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Labor Law

Green Notes

2016

Pre-week Labor Updates Prof. Benedict G. Kato, LA

(former professor) SUPPLEMENT NO. 001 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION

Bartolome vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

1. Rule limiting entitlement to death benefit claims to legitimate parents is contrary to law.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, the SC held:

Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.

Guided by this doctrine, Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate parents.” Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase “dependent parents” to solely legitimate parents. .. The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably shows that the phrase “dependent parents” was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.

2. Biological parent who earlier gave up child for adoption considered a dependent parent; death of adopter results in parental authority reverting to biological parent.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the “Social Security Law.” While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are

not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.

RETIREMENT

Goodyear Philippines, Inc. vs. Angus, G.R. No. 185449, November 12, 2014

1. When employee is entitled to both separation pay and early retirement benefit in the absence of a provision in the CBA prohibiting recovery of both. Retirement benefits and separation pay are not mutually exclusive. Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to an employer and are earned under existing laws, CBAs, employment contracts and company policies. On the other hand, separation pay is that amount which an employee receives at the time of his severance from employment, designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment and is recoverable only in instances enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code or in illegal dismissal cases when reinstatement is not feasible. In the case at bar, Article 283 clearly entitles Angus to separation pay apart from the retirement benefits she received from petitioners.

TERMINATION – CONSEQUENCES

FVR Skills and Services Exponents, Inc. vs. Seva, et. al.,

G.R. No. 200857, October 22, 2014

1. When corporate officers are not solidarily liable with the corporation. A director or officer shall only be personally liable for the obligations of the corporation, if the following conditions concur: (1) the complainant alleged in the complaint that the director or officer assented to patently

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unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) the complainant clearly and convincingly proved such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 002 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION

1. When death of seafarer considered work-related.

Racelis vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014

While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, Section 20 (B) (4) of the same explicitly provides that “[t[he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.” … This presumption should be overturned only when the employer’s refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence.

2. Seafarer’s death occurred during period of employment even if he was medically repatriated.

While it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of terminating the seafarer’s contract of employment, it is, however, enough that the work-related illness, which eventually becomes the proximate cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had.

Consistent with the State’s avowed policy to afford full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. As such, it is a standing principle that its provisions are to be construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in their favor.

Guided by this principle, the Court, in the recent case of Canuel, recognized that a medical repatriation case constitutes an exception to the second requirement under Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e.,

that the seafarer’s death had occurred during the term of his employment, in view of the terminative consequences of a medical repatriation under Section 18 (B) of the same. In essence, the Court held that under such circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his employment as it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death had occurred during the term of his employment.

3. Seafarer not immediately repatriated after his contract expired, thus his injury incurred after his contract expired was work-related.

Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. vs. Hipe, Jr., G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014

The issue of whether the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the employer/manning agency for an injury or illness suffered may be determined from the pertinent provisions of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Hipe was made to continuously perform work aboard the vessel beyond his six-month contract without the benefit of a formal contract. Considering that any extension of his employment is discretionary on the part of respondents and that the latter offered no explanation why Hipe was not repatriated when his contract expired on June 5, 2008, the CA correctly ruled that he was still under the employ of respondents when he sustained an injury on June 22, 2008. Consequently, the injury suffered by Hipe was a work-related injury and his eventual repatriation on August 5, 2008, for which he was treated/rehabilitated can only be considered as a medical repatriation.

4. When fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician stands; opinion of the seafarer’s physician was not supported by any diagnostic tests and/or procedures as would adequately refute the fit-to-work assessment, but merely relied on a review of Hipe’s medical history and his physical examination.

Nonetheless, Hipe was subsequently declared fit to work by the company-designated physician on October 9, 2008, or merely 65 days after his repatriation, thus negating the existence of any permanent disability for which

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compensability is sought. Said fit-to-work certification must stand for two (2) reasons:

First, while Hipe’s personal doctor disagreed with the abovementioned assessment, opining that “it would be impossible for him to work as seaman-plumber” and recommending a disability grade of five, records show, however, that such opinion was not supported by any diagnostic tests and/or procedures as would adequately refute the fit-to-work assessment, but merely relied on a review of Hipe’s medical history and his physical examination; and

Second, Hipe failed to comply with the procedure laid down under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarer’s personal doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician’s fit-to-work assessment. In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag

(Philippine Hammonia), the Court held that the seafarer’s non-compliance with the said conflict-resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician.

EMPLOYEE STATUS

1. Employee occupied a fiduciary position and thus held a position of trust and confidence.

P.J. Lhuillier Inc. vs. Velayo, G.R. No. 198620, November 12, 2014

The respondent was first hired by the petitioners as an accounting clerk on June 13, 2003, for which she received a basic monthly salary of 9,353.00. On October 29, 2007, the date of the subject incident, she performed the function of vault custodian and cashier in the petitioners’ Branch 4 pawnshop in Capistrano, Cagayan de Oro City. In addition to her custodial duties, it was the respondent who electronically posted the day’s transactions in the books of accounts of the branch, a function that is essentially separate from that of cashier or custodian. It is plain to see then that when both functions are assigned to one person to perform, a very risky situation of conflicting interests is created whereby the cashier can purloin the money in her custody and effectively cover her tracks, at least temporarily, by simply not recording in the books the cash

receipt she misappropriated. This is commonly referred to as lapping of accounts. Only a most trusted clerk would be allowed to perform the two functions, and the respondent enjoyed this trust.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 003 APPEAL

Michelin Asia Pacific Application Support Center, Inc. vs. Ortiz,

G.R. No. 189861, November 19, 2014

1. Appeal properly dismissed by the NLRC due to complainant’s failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping, in filing a motion for reconsideration beyond the 10-day period, and in filing a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.

2. Filing of a prohibited second motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, thus petition filed out of time.

JUDGMENTS

University of Pangasinan, Inc. vs. Florentino Fernandez and Heirs of Nilda Fernandez,

G.R. No. 211228, November 12, 2014

1. Updating the computation of awards to include as well backwages and separation pay corresponding to the period after the rendition of LA Gambito’s decision on November 6, 2000 up to its finality on July 11, 2005 is not violative of the principle of immutability of a final and executory judgment.

2. When inclusion of 13th month pay into

the computation proper even though it was not exclusively provided for in the CA decision.

RETIREMENT

University of Pangasinan, Inc. vs. Florentino Fernandez and Heirs of Nilda Fernandez,

G.R. No. 211228, November 12, 2014

1. Computation of backwages and separation pay should not be up to the dates when complainants turned 60, as this age is only for optional retirement

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and there is no showing that 60 was the provided mandatory age for faculty members.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 004 EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION

Government Service Insurance System vs. Calumpiano,

G.R. No. 196102, November 26, 2014

1. When court stenographer’s hypertension and resulting glaucoma considered compensable.

In Government Service Insurance System v. Baul, it was held:

Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex “A” of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent’s disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set forth in the Rules. In short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct

connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.

EMPLOYEE STATUS

Manalo, et. al. vs. TNS Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 208567, November 26, 2014

1. Regular employees, not project employees; project employment scheme circumvented the law and prevented employees from attaining regular status.

In Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC, the Court held that once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, rehired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee.

Granting arguendo that petitioners were rehired intermittently, a careful review of the project employment contracts of petitioners reveals some other vague provisions. Oddly, one of the terms and conditions in the said contract stated that:

1. The need for your services being determinable and for a specific project starting ____________ your employment will be for the duration of said project of the Company, namely Project ___________ which is expected to be finished on _____________. The

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Company shall have the option of renewing or extending the period of this agreement for such time as it may be necessary to complete the project or because we need further time to determine your competence on the job.

To the Court, the phrase “because we need further time to determine your competence on the job” would refer to a probationary employment. Such phrase changes the tenor of the contract and runs counter to the very nature of a project employment. TNS can, therefore, extend the contract which was already fixed when it deemed it necessary to determine whether or not the employee was qualified and fit for the job. Corollarily, TNS can likewise pre-terminate the contract not because the specific project was completed ahead of time, but because of failure to qualify for the job. Consistently, the terms and conditions of the contract read:

4. It is expressly agreed and understood that the Company may terminate your employment after compliance with procedural requirements of law, without benefit of termination pay and without any obligation on the part of the Company, in the event of any breach of any conditions hereof:

a) If the project is completed or cancelled before the expected date of completion as specified in paragraph 1 hereof;

b) If we should find that you are not qualified, competent or efficient in the above-stated positions for which you are hired in accordance with the company standards made known to you at the start of your employment; x x x

For said reason, at the outset, the supposed project employment contract was highly doubtful. In determining the true nature of an employment, the entirety of the contract,

not merely its designation or by which it was denominated, is controlling. Though there is a rule that conflicting provisions in a contract should be harmonized to give effect to all, in this case, however, harmonization is impossible because project employment and probationary employment are distinct from one another and cannot co-exist with each other. Hence, should there be ambiguity in the provisions of the contract, the rule is that all doubts, uncertainties, ambiguities and insufficiencies should be resolved in favor of labor. This is in consonance with the constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor.

EXECUTION

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Paz, G.R. No. 192924, November 26, 2014

1. When delay in execution of reinstatement pending appeal not attributable to the employer but because of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation, thus pilot not entitled to reinstatement salaries.

The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA decision granting him said relief. In Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, the Court underscored that it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. This is so because the order of reinstatement is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the LA to implement the order of reinstatement. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him.

In light of the fact that PAL's failure to comply with the reinstatement order was justified by the exigencies of corporation rehabilitation, the respondent may no longer claim salaries which he should have received during the period that the LA decision ordering his reinstatement is still pending appeal until it was overturned by the NLRC. Thus, the CA committed a reversible error in recognizing the respondent's right to collect reinstatement salaries albeit suspending its execution while PAL is still under corporate rehabilitation.

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TERMINATION – CONSEQUENCES

Manalo, et. al. vs. TNS Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 208567, November 26, 2014

1. Illegally dismissed employees entitled to backwages and separation pay.

Accordingly, as correctly ruled by the NLRC, each petitioner is entitled to backwages from the time of their dismissal up to the finality or this decision plus separation pay, following their prayer for such relief in lieu of reinstatement, computed as follows as of May 29, 2009: a) Backwages: October 21, 2008 to May 29, 2009 = 7.27 mos. P382.00 x 26 days x 7.27 mos. = P72, 205.64 b) Separation Pay: December 1, 2008 to May 29, 2009 = 5.93 mos. P382.00 x 26 days x 5.03 mps./12 = P4 908.10 P SUPPLEMENT NO. 005 ATTORNEY’S FEES

Montierro vs. Rickmers Marine Agency Phils. Inc.,

G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015

1. Seafarer not entitled to any attorney’s fees as there was no unlawful withholding of benefits; he jumped the gun when he filed his complaint one month before the company-designated doctor issued the final disability grading.

On the premise that there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the employer, forcing Montierro to litigate, the CA dropped the award of attorney’s fees. We arrive at the same conclusion by using another route.

Indeed, the general rule is that attorney's fees may not be awarded where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of one’s cause. The rule, however, takes a turn when it comes to labor cases.

The established rule in labor law is that the withholding of wages need not be coupled with malice or bad faith to warrant the grant of attorney’s fees under Article 111 of the Labor Code. All that is required is that lawful wages be not paid without justification, thus compelling the employee to litigate.

The CA thus relied on a wrong consideration in resolving the issue of attorney’s fees. Be that as it may, Montierro is not entitled to attorney’s fees, even if we apply the correct rule to this case.

EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION

Montierro vs. Rickmers Marine Agency Phils. Inc.,

G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015

1. 240-day rule applicable over the 120-day rule as complaint was filed after promulgation of the Vergara vs. Hammonia Maritime case; final disability assessment issued before the expiry of the 240 day period, thus the seafarer’s condition cannot be considered total permanent disability. The Court has already delineated the effectivity of the Crystal Shipping and Vergara rulings in the 2013 case Kestrel Shipping Co. Inc. v. Munar, by explaining as follows:

Nonetheless, Vergara was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two (2) years from the time Munar filed his complaint and observance of the principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip Munar of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a result of his continued inability to perform his customary work and the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final assessment.

Thus, based on Kestrel, if the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to 6 October 2008, the 120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from 6 October 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule applies.

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2. Assessment of company-designated physician upheld over the one (1) page assessment of the seafarer’s personal physician (Dr. Jacinto).

Vergara ruled that the procedure in the 2000 POEA-SEC must be strictly followed; otherwise, if not availed of or followed strictly by the seafarer, the assessment of the company-designated physician stands.

x x x

Having extensive personal knowledge of the seafarer's actual medical condition, and having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and treated his injury for an extended period, the company-designated physician is certainly in a better position to give a more accurate evaluation of Montierro's health condition. The disability grading given by him should therefore be given more weight than the assessment of Montierro's physician of choice.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 006 ABANDONMENT

Manarpiis vs. Texan Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 197011, January 28, 2015

1. When there is no abandonment. While the introduction of additional evidence before the NLRC is not proscribed, the said tribunal was still not persuaded by the company closure purportedly averted only by the alleged fresh funding procured by respondent Tan, for the latter claim remained unsubstantiated. The CA’s finding of serious business losses is not borne by the evidence on record. The financial statements supposedly bearing the stamp mark of BIR were not signed by an independent auditor. Besides, the non-compliance with the requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended, gains relevance in this case not for the purpose of proving the illegality of the company closure or cessation of business, which did not materialize, but as an indication of bad faith on the part of respondents in hastily terminating petitioner’s employment. Under the circumstances, the

subsequent investigation and termination of petitioner on grounds of dishonesty, loss of confidence and abandonment of work, clearly appears as an afterthought as it was done only after petitioner had filed an illegal dismissal case and respondents have been summoned for hearing before the LA.

Abandonment in this case was a trumped up charge, apparently to make it appear that petitioner was not yet terminated when she filed the illegal dismissal complaint and to give a semblance of truth to the belated investigation against the petitioner. Petitioner did not abandon her work but was told not to report for work anymore after being served a written notice of termination of company closure on July 27, 2000 and turning over company properties to respondent Rialubin-Tan.

APPEAL

One Shipping Corp. vs. Penafiel, G.R. No. 192406, January 21, 2015

1. Court of Appeals properly ruled on the merits of the case even if the NLRC decision had already become final after the lapse of ten days, as the petition was filed within the sixty (60) day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

In Aliviado v. Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc., it was held:

It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment… The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any

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party, and (3) void judgments. Nunc pro tunc judgments have been defined and characterized by the Court in the following manner:

Section A of Rule VII of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that “except as provided in Section 9 of Rule X, the decisions, resolutions or orders of the Commission shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. Section B of the same Rules provides that “upon the expiration of the ten (10) calendar days period provided in paragraph (a) of this Section, the decision, resolution, or order shall be entered in a book of entries of judgment.”

2. Filing of petition for certiorari does not interrupt the course of the principal case.

Section 7 of Rule 65 provides: Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; Injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration.

EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION

Unicol Management Services, Inc. vs. Malipot, G.R. No. 206562, January 21, 2015

1. Seafarer proven to have committed suicide.

The Medico-Legal Report and the Death Certificate, together with the Investigation Report, log book extracts, and Master’s Report substantially prove that seaman Glicerio’s death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by committing suicide.

2. Seafarer’s heirs not entitled to any death benefits as the seafarer committed suicide.

Section 20 of the POEA “Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships,” provides:

x x x

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

x x x

D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.

Clearly, the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. EVIDENCE

1. NLRC may receive evidence even on appeal.

In Sasan, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission 4th Division, it was held that jurisprudence is replete with cases allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. The submission of

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additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure considering that rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and Labor Arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.

Moreover, among the powers of the Commission as provided in Section 218 of the Labor Code is that the Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts, agreements, and others. In addition, the Commission may, among other things, conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or controversy within its jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the absence of any party thereto who has been summoned or served with notice to appear, conduct its proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private, adjourn its hearings to any time and place, refer technical matters or accounts to an expert and to accept his report as evidence after hearing of the parties upon due notice. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the NLRC can receive evidence on cases appealed before the Commission, otherwise, its factual conclusions would not have been given great respect, much weight, and relevance when an adverse party assails the decision of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA and then to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 007 APPEAL

Leus vs. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187225, January 28, 2015

1. Issue on the validity of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MRPS) cannot be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court.

The petitioner contends that the CA, in ruling that there was a valid ground to dismiss

her, erred in applying Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS. Essentially, she claims that the 1992 MRPS was issued by the Secretary of Education as the revised implementing rules and regulations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (BP 232) or the “Education Act of 1982.” That there is no provision in BP 232, which provides for the grounds for the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools. Thus, Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS, which provides for the causes of terminating an employment, is invalid as it “widened the scope and coverage” of BP 232.

The Court does not agree.

The Court notes that the argument against the validity of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94 thereof, is raised by the petitioner for the first time in the instant petition for review. Nowhere in the proceedings before the LA, the NLRC or the CA did the petitioner assail the validity of the provisions of the 1992 MRPS.

“It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.”

ATTORNEY’S FEES

Eyana vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015

1. When seafarer entitled to attorney’s fees, but the same is reduced to P1, 000.00 as the acts of respondents did not evince bad faith and they did not completely shirk from their duties to the seafarer.

The petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to Article 2208(8) of the Civil Code. The Court, however, notes that the respondents provided the petitioner with medical treatment and offered to pay him disability benefits, albeit in the reduced amount. In other words, the acts of the respondents did not evince bad faith. The respondents did not completely shirk from their duties to the

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petitioner. Although the petitioner was still thus compelled to litigate to be entitled to total and permanent disability compensation, the Court finds the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of US$1,000.00 as reasonable.

DAMAGES

Leus vs. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187225, January 28, 2015

1. When damages are not awarded in the absence of bad faith.

“A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.”

“Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.”

“It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it” since basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. “Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”

The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the petitioner. That the petitioner was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. A dismissal may be contrary to law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to entitle the dismissed employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his employee without cause.

EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION (NOTE: 2010 POEA-SEC VS. 1996 POEA-SEC)

C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Perez, G.R. No. 194885, January 26, 2015

1. Under the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract, it is enough that the seafarer suffered his illness or injury during the term of his employment contract for the same to be compensable.

The 1996 POEA-SEC reads: SECTION 20.

COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

x x x

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

x x x

We have ruled that under the 1996 POEA-SEC, it is enough that the seafarer proves that his or her injury or illness was acquired during the term of employment to support a claim for disability benefits.

Note: Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, injury or illness must be (a) work-connected; (b) acquired during the term of employment.

2. No provision in the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract on concealment of pre-existing medical condition.

C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Perez, G.R. No. 194885, January 26, 2015

We disagree with petitioners that respondent is not entitled to disability benefits because he is guilty of fraud in concealing his pre-existing medical condition. Petitioners cannot rely on Section 20(E) of the 2000 POEA-SEC since, as discussed above, it is the 1996 POEA-SEC that is applicable to the instant case. Section 20(E) of the 1996 POEA-SEC provides:

E. When requested, the seafarer shall be furnished a copy of all pertinent medical reports or records at no cost to the seafarer.

The above-quoted provision does not mention concealment. It only requires that the seafarer be furnished a copy of all pertinent

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medical records upon request. On this point, the NLRC appears to have been misled in ruling that respondent is guilty of concealment. Note: Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, there is a provision of concealment.

3. Seafarer’s psychotic disorder considered a permanent total disability under the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract as there is no finding that he was fit to work nor a declaration as to his disability grading.

The evidence on record likewise belies petitioners’ claim that respondent was eventually declared fit to work by their designated doctors. Notably, Dr. Reyes and Dr. Abesamis both found respondent to be suffering from recurrent acute psychotic disorder. Dr. Reyes said that respondent’s psychotic disorder will become manifest once triggered by an outside factor, while Dr. Abesamis said that recurrence of the same psychotic disorder is possible. Dr. Abesamis even signed a medical certificate, SSS Form MMD-102, supporting respondent’s claim for disability benefits before the SSS. In said medical certificate, Dr. Abesamis indicated her final diagnosis: respondent has acute psychotic disorder, recurrent. Hence, petitioners cannot claim that their designated doctors declared respondent as fit to work after his repatriation and treatment.

Without a declaration that respondent is already fit to work or an assessment of the degree of respondent’s disability by petitioners’ own doctors, respondent’s disability is therefore permanent and total. This is equivalent to a Grade 1 impediment/disability entitling respondent to US$60,000 as permanent and total disability benefits under the 1996 POEA-SEC.

4. Seafarer’s psychotic disorder not a result of an accident, thus the CBA is not applicable and the seafarer is entitled only to US$60,000.00 under the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract.

Accident is an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated; an unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect or misconduct. Accident is that which happens by

chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.

IMMORALITY

Leus vs. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187225, January 28, 2015

1. The labor tribunals’ respective conclusions that the petitioner’s pregnancy is a “disgraceful or immoral conduct” were arrived at arbitrarily. The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which provides that

Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment – In addition to the just causes enumerated in the Labor Code, the employment of school personnel, including faculty, may be terminated for any of the following causes:

x x x

e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct; x x x

The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is “disgraceful and immoral” considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational institution. In arriving at such conclusion, the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy vis-à-vis the totality of the circumstances surrounding the same.

However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned conclusion arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to characterize the petitioner’s conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.

2. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct alleged to be disgraceful or immoral must be assessed against the prevailing norms of conduct.

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In Chua-Qua v. Clave, the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws. Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct per se that determines whether the same is disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society as respectable or moral. If the conduct does not conform to what society generally views as respectable or moral, then the conduct is considered as disgraceful or immoral. Tersely put, substantial evidence must be presented, which would establish that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral.

Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

3. Public and secular morality should determine the prevailing norms of conduct, not religious morality.

In Estrada v. Escritor , an administrative case against a court interpreter charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Court stressed that in determining whether a particular conduct can be considered as disgraceful and immoral, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. That the distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

4. The petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral conduct since she and the father of her child have no impediment to marry each other.

Viewed against the prevailing norms of conduct, the petitioner’s conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law. To stress,

pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. 5. There is no substantial evidence to prove that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students.

Other than the SSCW’s bare allegation, the records are bereft of any evidence that would convincingly prove that the petitioner’s conduct indeed adversely affected SSCW’s integrity in teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands for. The petitioner is only a non-teaching personnel; her interaction with SSCW’s students is very limited. It is thus quite impossible that her pregnancy out of wedlock caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by SSCW, as to warrant her dismissal.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 008 POEA-SEC

Veritas Maritime Corporation vs. Gepanaga, Jr.,

G.R. No. 206285, February 4, 2015

1. In Philippine Hammonia v. Dumadag, it was held:

Given the circumstances under which Dumadag pursued his claim, especially the fact that he caused the non-referral to a third doctor, Dr. Dacanay’s fit-to-work certification must be upheld. In Santiago v. Pacbasin Ship Management, Inc., the Court declared: "[t]here was no agreement on a third doctor who shall examine him anew and whose finding shall be final and binding. x x x [T]his Court is left without choice but to uphold the certification made by Dr. Lim with respect to Santiago’s disability."

2. Seafarer’s claims premature as when he filed his complaint, he had yet to consult his own physician.

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A seafarer may have basis to pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits, if any of the following conditions is present:

(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;

(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician;

(c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;

(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well;

(e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading; (f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;

(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and (h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.

When Gepanaga filed his complaint on March 25, 2009, he had yet to consult his own physician, Dr. Villa. Indeed, the Court has observed that when Gepanaga filed his complaint, he was armed only with the belief that he had yet to fully recover from his injured finger because of the incident that occurred on board the M.V. Melbourne Highway. It was only on June 9, 2009, a few days before he filed his position paper on June 15, 2009, that Gepanaga sought the services of Dr. Villa.

3. Seafarer’s physician only examined him for one (1) day and failed to state the basis of his assessment and conclusion of permanent disability.

It bears pointing out that even worse than the case in Dumadag, Gepanaga's personal physician examined him for only one (1) day, that is, on June 9, 2009, two and a half months (2 ½)after he had filed his claim for permanent disability benefits. Furthermore, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Villa after examining the respondent failed to state the basis of his assessment and conclusion of permanent disability, more than three (3) months after the respondent was declared fit to work by Dr. Cruz, the company-designated physician.

4. Seafarer’s inability to resume his work after the lapse of 120 days is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor.

Let it be stressed that the seafarer's inability to resume his work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor. Both law and evidence must be on his side.

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SUPPLEMENT NO. 009 APPEAL

Milan, et. al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,

G.R. No. 202961, February 4, 2015

1. Claim for retirement benefits was not included in the complaint and hence cannot be raised on appeal.

Teodora Mahilom’s claim for retirement benefits was not included in her complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter. Hence, it may not be raised in the appeal.

2. Employer has the right to require clearance before the release of last payments to the employee; an employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the employee's return of its properties; employer’s withholding of terminal pay and other benefits pending the employees’ vacating properties it owns thus valid.

As an exception to the general rule that wages may not be withheld and benefits may not be diminished, the Labor Code provides:

Art. 113. Wage deduction. No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees, except: 1. In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance; 2. For union dues, in cases

where the right of the worker or his union to check-off has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and

3. In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

(Emphasis supplied)

The Civil Code provides that the employer is authorized to withhold wages for debts due:

Article 1706. Withholding of the wages, except for a debt due, shall not be made by the employer.

“Debt” in this case refers to any obligation due from the employee to the employer. It includes any accountability that the employee may have to the employer. There is no reason to limit its scope to uniforms and equipment, as petitioners would argue.

4. The preferential treatment given by our law to labor is not a license for abuse; it is not a signal to commit acts of unfairness that will unreasonably infringe on the property rights of the company. Our laws provide for a clear preference for labor. This is in recognition of the asymmetrical power of those with capital when they are left to negotiate with their workers without the standards and protection of law. In cases such as these, the collective bargaining unit of workers are able to get more benefits and in exchange, the owners are able to continue with the program of cutting their losses or wind down their operations due to serious business losses. The company in this case did all that was required by law.

JURISDICTION

1. The National Labor Relations Commission has jurisdiction to determine, preliminarily, the parties’ rights over a property, when it is necessary to determine an issue related to rights or claims arising from an employer-employee relationship; the return of its properties in petitioners’ possession by virtue of their status as employees is an issue that must be resolved to determine whether benefits can be released immediately and thus said issue is intertwined with employer-employee relationship and the labor tribunals thus have jurisdiction.

Claims arising from an employer-employee relationship are not limited to claims by an employee. Employers may also have

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claims against the employee, which arise from the same relationship.

2. Employee no longer entitled to any separation benefits as she retired long before the closure of the company.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 010 DUE PROCESS

Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Avestruz, G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015

1. Invalidly dismissed seafarer not afforded due process.

Similarly, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that Avestruz was not accorded procedural due process, there being no compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of the POEA-SEC as above-cited, which requires the “two-notice rule.” As explained in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira:

An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings.

The statement given by Captain Woodward requiring him to explain in writing the events that transpired at the galley in the morning of June 22, 2011 hardly qualifies as a written notice of the charge against him, nor was it an opportunity for Avestruz to explain or defend himself. While Captain Woodward claimed in his e-mail that he conducted a “disciplinary hearing” informing Avestruz of his inefficiency, no evidence was presented to support the same. Neither was Avestruz given a written notice of penalty and the reasons for its imposition. Instead, Captain Woodward verbally informed him that he was dismissed

from service and would be disembarked from the vessel.

EMPLOYEE STATUS

Basan, et. al. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,

G.R. No. 174365-66, February 4, 2015

1. Route helpers hired by Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. considered regular employees.

The argument of petitioner that its usual business or trade is softdrink manufacturing and that the work assigned to respondent workers as sales route helpers so involves merely "postproduction activities," one which is not indispensable in the manufacture of its products, scarcely can be persuasive. If, as so argued by petitioner company, only those whose work are directly involved in the production of softdrinks may be held performing functions necessary and desirable in its usual business or trade, there would have then been no need for it to even maintain regular truck sales route helpers. The nature of the work performed must be viewed from a perspective of the business or trade in its entirety and not on a confined scope.

The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their services clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the business or trade of petitioner company. The Court of Appeals has found each of respondents to have worked for at least one year with petitioner company. While this Court, in Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, has upheld the legality of a fixed-term employment, it has done so, however, with a stern admonition that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the period has been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, then it should be struck down as being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The pernicious practice of having employees, workers and laborers, engaged for a fixed period of few months, short of the normal six-month probationary period of employment, and, thereafter, to be hired on a day-to-day basis, mocks the law. Any obvious circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced.

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2. Doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere.

In fact, in Pacquing, et. al. v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., this Court applied the ruling cited above under the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled). It was held therein that since petitioners, as route helpers, were performing the same functions as the employees in Magsalin, which are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of Coca Cola Philippines, Inc., they are considered as regular employees entitled to security of tenure.

3. When all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification requirement.

Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Similarly, this Court has consistently held that when under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification requirement.

TERMINATION

Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Avestruz, G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015

1. No insubordination on the part of the seafarer proven.

Petitioners maintain that Avestruz was dismissed on the ground of insubordination, consisting of his “repeated failure to obey his superior’s order to maintain cleanliness in the galley of the vessel” as well as his act of “insulting a superior officer by words or deeds.” (Insubordination) In support of this contention, petitioners presented as evidence the e-mails sent by Captain Woodward, both dated June

22, 2011, and time-stamped 10:07 a.m. and 11:40 a.m., respectively, which they claim chronicled the relevant circumstances that eventually led to Avestruz’s dismissal.

In this case, the contents of Captain Woodward’s e-mails do not establish that Avestruz’s conduct had been willful, or characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. The Court concurs with the CA’s observation that Avestruz’s statement regarding the incident in the galley deserves more credence, being corroborated by Kong, a messman who witnessed the same.

SUPPLEMENT NO. 011 ATTORNEY’S FEES

Hocheng Philippines Corporation vs. Farrales, G.R. No. 211497, March 18, 2015

1. When attorney’s fees are awarded. But concerning the award of attorney’s fees, Farrales was dismissed for a flimsy charge, and he was compelled to litigate to secure what is due him which HPC unjustifiably withheld.

2. When damages are not awarded. There is no satisfactory proof that the concerned officers of HPC acted in bad faith or with malice in terminating Farrales. Notwithstanding the LA’s assertion to this effect, Farrales’ bare allegations of bad faith deserve no credence, and neither is the mere fact that he was illegally dismissed sufficient to prove bad faith on the part of HPC’s officers. But concerning the award of attorney’s fees, Farrales was dismissed for a flimsy charge, and he was compelled to litigate to secure what is due him which HPC unjustifiably withheld. EMPLOYEE STATUS

Fonterra Brands Phils. Inc. vs. Largado, G.R. No. 205300, March 18, 2015

1. Fixed term employee status valid. Foremost, respondents were fixed-term employees. As previously held by this Court, fixed-term employment contracts are not limited, as they are under the present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects with predetermined dates of completion; they also include those to which

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the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of termination. The determining factor of such contracts is not the duty of the employee but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of the employment relationship.

In the case at bar, it is clear that respondents were employed by A.C. Sicat as project employees. In their employment contract with the latter, it is clearly stated that “[A.C. Sicat is] temporarily employing [respondents] as TMR[s] effective June 6[, 2006] under the following terms and conditions: The need for your service being only for a specific project, your temporary employment will be for the duration only of said project of our client, namely to promote FONTERRA BRANDS products x x x which is expected to be finished on or before Nov. 06, 2006.”

2. Contractor considered a legitimate job contractor.

A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:

1. The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;

2. The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and

3. The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.

A.C. Sicat was able to prove its status as a legitimate job contractor for having presented the following evidence, to wit:

1) Certificate of Business Registration 2) Certificate of Registration with the

Bureau of Internal Revenue; 3) Mayor’s Permit;

4) Certificate of Membership with the Social Security System;

5) Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and

6) Employment;

7) Company Profile; and

8) Certifications issued by its clients. Furthermore, A.C. Sicat has substantial capital, having assets totaling _5,926,155.76 as of December 31, 2006. Too, its Agreement with Fonterra clearly sets forth that A.C. Sicat shall be liable for the wages and salaries of its employees or workers, including benefits, premiums, and protection due them, as well as remittance to the proper government entities of all withholding taxes, Social Security Service, and Medicare premiums, in accordance with relevant laws.

The appellate court further correctly held that Fonterra’s issuance of Merchandising Guidelines, stock monitoring and inventory forms, and promo mechanics, for compliance and use of A.C. Sicat’s employees assigned to them, does not establish that Fonterra exercises control over A.C. Sicat. These were imposed only to ensure the effectiveness of the promotion services to be rendered by the merchandisers as it would be risky, if not imprudent, for any company to completely entrust the performance of the operations it has contracted out.

EVIDENCE

Montero, et. al. vs. Times Transportation Co., Inc., G.R. No. 190828, March 16, 2015

1. It does not necessary follow that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor, as management also has its own rights. Although the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it does not necessary follow that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights. Out of

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concern for the less privileged in life, this Court, has more often than not inclined, to uphold the cause of the worker in his conflict with the employer. Such leaning, however, does not blind the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine.

DOUBTS

Hocheng Philippines Corporation vs. Farrales, G.R. No. 211497, March 18, 2015

1. If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and that of the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.

But where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and that of the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.

PRESCRIPTION

Montero, et. al. vs. Times Transportation Co., Inc.,

G.R. No. 190828, March 16, 2015

1. When action already considered prescribed; case filed but later withdrawn; prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no action has been filed at all.

Settled is the rule that when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one’s dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, as contemplated under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four years.

While the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, its voluntary withdrawal left the petitioners in exactly the same position as though no complaint had been

filed at all. The withdrawal of their complaint effectively erased the tolling of the reglementary period.

RESIGNATION

Fonterra Brands Phils. Inc. vs. Largado, G.R. No. 205300, March 18, 2015

1. When there is resignation and not illegal dismissal as employees no longer renewed their contracts and applied with another company rendering services to the first company’s former client.

By refusing to renew their contracts with Zytron, respondents effectively resigned from the latter. Resignation is the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to dissociate themselves from their employment, done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.

Here, it is obvious that respondents were no longer interested in continuing their employment with Zytron. Their voluntary refusal to renew their contracts was brought about by their desire to continue their assignment in Fonterra which could not happen in view of the conclusion of Zytron’s contract with Fonterra. Hence, to be able to continue with their assignment, they applied for work with A.C. Sicat with the hope that they will be able to continue rendering services as TMRs at Fonterra since A.C. Sicat is Fonterra’s new manpower supplier.

TERMINATION – CONSEQUENCES

Metroguards Security Agency Corporation vs. Hilongo,

G.R. No. 215630, March 9, 2015

1. Recomputation of monetary awards until finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals proper and does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented.

In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, the SC held that:

x x x no essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary consequence that

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