Res Gestae
Sec. 6 . Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction - Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.
(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A Or B or the by-standers at the beating or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.
(b) a is accused of waging war against the Government of India by taking part in an armed insurrection which property is destroyed, troops are attacked and gaols are broken open. The occurrence of these facts is relevant, as forming part of the general transaction, though A may not have been present at all of them.
(c) A sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a correspondence. Letters between the parties relating to the subject out of which the libel arose, and forming part of the correspondence in which it is contained, are relevant facts, though they do not contain the libel itself.
(d) The question is, whether certain goods ordered from B were delivered to A. The goods were delivered to several intermediate persons successively. Each delivery is a relevant fact.
Facts which are not themselves in issue may affect the probability of the existence of facts in issue and be used as the foundation of inference respecting them ; such facts are described in Act as relevant facts. Every fact is a part of other facts. Sec. 6 lays down that the facts which are so connected with the facts in issue that they form part of the same transaction are relevant facts. A definition of the word 'same transaction' is given by Stephen who says, “ a transaction is a group of facts, connected together to be referred to by a single legal name, a crime, a contract, a wrong or any other subject of enquiry which may be in issue. The rule of efficient test for determining whether a fact forms part of the same transaction or another “depends upon whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose, or as cause and effect, or as probable and subsidiary act as to constitute one continuous action.”
Doctrine of res gestae or parts of transaction
Apparently the phrase is well established in Law of Evidence. It has been used in two senses. In the wider sense it covers all the probative facts by which res gestae are reproduced to the tribunal where the direct evidence of witness or perception by the court are unattainable. In restricted meaning res gestae imports the conception of action by action. To be clear, in the restricted sense “facts which constitute the res gestae must be such as so connected with the very transaction or fact under investigation as to constitute a part of it.” They are the acts talking for themselves not what people say when talking about the acts.
The section is quite apparently based upon the English doctrine of res gestae. This Latin phrase means “things done” and when translated into English means “things said and done in the course of a transaction”. Every case that comes before a court of law has a fact story behind it. Every fact story is made of certain acts, omissions and statements. Every such act, omission or statement as throws some light upon the nature of the transaction or reveals its true quality or character should be held as a part of the transaction and the evidence of it should be received. “To state a fact or event in isolation without reference to its antecedents in time, place or surrounding circumstances, may render the fact, difficult or even impossible to comprehend. Other facts or circumstances may be so closely connected with the fact in issue as to be, in reality, part and parcel of the same transaction. Such ancillary facts are described as forming part of the res gestae of the fact in issue, and may be proved.
The expression res gestae as applied to a crime means the complete transaction from its starting point in the act of the accused until the end is reached. What in any case constitutes a transaction depends wholly on the character of the act and the circumstances of the case. It frequently happens that, as evidence of circumstances may be resorted to for the purpose of proving the commission of a particular offence charged, the proof of those circumstances involves the proof of other acts either criminal or apparently innocent. In such cases it is proper that the chain of evidence should be unbroken.
The words spoken by the person doing the act, or by the person to whom they were done or by the bystanders are relevant as a part of the same transaction, but it should be borne in mind that such statements or declarations, as they are called, in order that they might be admissible as res gestae should be contemporaneous with the transaction in issue, that is, the interval should not be made as to give time and opportunity for fabrication and connection and they should not amount a mere narrative of a past occurance. If the statement is answer to a query after lapse of some time it cannot be treated as res gestae. At the time of murder the cry of deceased 'save me' and that of the children that their mother was being killed are relevant as res gestae.
In Ratten v The Queen A man was prosecuted for the murder of his wife. His defence was that the shot went off accidently. There was evidence to the effect that the deceased telephoned say : “Get me the police please”. Before the operator could connect the police, the caller, who spoke in distress, gave her address and the call suddenly ended. Thereafter the police came to the house and found the body of a dead woman. Her call and the words she spoke were held to be relevant as a part of the transaction which brought about her death. Her call in distress showed that the shooting in question was intentional and not accidental. For no victim of an accident could have thought of getting the police before the happening. This then is the utility of the doctrine of res gestae. It enables the court to take into account all the essential details of a transaction.
A transaction can be truly understood only when all its integral parts are known and not in isolation from each other.
The Court of Appeal held in another case that a statement made to a police officer by the victim of an assault identifying the assailant while moving with the police in his car was relevant as showing that he had seen the victim of an assault and who committed it.
Acts or Omissions as Res Gestae
So far as acts and omissions accompanying a transaction are concerned, much difficulty does not arise. Nature of the transaction itself indicates what should be its essential parts. In case of Milne v Leisler a question was whether a contract had been made with a person in his personal capacity or as an agent of another. The fact that the contractor wrote a letter to his broker asking him to make inquiries was held to be relevant.
Statements as Res gestae
Statements may also accompany Physical happenings. In the application of this principle the courts have been very strict and cautious. For statements can be easily concocted. Hence the principle that the statement should have been made so soon before or after or along with the incident that there was hardly any time to deliberate and thereby to fabricate a false story. In case of R v. Bedingfield a woman, with a throat cut, came suddenly out of a room, in which she had been injured and shortly before she died, said : “Oh dear Aunt, see what Bedingfield has done to me.” It was held that the statement was not admissible. Anything uttered by the deceased at the time the act was being done would be admissible, as, for instance if she has been heard to say something, as “don't Harry”. But here it was something, stated by her after it was
all over. The statement was also held to be not relevant as dying declaration because she did not have the time to reflect that she was dying.
In case of R v. Christie an indecent assault was made upon a young boy. Shortly after the incident the boy made certain statements to his mother by which he described the offence and the man who assaulted him. The evidence of the statement was excluded. Remarked that the boy's statement was so separated by time and circumstances from the actual commission of the crime that it was not admissible as part of the res gestae.
The emphasis of the courts seem to be that “the words should be at least de recenti and not after an interval which should allow time for reflection and concocting a story.” The statement should be an exclamation “forced out of a witness by the emotion generated by an event” rather than a subsequent narrative. The courts have stressing the necessity for close association in time,place and circumstances between he statement and the crucial events.
It has been held by the Supreme Court in R. M. Malkani v State of Maharashtra, that “a contemporaneous tape-record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact. It is res gestae”. Here the act of the assailant intruding into the courtyard during dead of the night, victim's identification of the assailant her pronouncement that appellant was standing with a gun and his firing the gun at her, all circumstances so intertwined with each other by proximity of time and space that the statement of the deceased became part of the same transaction. Hence it is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.
In Rattan Singh v. State of H. P. it was held that where shortly before the incidence in which a woman dies of gun shot, she exclaimed that a man was standing near her with a gun in his hand, the statement was held to be sufficiently proximate in time to the happening as to be a part of the same transaction.
Res Gestae and Hearsay
Hearsay evidence means the statement of a person who has not sent he happening of the transaction, but has heard of it from others. But such evidence can be given if it is a part of the transaction.
In Sukhar v. State of U.P., One morning while deceased was going on the road, Accused caught hold of his back and fired a pistol shot towards him, deceased raised an alarm on account of which PW 1 and PW 2 reached the scene of occurrence and that point of time, deceased fell down and the accused made his escape. The two witnesses, brought deceased tot he police station whereupon the police recorded of the statement of deceased and started investigation. During trial the prosecution witnesses PWs 1& 2merely stated as to what they heard from the injured at the relevant point of time and according to PW 2, the injured had told him that the assailant had fired upon him. While the trial was pending the injured died.
The High Court heavily relied upon the statement of PW 2. Counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the evidence of the Evidence of PW 2 cannot be held to be admissible under Section 6 of Evidence Act inasmuch as what the injured told the witness when the witness when the witness reached the scene of occurrence and the factum of alleged shooting by the accused at the injured cannot be said to have formed part of the same transaction.
The Supreme Court said that Section 6 of the evidence act is an exception to the general rule hereunder the hearsay evidence become admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which allow fabrication. The statement sought to be admitted, therefore as forming part of res gestae must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter.
With reference to above explanation and referring to the case of Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., the court held that the statement indicating that the injured thold that the accused has fired at him, would become admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.
Proved , Disproved and Not Proved When is a fact said to be proved. Section 3 says :
Proved : A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.
The degree of certainty which must be arrived at before a fact is said to be proved is that described in this section.
The section also states as to when a fact is said to be disproved.
Disproved : A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist.
The section concludes with this set of provisions by defining a fact which is said to be “not proved”. It says :
Not Proved : A fact is said to be not proved when it is neither proved not disproved.
These provisions of the Act deal with the degree or standard of proof. What and how much proof is necessary to convince the judge of existence of a fact in issue? The answer depends upon many circumstances as different standards of proof are demanded in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases, for example, a matter is taken to be proved when the balance of probability suggests it, nut in criminal cases the court requires a proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof means such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to the conclusion. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof, nor moral belief of the judge in the guilt of the accused.
Supreme Court held that in Criminal cases there has to be a proof which leaves behind no reasonable doubt about the prosecution version. The victim's dying declaration which left many uncovered points and also narrated an unnatural story. Because of these doubts the evidence was rejected.
The court has to proceed on the basis of the “matters before it”, which may be in the shape of evidence or any other shape.
“Proved” :- “Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is impossible. It means such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to conclusion”. All that can be done is to adduce such evidence as that the mind of the tribunal is satisfied that the fact is so. In the ordinary affairs of life courts do not require demonstrative evidence. Absolute certainty amounting to demonstration is seldom to be had in the affairs of life and we are frequently obliged to act on degrees of probabilities which fall very short of it indeed.
In M. Narsingha Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that a fact is said to be proved when after considering the matter before it the Court either believe it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under circumstances of particular case, to act upon supposition that it exists. This is the definition of the word 'proved' in Evidence Act. What is required is production of such materials on which the Court reasonably act to reach the supposition that the fact exist. Proof of facts depends upon degree of possibility of having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any
important matter concerning him.
The extent to which a particular evidence aids in proving the fact in controversy is called as probative force. This probative force must be sufficient to induce the court either (a) to believe in the existence of the fact sought to be proved, or (b) to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that it exists. The test is of probability upon which a prudent man may base his opinion. In other words, it is the estimate which a prudent man makes of the probabilities having regard to what must be his duty as a result of his estimate. Proof and suspicion :- It must be borne in mind that suspicion and conjecture cannot take the place of legal proof.
Matter before it :- In order to decide as to whether a particular fact is proved, the court has to consider the 'matter' before it. The expression, “matters before it” in this definition includes materials which do not fall within the definition of 'evidence' as given in Sec. 3. The result of local enquiry by a court, material objects brought before the court, material objects brought before the court, the demeanor of witnesses, admission by parties, confessions by the accused, statement of the accused, Commissioner's reports, are not evidence according to the definition given in Sec. 3. But they are all matters before the court to be considered while coming to conclusion.
“Disproved and not Proved” :- The definition of the word 'disproved' is a converse of the definition of the word 'proved'. The expression 'not proved' indicates a state of mind in between the two, that is, when one cannot say whether a fact is proved or disproved. Not Proved is something different from being “false”. An inability to prove a claim does not mean in all cases that it is false. It negatives both proof and disproof.
Sec. 3 of Evidence Act, while explaining the meaning of proved, disproved and not proved provides, the standard of proof. This standard should be of ordinary prudence in person, who will judge its existence or non-existence from the standard of circumstances before him.
In Naval Kishor Somani v. Poonam Somani, Andhra Pradesh High Court said that a fact which is proved does not necessarily mean that it is false one. The expression 'Proved' is followed by expression disproved. This is followed by difinition of 'not proved'. The fact is said to be not proved when it is neither proved not disproved. On the other hand the fact is said to be disproved when after considering the matters before it the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its bib-existence. The word 'disproved' is akin to the word 'false'. What is disproved is normally taken to be false thing. It will be thus seen that a fact proved is not necessarily a fact disproved. A fact which is 'not proved' may be false or true. A doubt lingers about its truth merely because it is not proved or may not jump to the conclusion that it is disproved. A fact is disproved normally by the person who claims that alleged that the fact is not true.
A fact is said to be disproved when the Court believes that the fact in question does not exist and that the Court believes the non-existence of that fact from the standard of man of ordinary prudence.
Not Proved where the fact is deemed to be not proved from the standard of a person of ordinary prudence. The phrase NOT PROVED means neither the fact is proved with certainty nor the fact is believed to exist. The phrase NOT PROVED is between the phrase proved and disproved. And the phrase not proved is the result of careful scrutiny of the person of ordinary-prudence that the fact either exists with certainty nor its non-existence is proved with certainty. It is provision between existence and non-existence of the fact in the mind of a man of ordinary prudence.
CONSPIRACY
S. 10 Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design. - Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well as for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.
Illustration :- Reasonable ground exists for believing that A has joined in a conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India.
The facts that B procured arms in Eurpoe for the purpose of the conspiracy, C collected money in Calcutta for a like object, D persuaded persons to join the conspiracy in Bombay, E published writings advocating the object in view at Agra, and F transmitted from Delhi to G at Kabul the money which C had collected at Calcutta, and the contents of a letter written by H giving an account of the conspiracy, are each relevant, both to prove the existence of the conspiracy, and to prove A's complicity in it, although he may have been ignorant of all of them, and although the persons by whom they were done were strangers to him, and although they may have taken place before he joined the conspiracy or after he left it.
The leading English is R v. Blake and Tye. Blake was working as a landing waiter at the Customs House. Tye worked at the same place as an agent for the importers. They were charged with conspiracy to dodge the customs by passing goods without paying full duty. Tye made certain entries in two books. One of them was used for carrying out the fraud and the entries were necessary for that purpose. But the other was for his private record, or convenience, such as, the counterfoil of his cheque book.
It was held that the entries in the former book were admissible against Blake, but the latter were not. The essence of the decision was that evidence of an act of a conspirator is relevant against other only it the act was done to carry out the conspiracy. The act should “relate to the furtherance of the common object.”
THE basic principle which is underlined under Sec. 10 is the theory of agency and hence every conspirator is agent of this association in carrying out the object of conspiracy. Sec. 10 renders anything said or done or written by any one of the conspirators in reference to their common intention as relevant fact not only as (i) against each of the Conspirators but (ii) proving the conspiracy itself. The only condition for application of the rule of Sec. 10 is that there must be reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence. Conspiracy is a crime as well as a tort.
In State of Maharashtra v. Damu Gopinath Shinde, there was no doubt that there was reasonable ground to believe that four of accused conspirators have conspired to commit the offence of abduction and murder of children involved in this case. So when these accused had spoken to each other in reference to common intention as could be gathered from conspirators can be regarded as relevant facts falling within the preview of Sec.10. A dialogue between them could be proved through any permitted legal mode. When the confession is legally proved and found admissible in evidence the same can be used to ascertain what was said and done or written between the conspirators.
The term 'conspiracy is the corrupt agreeing together of two or more persons to do, by concerted action, something unlawful either as a means or as an end'. Sec 120-A of the Indian Penal Code
lays down : “ When two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal but illegal by means, such agreement is designated as criminal conspiracy; provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to criminal conspiracy unless some act besides an agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.” Thus it is clear that when two or more persons agree together to do some illegal act or some act by illegal means they are said to have conspired. It is enough if the acts agreed to be done although not criminal are wrongful, i.e., amount to civil wrong civil wrong.” “A conspiracy consists of unlawful combination of two or more persons to do that which is contrary of law, or to do that which is wrongful towards other persons. It may be punished criminally, or civilly by action.”
In case of Mohd. Khalid v. State of WB the court said that In case of conspiracy there cannot be any direct evidence. The ingredients of the offence are that there should be an agreement between persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing an illegal act or for doing by illegal means an act which itself may not be illegal. Therefore the essential of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstances evidence or by both, and it is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to proved conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore the circumstance proved before during and after the occurance have to be considered to be decided about the complicity of the accused.
Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of conspiracy than of a loud discussion in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a conspiracy is seldom available, offence of the conspiracy can be proved by either direct or ciarcumstance evidence. It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the object which the objectors set before themselves as the object of conspiracy and about the manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is a mater of inference.
Where trustworthy evidence establishing all links of circumstantial evidence is available the confession of a co-accused as to conspiracy even without corroboration evidence can be taken into consideration. It can in some cases be inferred from the acts and conduct of the parties. It must be remembered that mere knowledge on the part of a man about a conspiracy will not make him a conspiracy. Under Sec.10, a statement of act of one person is evidence against another. The Section puts certain limitations to the general rule of admissibility stated above. Under Sec.10 a thing done, said or written after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them is relevant. Anything done, said or written before such intention of conspiracy was entertained by any one of them is not relevant under this section. Against each and everything said, done or written by a conspirator even after such intention was entertained by a member of the conspiracy will not be relevant under this section. The only thing said, done or written in reference to the common intention of the conspirators will be admissible. There is more limitation to the relevancy of evidence under Sec.10. Before any evidence is entertained under this section there should be a reasonable ground for the court to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit, an offence or actionable wrong. Any statement made by accused after his arrest cannot fall within the ambit of Sec.10. Confessional statement of accused who is not alive would not be of any evidentiary use.
Analysis of Section 10. - Sec.10 can be analysed as follows :
(1) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for a court to believe that two or more persons are members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled,
anything said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence against the others; (3) any thing said, done or written by him should have been said, done or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them; (4) it would be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the conspiracy, whether it was said, done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left; (5) and it can be used only against a conspirator and not in his favour.
Before bringing on record anything said, done or written by an alleged conspirator the court has to bring on record some evidence which prima facie proves the existence of the conspiracy. Once a reasonable ground to believe that several persons have conspired to commit an offence exists the acts and declarations of a particular person in reference to the common intention are relevant facts although that person may not so much as even know of the existence of many other engaged in the conspiracy. And if the evidence is taken after a prima facie proof of conspiracy but at a later stage of the trial that reasonable ground of belief or prima facie proof is displaced by further evidence, the court must reject the evidence previously taken.
In C B I v. V.C. Shukla (Hawala Case), entries in the accounts book alleged to be showing conspiracy among all the accused. Evidence of prosecution witness only indicating that one of the accused in question was known to the other accused person and had gone to their residence on formal occasion, witness not speaking a word about other accused in question. It was held that Sec.10 cannot be pressed into holding that conspiracy amongst all the accused was proved. The word 'intention' implies that the act intended is in the future and the section makes relevant statements by a conspirator with reference to the future. The words “in reference to their common intention” mean in reference to what at the time of statement was intended in the future. Narratives coming from the conspirators as to their past act cannot be said to have a reference to their commo intention.
In the case of Badri Rai v. State of Bihar the Supreme Court referred to the state of English Law as expounded in R vs. Blake, and said that “ section 10 of the Evidence Act is on the same lines” :
Ramji and Badri were prosecuted for conspiracy under S.120- and for bribing a police officer under S.165-A. An inspector of police was on his way to the police station. Both Ramni and Badri approached him and requested that they would duly reward him if he could hush up the case relating to stolen ornaments and molten silver recovered from Ramji's house and which was under investigation. The inspector told them he could not talk to them on the road and that they should come to the police station. The inspector reported the matter to his senior officer. Badri alone came to the police station and offered him a packed wrapped in a piece of old newspaper containing Rs. 500 in currency notes. He told the inspector that Ramji had sent the money as a consideration for hushing up the case against him. In the presence of other persons, who became witnesses, the inspector seized the money and drew up the first information report.
The only question before the Supreme Court was whether the offer was whether the offer of money and the accompanying statement made by Badri were relevant against Ramji. The court said that when both the accused approached the inspector and requested him to hush up the case, that clearly showed that they had conspired to bribe a public servant. That being so, anything said or done by any of them in reference of their conspiracy to bribe was relevant against the other also. The statement and the offer of bribe had clear reference to their common intention and were, therefore, relevant against both.
The Supreme Court further said, Sec.10 of the Evidence Act has been deliberately enacted in order to make such acts and statements of a co-conspirator admissible against the whole body of
conspirators, because of the nature of crime. A conspiracy is hatched in secrecy, and executed in darkness. Naturally, therefore, it is not feasible for the prosecution to connect each isolated act or statement of one accused with the acts of statements of the others, unless there is a common bond linking all of them together.
In Mirza Akbar v. Emperor, Mirza Akbar, Mst Mehr Teja and Umar Sher were convicted for the murder of Ali Askar, the husband of Mst. Mehar Teja. The prosecution case was that Mst. Mehar Teja and Mirza Akbar desired to get rid of Askar so that they should marry each other. Umar Sher was hired for the purpose. Umar Sher shot Ali Askar dead. After the murder was committed, Mst Mehr Teja was arrested on the charge of conspiracy. She was examined before a magistrate and there she made certain statement implicating Mirza Akbar. This statement was admitted in evidence both by the trial Judge and Judicial Commissioner as relevant against the appellant under Sec.10, Evidence Act. It was held that the words of Sec.10 are not capable of being widely construed so as to include a statement made by one conspirator in the absence of the other with reference to past acts done in the actual course of carrying out the conspiracy, after it has been completed.
Appellant Mirza Akbar and Mst Teja were tried for conspiracy to commit the murder of Ali Askar, husband of Mst. Mehar Teja. After the murder was committed Mst. Mehar Teja was arrested. She made the statement to the effect that there was conspiracy for murdering Ali Askar. It was held that the statement was made with reference to past act 'common intention' in the section signify common intention existing at the time when the thing was done, written or said. Things said, written or done while the conspiracy is at foot are relevant. The statement was held to be not admissible.
ADMISSION
S. 17. Admission defined - An admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under circumstances hereinafter mentioned.
The section points three things it First defines “admission”, in terms of a statement which may be oral or documentary or in electronic form. Secondly, the section says that an admission will be relevant only if it is made by any of the person specified in the Act. The list is to be found in S. 18. Thirdly, the section says that it will be relevant only in the circumstances mentioned in the Act. Such circumstances are mentioned in section 18-30.
The Supreme Court has given some guidance in this respect. Before the right of a party can be taken to be defeated on the basis of an alleged admission by him, the implication of the statement made by him must be clear and conclusive. There should not be any doubt or ambiguity. It would be necessary to read all of his statements together. Applying this approach to the facts of a case before it.
Reasons for admissibility of admissions
An admission is a relevant evidence. Several reasons have been suggested for receiving admissions in evidence some of them are as follows :
1. Admissions as waiver of Proof
The section confines this effect only to formal admissions made at the time of the trial or as part of pleadings or in reference to the litigation. Sec.58 qualifies the principle by saying in the proviso that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. Thus the Court may reject an admission either wholly or in part or may
require further proof. “Waiver of proof” therefore, cannot be an exclusive reason for the relevancy of an admission.
2. Admissions as statement against interest
The Second suggested reason is that an admission, being a statement against the interest of the maker, should be supposed to be true, for it is highly improbable that a person will voluntarily make a false statement against his own interest. But this also does not squarely account for the relevancy of admissions. For one thing Section 17 does not require that an admission should be a statement suggest some inference as to a fact in issue or relevant to the issue, even if the inference is in favour of the declarant. The act does not seem to require that an admission should be self-harming statement.
3. Admissions as Evidence of Contradictory Statements
Still another reason that partly accounts for the relevancy of an admission is that there is a contradiction between the party's statement and his case. This kind of contradiction discredits his case. If, for example, A sues B upon a loan. His account books show that the loan was given to C. The statement in his accounts is an admission on his part as it contradicts his case against B. But his is only partly true, for the principle is that a party can prove all his opponent's statements about the facts of the case and it is not necessary that they should be inconsistent with his case.
4. Admissions as Evidence of Truth
The last and most plausible and perhaps widely accepted reason that accounts for relevancy of admissions is that whatever statements a party makes about the facts of the case, whether they be for or against his interest, should be relevant as representing or reflecting the truth as against him.
Forms of admission and to whom an admission may be made
It is generally immaterial as to whom an admission is made. It may occur in reference to the proceedings or outside the court.
Formal or Judicial Admissions
An admission which is made as part of the proceedings so that it is recorded in the file of the court, that is called a formal or judicial admission. “Admissions expressly made in the proceedings prior to the trial are sometimes called formal or express admissions.
Statements made by a person in his pleadings or in his evidence in a case have also been held by the Supreme Court to be admissions and, therefore, relevant. The case before the court was Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad :
The question was whether certain properties belonged to the defendant and certain others were liable to partition. The opposite party had made statement in dispositions in an earlier suit that they belonged to the defendant. Similar admissions occurred in the written statement filed by the plaintiff and his father in that suit.
Treating this as a relevant evidence against the plaintiff, Court remarked that Admissions are usually telling against the maker unless reasonably explained, and no acceptable ground to extricate the appellants from the effect of their own earlier statements has been made out. The attention of the learned Judge was drawn to section 145 of the Evidence Act which provides that if a witness is to be contradicted by his own earlier statement, the statement must be put to him so that he may have an opportunity to explain it and this was not done in the present case Dealing with this argument Court said :
There is a cardinal distinction between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness who is examined and is sought to be discredited by the use of his prior statement. In the
former case in admission by a party is a substantive evidence if it fulfills the requirements of Sec21; in the latter case a prior statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and does not become substantive evidence. In the former there is no necessary requirement of the statement containing the admission having to be put to the party because it is evidence proprio vigore; in the latter case the Court cannot be invited to be disbelieve a witness on the strength of the prior contradictory statement unless it has been put to him, as required by sec 145.
The court then pointed out that this distinction was clearly made out in Bharat Singh's Case, Where the court disposed of a similar argument with the following observation :
Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of sections 17 and 21 of the Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the case he made a statement contrary to these admissions. An admission is a substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness.
Referring to the distinction between the relevancy of an admission and its weight the Court pointed out in the Bharat Singh's Case that the “the weight to be attached to an admission made by a party is a mater different from its use as an admissible evidence.
Informal or casual Admissions
Such admissions may occur in the ordinary course of life, or in the course of business, or in casual or informal conversation. The admission may be in writing or oral. Written admissions may occur in the course of correspondence , in letters, business dairies or account book or other records. If there is a document against a party, any statement made by him about the contents of the document is an admission against him even if the document itself is not provable on account of want of stamp.
Admission and Hearsay
An oral admission can be proved either by the party to whom it was made or by someone who heard it being made. To this extent the evidence of an informal admission is an evidence of hearsay. Sec.60 requires that oral evidence must in all cases be direct, that is to say, the witness must have personal and direct knowledge of the fact to which he testifies. If, for example, the question is how a fire started. A person who witnessed the fire being started by an explosion can give evidence of this fact, for he has personal knowledge of the fact. If on his way home he told someone of the fact of explosion, that other cannot give evidence of the explosion for his knowledge is nothing but a hearsay.
Persons whose admissions are relevant
Section 18 lays down the list of persons whose admissions constitute evidence against a party. The effects of Sec.18,19 and 20, when put together, is that the admissions of following parties become relevant :
1. Parties of the Suit, 2. Agents of Parties,
3. Persons occupying representative character,
4. Statement will include the statements of the following parties : This category will include the statements of the following parties :
(a) Persons having pecuniary or proprietary interest. (b) Persons from whom the parties derived their interest. (c) Persons whose position is in issue or is relevant.
(d) Persons expressly referred to. Parties to suit or proceeding
The statement of a party in his written statement in an earlier proceeding was held to be relevant against him in a subsequent proceeding. It seemed to the court to be evidence of telling nature and heavily loaded against the party. Where there are more than one plaintiffs oar defendants to a suit, the Act does not make it clear whether the statement of a party will be relevant against his co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. On principle as well as policy the statement of a defendant should not bind his co-defendants, for otherwise the plaintiff can defeat the case of the other defendants through the mouth of one of them. That would be unfair to the co-defendants. So a defendant is bound by his statement only to the extent of his own interest. An admission is the best evidence only against the party who has made it. Even if it were relevant under one category or the other, it appears from decision of the Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of M. P., that not much weight can be attached to it against the co-parties and it cannot by itself be the basis of legal rights or liabilities.
Agents of Parties
The statement of an agent to a party are relevant as admission against the party provided the court regards, under the circumstances of the case, the agents to be expressly or impliedly authorised by the party to make the statement. According to the law of agency, a statement by agent in the ordinary course of the business of agency is an admission against his principal. Statements in representative character
A person who sues or is sued in a representative character, any statement made by him during the time that he holds such character is an admission against the party whose representative he is. Representative character is occupied, for example, by trustees, receivers, the assignee of an insolvent's estate, executors, administrators etc.
Persons having pecuniary or proprietary Interest in subject-matter
Statement of persons who, though not parties to the proceeding, have a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject-matter of the proceeding, are relevant provided that the statement is made by any such person in the character of his interest.
Predecessor-in-title
Statements made by a persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject-matter of the suit are admissions provided they are made during the continuance of the interest of the persons making the statements. A person of this kind is called a “predecessor-in-title”. Any statement made by him about the property while he was holding the title is relevant against the parties who acquired the title from him. This category will include statements made by a former owner of a property and such statements will be relevant against present owners. A statement made by any such person after he ceased to have any interest in the property in question shall not be an admission against the present owner of the property.
Persons whose position is in issue
Sec.19 deals with statements of persons whose position is in issue, though they are not parties to the case. The section is based upon the principle that where the right or liability of a party to a suit depends upon the liability of a third person, any statement by that third person about his liability is an admission against the parties.
Statements by referees
Sec.20 deals with the principle that when a party makes a reference to a third person for information, any statement by that person about the subject-matter of the reference is an admission against the party making the reference.
The Supreme Court in K.M. Singh v. Secretary, Association of Indian Universities. Here the issue was whether the resignation tendered by the plaintiff was an involuntary one. He named two officials of the respondent association that if they would take special oath at a specified religious place and affirm that his resignation was not involuntary, he would accept the same. When the official did so it amounted to an admission on his part and he became bound by the same.
S. 21. Proof of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their behalf. - Admission are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative in interest; but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in the following cases :
(1)An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it when it is of such a nature that, if the person making it were dead, it would be relevant as between third persons u/s 32.
(2)An admission maybe proved by or on behalf of the person making it; when it consists of a statement of the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant or in issue, made at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed, and is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable.
(3)An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, if it is relevant otherwise than as an admission.
Illustrations
(a) The question between A and B is, whether certain deed is or is not forged. A affirms that it is genuine, B that it is forged.
A may prove a statement by B that the deed is genuine, and B may prove a statement by A that the deed is forged; but A cannot prove a Statement by himself that the deed is genuine, nor can be proved a statement by himself that the deed is forged.
(b) A, the captain of a ship, is tried for casting her away.
Evidence is given to show that the ship was taken out of her proper course. A produces a book kept by him in the ordinary course of his business, showing observations alleged to have been taken by him from day to day, and indicating that the ship was not taken out of her proper course. A may prove these statements because they would be admissible between third parties if he were dead, under Sec.32.
Who can prove admissions
The section lays down the principles as to proof of admissions. The section is based upon the principle that an admission is an evidence against the party who has made the admission and, therefore, it can be proved against him. He himself cannot prove his own statements, “otherwise every man, if he were in a difficulty, or in view of one, might make declarations to suit his own case”, and then lodge them in proof of his case. The general rule is that “the statements of a living person cannot be received unless they are against his interest.” No man should be at liberty to make evidence for himself through his own statements. Granted this facility, every litigant would construct a favourable case by his own statement.
The principle is, however, subject to important exceptions. In these exceptional cases a party is permitted to prove his own statements. Some of them may be mentioned here.
1. When the statement should have been relevant as Dying Declaration or as that of a deceased person under S. 32.
Sec. 32 deals with the statement of persons who have died or who otherwise cannot come before the court. The statement of any such person can be proved in any case or proceeding to which it is relevant whether it operates in favour or against the person making the statement. In circumstances stated in Sec. 32 such a statement can be proved by the maker himself if he is still alive. The exception is thus stated in S. 21(1).
An admission may be proved by or behalf of the person making it, when it is of such a nature that if the person making it were dead, it would be relevant as between third persons under Sec. 32. Illustration (b) is on the point.
2. Statements as to bodily feeling or state of mind
The second exception is contained in S.21(2). It deals with statements as to body, bodily feeling or state of mind. The subsection enables a person to prove his statements as to his state of body or of mind. If, for example a person is injured and the question is whether the injury was intentional or accidental, his statement at that time as to the way he was injured can be proved by himself. The conditions for the admissibility of such statements are, Firstly, that the statement should have been made at about the time when the state of mind of of body which is described by the statement still existed. The statement should be contemporaneous with the existence of the condition of mind or of body. This rules our chances of fabrication. A person is the least likely to fabricate a statement when he is still reeling under the pain of the injury. And Secondly, the statement should be accompanied by conduct which renders the falsehood of the statement improbable. Thus to reassure that the statement is really true, the Legislature insist that the statement should be accompanied by such conduct as shows that the condition of mind or of body described by the statement is really true and not feigned. The conduct of a person under real pain is different from that of a person who is only acting as such. The accompanying conduct is a greater guarantee of truth than the statements.
3. When otherwise relevant
The last exception is that a person may prove his own statement when it is otherwise relevant under any of the provisions relating to relevancy. A statement may be relevant either as an admission of relevant fact or as a proof of the existence of a fact. There are many cases in which a statement is relevant not because it is an admission but because it establishes the existence or non-existence of a relevant fact or a fact in issue. In all such cases a party can prove his own-statements.
Statement when Relevant
The act provides for the relevancy of statement in several cases.
Firstly, a party may prove his own statement under S.6 if it is a part of the same transaction. The doctrine of res gestae covers such statements.
Secondly, a statement may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it under Section 8 if it accompanies or explains acts other than statements or if it influenced the conduct of a person whose conduct is relevant.
Thirdly, a statement may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it under Section 14 if the statement explains his state of mind or body or bodily feeling when any such thing is relevant or is in issue.
Fourthly, a statement may be proved on behalf of the person making it if it is relevant under any of the clauses of Section 32.
The Supreme Court has also laid down in some cases that where there is an admission, it is not necessary to confront the person concerned with the previous statement. This is so because an
admission is a substantive and an independent piece of evidence. Presumption of genuineness of electronic records.
Electronic records are presumed to be true. No further evidence is necessary in proof of a fact appearing in such record. It is only when the genuineness of the record is in question that other evidence would be receivable. In that case, an oral account of the contents of such record would also become receivable in evidence.
In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, to hold that the statement relating to concealment is admissible in evidence by virtue of section 27. In that case, the question was formulate by the court, as follows:
Let us then turn to the question whether the statement of the appellant to the effect that 'he had hidden them (the ornaments)' and would point out the place' where they were, is wholly admissible in evidence under S.27 or only that of it is admissible where he stated that he would point out the place but not the part where he stated that he had hidden the ornaments.
In Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, the above question was answered as :
If we may respectfully say so, this case clearly brings out what part of the statement is admissible under S.27. It is only that part which distinctly relates to the discovery which is admissible; if any part of the statement distinctly relates to the discovery it will be admissible wholly and the Court cannot say that it will excise one part of the statement because it is of a confessional nature. Section 27 makes that part of the statement which is distinctly related to the discovery admissible as a whole, whether it be in the nature of confession or not.
It is however urged that in a case where the offence consists of possession even the words where he had hidden them' would be inadmissible as they would amount to an admission by the accused that he was in possession. There are in our opinion two answers to this argument. In the first place S.27 itself says that where the statement distinctly relates to the discovery it will be admissible whether it amounts to a confession or not. In the second place, these words by themselves though they may prove the offence, for after the articles have been recovered are connected with crime. i.e. In this case the prosecution will have to show that they are stolen property. We are therefore of opinion that the entire statement of the appellant would be admissible evidence
In the light of this decision, we must hold that the accused must be deemed to be in exclusive possession of the articles concealed under the earth though the spots at which they were concealed may be accessible to public.
CONFESSION
The term “confession” is nowhere defined in the Evidence Act. All provisions relating to confessions occur under the heading of “admission”. If a statement is made by a party to a Civil proceeding it will be called an “admission” and if it is made by a party charged with a crime it will be called a “confession”. A confession is a statement made by a person charged with a crime suggesting an inference as to any facts in issue or as to relevant facts. The inference that the statement should suggest should be that he is guilty of the crime.
Stephen defined “Confession” as : A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime.
A confession is a direct acknowledgment of guilt, on the part of the accused, and by the very force of the definition excluded an admission which of itself as applied in Criminal Law, is
statement by the accused direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending in connection with a proof of other facts to prove his guilt but of itself is insufficient to authorise a conviction.
The acid test which distinguishes a confession from an admission is that where conviction can be based on the statement alone, it is a confession and where some supplementary evidence is needed to authorise a conviction, then it is an admission. An other test is that if the prosecution relies on the statement as being true it is confession and if the statement is relied on because it is false it is admission. In criminal cases a statement by accused, not amounting to confession but giving rise to inference that the accused might have committed the crime is his admission.
Only voluntary and direct acknowledgment of guilt is confession. In a statement recorded by the Magistrate, the accused did not admit his guilt in terms and merely went on stating the fact of assault on the deceased by mistake. The Supreme Court held that such statement could not be used against the accused as a Confession. A statement which may not amount to a confession may still be relevant as an admission.
The definition attempted by the Privy Council has found favour with the Supreme Court in Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor over two scores. Firstly, that the definition is that it must either admit the guilt in terms or admit substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and secondly, that a mixed up statement which, even though contains some confessional statement, will still lead to acquittal, is no confession.
The confession comprised of two elements : (a) an account of how the accused killed the woman and (b) an account of his reasons for doing so. The former elements being inculpatory and latter exculpatory. In Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar when a statement in FIR given by an accused contains incriminating materials and it is difficult to sift the exculpatory portion therefrom, the whole of it must be excluded from evidence.
Forms of Confession
A confession may occur in any form. It may be made to the court itself, when it will be known as judicial confession or to anybody outside the court, in which case it is called an extra-judicial confession. It may even consist of conversation to oneself, which may be produced in evidence if overheard by another.
Judicial Confession
Judicial confessions are those which are made before a magistrate or in court in the due course of legal proceedings. A is accused of having killed G. He may, before the trial begins confess the guilt before some magistratae who may record it in accordance with the provisions of Section 164, Cr.P.C. At the committal proceedings before the magistrate or at the trial before Session Judge, A may confess his guilt. All these are Judicial confessions. A judicial confession has been defined to mean “plea or guilty on arrangement (before a tribunal) if made freely by a person in a fit state of mind.”
Extra Judicial Confession
Extra Judicial confessions are those which are made by the accused elsewhere than before a magistrate or in court. An 'extra Judicial Confession' can be made to any person or to a body of persons. It is not necessary that the statements should have been addressed to any definite individual. It may have taken place in the form of a prayer. An extra judicial confession has been defined to mean “ a free and voluntary confession of guilt by a person accused of a crime in the course of conversation with persons other than judge or magistrate seized of the charge against himself.”
confession is made by that person who had committed the crime and it will be taken into consideration if it is free from doubt and its untruthfulness is free from any doubt. But for confession made about charge in question the court has to satisfy itself that the confession voluntary and the confessions should not have been caused by inducement, threat or promise of the confession should not have been taken under the circumstances which came under perview of Sec.25 or 26.
Before accepting the extra judicial confession, it should be seen that it is not made under unfair or colleteral notions. For this the court has to enquire all the relevant facts, such as to whom the confession was made, the time and place of making confession and the phraseology used by the accused.
Section 24. Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding. -- A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the court th have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by m aking it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of temporal nature in reference to the proceeding against him.
Principle underlying Section 24.
The ground upon which confessions are received in evidence is the presumption that no person will voluntarily make a statement which is against his interest unless it be true. But the force of the confession depends upon its voluntary character. There is always a danger that the accused may be led to incriminate himself falsely.
Voluntary and non-voluntary confession
The confession of an accused may be classified as voluntary and non-voluntary. A confession to the police officer is the confession made by the accused while in custody of a police officer and never relevant and can never be proved under Section 25 and 26. Now as for the extra-judicial confession and confession made by the accused to some Magistrate to whom he has been sent by the police for the purpose during the investigation, they are admissible only when they are made voluntarily. If the making of the confession appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient in opinion of the court to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making ti he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceeding against him, it will not be relevant and it cannot be proved against the person making the statement. Section 24 of the Evidence Act lays down the rule for the exclusion of the confession which are made non-voluntarily.
Confession irrelevant.-- If a confession comes within the four corners of Section 24 it is irrelevant and cannot be used against the maker.
The ingredients of Section 24.-- To attract the prohibition enacted in Section 24 the following facts must be established :
(1)That the statement in question is a confession, (2)that such confession has been made by the accused, (3)that it has been made to a person in authority,
(4)that the confession has been obtained by reason of any inducement, threat or promise, proceeding from a person in authority,
(5)such inducement, threat or promise must have reference to the charge againt the accused, and (6)the inducement, threat or promise must in the opinion of the court be sufficient to give the
accused ground, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.
(A)Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise. -- The term of inducement involves a threat of prosecution if the guilt is not confessed and a promise of forgiveness if it is so done. It is very difficult, to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what constitutes inducement. It is for the Judge to decide in every case. Before a confession can be received as such, it must be shown that it was freely and voluntarily made. Thus it is clear that if threat or promise from a person in authority is used in getting a confession it will not be taken into evidence.
(B)Threat, inducement and promise from a person in authority. -- The threat, inducement and promise on account of which, the accused admits the guilt must come from a person who has got some authority over the matter. It appears that a person in authority within the meaning of Section 24 should be one who by virtue of his position wields some kind of influence over the accused.
(C)Inducement must have reference to the charge.-- The inducement must have reference to the charge against the accused person, that is the charge of offence in the criminal courts and inferencing the mind of the accused with respect to the escape from the charge. The inducement must have reference to escape from the charge. Mere exhortation to speak the truth in name of God cannot in itself amount to an inducement.
(D)Sufficiency of the inducement, threat or promise. -- Before a confession is excluded, inducement, threat or promise would in the opinion of the court be sufficient to give the accused person ground which would appear to the accused (and not the court) reasonable for supposing that by making the confession he would gain an advantage or avoid an evil of the nature of contemplated in the section. Consequently the mentality of the accused has to be judged and not that of the person in authority.
Section 25.-- Confession to Police officer not to be proved. -- No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
The principle upon which the rejection of confession made by an accused to a police officer or while in the custody of such officer is found is that a confession thus made or obtained is untrustworthy. The broad ground for not admitting confessions made to a police officer is to avoid the danger of admitting a false confession. The police officer in order to secure conviction in a case very often puts the person so arrested to severe torture and makes him to confess a guilt without having committed it and when such steps are taken there is impunity for the real offender and great encouragement to crime. Section 25 lays down that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against person accused of an offence.
It must be borne in mind that Section 25 of the Evidence Act excludes only confessions. All statements that do not amount to confessions are not excluded by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and can be brought on record and proved against any accused.
Section 26.-- Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him. -- No confession made by any person whilst he is in custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.
The object of Section 26 of the Evidence Act is to prevent the abuse of their power by the police, and hence confessions made by accused persons while in custody of police cannot be proved against them unless made in presence of Magistrate.
Section 27.-- How much of information received from accused may be proved. - Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
This section of the Act is founded on the principle that if the confession of the accused is supported by the discovery of a fact then it may be presumed to be true and not to have been extracted. This section based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. But clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate.
Section 26 and 27 compared
Though the section is in the form of a proviso to Sec.26, these two sections do not deal with evidence of the same character. Section 26 bans confession to police altogether, but S. 27 lets in a statement which leads to a crucial discovery whether it amounts to confession or not. Under Section 26 a confession made in the presence of a Magistrate is wholly provable, whereas Section 27 permits only the part of the statement which leads to the discovery of fact. The scope of the section was explained by the Privy Council in Pulukari Kotaya v. Emperor.
A number of accused persons were prosecuted for rioting and murder. Some of them were sentenced to death and some to transportation for life. They appealed to the Privy Council on grounds, among others, that the statements of some of them were admitted in violation of Section 26 and 27. The statement of one of them was : “About 14 days ago I, Kottaya, and people of my party lay in waitfor Sivayya and others.... We all beat Sivayya and Subayya to death. Ramayya who was in our party received blows on his hands. He had a spear in his hands. He gave it to me then. I hid it and my stick in the rick of my village. I will show if you come. We did all this at the instance of Pulukuri Kottya”. Another accused said : “I stabbed Sivayya with a spear. I hid the spear in a yard in my village. I will show you the place”. The relevant articles were produced from their respective places of hiding.
The High Court admitted the whole of the above statement. High Court held that unless the whole of the statement is admitted, it would be difficult to connect the articles produced with the offence, the only connecting link being the confession statement.
The Privy Council pointed out that the case was wrongly decided. The result of the decision was to read in Section 27 something which is not there and admit in evidence a confession barred by Section 26.
Explaining the relationship between Section 26 and 27 and the bar imposed by Section 26, their Lordship said :
That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their Lordships think that the proviso to Section 26 added by Section 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. In their Lordship's view it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced ant the knowledge of accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to the past use of the object produced is not related to its
