UY VS CENTRO
Petitioner: Jhorizaldy Uy
Respondent: Centro Ceramica Corporation, Ramonita Y. Sy, and Milagro U. Garcia Citation: GR No. 174631
Date of Promulgation: October 19, 2011 Ponente: Villarama, J.
FYI: FACT S
1. Jhorizaldy Uy was hired by Centro Ceramica Corporation. - as a full-time sales executive
- hired on May 21, 1999, under probationary employment for 6 months - became a regular employee May 1, 2000
2. Milagros Garcia was rehired by the company in the last quarter of 2001 - petitioner alleged that this is when his predicament began
3. On February 19, 2002, he was informed by his superior, Richard Agcaoili, that he was to assume a new position in the marketing department.
- he was warned by his friends to be careful saying "mainit ka kay Ms. Garcia".
4. On the same day, he was summoned by Milagros Garcia and Sy who informed him of the termination of his services due to insubordination.
- Sy even commented "member ka pa naman ng Single for Christ pero napakatigas naman ng ulo mo."
5. Agcaoili informed Uy that the Sy spouses will give him all that is due him plus goodwill money to settle everything.
6. On February 21, 2002, Uy was again summoned by Sy, wherein Uy asked for his termination paper.
- Sy told him "If that's what you want I will give it to you." And added, "Pag-isipan mo dahil kilala mo naman kami we are powerful."
7. Uy turned over all bis samples, accounts and receivables to Agcaoili on February 22, 2002. After which he did not report for work.
8. On March 6, 2002, Uy received a memorandum dated February 21, 2002, from the company stating:
- that he has failed to meet the quota for sales executives, set fro the period from 1999 to 2001 (which was said to be a violation of his contract of employment)
- that he has to explain in writing within 24 hours why the company should not terminate his contract.
Uy was unable to reply because he did not receive the memo since he was already dismissed. However, he was surprised about the letter's content
- because he was informed by Agcaoili that management was satisfied with his performance and he ranked second top performer for January 2002.
9. Uy received another memorandum on March 13, 2002.
- the letter alleged that the company's records show that Uy has failed to report for work without informing his employer of the reason, and without securing proper leave (which was said to be in violation of his contract)
- the letter also mentioned that Uy has refused to receive any of his monetary entitlements despite notice that they are available.
- it asked for an explanation letter, within 24 hours, about why he should not be terminated.
10. Uy sought counsel who assisted him by replying to the memorandum.
11. Respondent denied dismissing petitioner and claimed he abandoned his job.
- they claim that petitioner's poor performance did not improve even after regularization; - the possibility of him being transferred to a different department was due to his poor sales performance;
- because he was aware of his problem and a possible termination, it was Uy's idea to voluntarily resign rather than be terminated;
- Uy angrily stated that the company should just terminate him and walked out after learning that he will receive the commissions of those sold but not yet delivered only upon their delivery;
- it was Uy who had a grudge against Garcia, that the Uy was discourteous and abusive; 12. Centro Ceramica Corporation presented two affidavits to prove their claim.
- Rommel Azarraga:
1. he was the one who told Uy to be careful
2. that Garcia did not harbour any ill feelings against Uy, nor did he know of any incident that may cause such;
- Richard Agcaoili
1. denied Uy was terminated
2. denied that Uy was performing well and that he mentioned that management was satisfied with his performance
- Arnulfo Merecido
1. claimed he has a fistfight with Uy because of the latter's insulting remarks against his (Merecido) family.
13. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondent basing on his finding that it was Uy who opted not to report for work after offering to resign.
14. NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's ruling. It found the dismissal of Uy questionable.
- no sanction was imposed on Uy or any other employee for the supposed failure to meet the quota
- Uy was being singled out notwithstanding that all sales personnel similarly could not meet the Php 1.5 million monthly quota.
15. CA reversed the NLRC's decision on account of the evidence on record.
- Uy, by his own account, has admitted that it was he who asked for his dismissal.
- the memorandums showed that the company has not yet terminated Uy's employment. ISSUE :Whether or not the dismissal was legal.
HELD
No. Dismissal was illegal. The petition for review on certiorari was granted. The SC set aside the decision of the CA and affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
The SC found that the NLRC's finding of illegal dismissal is supported by the totality of evidence and more consistent with logic and ordinary human experience.
- after declining his supposed transfer to another department per his supervisor's advise, it is hard to believe that he would just readily turn over his files and samples unless something critical had happened during his talk with Garcia and Sy
- it is irrelevant whether he had earlier inquired from his supervisor what he will receive if he offers instead to resign--what matters is the action of Sy on his employment status
- a crucial factor is the verbal order directly given by Sy for him to immediately turn over his accountabilities
- it is his right to be furnished with a written notice in order to inform him of the real ground for his termination
- the subsequent memorandums sent only reinforce the conclusion that the belated written notice of charge against him on having failed to meet the prescribed sales quota was an afterthought on the part of the company who may have realized that they failed to observe due process in terminating him
- he was not given the chance to defend himself from whatever charges the management hurled against him
- NLRC duly noted the discriminatory treatment accorder to petitioner when it declared that there is no evidence at all that other sales personnel who failed to meet the prescribed sales quota were similarly reprimanded
The SC found the affidavits to be at best self-serving having been executed by employees beholden to their employer.
Fairness requires that dismissal, being the ultimate penalty that can be meted out to an employee must have a clear basis. Any ambiguity in the ground of termination of an employee should be interpreted against the employer, who ordained such ground in the first place.
When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers it a case of illegal dismissal. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Labor Code expresses the basic principle that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code should be interpreted in favor of the workingman.
- This principle has been extended by jurisprudence to cover doubts in the
evidence presented by the employer and the employee. Thus we have held that if the evidence presented by the employer and the employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
The award of back wages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement should be modified. Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay has been considered an
acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer viable or desirable. Under the facts established, petitioner is entitled to the payment of full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the date of his dismissal on February 19, 2002 up to the finality of this decision, and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, computed from the time of his engagement by respondents on March 21, 1999 up to the finality of this decision.
DE CASTRO vs LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK Petitioner: Carlos C. De Castro
Respondents: Liberty Broadcasting Network Inc, Edgardo Quiogue Citation: GR No. 165153
Date of Promulgation: September 23, 2008 Ponente: Brion
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certitorari – to annul, reverse and/or set aside the Decision dated May 25, 2004, and the Resolution dated August 30, 2004 of the Former Special Third Division of CA
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Carlos De Castro: Building Administrator of Liberty Broadcasting. He started his employment on August 7, 1995
May 16, 1996: Bernard Mandap (HRM Senior Manager) sent a notice to Carlos requiring him to explain within 48 hours why he should not be made liable for violation of the Company Code of Conduct for acts constituting serious misconduct, fraud and willful breach of trust reposed in him as a managerial employee
De Castro’s ANSWER: denied the allegations against him in the Affidavits of Liberty’s witnesses: Vicente Niguidula and Gil Balais. He says such accusations are baseless and sham, designed to protect Niguidula and Balais who were the favorite boys of Edgardo Quiogue (EVP of Liberty Broadcasting)
At De Castro’s request, a formal hearing was scheduled at 2pm of May 28, 1996, but he thereafter sent a notice that he would not participate when he learned from his wife that estafa and qualified theft had been filed against him
He felt that the formal hearing would just be a more-more investigation
May 24, 1996: Liberty Broadcasting charged De Castro with Violation of Company Code of Conduct based on the Affidavits of Balais, Cristino Samarita and Jose Aying
Grounds for De Castro’s Dismissal
1. Soliciting and/or receiving money for his own benefit from suppliers/dealers/traders Aying and Samarita, representing commissions for job contracts involving the airconditioning units at the company, and the installation of fire exits at Technology Centre
2. Diversion of company funds by soliciting and receiving commissions amounting to a 14k from Aying for a job contract
3. Theft of company property involving the unauthorized removal of 1 gallon of Delo Oil from the storage room
4. Disrespect/discourtesy towards his co-employee, Niguidula
5. Disorderly behavior for challenging Niguidula for a fight during working hours
6. Threat and coercion against Niguidula and for coercing Balais to solicit money in his behalf from suppliers/contractors
7. Abuse of authority for instructing Balais to collect commissions from Aying and Samarita, and for requiring Raul Pacaldo to exact 2-5% of the price of contracts awarded to suppliers
8. Slander against Niguidula
De Castro then filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissat at NLRC. During the Arbitration, he denied the offenses charged, stating that:
1. He was just new in the office and could not encourage solicitation of commission from suppliers
2. The accusations are belated for the imputed acts happened in 1995
3. The gallon of Delo Oul carted away was at the room of Balais that, which circumstance he relayed to Mandap
4. Affidavits of Niguidula and Balais are not reliable because they had altercations for De Castro reprimanded Balais for incurring unnecessary OT work
5. Niguidula verbally assaulted and challenged him to a fight which he reported to Quiogue and Makati Police
Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati: rendered a decision on April 30, 1999, holding the respondent liable for illegal dismissal. He disbelieved the affidavits of the respondent’s witnesses in view of the circumstances prior to the execution.
NLRC: reversed the LA’s decision and adopted the findings of Labor Arbiter Tamayo who reviewed the Appeal on NLRC’s instructions. It ruled that Arbited Pati erred in disregarding the Affidavits of the witnesses.
MR by De Castro: NLRC granted it in a Resolution dated September 20, 2002. NLRC held the charges against De Castro were never substantiated other than by bare allegations of the company’s employees whom he had altercations with prior to the execution of Affidavits MR by Liberty Broadcasting: denied
Certiorari at CA: granted the Petition in its Decision on May 25, 2004, confirming the validity of De Casto’s dismissal. NLRC abused its discretion when it disregarded the Affidavits of the witnesses
ISSUES:
1. W/N CA erred when it substituted its judgment for that of LA and NLRC who were the triers of facts who had the opportunity to review the evidence extensively
HELD:
1. YES. CA erred in the appreciation of the evidence surrounding the petitioner’s termination from employment. The cited grounds are at best doubtful under the proven surrounding circumstances, and should have been interpreted in the petitioner’s favor pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code.
1. The petitioner had not stayed long in the company and had not even passed his probationary period when the acts charged allegedly took place. This fact carries several significant implications. First, being new, his natural motivation was to make an early positive impression on his employer. Thus, it is believable that as
building administrator, he diligently, zealously, and faithfully performed his tasks, working in excess of eight hours per day to maintain the company buildings and facilities in excellent shape; he even lent the company his personal tools and equipment to facilitate urgent repairs and maintenance work on company properties. Second, because of his natural motivation as a new employee and his lack of awareness of the dynamics of relationships within the company, he must have been telling the truth when he said that he objected to the way the contract for the installation of fire escapes was awarded to Samarita. Third, his being new somehow rendered doubtful the charge that he had already encouraged solicitation of commission from suppliers, especially if considered with the timing of the charges against him and the turnaround of witness Aying’s testimony.
2. The relationships within the company at the time the charges were filed showed that he was a stranger who might not have known the dynamics of company inter-relationships and might have stepped on the wrong toes in the course of performing his duties. Respondent Quiogue was the Executive Vice-President of the company, a very powerful official with a lot of say in company operations. Since Samarita was doing the fabrication of steel balusters for Quiogue’s home in New Manila, Quezon City, there is a lot of hidden dynamics in their relationship and it is not surprising that Samarita testified against the petitioner. Both Samarita and Quioque have motives to resent the petitioner’s comments about the irregular award of a contract to Samarita.
3. Mandap, as Personnel Manager, is a subordinate of Quiogue. The proposal to secure commissions from company suppliers reportedly took place in a very public gathering—a drinking session—in his house. Why Mandap did not take immediate action when he knew of the alleged plan as early as December 1995 was never explained although the petitioner raised the issue squarely. The time gap—from December 1995 to May 1996—is an incredibly long time under the evidence available and can be accounted for only by the fact that there was no intention to terminate the services of the petitioner in December; the motivation and the scheme to do this came only sometime in April-May 1996.
3. The timing of the filing of charges was, as the petitioner pointed out, unusual. Indeed, if the proposal to solicit commissions had transpired in December, the charges were quite late when they came in May.
All these considerations render the cited causes for the petitioner’s dismissal tenuous as the evidence supporting these grounds from suspect sources: they come either from people who harbor resentment; those whose positions have inherent conflict points with that of De Castro, or from business dealings with the company.
Under the circumstances, we join the NLRC in concluding that the employer failed to prove a just cause for the termination of the petitioner’s employment—a burden the company, as employer, carries under the Labor Code31—and the CA erred when it saw grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC’s ruling.
The evidentiary situation, at the very least, brings to the fore the dictum we stated in Prangan v. NLRC32 and in Nicario v. NLRC33 that “if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former’s favor
PEÑAFLOR V OUTDOOR
PETITIONER: Manolo A. Peñaflor RESPONDENTS:
OUTDOOR CLOTHING MFG CORP Nathaniel T. Syfu
Medylene M. Demogena Paul U. Lee
DOCKET NO.:G.R. No. 177114 PROMUL DATE: Jan. 21, 2010 PONENTE: Brion, J.
FACTS
Peñaflor – hired Sept. 2, 1999 as HRD Mgr of Outdoor. As HRD head, he was expected to: o secure and maintain the right quality and quantity of people needed by the company o maintain the harmonious relationship between the employees and management in a
role that supports organizational goals and individual aspirations o represent the company in labor cases or proceedings
His relationship with Outdoor went well during the first few months. Problems started when VP for Operations Edgar Lee left the company after a big fight between Lee and Chief Corporate Officer Nathaniel Syfu.
Outdoor began its alleged downsizing program due to negative business returns.
o Retrenchment – Peñaflor’s two staffs were dismissed leaving only him in the HRD. He worked as a one-man department, carrying out all clerical, administrative and liaison work; he personally went to various government offices to process the company’s papers.
Employee Lynn Padilla suffered a bombing incident. Outdoor required Peñaflor to attend to his hospitalization needs. Working outside office.
o As he was acting on the company’s orders, Peaflor considered himself to be ON OFFICIAL BUSSINESS, but was surprised when the company DEDUCTED SIX DAYS SALARY corresponding to the time he assisted Padilla.
o Finance Mgr Medylene Demogena: he failed to submit his trip ticket, but Peñaflor belied this claim as a trip ticket was required only when a company vehicle was used and he did not use any company vehicle when he attended to his off-premises work. Returned from field work on Mar 13, 2000
o While he was away, Nathaniel Syfu had appointed Nathaniel Buenaobra as the new HRD Mgr
o Syfu’s memorandum dtd Mar 10, 2000: Buenaobra was the concurrent HRD and Acctg Mgr
Peñaflor was surprised by the news; he also felt betrayed and discouraged. He tried to talk to Syfu to clarify the matter, but was unable to do so. He had no option but to resign. Letter to Syfu declaring his irrevocable resignation from his employment with Outdoor effective at the close of office hours on Mar 15, 2000.
o Filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with labor arbiter. Claim: constructively dismissed. Prayer: reinstatement, payment of backwages, illegally deducted salaries, damages, atty’s fees, etc.
Outdoor denied Peñaflor’s allegations:
o Peñaflor had voluntarily resigned from work
o Had continued working for the company until his resignation on Mar 15, 200, as evidenced by the security report that Peaflor himself prepared and signed on Mar 13, 2000
o Also denied making any illegal salary deductions. Those deductions were due to Peñaflor’s failure to report during work during the dates the company questioned. As a
probationary employee, he was not yet entitled to any leave credit that would offset his absences.
Aug 15, 2001 – Labor Arbiter’s decision finding Peñaflor had been illegally dismissed. Outdoor was ordered to:
o reinstate Peñaflor to his former or to an equivalent position
o pay him his illegally deducted salary for six days, proportionate 13th month pay, attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages
Outdoor appealed w the NLRC.
o Claimed that Peñaflor tendered his resignation on Mar 1, 2000 because he saw no future with the corporation due to its dire financial standing.
o Syfu alleged that he was compelled to appoint Buenaobra as concurrent HRD Manager through a memorandum dated Mar 1, 2000 to cover the position that Peñaflor would soon vacate.
o Peñaflor was given 2 notices (Mar 6 & 11) for his unauthorized absences. Peñaflor’s contentions:
o Syfu’s Mar 1 memo, Buenaobra’s Mar 3 memo, and the AWOL memo – ALL FABRICATED and were never presented before the labor arbiter
o Was never furnished with the AWOL Memo
o he could not be on prolonged absence without official leave, as his residence was just a few meters away from the office.
NLRC:
o Peñaflor’s resignation was a response to the Outdoor Clothing’s downward financial spiral
o Buenaobra’s appointment was made only after Peñaflor had submitted his resignation letter, and this was made to cover the vacancy Peñaflor’s resignation would create. o No malice likewise was present in the company’s decision to dismiss Peñaflor’s two
staff members; the company simply exercised its management prerogative to address the financial problems it faced.
o OVERTURNED LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION.
CA: affirmed NLRC’s decision, stating that Peaflor failed to present sufficient evidence supporting his claim that he had been constructively dismissed. Dismissed certiorari petition against NLRC, and denied his MR as well.
ISSUE: WON Peñaflor’s resignation was a voluntary or forced one, the latter making it a constructive dismissal equivalent to illegal dismissal
HELD: YES. Peñaflor has been constructively dismissed.
o The issue gives rise to the question of when was Peñaflor’s resignation letter submitted.
o SC finds that letter was indeed submitted on March 15, 2000, proving that he had been constructively dismissed as his resignation was a response to the unacceptable appointment of another person to a position he still occupied.
Peñaflor was never informed of Syfu’s Mar. 1 memo and Buenaobra’s Mar. 3 memo, even though those were directly concerning him
Said memoranda were only presented to the NLRC for appeal, not before the labor arbiter.
The memorandum on Mar. 10 by Syfu informing the whole office about Buenaobra’s appointment was properly signed by at least 5 company officials, showing that indeed the appointment was only that day disclosed.
o We find it highly unlikely that Peñaflor would resign on March 1, 2000 and would then simply leave given his undisputed record of having successfully worked within his probationary period. It does not appear sound and logical to us that an employee would tender his resignation on the very same day he was entitled by law to be considered a regular employee, especially when a downsizing was taking place and he could have availed of its benefits if he would be separated from the service as a regular employee.
o Another basic principle is that expressed in Article 4 of the Labor Code that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code should be interpreted in favor of the workingman. As shown above, Peñaflor has, at very least, shown serious doubts about the merits of the company’s case, particularly in the appreciation of the clinching evidence on which the NLRC and CA decisions were based.
o REVERSED the decision of the CA, and REINSTATED the decision of the labor arbiter, with the MODIFICATION that, due to the strained relations between the parties, respondents are additionally ordered to pay separation pay equivalent to the petitioner’s one month’s salary.
Norkis Union vs. Norkis Trading
Petitioner: Independent Workers Union Respondent: Norkis Trading Company Citation: GR No. 157098
Date of Promulgation: June 30, 2005 Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: The instant case arose as a result of the issuance of Wage Order No. ROVII-06 by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) increasing the minimum daily wage by P10.00, effective October 1, 1998. Prior to said issuance, herein parties entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from August 1, 1994 to July 31, 1999.
Sec. 1. Salary Increase. The Company shall grant a FIFTEEN (P15.00) PESOS per day increase to all its regular or permanent employees effective August 1, 1994.
Sec. 2. Minimum Wage Law Amendment. In the event that a law is enacted increasing minimum wage, an across-the-board increase shall be granted by the company according to the provisions of the law.On January 27, 1998, a re-negotiation of the CBA was terminated and pursuant to which a Memorandum of Agreement was forged between the parties. It was therein stated that petitioner shall grant a salary increase to all regular and permanent employees as follows:
Ten (10) pesos per day increase effective August 1, 1997; Ten (10) pesos per day increase effective August 1, 1998.
Pursuant to said Memorandum of Agreement, the employees received wage increases of P10.00 per day effective August 1, 1997 and P10.00 per day effective August 1, 1998. As a result, the agreed P10.00 re-negotiated salary increase effectively raised the daily wage of the employees to P165.00 retroactive August 1, 1997; and another increase of P10.00, effective August 1, 1998, raising the employees daily wage to P175.00.
On March 10, 1998, the Regional Tripartite Wage Productivity Board (RTWPB) of Region VII issued Wage Order ROVII-06 which established the minimum wage of P165.00, by mandating a wage increase of five (P5.00) pesos per day beginning April 1, 1998, thereby raising the daily
minimum wage to P160.00 and another increase of five (P5.00) pesos per day beginning October 1, 1998, thereby raising the daily minimum wage to P165.00 per day.
In accordance with the Wage Order and Section 2, Article XII of the CBA, [petitioner] demanded an across-the-board increase. [Respondent], however, refused to implement the Wage Order, insisting that since it has been paying its workers the new minimum wage of P165.00 even before the issuance of the Wage Order, it cannot be made to comply with said Wage Order.
Thus, [respondent] argued that long before the passage of Wage Order ROVII-06 on March 10, 1998, and by virtue of the Memorandum of Agreement it entered with herein [petitioner], [respondent] was already paying its employees a daily wage of P165.00 per day retroactive on August 1, 1997, while the minimum wage at that time was still P155.00 per day. On August 1, 1998, [respondent] again granted an increase from P165.00 per day to P175.00, so that at the time of the effectivity of Wage Order No. 06 on October 1, 1998 prescribing the new minimum wage of P165.00 per day, [respondents] employees were already receiving P175.00 per day. CA ruled in favour of the respondent.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated the CBA in its refusal to grant its employees an across-the-board increase as a result of the passage of Wage Order No. ROVII-06
HELD: No, we hold that the issue here is not about creditability, but the applicability of Wage Order No. ROVII-06 to respondents employees. The Wage Order was intended to fix a new minimum wage only, not to grant across-the-board wage increases to all employees in Region VII. The intent of the Order is indicated in its title, Establishing New Minimum Wage Rates, as well as in its preamble: the purpose, reason or justification for its enactment was to adjust the minimum wage of workers to cushion the impact brought about by the latest economic crisis not only in the Philippines but also in the Asian region.
Parenthetically, there are two methods of adjusting the minimum wage. In Employers
Confederation of the Phils. v. National Wages and Productivity Commission, these were identified as the floor wage and the salary-ceiling methods. The floor wage method involves the fixing of a determinate amount to be added to the prevailing statutory minimum wage rates. On the other hand, in the salary-ceiling method, the wage adjustment was to be applied to employees
receiving a certain denominated salary ceiling. In other words, workers already being paid more than the existing minimum wage (up to a certain amount stated in the Wage Order) are also to be given a wage increase.
A cursory reading of the subject Wage Order convinces us that the intention of the Regional Board of Region VII was to prescribe a minimum or floor wage; not to determine a salary ceiling. Had the latter been its intention, the Board would have expressly provided accordingly. The text of Sections 2 and 3 of the Order states:
Section 2. AMOUNT AND MANNER OF INCREASE. Upon the effectivity of this Order, the daily minimum wage rates for all the workers and employees in the private sector shall be increased by Ten Pesos (P10.00) per day to be given in the following manner:
i. Five Pesos (P5.00) per day effective April 1, 1998, and ii. Additional Five Pesos (P5.00) per day effective October 1, 1998.
Section 3. UNIFORM WAGE RATE PER AREA CLASSIFICATION. To effect a uniform wage rate pursuant to Section 1 hereof, the prescribed minimum wage after full implementation of this Order for each area classification shall be as follows:
Area Classification Non-Agriculture Sector Agriculture Sector *Class A 165.00 150.00 *Class B 155.00 140.00Class *C 145.00 130.00 Class *D 135.00 120.00
At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that the employees are not entitled to the claimed salary increase, simply because they are not within the coverage of the Wage Order, as they were already receiving salaries greater than the minimum wage fixed by the Order. Concededly, there is an increase necessarily resulting from raising the minimum wage level, but not across-the-board. Indeed, a double burden cannot be imposed upon an employer except by clear
provision of law. It would be unjust, therefore, to interpret Wage Order No. ROVII-06 to mean that respondent should grant an across-the-board increase.
In the resolution of labor cases, this Court has always been guided by the State policy enshrined in the Constitution: social justice and the protection of the working class. Social justice does not, however, mandate that every dispute should be automatically decided in favor of labor. In every case, justice is to be granted to the deserving and dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. SY v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
COMPLAINANT: Susana R. Sy
RESPONDENT: Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., and/or SSC Ship Management Pte., Ltd. CITATION: G.R. No. 191740
DATE OF PROMULGATION: February 11, 2013 PONENTE: J. Peralta
FACTS:
June 23, 2003 – Alfonso N. Sy (Sy) was hired by respondent Philippine Transmarine Carriers Incorporated for and in behalf of its foreign principal, co-respondent SSC Ship Management Pte. Ltd., as Able Seaman (AB) to work for ten months.
The contract of Sy’s employment, called Philippine Overseas Employment Administration- Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), incorporates a set of standard provisions established and implemented by POEA, called the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels
October 1, 2005 – The vessel was at the Port of Jakarta, Indonesia when Sy went on shore leave and left the vessel. A few hours later, the vessel’s agent from Jardine received an advice from local police that one of the vessel’s crew members died ashore. The vessel’s master, Capt. Norman C. Marquez went to the hospital and confirmed the cadaver to be that of Sy.
The local police found that Sy was riding on a motorcycle when he stopped the driver to urinate at the riverside of the road; Sy had not returned for a while, so the driver went to look for him but he was nowhere to be found. A few hours later, his body was found.
A forensic pathologist certified that the death was an accident due to drowning, and that there was 20% alcohol in his urine.
October 8, 2005 – Sy’s body was repatriated to the Philippines. NBI’s post-mortem examination certified that the cause of death was Asphyxia by drowning.
Petitioner Susana Sy, widow of Alfonso Sy, demanded from respondents the payment of her husband’s death benefits and compensation. Respondents denied such claim, since Sy’s death occurred while he was on shore leave, hence his death was not work-related and therefore, not compensable.
LABOR ARBITER RULING: (August 28, 2007)
Respondent is ordered to pay complainant death benefits and burial expenses.
Even if while he was on shore leave, he was still under the control and supervision of the master or captain of the vessel as it was provided under Section 13 of the Contract that the seafarer before taking a shore leave must secure the consent of the master of the vessel.
Another indication that a seafarer is considered to be doing work-related functions even when on shore leave is found in subparagraph 4, paragraph B, section 1 of the Contract where the duties of the seafarer are not limited to his stay while on board, but extend to his stay ashore.
Only a finding that his death was self-inflicted or attributable to him would bar the payment of death benefits. The Autopsy Report did not establish that the death was the result of Sy’s willful act on his own life; that there were traces of alcohol in his blood did not make him “intoxicated” as there was no proof that he was; and granting that he was intoxicated, such was accidental drowning and not an intentional taking of his life.
NLRC RULING: (October 17, 2008)
Respondent’s appeal was dismissed for lack of merit; complainant’s entitled to attorney’s fees
Affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter but modified the monetary award
CA RULING: (September 17, 2009)
Petition granted. NLRC’s decision and resolution ordering respondents to pay Mrs. Sy were reversed.
Mrs. Sy was ordered to return to the respondents the monetary award she received.
Sy’s death was not work-related. Under Section 20 (A) of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, series of 2000, it was not sufficient to establish that Sy’s death had occurred during the term of his contract, but there must be a causal connection between his death and the work for which he had been contracted. When he died, he was on shore leave and left the vessel, and his death neither occurred at his workplace nor while performing an act within the scope of his employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner/complainant is entitled to death compensation benefits from respondents
SC RULING: (February 11, 2013)
The petition is devoid of merit, denied. To be entitled for death compensation benefits from the employer, the death of the seafarer (1) must be work-related; and (2) must happen during the term of the employment contract. The qualification that death must be work-related has made it necessary to show a causal connection between a seafarer’s work and his death to be compensable.
Under the 2000 POEA Amended Employment Contract, work-related injury is defined as an injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment.
Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission – the words “arising out of” refer to the origin or cause of the accident, while the words “in the course of” refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place.
At the time of the accident, Sy was on shore leave and there was no showing that he was doing an act in relation to his duty as a seaman. Because of the 20% alcohol found in his urine, it can be presumed that he just came from a personal social function which was not related at all to his job as a seaman. His death could not be considered work-related to be compensable.
Their contract clearly provides that it is not enough that death occurred during the term of the contract, but must be work-related to be compensable.
Facts: On December 2, 2009, Hocheng Philippines Corporation (HPC) received a report that a motorcycle helmet was stolen at the parking lot within its premises. The theft was recorded in the company CCTV showing Antonio Farrales, an employee taking the missing helmet from a parked motorcycle. Farrales subsequently sent a notice to explain. According to him, he asked a co-worker named Eric Libutan if he could borrow his helmet and that since they reside in the same barangay Eric could pick it up from his house afterwards. In the parking lot, he asked Andy Lopega to hand him a yellow helmet hanging from a motorcycle parked next to him. Upon seeing Eric again, he asked why Eric did not get the helmet from his house to which he replied, “Hindi po sa akin yung nakuha nyong helmet.” Farrales then informed the HPC guard and upon finding out who owned the helmet, returned it and apologized saying it was an honest mistake. A hearing regarding the incident was consequently set by the company.
On February 15, 2010, the company dismissed Farrales from service for violating the HPC Code of Discipline, which provides that “stealing from the company, its employees and officials, or from its contractors, visitors or clients,” is akin to serious misconduct and fraud which are just causes for termination of employment.
On March 25, 2010, Farrales filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Farrales, ordering HPC to pay Farrales. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision. However, the CA agreed with the LA that Farrales’ act of taking Reymar’s helmet did not amount to theft, since Eric did admit letting Farrales borrow his helmet, only Farrales mistook which helmet was his.
Issue: WON Farrales was validly dismissed
Held: To validly dismiss an employee, the law requires the employer to prove the existence of any of the valid or authorized causes, which, as enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, are: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latter’s representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. Article 4 of the Labor Code mandates that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions thereof shall be resolved in favor of labor. The Court previously held that “to be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.” Moreover, the penalty imposed on the erring employee ought to be proportionate to the offense, taking into account its nature and surrounding circumstances.
The Court agrees with the CA that Farrales committed no serious or willful misconduct or disobedience to warrant his dismissal. Farrales lost no time in returning the helmet the moment he learned of his mistake and immediately admitted his error to the company guard and sought help to find the owner of the yellow helmet. Misconduct is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment, and it must be in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his separation. But where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and that of the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
Serrano vs Severino Santos Petitioner: Rodolfo Serrano
Respondent: Severino Santos Transit/ Severino Santos Citation:627 SCRA 483
Date of Promulgation: August 9, 2010 Ponente: Carpio, J
FACTS:
Rodolfo J. Serrano was hired on September 28, 1992 as bus conductor by Severino Santos transit, a bus company owned and operated by Severino Santos.
After 14 years of service or on July 14, 2006, petitioner applied for optional retirement from the company whose representative advised him that he must first sign the already prepared Quitclaim before his retirement pay could be released.
As petitioner’s request to first go over the computation of his retirement pay was denied, he signed the Quitclaim on which he wrote “U.P.” (under protest) after his signature, indicating his protest to the amount of P75,277.45 which he received, computed by the company at 15 days per year of service.
Petitioner soon after filed a complaint, alleging that the company erred in its computation since under Republic Act No. 7641, otherwise known as the Retirement Pay Law, his retirement pay should have been computed at 22.5 days per year of service to include the cash equivalent of the 5-day service incentive leave (SIL) and 1/12 of the 13th month pay which the company did not.
Severino Santos Defense
The Quitclaim signed by petitioner barred his claim and, in any event, its computation was correct since petitioner was not entitled to the 5-day SIL and pro-rated 13th month pay for, as a bus conductor, he was paid on commission basis.
ISSUE: Whether or not 22.5 days retirement pay per year of service is the correct formula. RULING:
Republic Act No. 7641 which was enacted on December 9, 1992 amended Article 287 of the Labor Code by providing for retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment. The pertinent provision of said law reads:
Section 1. Article 287 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
Admittedly, petitioner worked for 14 years for the bus company which did not adopt any retirement scheme. Even if petitioner as bus conductor was paid on commission basis then, he falls within the coverage of R.A. 7641 and its implementing rules. As thus correctly ruled by the Labor Arbiter, petitioner’s retirement pay should include the cash equivalent of the 5-day SIL and 1/12 of the 13th month pay.
Autobus vs Bautista
Petitioner: Autobus Transport Systems, Inc. Respondent: Antonio Bautista
Date of Promulgation: May 16, 2005 Ponente: Chico- Nazaro, J
FActs:
Antonio Bautista has been employed by Autobus, as driver-conductor and was paid oncommission basis, seven percent (7%) of the total gross income per travel, on a twice a monthbasis.
While Bautista was driving Autobus No. 114, he accidentally bumped the rear portion of Autobus No. 124.
Bautista averred that the accident happened because he was compelled by the management to go back to Roxas, Isabela, although he had not slept for almost 24 hours, as he had just arrived in Manila from Roxas, Isabela.
Furthermore, he alleged that he was not allowed to work until he fully paid 30% of the cost of repair of the damaged busesand that his pleas for reconsideration were ignored by management.
After a month, management sent him a letter of termination.
Thus, he instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay and service incentive leavepay.
Autobus maintained that Bautista’s employment was replete with offenses.
Furthermore,Autobus avers that in the exercise of its management prerogative, Bautista's employment was terminated only after the latter was provided with an opportunity to explain.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but ordered Autobus to pay his 13th month pay fromthe date of his hiring to the date of his dismissal, as well as his service incentive leave pay for allthe years he had been in service.
Autobus appealed to the NLRC which deleted the award of 13thmonth pay based on the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851,particularly Sec. 3 which exempts employers of those who are paid on purely commission,boundary, or task basis. Records showed that Bautista, in his position paper, admitted that he was paid on a
commission basis. The award of service incentive leave pay was maintained. Thus, Autobus sought a reconsideration which was denied by NLRC.
CA affirmed the decisionof the NLRC
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. RULING:
What must be ascertained in order to resolve the issue of propriety of the grant of service incentive leave to respondent is whether or not he is a field personnel.
Field personnel is further elaborated in the Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC), Advisory Opinion to Philippine Technical-Clerical Commercial Employees Association[10] which states that: As a general rule, [field personnel] are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of the employee
Along the routes that are plied by these bus companies, there are its inspectors assigned at strategic places who board the bus and inspect the passengers, the punched tickets, and the conductor’s reports. There is also the mandatory once-a-week car barn or shop day, where the bus is regularly checked as to its mechanical, electrical, and hydraulic aspects, whether or nott here are problems thereon as reported by the driver and/or conductor. They too, must be at a specific place at a specified time, as they generally observe prompt departure and arrival from
their point of origin to their point of destination. In each and every depot, there is always the Dispatcher whose function is precisely to see to it that the bus and its crew leave the premisesat specific times and arrive at the estimated proper time. These, are present in the case at bar. The driver, the complainant herein, was therefore under constant supervision while in the performance of this work. He cannot be considered a field personnel.
Therefore, Bautista is not a field personnel but a regular employee who performs tasks usually necessary and desirable to the usual trade of business of Autobus. Accordingly, Bautista is entitled to the grant of service incentive leave.
David vs Macasio Petitioner: Ariel David Respondent: John Macasio Citation: GR 195466
Date of Promulgation: July 2, 2014 Ponente: Brion, J
FACTS:
Macasio fled be ore the Labor Arbiter a complaint against petitioner Ariel L. David for nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay, and 13th month pay.
Macasio had been working as a butcher for David since January 6, 1995. Macasio claimed that David exercised effective control and supervision over his work
David claimed that he started his hog dealer business in 2005 and alleged that he hired Macasio as a butcher or chopper on "pakyaw" or task basis who is, therefore, not entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay pursuant to the provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Labor Code.
David pointed out that Macasio:
a) usually starts his work at 10:00 p.m. and ends at 2:00 a.m. of the following day or earlier, depending on the volume of the delivered hogs;
b) received the fixed amount of P700.00 per engagement, regardless of the actual number of hours that he spent chopping the delivered hogs; and
c) was not engaged to report for work and, accordingly, did not receive any fee when no hogs were delivered.
Macasio disputed David’s allegations .He argued that, first, David did not start his business only in 2005. He pointed to the Certificate of Employment that David issued in his favor which placed the date of his employment, albeit erroneously, in January 2000. Second, he reported for work every day which the payroll or time record could have easily proved had David submitted them in evidence.
Refuting Macasio’s submissions, David claims that Macasio was not his employee as he hired the latter on "pakyaw" or task basis. He also claimed that he issued the Certificate of Employment, upon Macasio’s request, only for overseas employment purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not a worker paid in "pakyaw" basis is entitled to holiday pay m overtime pay, 13th month pay and Service Incentive Leave.
RULING:
SIL and Holiday Pay
The payment of an employee on task or pakyaw basis alone is insufficient to exclude one from the coverage of SIL and holiday pay. They are exempted from the coverage of Title I (including the holiday and SIL pay) only if they qualify as "field personnel." The IRR therefore
validly qualifies and limits the general exclusion of "workers paid by results" found in Article 82 from the coverage of holiday and SIL pay. This is the only reasonable interpretation since the determination of excluded workers who are paid by results from the coverage of Title I is "determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
In short, in determining whether workers engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis" is entitled to holiday and SIL pay, the presence (or absence) of employer supervision as regards the worker’s time and performance is the key: if the worker is simply engaged on pakyaw or task basis, then the general rule is that he is entitled to a holiday pay and SIL pay unless exempted from the exceptions specifically provided under Article 94 (holiday pay) and Article95 (SIL pay) of the Labor Code. However, if the worker engaged on pakyaw or task basis also falls within the meaning of "field personnel" under the law, then he is not entitled to these monetary benefits.
Macasio does not fall under the classification of "field personnel" 13
th Month pay
13th month pay benefits generally cover all employees; an employee must be one of those expressly enumerated to be exempted. Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 85154 enumerates the exemptions from the coverage of 13th month pay benefits. Under Section 3(e), "employers of those who are paid on xxx task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof"55 are exempted.
Note that unlike the IRR of the Labor Code on holiday and SIL pay, Section 3(e) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD No. 851 exempts employees "paid on task basis" without any reference to "field personnel." This could only mean that insofar as payment of the 13th month pay is concerned, the law did not intend to qualify the exemption from its coverage with the requirement that the task worker be a "field personnel" at the same time.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby PARTIALLY GRANT the petition insofar as the payment of 13th month pay to respondent is concerned. In all other aspects, we AFFIRM the decision dated November 22, 2010 and the resolution dated January 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116003.
Robina Farms vs Villa
Petitioner: Robina Farms/ Universal Robina Corporatioj Respondent: Elizabeth Villa
Citation: GR 175869
Date of Promulgation: April 18, 2016 Ponente: Bersamin, J
FACTS:
Elizabeth Villa brought against the petitioner her complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, nonpayment of overtime pay, and nonpayment of service incentive leave pay Villa averred that she had been employed by petitioner Robina Farms as sales clerk since
August 1981;
1) that in the later part of 2001, the petitioner had enticed her to avail herself of the company's special retirement program;
2) that on March 2, 2002, she had received a memorandum from Lily Ngochua requiring her to explain her failure to issue invoices for unhatched eggs in the months of January to February 2002;
3) that she had explained that the invoices were not delivered on time because the delivery receipts were delayed and overlooked;
4) that despite her explanation, she had been suspended for 10 days from March 8, 2012 until March 19, 2002;
5) that upon reporting back to work, she had been advised to cease working because her application for retirement had already been approved;
6) that she had been subsequently informed that her application had been disapproved, and had then been advised to tender her resignation with a request for financial assistance; 7) that she had manifested her intention to return to work but the petitioner had confiscated
her gate pass;
8) and that she had since then been prevented from entering the company premises and had been replaced by another employee.
The petitioner admitted that Villa had been its sales clerk at Robina Farms.
1) It stated that on December 12, 2001, she had applied for retirement under the special privilege program offered to its employees in Bulacan and Anti polo who had served for at least 10 years;
2) that in February 2002, her attention had been called by Anita Gabatan of the accounting department to explain her failure to issue invoices for the unhatched eggs for the month of February;
3) that she had explained that she had been busy; that Gabatan had referred the matter to Florabeth Zanoria who had in turn relayed the matter to Ngochua;
4) and that the latter had then given Villa the chance to explain, which she did.
The petitioner added that after the administrative hearing Villa was found to have violated the company rule on the timely issuance of the invoices that had resulted in delay in the payment of buyers considering that the payment had depended upon the receipt of the invoices
She had been suspended from her employment as a consequence; that after serving the suspension, she had returned to work and had followed up her application for retirement with Lucina de Guzman, who had then informed her that the management did not approve the benefits equivalent to 86% of her salary rate applied for, but only Yz month for every year of service; and that disappointed with the outcome, she had then brought her complaint against the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villa had been ilegally dismissed. RULING:
Villa had not been dismissed from employment, holding thusly:
Complainant's application, insofar the benefits are concerned, was not approved which means that while her application for retirement was considered, management was willing to give her retirement benefits equivalent only to half-month pay for every year of service and not 86% of her salary for every year of service as mentioned in her application. Mrs. De Guzman suggested that if she wanted to pursue her supposed retirement despite thereof, she should submit a resignation letter and include therein a request for financial assistance. We do not find anything illegal or violative in the suggestion made by Mrs. De Guzman. There was no compulsion since the choice was left entirely to the complainant whether to pursue it or not.
Although ordering Villa's reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter denied her claim for backwages and overtime pay because she had not adduced evidence of the overtime work actually performed. The Labor Arbiter declared that Villa was entitled to service in
MAXICARE VS CONTRERAS
Petitioner: Maxicare PCIB Cigna Healthcare, Eric S. Nubla, M.D. and Ruth A. Asis, M.D. Respondent: Marian Brigitte A. Contreras, M.D.
Citation: GR No. 194352
Date of Promulgation: January 30, 2013 Ponente: Velasco Jr., J.
FYI: Constructive Dismissal is an employer's act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not; a dismissal in disguise, i.e. an employee is allowed to continue to work but it is simply reassigned, or demoted, or his pay diminished without a valid reason to do so
FACTS
1. Dr. Marian Contreras was hired by Maxicare as a retainer doctor at the Philippine National Bank Head Office sometime in March 2003. By virtue of a verbal agreement:
- she would render medical services for one year at Php 250 per hour - her retainer fee would be paid every 15th and 30th of each month
- her retainer fee would based on her work schedule which was every Tuesday, Thursday and Friday from 6am to 5pm
2. On July 3, 2003, Dr. Ruth Asis, Maxicare's medical specialist on Corporate Accounts, informed Dr. Contreras that she was going to be transferred to another account after a month.
- Dr. Contreras agreed on the terms of the Service Agreement with Dr. Eric Nubla, Maxicare's VP for Medical Services; such was executed on August 4, 2003
1. regarding her transfer to Maybank Philippines for a period of 4 months (Aug 5 - Nov 29, 2003)
2. retainer fee of Php 168 per hour 3. Dr. Contreras reported to work for one day only.
4. On August 8, 2003, she filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter claiming that she was constructively dismissed.
- Maxicare insisted that there was no constructive dismissal
5. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of Dr. Contreras for lack of merit.
- if she was forced to sign the Service Agreement, she could have not reported to that assignment (Maybank)
- her reporting to work for one day ratified the Service Agreement she signed and waived all her rights under the previous agreement (PNB) she is supposed to be entitled to reinforce
- she should have ventilated the matter before signing and executing the questioned Service Agreement
6. NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision.
- the Service Agreement's execution does not negate constructive dismissal arising from the termination of Dr. Contreras' PNB retainership without either just or authorized cause
- she signed the Service Agreement but later repudiated it with a notice to Maxicare that she could not go on serving under such a disadvantageous situation (decrease of retainer fee)
- the clear economic prejudice validated her claim of having reservation on the Service Agreement prior to her signature (she signed because it gave her no realistic chance to haggle for her job)
7. CA affirmed the conclusions of the NLRC
- her transfer to Maybank resulting to the diminution of her salary was prejudicial to her interest and amounted to a constructive dismissal
- Maxicare had the burden of proving that 1) the transfer made was valid or for legitimate grounds, 2) such transfer was not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial.
8. Maxicare filed a petition before the SC.
- there is no employer-employee relationship
- Dr. Contreras was an independent contractor (she rendered services for a few hours a week, giving her free time to pursue her private practice)
- terms of their agreement include that either party could terminate the arrangement upon one month's advance notice
- Dr. Contreras is a highly educated person who freely, willingly, and voluntarily signed the new Medical Retainership Agreement. There is no truth that she was forced to sign the Service Agreement.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was an employee-employer relationship. HELD
Yes. Petition of Maxicare was denied.
Maxicare is not unaware of Article 217 of the Labor Code which enumerates the cases where the Labor Arbiter has exclusive and original jurisdiction: cases only when there is an
employer-employee relationship between the parties in dispute.
- if Maxicare was at the position that there was no employer-employee relationship, it should questioned the jurisidiction of the Labor Arbiter right away
- while it is true that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage, it is also true that in the interest of fairness, questions challenging the jurisdiction of courts will not be tolerated if the party questioning such jurisdiction actively participates in the court proceedings and allows the court to pass judgement on the case.
Review of labor cases is confined to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The alleged absence of employer-employee relationship cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (Duty Free Philippines Services inc. v. Manolito Tria).
SEMBLANTE VS CA
Petitioner: Marticio Semblante and Dubrick Pilar
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Gallera De Mandaue/spouses Vicente and Maria Luisa Loot Citation: GR No. 196426
Date of Promulgation: August 15, 2011 Ponente: Velasco Jr., J.
FYI: Four-fold Test refers to the usual test used to determine the existence of employer-employer relationship.
FACTS
1. Marticio Semblante and Dubrick Pilar claim that they were hired by respondent-spouses Vicente and Maria Luisa Loot, owners of Gallera de Mandaue--a cockpit.
- Semblante, as the official masiador, calls and takes bets from the gamecock owners and other bettors and orders the start of the cockfight; he also distributes the winnings after
deducting the commission for the cockpit
- Pilar, as the sentenciador, oversees the proper gaffing of fight cocks, determines the fighting cocks' physical condition and capabilities, and declares the result of the cockfight
- Semblante receives Php 8,000 per month and Pilar receives Php 14,000 pero month. They work Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Saturdays and Sundays, excluding monthly derbies and special holidays. They work from 1pm-12mn or depending on the needs of the cockpit
- Semblante and Pilar have been issued employee identification cards that they wear everytime they go to work
- they allege not having incurred any infraction and/or violation
2. On November 14, 2003, petitioners were denied entry into the cockpit upon the instructions of the respondents. They were informed of the termination of their services effective that day. Petitioners then file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
3. Respondents denied that petitioners were their employees and claim that they were associates of respondents' independent contractor, Tomas Vega.
- respondent are free to decide whether they will report to work or not
- identification cards were given to them only to indicate that they were free from the normal entrance fee and to differentiate them from the general public
4. The Labor Arbiter found petitioners to be regular employees of the cockpit as they performed work that was necessary and indispensable to the usual trade or business of respondents for a number of year.
5. Respondents upon receiving the Labor Arbiter's decision dated September 14, 2004, filed an appeal with the NLRC on September 24, 2004.
- this was however without posting a cash or surety bond equivalent to the monetary award granted by the Labor Arbiter
- it was only on Octobr 11, 2004 that respondents filed an appeal bond dated October 6, 2004.
6. In a Resolution dated August 25, 2005, the NLRC denied the appeal for non-perfection.
- however, upon acting on respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, the NLRC reversed its Resolution on the ground that their appeal was meritorious
7. The NLRC, in a Resolution dated October 18, 2006, held that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and respondents.
- there was no separate individual contract with respondents was ever executed by petitioners
8. Petitioners went to the CA on a petition for certiorari.
- they argued that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in entertaining an appeal that was not perfected in the first place (the appeal bond being filed late)
9. The CA decided in favor of the respondents.
- in some circumstances, the NLRC is allowed to be liberal in the interpretation of the rules in deciding labor cases. Although the appeal bond was filed late, an exceptional
circumstance--the appeal being highly meritorious--in the case at bench warrants a relaxation of the bond requirement as a condition for perfecting the appeal
- there is no employer-employee relationship
1. petitioners are akin to independent contractors who possess unique skills, expertise, and talent that distinguishes them from ordinary employees
2. they are not given salaries by the cockpit owners; their compensation is based on the arriba (commission)
3. respondents have no control over the means and methods of the manner by which petitioners should perform their work
4. petitioners are free to choose which cockpit arena to enter and offer their expertise
5. respondents did not supply petitioners with the tools and instrumentalities they need to perform their work
6. respondents only needed their talent and skills to be masiador and sentenciador. 10. Petitioners came to the SC arguing that the CA committed a reversible error in entertaining an appeal which was not perfected in the first place.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in entertaining an appeal which was not perfected int he first place.
2. Whether or not there existed an employer-employee relationship. HELD
No. The SC denied the petition for lack of merit.
1. Indeed, the posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Article 223, Labor Code
Appeal. Ñ Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
The SC, time and again, has relaxed this rule on appeal bond when there are strong and compelling reasons for liberality, such as the prevention of miscarriage of justice extant in the case or the special circumstances in the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved.
- technical rules cannot prevent courts from exercising their duties to determine and settle, equitable and completely, the rights and obligations of the parties.
2. While the bond was filed late, it is evident that petitioners are not employees of respondents, since their relationship failed the four-fold test of employment.
1. the selection and engagement of the employee 2. the payment of wages
3. the power of dismissal
4. the power to control the employee's conduct (the most important element). As found by the NLRC and the CA:
- the respondents had no part in petitioners' selection and management - petitioners were paid out of the arriba
- petitioners performed their functions free from the direction and control of respondents
- petitioners relied on their expertise and was never given by the respondents any tool needed for the performance of their work.
PSI VS CA
Petitioner: Professional Services Inc.
Respondent: Leonardo de Castro, Brion, Peraltam Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., the Court of Appeals, and Natividad and Enrique Agana
Citation: GR No. 126297
Date of Promulgation: November 25, 2008 Ponente: Puno, J.
FYI: Principle of Ostensible Agency/Doctrine of Apparent Authority imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists; under the rule, the principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the agent to assume, or which he holds to the agent out to the public as possessing
FACTS
1. Enrique and Natividad Agana (later substituted by her heirs) filed a complaint for damages against Dr. Miguel Ampil and Dr. Juan Fuentes when the two doctors neglected to remove from Natividad's body 2 gauzes.
2. The RTC, in a decision dated March 17, 1993, held PSI with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for damages.
3. On appeal, the CA absolved Dr. Fuentes but affirmed the liability of PSI and Dr. Ampil, subject to the right of PSI to claim reimbursement from Dr. Ampil.
4. The SC affirmed the CA's decision in January 31, 2007.
- PSI filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court denied it in a Resolution dated February 11, 2008.
5. The SC premised the direct liability of PSI to the Aganas incident on the following facts and law:
a. There existed an emploter-employee relationship between PSI and Dr. Ampil. - as held in Ramos v CA, for purposes of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship exists between
