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Process Safety Performance Indicators

Process Safety Performance Indicators

API RP-754

September 15, 2010

Presenter: Kelly Keim

Presenter: Kelly Keim

--Location: PSRG

Location: PSRG

Brady’s Landing

Brady’s Landing

Houston Texas

Houston Texas

1

Houston, Texas

Houston, Texas

(2)

Outline

CSB Recommendation

RP-754 Development

C

i

M

b

hi

– Committee Membership

– Scope & Applicability

– Guiding Principles

g

p

RP-754 Process Safety Indicators

– Tier 1, 2, 3 & 4

– Guidelines for Selection & Use of Indicators

RP-754 Process Safety Indicator Reporting

B

d A

(N ti

id ) P bli R

ti

– Broad Access (Nationwide) Public Reporting

– Local (Site) Public Reporting

– Data Capture

p

(3)

CSB Recommendation to API & USW

“Work together to develop two new consensus

American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

standards. In the first standard, create

performance

indicators for process safety

p

y

in the refinery and

y

petrochemical industries. Ensure that the standard

identifies

leading and lagging indicators for

nationwide public reporting

as well as indicators for

use at individual facilities. Include methods for the

d

l

t

d

f th

f

i di t

development and use of the performance indicators.”

(4)

Total Recordable Incident Rate vs. Calendar Year – U.S. Refineries

Expectation that RP-754 will aid

in driving similar improvements

in process safety performance

in process safety performance

(5)

RP 754 – Committee Membership

Academia (1)

MKO Process Safety Center

Associations (5)

Owner/Operators – Refiners (11)

BPChevron

( )

ACCCCPSNPRACHS Inc.Chevron PhillipsKoch Ind.UKPIAORC

Engineering & Construction (1)

oc d

Pasadena Ref

ExxonMobil

ConocoPhillips

Engineering & Construction (1)

UOP

Government (1)

CSB ConocoPhillipsShellMarathonValeroCSB

Labor (3)

(Withdrew 04-Aug-09)

USW ICWUC Valero

Owner/Operator – Chemicals (2)

DuPontDow 5ICWUCTeamstersDowAir ProductsObserver
(6)

RP-754 Guiding Principles

Starting Point – Capitalize on Previous Work

– API / ACC / CCPS loss of primary containment definition

API / ACC / CCPS loss of primary containment definition

– API other loss of primary containment definition

(7)

RP-754 Guiding Principles

Key Concepts – Indicator Attributes / Principles

– Objective, few and simple

j

p

– Well defined, capable of being applied consistently across the

industry

I di t

h ld d i

f t

f

i

t

– Indicators should drive process safety performance improvement

and learning.

– Indicators useful to all stakeholders and allow internal and external

benchmarking

– Indicators should be statistically valid, provide appropriate sensitivity

to be useful for continuous improvement; sufficient # of events to

to be useful for continuous improvement; sufficient # of events to

allow predictive monitoring and identification of performance trends.

(8)

Process Safety Indicator Pyramid

 Tiers 1 & 2 are

RP-754 standardized d fi i i La gg La gg

Broad Access

B

d A

definitions

 Tiers 3 & 4 are

company defined Tier 1 gg in g Ind ic ato rs LOPC Events of Greater Consequence Tier 1 gg in g Ind ic ato rs LOPC Events of Greater Consequence

Broad Access

[Nationwide] Public

Reporting

Broad Access

[Nationwide] Public

Reporting

p y performance indicators Tier 2 s Greater Consequence LOPC Events of Tier 2 s Greater Consequence LOPC Events of Tier 3 Le ad in g Ind LOPC Events of Lesser Consequence Ch ll t S f t S t Tier 3 Le ad in g Ind LOPC Events of Lesser Consequence Ch ll t S f t S t Tier 4

Operating Discipline & Management System

dic ato

rs Challenges to Safety Systems

Tier 4

Operating Discipline & Management System

dic ato

rs Challenges to Safety Systems

Operating Discipline & Management System Performance Indicators

Operating Discipline & Management System Performance Indicators

(9)

RP-754 Applicability

RP-754 Applicability

– Developed for the refining and petrochemical industries, but

may also be applicable to other industries where loss of

containment has the potential to cause harm.

“Process Safety” as used in the document is independent of

– Process Safety as used in the document is independent of

and broader than OSHA regulatory requirements.

– Applicability not limited to facilities covered by OSHA PSM or

pp cab ty ot

ted to ac t es co e ed by OS

S o

similar national or international regulations.

– Exclusions to focus metrics on Process Safety vs. all other

areas.

(10)

Applicability / Events Excluded from Process Safety Reporting

Applicability is not limited to those facilities covered by the OSHA Process Safety Management Standard , 29 CFR 1910.119 or similar national and international regulations.

Events associated with the following activities fall outside the scope of this RP:

a) Releases from pipeline transfer operations occurring outside the process

or storage facility fence line;

b) Marine transport operations, except when the vessel is connected to the

process for the purposes of feedstock or product transfer;

c) Truck or rail operations, except when the vessel is connected to the

process for the purposes of feedstock or product transfer, or if the truck or rail car is being used for on site storage;

d) Vacuum truck operations, except on-site truck loading or discharging

operations, or use of the vacuum truck transfer pump;

e) Routine emissions that are allowable under permit or regulation; f) Office, shop and warehouse building events (e.g. office fires, spills,

(11)

Applicability / Events Excluded from Process Safety Reporting

Events associated with the following activities fall outside the scope of this RP:

Personal safety events (e g slips trips falls) that are not directly

g) Personal safety events (e.g. slips, trips, falls) that are not directly

associated with on-site response to a loss of primary containment (LOPC) event;

h) LOPC events from ancillary equipment not connected to the process (e g h) LOPC events from ancillary equipment not connected to the process (e.g.

small sample containers);

i) Quality assurance (QA), quality control (QC) and research and

development (R&D) laboratories (pilot plants are within RP scope); development (R&D) laboratories (pilot plants are within RP scope);

j) Retail service stations; and

k) On-site fueling operations of mobile and stationary equipment (e.g.

pick-up trucks diesel generators and heavy equipment) up trucks, diesel generators, and heavy equipment).

(12)

Tier 1 -- Process Safety Event

Tier 1 – An unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material, including

non-toxic and non-flammable materials (e.g., steam, hot condensate,

nitrogen, compressed CO2 or compressed air) from a process that

results in one or more of the consequences listed below:

An employee contractor or subcontractor “days away from work”

– An employee, contractor or subcontractor days away from work

injury and/or fatality; or

– A hospital admission and/or fatality of a third party; or

A hospital admission and/or fatality of a third party; or

– An officially declared community evacuation or shelter-in-place ; or

– A fire or explosion resulting in greater than or equal to $25,000 of

p

g

g

q

$ ,

direct cost to the Company; or ...

(13)

Slide 12

p2 I would keep these Tier 1 and 2 slides but would also use the Annex C Decision Logic Tree as part of the webinar in some fashion. It emphasizes the thought process you must go through to classify an event as a PSE.

(14)

Tier 1 -- Process Safety Event – Cont’d

– A pressure relief device (PRD) discharge to atmosphere whether

directly or via a downstream destructive device that results in one or

more of the following four consequences:

more of the following four consequences:

• Liquid carryover, or

• Discharge to a potentially unsafe location or

Discharge to a potentially unsafe location, or

• On-site shelter-in-place, or

• Public protective measures (e.g., road closure);

p

( g

)

where the PRD discharge quantity is greater than the threshold

quantities in Table 1; or

– A release of material greater than the threshold quantities described

in Table 1 in any one-hour period.

Ti

1 PSE R t

(T t l Ti

1 PSE C

t/T t l W k H

)

Tier 1 PSE Rate = (Total Tier 1 PSE Count/Total Work Hours) x

200,000

(15)

Slide 13

p3 I would keep these Tier 1 and 2 slides but would also use the Annex C Decision Logic Tree as part of the webinar in some fashion. It emphasizes the thought process you must go through to classify an event as a PSE.

(16)

Tier 1 Material Release Threshold Quantity

Threshold

R l

Material Hazard

Cl

ifi ti

Threshold

Q

tit

Threshold

Q

tit

Release

Category

Classification

Quantity

(outdoors)

Quantity

(indoors)

1

TIH Hazard Zone A

5 kg

2.5 kg

Materials

(11 lbs)

(5.5 lbs)

2

TIH Hazard Zone B

Materials

25 kg

(55 lbs)

12.5 kg

(27.5 lbs)

3

TIH Hazard Zone C

Materials

100 kg

(220 lbs)

50 kg

(110 lbs)

4

TIH Hazard Zone D

200 kg

100 kg

4

TIH Hazard Zone D

Materials

200 kg

(440 lbs)

100 kg

(220 lbs)

(17)

Tier 1 Material Release Threshold Quantity

Threshold

Release

Category

Material Hazard

Classification

Threshold

Quantity

(outdoors)

Threshold

Quantity

(indoors)

5

Flammable Gases or Liquids with IBP < 35 °C & FP < 23 °C, or

Other Packing Group I Materials excluding strong acids/bases

500 kg

(1100 lbs)

250 kg

(550 lbs)

excluding strong acids/bases

6

Liquids with IBP > 35 °C and

Flash Point < 23 °C, or

(2200 lbs)

1000 kg

(1100 lbs)

500 kg

Flash Point < 23 C, or

Other Packing Group II Materials

(2200 lbs)

or

7 bbls

(1100 lbs)

or

3.5 bbls

7

Liquids with FP ≥ 23 °C and < 60

°C, or Liquids with Flash Point > 60 °C released at or above FP, or

2000 kg

(4400 lbs)

1000 kg (2200

lbs)

15 , Strong acids/bases, or

Other Packing Group III Materials

or

14 bbls

or

7 bbls

(18)

Materials Typical of Threshold Release Categories

The following are UN DGL & GHS designations for Flammable

The following are UN DGL & GHS designations for Flammable

Liquids & Gases

Flammable Gases and Liquids with IBP < 35

q

o

C

Hydrogen, Methane, Ethane, LPG, Ethylene, isopentane

Flammable Liquids with IBP > 35

o

C and FP < 23

o

C

N-pentane, cyclopentane, hexane, cyclohexane, gasoline / petrol, toluene, o-xylene (but not meta or para-xylene), MTBE, ethanol, some crude oils

Fl

bl Li id

ith FP > 23

o

C

d

60

o

C

Flammable Liquids with FP > 23

o

C and

60

o

C

Diesel fuel, most kerosenes, p-xylene, n-butanol, isobutanol, some crude oils

Flammable Liquids with FP > 60

o

C (Must be released above Flash

Point for Tier 1)

M t h lt t lt lf (160 C) th l l l (110 C) Most asphalts, tars, molten sulfur (160oC), ethylene glycol (110oC),

(19)

Materials Typical of Threshold Release Categories

TIH – Toxic Inhalation Hazard & Zones

TIH – Zone A: Br, HCN, Nickel Carbonyl, Phosgene, Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) TIH Z B B T ifl id (BF ) Chl i H S R d F i Nit i A id TIH – Zone B: Boron Trifluoride (BF3), Chlorine, H2S, Red Fuming Nitric Acid TIH – Zone C: Hydrogen Chloride (HCl), Hydrogen Fluoride (HF), Sulfur

Dioxide (SO2)

TIH – Zone D: Ammonia (NH3), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Ethylene Oxide

Other hazardous materials are assigned to a Packing Group (I II or III) Other hazardous materials are assigned to a Packing Group (I, II, or III) depending upon level of hazard.

PG I: Aluminum Alkyls, Some Liquid Amines, Sodium Cyanide, Sodium Peroxide

Peroxide

PG II: Aluminum Chloride, Calcium Carbide, Carbon Tetrachloride, Nicotine, Some Organic Peroxides, Phenol

17 PG III: Calcium Oxide (CaO), Activated Carbon, Chloroform, Some Organic Peroxides, Sodium Fluoride, Sodium Nitrate, Sulfur

(20)

Tier 2 -- Process Safety Event

Tier 2

-- An unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material,

including non-toxic and non-flammables materials (e.g., steam,

hot condensate, nitrogen, compressed CO2 or compressed air)

from a process which results in one or more of the

consequences listed below and is not reported in Tier 1:

– An employee, contractor or subcontractor recordable injury; or

– A fire or explosion resulting in greater than or equal to $2,500

(21)

Tier 2 -- Process Safety Event

– A pressure relief device (PRD) discharge to atmosphere whether

directly or via a downstream destructive device that results in one or

more of the following four consequences:

more of the following four consequences:

• Liquid carryover, or

• Discharge to a potentially unsafe location, or

g

p

y

• On-site shelter-in-place, or

• Public protective measures (e.g., road closure);

where the PRD discharge quantity is greater than the threshold

quantities in Table 2; or

A

l

f

t i l

t

th

th th

h ld

titi

d

ib d

– A release of material greater than the threshold quantities described

in Table 2 in any one-hour period.

Tier 2 PSE Rate = (Total Tier 2 PSE Count/Total Work Hours) x

19

(

)

(22)

Tier 2 Material Release Threshold Quantity

Threshold

Release Category

Material Hazard Classification Threshold Quantity (outdoors)

Threshold Quantity (indoors)

1 TIH Hazard Zone A Materials 0.5 kg

(1.1 lbs)

0.25 kg (.55 lbs)

2 TIH Hazard Zone B Materials 2.5 kg

(5 5 lb )

1.2 kg (2 8 lb )

(5.5 lbs) (2.8 lbs)

3 TIH Hazard Zone C Materials 10 kg

(22 lbs)

5 kg (11 lbs)

4 TIH Hazard Zone D Materials 20 kg

(44 lbs)

10 kg (22 lbs)

(23)

Tier 2 Material Release Threshold Quantity

Threshold

Release Category

Material Hazard Classification Threshold Quantity (outdoors)

Threshold Quantity (indoors)

5 Flammable Gases or Liquids

with IBP ≤ 35 °C and FP < 23 °C ; or

Other Packing Group I

50 kg (100 lbs)

25 kg (50 lbs) Other Packing Group I

Materials

6 Liquids with FP ≥ 23 °C and < 60 °C or Liquids with FP > 60 100 kg (220 lbs) 50 kg (110 lbs) 60 C or Liquids with FP > 60 °C released at or above FP; or Other Packing Group II and III Materials excluding moderate

(220 lbs) or 1 bbl (110 lbs) or 0.5 bbl acids/bases;

or Strong acids and bases

7 Liquids with FP > 60 °C l d b l FP 1000 kg (2200 lb ) 500 kg (1100 lb ) 21 released below FP; or Moderate acids/bases (2200 lbs) or 10 bbl (1100 lbs) or 5 bbl

(24)

Tier 3 & 4 versus Tier 1 & 2

 The Swiss Cheese Model (Reason,

Swiss Cheese Model

1990) helps to compare and contrast:

– Tier 1 events result in some level of harm (fire, LWC, release, etc.)

f

HAZARD HAZARD

HAZARD Protective “Barriers”

“Weaknesses” or holes

– Tier 2 events result in a lesser level of harm.

– Tier 3 and 4 indicators provide

information about the strength (or lack information about the strength (or lack thereof) of barriers and weaknesses in the equipment and hazard control

systems.

(25)

Tier 3 – Challenge to Safety Systems

 Purpose

– Tier 3 indicators are likely to provide the greatest opportunity for

identification of areas for improvement in Process Safety at the site level. – Intended for internal company use and local (site) public reporting.

 Application of the Barrier concept

– Tier 3 indicators typically represent challenges to the barrier system that progressed along the path to harm, but were stopped short of a Tier 1 or Tier 2 LOPC consequence.

 Examples

S f O ti Li it E i

– Safe Operating Limit Excursions

– Primary Containment Inspection or Testing Results Outside Acceptable Limits

Demands on Safety Systems – Demands on Safety Systems

• Activation of a Safety Instrumented System • Activation of a Mechanical Shutdown System

• Activation of Pressure Relief Device (not counted as Tier 1 or Tier 2)

23

• Activation of Pressure Relief Device (not counted as Tier 1 or Tier 2) – Other LOPC Events

(26)

Tier 3 Indicator #1

Safe Operating Limit Excursions

- This is a process parameter deviation that exceeds the safe operating limit

li bl h h f i

applicable to the phase of operation.

- Different operating phases (startup, ongoing operation, steps in a batch process, etc.) may have different SOL’s for the same equipment.

S f O ti Li it t th i t b d hi h t bl h ti

- Safe Operating Limits represent the point beyond which troubleshooting ends and pre-determined action occurs to return the process to a known safe state.

- Pre-determined actions may range from manually executed operatingPre determined actions may range from manually executed operating procedures to a fully automated safety instrumented system.

(27)

Tier 3 Indicator #2

Primary Containment Inspection or Testing Results

Outside Acceptable Limits

- This is an inspection or test finding that indicates primary containment equipment has been operated outside acceptable limits.

- Findings typically trigger actions such as replacement-in-kind, repairs to

t fit f i l t ith th t i l i d

restore fitness-for-service, replacement with other materials, increased inspection or testing, or de-rating of process equipment.

- Counted for vessels, atmospheric storage tanks, piping or machinery when previous operating pressures or levels exceed the acceptable limits when previous operating pressures or levels exceed the acceptable limits based upon wall thickness inspection measurement.

(28)

Tier 3 Indicator #3

Demands on Safety Systems

- This is a demand on a safety system designed to prevent a loss of primary containment (LOPC) or to mitigate the consequences of a LOPC.

- Examples include safety instrumented systems, mechanical shutdown devices, and pressure relief devices.

- Excluded from the metric:

- Intentional activation of the safety system during periodic testing or manual

activation as part of the normal shutdown process.

- SIS activation configured for equipment protection with no LOPC consequence.

- Mechanical shutdown system activation for equipment protection with no LOPC

(29)

Tier 3 Indicator #4

Other LOPC Events

- These are a loss of primary containment with a consequence less than Tier 2 events.

- Companies establish the appropriate thresholds meaningful to your operations and your process safety goals.

- Consequences should reflect process safety hazards rather than health (e.g. personnel exposure limits) or environmental (e.g. fugitive emissions) hazards.

(30)

Tier 4 – Operating Discipline & Management System

Performance

 Purpose

– Typically represent the performance of individual components of the barrier system.

– Indicative of process safety system weaknesses that may contribute to future Tier 1, 2 or 3 PSEs.

– Intended for internal company use and local (site) public reporting.

 Examples

– Process Hazards Evaluation Completion – Process Safety Action Item Closure

– Training Completed on Schedule – Procedures Current and Accurate – Work Permit Compliance

– Safety Critical Equipment Inspection

– Safety Critical Equipment Deficiency Management – MOC and PSSR Compliance

– Completion of Emergency Response Drills – Fatigue Risk Management

(31)

Guidelines for Selection of Process Safety Indicators

 High-level overview of some key aspects of process safety indicator selection

and development.

 Defer to more exhaustive references such as:  Defer to more exhaustive references such as:

– Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics,

American Institution of Chemical Engineers, New York, 2009.

UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) “Step By Step Guide to Developing – UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Step-By-Step Guide to Developing

Process Safety Performance Indicators, HSG254,” Sudbury, Suffolk, UK, 2006.

Hopkins Andrew “Thinking About Process Safety Indicators ” Working – Hopkins, Andrew, Thinking About Process Safety Indicators, Working

Paper 53, Paper prepared for the Oil and Gas Industry Conference, Manchester, UK, 2007.

Ch t i ti f Eff ti I di t

 Characteristics of Effective Indicators

– Reliable, Repeatable, Consistent, Independent of Outside Influence,

Relevant, Comparable, Meaningful, Appropriate for the Intended Audience,

Ti l E t U A dit bl

29

Timely, Easy to Use, Auditable

(32)

Reporting Performance Indicators

Broad Access (Nationwide) Public Reporting

– Annually, each Company shall publicly report Tier 1 and Tier 2 PSE

information.

– Options for public reporting include:

• Company specific reports or web sites

• Industry association or professional society reports or web sites • Government agency or other organizations

Local (Site) Public Reporting

– Determine the appropriate methods to communicate PSE information.pp p

– Report a summary of its site-specific Tier 1, 2, 3 and 4 PSE information to employees and their representatives. Unattended, remote-operated, or single-manned facilities are exempt.g p

– Make available a summary of site-specific Tier 1 and 2 PSE information to the local community and emergency management officials along with

information regarding measures taken to improve performance. May report site-specific Tier 3 and 4 PSE information. Remote sites where the worst potential-case LOPC cannot impact any public receptors are exempt.

(33)

Table 3 – Stakeholder Report Information

Industry Company

Tier 1

PSE Count X See Note 1

PSE Rate X X

Tier 2

PSE Count X See Note 1

PSE Rate X X

Notes: C

1 Comparisons among companies and industries are only statistically valid on a rate basis; therefore, Company PSE counts are not required to be reported

publicly.

(34)

Broad Access [Nationwide] Public Reporting

Annually, each Company publicly reports Tier 1 and Tier 2

PSE information.

2010 – Implementation

2011 – Data validation

2012 – Industry aggregated result

2013 – Industry and Company blinded results

y

y

2014 – Industry and Company transparent results

(35)

PSE Data Capture

Site Information

– Type of Facility (NAICS or equivalent international code) – Corporate Name and Company Name (if different)Corporate Name and Company Name (if different)

– Site Location/Name (country, state/province, city, site name)

– Site Identifier (unique number assigned by data collection group) – Total work hours

– Total work hours

Tier 1 or 2 PSE Information

– Site Identifier

Ti 1 2 PSE C / T i

– Tier 1 or 2 PSE Consequences / Triggers • Harm to people

• An officially declared community evacuation or community shelter-in-l

place

• A fire or explosion

• A pressure relief device discharge to atmosphere whether directly or

i d t d t ti d i

33

via a downstream destructive device

(36)

PSE Data Capture – Cont’d

PSE Related Information

– Type of Process

D t & Ti

f E

t

– Date & Time of Event

– Mode of Operation

– Point of Release

Point of Release

(37)

Performance Targets

Process safety performance is dynamic and complex, and

must be managed over the entire life cycle of a facility

Due to the “long wave length,” performance targets should

be multi-year

For example, a 25% reduction in total Tier 1 PSE’s over 5

years is a more appropriate target than a 5% reduction year

over year

(38)

Link to API RP 754

The API RP 754 is available for free download from the site below:

http://www.api.org/Standards/psstandards/index.cfm

A series of hour-long Webinars are also being conducted on Tuesdays at

10:00 CDT (final is on 9/21) to introduce the standard. You can register for

the Webinar at the link below

the Webinar at the link below.

https://www.livemeeting.com/lrs/8001817693/Registration.aspx?PageNam

e=cd00qkwhh22zfx8q

e=cd00qkwhh22zfx8q

(39)

Questions

(40)

Contact Information

Karen Haase

API

API

1220 L Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

202 682 8478

202-682-8478

[email protected]

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