Political opposition in Northern Ireland National Democratic Party, 1965 1970

Political Opposition in Northern Ireland:

The National Democratic Party, 1965-1970*

I A N M C A L L I S T E R

Abstract: T h i s article is a study o f the role o f the National Democratic Party i n minority politics

in Ulster between 1965 and 1970. T h e N D P established three principles o f crucial significance for the later development o f minority party politics. Firstly, it established a belief in constructive political action as an effective lever to change, after the t w o alternative methods to change— political abstentionism and physical force—had been discredited. Secondly, the N D P formed a consistent and efficient political organisation and thirdly, an open membership. A l l three principles were the basic prerequisites for a modern political party and provided the basis for the Social Democratic and Labour Party w h e n it was formed i n 1970.

A

few studies have devoted any space to an examination o f the political

Lparties, and i n particular, to the political parties seeking support f r o m the

Catholic m i n o r i t y .1 I n large measure this neglect is attributable to the fact that

the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) has been the unanimous electoral choice o f the m i n o r i t y d u r i n g the greater part o f the crisis. I t is therefore easy to regard such u n a n i m i t y o f political expression as being a continuous theme o f m i n o r i t y politics rather than as a recent acquisition.

Prior to the founding o f the S D L P , anti-partitionist politics i n N o r t h e r n Ireland consisted o f a large n u m b e r o f groups and individuals, under a variety o f labels, each taking the nationalist vote i n constituencies containing a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f

* I a m indebted to Professor R i c h a r d Rose, M r J o h n Duffy, D r M a l c o l m Punnett and D r Paddy M c G i l l for formative help i n the preparation o f this article, w h i c h is part o f a wider research project on the S D L P .

Catholics. Political activity was characterised b y fragmentation, frequent schisms and numerous inter-party disputes. U p until the mid-1960s, the main burden o f responsibility for the representation o f the m i n o r i t y rested w i t h the Nationalist Party,2 w h i c h had, since 1921, been opposed to the N o r t h e r n Ireland state.

However, b y the early 1970s the Nationalists had virtually disappeared and this function had been transferred in toto to the SDLP, a party which, accepted that the state existed w i t h the consent o f a majority o f its people. I t is hard to imagine t w o political parties whose content and style differed so fundamentally, yet were i n succession the political mouthpiece o f the N o r t h e r n m i n o r i t y .

This crucially important shift i n the nature o f anti-partitionist opposition was aided b y an immense number o f factors, b o t h general and specific. One specific factor w h i c h has been constantly ignored is the role o f the National Democratic Party ( N D P ) between 1965 and 1970. As an off-shoot o f the Nationalist Party the N D P emerged initially as a Nationalist pressure group, but later became an autonomous political party i n its o w n right. The principles i t advocated—a belief i n constructive political action, an efficient political organisation and open membership—were an original contribution to, and an innovatory influence o n , m i n o r i t y political opposition i n the Province. These precedents became the foundation for the SDLP w h e n i t was formed i n August, 1970. I n a very real sense, then, the N D P forms a psychological, organisational and political link between the unorganised, single-issue Nationalists and the modern party organisa­

t i o n o f the SDLP, w i t h its w i d e range o f policy aims.

The first part o f this article w i l l be devoted to an examination o f the Nationalist Party and the contemporary criticisms made o f i t . The second part w i l l describe the emergence o f the N D P , w h i l e i n the t h i r d section, its subsequent development w i l l be assessed. The f o u r t h and final section w i l l examine the legacy o f the N D P to present day m i n o r i t y political opposition.

The Nationalist Party

Conventional conceptual definitions o f the modern political party see its main functions as p r o v i d i n g an organisational framework that can, w h e n set i n m o t i o n , nominate candidates o n a cross local basis, supply them w i t h a coherent policy, and hopefully, w i n elections (Neumann 1962). Organisation is an essential attribute i n that i t sets political activity on a stable footing, and enables the party to perpetuate itself longer than the personalities or local groups that may come to dominate i t at any one time. As the main purpose o f the party is to w i n elections, organisation comes into play i n nominating candidates and equiping them w i t h a political platform. W h i l e the elector may k n o w little, i f anything, about a candidate, a party label backed b y a consistent programme lends cohesion to the political process as a w h o l e .

I n N o r t h e r n Ireland only one question—that o f the constitution—has dominated

politics, thus political activity has been rooted i n tendency rather than ideology or political programme. This has consequently overshadowed b o t h candidate and policy (and has hence made organisation irrelevant) so l o n g as a candidate declares his position o n the constitutional issue. As the Catholics i n Ulster were i n a permanent m i n o r i t y , the Nationalist Party could never hope to w i n an election, so political organisation became for them an irrelevancy. B y contrast, organisation was essential to the Unionist Party i n ensuring a u n i f o r m approach b y candidates to the constitutional question and maintaining a cohesive Parliamentary majority. T h e Nationalist Party never filled any o f the criteria for a modern political party, being neither organised nor selecting candidates o n a cross local basis. As Richard Rose (1971) has noted "Because nationalism appeals for votes i n terms o f an ascriptive characteristic, there is less need for an organisation than i n a political party competing against others w i t h attributes that all can share". Organisation was thus unnecessary for the Nationalists. Their position as a political opposition was further compounded b y their intractable antagonism towards the state. T o employ the t y p o l o g y developed b y the late O t t o Kirchheimer, the Nationalists were an "opposition o f principle, bent n o t only o n wrenching power f r o m the government o f today, b u t o n ending once and for all the system o n w h i c h the government rests" (Kirchheimer 1971). The t w o remaining categories relate to "classical opposition", as i n the British Parliamentary tradition and to "opposition by cartel", a semi-permanent abandonment o f the government-opposition relationship.

The partition settlement o f 1921 left the Nationalist Party cut o f f f r o m the nation-wide movement, w i t h a legacy o f bitterness and frustration. This frustra­ tion, coupled w i t h the widespread belief that the border was a temporary expedient "imposed o n the country b y a hard pressed British cabinet" (Beckett

1971), led to intermittent abstentionism f r o m the Stormont Parliament and to an

unconstructive attitude to the institutions o f the state. The abstentionist strategy was exemplified b y the veteran Nationalist, Cahir Healey, w h e n he stated that they w o u l d n o t allow themselves " t o become an official opposition i n the House. W e reserve the r i g h t , " he said, " t o come i n or stay outside, as and w h e n our people may decide." The approach to other institutions was hardly more con­ structive. W r i t i n g i n 1948, the future leader o f the Party, Eddie McAteer, advocated Catholics to get as m u c h f r o m the Welfare State as possible and then "act stupid, demand explanations, object, anything at all that w i l l clog the departmental machinery".

nationalist." (Rutan 1967). Thus such pressing issues as religious discrimination, the housing shortage and educational policy were rarely brought up b y Nationalist MPs. Before the w i t h d r a w a l f r o m Stormont, the Nationalist leader, Joe D e v l i n , had initiated some movement o n these issues, largely b y cultivating a rapport w i t h the Unionist Prime Minister, James Craig. B u t no attempt was made to inculcate this approach among the other Nationalist MPs or to set i t o n a secure Parliamentary basis; thus w h e n he walked o u t i n 1932 and died soon after, the rest o f the party reverted to the established policy o f concentration o n the " N a t i o n a l Question" and abstentionism. U n t i l November, 1964, the Party had never issued any clear declaration o f policy. Even i f a set o f policy objectives had been adopted, they w o u l d n o t have been able to press them due to the second factor, the total lack o f organisation or co-ordination.

T h e party had no organisation whatsoever i n the country, and existed i n Stormont as a loose collection o f individuals, acting " i n harmony, b u t n o t i n harness". T h e lack o f constituency organisation meant that local energies w e n t untapped and MPs relied o n personal f o l l o w i n g for votes: "their constituencies were like dioceses and they were like bishops, answerable to no-one and answering no-one". The absence o f any machinery for co-ordinating anti-partitionist groups and elected representatives was perhaps more serious i n that i t negated any potential political impact the m i n o r i t y m i g h t have. There was n o effort to l i n k up the activities o f nationally-minded local government representatives and Stormont representatives. I n Belfast, the anti-partitionists tempered their appeal w i t h a socialist content, w h i c h tended to engender suspicion among the con­ servative Catholic politicians i n rural areas.

H a v i n g no consistent organisation, the party had therefore n o formal member­ ship w h i c h presented problems i n selecting candidates for elections. This gave rise to the " c o n v e n t i o n " system b y w h i c h prominent Catholics i n the constituency, often invited b y the local priest, came together to select a candidate. A c o n ­ temporary critic observed that "charges o f ' f i x i n g ' and selective invitations b y the sponsors to such conventions have been the rule rather than the exception". Clerical influence i n Nationalist politics was, i n fact, a consistent theme. D i r e c t involvement b y the Roman Catholic clergy was usually l i m i t e d to election periods, especially w h e n disputes arose between contenders for the nationalist vote. I n at least one instance, the Archbishop o f A r m a g h himself acted as an arbiter i n an electoral dispute concerning rival groups. According to J. L . McCracken (1967), this identification o f Catholicism and nationalism "detracted f r o m the effectiveness o f opposition criticism" and encouraged a " n a r r o w sectarian approach o n the part o f some nationalist members".

and T y r o n e . For many, the distinction between physical force Republicanism and constitutional Nationalism became blurred. O w e n D u d l e y Edwards (1970) has succintly characterised the interaction between the t w o traditions: "Sinn Fein was abstentionist i n principle; the Nationalists had come near t o being so i n practice; Sinn Fein and the I R A operated as a response to p a r t i t i o n ; the Nationalists employed anti-partitionist rhetoric as the stock-in-trade. Sinn Fein denounced the Unionist oppression; the Nationalists could hardly a l l o w themselves to be o u t b i d o n such a p o i n t . " Overall, this enabled opponents to h o l d the party responsible for the action o f extremists and to reduce further their credibility as an opposition.

I n sum, the effect o f the Nationalist opposition was to help foster the endemic political parochialism o f the Province and, among the m i n o r i t y , gave rise to "apathy and a feeling o f helplessness". N o t o n l y moderate Protestants were repelled f r o m becoming involved i n anti-partitionist politics, but also the younger better educated Catholics w h o were beginning to emerge i n the early 1960s. T h e disenchantment and dissatisfaction w i t h the Nationalists manifested itself t h r o u g h this latter g r o u p ; the first tangible expression o f the reappraisal that was taking place was articulated i n the National U n i t y movement, and later the N D P .

National Unity and the Maghery Convention

I n its investigation o f the causes o f the 1969 Ulster disturbances, the Cameron Commission noted the rise o f a larger Catholic middle class and a concomitant "decline i n preoccupation w i t h the border as an immediate political issue, and i n the appeal o f Nationalism to the Catholic population". This new Catholic middle class was the product o f increased social m o b i l i t y , occasioned i n part b y the 1947 ( N I ) Education A c t . T h e A c t provided post-primary education for the children o f w o r k i n g class parents w h o w o u l d n o t normally have had the opportunity. I n the 17 years f o l l o w i n g the A c t there was an increase i n pupils to grant-aided schools o f almost 32 per cent and i n many cases this enabled the recipients to attain middle class employment and status. As Garret FitzGerald (1973) has pointed out, the political result was that " i n the 1960s, the beneficiaries o f this education amongst the Catholic c o m m u n i t y began to challenge the hitherto largely rural middle class leadership o f the m i n o r i t y . . . . "

T h e challenge found political expression initially i n the National U n i t y movement, created i n December, 1959. A founder member, Michael M c K e o w n , stated that the b o d y was not i n competition w i t h the Nationalist Party. I t was " n o t a political p a r t y " , he said, " b u t rather a political study group. . . . " The emergence o f the movement was aided b y the then Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, i n his speech to the O x f o r d U n i o n i n October, 1959. A r g u i n g i n favour o f a federalist solution to the N o r t h e r n Ireland problem, the importance o f his speech lay i n the

de facto recognition i t gave t o partition. O f more consequence t o N o r t h e r n

Catholics was that the idea o f force inherent i n Republican ideology could at last be dropped.

W i t h this impetus, the elements w h i c h coalesced i n National U n i t y produced a magazine, The New Nation. As the title suggests, i t was intended to invoke

parallels w i t h The Nation, a newspaper founded i n 1842 b y the Y o u n g Irelanders.

The New Nation subjected the malaise o f nationalist politics to thorough

criticism-and endeavoured to guide the re-thinking that was taking place away f r o m a preoccupation w i t h the sterile effects o f permanent opposition. Its main aim was to produce a more constructive belief i n politics as an end i n itself, and not merely as a means towards attaining reunification.

Accordingly, National U n i t y based its appeal, firstly, o n the need to make reunification conditional o n consent and secondly, the need for a united opposition. The n o t i o n o f the consent o f a majority was a recognition that n o t only Protestants b u t a substantial number o f Catholics were apathetic to the ideal o f Irish U n i t y . A n y " n e w nationalism" i n the Province w o u l d therefore have to spring f r o m the integration o f the t w o politico-religious traditions "and n o t f r o m the domination o f the one b y the other". T h e a i m o f creating a united opposition f r o m the existing fragmented nationalist groups made the U n i t y movement a focal p o i n t for the co-ordination o f these groups and aroused a hope that a united opposition was an attainable goal.

T h e first practical attempt to realise the aims o f National U n i t y occurred at Maghery, C o . A r m a g h , i n A p r i l , 1964. A convention was arranged, attended by the nationalist elected representatives and their critics, i n order to discuss a previously circulated m o t i o n w h i c h called for the setting up o f a united, demo­ cratic political party to represent all w h o espoused the ideal o f reunification. The elected representatives themselves were only encouraged to attend the convention b y a threat that i f they failed to attend, the assembly itself w o u l d "undertake the creation o f such an organisation". Indeed, the o n l y elected representative not to attend, a Nationalist Party Senator, condemned the meeting as a f o r m o f court at w h i c h the representatives were being summoned to account for their actions.

Given the g u l f between the representatives and their critics, i t was n o t surprising that the meeting t o o k the f o r m o f a confrontation. One trade unionist caught the m o o d o f the meeting w h e n he opened a speech b y saying: " I come here out o f frustration". O n l y one M P , Paddy Gormley, spoke i n favour o f the m o t i o n and o n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n o f the floor (mainly f r o m D e r r y ) supported the elected representatives. I n the course o f the second session the m o m e n t u m o f pressure for reform became more intense and forced the Parliamentary parties to agree to steps to achieve i t . Eventually an amended m o t i o n was passed w i t h only one vote against and a few abstentions. This committed the participants at the convention to create a " N a t i o n a l Political F r o n t " to "stimulate the g r o w t h o f nationalist constituency organisations" w h i c h w o u l d contain " a l l the machinery o f a normal political p a r t y " .

and housing (and hence religious discrimination) w h i c h had a more pressing concern for their constituents. Moreover, the Maghery resolution defined the t w i n aims o f a united opposition and party organisation w h i l e setting up the structures w h i c h could b r i n g them about. The traditional hegemony o f the Nationalist Party was beginning to disintegrate.

However, the h i g h hopes that the National Political Front marked "an end to the weakening divisions i n nationalist political ranks" w e n t unfulfilled. Tensions developed w i t h i n the guiding body, the Provisional Council, between the elected representatives (who had a place o n the C o u n c i l b y right) and those w h o had obtained their seats b y co-option. T h e Nationalist Party leader, Eddie McAteer, asserted that they w o u l d n o t abdicate their position as elected representatives " i n favour o f people w h o have no claim to representation whatsoever . . . " . A t the r o o t o f this dissension was the lack o f w i l l o n the Nationalist side to implement the Maghery aims. I n defence o f their position, M c A t e e r believed that "political organisation . . . is simply a matter o f degree . . . w e have always kept i n touch w i t h the people—one o f the m a i n objectives o f organisation". O n the plans for open membership, he believed that " t o o m u c h importance is given to 'card-c a r r y i n g ' " and i n 'card-con'card-clusion stated that there was a danger "too formal or r i g i d organisation m i g h t be inclined to repel people f r o m j o i n i n g " .

Nationalist hostility towards reform and the concept o f opposition u n i t y forced their critics to set up an autonomous political party i n the Belfast area f r o m the remnants o f the National Political Front. The inaugural meeting o f the new party was held i n February, 1965, the aims being firstly, to set up associations i n Belfast's four Westminster constituencies and secondly, to t r y and effect a merger w i t h the rural associations o f a reorganised Nationalist Party. Significantly, the new party d i d n o t adopt the title o f the parent party, b u t rather t o o k the title " N a t i o n a l Party". T h e Chairman, E. G. Quigley, explained that "this designation is more acceptable i n the Belfast area . . . the title 'Nationalist' is acceptable i n rural areas. . . " . W h i l e this was undoubtedly a factor i n the choice o f name, i t was also indicative o f the conscious attempt that was being made to break away f r o m the sectarian alignment o f the Nationalist Party. A t a press conference after the meeting, a rare invitation to j o i n the party was made to Protestants " w h o accept the aims o f the party". Later i n 1965, a special conference was convened to reaffirm the t w i n aims o f the party as being the creation o f a united, as w e l l as an organised, Nationalist political party. A resolution was passed renaming the party the " N a t i o n a l Democratic P a r t y " : this was again evidence o f the efforts being made to give the party an independent political identity.

The National Democratic Party

The substance and outlook o f the N D P is best seen i n an examination o f three o f its attributes. Firstly, i n its political organisation, secondly, i n its policies and t h i r d l y , i n the electoral strategy o f the party.

major parties i n the Irish Republic, i t established permanent machinery and efficient procedures. T h e constitution made the annual conference the "supreme governing authority i n the party". Because the party had a relatively small membership and spawned no real Parliamentary entity w h i c h could have gained ascendancy w i t h i n the party, there was no contradiction between the theoretical function o f the conference and its practical reality. Between 1965 and 1970, six conferences were held and these provided an important focal p o i n t for the f o r m u ­ lation o f policy and for the leadership to gauge rank and file t h i n k i n g . The conference also elected the t w o governing bodies o f the party, the Central C o u n c i l and the Executive.

T h e Central Council was empowered " t o further the policies o f the party, to give general oversight to its management and to promote its development". The Council membership consisted o f five officers elected b y conference, and the balance o f about 30 was made up o f representatives o f local associations admitted o n a sliding scale. The function o f the Council was to oversee the running o f the local associations and to report to conference o n its w o r k and carry out its directives. W h i l e the Council met every three months, the Executive met m o n t h l y and had the task o f p r o m o t i n g the "day-to-day management o f the affairs o f the party". Executive membership was made up o f five officers elected b y conference and ten elected b y the Central Council f r o m among themselves. I n the absence o f any Parliamentary b o d y w i t h i n the party, the Executive necessarily performed a crucial leadership function.

The final and most important element i n the N D P ' s structure was the local associations. Because they could n o t organise i n areas where the Nationalist Party was already predominant, the party was generally restricted to Belfast and its environs. B y 1967, ten local associations were active, covering Belfast, C o . A n t r i m and parts o f Counties D o w n , A r m a g h and T y r o n e and an association was also established i n Queen's University, Belfast. U n t i l 1968 the University constituted a constituency electing four MPs b y proportional representation. The functions o f the associations were t w o - f o l d : firstly, to provide a vehicle for National Democratic propaganda, to carry o n a continuing system o f recruitment and to educate politically the existing membership. T h e second, more important function was to contest elections, select candidates and to maintain an efficient electoral machinery.

by a number o f comprehensive policy aims, again marked the establishment o f a crucially important precedent.

The approach o f the N D P , and o f the other Catholic m i n o r i t y parties w h i c h followed i t — t o advocate reunification only b y consent—created a political vacuum w h i c h could only be filled by an extensive programmatic content. N o single issue, aside f r o m partition, existed w i t h the capacity to mobilise electors and rally support around the t w o opposing parties: any lessening o f its saliency was there­ fore likely to have w i d e repercussions o n their political stances. I n the 1960s, a period o f reduced communal tension initiated b y the end o f the 1956-62 I R A border campaign, i t appeared as i f the saliency o f the perennial p r o b l e m m i g h t , at last, be declining. The m i l d reformism o f Terence O ' N e i l l coupled w i t h the Nationalist Party's decision to accept (after 44 years) the title "Official O p p o s i t i o n " , contributed i n large measure to a belief that politics i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was changing—and changing for the better. The 1968 Loyalty Survey found this trend to be marginally stronger among Catholics. O f all the Catholics interviewed,

65 per cent believed things were changing for the better, w h i l e o n l y 27 per cent

saw no change and 4 per cent felt things had got worse (Rose 1971).

This environment helped the N D P to b r i n g socio-economic aims to the fore. A l t h o u g h they had a strong c o m m i t m e n t to opposition unity, inherited f r o m National U n i t y , their policy programme formed the substance o f its political platform. This programme was at least nominally socialist. Previously most opposition groups had neither seen the need nor had the resources to produce a coherent b o d y o f policy. However, as the introduction to one N D P policy document p u t i t : " A n y political organisation w h i c h aims at becoming an alternative government to the Unionist Party has an obligation to prove its credibility b y . . . producing a comprehensive body o f p o l i c y " . Various publica­ tions were produced o n a w i d e range o f topics, including social welfare, housing and regional development. T h e t w o main priorities were seen as the elimination o f unemployment and a rapid acceleration i n the Council house building p r o ­ gramme. T h e general theme o f all the Party's declared policies was the belief i n a left-of-centre approach, emphasising extensive state intervention and control i n the private sector.

The N D P was able to produce such detailed policy statements and strive to gain votes on that basis rather than rely o n their religion, for t w o reasons. Firstly, although socialism was anathema to the Catholic electorate, their appeal was largely focused o n the more politically sophisticated Belfast. Secondly, the party had the potential to produce them due to the intellectual ability o f the member­ ship. This ability stemmed f r o m the middle class nature o f these individuals, based o n the teaching profession. I t d i d , however, have the drawback i n that i t created a " m i d d l e class professional image" for the party and also created a p o i n t o f friction w h e n disputes arose w i t h other anti-partitionist parties.

The policy content o f the N D P was n o t dissimiliar to that o f the pro-union, b u t anti-Unionist N o r t h e r n Ireland Labour Party (NLLP). B u t because o f the

approved by Westminster (and between 1964 and 1970 legislation emanating f r o m a Labour government), the NLLP was almost bereft o f criticism. Their opposition was ineffectual; rather i n Kirchheimer's (1971) phrase i t was "the waning o f opposition". T h e N I L P could be "against nothing 'British' and cannot advocate anything 'un-British'. T h e y are forced i n t o a position o f being an Opposition b y C a r t e l " (Rutan 1967). T h e N I L P and also the Nationalist Party had, therefore, i n different ways, allowed themselves to be so positioned that the impact o f their opposition was negligible—the N I L P as an "opposition b y cartel" and the Nationalists as an "opposition o f principle". The N D P hoped to avoid these pitfalls and appear as a " l o y a l " and responsible opposition—a' classical opposition" —despite their somewhat contradictory dual emphasis o n nationalist and socialist symbols.

T h e t h i r d and final element that marked the N D P o u t as a new force i n m i n o r i t y politics was its electoral strategy. Previously the Nationalist Party had fought only constituencies where i t was virtually assured o f success. This policy resulted i n the very h i g h levels o f uncontested seats at Stormont general elections. The Unionist viewed the phenomenon o f the unopposed return as symptomatic o f the lack o f Nationalist c o m m i t m e n t to Parliamentary politics and indicative o f his o w n undeniable majority. The Nationalist saw i t as stemming f r o m the gerry­ mandering o f the electoral boundaries and the abolition o f proportional representa­ t i o n . W h i l e the true cause probably lies somewhere i n between these extremes, i t is clear that the abolition o f PR was a major factor. T h e simple majority system was re-instated for local government i n 1922 and for the Stormont Parliament i n

1929, this reversal being, as has been pointed out, " i n breach o f the spirit i f n o t the

letter o f the Government o f Ireland A c t " (Budge and O'Leary 1973). The reason for its abolition was that Craig feared the g r o w t h o f t h i r d parties, particularly Labour, w h o m i g h t combine w i t h the Nationalists to rob h i m o f his majority. Thus i n abolishing an electoral system w h i c h benefited Labour most (and ironically, the Nationalists least) his publicly stated a i m was to abolish all minorities except the Nationalist Party. The Nationalist leader, Joe D e v l i n , described the m o v e as "mean, contemptible and callous". The lasting consequence was, inter

alia, the h i g h level o f unopposed returns. I n the nine elections for Stormont

between 1929 and 1965, this never fell below 38 per cent o f the total seats and i n the 2 elections o f 1933 and 1958, a majority o f the seats were uncontested. The situation i n local government was consistently worse.

early threats o f encroaching o n Nationalist dominated constituencies, any such intention was quickly renounced. There was also a desire to promote the image o f a "socialist" rather than a "pan-Catholic" p a r t y : indeed, for any o f the seats (but one) to have been w o n b y the N D P w o u l d have required an unprecedented degree o f v o t i n g across the sectarian divide.

The overall a i m o f this strategy was to f o r m a radical and viable alternative to U n i o n i s m and to appear as a responsible and constructive opposition i n the British tradition. I n a Province w i t h a permanent opposition and an equally permanent one party government, this was a f o r l o r n hope. The failure to achieve a credible Parliamentary representation had lasting consequences i n shortening the life o f the N D P : a party w i t h a mass membership "cannot survive w i t h o u t foreseeable success. Its final fate becomes a race against t i m e " (Neumann 1962). Moreover, the urge to contest winnable seats brought the party into conflict w i t h other m i n o r i t y parties, particularly Republican Labour. T h e most divisive dispute came over a decision b y b o t h the N D P and the Republican Labour Party to nominate a candidate to contest the traditionally anti-partitionist West Belfast seat i n the 1966 Westminster general election. I n the event, pressure b y Catholic politicians forced the N D P to w i t h d r a w their candidate to avoid splitting the Catholic vote. T h e dispute precipitated m u c h bitter internal recrimination and a party rift was o n l y n a r r o w l y avoided. The outcome o f the West Belfast election was that the Republican Labour candidate, Gerry Fitt, received a n a r r o w majority, and for the first time i n 11 years N o r t h e r n Ireland had p u t "an authentic w o r k i n g class spokesman" (O'Leary 1971) into Westminster.

The party's fortunes i n local government elections fared somewhat better. This was due to the less r i g i d politico-religious boundaries at the local level outside Belfast and the fact that at this level, the local constituency organisations were able to exert a greater influence. I n the 1967 local government elections, the party had h a l f o f its 58 candidates returned, and i n 2 towns, D o w n p a t r i c k and Strabane, the party held a majority o f the seats.

B y M a r c h , 1969, however, the N D P had still failed to make any significant impact o n the political scene. After the February 1969 election, i t had no repre­ sentation i n Stormont and its cardinal a i m o f opposition unity was still left unfulfilled. Moreover the increasing socio-economic emphasis o f politics i n the

1960s had been superseded b y a more strident and u n i f o r m demand for c i v i l

rights. A t this time " w h a t Catholics wanted . . . were militant champions o f the Catholic c o m m u n i t y " ( O ' B r i e n 1972). A l l three o f the established political parties d r a w i n g support f r o m that section o f the c o m m u n i t y — t h e Nationalists, the N D P and Republican Labour—failed to provide this. I t is n o t surprising therefore, that the first successful translation o f c i v i l rights demands i n t o an electoral p l a t f o r m was realised b y three individuals standing independently o f any established political p a r t y .3 The c o m m o n denominator o f the victors was that they possessed "a

greater social consciousness, activism and ecumenical image than their pre­ decessors" (Edwards 1970).

T h e "crossroads" election and its aftermath marked the beginning o f a period o f volatility i n the N o r t h e r n party system w h i c h has not, as yet ended. The new political environment produced parallel b u t opposite changes w i t h i n the respective political camps: w h i l e the Unionists embarked o n a l o n g road o f fragmentation, the c i v i l rights movement provided a new unifying force for Catholic politicians. O u t o f this new force the SDLP was born.

The Emergence of the SDLP

T h e SDLP was launched at a press conference i n Belfast o n August 21, 1970, and its initial membership consisted o f seven Parliamentary members.4 Faced w i t h

the formation o f a party w h i c h appeared to f i l l all the criteria the N D P stated as prerequisites for an effective opposition—reunification b y consent, a demo­ cratically based political organisation and socialist policies—the only feasible path was to dissolve the party and j o i n the SDLP o n an individual basis. This decision was taken at a special conference o f the party membership convened i n October

1970.

There were three reasons w h y the N D P played no part i n the formation o f the new party, and w h y a "merger" was effected only b y a dissolution o f the N D P . T h e first was that the N D P appeared, i n electoral terms at least, a spent force, and its f o r m a l inclusion i n the SDLP could have created an initially bad image. Similarly, i t was closely associated b y the electorate w i t h the Nationalist Party w h i c h had been decisively repudiated at the 1969 election. Finally, i t was felt that the new party, w i t h a new title and utilising new (and non-Catholic) political symbols, w o u l d have the best chance o f assimilating the various splinter groups w h i c h comprised the opposition.

The innovations and precedents established b y the National U n i t y movement, and later the N D P , had a considerable legacy for the SDLP. Firstly, the principle o f positive constitutional political action was established as an end i n itself and not merely as a means towards reunification. This was achieved b y the n o t i o n , derived f r o m National U n i t y , that reunification could o n l y come through the consent o f a majority o f people i n the Province (and not necessarily the whole island, as the Nationalists and Republicans had traditionally asserted). Secondly, a compre­ hensive political organisation was constructed as a lever towards effective political action. This organisation began at constituency level and was linked to an elective leadership; the principle o f open membership was established and b o t h the leadership and membership were brought together i n a democratically organised conference. T h e w h o l e structure and organisation o f the party was laid d o w n i n a w r i t t e n constitution, itself a substantial innovation. T h i r d l y , the assimilation o f these principles i n t o Catholic party politics—and particularly those i n v o l v i n g

permanent procedures—implied the freeing o f anti-partitionist politics f r o m clerical control. Together they were a sine qua non for a modern political party. Thus the innovations o f National U n i t y and the N D P came to m a t u r i t y i n the political opposition o f the future, the SDLP.

A t the inaugural press conference, the leader o f the new party, Gerry Fitt, announced that the guiding principles o f the party w o u l d be the presentation o f a strong socialistic alternative to U n i o n i s m , to the extent o f contesting seats o f other Catholic members o f the opposition, i f need be, and to seek the u n i t y o f Ireland o n l y b y consent. H e c o m m i t t e d the party to organising i n each o f the

52 Stormont constituencies, w i t h open membership, a central party office and a

democratically organised party conference. Fitt also r i g h t l y pointed out that " f o r the first time i n N o r t h e r n Ireland politics . . . w e have brought the t o w n and country together".

T h e most easily traceable legacy o f the N D P was i n terms o f political organisa­ tion. I t is clear that the SDLP constitution was modelled closely o n that o f the N D P . As the SDLP was formed at the Parliamentary level d o w n , rather than vice versa, the experience o f the o l d N D P members i n constituency organisation and co-ordination proved invaluable i n g i v i n g the new party a residue o f support and ability i n the country w h e n setting up their constituency organisation. The considerable contribution o f the N D P towards contemporary m i n o r i t y political opposition i n N o r t h e r n Ireland is an acknowledgeable, i f neglected fact.

University of Strathclyde.

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