Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan...3
INDING VS SANDIGANBAYAN...3
Marilyn Geduspan v. People...3
Rule 110, Sec. 1...4
SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED v. EDGAR C. LIM,...4
Rule 110, Sec. 4...4
Leviste v Alameda...4
RULE 110, Section 5...5
JIMMY T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO...5
Rule 110, Sec. 6...5
Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines...5
Rule 110, Sec. 8 & 9...6
Michael Malto vs. People...6
Rule 110, Sec. 11...6
People v. Zaldy Ibanez...6
Rule 110, Sec. 13...6
Hilario Soriano vs. People of the Philippines...6
Rule 110, Sec. 14...8
Dino v. Olivarez...8
Quintin Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan...8
Rule 110, Sec. 15...9
Hector Trenas v. People...9
Rule 111, Sec. 1...9
Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos vs. Court of Appeals. 9 Rule 111, Sec. 4...10
Asilo vs. People of the Philippines...10
Rule 111, Sec. 5, 6 & 7...10
Magestrado vs. People and Librojo...10
SPS. JOSE VS. SPS. SUAREZ...11 Dreamworks v. Janiola...11 De Zuzuarregui vs Villarosa...12 Rule 112, Sec. 1...13 De Chavez vs. OMB...13 Ricaforte vs. Jurado...13 Rule 112, Sec. 2...14 Turingan vs. Garfin...14
Marina Schroeder v. Saldevar...14
Payakan Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan..15
SHARON CASTRO vs. HON. MERLIN DELORIA...15
Sps. Chua v. Ang...16
Rule 112, Sec. 3...16
People v. Emiliano Anonas...16
Ladlad vs. Velasco...17
Rule 112, Sec. 4...18
DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ vs. WILFREDO R. CRUZ...18
Adasa v Abalos...19
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo...20
Jose Gonzales vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation...20
Summerville v. Eugenio...20
Rule 112, Sec. 5...21
JUDGE ESPAÑOL vs. JUDGE TOLEDO-MUPAS...21
Rule 112, Sec. 6...22
Manolo Adriano v. Judge Bercades;...22
Rule 113, Sec. 3...22
People vs. Nunez...22
Rule 113, Sec. 5...23
Pp vs. Carlos Dela Cruz...23
Rule 126, Sec. 2...23
Sps. Marimla vs. People and Judge Viola...23
Rule 126, Sec. 4...23
Sony Music Entertainment vs. Hon. Espanol...24
Andy Quelnan vs. PP...24
COCA-COLA vs. GOMEZ...24
Rule 126, Sec. 13...25
People vs. Mariacos...25
Rule 126, Sec. 14...25
MANLY SPORTWEAR vs. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES...25
Rule 114, Sec. 1...27
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia...27
Rule 114, Sec. 3...28
P/Supt Orbe v. Digandgang...28
Ambil vs. SB...28
Rule 114, Sec. 4 & 5...28
Eduardo San Miguel v. Judge Maceda...29
Rufina Chua v. CA and Chiok...29
People v. SB and Jinggoy Estrada...30
OCA v. Judge Lorenzo...31
Leviste v. CA...33
Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara...34
Rule 114, Sec. 7...34
Laarni Valerio v. CA...34
Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante...35
Rule 114, Sec. 15...36
Rasmia Tabao v. Judge Barataman...36
Rule 114, Sec. 16...36
Judge Simbulan v. Judge Bartolome...36
Rule 114, Sec. 17...37
Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint...37
Purita Lim v. Judge Dumlao...38
Rule 114, Sec. 17 and 19...39
Virginia Savella v. Judge Ines...39
Rule 114, Sec. 8, 15, 18...39
Torrevillas v. Judge Navidad...39
Rule 114, Sec. 21...40
Mendoza v. Alarma...40
WILFREDO TALAG v. JUDGE REYES...41
Rule 114, Sec. 22 and 24...42
Bongcac v. SB...42
People v. Cawaling...42
Rule 114, Sec. 26...43
Borlongan v. Pena...43
Rule 116, Sec. 1[g]...55
People v. Alfredo Pangilinan...55
Olbes v. Judge Buemio...56
Rule 116, Sec. 3...56
People v. Rogelio Gumimba...56
Rule 116, Sec. 9...57
Hubert Webb v. Judge de Leon...57
Rule 116, Sec. 11...58
Spouses Trinidad v. Ang...58
Rule 117, Sec. 3...58
MELBAROSE SASOT v. PEOPLE...58
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo...59
Rule 117, Sec. 4, 5...60
Rafael Gonzalez v. Judge Salvador...60
Rule 117, Sec. 7...63
People v. Nazareno...63
Tan v. People...63
Rule 117, Sec. 8...64
People v. Panfilo Lacson...64
Rule 117, Sec. 9...65
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan INDING VS SANDIGANBAYAN Facts:
City Councilor Ricardo Inding was charged before the SB for violations of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Accordingly, he faked buy-bust operations against alleged drug pushers and users to enable him to collect from the coffers of the local government as reimbursement for the actual expenses incurred, thereby causing undue injury to the government.
Inding filed a motion for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. He contended that the SB has jurisdiction to try cases only to those officers who have a Salary Grade 27 or higher; and not to him who as a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is having only a SG 25. Hence, the crime must be tried in the RTC.
Issue: WON the SB has jurisdiction over petitioner Inding?
Held:
- Positive. RA 7975 as amended by RA 8249; expanded the jurisdiction of the SB. Sec. 4 (a); Par. 1 (b) of the said act “specifically includes” ; “city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other department heads”, fall within the jurisdiction of the SB; without classification and regardless of their salary grades.
- In addition, when the legislature approved the acts mentioned, it was fully aware that not all positions specifically mentioned in Section 4 were classified as SG 27; and yet were specifically included therein.
- Therefore, petitioner fell under the jurisdiction of the SB by express provision of a law.
Marilyn Geduspan v. People
G.R. No. 158187 February 11, 2005 Facts: On July 11, 2002, an information, for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr.
Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director/Manager of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26.
Geduspan cites paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? YES.
Held: Petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of the offense and that position was among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense; (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘Grade 27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) xxx xxx xxx (e) xxx xxx xxx (f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations." (Underscoring supplied).
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the above–quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her. The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Rule 110, Sec. 1
SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED v. EDGAR C. LIM, Facts:
Sanrio filed a complaint against Edgar Lim for violation of the Intellectual Property Code.
Lim asserted that he did not violate the provisions of the IPC since he was only a retailer and that he obtained his merchandise from authorized manufacturers of Sanrio products.
After the case was elevated to the CA, the appellate court dismissed it on the ground of prescription since no complaint was filed in court within 2 years after the commission of the alleged violation.
Sanrio now contends that the pendency of a preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Issue:
W/N the pendency of a preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Held:
Yes.
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts on the day such an offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against the accused.
In the case at bar, Sanrio filed his complaint with the Task Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) on April 4, 2002 or 1 year, 10 mos., and 4 days after the NBI searched Lim’s premises and seized the Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information was immediately filed in court, Lim’s alleged violation had not yet prescribed.
Rule 110, Sec. 4 Leviste v Alameda
This case involves Former Governor of Batangas Antonio Leviste who shot dead his employee in 2007. The pertinent facts to our subject are as follows: Leviste was, by Information, charged with homicide for the death of De las Alas. This was filed in the court presided by Judge Alameda.
The heirs of de las Alas filed a motion for reinvestigation. This was granted and the Information was amended. The felony of homicide was replaced with murder.
Leviste contended that the heirs did not have the right to cause the reinvestigation when the criminal information had already been filed with the lower court.
Under the rules, ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the ACCUSED is given another opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation. In the case at bar, the heirs of de las Alas or the private complainant is the party which asked for reinvestigation and was subsequently granted.
The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether de las Alas or A private complainant could invoke a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.
Issue: Whether or not the information was validly amended
Ruling: YES. The heirs of de las Alas can move for reinvestigation provided that it shall be done with the conformity of the public prosecutor.
(In case the conformity of the public prosecutor will be asked.)
***There shall be another preliminary investigation. In the case at bar, what was conducted was a reinvestigation. The court ruled that There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder.
RULE 110, Section 5
JIMMY T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO Facts: Petitioner Go and respondent Looyuko were business associates. Looyuko is the registered owner of a sole proprietorship of the businesses which are collectively known as the Noah’s Ark Group of Companies. Go was the business manager or chief operating officer of the group of companies.
Sometime in 1997, the business associates had a falling out that spawned numerous civil lawsuits. Among these actions are Civil Case No. 67921 and Criminal Case No. 98-1643 from which arose several incidents which eventually became subject of these consolidated petitions.
On May 21, 1998, petitioner filed People of the Philippines v. Alberto T. Looyuko, an Affidavit Complaint18 before the Makati City RTC, Branch 56, charging Looyuko with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-1643. Go alleged that respondent misappropriated and converted in his name petitioner’s 41,376 China Banking Corporation (CBC) shares of stock. Petitioner
averred that he entrusted the stock certificates to respondent for the latter to sell.
Petitioner Go filed another petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62296. It sought to reverse the orders of the trial court declaring petitioner to have waived his right to formally offer his documentary evidence and allowing respondent to file a demurrer to evidence.
The CA explained that the petition was initiated solely by petitioner and was dismissible for it did not implead nor have the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General. And, on the merits, the appellate court ruled that the voluntary inhibition prayed by petitioner had no legal and factual basis. The appellate court found that three (3) alleged grounds of partiality raised by petitioner were not badges of partiality.
Issue: W/ N there is violation of Sec. 5, Rule 110 on the part of petitioner Go.
Held: Petitioner Go filed the two petitions before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58639 and CA-G.R. SP No. 62296 involving incidents arising from the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 98-1643. It can be observed from the two petitions that they do not reflect the conformity of the trial prosecutor assigned to said criminal case. This is in breach of Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that requires that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted "under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." Although in rare occasions, the offended party as a "person aggrieved" was allowed to file a petition under Rule 65 before the CA without the intervention of the Solicitor General,55 the instant petitions before the CA, as a general rule, should be filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State and not solely by the offended party.56
For non-compliance with the rules, the twin petitions could have been rejected outright. However, in view of the death of respondent Looyuko, these procedural matters are now mooted and rendered insignificant.
Rule 110, Sec. 6
Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines Facts:
Eugene Firaza was appointed as a confidential agent of the NBI in Caraga Regional Office. He was issued with a firearm and a mission order to gather and report to the NBU such information as may be relevant to the investigations undertaken by it.
Firaza also served as a manager for RF Communications in connection on which he dealt with Christopher Rivas (Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur), for the establishment of Public Calling Office in the Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
On August 11, 2000, while in Firaza and Rivas had their meeting at the latter’s restaurant, a heated argument commenced between them which opted Rivas to point his gun at Rivas. Firazo was accosted by P/Insp. Mullanida and PO2 Ronquillo by which they discovered that Firaza’s permit to carry firearm outside residence had expired more a month earlier or on July 5, 2000.
A criminal complaint was filed against Firaza for “Unauthorized Carrying of License Firearm Outside Residence.” He was then convicted that offense. Firaza now argued that the complaint charged against him should be “Illegal Possession of Firearms” and not “Carrying Firearms Outside of Residence” as the phrase in the complaint reads “with expired license or permit to carry outside residence…” being “merely descriptive of the alleged unlicensed nature of the firearm.
Issue:
WON the complaint was sufficient. Held:
Yes. The allegations in a complaint on information determine what the offense is charge. The allege acts or omissions complained of constituting the offense need not be in the terms of the statute determining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as the qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce its judgment.
Firaza cannot seriously claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. For the transcript of Stenographic notes of the proceedings before the trial court shows that he, through his counsel, was duly informed of the nature of the cause against him.
The mission order issued to Firaza authorized him to carry firearms “in connection with confidential cases assigned to him.” Admittedly, Firaza was at Riva’s restaurant in connection with a private business transaction. Additionally, the mission order did not authorize him to carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.
Rule 110, Sec. 8 & 9 Michael Malto vs. People FACTS:
Information was filed against Michael for violation of RA 7610, Section 5(a), par. 3, Article III (Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution). However, it did not allege anything pertaining to or connected with prostitution. What it charged was that he had carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA, which is Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
Despite such, the RTC in its dispositive portion convicted Michael for violation of Section 5(a) of RA 7610 which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: Is the information fatally defective? HELD:
The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined by Facts Alleged in the Information, Not By the Designation
The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information.
The facts stated in the amended information against Michael correctly made out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly proven during trial.
Rule 110, Sec. 11 People v. Zaldy Ibanez Facts:
Zaldy Ibanes w as charged with three counts of rape of his own daughter. Lower courts convicted him of the Rape.
Zaldy filed an appeal raising as issue that the lower courts erred in not considering the informations as insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to state the precise dates of the commission of the alleged rapes, it being an essential element of the crime.
He avers that the formations are not explicit and certain as to the dates of the rapes. He
argues that such uncertainties run afoul to his Constitutional Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Issue: Whether the dates of the alleged offense are essential ingredient of the crime of rape and thus must be indispensable in the information filed by the prosecution.
Held: NO.
An information is as valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In the prosecution of rape, the material fact to be considered is the occurrence of rape not the time of its commission.
The gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowlwdge of a woman. The precise time of the crime has no essential bearing on its commission. Therefore it is not essential to be alleged in the information.
Rule 110, Sec. 13
Hilario Soriano vs. People of the Philippines Facts:
A letter was transmitted to the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno by the Office of Special Investigation of the BSP. The letter was attached with five affidavits that would serve as the bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to PD No. 1689, and for violation of Section 83 of RA 337 as amended by PD 1795 against Hilario Soriano. It alleged that spouses Enrico and Amalia Castro appeared to have an outstanding loan of 8Million Pesos with the Rural Bank of San Miguel, but they had never applied for nor received such loan and that it was Soriano, the president of RBSM who ordered, facilitated, and received such loan without the authorization of RBSM Board of Directors. The letter of the OSI, which was not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against Soriano.
Acting on the letter-request and its annexes, State Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier proceeded with the preliminary investigation. He issued a subpoena with the witnesses’ affidavits and supporting documents attached, and required petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit. In due course, the investigating officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause and correspondingly filed two separate informations against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.
Soriano moved to quash the information. One of the grounds for such motion was that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. he argued that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and subscription. Moreover, Soriano argued that the officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the "letter-complaint," were not authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint. According to Soriano, this alleged fatal oversight violated Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).
The RTC denied Soriano’s Motion to Quash for lack of Merit. He also filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA, however, this was denied.
Issue:
WON the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA NO. 7653.
Held:
On March 5, 2007, the Court noted petitioner's Manifestation and Motion for Partial Withdrawal of the Petition36 dated February 7, 2007. In the said motion, petitioner informed the Court of the promulgation of a Decision entitled Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, which also involved petitioner and similar BSP letters to the DOJ. According to petitioner, the said Decision allegedly ruled squarely on the nature of the BSP letters and the validity of the sworn affidavits attached thereto.
We held in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, after a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that these were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the
witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
We further held that since the offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be initiated by "any competent person" with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the offender.
Furthermore the case of Santos-concio vs. DOJ it held that: The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all allegations in one document denominated as "complaint-affidavit." It does not pronounce strict adherence to only one approach, however, for there are cases where the extent of one’s personal knowledge may not cover the entire gamut of details material to the alleged offense. The private offended party or relative of the deceased may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which case the peace officer or law enforcer has to rely chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not in fact preclude the attachment of a referral or transmittal letter similar to that of the NBI-NCR. Thus, in Soriano v. Casanova, the Court held:
A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ shows that these were not intended to be the complaint envisioned under the Rules. It may be clearly inferred from the tenor of the letters that the officers merely intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank employees to the DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any averment on the part of the BSP and PDIC officers of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of the criminal violations alleged to have been made by the accused. In fact, the letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for preliminary investigation the affidavits and personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public. Since the affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, were intended to initiate the preliminary investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court was substantially complied with. Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito, the Court of Appeals correctly held that a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. The crime of estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by "any competent person." The witnesses who executed the affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall within the purview of "any competent person" who may institute
the complaint for a public crime. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied)
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise. The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Monserate does not appear to dent this proposition. After all, what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant the eventual prosecution of the case in court.
Following the foregoing rulings in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, we hold that the BSP letter, taken together with the affidavits attached thereto, comply with the requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653.
Rule 110, Sec. 14 Dino v. Olivarez
Facts: Bienvenido Dino and Renato Comparado charged Pablito Olivarez of vote buying. Two informations were filed against Olivarez for violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Art. 22 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Before arraignment, Olivarez moved to quash the two criminal informations on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein. The assistant prosecutor opposed such motion and likewise moved for the amendment of the information, this time only charging Olivarez with violation of paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b of Section 261, Article 22 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Olivarez opposed the motion for the amendment of the information alleging that there was no resolution to explain the changes therein, particularly the deletion of paragraph k. He likewise posits that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the informations since COMELEC had already directed it to transmit all the records of the case.
When Olivarez failed to show up for his arraignment the judge denied his petition to quash the informations and likewise admitted the amended complaint.
Subsequently, the COMELEC, upon Olivarez motion, revoked the deputation of the prosecutor to investigate and prosecute election offense cases.
Issue/s: WON the City the Amended Informations should be admitted.
Ruling: The Supreme Court finds that the prosecutors, in filing the Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC. The resolution which effectively revoked the deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor was issued on April 4, 2005, after the Amended informations were filed on October 28, 2004.
Furthermore, the letter of the director of the Law Department of COMELEC did not revoke the continuing authority granted to the City Prosecutor. It merely directed the latter to forward the records of the case to COMELEC. The filing of the amended informations was not made in defiance to the order of the Director, rather, it was an act necessitated by the developments of the case.
Moreover, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. x x x. (Emphasis provided.)
Since the Rules of Court provided for a remedy that would avert the dismissal of the informations on the ground that more than one offense was charged, the public prosecutor filed the Amended Informations. The instructions of the COMELEC were clearly intended to allow sufficient time to reconsider the merit of the joint resolution, not to have the public prosecutor abandon the prosecution of the case and negligently allow its dismissal by not filing the Amended Informations, thus leaving the COMELEC in a quandary should it later dismiss the appeal before it. by filing the Amended Informations, the public prosecutor had avoided such undesirable situation, which would have forced the COMELEC to re-file the case, waste government resources, and delay the administration of justice.
Quintin Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan Facts:
An Information was filed charging both of Mayor Saludaga and SPO2 Geni of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the government. A Motion to Quash filed by Saludaga was granted for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused to the government. A new Information was filed charging Saludaga and Genio for violation of Sec. 3(e), by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government. Saludaga contends that
the change from undue injury to the government to giving unwarranted benefit would constitute as a substitution or a substantial amendment.
Issue:
Whether or not the changes made in the new Information filed is a substitution or a substantial amendment.
Ruling:
There is no substitution because only the mode of the commission of the crime was changed. The nature of the offense charged is still the same. Causing undue injury and giving unwarranted benefit are modes of violating Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The SC also ruled that there was no substantial amendment when there was a shift from giving undue injury to giving unwarranted benefit. The Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information.
Rule 110, Sec. 15 Hector Trenas v. People Facts:
A complaint for estafa was file agains Trenas with the RTC of Makati City.
Trenas contends that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Trenas asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the money that was given to and received by him took place in Makati; the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by him was signed and notarized in Iloilo City; the only time Makati was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by him was dishonored by Equitable PCI Bank in Makati.; and that the prosecution failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa occurred in Makati.
Issue:
W/N the RTC of Makati failed to acquire jurisdiction over his case.
Held:
Yes.
It is a fundamental principle that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court in a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so show, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence and during trial which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
Rule 111, Sec. 1
Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
While everyone was asleep, the household of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos were attacked by a number of assailants killing Sarah herself and her uncle Erasmo Palma while her another uncle Victor Palma and friend Beningno Oquendo survived the attack.
Based on the theory of the police, the cause for such attack is attributed to the land transaction that gone sour between Sarah’s live-in partner, David So and Johnny Co.
Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresnencio Aman and Romeo Martin and both executed confession allegedly admitting their part in the attack.
They also admitted the participation of Artemio Bergonia, Danilo Sy, and Co who allegedly to be the mastermind. However, these three remained at large. The RTC acquitted Aman and Martin.
Ten years after, Co surrendered to the NBI. He was then charged with two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing, the RTC granted the bail on the ground that the evidence presented against Co was not strong.
The heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied such, hence the heirs of Sarah filed a special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed it for the reason that it was filed without involving the Office of the Solicitor General, which is in violation of the jurisprudence and
the Law (Sec. 35 Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code)
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Special Civil Action of certiorari, which questioned the RTC’s grant of bail to Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without Office of the Solicitor General.
Held:
Yes. The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant, is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action
The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits. Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him.
But, when the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the case on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability.
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.
Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
Rule 111, Sec. 4
Asilo vs. People of the Philippines Facts:
This case involves the acts of the late Mayor Comendador who authorized the demolition of the stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial order. The said demolition was supervised by Asilo and Angeles. The acts of the three mentioned – Asilo, Mayor Comendador and Angeles prompted the Spouses Bombasi to file a civil action for damages before the RTC and a separate criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3e of R.A. 3019. Upon arraignment the three accused all pleaded not guilty. (Note: After the arraignment the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of the civil with the criminal case. ) However during the pendency of the case, Mayor Comendador died. Notwithstanding the Manifestation of Mayor Comendador’s counsel informing the court of the Mayor’s death, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Comendador and Asilo guilty for violating Section 3e of R.A. 3019 and also held them civilly liable to Spouses Bombasi (No liability si Angeles as he died ahead of Mayor Comendador, the difference is when nag file ng motion to drop ang counsel ni Angeles, there was no objection on the part of the public prosecutor). The counsel for the late Mayor filed a Motion for reconsideration alleging that the death of Mayor Comendador extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion as to the extinction of the criminal liability but upheld Mayor Comendador’s civil liability.
Issue: WON the death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case also extinguished his civil liability. No.
Ruling: The death of Mayor Comendador did not extinguish his civil liability because his civil liability is not predicated upon the violation of R.A. 3019 but upon his violation as provided under Art. 32(6) of the Civil Code. The Mayor, by authorizing the demolition of the stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial order is tantamount to depriving the Spouses Bombasi of their property without due process. Hence, his civil liability stands
Rule 111, Sec. 5, 6 & 7
Magestrado vs. People and Librojo
FACTS Elena Librojo filed 2 cases against Magestrado:
1. Criminal action for perjury in the MeTC
2. Civil action for collection of sum of money in the RTC
On the other hand, Magestrado filed a civil action against Librojo for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of title and Damages in the RTC.
Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. He alleged that the civil cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City must be resolved first before the criminal case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.
ISSUE WON there exists a prejudicial question. HELD No. there is no prejudicial question.
Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. – A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
The determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.
determination of whether a loan was obtained by and whether Magestrado executed a real estate mortgage involving a property. On the other hand, Criminal Case involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT.
The civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss.
SPS. JOSE VS. SPS. SUAREZ [G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008]
FACTS: Spouses Suarez had availed of Carolina Jose’s offer to lend money at daily interest of 1% to 2% which the latter increased to 5% and Spouses Suarez were forced to accept due to their financial distress. They sought to nullify the 5% interest per day fixing claiming that the same were contrary to morals and done under vitiated consent. Thereafter, the Spouses Jose herein filed cases of violation of BP22 against Sps. Suarez where the latter filed motions to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question. Herein Sps. Suarez claimed that if the 5%interest rates are nullified and loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the checks which are objects of BP22 cases are not only fully paid but in fact over paid.
Accordingly, the trial court as well as the appellate court concluded that if the checks subject of the criminal cases were later on declared null and void, then said checks could not be made the bases of criminal prosecutions under B.P. Blg. 22. In other words, the outcome of the determination of the validity of the said checks is determinative of guilt or innocence of Purita in the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a prejudicial questions exists such that the outcome of the validity of the interest is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal case. NO
HELD: Prejudicial questions have two elements: a) The civil actions involve an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of
the guilt of the respondents in the criminal case. The cause or reason for issuance of a check is immaterial in determining criminal culpability under BP22. The law punishes the issuance of the bouncing check and not the purpose it was issued for.
The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under B.P. Blg. 22. In several instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved. Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been issued.
Dreamworks v. Janiola
Facts: On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the
grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Issue: W/N there is a prejudicial question in this case. SC: The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
Ruling: It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner.
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.
NB: Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
De Zuzuarregui vs Villarosa
This is regarding Bella Torres’s estate. When she died, a compromise agreement was entered into by Rosemary Torres (Bella’s daughter) and Krizia Torres-de Zuzuarregui(Bella’s granddaughter and Rosemary’s niece) regarding the letters of administration of Bella’s estate. In said compromise agreement, they both alleged that they are the only leaving heirs of Bella, and that they have reached an amicable settlement regarding Bella’s estate. The same was approved by the RTC.
However, subsequently after the RTC decision, three others claimed to be living heirs of Bella (Peter, Catherine, and Fannie). These three filed a petition to annul the said compromise agreement as they are also legal and living heirs of Bella.
While the case in the CA is still pending, Fannie filed a criminal complaint against Rosemary and Krizia for perjury and falsification in the MeTC. She alleges that these two committed these crimes when they falsified a sworn statement claiming to be the only living heirs of Bella in the compromise agreement, when in truth and fact, three others are also living heirs.
Rosemary and Krizia motioned to suspend proceedings in the MeTC. They invoke prejudicial question.
Issue: Whether or not there is prejudicial question in the case at bar.
Ruling: Yes, there is aprejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal case against Rosemary and Krizia.
Requisites of Prejudicial question:
1.) The facts and issues raised in the previously instituted civil action are intimately related with the issues in the criminal case;
2.) The resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in the criminal case.
It is evident, in the case at bar, that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in the criminal case for perjury and falsification. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in the estate, then there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against Rosemary and Krizia, who could not have committed perjury and falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC, for the truth of her statements regarding Peter, Catherine, and Fannie having been judicially settled
Rule 112, Sec. 1 De Chavez vs. OMB
Facts: On 7 November 2001, private respondent Nora L. Magnaye (Magnaye), Professor IV of the Batangas State University (BSU), filed with the public respondent an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interests of the Service, Falsification of Official Documents, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty and Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as "CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES" against petitioners.
Subsequently, on 13 November 2001, based on the above imputed acts plus an additional one,7 private respondent also filed with the public respondent another Complaint imputing criminal liability to the BSU officials above-named for Violation of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT," Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, Falsification of Official Documents and Estafa. After the conduct of a clarificatory hearing14 and upon submission of both parties of their respective position papers, the public respondent, through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao with Director Joaquin F. Salazar and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez concurring, issued its Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005 in 1036-K and OMB-1-01-1083-K recommending the indictment of petitioners De Chavez, Lontok, Sr., and Mendoza for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019. It, however, proposed the dismissal of the complaints against petitioners Ligaya and Lontok, Jr., and other officials of BSU namely, Lualhati, Zaraspe, and Montalbo for lack of probable cause.
Upon review by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, he issued a Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005 "partially approving" with modifications the Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005. Among other findings, he found petitioners de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Mendoza liable for violation of Section 3(e) and (h) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for violation of Article 315(2)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. He also found petitioners de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Ligaya guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, and, thus, imposed on them the penalty of Dismissal from the Service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
Issue: WON the OMB committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in "convincting" De Chavez et. al.
Held: NO.
Petitioners make mountain on the use of the words "liable for violation x x x" employed by the Ombudsman. A review of the specific powers of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, the laws and jurisprudential pronouncements is in order. Both the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770) empower the public respondent to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.22 By virtue of this power,23 it may conduct a preliminary investigation for the mere purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no objective except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is guilty thereof.25 In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so.FOOTNOTE: simply put, the OMB merely found probable cause against De Chavez, et.al. finding them to be LIABLE for committing the said offenses and be subjected to the appropriate penalties. No Conviction was EVER MADE by the OMB.
Ricaforte vs. Jurado
Facts: Leon Jurado filed a complaint before the prosecutor's office charging Alicia Ricaforte of violation of BP 22 and estafa. Ricaforte alleged that Aguilar who had lost her Metrobank checkbook borrowed her checks to pay off Aguilar’s obligations with Leon Jurado under the condition that Aguilar will replace these checks with her own once Metrobank issued her a new checkbook. Ricaforte likewise claime that when Aguilar issued the replacement checks, the former asked Jurado to return her checks but Jurado
refused and that's when Ricaforte asked her bank to issue a stop payment order and that's why the checks where dishonored.
The Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estafa and BP 22 for insufficiency of evidence.Jurado's motion for reconsideration was denied and so he appealed before the Secretary of Justice. The Justice Secretary modified the decision of the prosecutor's office and ordered the filing of an information for violation of BP 22 against Ricaforte.
The motion for reconsideration was denied and the CA upheld the decision of the Justice Secretary. It ruled that trial on the merits must ensue since it is on said occasion that petitioner is granted opportunity for a full and exhaustive presentation of her evidence and not during the preliminary investigation phase where the investigating officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief; that in the preliminary investigation phase, it is not yet clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the offense charged and sought to be punished, although petitioner is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; that the crux of the matter rests upon the reasons for the drawing of the postdated checks by petitioner; i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value" as required under B.P. Blg. 22 which will only be determined during trial.Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON trial on the merits must ensue ensue for violation of BP 22.
Ruling: Yes. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of
arbitrariness, credence is given to the finding and determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation.
Herein case is still in the preliminary investigation stage which is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Rule 112, Sec. 2 Turingan vs. Garfin
G.R. No. 153284 Facts:
An Information was filed against Apolinar charging him for violation of relating sections in R.A. 8282 (Social Security Act) for non-remittance of social security and employees’ compensation. The Information was signed by state prosecutor Tolentino accompanied by a certification also signed by Tolentino. Apolinar contends that the state prosecutor Tolentino lacked authority to sign the Information. Respondent Judge Garfin (Branch 19 RTC, Naga) dismissed the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. Issue:
Whether or not the state prosecutor had the authority to file the Information without a written authority or approval of the provincial state prosecutor.
Ruling:
Toletino lacked authority to file the Information because there was neither a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating him as special prosecutor for SSS cases nor the written approval of the Information by the city prosecutor. An information field by an officer without authority to do so is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured. Judge Garfin correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Note:
The special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information.
Marina Schroeder v. Saldevar Facts: