EURASIAN UNIVERSITIES UNION
Academic
Winter - 2015
ISSN: 2147 - 2149
Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015
Istanbul/Turkey
EDITOR IN CHIEF
EDITORIAL BOARD
Dr. Mustafa AYDIN
Eurasian Universities Union
President
Muzaffer BACA
Eurasian Universities Union
E-mail: [email protected]
Kurban Kurbanmagamedov,
The Institute Of Moscow State Open University, Dagestan
Saimat Salmanova,
The Institute Of Moscow State Open University, Dagestan
Firuz Demir Yaşamış,
American University in the Emirates, UAE
Anastas Angjeli,
Mediterranean University Of Albania, Albania
Fabio L. Grassi,
Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
Zeynep Banu Dalaman,
Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey
Sulo Haderi,
Mediterranean University Of Albania, Albania
Mahdieh Aghazadehkhoei,
İstanbul Aydın University, Turkey
Tabagari Sergo,
David Tvildiani Medical University, Georgia
Aurelian A.Bondrea,
Spuri Haret University, Romania
Özüm Sezin Uzun,
Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey
Georgescu Stefan,
Andrei Saguna University, Romania
Filiz Katman,
Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey
Agron Beka,
European Collage Juridica, Kosovo
Judit Hidasi,
Budapest Business School, Hungary
Ibrahim Gashi,
University of Prishtina, Kosovo
Zafer Aslan,
Istanbul Aydın University, Turkey
Kürşat Güleş,
Selçuk University, Turkey
Avdi Smajljaj,
Epoka University, Albania
Ateş Uslu,
Istanbul University, Turkey
Faisal Aftab,
Bahria University, Pakistan
Academic Journal is an international peer – reviewed journal and published quarterly. The opinions,
thoughts, postulations or proposals within the articles are but reflections of the authors and do not, in
any way, represent those of the Eurasian Universities Union.
EURAS TEAM
ADDRESS
PUBLISHER
DESIGN
Dr. Mustafa AYDIN, President
Muzaffer BACA, General Secretary
Handan TEZKANLI, General Coordinator
İpek ÇALIŞIR, Communication Coordinator
Miraç ŞAHIN, Project Coordinator
Beşyol Mah. Inönü Caddesi No: 38
Sefaköy, Küçükçekmece 34295 Istanbul / TURKEY
Tel: +90 212 411 61 68
Fax: +90 212 411 62 49
Website: www.euras-edu.org
Eurasian Universities Union (EURAS)
ISSN:
2147-2149
The Visual Design Department of Istanbul Aydin University
Euras Secretariat
Editorial
Muzaffer BACA………..………....………...…8-9
Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon
Prof.Dr.Finn-Aage ESBENSEN…………..………...…...10-22
Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in Antiquity (500 Bc- 350bc)
Adil CALAP - Özcan ERDOĞAN.………...……….……...23-52
Quantum Jumps in the Renewable Energy Technologies
Prof.Dr.Hayrettin KILIÇ………...…...….53-69
The Arab Spring and the Balance of Power in the Middle East
Marian ZIDARU-Stefan GEORGESCU………...….70-88
Clustering G-20 Countries Using the Euclidian Method and Fuzzy Logic
Esra DEMİR - Çiğdem ÖZARI………...…...89-95
Iran’s Foreign Policy Approach Towards the Central Asia and the Caucasus
Mahdieh AGHAZADEH…..………...96-102
Unpacking Crime Over the Life Course: Causes of Offending in a High Risk Sample of Women
Lee Ann SLOCUM - Sally S. SIMPSON………..……103-110
Students’ Social Mobility in the Dialogue of Education and Culture in Modern University
Leila Munirova…….………...….111-120
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ON THE REGION IS OBVIOUS
Eurasian Universities Union, established in 2008, managed to promote the intellectual capacity of
the region and contributed by the best for the educational capacity building.
By networking more than 80 prominent universities all over region we managed to transfer the
knowledge and best practices between the member universities and benefit them from the
experi-ences that their partners benefited.
By organizing regional conferences as in Dubai, Bucharest, Baku and Komrat we managed to
draw the attention of international stakeholders on education to the issues related with these
re-gions and mobilize them for better results.
Through students and academicians exchanges, cultural interaction between members was the
highest priority and it helped for strengthening bilateral relations and promoting peace in our
region.
Involving prominent leaders to the Leaders Conferences programs we launched helped very much
to introduce the regional strategic importance to the World.
Our publications, conferences and projects will be a step forward to intensify our activities in
more areas as transforming EURAS to a regional play maker on educational capacity building
and development.
Main targets of the new re-scheduling must be the promotion of peace and dialogue in the region
through universities whom we are encouraging to take part in a more actively way for the
settle-ment of issues as democratization, human rights, worldwide and regional peace, environsettle-ment and
cultural sustainability.
Eurasian Universities Union proved its capacity on such structuring and invites all members to
mobilize their academic network and student’s capacity for more accurate and concentrated to
regional issues campaigns.
The region, hosting the 2/3 of World population must have a more powerful voice, at least on
academic sphere, for the world events and submit its opinion and intellectual treasure to
influ-ence these events for brooder benefit of the humankind and eliminate in-equalities on worldwide
extend.
We do believe that EURAS Journal will continue to be a platform to submit the research and
academic papers of our academicians to the world intellectual circles and prove once again that
we the academicians of Eurasian Region are capable to generate projects and programs not only
affecting our region but on worldwide basis.
(What we Think We Become)...It is the reality of life. If you don’t dream you can’t develop
yourself or contribute to the humanity.
Eurasian Universities Union was our dream for years. It was for the developments and
prosperity of the nations that lost the great race of development in the 20th Century.
When launched EURAS the founding members were just seven, from Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Romania and Moldova.
WE organized our last General Assembly on 7th November 2014 and the members are
84..
Our prominent new members as La Sapienza University from Italy, a University
operat-ing for centuries have increased our capacity for contributoperat-ing to the academic capacity of
EURAS.
We have new members from all over Eurasia as from Afghanistan, Philippines, South
Korea, UK and other far east Asian territories.
We became a very powerful family with a strong voice concerning the regional issues and
settlements we are offering through our scientific and academic infrastructure.
By launching a new member status-Observer member, we started to involve United
Na-tions, World Bank, European Union, OSCE and other international organizations to the
activities of Eurasian universities Union. That integrated EURAS in a more powerful way
to the World agendas.
As an example we organized the Conference about (Security of Europe and Turkey Role)
together with OSCE in Istanbul.
For the Year 2015, we will focus mostly on the regional issues in Balkans, Caucasus and
Central Asia. In this framework conferences about Balkan interests are organized in
Tira-na, Belgrade and Istanbul.
This year we are planning the Annual Youth Festival of EURAS in a member country and
we are waiting for the candidate member s to inform us about their plans and involvement
capacity.
As EURAS What we thought we become..
It is now the turn of our members with their great ideas and proposals to develop our
ac-tivities and capacity and EURAS General Secretariat is keen to implement them
With my best regards
Muzaffer BACA
Secretary General
“Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon”
Prof.Dr.Finn-Aage Esbensen Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice University of Missouri-St. Louis
ABSTRACT
Gang research has a long history in the United States and gangs are often portrayed as an American problem. Much of the gang literature and gang lore would lead one to believe that the stereotypical gang is organized, hierarchical, territorial, and racially/ethnically homogeneous and that gang members are male, members of racial/ethnic minority groups concentrated in economically and socially marginalized neighborhoods. These stereotypes have contributed to a belief that gangs are not found in a number of communities in the USA or in other countries. The truth of the matter is that gangs come in many shapes and sizes and gang members represent the communities in which they reside. A relatively recent emergence of comparative and multi-method research conducted as part of the Eurogang Program of Research suggests that gangs not only exist throughout the world but that they are remarkably similar in terms of gang and gang member characteristics.
“Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon”
Gang research in the United States of America can be traced back to the seminal work by Thrasher (1927). Over the ensuing years, most gang research has relied on case studies (including ethnographies, in depth studies of individuals and/or groups) that have provided rich, descriptive accounts of gang members and gangs. More recently, largely stimulated by the work of Walter Miller in the 1970s, gang researchers drew from law enforcement data to address the extent and nature of gangs and associated illegal activity. Journalists and the mass media have also been intrigued with gangs and have introduced the general population to gangs (including the gangs of the American Wild West, such as Jesse James’ gang in the Midwest and the Hole in the Wall Gang featuring Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid but also including more current images introduced in films such as Colors and in Gangsta Rap videos). Many of the ethnographic and contemporary journalistic accounts have focused on gangs in traditional “gang” cities including Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City. These various sources of information have contributed to a
stereotypical image of gangs and gang members: members are generally viewed as males of racial/ethnic minority status residing in impoverished urban settings (see, for example, the work of Esbensen and Tusinski, 2007). One over-riding notion is that these gangs are an American phenomenon that does not exist in other nations.
The past 25+ years have witnessed a shift in gang research. Survey methodology, including cross-sectional and longitudinal studies utilizing in-person interviews of youth in general samples, self-administered questionnaires completed by students in school, and interviews with incarcerated samples, has been incorporated into the study of gangs. Findings from these research projects have challenges the stereotypical picture of gangs and gang members (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993; Esbensen and Winfree, 1998; Fagan, 1989; Thornberry et al., 1993).
While gang research has a long history and tradition in the USA, there is a lack of consensus about what constitutes a gang or a gang member. These definitional issues have received considerable attention (for a review of the definitional debate, consult Curry et al., 2014; Klein and Maxson, 2006). One common refrain used by law enforcement representatives defies definition and relies on description: “if it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, and looks like a duck; it’s a duck.” This approach of relying upon the physical characteristics of potential gang members may have some utility but caution must be urged. True, some gangs and gang members have denotable characteristics such as favoring one color (often blue or red), specific tattoos and hand signals to identify members, and wearing specific clothing. But, with the dissemination of culture and language through mass media and social media, such clothing styles, tattoos, and other “gang” symbols have been adopted by non-gang youth. So, while it may look like a duck, it may not be a duck. This reliance upon descriptive characteristics could well result in an over-identification of youth as gang involved. A better approach to defining gangs and gang members is required.
One potential definition is provided by the US Department of Justice. DOJ developed a working definition of a “gang” as a group or association of three or more persons who may have a common identifying sign, symbol, or name and who are involved in criminal activity which creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation” (GAO, 2009). This definition continues to rely on descriptive characteristics, which could be used to identify sports teams such as the Swiss National Football team. The inclusion of “involvement in criminal activity and creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation” begins to narrow the scope of interest but may still include groups that would not or should not be considered gangs. This is a rather important issue given the introduction of
enhanced sentencing guidelines for gang-involved crimes and/or crimes committed by gang members. Being identified as a gang member can result in many more years in prison. With such real-world consequences, it is essential that the label of gang member be correctly applied. I will return to this topic later in this chapter.
As mentioned above, there has been and continues to be debate about how to define gangs and gang membership. Researchers in the American context have adopted the self-nomination method. Similar to self-reported delinquency, the researcher relies upon the study participant to indicate whether or not they are a gang member. This self-nomination technique (also used by law enforcement) has proven to be particularly robust, especially in American gang research (see, for example, Esbensen et al. 2001). However, how well does such an approach work in different languages and different cultures?
Gangs Outside of the USA
During the 1990s gangs and gang culture proliferated. At the same time the USA experienced a drastic increase in youth violence, drug sales, and overall homicide rate. Some suggest that these two phenomena were inter-related and that gangs were involved with the distribution of crack cocaine and that this drug trade was particularly violent (see, for instance, the volume by Blumstein and Wallman, 2000). Two Los Angeles-based gangs, the Bloods and Crips, contributed to the notion that gangs were establishing satellite sets while creating a national drug and crime distribution network. Gangsta rap was widely disseminated and music videos popularized the “gangster” look (e.g., wearing specific colors, wearing a hat in a certain manner, hanging a bandana out of your pocket, sagging your pants, etc.) leading to the impression that gangs were developing everywhere. The question raised by these “wannabes” was whether they were “real” gangs and gang members or simply imitating this American phenomenon.
By the mid- to late 1990s, gang research in the United States had expanded beyond the traditional gang cities and found that gangs and gang-involved youth were found in a variety of settings, including large urban areas, the suburbs and small cities, and even in rural areas (e.g., Egley et al., 2004; Esbensen and Peterson Lynskey, 2001). Several researchers wondered if other countries, especially within Europe, were experiencing this same emergence or identification of gangs (e.g., Klein et al., 2001). In an attempt to address this question, a group of approximately 50 researchers and policy makers from the USA and throughout Europe convened a workshop in 1998. In the course of this three-day meeting, it became clear that in order to answer this question, there would be
a need for agreement on a definition as well as more systematic research. Some European researchers commented: we don’t have gangs like you do in the US. This was an interesting observation because it highlighted the extent to which those individuals were responding to the stereotypical image of gangs presented in the media and not the empirical reality that not all gangs are large, hierarchical, organized, and territorial. This initial meeting in Germany led to the formation of the Eurogang
Program of Research which has produced a number of research instruments (Weerman et al., 2009)
as well as four volumes describing gang research in Europe and the United States as well as several comparative research projects (e.g., Decker and Weerman, 2005; Esbensen and Maxson, 2012; van Gemert et al. 2008; Klein et al., 2001).
Over the course of four years (five meetings and numerous email and telephone exchanges), this group of researchers agreed on a nominal definition of gangs: “a street gang is any durable,
street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activities is part of its group identity.
This definition incorporates the following defining elements of a gang. The group must consist of 1) 3 or more people, 2) who are mostly between the ages of 12 and 25 years of age, 3) spend a lot of time in public places, 4) been in existence for more than 3 months, and, importantly, 5) accept and actually participate in illegal activity. One objective of this definition was to define the key elements of a gang rather than description of characteristics.
Early research conducted by these international scholars tended to be qualitative accounts similar to those produced by American ethnographers studying gangs. These case studies tended to mirror the findings from the American qualitative research that had been traditionally conducted in single sites (usually New York, Chicago, Los Angeles but also including St. Louis) and confirmed the impression that gangs were disproportionately male and immigrant groups. Some examples of these studies follow. In the Netherlands, van Gemert (2001) described a Moroccan gang thusly: “Of the 24 members … all are Moroccan with the exception of a Dutch, a Surinamese, and a Dutch Philippine boy… the three non-Moroccan boys are ‘Moroccanized’.” Mares (2001) described the group he studied in Manchester, UK as “(a)bout 80 percent of the gang members are of ethnic descent, mostly Afro-Caribbean.” Lien’s (2001) description of Oslo gangs further highlights the ethnic status of the members: “Immigrant gangs, both homogeneous and multiethnic, represent a new phenomenon that has emerged during the eighties. The most famous of these is a gang composed of Pakistani youths called the Young Guns …. came to the attention of the media … through a series of fights with other gangs, among them a Pakistani group called the ‘Killers’, a Filipino gang called the ‘Outsiders.’”
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In addition to agreeing on a common definition, the Eurogang Program of Research also encouraged researchers to adopt the instruments that had been developed for use in multi-method, multi-site studies (Weerman et al., 2009). The importance of multiple methods research is underscored by the ethnographic studies that, like their American counterparts, focused attention on males and racial/ethnic minorities. To what extent were these studies representative of gangs in those countries? The quotes from qualitative research highlight the similarity to media generated picture. However, a growing body of research finds that gang members are representative of the communities from which they hail (Esbensen and Carson, 2012). As survey studies have moved beyond the traditional gang cities and out of “high-risk” neighborhoods and included wider representation of youth, the emerging picture is not consistent with the stereotypical picture painted by the media or even that depicted in the qualitative research. For example, studies have increasingly identified girls in gangs, ranging from around 25% to 50% with the norm being more in the 33% range. Studies in the USA, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands (and recently also in China and Trinidad Tobago) consistently report that girls account for one quarter to one-half of all youth gang members (Bendixen et al., 2005; Esbensen and Weerman, 2005; Gatti et al., 2011; Huizinga and Schumann, 2001; Pedersen and Lindstadt, 2012; Pyrooz et al., 2012; Weerman, 2012).
These largely school-based surveys conducted in numerous nations during the past decade also cast doubt on the notion that gangs consist primarily of immigrant or minority youth. Klein concluded that “While both scholars and practitioners often specify gang differences according to ethnic backgrounds or neighborhood (community) characteristics, my own experience and a good deal of research suggest that group processes trump ethnicity and neighborhood” (2012:296). In their comparison of gang-involved youth in the Netherlands and the USA, Esbensen and Weerman (2005), for instance, found native born Dutch to be proportionately represented in youth gangs. In addition to the sex and ethnic background of gang members relative to non-gang members, the various studies utilizing the Eurogang definition have reported the presence of youth gangs in all nations studied. The prevalence rates vary but generally hover between five and 10 percent of youth being classified as gang involved. The International Self-Report Delinquency study was conducted in 30 nations across the globe. They report gang prevalence rates ranging from a low of 0.4 to a high of 16.8 percent (Gatti et al., 2011; Haymoz et al., 2013). Clearly the American phenomenon of youth gangs is not exclusively the domain of the American setting.
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In addition to agreeing on a common definition, the Eurogang Program of Research also encouraged researchers to adopt the instruments that had been developed for use in multi-method, multi-site studies (Weerman et al., 2009). The importance of multiple methods research is underscored by the ethnographic studies that, like their American counterparts, focused attention on males and racial/ethnic minorities. To what extent were these studies representative of gangs in those countries? The quotes from qualitative research highlight the similarity to media generated picture. However, a growing body of research finds that gang members are representative of the communities from which they hail (Esbensen and Carson, 2012). As survey studies have moved beyond the traditional gang cities and out of “high-risk” neighborhoods and included wider representation of youth, the emerging picture is not consistent with the stereotypical picture painted by the media or even that depicted in the qualitative research. For example, studies have increasingly identified girls in gangs, ranging from around 25% to 50% with the norm being more in the 33% range. Studies in the USA, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands (and recently also in China and Trinidad Tobago) consistently report that girls account for one quarter to one-half of all youth gang members (Bendixen et al., 2005; Esbensen and Weerman, 2005; Gatti et al., 2011; Huizinga and Schumann, 2001; Pedersen and Lindstadt, 2012; Pyrooz et al., 2012; Weerman, 2012).
These largely school-based surveys conducted in numerous nations during the past decade also cast doubt on the notion that gangs consist primarily of immigrant or minority youth. Klein concluded that “While both scholars and practitioners often specify gang differences according to ethnic backgrounds or neighborhood (community) characteristics, my own experience and a good deal of research suggest that group processes trump ethnicity and neighborhood” (2012:296). In their comparison of gang-involved youth in the Netherlands and the USA, Esbensen and Weerman (2005), for instance, found native born Dutch to be proportionately represented in youth gangs. In addition to the sex and ethnic background of gang members relative to non-gang members, the various studies utilizing the Eurogang definition have reported the presence of youth gangs in all nations studied. The prevalence rates vary but generally hover between five and 10 percent of youth being classified as gang involved. The International Self-Report Delinquency study was conducted in 30 nations across the globe. They report gang prevalence rates ranging from a low of 0.4 to a high of 16.8 percent (Gatti et al., 2011; Haymoz et al., 2013). Clearly the American phenomenon of youth gangs is not exclusively the domain of the American setting.
Gangs and Delinquent Behavior
One of the reasons that gangs are of interest to researchers and practitioners is that they commit a disproportionate amount of crime. You will recall from the Eurogang definition that a defining element of that definition was that it was okay to commit illegal acts and that doing so was part of the group identity. Some might argue that this aspect of the definition makes it tautological to say that gang members are more delinquent than non-gang members. Two points are relevant: 1) the difference in offending rates exist even when involvement in illegal behavior is not part of the definition (e.g., Esbensen et al., 2001) and 2) the order of magnitude in the differences in offending rates is such that it cannot be attributed solely to definitional issues. Several studies have found that gang boys and girls commit approximately four times as many offenses as their non-gang counterparts but the ratio increases with severity of offending (Esbensen and Weerman, 2005; Huizinga and Schumann, 2001; Pedersen and Lindstadt, 2012). In the American context, two large studies reported that the gang members in those samples, while accounting for a minority of the sample, accounted for more than 75 percent of violent offenses (Huizinga et al., 2003; Thornberry, 1998). It is important to note that gang girls are also engaged in the delinquent activity of the gang; they are not just affiliates who stand by while the boys fight.
One factor that has been related to levels of offending by gang members is the sex composition of the gangs. To date, only studies in the US and the Netherlands have examined this feature but results were similar. First, a minority of gangs are exclusively male or female. The relative distribution of girls and boys in gangs seem to influence group dynamics, including delinquency. Female offending is higher among girls who are in majority male gangs rather than sex-balanced gangs. Likewise, boys in sex sex-balanced gangs commit fewer crimes than those in majority male gangs (e.g., Peterson et al., 2001; Peterson and Carson, 2012; Weerman, 2012).
Gang Member Stability – The gang effect
With the introduction of longitudinal studies including gang involved youth, researchers have been able to examine a number of issues associated with gang membership. For example, what are the risk factors contributing to joining a gang? What are the consequences of leaving the gang? Are youth delinquent prior to joining the gang or does the gang facilitate delinquent involvement? While cross-sectional studies of youth can provide a lot of information and provide a snapshot of their lives, longitudinal studies allow for examining changes and stability over time. Two early panel studies (that is, following the same individuals across time) highlighted the fact that gangs enhance youths’ involvement in crime. While the gang members had slightly higher rates of delinquency prior to joining the gang, those rates skyrocketed during the time the youth was in the gang and then declined
upon leaving the gang (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry et al., 1993). Since publication of these findings, they have been replicated in other panel studies conducted in the US (Battin et al., 1998; Gordon et al., 2004; Melde and Esbensen, 2011, 2013, 2014; Peterson et al., 2004; Thornberry et al., 2003), Canada (Gatti et al., 2005), and Norway (Bendixen et al., 2005).
In addition to identification of the enhancement effect, these studies highlighted the fact that gang membership is a relatively transient experience for most gang youth. Contrary to the media generated myth that “once in a gang, in a gang for life” or “blood in, blood out,” most gang youth were members of the gang for less than one year (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry et al. 1993, 2003).
Risk Factors
On important question is: why do youth join gangs? In the preceding sections of this chapter, it has been noted that gangs are found in a variety of settings and in all nations studied. These gang youth are representative of the larger adolescent population and the majority of youth who join a gang, remain in the gang for a relatively short period of time. Are the youth who join gangs in some way different from those youth who do not? To answer this question, researchers have examined risk factors that may be predictive of gang joining. To date, most of this research has been conducted in the USA but there is a growing body of research in Europe that suggests that the risk factors as similar across different national contexts (e.g., Bendixen et al., 2004; Esbensen and Weerman, 2005; Pedersen and Lindstadt, 2012)
Risk factors are generally categorized into five different domains: neighborhood, family, school, peers, and individual. To date, risk factors in all five domains have been linked to gang joining and youth are at greater risk the more risk factors they possess across different domains (see, for example, Esbensen et al., 2010). Risk factor research is hindered by the fact that different researchers employ different measures of similar concepts but an important finding is that regardless of how risk factors are operationalized, they tend to produce the same or similar results. In their comparative research, Esbensen and Weerman (2005) examined factors associated with gang membership in a sample of students from the USA and another from the Netherlands. To measure “parental monitoring” the Dutch students responded to the following three questions: 1) At home, I have to do what my parents say; 2) I know what is and what is not allowed for me at home; and 3) My parents know where I go to outside the home. In contrast, the American students responded to the following four questions: 1) When I go someplace, I leave a note for my parents or call them to
tell them where I am; 2) My parents know where I am when I am not at home or at school; 3) I know how to get in touch with my parents if they are not at home; and 4) My parents know who I am with if I am not at home. In spite of these different measures, the concept of parental monitoring is identified as a risk factor in both samples. Other risk factors that have very similar patterns in the two studies include: peer delinquency and peer pressure, parental attachment, school commitment, impulsivity, risk seeking, and moral attitudes. To date, similar risk factors have been identified in studies conducted in the USA, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, and China.
Summary
In this brief chapter I have addressed several themes related to the phenomenon of youth gangs. First, definition matters: just because it walks like a duck, looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, doesn’t mean it’s a duck. It is important to have defining elements that move beyond sheer description of a gang. In the American context, self-definition works well. For comparative research, however, a common definition that identifies key characteristics that distinguish gangs from other groups is necessary. The Eurogang Program of Research provides one definition that has received considerable support (http://www.umsl.edu/ccj/Eurogang/euroganghome.html). Just as definition matters, so too does research methodology. Single methods can provide important information but researchers will benefit from incorporating multiple methods. Such an approach will provide, for instance, a broad overview of the gang situation using school-based surveys while obtaining more nuanced and contextual information by incorporating ethnographic and/or expert surveys.
While the history of gang research has tended to report on single-method, single-site research, it is important for understanding the youth gang problem to include not only mixed/multiple methods but to include multiple sites within nations and across nations. To date, studies have suggested considerable robustness and consistency in the nature and extent of the gang problem. Prevalence rates, when using a common definition, indicate gangs exist to varying degrees in all nations studied. Interestingly, especially given stereotypes, girls account for a sizable percentage (generally around 30 – 35%) of gang members. And, based on relatively recent research, other stereotypical depictions of youth gangs are called into question:
1) Gangs are not solely a minority or immigrant problem;
2) Gangs are found outside of economically distressed urban areas;
3) A common set of risk factors appear to be associated with gang membership;
4) Involvement in delinquent behavior and especially violence is closely associated with gang joining; and
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5) Gang membership is a transitory stage in adolescence – that is, the average youth belongs to the gang for less than one year.
Much has been learned with respect to youth gangs during the past two decades. Continued collaboration and expansion of research to more countries will help to establish if the youth gang phenomenon transcends all national boundaries or if cultural and societal differences persist. To date, the emerging comparative research holds promise and, as we move forward, perhaps this comparative approach will be successful in identifying strategies to reduce the prevalence and negative consequences of youth gangs.
REFERENCES
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2. Bendixen, Mons, Inger M. Endresen, and Dan Olweus. (2006). “Joining and Leaving Gangs. 3. Selection and Facilitation Effects on Self-Reported Antisocial Behaviour in Early
Adolescence.”
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5. Blumstein, Albert and Joel Wallman. (2000). The crime drop in America. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
6. Curry, G, David, Scott H. Decker, and David C. Pyrooz (2014). Confronting Gangs; Crime and Community, 3rd edition, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
7. Decker, Scott H. and Frank M. Weerman (2005), European Street Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups. Alta Mira Press.
8. Egley, Arlen, Jr., James C. Howell, and Aline K. Major. (2004). “Recent patterns in gang problems in the United States: Results from the 1996 - 2002 National Youth Gang Survey.” Pp. 90-108 in Finn-Aage Esbensen, Stephen G. Tibbetts, and Larry Gaines (eds.) American Youth Gangs at the Millennium. Long grove, IL: Waveland Press.
9. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Dena Carson. (2012). “Who Are the Gangsters?: An examination of the age, race/ethnicity, sex, and immigration status of self-reported gang members in a seven city study of American youth.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 28:462-478. 10. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and David Huizinga (1993). “Gangs, drugs, and delinquency in a
11. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Cheryl L. Maxson. (2012), Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York, NY: Springer. 12. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Dana Peterson Lynskey. (2001). “Youth Gang Members in a
School Survey.” Pp. 93-114 in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, and Elmar Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Press.
13. Esbensen, Finn-Aage, Dana Peterson, Terrance J. Taylor, and Adrienne Freng. (2010). Youth Violence: Sex and Race Differences in Offending, Victimization, and Gang Membership. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
14. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Karin Tusinski. (2007). “Youth gangs in the print media.” Journal of Crime and Popular Culture 14:21-38.
15. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Frank M. Weerman. (2005). A Cross-National Comparison of Youth Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups in the United States and the Netherlands.” European Journal of Criminology 2:5-37.
16. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. (1998). “Race and Gender Differences between Gang and Nongang Youth: Results from a multisite survey.’ Justice Quarterly 15:505-526.
17. Esbensen, Finn-Aage, L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., Ni He, and Terrance J. Taylor. (2001). “Youth Gangs and Definitional Issues: When is a gang a gang, and why does it matter?” Crime and Delinquency 47:105-130.
18. Fagan, Jeffrey. (1989). “The social organization of drug use and drug dealing among urban gangs. Criminology 27:633-669.
19. Gatti, Uberto, Sandrine Haymoz, and H. Schadee. (2011). “Deviant Youth Groups in 30 Countries: Results from the second international self-report delinquency study.” International Criminal Justice Review 16:1667-182.
20. Gatti, Uberto, Tremblay, R. E., Vitaro, F., & McDuff, P. (2005). “Youth Gangs, Delinquency and Drug Use: A Test of the Selection, Facilitation, and Enhancement Hypotheses.” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 46:1178-1190.
21. van Gemert, Frank. (2001). “Crips in Orange: Gangs and groups in the Netherlands.” Pp. 145 – 152 in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, and Elmar Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Press.
22. van Gemert, Frank, Dana Peterson, and Inger-Lise Lien. (2008). Youth Gangs, Migration, and Ethnicity. Willan Publishing.
23. Gordon, Rachel A., Benjamin B. Lahey, Eriko Kawai, Rolf Loeber, Magda Stouthamer-Loeber, and David P. Farrington. (2004). “Antisocial Behavior and Youth Gang Membership: Selection and socialization.” Criminology 42:55-88.
24. Haymoz, Sandrine, Cheryl L. Maxson, and Martin Killias. (2014). “Street Gang Participation in Europe: A comparison of correlates.” European Journal of Criminology 11:559-681. 25. Huizinga, David and Karl F. Schumann, (2001). “Gang Membership in Bremen and Denver:
Comparative longitudinal data.” Pp. 231-246 in M.W. Klein, H.-J. Kerner, C.L. Maxson, and E.G.M Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street gangs and youth groups in the U.S. and Europe. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishing.
26. Huizinga, David, Anne W. Weiher, Rachelle Espirutu, and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2003). “Delinquency and Crime: Some highlights from the Denver Youth Survey.” Pages 47-91 in Terence P. Thornberry and Marvin D. Krohn (eds.) Taking Stock of Delinquency: An overview of findings from contemporary longitudinal studies. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
27. Klein, Malcolm W. (2012). “The Next Decade of Eurogang Program Research.” Pages 291-301 in Finn-Aage Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
28. Klein, Malcolm W., Hans-Juergen Kerner, Cheryl L. Maxson, and Elmar G.W. Weitekamp (2001), The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
29. Klein, Malcolm W. and Cheryl L. Maxson. 2006). Street gang patterns and policies. New York City, NY: Oxford University Press.
30. Lien, Inger-Lise. (2001). “The Concept of Honor, Conflict and Violent Behavior among Youths in Oslo.” Pp. 165-174 in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, and Elmar Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Press.
31. Mares, Dennis, (2001). “Gangstas or Lager Louts? Working class street gangs in Manchester.” Pp. 253-164 in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, and Elmar Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Press.
32. Melde, Chris and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2011). “Gang Membership as a Turning Point in the Life Course.” Criminology 49:513-552.
33. Melde, Chris and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2013). “Gangs and Violence: Disentangling the impact of gang membership on the level and nature of offending.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 29:143-166.
34. Melde, Chris and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2014). "The Relative Impact of Gang Status Transitions: Identifying the mechanisms of change in delinquency." Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 51:349-376.
35. Pedersen, Maria Libak and Jonas Markus Lindstad. (2012). “The Danish Gang-Joining Project: Methodological Issues and Preliminary Results.” Pp. 239-250 in Finn-Aage Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
36. Peterson, Dana, and Dena C. Carson. (2012). “The Sex Composition of Groups and Youths’ Delinquency: A Comparison of Gang and Non-gang Peer Groups.” Pp. 189-219 in Finn-Aage Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
37. Peterson, Dana, Jody Miller, and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2001). “The Impact of Sex Composition on Gang Member Attitudes and Behavior.” Criminology 39:411-440.
38. Peterson, Dana, Terrance J. Taylor, and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2004). “Gang Membership and Violent Victimization.” Justice Quarterly 21:793-815.
39. Pyrooz, David C., Andrew M. Fox, Charles M. Katz, and Scott H. Decker. (2012). “Gang Organization, Offending, and Victimization: A Cross-National Comparison.” Pp.85-106 in Finn-Aage Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
40. Thornberry, Terence P. (1998). “Membership in Youth Gangs and Involvement in Serious and Violent Offending.” Pp. 147-166 in Rolf Loeber and David P. Farrington (eds.) Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk factors and successful interventions. Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage.
41. Thornberry, Terence P., Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, and Deborah Chard-Wierschem. (1993). “The role of juvenile gangs in facilitating delinquent behavior.” Journal or Research in Crime and Delinquency 30:55-87.
42. Thornberry, Terence P., Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, Carolyn A. Smith, and Kimberly Tobin. (2003). Gangs and Delinquency in Developmental Perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
43. Thrasher, Frederic. (1927). The gang: A study of 1,313 gangs in Chicago. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
13
44. Weerman, Frank M. (2012). “Are the Correlates and Effects of Gang Membership Sex-Specific? Troublesome Youth Gangs and Delinquency Among Dutch Girls.” Pp.271-290 in Finn-Aage Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
45. Weerman, Frank M., Cheryl L. Maxson, Finn-Aage Esbensen, Judith Aldridge, Juanjo Medina, & Frank van Gemert. (2009). Eurogang Program Manual: Background, development, and use of the Eurogang instruments in multi-site, multi-method comparative research. St. Louis, MO: University of Missouri-St. Louis.
ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ANTIQUITY (500 BC- 350BC) Adil CALAP1 & Özcan ERDOĞAN2
Abstract
The common objective of the temple of Apollo at Delphi3 is associated with that of the United Nations by some Constructivists in International Relations. Delphi and the external relations of the city states on both sides of Aegean Sea in the age of Antiquity between 500 BC and 350 BC are analyzed whether institutions of the Antiquity were capable of forming resolution of conflicts on the basis of mutually agreed and recognized rules, customs and norms. Another objective of the study reveals a cardinal fact that the city states within the context of slavery were function of the slavery system created by the Persian Empire. The relative independence of the slavery city-states owns their historical existence to the requirements of the slavery dependent on the Persian strategies. The versatile relations of the temple of Apollo at Delphi with the city-states are revealed that they were not strong enough to set incentives for forum and rules in organizing certain constructive cooperation and common institutions among the city-states prior to and during the Peloponnesian wars (490 BC- 404 BC). Optimal approaches to the analysis of dispute prevention and dispute settlement process particularly focusing on Peloponnesian wars may require distinguishing the various categories of external political and military disputes in accordance with their underlying conflicts of interests. Although some significant contributions by Constructivist Paradigm to the international relations theory are appreciated, there is in Constructivism an idea that needs profoundly criticizing. There is a claim, a point of view which this study opposes. In that respect this study concludes that Delphi was permanently structurally incapable of carrying out a negotiation and arbitration approach to conflict resolution. The role of Delphi was rather a key justifying role than the direct arbitration and
1 Senior Lecturer, Responsible for lecturing on courses in English, Department of International Relations, Karadeniz
Technical University.
2Dr, Civil Service Chief Inspector, Interior Ministry Inspection Board, Ankara, Turkey
3Delphi was one of the most important ancient religious temples devoted to the god Apollo. The site was settled in the
late Bronze Age (1500-1100 BC) but took on its religious importance from around 800 BC. The original name of the temple was Pytho after the snake which Apollo was believed to have killed there. Located near the Gulf of Corinth, the temple was home to the famous oracle of Apollo which gave cryptic predictions and guidance to representatives of city-states including individuals. In 191 BC Delphi came under Roman control. For further information please see: Hornblower, S. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. OUP, (Oxford, 2012).
negotiation role. Conflicting judgments invite the-re-evaluation of Constructivist theoretical approach to the city-state relations in the Antiquity.
Key Words: Delphi, slavery, conflict Resolution, arbitration, Constructivism, Persians,
Peloponnesian Wars, Athenians, Spartans.
1.1 Introduction
Promoting historical consistency between the contemporary international institutions such as the United Nations and the temple of Apollo at Delphi in the Antiquity is required to consider historically distinctive natures of the structures in which international dispute settlement proceedings partake. But this research study rather discusses the characteristics of Delphi than compare it to the United Nations in terms of conflict resolution4.
This study aspires to make it clear that the possible explanation of the Delphi’s existing structure was not on the basis that it had been run by incompetent people and that a change in morale and performance would have solved the problem of slavery. The inadequacy in arbitration and amoral approaches in the context of moral purpose was much more fundamental. Subsequently, the aim of the argument seeks to state that the international structure for conflict resolution posited by Constructivism in regard to Antiquity seems to be fragmented in its real image. It explicitly points out why the Delphi was but an insufficient institution to account for relations based on her arbitrating role. The external relations between the city states during the Peloponnesian war become the starting point of enquiry.
It will be also argued that the behavior of Athenian city state5 with respect to her interests drawing gains from slavery was only able to find its meaning in the existence of a continual war. Thus identifying Athenian city state with a major actor in the pursuit of regulating power politics for the
4 The word conflict resolution is a method by which arbitration and litigation processes can be critically involved in
facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict. For further information, please see: Bercovitch, Jacob and Jackson, Richard,
Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches, (University of Michigan Press,
2009)
5
Athenian city state experienced its most glorious times during the 5th century BC before and during the reign of Pericles. Throughout this period the Golden Age of Athenian city-‐state, Parthenon was build. Arts , Science, Philosophy, Drama, developed to their highest point. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian war between the Athenians including her allies and Sparta alongside with her allies put an end to this glory. For further information, please see: Meier C., Athens: a portrait of the city in its Golden Age, translated by R. and R. Kimber (New York, 1998).
sake of her democratic system may be utterly misleading. Athenian city state was manifestly a dominant element in the slavery system6. Meanwhile, the discussion is extended to the point at which Athenian city state is identified as a power that inevitably and eventually gave rise to a counter-structure which had been seeking out its basis of support and element of cohesion in the fragmented part of the traditional social forces within the penetrating context of slavery.
To introduce the term arbitration recognized by most of the members of the system with reference to the Delphi obscures the important difference between Antiquity and the 21st century, structurally different kinds of periods. Despite the fact that Delphi’s obedience to the most powerful city-states seems evident, this study accepts that the Delphi was a respectable institution, commanding a wide measure of consent among the city states, and was able to provide some benefits to the city states up to before the emergence of the slavery period anyway. However, that sort of influence attributed to Delphi seems to have faded away before the dawn of the slavery era. Subsequently, consent wore thin as the city states unevenly began to be dragged into a slavery system in which the element of force and violence became predominant, and it was in the core of the slavery system that the challenge to the Athenian power first became manifest.7 At the core was a ruthless competition among the slavery city states represented as sudden eruptions of symptoms between the Athenians and others including Megara while at the periphery was a constant fear of disintegration and annihilation represented by the Sparta city state8.
Another goal of the study attempts to disclose a fact that the city states within the context of slavery had emerged as an inevitable function of the slavery system under the expansive influence of Persian Empire. The argument is extended to a point at which the structure and network of the city states in connection to the temple of Apollo at Delphi had transformed into meeting the need of the slavery which was being monitored by the Persians.
Since the main issue was whether or not the Delphi became an ineffective instrument into the hands of the variable powers or whether she had moral purpose as insisted by Constructivists, two important question which are raised in that study are: 1) what were the mechanisms forming resolution of conflicts in that particular historical structure? And 2) what forms of state and external relations had existed within that particular historical structure?
6 Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World At War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 7 Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World At War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 8 Please see: Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990)
The analysis of this study would also seek to include some explanatory discussions to the questions raised above. In that case this essay will try to demonstrate that actions of the Delphi for conflict resolutions were constrained and manipulated by the need of the slavery system. At this point, it will be explained that it is preferable for Constructivism to revert to a distorted terminology attributed to Aristotle in order to justify their statement.
This study will try to understand both what is this Greek city states that so draw the theoretical studies in IR and what the theoretical studies in IR find there. Do they reconfirm the claims of constructivists? Do the Greek city states persist a metaphor for the imaginable realm in which the concepts of Constructivism have been placed? Can we read all the documents of the city-states as accounts or witnesses of the actual international relations? Under the pressure of such questions, the ancient city-states may offer this essay a chance to revision the concepts of constructivists. By stepping back into the city states, into what is factual and historical, this paper will seek to analyze nonfactual and ahistorical predicaments of constructivism.
2.1 Constructivism and a Network of Institutions as Arbitrators in Antiquity
Constructivists regard the period of the Greek city-states as the manifestation of the Hobbesian nature of international relations; the primordial period of the international relations dominated by anarchy, insecurity, constant possibility of war among the states.9 For instance, Alexander Wendt claims that “Judging from the violence and high death rate of states in the past it seems clear that world politics has often been Hobbesian.”10 By this statement he also means that the functions and roles of the Greek city-states in essence are similar to those of the modern states. But, in that discourse he spots only one problem which is about ‘ignoring important differences in the systemic context’. However, he argues that those ‘important differences’ could be overcome provided “the structure is conceptualized in cultural terms”11. Subsequently through that angle of the view, he suggests that any valid transhistorical generalizations become possible.
9 For Further Information please see: Strauss, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, (The University of Chicago
Press, 1963)
10 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.279 11 Ibid., p.214
For Constructivists “it is only through the interaction of state agents that the structure of the international system is produced, reproduced, and sometimes transformed.”12 That is, without the interaction of state agents we could not mention of any change or transformation in the structure of the international system. In another word, the structure of the international system, the patterns of cooperation, changes and transformation in the structure of IR are all reduced to the interactions of the state agents. Due to such an abstraction, they return to the Greek city states in order to seek the nature and genesis of the contemporary fundamental institutions. That is, they isolate sociology from history, and summarize that randomness governs IR. For in its most simplistic form, Constructivists invent a fundamental institution of third-party arbitration to support their claims about patterns of cooperation. Delphi is considered an interstate organization which is thought to have been produced by the interactions of the Greek city-states agents. Did Delphi really an interstate organization resemble the United Nations?
In his writing, moral codes, including those which attempt the simplification of universality are the lateralization of Aristotle’s thoughts. As a consequence, this study sets out to de-moralize the moral codes from the moralistic fallacy of constructivism which reads the Peloponnesian war in terms of good and bad, right and wrong. This requires the fiction of a fixed subject (arbitration), the choosers (city-states), and the fixer (oracles at Delphi). This moralistic fallacy is central to the myth of institution, a kind of identification projection, the source of heroic behavior which was essential for sustaining slavery of the city states..
2.2 Constructivism and City States
To the constructivists, the Greek city-states are usually a universal standard against which all events are measured. For example, as a constructivist Christian Reus-Smit says that “The ancient Greek system of city-states occupies a special place in the study of international relations. It stands as one of the great analogues of the modern state system, a familiar world of independent states in which the eternal varieties of international politics are thought to have appeared in their most rudimentary and essential form.”13
In that context, Constructivists try to be highlighting the historically existence of patterns of cooperation by means of an international institutions as their intellectual efforts are placed upon thrashing out the differences between distinct periods of history. Like Alexander Wendt, Christian
12 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.365 13 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p.40
Reus-Smit as another constructivist thinker follows suit as well. By such a reductionist method, one may witness that the structure and functions of the Greek city-states are subjected to an imagined transhistorical generalization. Therefore, Christian Reus-Smit may be seen as complying with the principle of Alexander Wendt, namely conceptualizing the structure and roles of the ancient city-states in cultural terms, but implicitly in distorted ones.
Like modern states, Greek city-states are believed by Constructivists to have established a network of institutions to facilitate cooperation, negotiations, and arbitrations. They are imagined to have favored the practice of third party arbitration in the absence of experiencing ‘contractual international law and multilateralism’. They argue that the Greek city-states were bound together by the Oracles at Delphi similar to a constitutional structure by which the state is thought to gain her social identity. “Arbitration was the core fundamental institution, but it was nested within a web of lesser institutions.” says Christian Reus, “The oracle at Delphi and the periodic Olympic festivals are the best known, yet least important politically… The Oracle was the paramount religious institution in ancient Greece, and it often issued political advice to city-states… Delphi exerted greater political influence through another type of interstate institution.”14
3.1 The Archaic Background of Delphi
In archaic Greece (750-480 BC) among city-states treaties and alliances including arbitration were useful tools to avoid the violent resolution conflicts. Cities would appoint arbitrators to settle inter-city conflicts15. A group of men would stand above the conflicting parties; enjoy an independent third position acting as mediators to all concerned16. The highest religious authority the oracle of Apollo in Delphi promoted principles of moderation even in warfare17.
The effectiveness of Delphi over the city-states might have happened to have materialized at a time when there was almost no trade within and among the cities in which the division of labor including the divided function and role of the city states was very low18. Among the native people was also hostility toward any kind of the trade and trading relations. For instance the exportation of oil which was the only exported product in Attica at the time was secured by law issued by Solon (658 BC-538BC) who was an Athenian politician, lawmaker and poet. “This law is inscribed upon the first of
14 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p.44 15 Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996)
16 Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990), p.28-52 17 Ibid. p.33
his tables, so that there seems to be some evidence for the tradition that the export of figs was prohibited in ancient times.”19 Likewise, Thucydides suggests that in former times there was no mercantile traffic.20 There were no any structures which could have a tradition of containing and tolerating any sort of commerce except the enforced intervention by the law itself until the slavery became a complicated and relatively accepted system. By then, in the absence of a well-developed mercantile traffic, Delphi would be thought to have experienced its golden era21. The existence of commercial relations at primitive levels between the city states might furnish the Delphi as great institution of arbitration.
However, due to eventual developments of the trade including a complex development in the slavery associated with the division of labor induced by the expansion of the Persian slavery system and the slowly growing appearance of polarization between the cities and country, Delphi may seem to have begun to effectively lose its traditional identity and respected cultural position22.
4.1 The Persians, the City-States and Delphi
In antiquity, old practices and methods occurred prior to the slavery period always co-existed alongside the emerging slavery. The development in the distribution of slavery among the city-states was uneven: The coastal area of the European side of the Aegean Sea had devolved into slavery markets by the Persians; people living in Asia minor appeared to have been sold out as slaves, the import and export of whom were organized by the city-states under the guidance of the Persian Empire23. The growing power of the city-states and the enlarged slave markets existed were the product and function of the Persians. The inlands in Asia Minor used to serve as mechanism that would produce slaves who were considered rebels revolting against the Persian rule.24
Relatively after two centuries during which time the mode of slave production seems to have settled down with its own specific contradictory institutions and conflicts, when we arrived at the period of Pericles in Athens (461 BC-429 BC), Delphi had already been transformed into an instrument into the hands of cities as vassal of either Athens or Sparta or Corinth. It was no longer a common
19 Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens, (Penguin Books, 1964), p.66
20 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press,
2003), p.5
21 Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996) 22 Please see: Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990) 23
Please see: The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005)
respectable religious institution, had already lost her impartiality, but seems to have turned into an instrument being controlled by the interests of the unstable nature of the alignments of the cities. The Development of slavery and the competition for the process of enslaving people transformed the nature of the relationships among the city-states in Greece under the pressure of the Persian Empire. The instinct for slavery gave way to fear and anxiety for annihilation within each state. Military balance had mixed with unrest and unsettled feelings about whether their city-states would resume surviving the ruthless enslaving conditions25.
The persistence of the fear for the enslavement was so deep and acute that it lasted centuries. One could observe the deep and irrational anxiety of the city states forty years after the end of Peloponnesian War (432 BC- 404 BC). For example, with the strategy of enslaving the Peloponnesians, Corinthians had designed another war against both Spartans and Athenians. But to form an alliance with Argos, Corinthians had employed some fears of enslavement about Argos, and convinced them of the intention of Athenians and Spartans, hence successfully drove the Argos to war26. Empirical evidence shows that such fear about the enslavement had been an essential provocation to move city-states to major wars.
4.2 The Persian Aims in the 490s BC and Delphi’s Misjudgment
The Delian League was formed late in 478 BC27. In the aftermath of the success of the Greek navies and revolt of city states, in 479-478 BC the defeated Persians moved along the coast restoring order in city after city in Asia Minor with fleet and army moving together28. It had ensured that the victory of the city states on the European side against the Persians could have been prevented from spreading over Minor Asia. Through the city-states in Minor Asia, did the Persians would aim at controlling the functioning structure of slavery trade in the city-states on the European continent side of the Aegean Sea. A similar strategy by the Persians had been applied in 469 BC. The goal of the resumption of the Persian Empire over the city-states in Greece was reduced to a commitment to maintaining slavery trades within and across the city states. The perceptual change in politics and actual adjustments to economic development solidified in strategy and diplomacy of the Persians. The
25 Please see: Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990) 26 Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.200-201 27 Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World At War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005)
Persians began applying a strategy in which they decided to see whether they could secure by diplomacy something of what they had not been able to secure by force29.
The Persians’ purposes were twofold. They sought to secure undisputed control over all of Asia. Secondly they wanted a settled order within Greece that would occasion them the least trouble.30 Since trouble had come from naval power, they would be best served by enforcing a system that required city states to be autonomous. But autonomy would not flourish to be left to itself. When the Persians’ agent city states would fail to keep control over the rest of the city states, the Persians would and did intervene31. The ending of Peloponnesian wars explicitly refers to that reality. Those who did not accept such a condition would have to be coerced by joint action. The peace of Thebes in 366 illustrates this32. In 367 Thebans had sought to institute a Persians peace with themselves the leading power, that is, peace and alliance.
By the mid-fifth century the city states in Greece was polarized due to the competition for slavery. Two power blocks appeared to emerge, led by the Athens and Sparta33. Those seeking to remain neutral were viewed with suspicion by both block members34. This polarization made arbitration and consequently the peaceful resolution of conflicts almost impossible35.
Arbitration between two power blocks was unable to work since there had been no superior institution or agency that had sufficient authority to be recognized by both power blocks members. In addition the prevailing political culture would encourage violent conflict resolution rather than peaceful resolution36. The arbitration clause in the ‘Thirty Years Treaty’ of 446 BC between two
29 Ibid., p.135
30 Please see:
The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005)
31 Ibid., p.183
32 (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 6. 10)
33Sparta as a city state grew strong to become the dominant military land-power in ancient Greece around 650 BC. Sparta
led the campaign as the leader of the combined city-states forces during the Greco-Persian Wars at the beginning of the fifth century. Between 431 and 404 BC, Sparta was the enemy of Athenian city-state throughout the Peloponnesian War Sparta with the financial aid of the Persians emerged victorious. 34 years after the victory of the Spartans, Thebes receiving the financial support of the Persians ended Sparta’s role in 371 BC. For further information, please see: Cartledge Paul, Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 BC (2 ed.), (Oxford: Routledge, 2002)
34 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press,
2003), 5.84-114
35 Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. Warfare in the Ancient World. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989 36 Kagan, Donald, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, (New York, 1995), ch.1
