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AGRARIAN REFORM LAW AND OTHER SOCIAL LEGISLATIONMIDTERM TRANSCRIPT 2016 Atty. Glenn Capanas Agra June 25 First Minutes
If CARP is important in Agrarian reform, RA 3844 equally shares the same importance.
1. This law is still applicable. Not all farmers are considered as owners of the land they tilled, some may have chosen to remain or to stay as farmers of the landowner under Sec. 6 of CARP.
2. CARP was silent as to the leasehold provision then you should apply RA 3844
3. There is only one section that was expressly repealed by the CARP. (repeals on implication is not favored).
Sec. 35 of RA 3844 was repealed because in this law it says that shared tenancy was abolished and leasehold relation was instituted in place of shared tenancy. Leasehold will governed all the existing contracts between land owners, farmers, lessor, lessee.
There is a portion of Sec. 35 of RA 3844 which states that notwithstanding the abolition of shared tenancy and leasehold to be considered as the relation between the lessor and the lessee, this law will not apply to certain Agri products such as durian, coffee and cacao. There were, in short, Agri products which were not covered under this law. It was expressly repealed because CARP covers all kinds of Agri products, no more reference to durian, coffee and cacao.
Although there are other ways of distributing lands in CARP that even if CARP covers all kinds of Agri products, the government provided other ways for the farmers to acquire lands like for example through STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION.
Just to show us that there are lands covered under this law (check the law). Except that the public area which are covered under this law are those devoted for settlement purposes whereas under CARP, regardless of whether it was for settlement purposes, all public lands which are agricultural in nature are supposed to be…(ming jump ug other topic si Atty. Haha).
Beneficiaries
When you read the law, you will found that there are 9 components:
1. Share tenancy is abolished and the law institutionalized leasehold relation
2. There is a declaration of rights for agricultural labor. The word labor is actually granting rights in favor of agricultural lessee like for example minimum wage, right to participate in certain activities, right to self-organization.
3. An authority for the acquisition and equitable distribution of Agri land. The authority referred to here is the Land Authority which the former name of Department of Agrarian Reform. 4. An institution to finance the acquisition and distribution of
the Agri land. The institution referred to is the Land Bank of the Philippines.
LBP comes in, insofar as acquisition is concerned, when the Land Authority send a notice to the owner-“your land is covered by the agrarian reform”- they will conduct a meeting with the LBP so that LBP can show you how much is the valuation of the property the government intends to pay you. When the land owner accepts the offer, they will execute the sale then that’s it. If the landowner rejects the
offer of LBP before under this Code, the land owner can actually go to the judiciary which the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR). CAR under this code has the power to decide issues arising in this code and other related laws in relations including among others the task of fixing just compensation.
The task of LBP is not only on the acquisition, it is also tasked regarding distribution. When the government wants to acquire the agri land, the government has to pay the landowner just compensation, the valuation of the land is supposed to be just.
Once the government is now in possession of the Agri land, the government will now inform the Registry of Deeds, by process we have now deposited the valuation of the land pertaining to land owner A, deposited the money to LBP, so now we have certification form LBP that there is a deposit of money so cancel now the title of the landowner and issue a new title in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
Once the title is now under the name of the republic of the Philippines, then the government will now distribute the land to the qualified farmer beneficiaries. But these lands to be given to the farmer beneficiaries are not for free, the farmer beneficiaries will have to have to pay 36 under CARP annual amortizations plus 6% interest based on the valuation of the LBP.
So once the beneficiaries are identified, the title of the Republic will be transferred in favor of the different beneficiaries, others are individual and others are cooperative-in the back of the title, there is a list of the names. Because it is not for free, they will have to pay LBP. LBP is assured that Republic will not lose the property through the title bearing the annotation of the mortgage to be signed by the farmer beneficiary-mortgagee in favor of the LBP. If farmer defaulted, LBP can get it back, thus the farmer beneficiary cannot anymore be qualified for future beneficiary since he defaulted.
5, 6, 7, and 8. These are internal procedure for the effective implementation of the program. So if the land was to be surveyed if there is discrepancy or there is a need to classify or to register.
9. It mentions the CAR
Even if this code will still apply but with respect to No. 3 there is a qualification. DAR now has two arms: (1)
Implementation-that’s why we have Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases, Secretary down to MARO; (2) Quasi-Judicial Functions- DARAB to PARAB.
Since DAR has two arms, this judicial system has been abolished. There is no more CAR now. The SOLE jurisdiction to determine the
just compensation is given to RTC. It does not depend on the jurisdictional amount, there is no amount deposited because the law says that it is RTC which has jurisdiction for as long as the subject matter, the nature of the action is just compensation
The power of CAR before also covers the determination of whether the parties are landlord-tenant or landlord-farmer, RTC has no jurisdiction over that as of now. It is the other arm of DAR that determines this, the DARAB.
WHY SHARED TENANCY WAS ABOLISHED
In labor law the employee has security of tenure, in Agra law, the agricultural lessee has security of tenure under RA 3844. Shared tenancy depends on the agreement between the landowner and the tenant. What is important in shared tenancy is sharing but previous laws have not focus on the tenurial status or the continuity of relation or the guarantee of the physical possession and enjoyment and management of the party. So right now, if farmer covered under RA 3844, the law says under Sec. 10, in case of sale or alienation of the legal
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possession, transferee shall will be subrogated to the rights andsubstituted to the obligation of the lessee.
For example, if you have a landowner who wants to remove a farmer from the agri land and you have no leasehold relation, you have no law like this but probably there were few laws before that provide safety measures before a farmer or tenant can be ejected. However the law is silent before whether what will happen to the Agri-lessor will sell the property to another person. So if you want to eject the tenant you can ask the dummy to eject the tenant.
This cannot be done now because there is an assurance of the status. This kind of relation is physical agreement, landowner and farmer agree, okay landowner ako ang yuta, farmer ikaw maoy service. They have a term in contract. Let’s say we have 10 years in the agreement. Do you think after 10 years, you can eject the tenant or farmer? NO, not anymore. Notwithstanding of the expiration of the term or period of the contract, the farmer is guaranteed of tenurial status.
Sec. 9 of the law, in case of death or physical incapacity of the Agri-lessee the relation will continue. In Sec. 9 there are three persons who can succeed-that is where continuity of relation comes in- (1)Surviving spouse; (2) Eldest direct descendant by consanguinity and; (3) Direct descendant in the order of age priority.
June 29, 2016
You know how it is to redeem in a foreclosure in civil law: One year after the foreclosure. In Agra, under RA 3844, it is 180 days.
In ordinary civil law foreclosure, 1 year after the registration of the property to the Register of Deeds. The Certificate of Sale will be registered at the Register of Deeds. That is where the reckoning point of the one year period.
It is different in Agrarian Law, in Section 12 of the RA 3844, you have lessees right of redemption (Agricultural lessees), its redemption period is 180 days from notice in writing to be served by the vendees on all lessee affected and the DAR. Vendee in the auction is the one who will serve the notice. Who are to be notified: all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Po vs Dampal
Petitioner who is the highest bidder in an auction conducted when the farmlands were foreclosed by the bank. Now, this one is very important: After the foreclosure with Po as the highest bidder, the previous owner (mortgagor) and the tenant filed a civil case against the bank for annulment of mortgage. Meanwhile the tenant filed a complaint for legal redemption made in DARAB. And that agency has the different interpretation on the complaint for legal redemption. The Adjudicator is allowed. It was a prescription and that the requirement of notice was complied when the tenant filed the civil case. Remember: Civil case was filed ahead for legal redemption.
Now, with the DARAB central office reversed the lack of notice of sale of the tenant and the DAR. The basis is Section 12. Section 12 requires a notice in writing. That was not complied. However, since the tenant was partly a plaintiff in the civil case that was filed ahead of the complaint for legal redemption, then there must be substantial compliance of the law.
But the SC did not agree with that argument. SC said that there was an express requirement of the law. Notice of writing is indispensable. Thus, the period to redeem has not begun to run. So the
legal redemption should be granted because it was denied because of prescription by the Regional Adjudicator because it was filed beyond the 180 days.
Extinguishment: 1. Abandonment 2. Voluntary Surrender
3. Absence of first ____ in Section 9 (di ko kagets kay sir kani na part)
Extinguishment - normally is voluntary, depends on the lessee Dispossession – dispossess is similar to eject; based on an offense
committed by the lessee.
Section 36 listed this grounds for dispossession under RA 3844: (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions.
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
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(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
We will have to focus on number 6 because this is subject on several cases.
Sta. Ana vs. Carpo
If truly there is no leasehold relation between parties, then the remedy is a civil law case. But if there is leasehold relations, agrarian court is the one who has jurisdiction.
Go directly to the ruling of the SC:
1) Burden of Proof: The lessor because of the principle of security of tenure of lessee
2) Failure to pay means “wilful and deliberate”
Comment of Atty: The law does not say “wilful and deliberate” (just
mentioned “non-payment of rental) but the SC qualified in this case. Facts:
Evidence was an affidavit executed by the lessee stating the Leon, the lessor, refused to receive. If there is refusal, how can there be wilful and deliberate intent? Plus, there were two letters informing him of the _____ base rentals. If a mere affidavit is sufficient is Agra Law? (Compared to Civil Law System, an affidavit generally is not enough unless he testifies. But there is an exception: Ejectment and other cases that are summary in nature)
What about agra? No. Judicial affidavit applies only to all court and other quasijudicial agencies under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. DARAB is not. So a mere affidavit will suffice. Depending of course of the contents of the affidavit.
Natividad vs. Mariano
Facts: Non-payment of rentals and Petition for Ejectment.
Now, here is this Ernesto who allege that he purchased the property in an auction. He filed the ejectment case. After the purchase according to him, he verbally demanded for respondents to pay the rentals. And respondents refused to pay
You have another principle here. (Take note Sta Ana) Only for the specifically enumerated causes of dispossession. You cannot add another cause under Section 36.
Three points discussed by SC: 1) Was there demand?
2) Was there deliberate and wilful failure to payment of rentals? 3) Whether the lease rentals paid to Corazon and Laureano was valid?
(They were former owners of the land) T/N: Ernesto was a purchaser of an auction.
So according to the facts, the lessees were paying the rentals continuously to the previous owners. They do not know that Ernesto was the new owner of the land.
Ernesto did not present proof that he demanded the lessees. Thus, there was no demand.
---
So the principles (discussed)
1 Wilful and deliberate non-payment is needed
2. It must have lasted for at least two years of non-payment (another principle)
What was the basis as to why the Supreme Court held that the non-payment must have lasted for at least two years?
The Supreme Court cited a decree, PD 816. This law says. Continued that refusal or continued refusal to the lease rental by the agri lessee, shall upon hearing the judgment result in the cancellation of the CLT issued in the agri lessee’s name.
Presidential Decree 816
Section 1. That the continuing and deliberate refusal of the agricultural
lessees to pay their leasehold rentals to the landowners/agricultural lessors cannot be countenanced and shall not remain unchecked or unpunished;
Section 2. That any agricultural lessee of a rice or corn land under
Presidential Decree No. 27 who deliberately refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years shall, upon hearing and final judgment, forfeit the Certificate of Land Transfer issued in his favor, if his farmholding is already covered by such Certificate of Land Transfer, and his farmholding;
Section 3. That any agricultural lessee whose landholding is not yet
covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer and who shall continue not
to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner/agricultural lessor shall, upon proper hearing and judgment, lose his right to be issued a Certificate of Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and his farmholding;
Section 4. That landholdings subject of forfeiture under the preceding
Section shall be turned over to the Samahang Nayon with which the agricultural lessee is affiliated for assignment to a qualified member or members of the association whose landholding/s is/are of uneconomic size in accordance with the policies laid down by the Department of Agrarian Reform;
Section 5. That any action for violation of the provisions of the
preceding Sections 2 and 3 shall be cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations which is hereby vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide the same;
Section 6. All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, and rules and
regulations which are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
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CLT (Certificate of Land Title) is the ticket of land transfer. It is the term used under PD 27. It is a document to be given to a tenant or a farmer preparatory to an issuance of an emancipation patent.
It would seem that based on PD 816, the Supreme Court is making an analogy when they used this principle that lasted “for at least two years”. Meaning, if we had this under PD 816 and the period of non-payment is two years will result to the cancellation of CLT then might as well as dubbed it as a minimum period for non-payment of rental for
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ground to disposes the lessee under section 36. Because I think you will all agree that this one, PD 816, has nothing to do with dispossession. It talks about cancellation of title but not dispossession. So I submit that the Supreme Court is adapting the law by analogy. Applying it to non-payment of rental as ground to dispossess based on this.
Now this bothers me, the Supreme Court clarified what is the meaning of deliberate to be absolute aside from defining the Sta. Ana case. “It must be non-payment of lease rentals to be absolute”. Kailangan wla gyuy bayad! To be considered deliberate or wilful. The example like, marked by the complete absence of any payment. Dli ba illogical? Because probably in the past months, the tenant was paying but now if I refuse to pay, I cannot be held to be considered as wilful and
deliberate non-payment? That should not be the case. Because here. There were payments for 2 years. So if there were payments. This principle will apply. Now, you must take note that this are my observations dli nani sa Supreme Court.
Now, my question is this:
1. Why did the Supreme Court applied PD 816? Considering PD 816 applies only to rice and corn. That’s why the word CLT is there in PD 816
2. Why did the y question the applicability of PD 816? Because there is nothing in the facts that will show you whether the land is rice or corn.
RA 3844 is silent on the non-payment of rental. Because non-payment of rental is a ground to dispossess. There was no period and you can’t find the words “wilful and deliberate”.
Ako nalang mag-question, ako nalang say mu-answer para mahuman (Corny mani si Sir oi. HAHAHA) and this is my answer:
1. Why did the Court applied PD 816? I made an assumption. The assumption being that the words “crop” appeared in the case. Crop here applies to rice. This CLT appeared also in the case. You can find CLT in PD 27 and this applies to rice and corn. Mao tingale ang reason sa supreme court it applied PD 816 in the Case of Natividad.
Nieves v. Duldulao
Facts:
You have an owner who filed a case to eject a tenant. The tenant invoke fortuitous event such as the flooding and typhoons as a defense for the non-payment of rentals.
Issue:
Is it a valid defense? Held:
No. Under Paragraph 6 of Sec. 36 provides “The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rentals when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished.”
Antonio v. Manahan – SC held that the records show that the landowner actually rejected the rentals tendered by the tenants therein due to
their supposed poor quality. This circumstance was taken by the Court together with the fact that said tenants even exerted efforts to make up for the rejected rentals through the payments made for the other year Roxas v. Cabatuando – SC held that the tenants therein did not wilfully and deliberately fail to pay their leasehold rentals since they had serious doubts as to the legality of their contract with respect to their non-sharing in the coconut produce, which thus prompted them to withhold their remittances in good faith.
In contrast to Antonio and Roxas, the landowner in this case never rejected any rental payment duly tendered by respondents or their predecessors-in-interest. Neither was the legality of their agricultural leasehold contract with the landowner ever put into issue so as to intimate that they merely withheld their remittances in good faith. Thus, with the fortuitous event defense taken out of the equation, and considering the wilfulness and deliberateness were not found to have been established, the Court is impelled to agree with the DARAB that respondents herein wilfully and deliberately chose not to pay their leasehold rentals to the landowner when they fell due.
Atty Comments:
Sa Ato pa, if you do not fall between Roxas or Antonio then wla kay depensa, there is deliberate failure to pay. And I don’t think that is right. Why? Because who has the burden? It is the land owner. What was admitted was the non-payment of rental but in Sta. v. Carpo the SC said non-payment means “wilful and deliberate”. And who is suppose to prove that? The land owner! You don’t render a judgment based on logic or simple deduction based on Antonio or Roxas.
But for me, it would have been better if the Supreme Court would have concluded that anyway that this is Rice land, so why not adopt PD 816? PD 816 said that non-payment should have lasted for at least 2 years diba? In this case the non-payment lasted for more than 20 years. Based on the case of Natividad, that is considered as wilful and deliberate. Ngano man? More than 2 years naman.
Section 34 for RA 3844 - Liabilities of lessor if he ejects tenant without authorization
Fine or Imprisonment
Damages suffered
Attorney’s fees
Remuneration for last income
Lease Rental – Shall not be more than the equivalent of 25% of the average normal harvest during the 3 agricultural years immediately preceding amount used for seeds and costs of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing.
Atty Comments:
Authorization here means, DARAB or PARAB. This also presupposes a real leasehold relation because the word used is “tenant”.
Remember, this leasehold relation. Somebody is furnishing the land, somebody cultivates and the produce is shared. Naay magbayad ug lease rental sa land owner, the law fixed the lease rental. Ngano man? Luoy kaayo ang lessee if there is no cap. Basin i-take advantage sa land owner. You have to take note, Agri years is different from a calendar years. Agri years depends upon a commodity. There are certain commodity who have 2 or more Agri years in 1 calendar year. If I’m not mistaken there are 2 agri years in 1 calendar year.
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Suppletory ApplicationReyes v. Reyes
This confers that RA 3844 has suppletory application and you will find here the confirmation made by the Supreme Court that only Section 35 was repealed by CARL The Supreme Court emphasize that there are 2 modes that provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act or (2) by oral or written agreement either express or implied.
Atty Comment:
I submit there is a third mode. What is that? Katong there is a retained area and the farmer chooses to retain. It falls under leasehold but it does not fall under these two. Ngano man? Operation of law, those under staring 1963, shared tenancy convert into by operation of the law into leaseholds. What about oral or written agreement? The word is agreement. However even if the land owner doesn’t want to, he has no choice since the choice is given to the farmer whether to remain or not to remain. Pero ato-ato rana kay wla mana diri (LOL).
Agra Transcript July 2, 2016 P.D. 27 effectivity date: oct. 21, 1972
-lands acquired starting oct 21, 1972, if landowners are not yet paid just compensation, CARL took effect on june 10, 1988. Just compensation will now be based on CARL, not on PD 27.
What are covered under P.D. 27?
-only those private agri land devoted to rice and corn
-Lands under the public domain are not included
Differences of PD 27 and CARL
o Under PD 27, what is included is only private agri land devoted to rice and corn. CARL includes all other agri land regardless of the commodity produced.
o Under PD 27, there are limitations on the number of hectares a farmer may own. There’s a distinction between judicated and non judicated. Under CARL, there is no more distinction, and the number of areas also differs.
Can lands acquired under PD 27 be transferred by DAR to another qualified beneficiary?
Estolas vs. Mabalot , G.R. No. 133706, May 7, 2002 Facts:
A Certificate of Land Transfer (hereinafter referred to as CLT) was issued in favor of respondent over a 5,000 square meter lot (hereinafter referred to as subject land). Needing money for medical treatment, respondent passed on the subject land to the petitioner. According to respondent, there was only a verbal mortgage; while according to petitioner, a sale had taken place.
Respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner before the Barangay
Lupon in Pangasinan for the purpose of redeeming the subject land. When no amicable settlement was reached, the case was referred to the
DAR regional office. DAR’s District Office found that respondent merely gave the subject land to petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan he had incurred from the latter; and recommending that the CLT remain in the name of respondent and that the money loan be returned to petitioner. Petitioner insisted that the subject land had been sold to him by respondent and requested the DAR to cancel the CLT in respondent’s name. Another investigation was conducted on the matter which led to the issuance of an Order issued by DAR Regional Director. In the said Order, the DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of petitioner as constituting abandonment thereof, and denied respondent’s prayer for redemption of the subject land. Respondent’s request for reinvestigation was denied in a Resolution. Thus, respondent appealed the case to the DAR Central Office which an order was issued reversing the assailed Order of DAR Regional Director and ordering the petitioner to return the subject land to respondent. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issues:
A. Whether or not there is a valid abandonment made by Respondent Mabalot.
B. Whether the act of Respondent Mabalot in conveying to petitioner the right to possess and cultivate the disputed parcel of land constitutes a valid abandonment thereby rendering the property available for transfer to other bona fide farmers.
C. Whether the issuance of an emancipation patent and thereafter a transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner has validated and legitimized possession and ownership over the disputed property."
Held:
Main Issue: Abandonment
The subject property was awarded to respondent by virtue of PD 27. A CLT was issued in his favor. PD 27 specifically provides that when private agricultural land -- whether classified as landed estate or not – is primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy, the tenant farmers thereof shall be deemed owners of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated, and three (3) hectares if irrigated. Petitioner avers that respondent neither protested when the former had the subject land surveyed and planted with 40 mango trees, nor attempted to return the money he had borrowed from petitioner in 1976. Because the lot has been abandoned by respondent, the beneficiary, and because PD 27 does not prohibit the transfer of properties acquired under it, petitioner theorizes that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) may award the land to another qualified farmer-grantee.
Non-transferability of Land Awarded Under PD 27
We do not agree. PD 27 specifically provides that title to land acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the government shall not be transferable except to the grantee’s heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the government by other legal means. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Upon the promulgation of PD 27, their emancipation gave them the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for themselves. These rights were granted by the government to them as the tillers and to no other. Thus, to insure their continuous possession and enjoyment of the property, they could not, under the law, effect any transfer except back to the government or, by hereditary succession, to their successors. Furthermore, this Court has always ruled that agrarian laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of the grantees in order to give full force and effect to the clear intent of such laws: "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers"; and to make them "more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society." Neither are we convinced that an award under PD 27 may be transferred to another in case the grantee abandons it. The law is explicit.
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For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. There must be an actual, not merely a projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated by another. In the present case, no such "wilful failure" has been demonstrated. Quite the contrary, respondent has continued to claim dominion over the land.
No Valid Reallocation
Furthermore, even if respondent did indeed abandon his right to possess and cultivate the subject land, any transfer of the property may only be made in favor of the government. In Corpuz v. Grospe, the Court held that there was a valid transfer of the land after the farmer-grantee had signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolution surrendering his possession of the landholding. This voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon constituted a surrender or transfer to the government itself.
In the present case, there was no valid transfer in favor of the government. It was petitioner himself who requested the DAR to cancel respondent’s CLT and to issue another one in his favor.21 Unlike in the above-cited case, respondent’s land was not turned over to the government or to any entity authorized by the government to reallocate the farm holdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiary’s landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was abandoned. The proper procedure for reallocation must be followed to ensure that there was indeed abandonment, and that the subsequent beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED
Estolas v. Mabalot: Land may only be transferred either by succession or to government (landbank-in case of non-payment of amortization, landbank can foreclose the property [even if 10 years pa]). DAR cannot transfer directly to a qualified beneficiary.
PD 27 applies suppletory on just compensation (no express repeal by RA 6657)
Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, G.R. No. 175175, September 29, 2008
Facts:
Case is regarding the valuation to the land of the respondents of which the area was placed by the government under the coverage of the operation land transfer program under PD 27. The LBP, petitioners herein, valued the land in accordance with the guidelines set forth under PD 27 and EO No. 228 and pegged the value of the land amounting to P106,935.76 per hectare. Respondents rejected petitioner’s valuation and insist on claiming that the said land is worth between P150,00 to P200,000 per hectare. The Cagayan Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) however valued the land at P80,000 following the factors set under RA 6557 (CARL) and of which such value, as just compensation to the respondent, was approve by the lower court (RTC) setting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Issue:
Whether or not PD 27 or RA 6557 is the applicable law in determining the value of the land which was taken under PD 27 or before RA 6557 was enacted.
Held:
The Court laid down in Paris v. Alfeche the applicability of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 in relation to R.A. No. 6657 in the matter of the payment of just compensation. There the Court explained that while under P.D. No. 27 tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the
land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land before the title is transferred to them and that pending the payment of just compensation, actual title to the tenanted land remains with the landowner.
In Paris, the application of the process of agrarian reform was still incomplete thus, the Court held therein that with the passage of R.A.
No. 6657 before its completion, the process should now be completed under R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 applying only suppletorily. It would certainly be inequitable to
determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
The land therefore should be valued under RA 6657 following the guidelines set in DAR AO no. 5, series of 1998 and not under PD 27. Land Bank v. Heirs of Cruz:
-The determination of just compensation should be based on RA 6657 for lands covered under PD 27. PD 27 applies only suppletory.
IV. RA 6657 (as amended by RA Nos. 7881, 7905, 8532, and 9700)
Is industrialization a component of Agrarian Reform?Yes. Sec.2 (RA 6657)
“…sound rural development and industrialization” “…to promote industrialization”
Industrial inputs necessary to agriculture(fertilizers, insecticides, hybrid seeds, irrigation systems, tractors)
Can Private Corporation acquire ownership of alienable lands of public domain?
Chavez v. PEA: No, only through lease not exceeding 25 yrs. Renewable
not more than 25yrs. And not to exceed 1,000 hectares (CONST., Art. XII, Sec.3)
Sec. 3 (b) “Agriculture” or “Agricultural Activity”
- Means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by person whether natural or juridical.
Luz Farms v. Sec. – Sec.3 (b) unconstitutional
(“Raising of livestock, poultry and swine” per SC)
- “use of land is incidental and not the principal factor”
RA 7881 (effective May 1995)
- amended Sec.3 (b) and removed “the raising of livestock, poultry or fish”
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. (no land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming”, “livestock and poultry do not sprout from the land”, “there are neither tenants or landlords, only employees”)
Industrial, not agricultural activity.
Great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feed mill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deep wells,
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elevated water tanks, pump houses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
DAR Admin. Order No. 03-95 (rules and regulations governing the exemption/exclusion of fishpond and prawn farms from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to RA 6657, as amended by RA 7881)
Policies:
a. In general, private agri lands owned by individuals or entities actually, directly, and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds as of march 12, 1995 shall be exempt from the coverage of CARP
b. Lands devoted to prawn or fishponds which have already been distributed to ARB’s with the corresponding CLOA’s issued, being a consummated transaction, shall no longer be exempt from the coverage under the CARP
c. Fishpond or prawn farms which are already been subjected to the CARL by voluntary offer to sell (VOS) or are under Commercial Farm Development (CFD) or for with notices of acquisition (NA) have already been issued to the landowner under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme, shall be exempt from CARP coverage only upon the consent of a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants within 1 year from March 12,1995
In case said workers object to the exemption, the subject fishpond or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to manage the same. The land bank of the Philippines shall extend financial assistance to aid the said cooperatives through its countryside loan assistance program.
In the event the 1 year period has elapsed and the required consent has not been obtained, the property becomes subject to CARL.
d. Xxxx
e. Fishpond or prawn farms workers affected by exemption have the option to remain as workers or become beneficiaries in other agri lands. Workers who opt to choose to be a beneficiary may be awarded other lands covered by the CARP.
DAR Admin. Order No. 01, S. 2004 (RULES & REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE EXCLUSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS USED FOR CATTLE RAISING FROM THE COVERAGE OF CARP)
Objective: To prevent circumvention of CARP and to protect the rights of ARBs due to unauthorized change/conversion or fraudulent declaration of areas used for cattle purposes.
Coverage: All applications for exclusion from CARP of private agricultural lands actually, exclusively and directly used for cattle raising as of 15 June 1988.
Types of animal: cattle (of bovine family), bull, calf, cow. Policies:
(1) Those ADE used for cattle raising as of 15 June 1988 shall be excluded (exclusion to be granted only upon proof and continuously utilized up to time of application);
(2) Any change in use shall be subject to policies on land conversion (3) Only the grazing/pasture area and for infrastructure necessary for cattle raising shall be excluded; all other areas shall be covered. (4) Encourage growth of cattle industry
(5) If filing of exclusion is in response to notice of CARP coverage, DAR shall deny due course if application is filed 60 days after date of receipt of notice.
(6) Only exclusion applications fully supported by documents shall be accepted
Need to file an application with DAR, not automatic exempt from the coverage. So that DAR can verify.
DAR v. Sutton: Masbate land -cattle-breeding capital of Phil
(VOS - due to Luz Farms - withdraw VOS)
- Constitutionality of AO No. 9, S. 1993 (prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising); - SC nullified AO; RA 7881 changed definition of “agricultural
activity“ by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Admin. Order No. 07, S. 2008 Policy guidelines:
Lands ADE used for livestock purposes as of 15 June 1988 and continuously used shall be excluded; conversely, those not ADE are subject to CARP if one or more of the following conditions apply: (1) there is agricultural activity in the area (i.e., cultivation of soil, planting of crops, growing of trees including harvesting); (2) land is suitable for agriculture and occupied and tilled by farmers.
In line with principle of regularity in the performance of official functions, all processes by DAR per AO No. 9 are valid.
Sec. 3 (c) “Agricultural land” land devoted to agricultural activity & not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
Republic vs Salvador Lopez Agri-business Facts
Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corporation.
On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards (sic) to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).
On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao Oriental, an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No. T-12637 and T-12639 from CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioner's 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos,11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated.
On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T-16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter-affidavit addressed to the respondent-Secretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that they needed the additional area for its livestock business. On March 28, 1995, petitioner filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an application for the exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 stating that it has been operating grazing lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an integral part of its grazing land.
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The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997 denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock
raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs
the lots for additional grazing area. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.
Issue:
Whether or not the lands are covered under CARL
Held:
In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.
In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the inspection found that the entire Limot lands were devoted to coconuts (41.5706 hectares) and rubber (8.000 hectares) and recommended the denial of the application for exemption. 30 Verily, the Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for agricultural activities, a fact that necessarily makes them subject to the CARP. These findings of the inspection team were given credence by the DAR Regional Director who denied the application, and were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals.
In the 07 February 1994 Letter-Affidavit addressed to the DAR Secretary,
SNLABC requested the exemption of the Limot lands on the ground that the
corporation needed the additional area for its livestock business. As pointed out by the DAR Regional Director, this Letter-Affidavit is a clear indication that the Limot lands were not directly, actually and exclusively used for livestock raising. SNLABC casually dismisses the clear import of their Letter-Affidavit as a "poor choice of words." Unfortunately, the semantics of the declarations of SNLABC in its application for exemption are corroborated by the other attendant factual circumstances and indicate its treatment of the subject properties as non-livestock.
Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR Secretary even described SNLABC's use of the area as a "seasonal extension of the applicant's 'grazing lands' during the summer." Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC's livestock business, especially since these were only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable — and are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used — for agricultural purposes.
· Tax declaration classified as agricultural land (one way to prove) - it is not conclusive.
Milestone Farms, Inc. vs. Office of the President Facts:
Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 8, 1960. 4 Among its pertinent secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the corporation; (2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies, stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and by-products of said business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other
livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be authorized by law. 5
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform 6 that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (T-
410434) M-15750, 486101) M-7307, 486102) M-7308, 274129) M-15751, 486103) M-7309, 486104) M-7310, (T-332694) M-15755, (T-486105) M-7311, (T-486106) M-7312, M-8791, (T-486107) 7313, (T-486108) 7314, 8796, (T-486109) M-7315, (T-486110) M-9508, and M-6013, and located in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner re-documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9. 7
Acting on the said application, the DAR's Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioner's property and arrived at the following findings:
[T]he actual land utilization for livestock, swine and poultry is 258.8422 hectares; the area which served as infrastructure is 42.0000 hectares; ten (10) hectares are planted to corn and the remaining five (5) hectares are devoted to fish culture; that the livestock population are 371 heads of cow, 20 heads of horses, 5,678 heads of swine and 788 heads of cocks; that the area being applied for exclusion is far below the required or ideal area which is 563 hectares for the total livestock population; that the approximate area not directly used for livestock purposes with an area of 15 hectares, more or less, is likewise far below the allowable 10% variance; and, though not directly used for livestock purposes, the ten (10) hectares planted to sweet corn and the five (5) hectares devoted to fishpond could be considered supportive to livestock production.
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao (Secretary Garilao) issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP. 14
Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were registered in the name of petitioner's president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior to June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while 204 were registered from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the certificates rather than to the headcount because "the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle owned by petitioner as of June 15, 1988.
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Whether or not the lands are covered under CARL
Held:
With the procedural issue disposed of, we find that petitioner's arguments fail to persuade. Its invocation of Sutton is unavailing. In Sutton, we held:
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
Petitioner's admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause. 64 While petitioner advances a defense that it leased this ranch because the occupants of the subject property harmed its cattle, like the CA, we find it surprising that not even a single police and/or barangay report was filed by petitioner to amplify its indignation over these alleged illegal acts. Moreover, we accord respect to the CA's keen observation that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating Team's Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject property.
· Adjacent property is not covered.
Definitions
o “agriculture, agricultural enterprise” or agricultural activity” (sec 3 [b])
o Used among others, in:
“sec 4. Scope. The CARL of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No 131 and EO 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
When lands are no longer suitable for agriculture, they are supposed not to be covered by CARL. The law looks into the nature of the land.
Agra transcript july 9, 2016
Agricultural Land (Section 3[c])
Most important element! “Not classified as mineral, residential, forest, commercial, or industrial”
-who makes the classification?
Atty Capanas believes that DAR is not competent to say land is not suitable for agriculture. It should be the department of agriculture
DAR should respect the classification made by competent authorities
If mineral or forest, it is the DENR (executive)
If residential, commercial or industrial, it is the LGU’s (legislative act) by means of ordinance (went to a process, public hearing) or a Presidential Proclamation
-when is classification done?
Must be done prior to June 15, 1988
If you believe that your land should be exempt even if there is agricultural activity but it is already classified as resident prior to June 15, 1988, it is supposed to be exempt but there is a process
If the classification is made by LGU’s, it needs an approval from the HLURB. Approval from the predecessor of HLURB, is valid.
Natalia Realty v. DAR – 1979
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as town site areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as town site reservation. NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the Notice of Coverage SC:
“They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of the reservation”. Lands previously converted by government agencies, other than DAR, to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL were outside the coverage of reservations, but applied also to real estate converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL. NOTE:
DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and the case of Natalia Realty, Inc opine that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the DAR to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15, 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to divest tenant-farmers of their rights over lands covered by PD 27, which have been vested prior to June 15, 1988.
In order to implement the intent and purpose of the provisions of the aforecited laws, the DAR has issued guidelines through AO No. 4, Series of 2003.
(Please refer to the attached files together with this reviewer… The important provisions there are only the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION, APPROVING AUTHORITIES, EFFECT ON PRE-EXISTING CARP COVERAGE and PROTESTS).
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DAR AO No. 4 (Rules on exemption) - “all lands already classified ascommercial, industrial or residential before June 15,1988 no longer need conversion clearance”
Requirements: Sworn application, copy of title, certification from HLURB (zoning or classification, citing zoning ordinance), among others. Public notice and Disturbance compensation (in case there are farmers there, to inform them)
Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999 Facts:
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner Roxas & Co., Inc and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under RA No. 6657.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner with TCTs andTax Declarations of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s landholdings are subject to coverage under the CARL, in view of the undisputed fact that petitioner’s landholdings have been converted to non-agricultural uses by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 which declared the Municipality of Nasugbu as a tourist zone, and the zoning ordinance of the said Municipality re-classifying certain portions of the petitioner’s landholdings as non-agricultural or at the very least entitle the petitioner to apply for conversion as conceded by respondent DAR.
Held:
Respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner’s landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner’s application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged for conversion is the DAR.
The petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process therein. In and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is hereby remanded to the respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner’s application for conversion.
Notice of coverage was wrongfully sent
SC: . DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioners' landholdings does not ipso facto give the Supreme Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner's application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The power to determine whether Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural which exempts from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with the Supreme Court. Case was remanded to DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for conversion
NHA vs. Allarde, G.R. No. 106593, November 16, 1999 Facts:
Lots 836 and 839, registered in the of the Republic of the Philippines, and covered by the TCT No. 34624 and No. 34627, respectively, were acquired b the Republic on April 2, 1938 from Philippine Trust Company. They form part of the Tala Estate in Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, which, on April 26, 1971, was reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for, among others, the housing programs of the National housing Authority.
According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he had lived in the disputed lots since his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and working on six hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his father who had cultivated a 13 hectare portion of the same lots.
In 1989, Mateo filed with the DAR the petition for the award to them of subject disputed lots under CARP.
On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses Mateo, relying on their claim that the subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, brought
before the respondent RTC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the NHA from bulldozing further and making constructions on the lots under controversy. RTC Judge Allarde issued the injunction against NHA.
Held:
As early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (included the disputed lots) was
reserved, inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the NHA, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity
SC: As early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed lots) was reserved under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the National Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of the respondent Court declaring the lots under controversy as "agricultural land" and restraining the petitioner from involving the same in its housing project thereon, are evidently bereft of any sustainable basis
Advincula-Velasquez vs. CA,et al., G.R. No. 111387, June 8,2004
The petitioners were the agricultural lessees of a Riceland located in Parañaque Metro Manila.
In 1978, Sps. Nery and the Lorenzo sold the property to the Delta Motor’s Corporation (DMC). Petitioner Velasquez, in his capacity as leaseholder agricultural tenant, filed an action for the redemption of the said property before the Court of Agrarian Relation. The CAR dismiss the petition for lack on the part of the petitioner to redeem the property in its acquisition price in the amount of 2,319,210 pesos but directing the defendant to maintain the petitioner as agricultural lessee to the land in question.
Petitioner Velasquez and the defendants appealed the decision of the CAR to the Intermediate Appellate Court who affirmed the decision of the CAR. Petitioner Velasquez filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the CAR’s decision pending the outcome of the petition.
In 1981, the land in question was reclassified as residential zone under the ordinance issued by the city of Manila. Later, the land in question was mortgage by the DMC to the PNB as a security for its obligation who later foreclose it because of the failure of the DMC to pay its account. The PNB in 1986 executed a deed of sale of the said land in favor of the Remman Enterprise Inc. who decided to develop it in to a residential subdivision.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court issue a decision on the petition for review filed by the petitioner Velasquez affirming the decision of the IAC stating that the case had become moot and academic with regards the claim of the petitioner against the DMC considering that the property had been foreclose by the PNB declaring however that the petitioner may redeem the property from the PNB and its transferee. The record was remanded to the PARAD or the Provincial Agrarian Adjudication for the petitioner to exercise their right of redemption but since the case had become moot and academic, the PARAD denied the action of the petitioner to recover the property against the DMC since the land in question is now a residential land. The right of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee was terminated and the property was now in the possession of the Remman Enterprise, Inc. The petitioner filed a