Merida vs People
Merida vs People
june 12
june 12
2008
2008
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
2
2
Provident tree farms vs
Provident tree farms vs
Batario mar 28
Batario mar 28
1994
1994
...
...
...
...
...
...
3
3
People vs
People vs
CFI feb
CFI feb
13
13
1992
1992
...
...
...
...
...
...
4
4
Lagua vs
Lagua vs
Cusi april
Cusi april
15 1988
15 1988
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
5
5
Mustang Lumber
Mustang Lumber
vs CA
vs CA
june 18,
june 18,
1996
1996
...
...
...
...
5
5
Tigoy vs
Tigoy vs
CA june
CA june
26,
26,
2006
2006
...
...
...
...
6
6
People vs
People vs
Que dec
Que dec
17, 1996
17, 1996
...
...
...
...
8
8
calub
calub
vs
vs
CA
CA
april 27,
april 27,
2000
2000
...
...
...
...
...
...
..
..
9
9
factoran vs CA
factoran vs CA
dec 13,
dec 13,
1999
1999
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
..
..
9
9
paat vs
paat vs
CA jan
CA jan
10, 1997
10, 1997
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
10
10
Alvarez vs
Alvarez vs
PICOP
PICOP
dec
dec
3,
3,
2009
2009
...
...
...
...
11
11
ALvarez vs PICOP nov 29, 2006
ALvarez vs PICOP nov 29, 2006
...
...
11
11
DY vs
DY vs
CA March 9,
CA March 9,
1999 (304
1999 (304
SCRA 331)
SCRA 331)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
12
12
PICOP vs
PICOP vs
Base metals
Base metals
dec 6,
dec 6,
2006
2006
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
12
12
asaphil vs
asaphil vs
tuason april
tuason april
25,
25,
2006
2006
...
...
...
...
13
13
didapho earth savers vs
didapho earth savers vs
gozun mar 30,
gozun mar 30,
2006
2006
...
...
...
...
..
..
14
14
republic vs
republic vs
rosemoor mar
rosemoor mar
30, 2004
30, 2004
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
....
....
15
15
labugal vs
labugal vs
ramos jan 27,
ramos jan 27,
2004
2004
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
.
.
16
16
labugal vs ramos dec
labugal vs ramos dec
1, 2004
1, 2004
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
17
17
Metro Iloilo
Metro Iloilo
Water vs
Water vs
CA mar
CA mar
31,
31,
2005
2005
...
...
...
...
..
..
18
18
BF Northwest vs
BF Northwest vs
IAC may
IAC may
29, 1987
29, 1987
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
19
19
Amistoso vs
Amistoso vs
Ong
Ong
june
june
29,
29,
2004
2004
...
...
...
...
20
20
Loney vs
Loney vs
people feb
people feb
10, 2006
10, 2006
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
21
21
Alexandria Condo vs
LLDA
LLDA
vs
vs
CA
CA
dec
dec
7,
7,
1995
1995
...
...
...
...
...
...
23
23
Tano vs
Tano vs
Socrates aug
Socrates aug
1, 1997
1, 1997
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
24
24
Hizon vs
Hizon vs
CA dec
CA dec
13,
13,
1996
1996
...
...
...
...
...
...
.
.
25
25
Province of Rizal
Province of Rizal
vs Executive Secretary
vs Executive Secretary
dec 13,
dec 13,
2005
2005
...
...
...
...
26
26
Baguio City
Baguio City
vs
vs
Masweng feb
Masweng feb
4,
4,
2009
2009
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
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....
.
.
27
27
Province of North Cotabato vs
Province of North Cotabato vs
GRP Peace Panel oct
GRP Peace Panel oct
14, 2008
14, 2008
...
...
...
...
...
...
27
27
Bangus Fry
Bangus Fry
Fisherfol
Fisherfol
k
k
vs Lanzanas
vs Lanzanas
july 10,
july 10,
2003
2003
...
...
...
...
29
29
Merida vs People june 12 2008
Merida vs People june 12 2008
DOCTRINE DOCTRINE
In People v. Merida (G.R. No. 158182, June 12, 2008), the
In People v. Merida (G.R. No. 158182, June 12, 2008), the Supreme Court ruled that cutting a tree in private land for timber without aSupreme Court ruled that cutting a tree in private land for timber without a permit from the DENR was punishable und
permit from the DENR was punishable und er this provision.er this provision.
FACTS FACTS
The government hailed Petitioner before the
The government hailed Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, RRegional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) wiomblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Sectionth violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which priva
Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which priva te complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) te complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownershipclaims ownership
The RTC handed judgment rapidly. In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced The RTC handed judgment rapidly. In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal reclusion temporal andand ordered theordered the seizedseized lumber lumber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor.
forfeited in Tansiongco's favor.[12][12]
The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
ISSUE ISSUE
w/n sec 28 of PD 705 prohibiting the cutting gathering and collecting of timber and other forest products apply to Petitioner w/n sec 28 of PD 705 prohibiting the cutting gathering and collecting of timber and other forest products apply to Petitioner ..
HELD HELD
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts[25][25]penalized under PD 705, provides:penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68.
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without LicenseCutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall. — Any person who shall cutcut,, gather
gather, , collectcollect, , remove timber or other remove timber or other foresforest t producproducts from ts from any forest land, or any forest land, or timbertimber from alienable or disposable public land, or from alienable or disposable public land, or fromfrom private land
private land, , withowithout any ut any authorauthority, or ity, or possespossess s timbetimber r or other or other foresforest products without the t products without the legal documents as required under existinglegal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
C
Coommmmiissssiioon n oon n IImmmmiiggrraattiioon n aannd d DDeeppoorrttaattiioonn..
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the
forest land without any authority; (2) the cuttingcutting, gathering, collecting, or removing, gathering, collecting, or removing of timberof timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from alienable or disposable public land, or from
from private land without any authorityprivate land without any authority;;[26][26]
and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
Provident tree farms vs Batario mar 28 1994
Provident tree farms vs Batario mar 28 1994
DOCTRINE:
DOCTRINE:
Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating the issues to a regular court in keeping with the
Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating the issues to a regular court in keeping with the
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
FACTS FACTS
In the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and prays for the continuation of the hearing in In the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and prays for the continuation of the hearing in Civil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that
Civil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial cwhat was brought before the trial c ourt was a civil case for injunction, ourt was a civil case for injunction, i.e., "restraining thei.e., "restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . . . for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code and for damages, entry of safety matches into the country . . . for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code and for damages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the importation of safety matches . . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the importation of safety matches . . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ."
of the protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ."
Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before the Court of Tax Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before the Court of Tax Appeals because the instant action is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that since it could not Appeals because the instant action is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that since it could not avail of the remedies a
avail of the remedies a fforded by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort fforded by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citingto the courts is warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v.Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala
Alikpala..
Petitioner asserts his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only Petitioner asserts his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which is to be enforced by the subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under
Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code, the the Tariff and Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeitureand forfeiture cases
cases and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations.and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations.
The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is
Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.
devoid of any legal basis.
Now it follows that to allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner insisted, is Now it follows that to allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner insisted, is
clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of Customs
against the Bureau of Customs as well as the as well as the prayer for injunction against importation of matches by prprayer for injunction against importation of matches by private respondent AJIC ivate respondent AJIC may not bemay not be granted without the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
granted without the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
ISSUE ISSUE
w/n the BOC holds jurisdiction in the
w/n the BOC holds jurisdiction in the matter of wood product importationmatter of wood product importation
HELD HELD
Petitioner’s position is inconceivable! The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban under the Petitioner’s position is inconceivable! The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban under the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does no
Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does no t at all diminish the t at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. Thethe subject matter. The enforcement of statutory rights is not
enforcement of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has the power toCustoms has the power to "promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the approval of "promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance."
the Secretary of Finance."
Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed by an Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions."
administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions."
But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs
But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match importations maycontesting the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
People vs CFI feb 13 1992
People vs CFI feb 13 1992
DOCTRINE:
DOCTRINE:
Mere possession of lumber is punishable; ownership is not
Mere possession of lumber is punishable; ownership is not an element of the
an element of the crime.
crime.
FACTS
FACTS
Charges were levied against private respondents for the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of Charges were levied against private respondents for the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known a
Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known a s the Revised Forestry Code of the s the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which read:Philippines, in an information which read:
That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality of General That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality of General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, toge
accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, toge ther with twenty (20) other John Does whose identities ther with twenty (20) other John Does whose identities are stillare still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, with intent to gain, unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRE
FIFTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and D FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) includingFIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.
government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.
On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and the opinion of the trial court, the On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and the opinion of the trial court, the information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the consent of the state," was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different consent of said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest resources, including species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.
license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.
ISSUE ISSUE
W/N the theft of
W/N the theft of logs was committed in contravention of Plogs was committed in contravention of PD 705D 705
HELD HELD
The SCs agrees with the petitioner. The SCs agrees with the petitioner.
Sec. 68.
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without licenseother products without license.— Any person who shall cut,.— Any person who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be
guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . .
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a] Rules of When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165 elements of the offense defined in the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 57).
SCRA 57).
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private
individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
permit granted by the state.
Ownership is not an essential element of
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information tothe failure of the information to allege the true owner
allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without anytaking was without any authority or license from the government.
authority or license from the government.
The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the information was filed The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705
not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705
The SC thereby granted the position and reversed the trial court’s order of dismissing the information The SC thereby granted the position and reversed the trial court’s order of dismissing the information
Lagua vs Cusi april 15 1988
Lagua vs Cusi april 15 1988
DOCTRINE:
DOCTRINE:
It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Bureau of Forest Development Development
FACTS FACTS
In a vigorous complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others: In a vigorous complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others:
In Paragraph 5(a): In Paragraph 5(a):
a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum to the Chief a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum to the Chief Security Guard of Defendant East coast directing the latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks Security Guard of Defendant East coast directing the latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time) on the national highway loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time) on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their passage Eastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof while the vehicles and trucks
thereof while the vehicles and trucks
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action. The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) resolution of this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an No. 705. The private respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an
"agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry. "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.
ISSUE ISSUE
w/n the petition for mandamus may be entertained by the trial court. w/n the petition for mandamus may be entertained by the trial court.
Yes. Yes.
The petition for mandamus will be treated as a petition for certiorari in the interest of justice. The petition for mandamus will be treated as a petition for certiorari in the interest of justice.
The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages can be instituted.
is illegal before an action for damages can be instituted.
P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.
may be maintained.
Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau
of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial court's ruling that since they were mere agents of Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial court's ruling that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and were suing in their own behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for damages. They are not the petitioners Achanzar and Donga and were suing in their own behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for damages. They are not the
real parties in interest. However, the complaint can still be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in interest, Achanzar real parties in interest. However, the complaint can still be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in interest, Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only the dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only the dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.
Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.
Mustang Lumber vs CA june 18, 1996
Mustang Lumber vs CA june 18, 1996
DOCTRINE:
DOCTRINE:
Possession of lumber is not a
Possession of lumber is not a crime under PD 705. Timber is the
crime under PD 705. Timber is the punishable act
punishable act
FACTS
The authorities got wind of a suspicious stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs that were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner The authorities got wind of a suspicious stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs that were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Readily,
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Readily, the SAID organized a team of the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at theconduct surveillance at the said lumberyard.
said lumberyard.
During the sting operation, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded During the sting operation, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted
with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transporttransport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.
City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informidate, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the ng the latter that the petitioner had already secured thelatter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready to submit
required documents and was ready to submit them. them. None, however, was submitted.None, however, was submitted.[[
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant.
supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure isThe situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified,
justified, viz viz ., a search of a moving vehicle., a search of a moving vehicle
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
On 7 July 1991, accused
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on thebased on the following grounds:
following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offens(a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of e, for possession of lumber lumber , as opposed to, as opposed to timber timber , is not penalized in, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendoarguendo thatthat lumber lumber falls within the purview of the falls within the purview of the said section, the samesaid section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pe
of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pe nding before the Court of Appeals, nding before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the which involves the legality of the seizure,seizure, raises a prejudicial question
raises a prejudicial question
ISSUE: ISSUE:
Whether the complaint charges an offense Whether the complaint charges an offense
HELD HELD
No. The petitioner proposed to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an No. The petitioner proposed to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense.
offense. Respondent Judge granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER,Respondent Judge granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense.
therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test fIt has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufor the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments inficiency of the averments in th
the e ininfoformrmatatioion, n, ththat at isis, , whwhetetheher r ththe e fafactcts s alallelegedged, , if if hyhypopoththeteticaicalllly y adadmimitttted, ed, coconsnstititutute te ththe e eleelemementnts s of of ththe e ofoffefensnse, e, anandd matters
matters aliundealiunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires,will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter inter alia
alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense., that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Tigoy vs CA june 26, 2006
Tigoy vs CA june 26, 2006
DOCTRINE DOCTRINE
In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is
In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the present case, theprohibited by a special law such as in the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and
special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously.consciously.
FACTS FACTS
Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who revealed a desire to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog Bertodazo who revealed a desire to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City
In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy who had been employed by him In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy who had been employed by him as truck drivers for two ears, to
as truck drivers for two ears, to bring the two trucks to Lolong bring the two trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte which is about fifteen (15) minutesNorte which is about fifteen (15) minutes away from Iligan City. He instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan for the loading of the construction materials by Lolong away from Iligan City. He instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan for the loading of the construction materials by Lolong Bertodazo, and to go back at dawn for the trip to Dipolog City. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner Tigoy Bertodazo, and to go back at dawn for the trip to Dipolog City. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to return to Larapan at four o’clock in the morning the next day. When they arrived, the trucks had been laden with allegedly went home to return to Larapan at four o’clock in the morning the next day. When they arrived, the trucks had been laden with bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas.
bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas.
That same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior Inspector Rico Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis City), while escorting That same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior Inspector Rico Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis City), while escorting Provincial Director Dionisio Coloma at the
Provincial Director Dionisio Coloma at the ICC Arts Center in Ozamis City, along with the membeICC Arts Center in Ozamis City, along with the membe rs of the Special Operation Group,rs of the Special Operation Group, received a dispatch from the 466th PNP Company situated at Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis City, informing him that two trucks, a blue and received a dispatch from the 466th PNP Company situated at Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis City, informing him that two trucks, a blue and green loaded with cement, that were going towards Ozamis City did not stop at the checkpoint. Upon receiving the report, Tome, along green loaded with cement, that were going towards Ozamis City did not stop at the checkpoint. Upon receiving the report, Tome, along with PO2 Peter Paul Nuqui and PO3 Bienvenido Real, boarded their patrol vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to intercept the two trucks at Lilian with PO2 Peter Paul Nuqui and PO3 Bienvenido Real, boarded their patrol vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to intercept the two trucks at Lilian Terminal, Ozamis City.
Terminal, Ozamis City.
At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who
At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only one in uniform awas the only one in uniform a mong the police officers, flagged mong the police officers, flagged down the two trucks but the samedown the two trucks but the same just sped away and proceeded towards the direction of Oroquieta City. Aboard their patrol vehicle, they chased the trucks and overtook the just sped away and proceeded towards the direction of Oroquieta City. Aboard their patrol vehicle, they chased the trucks and overtook the
same at Barangay Manabay. They blocked the road with their vehicle causing the two trucks to stop. same at Barangay Manabay. They blocked the road with their vehicle causing the two trucks to stop.
The police chief hassled the driver who had alighted from the green truck why he did not stop at the checkpoint but the latter did not The police chief hassled the driver who had alighted from the green truck why he did not stop at the checkpoint but the latter did not answer. When he inquired what was loaded in the truck, the driver replied that there is "S.O.P," which means grease money in street answer. When he inquired what was loaded in the truck, the driver replied that there is "S.O.P," which means grease money in street parlance. This raised the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded with "hot items."
parlance. This raised the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded with "hot items."
Immediately thereafter, an Information was filed against Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession of Immediately thereafter, an Information was filed against Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession of forest products without legal permit
forest products without legal permit
ISSUE: ISSUE:
W/n knowledge was necessary to incur liability for the violation of the timber law W/n knowledge was necessary to incur liability for the violation of the timber law
HELD: HELD:
No. The crime is mala prohibita No. The crime is mala prohibita
Stated otherwise, the core issue presented
Stated otherwise, the core issue presented is whether or not petitioner Tigoy is whether or not petitioner Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in pis guilty of conspiracy in p ossessing or transporting lumber ossessing or transporting lumber without the necessary permit in violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
without the necessary permit in violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, as amended by E.O. No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines,Philippines, provides:
provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. – Any person who shall cut,License. – Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documenforest products without the legal documen ts as requiredts as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . .
Revised Penal Code. . . .
There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code. He, Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code. He, Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officers
Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officersinin flagrante delicto flagrante delicto as they were transporting theas they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog
subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City.City.
Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He believed that what he was transporting were bags of cement in view of the contract between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not He believed that what he was transporting were bags of cement in view of the contract between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when Bertodazo loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement.
around when Bertodazo loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement.
When finally accosted, one of the drivers, whom witness Tome identified as the driver of the green truck, Sumagang, but who actually was When finally accosted, one of the drivers, whom witness Tome identified as the driver of the green truck, Sumagang, but who actually was Tigoy (as he was the driver of the green truck and who came to the road block first, being the lead driver) offered "S.O.P." which to Tigoy (as he was the driver of the green truck and who came to the road block first, being the lead driver) offered "S.O.P." which to witness Tome meant that the trucks were carrying "hot items."
witness Tome meant that the trucks were carrying "hot items."
Why would the drivers refuse to stop when
Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they fear inspection required? Did they fear inspection of their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which of their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which in streetin street
parlance is grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks? The only logical answer to all these questions is that the drivers parlance is grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks? The only logical answer to all these questions is that the drivers knew that they were carrying contraband lumber. This Court believes that the drivers had knowledge of the fact that they were transporting knew that they were carrying contraband lumber. This Court believes that the drivers had knowledge of the fact that they were transporting and were in possession of undocumented lumber in violation of law.
and were in possession of undocumented lumber in violation of law.
In offenses considered as
In offenses considered as mala prohibitamala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the present case, theor when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously.
special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously.
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proven by Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. It is not even required acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. It is not even required that the participants have an agreement for an appreciable period to commence it
People vs Que dec 17, 1996
People vs Que dec 17, 1996
DOCTRINE
DOCTRINE
In the first offense, one
In the first offense, one can raise as a can raise as a defense the legality of said adefense the legality of said a cts. However, in the second offense, mere possession without proper cts. However, in the second offense, mere possession without proper documentation consummates the crime.
documentation consummates the crime.
Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass throug
through Ilocos Norte. h Ilocos Norte. ActinActing on g on said informasaid information, members of the tion, members of the PTF went on PTF went on patrol severapatrol several times within the l times within the vicinitvicinity of y of GenerGeneralal Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.
Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area.
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At aboutAt about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and R
1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. izal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw aThirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PA
ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. D-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at tThey followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.he Marcos Bridge.
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O
as amended by E.O. 277. . 277. The Information alleged:The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8
That on or about the 8ththday of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorableday of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities
from the proper authorities
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him.
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legaltanguile lumber from a legal source.
source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and NaturalDuring the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa
Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa[13][13]and Elpidio Sabaland Elpidio Sabal..[14][14]The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from theThe PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the
forest area covered by the permit.
forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th PLTP’s of Cayosa andHe alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th PLTP’s of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services
Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services
ISSUE: ISSUE:
Whether or not Appellant’s activities consist an offense Whether or not Appellant’s activities consist an offense
HELD HELD
YES. Possession of the lumber without the ne
YES. Possession of the lumber without the ne cessary permit is a violation of cessary permit is a violation of the RFC.the RFC.
When the police apprehended Que, he failed to present documentary evidence to prove that he has the permit to possess and transport the When the police apprehended Que, he failed to present documentary evidence to prove that he has the permit to possess and transport the lumber. All he had was the permit for the coconut slabs. He even concealed the lumber so as to avoid it from being seen upon first lumber. All he had was the permit for the coconut slabs. He even concealed the lumber so as to avoid it from being seen upon first inspection of the load.
inspection of the load.
Under the circumstances, there is no doubt that the accused was aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber, but Under the circumstances, there is no doubt that the accused was aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber, but could not secure one and therefore, concealed such by placing it in such a manner that it could not be seen by merely looking at the cargo. could not secure one and therefore, concealed such by placing it in such a manner that it could not be seen by merely looking at the cargo.
There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code: There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code:
a.
a. By cBy cututtitingng, ga, gaththererining ang and/d/or cor colollelecticting tng timimber ber or oor othther fer fororesest prt prodoductucts wis withthouout a lit a licencensese; an; andd
b
b.. By pBy posossesessssing ing titimbmber oer or or othether for forerest pst proroduductcts ws witithohout tut the rhe requequirired led legegal dal dococumumentents.s.
In the first offense, one can
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the leraise as a defense the le gality of said acts. However, in the gality of said acts. However, in the second offense, mere possession without proper second offense, mere possession without proper documentation consummates the crime.
