Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). 2 Three children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), 3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985
(Exh. C), 4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). 5
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992. 6
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the
parties. 7 Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial. 8 Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows: 9
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E). 10 When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in
Dasmariñas, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F). 11
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H). 12
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) 13 with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale(Exh. K) 14 was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) 15 was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten
letter 16 to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney 17 and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to fill a petition for the annulment of their marriage. It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough,
although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro
corroborated petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner. 18
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 19 dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: 20
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the
petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated" to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) — not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; xxx xxx xxx
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; xxx xxx xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
xxx xxx xxx
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions
psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the "gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioner's marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 21 the Court of Appeals held: 22
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellant's declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband's character was on the "borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husband's youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred —
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00 PER CHILD. V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private respondent's psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 23
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 24 we held:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent's parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 25
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salaita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. 26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 27 We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even
finality. 28 Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
epublic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 106429 June 13, 1994
JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, vs.
HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.
Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioner.
Yolanda, Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity. The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the interpretation of Art. 36 of the Family Code. 1 Rather, the issue is the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition.
The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7 January 1992. Therein it is alleged that "[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only
thereafter." 2 Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. 3 Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that —
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the "assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . ." 4 But finding the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us. However, we referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution.
On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her petition thus —
In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salita’s alleged psychological incapacity in his bill of particulars . . .
In our view, the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the Rules’ requirement that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiff’s cause of action. To require more details thereof, to insist on a specification of Salita’s particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding ‘circumstances of time, place and person’ indicating her alleged psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. To obtain evidentiary details, Salita may avail herself of the different modes of discovery provided by the Rules of Court
(Rules 24 to 28).
Whether Espinosa’s averments in his bill of particulars constitute psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code is a question that may be
resolved in a motion to dismiss or after trial on the merits of the case, not in a motion for bill of particulars. And certainly, that matter cannot be resolved in the present petition. 5
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita Salita questioning the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying due course to her petition.
Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not call for
information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point. He defines ultimate facts as —
. . . important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to
principal, determinate facts upon the existence of which the entire cause of action rests. 6
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts . . . 7
Private respondent further argues that "[c]onclusions of law and evidentiary matters need not be stated in the complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of the cause of action only to such operative facts as would give rise to the right of action of the plaintiff to obtain relief against the wrongdoer. The details of probative matter or particulars of evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need not be stated." 8
In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will support." 10 As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. 11A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means. 12
We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private respondent’s cause of action against her thus —
. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. 13 For sure,
the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars. 14 We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic 15 where we said —
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case. That ruling involves alleged "misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power." The respondents therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. There, the alleged illicit acts should be fully documented. The instant case, on the other hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse will have to prove his case, but that will not come until trial begins.
Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of the annulment proceeding which have already been delayed for more than two years now, even before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.
A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code. 16 We do not see the need to define or limit the scope of the provision. Not in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do so, the actual controversy being the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. To interpret the provision at this juncture would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides, it appears that petitioner in her memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family code, explains —
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 17
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated 21 July 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3 Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4 The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured. Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and
there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in
consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads: Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae). So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is
due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a
binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare
marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years; 4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child; 5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife. Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
