Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano
Case Title Quick Facts Held/Ratio/Doctrine
Davao Sawmill v. Castillo August 7, 1935
Malcolm, J.
A lessee placed machinery in a building erected on land belonging to another, with the understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass on the lessor on the expiration of the lease.
Lessee also treated the machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of 3rd persons
The machinery unit must be classified as a personal property.
Machinery which is movable in its nature becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as an agent of the owner. Berkenkotter v. Cu Unjieng e Hijos
July 31, 1935 Villa-Real, J.
Mabalacat Sugar Co. obtained from D a loan secured by a 1st mortgage on 2 parcels of land “with all its buildings, improvements, mill, steel reailway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part or is a necessary complement of said […] or that may in the future exist in said lots.”
After some months, MSC bought additional machinery and equipment to increase its capacity.
Petitioner advanced the amount for the addt’l equipment, with promise to be reimbursed.
The installation of a machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar central constitutes a permanent improvement, which subjects said machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted thereon.
Lopez v. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc. February 28, 1958
Felix, J.
Orosa proposed to Lopez to invest in a theatre business, which would be erected on O’s land. Lopez refused, but agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the construction. Payment, as agreed, would be upon demand and not COD. Lopez was paid only a portion of the amount. As Lopez was demanding payment, O obtained a bank loan by mortgaging the theatre to pay for the balance due L. However, the theater was already mortgaged to PNB
Appellant’s contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of the materials used for the construction, repair or refection of a building is also extended to land on which it was constructed is without merit, because while it is true generally that real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what constitutes real property, could mean only one thing: that a building is by itself an immovable property
Associated Ins. & Surety Co. v. Iya May 30, 1958
Felix, J.
Sps. Valino owned and possessed a house of strong materials In Grace Park Subd, Caloocan, which they purchased on installment from PRC. Wife purchased rice with AISC as surety, and as counter-guaranty, executed a chattel mortgage on their house. At that time, the land was still in PRC’s name.
After completion of payment of purchase price, TCT in Valino’s name was secured. Then, to secure an indebtedness, executed a REM over the lot and house in favor of Iya.
A building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. It cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it was constructed belongs to another.
As personal properties could only be the subject of a chattel mortgage, the execution of a CM on a building is invalid and a nullity, the registration of the chattel notwithstanding.
Tumalad v. Vicencio Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Tumalads over their house of strong materials located at 550 Int. 3, Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, over Lot 6-B and 7-B, Block 2554, which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc.
When Vicencio and Simeon defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March 1956, the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest bidder, the Tumalads were issued the corresponding certificate of sale.
On 18 April 1956, the Tumalads commenced Civil Case 43073 in the municipal court of Manila, praying, among other things, that the house
Certain deviations from the rule in Lopez and Iya, however, have been allowed for various reasons.
Hence, if a house belonging to a person stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may be mortgaged as a personal property as so stipulated in the document of mortgage. It should be noted, however that the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house to be a chattel, a conduct that may conceivably estop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
Unlike in the Iya cases, Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatreand Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery and Williamson, wherein third persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage, it is the defendants-appellants themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking the
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano be vacated and its possession surrendered to them, and for Vicencio and
Simeon to pay rent of P200.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the time the possession is surrendered. MC ruled in favor of Tumalad Nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the mortgaged house had been demolished on 14 and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a decision obtained by the lessor of the land on which the house stood.
validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein defendants-appellants, having treated the subject house as personalty.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corp v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. May 16, 1983
De Castro, J.
To be able to secure financial accommodations from the petitioner, the private respondent discounted and assigned several receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement. To secure the collection of the receivables, a chattel mortgage was executed over machinery found in the factory of the private respondent.
As the private respondent failed to pay, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. Nonetheless, the sheriff was unable to seize the machinery. This prompted petitioner to file an action for replevin.
The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the return of the drive motor, after ruling that the machinery may not be the subject of a chattel mortgage, given that it was an immovable under the provisions of Article 415. The same was attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from the plant would be to drill the ground.
There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out that the machinery may be considered as personal property, and subject to a chattel mortgage. If a house may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage, what more a machinery,
which is movable by nature and
becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
Tumalad doctrine applies.
Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric Co. January 31, 1964.
Paredes, J.
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484 which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric street railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of Manila.
Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls, Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City.
These electric transmission wires which carry high voltage current, are fastened to
insulators attached on steel towers constructed by respondent at intervals, from its hydroelectric
plant in the province of Laguna to the
City of Manila. The respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
The City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under Tax.
The SC ruled that Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from taxation. The steel towers were considered personality because they were removable and merely attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and dismantled. Furthermore, they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached.
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation v. CBAA
May 31, 1982. Aquino, J.
Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of 1949, Republic Act No. 387, Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway.
The pipes are embedded in the soil while the valves are welded to the pipes so as to make the pipeline system one single piece of property from end to end.
Pursuant to the Assessment Law,
Commonwealth Act No. 470, the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declarations.
The Court ordered that CBAA did not with grave abuse and discretion and acted within its jurisdiction in sustaining the holding of the
provincial assessor that Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is subject to a realty tax for the following reasons that the pipes are machinery or improvements and regarded as realty because they are constructions adhered to the soil. It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without dismantling the steel pipes which are welded to the pipeline. In so far as the pipeline
uses valves, pumps and control devices to maintain the flow of the oil, it is in a sense a machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code.
Meralco v. CBAA May 31, 1982 Aquino, J.
This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks installed in 1969 by
Manila Electric Company on a lot in San Pascual, Batangas which it leased in 1968 from
Caltex (Phil.), Inc.
The storage tanks are made of steel plates welded and assembled on the spot. Their
bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost layer. The tank is not attached to its foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the concrete circular wall. Its bottom plate is not attached to any part
of the foundation by bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank merely sits on its foundation.
Pipelines were installed on the sides of each tank and are connected to the pipelines of the
Manila Enterprises Industrial Corporation.
The Board concludes that while the tanks rest or sit on their foundation, the foundation itself and the walls, dikes and steps, which are integral parts of the tanks, are affixed to the land while the pipelines are attached to the tanks and required Meralco to pay realty taxes on the two tanks.
The SC ruled that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the
considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations. Thus, the two tanks should be held subject to realty tax because they were considered real property.
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. CBAA May 31, 1982
Aquino, J.
This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land. The machines and equipment consists of underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps,
computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators.
The building or shed, the elevated water tank, the car hoist under a separate shed, the air compressor, the underground gasoline tank, neon lights signboard, concrete fence and pavement and the lot where they are all placed or erected, all of them used in the pursuance of the gasoline service station business formed
the entire gasoline service-station.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become
The Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements".
SC hold that the said equipment and
machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or
embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano the owner of the machines and equipment installed therein.
Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease. Benguet Corp. v. CBAA
January 29, 1993 Cruz, J.
Benguet Provincial Assessor: Assessed real property tax on the bunkhouses of petitioner Benguet Corporation occupied for residential purposes by its rank and file employees under Tax Declaration Nos. 8471 (1985) and 10454 (1986). The tax exemptions of bunkhouses under Sec. 3 of PD 745 was withdrawn by PD 1955.
Benguet Corp.: Appealed the decision to the LBAA of Benguet.
CBAA: held that the bldgs of petitioner used as dwellings were exempt from real property tax pursuant to PD 745.
LBAA: affirmed taxability of the bunkhouses. On appeal, CBAA held the exemption was withdrawn so petitioner should have applied for restoration of the exemption with the Fiscal Incentives Review Board. Benguet: LGUs don’t have any authority to levy realty taxes on mines pursuant to Sec. 52 of PD 463 and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code. Sol Gen: Benguet is estopped from raising the question of lack of authority as it was never raised before.
(1) The provisions of Sec. 52 of the Mineral Resources Dev’t Decree of 1974 (PD 463) and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code are mere limitations on the taxing power of LGUs; they are not pertinent to the issue before the SC. They cannot affect the imposition of the real property tax by the national government.
Although LGUs are charged with fixing the rates of real property tax, it does not follow that they also have the authority to determine WON they can impose the tax.
It is the national government that levies real property tax. When LGUs are required to fix the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the national government in the enforcement of the real property tax code. The delegation of taxing power is not even involved since the tax has already been imposed and the LGUs are just mandated to enforce it. If the SC were to sanction the interpretation of Benguet, then necessarily all real properties exempt by any law would be covered, and
there would be no need for congress to specify “Real Property Tax Code, as amended” instead of stating clearly realty tax exemption laws. The intention is to limit the application of the “exception clause” only to those given by the Real Property Tax Code.
La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources.
The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of “every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article
XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements -- as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
Chavez v. PEA This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of the government.
Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano title and possession over the Property, consisting of approximately One
Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter.
Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Usero v. CA Respondents build a concrete fence between their property and the property of the petitioners.
Petitioners assailed the building of the
said fence on the ground that the property was theirs.
The mere fact that there are water lilies on the space filled with water proves that there is a permanent stream of water or a creek there. The petitioners also failed to prove their claim of ownership. Art.420 – The phrase "others of similar
character" includes a creek which is a
recess or an arm of a river. It is property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private ownership. Being public water, a creek cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual.
Accordingly, the petitioners may utilize the rip-rapped portion of the creek to prevent the erosion of their property.
Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo March 25, 1926
Villamor, J.
Municipal council of Iloilo failed to pay Tantoco the purchase price of 2 strips of land, which it appropriated for road widening. By virtue of a writ of execution, the sheriff attached “two autotrucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini St., and other structures, plus the market
The property of a municipality, whether real or personal, necessary for governmental purposes cannot be attached and sold at a public auction to satisfy a judgment against the municipality
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga March 28, 1868
Bengzon, J.P., J.
RA 39 converted municipality of Zamboanga to a city, and provided that bldgs. And properties abandoned shall be paid for by the City at a price fixed by the AG (PhP 1,294,244)
RA 711: del Norte/del Sur funds, assets, and other properties shall be divided equitable between the 2. AG apportioned assets: 54.39% to Norte, 45.61% to Sur
ExecSec then issued a ruling holding that Norte had a vested right as owner of the properties given to the City and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. Finance Sec authorized CIR to deduct 25% from City’s IRA to be credited to Norte.
RA3039 all bldgs, etc, belonging to the former province and located within the City, free of charge, in favor of the City.
Validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and bldgs thereon – If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control.
The capacity in which the property is held is dependent on the use which it is intended and devoted.
Salas v. Jarencio August 30, 1972 Esguerra, J.
On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring
In the absence of a deed or title to any land claimed by the City as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska
Streets containing a total area of 7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. RA 4118 was passed which subdivided said lot for resale by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants.
- The City of Manila made a complete turn-about. The City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized public corporation brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants, particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing RA 4118, and praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional.
of the municipality. Such property is held in trust for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purpose. RA 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government. It was enacted upon formal written petition of the Municipal Board of Manila in the form of a legally approved resolution. The foregoing sequence of events clearly indicates a pattern of regularity and observance of due process in the reversion of the property to the National Government. All such acts were done in recognition by the City of Manila of the right and power of the Congress to dispose of the land involved. Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power to grant that relief.
Cebu Oxygen & Acytelene Co. v. Bercilles August 29, 1975
Concepcion, Jr. J.
The land sought to be registered in this case was formerly a part of a street. Through a resolution, it was declared to be an abandoned road and not part of the City development plan. Thereafter, it was sold through a public bidding and petitioner was the highest bidder. He then sought to register said land but his application was dismissed.
The portion of the city street subject to petitioner’s application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use. Then it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property of the State. It is also very clear from the Charter that property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.
Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez June 25, 1984
Relova, J.
In a civil case, petitioner was held liable to private respondents. Alias writ of execution was granted on the funds of the municipality in the hands of the treasurers.
Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. A corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance by the SB is needed before any money of the municipality may be paid out. Government of the Phil. Islands v. Cabangis
March 27, 1929 Villa-real J.
Lots 36, 39 and 40, block 3035 of cadastral proceeding 71 of the City of Manila, GLRO. Record 373, were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of Cabangis. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of the proceeding. Up to the month of February 1927 nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of Cabangis, declared lot 40 for such purpose.
Article 5 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that “lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos, or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." The fact that from 1912 some fishermen had been drying their fishing nets and depositing their bancas on lots 36, 39 and 40, by permission of Tomas Cabangis, does not confer on the latter or his successors the ownership of said lots, because, as they were converted into public land, no private person could acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established by the law.
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano April 29, 2005
Callejo, Sr. J. Defendant refused to vacate the property in Romblon, Romblon. of possession over the real property as owner while an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess – it is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In this case, it was an accion publiciana. The action of the petitioners does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They alleged that they are co-owners thereof, and are entitled to possession.
Sampayan v. CA January 14, 2005 Garcia, J.
Vasquez siblings filed a complaint for forcible entry against Sampayan for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth. The lot was allegedly owned and possessed by the Vasquez’s deceased mother [Cristita Quita]. – Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur
Sampayan: Maria Ybanez, the overseer of Sps. Terrado [lot’s true owners], gave him permission to enter subject lot.
In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means, force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Santos v. Ayon May 6, 2005
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Davao City: Ruben Santos filed a complaint for illegal detainer against sps. Ayon.
Santos is the registered owner of 3 lots situated at Lanzona Subd, Ayons are registered owners of adjacent land. Previous occupant of the property built a building which straddled both the lots. Ayons using the building as a warehouse. Santos informed respondents that the building occupies portion of his lot, but he let them use it.
A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses tp vacate upon demand made by the owner.
Ganila v. CA June 28, 2005 Qusiumbing, J.
Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints before MCTC (Jordan, Guimaras). H alleged that she owns the lot (inherited from parents) and that she only tolerated petitioners to construct houses therein. When she demanded that they leave, they refused.
In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary – it is enough that plaintiff has a better right or possession; in forcible entry, defendants, by force intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession.
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from an accion publiciana and from an accion reinvindicatoria is that UD is limited to the question of possession de facto. A UD suit together with forcible entry are the 2 forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property
Ross Rica Sales Center v. Ong August 16, 2005
Tinga, J.
Petitioners bought land from Mandaue Prime, which bought the same from respondent Ong.
MTC granted petitioners’ ejectment suit and ordered respondent to vacate the premises.
The phrase “unlawful withholding” has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issure is the better right of possession [possession de jure], and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession [possession de facto]. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano issue of ownership is generally unessential.
Peralta-Labrador v. Buarin August 25, 2005
Ynares-Santiago, J.
San Felipe, Zambales
Petitioner alleges that she is the owner of a lot, having purchased it from Sps. Pronto. In 1990, DPWH constructed a road, thereby separating a portion from the rest of P’s lot. Sometime in 1994, respondent Bugarin forcibly took possession of the small portion and refused to vacate the same. Thus, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership.
Respondent: He has been in possession since 1955.
Forcible entry is a quieting process, and the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land.
Seriña v. Caballero August 17, 2004 Callejo Sr., J.
Sps Seriña filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages against Caballero and his tenants Sps. Donela (Cagayan de Oro City). P alleged that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual possession for 35 years of a parcel of land. Sometime in 1982, they allegedly discovered that C was caliming ownership over the land and offering it for sale or mortgage.
In order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed, by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.
Boundaries set forth in complaint not the same as in the Deed of Sale Perez v. Mendoza
July 28, 1975 Muñoz-Palma, J.
Felisa Montalbo inherited land from her father, which she exchanged with that of her aunt, Andrea. After the exchange, A donated half the land to daughter Margarita. Margarita and husband occupied the land continuously in the concept of owners. When Nicolas sought the transfer of property in their names, he submitted the deed of exchange. Perezes then accused sps. Nicolas and Andrea of falsifying the deed of exchange
Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Perezes dialed to prove ownership of land.
Dizon v. CA January 6, 1993. Padilla, J.
Galang spouses owned 2 lots, which they mortgaged. Their son Dionisio redeemed the lot in his own name despite that fact that the funds came from his 5 sisters. After a cadastral survey of the lots, CFI ordered the issuance of OCTs solely in Dionisio’s name. the heirs of D’s sisters claim that the 6 Galang siblings partitioned the lots in an unnotarized affidavit
The properties belonged solely to Dionisio and not in co-ownership with his sisters. Dionisio’s ownership had been judicially confirmed by the CGI, which involved a proceeding in rem and hence, “binding on the whole world.”
Moreover, the sisters objected only 61 years after the issuance of the OCT.
US v. Causby May 27, 1946 Douglas, J.
Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was located near an airport used regularly by the United States military. According to Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his business.
Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth. Using this doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Violation of the 5th amendment. The Court concluded that the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea."
However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano The United States Court of Claims accepted Causby's argument, and
ordered the government to pay compensation. Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation.
Lunod v. Meneses
11 Phil. 128 Plaintiffs own farmlands situated near a lake. Meneses owns a fishpond and piece of land between the lake and a river. The plaintiffs claim the existence, in favor of their rice fields, of a statutory easement permitting the flow of water over Meneses’ land. This allowed water collected upon their land and the lake to flow through Meneses’ land and into the river. Plaintiffs’ lands were flooded and their plantations destroyed.
Meneses cannot block the flow of water. Art. 552 (A637, NCC): Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them. Neither may the owner of the lower estate construct works preventing this easement, nor one of the higher estates works increasing this burden. In addition, under the land of waters, Meneses had no right to construct the works which blocks the passage through his land and the outlet to the river. Having done so, to the detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he violated the law. Bachrach v. Seifert
October 12, 1950 Ozaeta, J.
The deceased Emil Maurice Bachrach left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach. In his last will and testament made varius legacies in cash and willed all the fruits and usufruct the
remainder of his estate (after payment of legacies, bequests and gifts) to his wife’s enjoyment. The will further provided that upon the death of Mary McDonald Bachrach, one-half of all his estate shall be divided share and share alike by and betweenhis legal heirs, to the exclusion of his brothers.
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50% stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On 10 June 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. The lower court granted the petition and overruled their objection. Siefer and Elianoff appealed.
Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. Further, Articles 474 provides that " Civil fruits are deemed to accrue day by day, and belong to the usufructuary in
proportion to the time the usufruct may last.” Article 475, on the other hand, provides that “When a usufruct is created on the right to receive an income or periodical revenue, either in money or fruits, or the interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each matured payment shall be considered as the proceeds or fruits of such right. When it consists of the enjoyment of the benefits arising from an interest in an industrial or commercial enterprise, the profits of which are not distributed at fixed periods, such profits shall have the same
consideration. In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in accordance with the rules prescribed by the next preceding article."
A dividend, whether in the from of cash or stock, is income or fruit and consequently should go to the usufructuary rather than the owner of the shares of stock in usufruct. Dividend is declared only out of the profits of a corporation and not out of its capital.
Bachrach v. Talisay-Silay September 17, 1931 Romualdez, J.
Sugar planters of TS mortgaged their lands in order to secure the debts of TS against PNB. As compensation for the risk the planters took, TS undertook to give them a bonus equal to 2% of the debt secured. Bachrach filed a case against TS, asking for Ledesma’s credit bonus as a payment for the latter’s debt to Bachrach. TS answered that Ledesma’s credit bonus had been purchased by another. PNB alleged that it had
A bonus paid by the mortgage-debtor to another who had mortgaged his land to secure the payment of the debtor’s obligation to a bank is not a civil fruit of the mortgaged property. Such bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote and accidental relation to the land. It is not income delivered from the property but a compensation granted for the risk assumed by the owner of the property.
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano preferential right to the bonus because such bonus would be civil fruits
of the land that Ledesma mortgaged. Bernardo v. Bataclan
November 28, 1938 Laurel, J.
Bernardo bought a parcel of land only to discover that Bataclan is possessing the same. LC held Bataclan to be a possessor in good faith and thus entitled to reimbursement with right of retention subject to Bernardo’s 2 options whether to sell the land to Bataclan, but Bataclan was unable to pay and so the land was sold at a public auction. The court removed Bataclan’s right of retention.
When Bernardo opted to sell the land to Bataclan, he lost his right to retention over the said property.
When, in the face of a conflict between the rights of an owner and a BPS in good faith, the owner opts to sell the land to the BPS who is
subsequently unable to pay, the BPS loses his right of retention. Ignacio v. Hilario
April 30, 1946. Moran, C.J.
Lower court rendered judgment holding Hilario as the legal owner of a property, but ceded to Ignacio the ownership of the improvements he built on the same land. Hilario was given the option to reimburse Ignacio for the improvements or to sell the land to Ignacio. Hilario exercised neither option.
Since the option to remove or demolish improvement is given to the LO and it is limited to paying for the improvement or selling his land to the BPS, he cannot refuse to exercise his right of choice and compel the builder to remove or demolish the improvement. He is entitled to such removal only when after choosing to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
Sarmiento v. Agana April 30, 1984 Melencio-Herrera, J.
Spouses Valentino were told by mother of wife to construct a
residentioal house only to find out later that the land did not belong to the mother but to the Santos sps. Who sold the same to Sarmiento.
Sps. Valentino may not be ejected from the land, because they were builders in GF. The owner of a building erected in GF on a land owned by another is entitled to retain possession of the land until he is paid the value of the building.
Depra v. Dumlao May 16, 1985 Melencio-Herrera, J.
Dumlao’s kitchen encroached on 34sq.m. of Depra’s property. Depra filed an unlawful detainer. LC found Dumlao to be a builder in GF, and ordered a forced lease on the parties. Depra, instead of accepting rentals, filed for quieting of title
The municipal court has no authority to impose a “forced lease.” The owner of the land on which the improvement was built by another in GF is entitled to removal of improvement only after LO has opted to sell the land and the builder refused to pay for the same.
Tecnogas Phil. Mfg. Corp. v. CA February 10, 1997
Panganiban, J.
Tecnogas discovered that portions of its buildings and wall were occupying Uy’s land. The wall was presumably erected by the former owners. Tecnogas offered to buy the land by Uy refused. Uy then caused canal to be dug along the wall, causing it to collapse.
There is no question that when P purchased the land from Pariz Ind., the buildings and other structures were already in existence. As such, the supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner does not militate against its right to claim the status of a builder in GF. Ortiz v. Kayanan
July 30, 1979 Antonio, J.
Homestead Application Lot belonged to Dolorico II, Ortiz’s ward located in Barrio Cabuluan, Calauag, Quezon. Dolorico II named as successor and heir his uncle Dolorico, then died. All this time Ortiz was in possession and cultivation of the property.
Dolorico relinquished rights over property in favour of Comintan and Zamora.
Court found Ortiz to be in good faith, but held the public bidding to be valid. If petitioner was not found to be the winner, Comintan and Zamora are to reimburse him for P13,632. Ortiz is to retain possession until the amount is paid.
Respondent Judge discovered that after the decision of the lower courts, Ortiz collected tolls on portion of the land even if he had not introduced any improvements on said portions estimated to amount to
P25,000.
petitioner is NOT entitled to fruits while Comintan and Zamora have yet to pay the indemnity due him.
Before possession is legally interrupted, possessor in good faith is entitled to fruits. This right ceases upon defects being known. This is known as a right to retention, for the creditor to obtain payment of a debt.
Also we must consider that tolls were collected from portions with no improvements of petitioner,
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the fruits of the property while
the P13,632 has yet to be paid, this being considered as civil fruits. Geminiano v. CA
July 24, 1996 Davide, Jr. J.
Lot originally owned by G’s mom. On one portion of the lot stood G’s unfinished house, which they sold to PR. Then, G’s mom executed a contract of lease a portion of the lot, including the portion on which the house stands.
Private respondents cannot be considered possessors nor builders in GF – being mere lessees, they knew that their occupation was temporary. Pleasantville Dev’t Corp v. CA
February 1, 1996 Panganiban, J.
Edith Robillo purchased a parcel of land, Lot 9, from Pleasantville Dev’t Corporation in Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant. · Upon completing all payments and securing a TCT in his name, Jardinico discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
· It appears that Kee bought on installment Lot 8 from CT Torres Enterprises Inc (CTTEI), the real estate agent of Pleasantville. · Under the Contract to Sell, Kee could and did possess the lot even before the completion of payments.
· Zenaida Octaviano, CTTEI’s employee, was the one who mistakenly pointed out Lot 9 (instead of Lot 8) to Kee’s wife. Thereafter, Kee built his residence, a store, an auto repair shop, and other improvements on the lot.
· Jardinico confronted Kee after discovering that the latter was occupying Lot 9. Kee refused to vacate, hence Jardinico filed an ejectment suit with damages.
RTC: Kee is a builder in bad faith. Assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was nonetheless guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with
notice to vacate said lot, and was thus liable for rental.
CA: Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the “mix-up” when he began construction of the improvements. The erroneous delivery was due to the fault of CTTEI and thus imputable to Pleasantville, the principal.
Kee = builder in GF
The roots of the controversy can be traced in the errors committed by CTTEI when it pointed the wrong lot to Kee.
· Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and he is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, Pleasantville has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
· At the time he built the improvements on Lot 9, Kee believed that the said lot was the one he bought. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Pleasantville failed to prove otherwise.
· Violation of the Contract of Sale on Installment may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the
improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioner’s cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach) but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.
Felices v. Iriole
May 26, 1995 Felices was the grantee of a homestead over 8has. He conveyed in conditional sale to Iriole a portion of his homestead of more than 4has. The conveyance expressly stipulates that after the lapse of 5 years or as soon as may be allowed by law, the vendor or his successors would execute in vendee’s favor a deed of absolute sale over the land in question.
2 years after the sale, F tried to recover from I, but the latter refused to allow it unless he was paid the alleged value of improvements he had introduce therein.
The rule of A453 invoked by I cannot be applied to the instant case for the reason that the improvements in question were made on the premises only after F had tried to recover the land in question from him, and even during pendency of this action in the lower court. Hence, he built the improvement in BF.
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano two-storey apartment building. He failed to pay realty taxes, so the LOT
was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno, and later to the Sps. Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
Case 1: Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale. SC: Sps. Nuguid owned the lot, while Pecson still owned the building (May 5, 1993).
Case 2: Nuguids sought delivery of possession of the lot and apartment building, i.e., they want to acquire the building.
SC (Nov. 15, 1993):
1. Art. 448, NCC: Case is apposite as when the landowner is the BPS who then later loses ownership through
sale;
2. Current market value of the building should be the basis of the indemnity;
3. Pecson entitled to retain ownership of the building and the income therefrom;
4. CA erred in upholding TC’s determination of indemnity (P53,000.00 construction cost) and in also ordering Pecson to account for rent. 5. Remanded to TC for determination of CMV.
Case 3 (Case at bar): CMV = P400,000. Pecson already received P300,000 from Sps. Nuguid; balance of P100,000
paid thereafter. TC directed Sps. Nuguid to also pay P1.34 million for rentals from Nov. 1993 to Dec. 1997 (@ P28K/mo.) Thus, petition.
· Art. 448, NCC entitles landowner (Nuguid) to either appropriate the building upon payment of indemnity or sell the land. Nuguid sought appropriation.
· Art. 546, NCC entitles the BPS to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses, and the right of retention until full reimbursement is made.
· However, until the payment of indemnity is full, the BPS (Pecson) has a RIGHT of RETENTION (which includes the right to the expenses and the right to the fruits) as a builder in good faith. Thus, he cannot be
compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate.
The landowner is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits received by the BPS in good faith.
Republic v. CA October 12, 1984 Gutierrez Jr., J.
The Republic opposed the registration of lots adjacent to the property of R on the ground that they merely transferred their dikes further down the Meycauayan river bed, such that if there is any accretion to speak of, it was man-made and artificial and not the result of gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
What R claims as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the river by reclamation caused by their having transferred their dikes towards the river bed. Being a portion of the bed of said river, the lots are of the public dominion and not registerable under the LRA. A457 requisites: concurrence of (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers. -- #2 is indispensable. This includes all deposits caused by human intervention.
Grande v. CA June 30, 1962 Barrera, J.
Grande siblings are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), Isabela by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui who in turn inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name the land is registered. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration, sometime in 1930, its northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the said river, so much, so that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded t a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposite of 19,964 sq. meters more or less had been added to
The accretion does not ipso facto become registered like the land to which it is attached. Ownership of land is different from registration. Ownership is governed by the civil code while the imprescriptibility of registered land is governed by the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts. To obtain the protection of imprescriptibility, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures must be observed. The fact remains that the Grandes have not sought registration of the alluvial property in dispute up to the time they filed an action against respondents. Because of this, said accretion is not protected by imprescriptibility.
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano the registered land. On Jan. 25, 1958, the siblings instituted a case to
quiet title against private respondent Calalungs and alleged that they were in former peaceful possession of said alluvial deposit when respondents encroached the land claiming ownership.
– The trial court ruled in favor of the Grandes ratiocinating that, by accession the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since the original estate is registered, the accretion consequently is
automatically registered too. There can also be no acquisitive prescription in favor of the Calalungs since the land is already
registered. The action to claim land by the owners which is registered is imprescriptible. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court thus this appeal by the Grandes.
The Court of Appeals have acquired evidence that respondent Calalungs were in open and continuous possession of the accretion since 1933 or 1934 up to the time the action against them was filed. The prescriptive period in this applied in this case is 10 years and not 30 since the law applicable is Act 190 and not the Civil Code. Respondents’ possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not yet in force.
Meneses v. CA July 14, 1995 Quiason, J.
Darum issued to Meneses OCTs and free patents over lots, which were found by the court to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.
Navarro v. IAC
1997 Pascual claimed ownership to a parcel of land claiming that it was an accretion to his property. Navarro opposed saying that such property has always been part of public property. Subject property is situated between 2 rivers and is fronted by the Manila Bay. If the land in dispute was formed by the action of the 2 rivers, then it is an accretion, hence owned by Pascual. If it were formed by the action of Manila Bay, then it is foreshore land, hence part of public domain
The property is foreshore land, hence part of public domain. The property is an accretion of on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or arm of the sea, as such, the disputed property is, under Art.4 of 1886 Spanish Law of Waters, public domain
Riparian owners, are strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering seashore or lake or other tidal waves.
The alluvium, by mandate of A457, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but ut is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by 3rd person.
Baes v. CA July 6, 1993 Cruz, J.
The government dug a canal on a protion of land owned by Baes to streamline the Tripa der Callina creek. In exchange for such portion, B was given a lot with an equal area. When B had his lots resurveyed and subdivided, the area of the old creek bed was included such that his landholdings increased. Upon petition by the gov’t TC ordered status qui prior to resurvey. However, B contends that under A461, the area of the old creek should belong to him because it says that once the river bed has been abandoned, the owners of the land invaded by the river’s new course automatically become the owner of the abandoned bed.
B’s contention is impressed with merit. The law speaks of the natural change in the course of the stram, and of the ripoarian owner is entitled to compensation for damge to or loss of property due to natural causes, there’s all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through artificial means. BUT, since he has been given an equivalent lot, he is no longer entitled under the principle of unjust enrichment.
Binalay v. Manalo Judge Taccad owned a parcel of land—on the west, bordering on the Cagayan River, on the east, the national road. The western portion would occasionally go under the waters and reappear during the dry season. Manalo purchased the land. A relocation survey was conducted during the rainy season, so the survey didn't cover the submerged land. The sketch would show that the river branches through the west and east, leaving a strip of land. The land was then surveyed into two 2 lots. One of these is being claimed by Manalo
According to the Law of Waters, the natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods.
This being the case, the subject land couldn't have been sold to Manalo, being part of the public domain.
Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano through accretion.
Siari Valley Estates v. Lucasan SVE sought to recover 200 heads of cattle that were driven or wandered from its pasture lands into the adjoining lands of Lucasan. Lucasan himself admitted such commixtion although he says that SVE had already retrieved its animals. Which belongs to whom can no longer be determined.
Lucasan willfully caused the commixtion such that A383 (now $73) he will be held to forfeit his own cattle. No actual evidence that the 823 missing cattle were taken by Lucasan, but in view of the proof that his men, on 2 occasions, drove away more than 30 heads, it may be presumed that the others must have also been driven away subsequent or prior occasions.
One who has stole a part of the stolen money must have taken the larger sum lost by the offended party.
If the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it will lose his share.
Santos v. Bernabe November 6, 1929 Villa-real, J.
Urbano Santos (778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay) and Pablo Tiongson (1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay) both deposited in the warehouse of Jose Bernabe palay with the same grade and quality. However, it does not appear which sack belongs to Santos and which is owned by Tiongson. There were no marks or signs, nor were they separated from each other.
· Tiongson filed a case against Bernabe for the recovery of the palay he deposited in his warehouse. The writ of attachment for the said palay was granted and the attachable property of Bernabe including the 924 cavans and 31.5 kilos palay found in his warehouse were attached, sold in public auction and the proceeds delivered to Tiongson.
· Santos then intervened contending that Tiongson cannot claim the 924c & 31.5k palay because by asking for the attachment thereof, he impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged to Bernabe and not to Tiongson. Also because, some of these palay could be those deposited by Santos.
Art 381 of the CC prescribes that “if by will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the later case the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according o the value of the things mixed or commingled.”
In the present case, since the number of kilos in a cavan has not been determined, only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached and sold shall be distributed proportionately between Santos (398.49 cavans) and Tiongson (525.52 cavans) or the value thereof at the rate of P3/cavan.
Olviga v. CA Olviga was able to register a title of a parcel of land in his name. Glor sps. Filed an action for reconveyance since they had previously purchased the land and were the real and actual occupants of the land. CA ruled that action by Glor sps is one for quieting of title that does not prescribe.
An action for reconveyance:
(a) Prescribes in 10 years if the plaintiff is not in possession of the property and if the action for reconveyance is based on an implied or constructive trust. The point of reference is the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the title over the property.
(b) Is IMPRESCRIPTIBLE if the person claiming to be an owner is in actual possession of the property. Here, the right to seek reconvenyance in effect seeks to quiet title.
Pingol v. CA September 6, 1993 Davide, Jr. J.
Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters, located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. On 17 February 1969, he executed a “DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND” in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was
Although the private respondents’ complaint before the trial court was denominated as one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title. That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private respondents is indubitable. Despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused to accept the tender of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly
