Aratuc vs. COMELEC 88 SCRA 251
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.”
“The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board G.R no. 96266
FACTS: Private respondents filed an application for oil price increase was granted by public no. the provisional increase. On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed the petition and reaffirm ERB’s provisional increase without hearing pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the issuance of said order, a hearing was conducted but the petitioner failed to appear at said hearing .The petitioner contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated due process for having been issued without notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting provisional oil increase without prior notice is valid. HELD: Yes, it is valid. While E. O 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the board from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase, subject to final disposition of whether or not: to make it permanent; to reduce or increase it further; to deny the application. Sec. 3, par. e is akin to temporary restraining order. It outlines the jurisdiction of the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject of notice and hearing. However, under Sec. 8, it may order the price increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of the proceeding. The Board is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority, however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.
GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last day for submission of pre-qualification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December, petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December, defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by PD No. 1818, which provides: “Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order… in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project… of the government… to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project…” Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCC’s. The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institution—refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied.
207 SCRA 689
FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.
HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA. With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel”. On December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination”. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination.” With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions “ in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions” under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA –AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
Ursal vs. CTA 101 Phil. 209
FACTS: Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu in the exercise of his powers assessed for taxation certain real properties of Consuelo Noel and Jesusa Samson in the City of Cebu, and
that upon protest of the taxpayers, the Cebu Board of Assessment Appeals reduced the assessments. It also shows he took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals insisting on his valuation; but said Court refused to entertain the appeal saying it was late, and, besides, the assessor had no personality to bring the matter before it under section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, which reads as follows:
SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any person, association or corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu have the personality to resort to the Court of Tax Appeals on his valuation on the taxes of Consuelo and Jesusa Samson.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, the petitioner has no personality to bring before the CTA. Supreme Court stressed out that “The rulings of the Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" him. At most it was the City of Cebu1 that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty taxes from the abovementioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had been overruled; but the overruling inflicted no material damage upon him or his office. And the Court of Tax Appeals was not created to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies.” Republic Act No. 1125 creating the Court of Tax Appeals did not grant it blanket authority to decide any and all tax disputes. Defining such special court's jurisdiction, the Act necessarily limited its authority to those matters enumerated therein.
Sea-Land Service Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 357 SCRA 441
FACTS: Sea-Land Service Incorporated (SEA-LAND), an American international shipping company licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines entered into a contract with the United States Government to transport military
household goods and effects of U. S. military personnel assigned to the Subic Naval Base. From the aforesaid contract, SEA-LAND derived an income for the taxable year 1984 amounting to P58,006,207.54. During the taxable year in question, SEA-LAND filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) the corresponding corporate Income Tax Return (ITR) and paid the income tax due thereon of 1.5% as required in Section 25 (a) (2) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) in relation to Article 9 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, amounting to P870,093.12. “Claiming that it paid the aforementioned income tax by mistake, a written claim for refund was filed with the BIR on 15 April 1987. However, before the said claim for refund could be acted upon by public respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner-appellant filed a petition for review with the CTA docketed as CTA Case No. 4149, to judicially pursue its claim for refund and to stop the running of the two-year prescriptive period under the then Section 243 of the NIRC. “On 21 February 1995, CTA rendered its decision denying SEA-LAND’s claim for refund of the income tax it paid in 1984.” On March 30, 1995, petitioner appealed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of Appeals. After due proceedings, on October 26, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the appeal and affirming in toto the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has committed grave abused of discretion.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court sees no reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. The Supreme “Court will not set aside lightly the conclusion reached by the Court of Tax Appeals which, by the very nature of its function, is dedicated exclusively to the consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.”
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err or gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for review
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals 477 SCRA 49
FACTS: Far East Bank and Trust Company herein referred to as the petitioner is a domestic banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. In the early part of 1992, the Cavite Development Bank [CDB], also a domestic banking corporation, was merged with Petitioner with the latter as its surviving entity [under] the merger. Petitioner
being the surviving entity, [it] acquired all [the] assets of CDB During the period from 1990 to 1991, CDB sold some acquired assets in the course of which it allegedly withheld the creditable tax from the sales proceeds which amounted to P755,715.00. In said years, CDB filed income tax returns which reflected that CDB incurred negative taxable income or losses for both years. Since there was no tax against which to credit or offset the taxes withheld by CDB, the result was that CDB, according to petitioner, had excess creditable withholding tax. Thus, petitioner, being the surviving entity of the merger, filed this Petition for Review after its administrative claim for refund was not acted upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals are not based on Facts and the Law.
HELD: The petition is denied and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The Court stressed out that “The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding and conclusive upon this Court, especially if these are substantially similar to the findings of the CA which is normally the final arbiter of questions of fact. The findings shall not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal unless a party can show that these are not supported by evidence, or when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the lower courts failed to notice certain relevant facts which if considered would justify a different conclusion”
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp. 474 SCRA 258
FACTS: Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the “Corporation”) is a duly organized condominium corporation constituted in accordance with the Condominium Act, which owns and holds title to the common and limited common areas of the BA-Lepanto Condominium (the “Condominium”), situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Its membership comprises the various unit owners of the Condominium. The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its
Amended By-Laws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses, capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium. Proceeding from the premise that its tax liability arose from Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the Corporation proceeded to argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government Code, “business” is defined as “trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit.” It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it did collect from the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses. The protest was rejected by the City Treasurer, insisting that the collection of dues from the unit owners was effected primarily “to sustain and maintain the expenses of the common areas, with the end in view of getting full appreciative living values for the individual condominium occupants and to command better marketable prices for those occupants” who would in the future sell their respective units. Thus, she concluded since the “chances of getting higher prices for well-managed common areas of any condominium are better and more effective that condominiums with poor managed common areas,” the corporation activity “is a profit venture making”. The CA reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay business taxes to the City of Makati.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations.
HELD: No. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the Makati Revenue Code (“Revenue Code”), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92-072. The Revenue Code remains in effect as of this writing. Article A, Chapter III of the Revenue Code governs business taxes in Makati, and it is quite specific as to the particular businesses which are covered by business taxes. At no point has the City Treasurer informed the Corporation, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, or this Court for that matter, as to what exactly is the precise statutory basis under the Makati Revenue Code for the levying of the business tax on petitioner.
Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil. 490
FACTS: Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the Floating Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public Works. In Administrative Case No. R-8182 instituted against him for negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care), the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty
of contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer. Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not there that the case at bar requires a need to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking for affirmative relief in court?
HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) the doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 119761, August 29, 1996
FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. The Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. The initial position of the CIR was to classify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury ' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. RA No. 7654 was enacted
and became effective on 03 July 1993. It amended Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC. About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectively of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93") Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise Tax, was issued by the BIR. Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9, 598, 334. 00. On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco and adjudged RMC No. 37-93 as defective.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the due process of law.
HELD: A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.
Tio vs. Videogram 151 SCRA 208
FACTS: Valentino Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly
lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the Board." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General 15 SCRA 569
FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces. The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides
that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez’ argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.
Tadlip vs. Borres, Jr. 474 SCRA 441
FACTS: This case involves a parcel land of land situated in Mambajao, Camiguin which was issued OCT No. P-106, Emancipation Patent No. A-028380 by the MAR to Eusebio Arce. The land was formerly owned by Angel Madarieta. Subsequently, a Deed of Transfer under PD 27 was executed by Angel Madarieta, as represented by his wife, Pelagia Madarieta and Eusebio Arce. Six years later Arce died and was succeeded by two minors and Tadlip, his nephew, assumed the responsibility of tilling the land. Tadlip caused the reallocation of the disputed land. Respondent, as PARAD of DARAB issued an order dated 3 April 1998 granting the petition of complainant reallocating the land to him and heirs of Arce. However, the title was never transferred to the complainant and the heirs of Arce because unknown to them respondent
rendered another Order dated 26 January 1999 cancelling the registration of the same OCT No. P-106 and ordering the issuance of a TCT ex parte in favor of Madarieta. He also approved the motion of execution filed by Madarieta.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
HELD: Respondent's non-observance of the DARAB Rules on notice and hearing and his grant to Madarieta of her motion for execution pending appeal in effect deprived complainant of the land he tills and the source of his income. Complainant woke up one day not knowing that the emancipated land which he thought was already reallocated to him was lost by order of respondent. He was not given the chance to defend his claim over the property. This is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law, a constitutional guarantee available to every individual. The actual review of the subject issuance of the respondent should be undertaken in the proper judicial proceedings and not by this Court at this time via an administrative action. Nevertheless, respondent's culpability under the Code of Professional Responsibility is indubitable. As a lawyer, the IBP determined, and we subscribe to such determination, that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states: Canon 1A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws is an obligation imposed upon every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an exemplar of others to emulate. A member of the bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on 21 June 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of the said Code. Lawyers in government service are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public. Respondent, as a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB, was reposed with a higher gravamen of responsibility than a lawyer in private practice. The recommended penalty of two months suspension is too light under the circumstances, and a penalty of six (6) months' suspension more appropriate. As held in recent cases, the penalty for a judge found to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law is six (6) months.
COMELEC vs. Español
417 SCRA 554
FACTS: During the May 11, 1998, Florentino A. Bautista, Lakas candidate for Mayor of Kawit, Cavite. He executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the incumbent Municipal Mayor Atty. Federico “Hit” Poblete and other candidate of violation of paragraphs(a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (vote buying) and filed the same with the Law Department of the COMELEC.COMELEC’s Law Department filed an Information against the respondents with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. In the meantime, Gerardo Macapagal and Inocencio Rodelas filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code (vote selling) against the witnesses of Florentino A. Bautista. An information was filed before the RTC.COMELEC now claims that it has the “exclusive power” to review, motu proprio or through an appeal, the “recommendation or resolution of investigating officers” in the preliminary
investigation since it has “exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same” and to review their commendation or resolution of investigating officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exclusive power to prosecute election cases? HELD: Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The petitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government but as held in Margarejo vs. Escoses until revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial or City Prosecutors stays
Mauricio Cruz vs. Stanton Youngberg GR No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
FACTS: Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It was enacted for the purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries. The Act provides: “SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers.
HELD: No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Governor-General is authorized to lift the prohibition, with the consent of the presiding officers of the legislature, if he should determine after a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any threat of contagion from cattle. The lifting of the ban would have been effected through a contingent regulation based on the prescribed contingency, to wit, the finding that foreign cattle would no longer contaminate the local livestock.
SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL. vs. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ET AL. G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957
Facts: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid. Issues: Whether or not the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80. Whether or not the said Executive Orders were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.
Held: Yes. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
Grego vs. COMELEC GR. No. 125955, June 19, 1997
FACTS: On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was removed from office as Deputy sheriff by the court upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. Ran for councilor in the second district of Manila and had won the race for 3 term. On his final term, an election protest was filed against him by petitioner Grego, seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he was removed previously in an office as a result of an administrative case. On May 14, 1995, COMELEC ordered the parties to submit memoranda, but before the parties able to comply the directive, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as duly elected councilor and took his oath of office. Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC should have suspended the proclamation. Such act according to the petitioner violated the provision of sec. 6 of R.A 6646, which prohibits the proclamation of the elected candidate by the COMELEC pending final judgment on the case filed, uses the word may, therefore giving discretion to order the suspension of the proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COMELEC violated the provision of R.A 6646 when it did not suspend the proclamation of the petitioner as the elected councilor pending final judgment of the case filed against it.
HELD: It did not. The use of the word “may” in sec.6 of R.A 6646 indicates that the proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and confers no jurisdiction. What is merely mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic. Since section 6 of R.A 6646, the law which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may”, it is, therefore improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.
People vs. Maceren 79 SCRA 450
FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law. On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in Section 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Thus, the lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
Bautista vs. Juinio 127 SCRA 329
FACTS: Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 memorandum circular No. 39, provides fort the penalties. Letter of Instruction No. 869 banning the use of the private vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and on holidays 12am Saturday morning to 5am Monday morning, 1am of the holiday to 5am of the day after the holiday. Memorandum Circular No. 39 has penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicles and cancellation of registration. The exempted vehicles are service trucks, Diplomatic, Consular Corps, and tourist cars. Petitioners contended that Memorandum Circular No. 39, issued by the Minister of Public works, Transportation and Communications (Alfredo L. Juinio), and then respondent Land Transportation Commissioners (Romeo Edu), is unconstitutional on the ground that is violative of the non-delegation of legislative powers. However respondent contend that said Memorandum Circular No. 39 were adapted pursuant to the land transportation and traffic code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 39 is ultra vires
HELD: Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held ultra vires as long as the fine imposed is not less than ten or more than fifty pesos, as to the suspension of registration to the suspension of registration, it is valid. However as to the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification, it must be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.
Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong 187 SCRA 432
FACTS: On 10 August 1989, Lawyer Dante s. David filed a complaint before the regional Trial Court alleging that the license plate of his car issued by the Land Transportation Commission now Land Transportation Office, was removed by the agents of herein Petitioner while the car was parked somewhere in Escolta, Manila. The complainant further alleged that the car was not illegally parked. Ultimately complainant and private respondent David raised the issue that there was no local ordinance or law to justify the removal of his car rear plate number, thus praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ f preliminary injunction by the court. On 14 August of the same year, prayer for the issuance of TRO was granted however, after series of hearing, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Parties –in-interest told to present their respective memoranda before the ruling shall be issued. Subsequently, the respondent judge ruled that LOI 43 in which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it to detach or remove or confiscate the plates of any vehicle which are caught illegally parked outside of the designated parking area (s), further declares that LOI 43 only authorizes the agents of MTC –WTD to tow or remove vehicles or motor vehicles whenever it causes traffic congestion. Undaunted of the defeat, Petitioner brought the case before the Supreme Court when it should have been properly raise first, before the Court of Appeals in which the latter has a concurrent jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court when the validity of a statute is put into test. On the ground of public interest, the highest tribunal had decided to take cognizance of the case. On 6 February 1990 a temporary restraining order was issued. Private respondent argued that Presidential decree 1605(Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central Powers Related to Traffic Management, Providing Penalties, and for other Purposes) repeals letter-of-Instruction 43, however the contention of petitioner herein was, the question statute remains in full- force despite the issuance if PD 1605, and further contends that PD 1605 shall be considered as special law because it is limited in territorial application.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid? (2) Whether or not the removal or confiscation of the plate number of any vehicle found to be illegally parked is sanctioned by LOI 43?
HELD: On the first issue, the highest tribunal resolves that, letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid. However, applicable only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the streets due to some involuntary reasons and not against those who intentionally breaks traffic laws. Resolving the second issue, the Court holds that the applicable law to justify the removing and confiscating the plate number of any vehicle intentionally parked by the owner in an area not designated as parking sides is Presidential decree 1605. The court found out that the provisions of the two statutes do not clash each other, LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on public roads because of involuntary cause while PD 1605 deals with motor vehicles that have deliberately parked in a place which is not designated as parking area.
Accordingly, the petition was DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, branch 8, Manila was affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court on February 9 1990 was lifted.
LUZON POLYMERS CORPORATION vs. CLAVE 209 SCRA 711, G.R. No. 51009, June 10, 1992
Facts: This special civil action of certiorari questions the administrative grant of an emergency allowance of fifty pesos to the employees of a corporation with a capital stock of one million pesos. The emergency allowance of employees in the private sector has its origin in Presidential Decree No. 390, granting said allowance to government employees. Subsequent to the promulgation of P.D. No. 390, then President Marcos issued Letter of Instructions No. 174 to implement the policy enunciated in said decree in the private sector. He directed the Secre-tary of Labor "to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure orderly and effective response by employers in the private sector." To explain the meaning and scope of application of LOI No. 174, on March 11, 1974, the Department of Labor issued an Interpretative Bulletin. P.D. No. 525 was issued making mandatory the payment of emergency allowance under LOI No. 174. petitioner, a corporation with an authorized capital stock of P1 million and total assets of P2,656,793.45 as of December 31, 1974, was named a respondent in a complaint for underpayment of emergency allowance filed before Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor in 1976 by the Luzon Polymers Labor Union (FFW) on behalf of 185 of its members. Alleging that since February 1974, regular employees of petitioner corporation who were members of the union had been receiving P1.15 daily or P30.00 monthly emergency allowance, complainant-union contended that its members were entitled to P50.00 monthly emergency allowance inasmuch as their employer's total assets were over and above P1 million. Petitioner claimed that since it had fully complied with LOI No. 174, it had not underpaid its employees. Noting that petitioner corporation had total assets of more than one million in 1973 and 1974 or P1,920,529.04 and P2,676,793.45, respectively, Officer-in-Charge and Assistant Secretary Vicente Leogardo, Jr. ruled that petitioner had not fully complied with LOl No. 174. Petitioner appealed to Secretary Ople but the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in the order of February 21, 1978 and directed petitioner "to pay the difference of P20.00 as awarded in the appealed order." Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President which, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, likewise dismissed the appeal in an undated decision.
Issue: Whether or not the Department of Labor exercised a valid quasi-legislative power when it issued their interpretative bulletin.
Held: No. The second requisite for a valid administrative regulation was not complied with, which says that “it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature”. The Supreme Court stated that, LOI No. 174 mandates the grant of P50 a month emergency allowance for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P1 million to P4 million or more" and P30 for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P100,000 to P1 million." While the determinative factor for the amount of emergency allowance is simply the capitalization of the employer concerned. The problem lies in the fact that the same provision of LOI No. 174 categorizes an enterprise capitalized at P1 million as under both the P50 and the P30 brackets of emergency allowance. This grey area, however, was clarified by the Interpretative Bulletin on LOI No. 174 issued by the Department of Labor. Sec. 5 states that an employer has to pay the fifty-peso allowance "where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, exceeds P1 million" or thirty pesos "where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, is not less than P100,000 but not more than P1 million." Clearly then, the petitioner falls under the bracket of employers required to give a thirty-peso monthly emergency allowance under LOI No. 174 in view of the undisputed fact that it is a "domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws" with an authorized capital stock of one million pesos. While said administrative interpretation of LOI No. 174 is at best merely advisory for it is only the courts which have the power to determine what LOI No. 174 really means, said Sec. 5 of the Interpretative Bulletin
was adopted in P.D. No. 525 Sec. 7 of the said Rules has not conformed with the standards that P.D. No. 525 prescribes. Having been based on an erroneous decision of the Office of the President, it is further rendered obnoxious by the principle that an administrative agency like the Department of Labor cannot amend the law it seeks to implement.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999
Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by applying PBCom's tax credit memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1985. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year. But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69. Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 4309 entitled: "Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue." The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of time as the same was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period. This is in reference to the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, through the Solicitor General, argues that the two-year prescriptive period for filing tax cases in court concerning income tax payments of Corporations is reckoned from the date of filing the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return, which is generally done on April 15 following the close of the calendar year. Respondent Commissioner also states that since the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return of the petitioner for the taxable year 1985 was supposed to be filed on April 15, 1986, the latter had only until April 15, 1988 to seek relief from the court. Further, respondent Commissioner stresses that when the petitioner filed the case before the CTA on November 18, 1988, the same was filed beyond the time fixed by law, and such failure is fatal to petitioners cause of action. A motion for Reconsideration was denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Thus, this appeal to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the BIR exercised a valid quasi-legislative power when it issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85.
Held: No. Supreme Court stated that the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 is clearly inconsistent with the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Further, the Supreme Court said that “A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with a shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials and such wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same.” A valid administrative regulation must comply with the following requisites: (1) its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; (2) it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; (3) it must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, and (4) it must be reasonable. In the case at bar, the BIR have not complied with the second requisite as it was ultra vires with the NIRC.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres 212 SCRA 298
FACTS: On 01 June 1991, DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres as a result of published stories the abuses suffered by Filipina housemaids particularly in Hong Kong suspended the placement and recruitment by the private recruitment agencies. The DOLE itself and POEA took control of the recruitment and deployment of Filipina helpers bound to Hong Kong. On 01 July 1991, DOLE Secretary ordered the administrator of POEA to use the facilities of the agencies for the purpose. On 10 July DOLE Secretary issued memorandum Circulars no. 30 series of 1991 seeking accreditation by the Philippine government from recruitment agencies based in Hong Kong. On 01 August of the same year, POEA Administrator issued MC no.37 series of 1991 on the processing of domestic helpers after the request for accreditation was responded positively by recruitment agencies in based in Hong Kong. On 02, September 1991, petitioner, through its counsel, filed a petition to annul the DO 16 and MC 30 and 37 thus, preventing the Department of Labor and Employment and the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration to implement the issuances.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondents committed a grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing the circulars? (2) Whether or not the issuances violates the constitution and against the regimes of reasonableness, fairness and equality? (3) Whether or not the issuances complies the requirement of publication for its validity?
HELD: Resolving the first issue, the court finds that the circulars are valid exercise of the rule-making power of DOLE Secretary as delegated to the executive Branch of the Government. Applying article 36 the regulatory power of the Secretary of Labor to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement as well as deployment of Filipino abroad. Executive order 797 issued on May 01, 1982 further provides the DOLE’s regulatory functions to regulate the deployment of foreign Filipino workers. The issuances of those circulars are therefore valid exercise of quasi-legislative power of the agency, it cannot be considered as unconstitutional or oppressive or unreasonable. Resolving the last issue, the issuances are legally invalid, defective and it cannot be enforced for lack of publication requirement as codified under section 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and section 3 and 4 chapter 2 of the administrative code of 1987. Lack of publication is an essential requisite for the validity of the law. (Tanada v. Tuvera)
Accordingly, the prohibition was granted. The issuances were all suspended pending the compliance of publications as required by law.
Philippine Interisland Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. CA, et al G.R no. 100481
FACTS: Private respondent United Harbor Pilots’ Association of the Philippines is the umbrella organization of groups rendering pilotage services in different ports of the country. The Philippine Ports Authority is a government agency created pursuant to P.D 857, vested with the power to control, supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any port district. It has also the power to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates charges or fees, for the services rendered by the authority or by any private organization within the port. These consolidated petitions of harbor pilots to secure enforcement of E.O 1088, which fixes the rates of pilotage services and the efforts of the PPA and its officials, petitioners herein, to block enforcement of the said E.O
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O 1088 issued by Pres. Marcos (for purpose of increasing existing pilotage fees) is a valid statute and could not be revoked by the PPA, who has the power to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees.
HELD: YES, rate fixing orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it is the exercise of delegated power. Hence, could be amended or revised by law. President Marcos in the exercise of legislative powers could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so he can exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by PD 857.
VALENTINO L. LEGASPI vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER and/or THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. L-58289, July 24, 1982
Facts: In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes” unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.
Issue: Whether or not the President can validly grant tax amnesties without the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa in the exercise of his power to legislate.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides that “The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.” The Supreme Court noted that Article 7, Sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.”
