The projects provided employment and income to many community members during their implementation phases.

The projects made the community feel recognized and respected by the multi-national oil companies.

The projects gave community members some share in the resources of their land.

Since completion, the projects have provided jobs to some youth on a rotational or permanent basis, though they want all youth to be permanently employed.

The projects have removed the physical or financial stress associated with seeking project-related services outside our community, particularly felt when seeking services elsewhere.

The projects have provided opportunities to dispense favours to members of other communities, while giving their own indigenes priority attention.

The projects are sources of continuing income to community members.

The projects have been sources of pride to the community, particularly since most rural communities do not have anything.

Achieving even these modest indicators requires assiduous, sustained investigation and on-going analysis. They are a place to start.

ANNEX I

GERALD OHLSEN ASSOCIATES 48 DELAWARE AVENUE, SUITE 1 OTTAWA, ON

CANADA K2P 0Z3

ANNEX I: PEACE AND CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

Ottawa, ON

April 2008

Annex I: Peace and Conflict Assessment

1.1 What is Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment?

“…we can evaluate the developmental impact of an initiative, but we do not have the means to monitor, analyze, and measure and manage peace and conflict impacts in a comprehensive or systematic way. Peace and Conflict Impact

Assessment (PCIA) is a response to this problem. PCIA is a means of anticipating, monitoring, managing and evaluating the ways in which an intervention may affect, is affecting, or has affected the dynamics of peace or conflict in a conflict-prone region.”

PCIA is a process which helps identify and understand the impacts of an initiative on peace or conflict. PCIA can be used in a broad range of conflict- prone settings, from areas of overt violence to areas where there is a risk that non-violent conflict may turn, or return, to violence. PCIA can be integrated into every stage of the project cycle - design, implementation and evaluation.

“PCIA … is not about introducing or imposing foreign or abstract peace building techniques, it is about identifying, supporting, and most importantly,

systematizing existing peace and conflict -sensitive practices that have grown from very specific conditions (social, political, economic, military,

organizational).”

When to “do” PCIA

PCIA should be embedded in initiatives located in areas of militarized violence.

However, it should also apply to initiatives in a far wider range of conflict-prone settings – that is, places where there is a risk that nonviolent conflict may turn (or return) to violence. This includes areas: where the control over, or use of,

territory or resources is disputed; where the socio-economic gap between groups is increasing; or where unemployment is rising while living standards and human security are declining.

7

The following section has been excerpted from Kenneth Bush’s monograph, Hands-on PCIA, St. Paul

University, Ottawa, Canada 2007 p. 1- 17

Guiding Principles

PCIA is a process, not a tool.

PCIA helps us to understand the specific, rather than the general.

PCIA is not static.

PCIA needs to be transparent, shared and people –centered. The real experts of PCIA are the women, men, girls and boys living in conflict zones.

PCIA is too important to leave in the hands of so-called “experts.

It is all about ownership, control, and capacity.

…to ensure that any PCIA initiative will have a positive peacebuilding and developmental impact, it only needs to be able to answer “yes” to the following two questions: (1) Is the initiative increasing the capacities of participants – particularly those on the ground to (a) identify the real and potential peace and conflict impacts of an intervention; and (b) formulate and implement their own solutions non-violently and effectively? (2) Is the initiative built on a partnership that leads towards the genuine ownership by partners on the ground?

Building peace includes “unbuilding” the structures of violence.

Neither Development nor Peacebuilding on their own will magically create peace. Development and peacebuilding activities can make

important positive contributions to peace and unity (or they can increase existing tensions). Full, genuine, and lasting peace requires substantive and on-going efforts by a wide range of actors (local, national, regional, international) in a broad range of activities (military, trade, development and humanitarian assistance,diplomatic).

Haste makes waste – PCIA takes time.

Questions about PCIA

If development equals “peace” why does conflict sometimes increase when a country or region “develops”.

How Development can Create Conflict:

By increasing socio-economic inequalities – or fueling the belief that such inequalities are increasing

By increasing competition for development resources & political control

By introducing new structures & institutions that challenge existing ones

(social, political or economic)

By distorting markets and reinforcing a war economy or undermining a non-war economy

By legitimizing armed groups, their actions or agendas. Stolen resources may support armies and buy weapons

Some ways Development Interventions may have positive peacebuilding impacts:

By creating common/shared/joint interests among stakeholders

By creating ad hoc (then increasingly institutionalized) mechanisms of cooperation

By increasing & institutionalizing positive communication channels

By decreasing negative stereotyping

By creating neutral space

By demilitarizing minds

By reinforcing appropriate conflict management mechanisms

By demonstrating alternatives to conflict (economic/social)

By nurturing empathy

The difference between PCIA and Risk Assessment

PCIA includes Risk Assessment, but includes as well, identification of

opportunities to achieve initiative goals created by decreased violent conflict or increased peacebuilding space (e.g. access to new areas, populations)

PCIA has as its central point of reference un-stated impact of an initiative. It assesses the possible/actual impacts of an initiative on peace and conflict environments.

The guiding question for PCIA is “How might this initiative create conflict or build peace directly or indirectly. What changes might be mane to optimize positive impacts and minimize negative impacts?”

Project/ Program Specific Sample Questions

• Will the initiative’s benefits generate tensions or build bridges between groups in conflict?

• Will beneficiaries be specifically targeted because of the project?

• Will the initiative support (directly or indirectly) groups using violence, or

groups using genuine dialogue and participation).

Risk Assessment has the stated objectives of an initiative as its central point of reference.

The guiding question of Risk Assessment is “Is the initiative possible within the current conflict?” If the answer is no, then do not proceed with the initiative. If the answer is yes, then ask the following question: what can be done to reduce the risk of failure caused by surrounding conflicts?”

1.2 Putting PCIA into Practice

Bush’s monograph is a handbook, a working document on how to do PCIA. He gives detailed directions, a cookbook as it were, of the steps needed to carry out PCIA.

Step One: Mapping Peace and Conflict Stakeholders

1. PCIA is required only in conflict prone areas.

2. Different types of conflicts have different patterns, intensities, and impacts.

3. How to tell you are in a conflict prone setting – before it is too late?

Violent – usually militarized – conflict is taking place, or has taken place (conflict zones, post-conflict settings, transitional settings)

Competition over scarce resources (such as: water, agricultural land, and fish; grazing lands; access to education, public employment, or housing)

Absence of effective conflict management and resolution mechanisms

More than one group claims the right to have, govern, or use the same piece of land

Competition or disagreement over the allocation of the benefits of newly discovered resources (oil, diamonds, strategic minerals, etc.). Note that in the Niger Delta, the resources that are a source of conflict are not newly discovered.

Unresolved socio-economic tensions (e.g., workers vs. plantation owners;

labourers vs. land owners; unemployed vs. corrupt government officials)

A feeling by a group (or groups) that they have been "wronged" or

exploited, and, possibly, the presence of a leader who is trying to use this feeling to fight for "justice." Or, the absence of a leader able to harness dissent constructively.

If you are working in areas affected by these tensions, the PCIA should be used,

and you should undertake a collective mapping exercise of the peace and conflict

environment using the Mapping the Conflict(s) and Mapping the Peace (s) worksheets found in Appendices.

Step Two: Risk and Opportunity Assessment (ROA)

Before starting an initiative or project we need to decide whether it makes sense to try to work in a particular conflict environment, i.e., is there enough room to work in the area, or are the levels of risk/violence too high and peace

opportunities too low? Is the initiative appropriate – that is, does it have the right ingredients for success (personnel, operating procedures, peace and conflict sensitivities? What needs to be done to reduce the chance of failure of an initiative cause by conflict?) To answer these questions, we need to do a basic Risk and Opportunity Assessment of the ways in which the conflict may hinder a proposed initiative and to determine whether (and how) existing or newly-

emerging peace capacities and resources may help it.

While Risk and Opportunity Assessment needs to be undertaken before starting an initiative or project, it should be repeated throughout the life of an initiative.

Because both the peace and conflict environment and the initiative itself will change over time, it is important that we monitor the on-going feasibility and appropriateness of the initiative throughout its life.

Kenneth Bush’s Thoughts On How to Proceed Beyond The PCIA Analysis

Getting an organization to do a PCIA (itself, along with partners), and then to accept the outcome of the process, is still a matter of convincing someone with decision-making authority to join the team. The necessary space to do so opens or closes depending on the presence or absence of this support (set within the power constellation of other decision-makers within an organization). As a result, despite the success of individual PCIAs, overall peace and conflict sensitivity remains ad hoc and shallow-rooted.

The biggest challenge right now, is the same one faced by environmentalists and gender specialists twenty five years ago: mainstreaming and integration. We have much to learn from the way they introduced change into organizations that resist change. However, when we think more broadly about this challenge, we see that where there have been substantive changes in the operations and

objectives of organizations, this was always the result of the hard and committed

work of “champions” within those organizations who were able to mobilize and catalyze changes in the thinking and actions of individuals which eventually led to higher level institutional change.

So, although there is no short and easy answer to the question, “now what,” one small way that capacity building exercises (workshops) may contribute to the revolution in thinking necessary to integrate genuine, community-empowering, forms of PCIA into the development industry, is by building and nurturing a network of PCIA champions to catalyze such changes in ways that are unique and appropriate to the specific context in which they find themselves. By sharing our work broadly, by nurturing and supporting existing peace and conflict sensitive initiatives (that adhere to the principles discussed in the introduction), we contribute to the slow process of PCIA integration. However, in light of the Berghof debates on PCIA (www.berghof-center.org/), we see that that PCIA can also become a commodified disempowering weapon in the hands of privileged professionalized Northern actors. For this reason, we need to start this exercise with the clear-eyed awareness that the challenge to integration of genuine PCIA will be 99% political and 1% technical.

Bush’s Handbook can be acquired from the author. Kenneth Bush, Hands-on

PCIA, St. Paul University, Ottawa, Canada 2007. [email protected]

ANNEX II

GERALD OHLSEN ASSOCIATES 48 DELAWARE AVENUE, SUITE 1 OTTAWA, ON

CANADA K2P 0Z3

LITERATURE REVIEW

CONFLICT SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING IN THE NIGER DELTA

Prepared by Ruth Anne Mitchell for

Peacebuild - The Canadian Peacebuilding Network

Ottawa, ON

April 2008

LITERATURE REVIEW

CONFLICT SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING IN THE NIGER DELTA

CONTEXT

The Niger River Delta is a volatile environment. An up to date picture of the conditions in the Delta is a help when attempting to carry out any aspect of conflict sensitive programming. The following sources of current information are useful.

Human Rights Watch www.hrw.org

This organization provides indepth reporting on specific topics by their own researchers in the field, and also provides relevant articles from other sources.

Their view of human rights is broad enough to take in most topics of concern in the Niger Delta. Reporting is thorough, and balanced. Of specific interest are three recent reports, Politics as War, March 27, 2008, Criminal Politics, October 9, 2007, and Chop Fine, January 2007.

Transparency International <www, transparency.org> and

<www.transparency.ca>

These sites deal primarily with issues of corruption, and make use of automatic links to other sites all over the world. The search engine is slow.

International Crisis Group http://www.crisisgroup.org/

This group covers crises of all sorts as they arise, and does periodic in depth reporting on specific crisis situations, including the Niger River Delta. It

provides a list-serve feature so that you can have the week’s most pressing crises popped into your email.

IRIN News <irinnews.org>

A product of the UN Humanitarian system, IRIN news tracks humanitarian

problems world wide. The free list serve system provides the subscriber (free)

with the ability to get reports that are place and topic specific. Thus you can sign

up for current information on environment, and governance in Nigeria, for

example.

Background

Human Rights Watch, Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigera, Volume 19, No. 2(A), January 2007, 107 p.

A report on and analysis of the role government has played in the erosion of human rights specifically in Rivers State, with relevance to the entire Delta.

Current and pertinent.

Ibid, Politics as War: The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election Violence in Rivers State, Nigeria, Volume 20, No.3 (A), March 2008, 59p.

Reporting on current situation of gang violence in Rivers State, its links to politics, and of course, money. Current and pertinent.

International Crisis Group, The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest, Africa Report 115, 3 August 2006.

Provides analysis of the conflict in the Delta, and makes recommendations for models that could be used by external players – E.U., UN, Oil Companies – to reverse the cycle of poverty and violence.

Ibid, Fueling the Niger Delta Crisis, Africa Report 118, 28 September, 2006 Considers the causes of conflict in the Delta, and identifies steps needed to defuse the conflict.

Ed Kashi, Curse of the Black Gold: 50 Years of Oil in the Niger Delta, powerhouse Books, 220 p.,

To be released in July, 2008. Terrific title, content remains to be seen.

Akpobibibo Onduku,The Lingering Crisis In The Niger Delta,Field Work Report,<peacestudiesjournal.org>, undated, 10p.

Concise account of the background of the conflict in the Niger Delta, from a

Nigerian perspective. Covers the roles of government, NGOs, and oil companies.

Ike Okonta, Oronto Douglas, Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta, Sierra Club Books, 2001, 286 p.

In 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, a writer, political activist, and leader of the Niger

Delta's Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), was executed

by Nigeria's military junta. MOSOP was formed out of the need to protest the

destruction of a people's land and culture by two forces: Royal Dutch Shell, and a series of corrupt and repressive Nigerian governments. With the support of the Nigerian regime, Shell instituted practices such as gas flaring, the laying of high- pressure oil pipelines above ground, and the pollution of water sources,

degrading the land and leaving many local people destitute. In contrast to the beneficial picture of the corporation's activities painted by its public relations professionals, authors Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas have found persuasive evidence that Shell and the Nigerian government share responsibility for making the Niger Delta one of the world's most endangered ecosystems. Slightly dated.

Philip M. Peek (Editor), Martha G. Anderson, Ways of the Rivers: Arts and Environment of the Niger Delta, University of California Los Angeles, 2002, 376 pages.

Anderson and Peek present a collection of 25 scholarly essays with 448

illustrations published in conjunction with an exhibition at the UCLA Fowler Museum. This volume provides an anthropological exploration of the

relationship between the art and rituals of the Niger Delta and its water-focused environment. The diverse ethnic groups living in the Niger Delta have long participated in a vibrant and widespread exchange of ideas and art forms, both among one another and with Western nations, because of the region's culture of trade and travel. The essays are illustrated with color photographs of artifacts and ceremonial activity from the groups defined by these languages: Ijo, Isoko/Urbhbo, Itsekiri, and Ogoni. Good for cultural background that is not closely linked to politics, corruption, and oil – another way of looking at the Delta.

The Underpinnings of Program Design and Evaluation without specific reference to Conflict Sensitive

Situations

Conflict Sensitive community development and programming deals with a

special set of conditions, and we are considering those conditions specifically in

the context of the Niger River Delta, an area rich in chaos, conflict, violence and

money. There are texts which lie outside the purview of topics, such as PCIA,

that remain relevant. A few of the best are cited here.

Korten, David C. Editor, Community Management: Asian Experience and Perspectives, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, Ct, USA, 1987, 328 p.

Introduction is good.

Patton, Michael Quinn, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, 1990, 532p.

This is one of the great classic works on qualitative evaluation, and by extension, participatory development. It bears careful reading.

“How to” Resources

Alternatives to Violence

This is a powerful program developed by the Quakers for use with individuals living/working in a violent environment. It has a handbook of exercises that act as tools to teach the principles of the AVP program. The Canadian contact for AVP is: http://home.golden.net/~respection/AVP/MAIN1.htm

Bush, Kenneth; Hands-on PCIA: A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact

Assessment, June 2007 Monograph Available from the author, Conflict Studies Programme, St. Paul University, Ottawa, Canada <[email protected]>

[email protected] or see this manual, including Appendix --.

A hand book on how to do PCIA, including extensive worksheets to guide the practitioner through the assessment process, in a methodical way. Easy to use, easy to follow. Examples from experience are used throughout.

Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, humanitarian assistance, and peace building: a Resource Pack, 2004, unpaginated ring binder format

This binder has been developed by a consortium of NGOs that include Africa Peace Forum, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, International Alert, and Safer World. The chapters cover an introduction to the key concepts of conflict- sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance, and peace

building; conflict analysis;applying conflict sensitivity at project and programme level;conflict-sensitive implementation; conflict-sensitive monitoring and

evaluation;integrating conflict sensitivity into sectoral approaches; and

institutional capacity building for conflict sensitivity. The orientation is practical

rather than theoretical, with emphasis on how to use conflict sensitivity concepts

in real situations. A rich source of information, clearly presented.

Security System Reform and Governance - DAC Guidelines www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/ssr, 2004

Continuing efforts to develop useful tools for conflict prevention and for

improving security and stability in the long term, the DAC High Level Meeting in April 2004 Ministers and Agency Heads endorsed a policy statement and paper entitled "Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice". The Policy and Good Practice paper highlights the changes that are taking place in the way that donors think about security and offers and sets out concrete examples to help guide donors who engage in Security System Reform (SSR). The OECD has also published an accompanying concise Policy Brief.

SSR seeks to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. A democratically run, accountable and efficient security system helps reduce the risk of violent conflict. The term security “system” is used in order to emphasise the number and inter-connectivity of its different components, which include not only the armed forces, police and gendarmerie, intelligence services and justice and penal systems, but also the civil authorities responsible for oversight and democratic control (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, and the Defence Ministry).

Drawing on examples of good practice in other areas of institutional reform, the paper argues that partner country ownership and buy-in are critical. Wherever possible, donors need to support locally-owned comprehensive strategies and should seek to avoid piece-meal efforts. In addition, all external actors need, through in-depth analysis, to have an understanding of the context and history of partner countries and must carefully consider regional dynamics. Long-term engagement is vital if the assistance is to sustain political, economic and social development.

Whole-of-government approaches to Security System Reform should be the goal

both in donor and developing countries. The importance of SSR, and its key

concepts, must be understood throughout the foreign affairs, development and

the defence establishments so that comprehensive reform is promoted by their

officials at all levels. Clarity on objectives and principles is essential for effective

implementation on the ground.

OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ss

The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice provides guidance to operationalise the 2005 DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance and closes the gap between policy and practice. It largely follows the external assistance programme cycle and contains valuable tools to help

encourage a dialogue on security and justice issues and to support an SSR process through the assessment, design and implementation phases. It also provides new guidance on monitoring, review and evaluation of SSR

programmes, and highlights how to ensure greater coherence across the different actors and departments engaged in SSR. It has been designed by and for

international actors working to address insecurity and to support access to justice.

The process has brought together the development community with their security and diplomatic colleagues to ensure that the handbook incorporates knowledge on the political, governance and technical nature of SSR. It is based on experience gathered from countries that have undertaken security and justice reforms, and the work of the international community in supporting conflict prevention and peacebuilding over the last decade throughout the developing world.The purpose of the Handbook is to ensure that donor support to SSR programmes is both effective and sustainable.

Gender and Peacekeeping on line training

The Gender and Peacekeeping site provides material for a three-day course on gender sensitization. It examines how the different roles and responsibilities of men and women are relevant in the context of peace support operations (PSOs).

http://www.genderandpeacekeeping.org

Hofmann, Charles-Antoine, Les Roberts, Jeremy Shoham and Paul Harvey, Measuring the impact of humanitarian aid: A review of current practice, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 17, June 2004, 38p.

Overview of current measurement tools, their advantages and constraints.

ANNEX III

GERALD OHLSEN ASSOCIATES 48 DELAWARE AVENUE, SUITE 1 OTTAWA, ON

CANADA K2P 0Z3

REPORT ON A SURVEY OF ENTRY-POINTS AND CONFLICT- SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN THE NIGER DELTA

Prepared by Godwin Unumeri for

Peacebuild – The Canadian Peacebuilding Network

Lagos, Nigeria

April 2008

REPORT ON A SURVEY OF ENTRY-POINTS AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN

THE

NIGER DELTA

INTRODUCTION

The Niger Delta is beset by protracted and persistent crises that have defied reconciliation, particularly since the advent of democracy in Nigeria.

Environmental degradation directly linked to the activities of multi-national oil companies (MNOCs) and the meagre federal government presence in the region, with marginal social, political and economic representation, are key factors in the prolonged crisis that constrains the development of the region by both local and international stakeholders. In an attempt to contribute to the amelioration of this situation, this survey has been undertaken to identify effective entry and conflict- sensitive development strategies. The report that follows discloses the findings of the survey that was conducted between 15

and 23

March 2008 and is divided into five sections aimed at responding to:

 the challenges of various cadre of leadership

 entry-points strategies

 conflict-sensitive development and

 the role of CDCs

 apparently successful strategies

SURVEY SETTING

A CHANGE OF TARGET COMMUNITY – CRISIS IN RUMUEKPE, RIVERS STATE

The original intention was to carry out this research in the community of Rumuekpe, Rivers State, where the researcher had previously worked. The current level of conflict in that region made this impossible.

For a number of years Rumuekpe has been entangled in persistent and multi-

dimensional crises. At the level of the immediate community, these involve

factions of the various structures of leadership, such as the youth and

community leaders. Just as there is a youth-youth and youth-leaders component,

there is also a leaders-leaders facet to the crises in the community. Perhaps as a

result of political and security interests, external stakeholders have expanded the crises into youth-local government, youth-military and community-military conflicts, quite apart from the conflict revolving around the core business of SPDC.

While youth factions are fighting over inequities in the distribution of employment and security contracts associated with SPDC projects in their community, there are factions of youth leaders (and their supporters) fighting themselves over the sit-tight tendencies of an incumbent leader. Equally significant is the loss of respect for the community leadership that allegedly embezzled an oil spillage compensation, which ought to have been used to improve the quality of lives of the people. This has factionalised the community leadership, with sections of the community (no matter how numerically insignificant) lending support to one group or the other. At the same time the then local government (LG) chairman seems to have deepened the crises by appointing a youth leader involved in the conflict as his liaison officer, thus giving political strength to the latter’s actions. Moreover, some youth also refuse to accept an LG that has not done much to develop the Rumuekpe community.

Similarly, the youth are resisting the joint task force (JTF) on security for appearing to represent only the interests of the federal government (FG) and SPDC. Apart from the regular killing and suppression of youth, the JTF is accused of sexual molestations, harassment and intimidation within the broader community, hence the community is equally displeased with the JTF. The Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) is being implicated in all of these because of its one-sided distribution of development interventions within the community. Ready examples are the road and electrification projects that SPDC sited in the community where their manifold is located. To worsen the situation, SPDC is also seen as singling out owners of the properties on which they have their projects for preferential treatment.

These are some of the root causes of the Rumuekpe crises, which, in recent times,

have degenerated into something in the nature of guerrilla warfare – where

heavily armed youth emerge from nowhere, at any time of the day or night, to

wreck havoc and disappear within a short space of time.

THE TARGET COMMUNITY – OTUJEREMY, DELTA STATE

Otujeremy is the headquarters of Otujeremy kingdom that is made up of 32 communities. It is an Urhobo-speaking community situated in Ughelli south Local Government a Area of Delta state of Nigeria. The kingdom is headed by a king; each of its 32 communities is headed by a prominent chief, who is assisted by a council of chiefs and elders. The social structures of these communities also include an executive committee (EXCO) and youth and women’s associations.

The EXCO is made up of the executives of each of the aforementioned organised groups. These communities also have community development committees (CDCs) and project management committees (PMCs) that are involved with active project management issues (planning, implementation and sustainable management).

ROOTS OF THE CRISES IN OTUJEREMY

As in most of the Niger Delta, there is a considerable degree of violent conflict in Otujeremy; while the researcher was familiar with these conflicts, he had not had previous direct professional experience with the community. As is evident from the various segments of this report, the storyline is essentially the same as that which obtains at Rumuekpe and elsewhere in the Niger Delta. In Otujeremy, youth discontent is being expressed to a community leadership that has been corrupted by multi-national oil companies (MNOCs). Thus, depending on the group interviewed, there are ready accusations and counter-accusations.

Traditional leaders and elders in turn portray the youth as impatient, inexperienced and disrespectful, with a strong tendency to disrupt the peace of the community, as a result of their refusal to take their leaders/elders into confidence.

Here too, youth are at loggerheads with the JTF, which they accuse of

representing only the interests of government and the MNOCs. As is noted

below, the JTF has dealt with Otujeremy youth violently. There is, however, an

interesting possibility that Otujeremy youth who presently resist community

security arrangements, from which they feel excluded, may become receptive to

the JTF, should it be possible for them eventually to be incorporated into it. The

youth factions that exist at Otujeremy were created by the three dominant

political parties. Though the youth of Otujeremy have equally been involved in

violent protests/confrontations, it is evident that the topography (creeks/rivers)

of the Rumuepke kingdom has made the arm of the JTF dispatched to that area

far less effective than elsewhere..

Allegations of sexual harassment, rape and intimidation in the wider community have also been levelled against the JTF at Otujeremy, as in Rumuekpe. Women, as well, are not satisfied with a community leadership that has virtually relegated them to the background.

While there is no concrete evidence of the embezzlement of oil spillage compensation, there are very strong suspicions of embezzlement that could exacerbate the crises in the community. A perceived SPDC development intervention policy that favours only direct host communities has made reaction to oil spillage by affected communities that have not benefited from SPDC activities to be more vehement and violent. Consequently, about five communities have been locked in a legal battle to question why only one community is enjoying the benefits of a project while the drawbacks affect every community. SPDC has empowered some individuals and families to become very prominent in this community.

Evidence of the severity of the conflict in Otujeremy is that none of the persons interviewed were prepared to be identified by name, only by job or social category.

CONFLICT-SENSITIVE STRATEGIES PREVIOUSLY USED IN THE AREA

This is a rather difficult issue. Before 2006, what occurred in the guise of conflict sensitive development were community --local government – NGO -- SPDC project-based consultations (Box 4) that took place before projects were sited.

However, if the response of the LG official to SPDC CSD is anything to go by, CSD has been theoretical, limited to the pages of corporate policy. The handling of development initiatives has not been very conflict-insensitive. CSD was seen, at least in operational terms, as a process of fulfilling obligatory consultations with community and other stakeholders prior to implementing a project.

Compensations for oil spillages that affect community livelihoods are carelessly paid to individuals that embezzle the funds. This may have been done in the past because the communities were thought to be unenlightened. That perception should be changed in light of the more sophisticated analysis now demonstrated by members of the rural Delta communities, for example the articulate nature of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) despite their often violent activities that have virtually institutionalized kidnapping of

foreigners and Nigerians alike.

THE SURVEY

LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES

The research demonstrated that the various cadres of leadership are confronted by diverse challenges. A major challenge identified by the Local Government (LG) sources was being accused of insensitivity to the yearnings of the people as a result of infrequent consultations, which has made the people indifferent/resistant to government policies and programmes. This complicates the implementation of government policies and programmes: “what is needed to tackle this challenge is a structure that would facilitate communication to the grassroots people at all levels, namely, the unit, ward and local government.”

From the perspective of the Joint Task Force (JTF) on security and some key informants: “indigenes of the community are not satisfied with a security arrangement that has completely sidelined them from the security of their own community. They believe that the Joint Task Force (JTF) ought to be limited to offering expert advice on the security of lives and property to their community.

We are being associated with the sole security of government and Multi-national Oil Company (MNOC) interests that brought them to the community, in the first instance, as against that of the wider community. Hence they think that our mandate is principally to suppress and intimidate the community so that oil exploration can progress unimpeded.

There is also the problem of youth militancy. The JTF and key informants share the conviction that persistent efforts be made to educate the communities concerning protection of the lives and properties that the JTF are serving. Beyond this common ground, the JTF states that “we do not condone the activities of youth militancy.” Community leaders see disregard or disrespect from immature or impatient youth, who take and implement decisions without consulting them, as a rude challenge. “The youth leadership continue to consider community leaders as weak and a greedy lot who do not want them to partake in the national cake – money that accrues to the community by way of royalty – besides insufficient educational opportunities.”

The women’s leadership is aggrieved by exclusion from decision-making,

believing that “their views are hardly taken into consideration in a male-

dominated society.” Interestingly, though with reluctance on the part of youth,

all the parties seem to agree that dialogue and participatory decision-making is

all that is required to solve the leadership problems.

ENTRY-POINT STRATEGIES

All the interviewed stakeholders share common knowledge that there have been persistent crises since the discovery of crude oil in Otujeremy kingdom. “Some of these concern the lack of trust for the political leadership as aforementioned, youth restiveness occasioned by unemployment, community resistance to environmental pollution and dislocation of means of livelihoods by the activities of Multi-national Oil Companies (MNOCs) and inter-communal crises resulting from the inequitable distribution of benefits by MNOCs operating in the kingdom.”

“Working with development partners (DPs) is an opportunity that any right thinking leader and organisation that aspire to develop his/her environment should strongly desire.” But how can these partners gain access to communities that degenerate into crises situation at the slightest prompting, or for reasons that are unknown to strangers/visitors? The survey revealed that to gain entry into such fragile communities and accomplish your objectives, be it research and/or a development project, “you need to inform the community authorities about your intentions to do something good within their jurisdiction as this will not only forestall potential inconveniences but also guarantee your protection from all sources of disruption of your work in the community.” Once you successfully convince the authorities, they “can now assume the role of advocates on your behalf to explain your purpose to their people” to permit you to work in a peaceful atmosphere so that your good intentions might not “turn out chaotic.”

“You therefore explain to them that this is what we want to do: we want to build a hospital for which you could get a free land and be charged to court if the owner of the land was probably not pre-informed that a hospital is about to sited in his parcel of land.” This is a clear issue of inappropriate communication that initial contacts with the authorities could clarify to quarters that are necessary.

Some of the community leaders with whom an external stakeholder needs to discuss issues of community access for development interventions (DIs) include:

 the chairman of the community

 the oldest man in the community

 the president-general

 the king who may summon other categories of chiefs for consultation –

“as you know only one person cannot rule a community,

 the community’s executive committee (EXCO)

 the community development committee