BASIC PRINCIPLES
Tesoro et al., vs. Metro Manila Retreaders Inc., et al. GR No. 171482, March 12, 2014
This case concerns the effect on the status of employment of employees who entered into a Service Franchise Agreement with their employer.
Facts:
On various dates between 1991 and 1998, petitioners Ashmor M. Tesoro, Pedro Ang, and Gregorio Sharp used to work as salesmen for respondents Metro Manila Retreaders, Inc., Northern Luzon Retreaders, Inc., or Power Tire and Rubber Corporation. These are sister companies collectively called “Bandag”. Bandag offered repair and retread services for used tires. In 1998, however, Bandag developed a franchising scheme that would enable others to operate tire and retreading businesses using its trade name and service system. Petitioners quit their jobs as salesmen and entered into separate Service Franchise Agreements (SFAs) with Bandag for the operation of their respective franchises. Under this SFA, Bandag would provide funding with the petitioners subject to regular liquidation of revolving funds. The expenses of these funds will be deducted from their sale in order to determine their income. After some time, petitioners began to default on their obligations to submit periodic liquidations of their operational expenses in relation to the revolving funds Bandag provided them. Bandag terminated their SFA.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, non– payment of wages, incentive pay, 13th month pay and damages against Bandag with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioners contend that despite the SFA, they remained employees of Bandag. For its part, Bandag pointed out that petitioners freely resigned from their employment and decided to avail themselves of the opportunity to be independent entrepreneurs under the franchise scheme that Bandag had. Thus, no employer–employee relationship existed between petitioners and Bandag.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners remained to be Bandag’s salesmen under the franchise scheme it entered into with them.
Ruling:
No, petitioners were no longer employees of Bandag the moment they entered into the SFA. Franchising is a business method of expansion that allows an individual or group of individuals to market a product or a service and to use of the patent, trademark, trade name and the systems prescribed by the owner.
The tests for determining employer–employee relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. The last is called the “control test,” the most important element.
When petitioners agreed to operate Bandag’s franchise branches in different parts of the country, they knew that this substantially changed their former relationships. They were to cease working as Bandag’s salesmen, the positions they occupied before they ventured into running separate Bandag branches. They were to cease receiving salaries or commissions. Their incomes were to depend on the profits they made. Yet, petitioners did not then complain of constructive dismissal. They took their chances, ran their branches, Gregorio Sharp in La Union for several months and Ashmor Tesoro in Baguio and Pedro Ang in Pangasinan for over a year. Clearly, their belated claim of constructive dismissal is quite hollow.
It is pointed out that Bandag continued, like an employer, to exercise control over petitioners’ work. It points out that Bandag: (a) retained the right to adjust the price rates of products and services; (b) imposed minimum processed tire requirement (MPR); (c) reviewed and regulated credit applications; and (d) retained the power to suspend petitioners’ services for failure to meet service standards. But uniformity in prices, quality of services, and good business practices are the essence of all franchises. A franchisee will damage the franchisor’s business if he sells at different prices, renders different or inferior services, or engages in bad business practices. These business constraints are needed to maintain collective responsibility for faultless and reliable service to the same class of customers for the same prices.
This is not the “control” contemplated in employer–employee relationships. Control in such relationships addresses the details of day to day work like assigning the particular task that has to be done, monitoring the way tasks are done and their results, and determining the time during which the employee must report for work or accomplish his assigned task.
Petitioners cannot use the revolving funds feature of the SFAs as evidence of their employer–employee relationship with Bandag. These funds do not represent wages. They are more in the nature of capital advances for operations that Bandag conceptualized to attract prospective franchisees. Petitioners’ incomes depended on the profits they make, controlled by their individual abilities to increase sales and reduce operating costs.
Royale Homes Marketing Corp., vs. Alcantara GR No. 195190, July 28, 2014
Handwritten
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. JOY C. CABILES
Fuji Television Network vs. Espiritu GR No. 204944-45, Dec. 3, 2014
Cabaobas vs. Pepsicola
GR No. 176908, March 25, 2015
WAGES & WAGE RATIONALIZATION ACT Vergara, Jr. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils Inc.
G.R. No. 176985, April 1, 2013 Fact:
Petitioner Ricardo E. Vergara, Jr. was an employee of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. from May 1968 until he retired on January 31, 2002 as a District Sales Supervisor (DSS) for Las Piñas City, Metro Manila.
As stipulated in respondent's existing Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations at the time, the Annual Performance Incentive Pay of RSMs, DSSs, and SSSs shall be considered in the computation of retirement benefits, as follows: Basic Monthly Salary + Monthly Average Performance Incentive (which is the total performance incentive earned during the year immediately preceding 12 months) No. of Years in Service.
Claiming his entitlement to an additional PhP474,600.00 as Sales Management Incentives (SMI) and to the amount of PhP496,016.67 which respondent allegedly deducted illegally, representing the unpaid accounts of two dealers within his jurisdiction, petitioner filed a complaint before the NLRC on June 11, 2002 for the payment of his "Full Retirement Benefits, Merit Increase, Commission/Incentives, Length of Service, Actual, Moral and Exemplary Damages, and Attorney's Fees."
(Apparently, Petitioner argued that the granting of SMI to all retired DSSs regardless of whether or not they qualify to the same had ripened into company practice. The only two pieces of evidence that he stubbornly presented throughout the entirety of this case are the sworn statements of Renato C. Hidalgo (Hidalgo) and Ramon V. Velazquez (Velasquez), former DSSs of respondent who retired in 2000 and 1998, respectively. They claimed that the SMI was included in their
retirement package even if they did not meet the sales and collection qualifiers. Therefore, the failure of employer to grant him his SMI is a violation on the principle of non-diminution of benefits.)
Issue:
WON the granting of SMI to all retired DSSs regardless of whether or not they qualify to the same had ripened into company practice
Ruling:
Generally, employees have a vested right over existing benefits voluntarily granted to them by their employer. Thus, any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is actually founded on the Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers, to promote their welfare, and to afford them full protection. In turn, said mandate is the basis of Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be rendered in favor of labor."
There is diminution of benefits when the following requisites are present:
1. the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time;
2. the practice is consistent and deliberate;
3. the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law; and
4. The diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.
To be considered as a regular company practice, the employee must prove by substantial evidence that the giving of the benefit is done over a long period of time, and that it has been made consistently and deliberately. Jurisprudence has not laid down any hard-and-fast rule as to the length of time that company practice should have been exercised in order to constitute voluntary employer practice. The common denominator in previously decided cases appears to be the regularity and deliberateness of the grant of benefits over a significant
period of time. It requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefit knowing fully well that the employees are not covered by any provision of the law or agreement requiring payment thereof. In sum, the benefit must be characterized by regularity, voluntary and deliberate intent of the employer to grant the benefit over a considerable period of time.
Upon review of the entire case records, We find no substantial evidence to prove that the grant of SMI to all retired DSSs regardless of whether or not they qualify to the same had ripened into company practice.
The granting of the SMI in the retirement package of Velazquez was an isolated incident and could hardly be classified as a company practice that may be considered an enforceable obligation. To repeat, the principle against diminution of benefits is applicable only if the grant or benefit is founded on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time which is consistent and deliberate; it presupposes that a company practice, policy and tradition favorable to the employees has been clearly established; and that the payments made by the company pursuant to it have ripened into benefits enjoyed by them. Certainly, a practice or custom is, as a general rule, not a source of a legally demandable or enforceable right. Company practice, just like any other fact, habits, customs, usage or patterns of conduct, must be proven by the offering party who must allege and establish specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit or company practice.
Royal Plant Workers Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils Inc. -Cebu Plant
G.R. No. 198783, April 15, 2013 Facts:
Under the employ of each bottling plant of Coca-Cola are bottling operators. In the case of the plant in Cebu City, there are 20 bottling operators who work for its Bottling Line 1 while there are 12-14 bottling operators who man its Bottling Line 2. All of them are male and they are members of herein respondent Royal Plant Workers Union (ROPWU).
In 1974, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 2 were provided with chairs upon their request. In 1988, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 1 followed suit and asked to be provided also with chairs. Their request was likewise granted. Sometime in September 2008, the chairs provided for the operators were removed pursuant to a national directive of petitioner. This directive is in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of petitioner for bottling operators, wherein every bottling operator is given the responsibility to keep the machinery and equipment assigned to him clean and safe. The program reinforces the task of bottling operators to constantly move about in the performance of their duties and responsibilities.
With this task of moving constantly to check on the machinery and equipment assigned to him, a bottling operator does not need a chair anymore, hence, petitioner’s directive to remove them. Furthermore, CCBPI rationalized that the removal of the chairs is implemented so that the bottling operators will avoid sleeping, thus, prevent injuries to their persons. As bottling operators are working with machines which consist of moving parts, it is imperative that they should not fall asleep as to do so would expose them to hazards and injuries. In addition, sleeping will hamper the efficient flow of operations as the bottling operators would be unable to perform their duties competently.
Issue:
Whether or not the removal of the bottling operators’ chairs was a valid exercise of management prerogative. ---YES
Ruling:
According to the Union, such removal constitutes a violation of the 1) Occupational Health and Safety Standards which provide that every worker is entitled to be provided by the employer with appropriate seats, among others; 2) policy of the State to assure the right of workers to a just and humane condition of work as provided for in Article 3 of the Labor Code;8 3) Global Workplace Rights Policy of CCBPI which provides for a safe and healthy workplace by maintaining a productive workplace and by minimizing the risk of accident, injury and exposure to health risks; and 4) diminution of benefits provided in Article 100 of the Labor Code.
The Court has held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place, and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.10
In the present controversy, it cannot be denied that CCBPI removed the operators’ chairs pursuant to a national directive and in line with its "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program, launched to enable the Union to perform their duties and responsibilities more efficiently. The chairs were not removed indiscriminately. They were carefully studied with due regard to the welfare of the members of the Union. The removal of the chairs was compensated by: a) a reduction of the operating hours of the bottling operators from a two-and-one-half (2 ½)-hour rotation period to a one-and-a-half (1 ½) hour rotation period; and b) an increase of the break period from 15 to 30 minutes between rotations. Apparently, the decision to remove the chairs was done with good intentions as CCBPI wanted to avoid instances of operators sleeping on the job while in the performance of their duties and responsibilities and because of the fact that the chairs were not necessary considering that the operators constantly move about while working. In short, the removal of the chairs was designed to increase work efficiency. Hence, CCBPI’s exercise of its management prerogative was made in good faith without doing any harm to the workers’ rights.
The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. There is no law that requires employers to provide chairs for bottling operators. There was no violation either of the Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefit provisions under Book IV of the Labor Code of the Philippines. As shown in the foregoing, the removal of the chairs was compensated by the reduction of the working hours and increase in the rest period. The directive did not expose the bottling operators to safety and health hazards.
The Union should not complain too much about standing and moving about for one and one-half (1 ½) hours because studies show that sitting in workplaces for a long time is hazardous to one’s health. The CBA between the Union and CCBPI contains no provision whatsoever requiring the management to provide chairs for the operators in the
production/manufacturing line while performing their duties and responsibilities.
The Court completely agrees with the CA ruling that the removal of the chairs did not violate the general principles of justice and fair play because the bottling operators’ working time was considerably reduced from two and a half (2 ½) hours to just one and a half (1 ½) hours and the break period, when they could sit down, was increased to 30 minutes between rotations. The bottling operators’ new work schedule is certainly advantageous to them because it greatly increases their rest period and significantly decreases their working time. A break time of thirty (30) minutes after working for only one and a half (1 ½) hours is a just and fair work schedule.
The operators’ chairs cannot be considered as one of the employee benefits covered in Article 10016 of the Labor Code. In the Court’s view, the term "benefits" mentioned in the non-diminution rule refers to monetary benefits or privileges given to the employee with monetary equivalents.
Such benefits or privileges form part of the employees’ wage, salary or compensation making them enforceable obligations.
This Court has already decided several cases regarding the non-diminution rule where the benefits or privileges involved in those cases mainly concern monetary considerations or privileges with monetary equivalents. Without a doubt, equating the provision of chairs to the bottling operators is something within the ambit of "benefits'' in the context of Article 100 of the Labor Code is unduly stretching the coverage of the law. The interpretations of Article 100 of the Labor Code do not show even with the slightest hint that such provision of chairs for the bottling operators may be sheltered under its mantle.
Maynilad Water Supervisors Asso. Vs. Maynilad Water Services GR No.198935, Nov. 27, 2013
National Wages & Productivity Commission et al., vs. The Alliance of Progressive Labor et al.
Facts: On June 9, 1989, Republic Act No. 6727 was enacted into law. In order to rationalize wages throughout the Philippines, Republic Act No. 6727 created the NWPC and the RTWPBs of the different regions.
Article 121 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727, empowered the NWPC to formulate policies and guidelines on wages, incomes and productivity improvement at the enterprise, industry and national levels; to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of appropriate minimum wage and productivity measures at the regional, provincial or industry levels; and to review regional wage levels set by the RTWPBs to determine whether the levels were in accordance with the prescribed guidelines and national development plans, among others.
On the other hand, Article 122(b) of the Labor Code, also amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727, tasked the RTWPBs to determine and fix minimum wage rates applicable in their region, provinces or industries therein; and to issue the corresponding wage orders, subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC.
Consequently, the RTWPB–NCR issued Wage Order No. NCR–07 on October 14, 1999 imposing an increase of P25.50/day on the wages of all private sector workers and employees in the NCR and pegging the minimum wage rate in the NCR at P223.50/day.6 However, Section 2 and Section 9 of Wage Order No. NCR–07 exempted certain sectors and industries from its coverage
Section 2. The adjustment in this Order does not cover the following:
A. [W]orkers in the following sectors which were granted corresponding wage increases on January 1, 1999 as prescribed by Wage Order No. NCR–06:
a.1. Agriculture workers
–Plantation P12.00
–Non–plantation P18.50
a.2. Cottage/handicraft industry P16.00
a.3. Private hospitals with bed capacity of
100 or less P12.00
a.4. Retail/Service establishments
–Employing 11–15 workers P12.00 –Employing not more than 10
workers P19.00
B. Workers in small establishments employing less that ten (10) workers.
Section 9. Upon application with and as determined by the Board, based on documentation and other requirements in accordance with applicable rules and regulations issued by the Commission, the following may be exempt from the applicability of this Order:
1. Distressed establishments as defined in the NPWC Guidelines No. 01, series of 1996;
2. Exporters including indirect exporters with at least 50% export sales and with forward contracts with their foreign buyers/principals entered into on or twelve (12) months before the date of publication of this Order may be exempt during the lifetime of said contract but not to exceed twelve (12) months from the effectivity of this Order.
Feeling aggrieved by their non–coverage by the wage adjustment, the Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL) and the Tunay na Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Royal (TNMR) filed an appeal with the NWPC assailing Section 2(A) and Section 9(2) of Wage Order No. NCR–07. They contended that neither the NWPC nor the RTWPB–NCR had the authority to expand the non–coverage and exemptible categories under the wage order; hence, the assailed sections of the wage order should be voided.
The NWPC upheld the validity of Section 2(A) and Section 9(2) of Wage Order No. NCR–07. It observed that the RTWPB’s power to determine exemptible categories was adjunct to its wage fixing function conferred by Article 122(e) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6727; that such authority of the RTWPB was also recognized in NWPC Guidelines No. 01, Series of 1996.
The APL and TNMR assailed the decisions of the NWPC on certiorari in the CA, contending that the power of the RTWPB–NCR to determine exemptible categories was not an adjunct to its wage fixing function. CA favored the respondents and granted the petition for certiorari.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari by the NWPC and RTWPB–NCR.
Issue: Whether or not the RTWPB–NCR had
Ruling: the RTWPB–NCR had the authority to provide additional exemptions from the minimum wage adjustments embodied in Wage Order No. NCR–07
The NWPC promulgated NWPC Guidelines No. 001–95 (Revised Rules of Procedure on Minimum Wage Fixing) to govern the proceedings in the NWPC and the RTWPBs in the fixing of minimum wage rates by region, province and industry. Section 1 of Rule VIII of NWPC Guidelines No. 001–95 recognized the power of the RTWPBs to issue exemptions from the application of the wage orders subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC
(this is the rationale behind exemption)
SECTION 2. CATEGORIES OF EXEMPTIBLE ESTABLISHMENTS
Exemption of establishments from compliance with the wage increases and cost of living allowances prescribed by the Boards may be granted in order to (1) assist establishments experiencing temporary difficulties due to losses maintain the financial viability of their businesses and continued employment of their workers; (2) encourage the establishment of new businesses and the creation of more jobs, particularly in areas outside the National Capital Region and Export Processing Zones, in line with the policy on industry dispersal; and (3) ease the burden of micro establishments, particularly in the retail and service sector, that have a limited capacity to pay.
The following categories of establishments may be exempted upon application with and as determined by the Board:
1. Distressed establishments
2. New business enterprises (NBEs)
3. Retail/Service establishments employing not more than ten (10) workers
4. Establishments adversely affected by natural calamities
Under the guidelines, the RTWPBs could issue exemptions from the application of the wage orders as long as the exemptions complied with the rules of the NWPC. In its rules, the NWPC enumerated four exemptible establishments, but the list was not exclusive. The RTWPBs had the authority to include in the wage orders establishments that belonged to, or to exclude from the four enumerated exemptible categories.
If the exemption was outside of the four exemptible categories, like here, the exemptible category should be: (1) in accord with the rationale for exemption; (2) reviewed/approved by the NWPC; and (3) upon review, the RTWPB issuing the wage order must submit a strong and justifiable reason or reasons for the inclusion of such category. It is the compliance with the second requisite that is at issue here.
The NWPC, in arriving at its decision, weighed the arguments of the parties and ruled that the RTWPB–NCR had substantial and justifiable reasons in exempting the sectors and establishments enumerated in Section 2(A) and Section 9(2) based on the public hearings and consultations, meetings, social–economic data and informations gathered prior to the issuance of Wage Order No. NCR–07. The very fact that the validity of the assailed sections of Wage Order No. NCR–07 had been already passed upon and upheld by the NWPC meant that the NWPC had already given the wage order its necessary legal imprimatur. Accordingly, the requisite approval or review was complied with.
The RTWPBs are the thinking group of men and women guided by statutory standards and bound by the rules and guidelines prescribed by the NWPC. In the nature of their functions, the RTWPBs investigate and study all the pertinent facts to ascertain the conditions in their respective regions. Hence, they are logically vested with the
competence to determine the applicable minimum wages to be imposed as well as the industries and sectors to exempt from the coverage of their wage orders.
Lastly, Wage Order No. NCR–07 is presumed to be regularly issued in the absence of any strong showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTWPB–NCR. The presumption of validity is made stronger by the fact that its validity was upheld by the NWPC upon review.
Our Haus Realty Development Corp., vs. Parian et al. GR No. 204651, August 6, 2014
Vivares vs. St. Theresa College GR No. 202666, Sept. 29, 2014
WAGE ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY
Handwritten
People’s Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils) vs. Sec of DOLE et al.
March 6, 2012 Resolution on the main Decision of May 8, 2009 Facts:
Jandeleon Juezan (“Juezan”) filed a complaint before the DOLE against Bombo Radyo Phils. (“Bombo Radyo”) for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. On the basis of the complaint, the DOLE conducted a plant level inspection. The Labor Inspector in his report wrote, Management representative informed that (Juezan) complainant is a drama talent hired on a per drama ‘participation basis’ hence no employer-employer relationship existed between them. As proof of this, management presented photocopies of cash vouchers, billing statement, employments of specific undertaking, etc. The management has no control of the talent if he ventures into another contract with other broadcasting industries.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Ruling:
Yes. No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a
preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRC’s determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a ready set of guidelines to follow, the same guide the courts themselves use. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The use of this test is not solely limited to the NLRC. The DOLE Secretary, or his or her representatives, can utilize the same test, even in the course of inspection, making use of the same evidence that would have been presented before the NLRC.
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be respected. The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of disputing the employer-employee relationship, force the referral of the matter to the NLRC. The Court issued the declaration that at least a prima facie showing of the absence of an employer-employee relationship be made to oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the DOLE that will be faced with that evidence, and it is the DOLE that will weigh it, to see if the same does successfully refute the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if the employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it appears, upon review, that no employer-employee relationship existed in the first place.
It must also be remembered that the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship need not necessarily result in an affirmative finding. The DOLE may well make the determination that no employer-employee relationship exists, thus divesting itself of jurisdiction over the case. It must not be precluded from being able to reach its own conclusions, not by the parties, and certainly not by this Court.
Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial
and enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC.
To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Superior Packaging Corp., vs. Balagsay et al. G.R. No. 178909, October 10, 2012
Facts: The petitioner engaged the services of Lancer to provide reliever services to its business, which involves the manufacture and sale of commercial and industrial corrugated boxes. According to petitioner, the respondents were engaged for four (4) months from February to June 1998 and their tasks included loading, unloading and segregation of corrugated boxes.
Thereafter, respondents filed complaint against the petitioner and President, Cesar Luz (Luz), for underpayment of wages, non-payment of premium pay for worked rest, overtime pay and non-payment of salary. Upon receipt Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) conducted an inspection of the petitioner’s premises and found several violations, to wit:
(1)Non-presentation of payrolls and daily time records; (2)Non-submission of annual report of safety organization; (3)Medical and accident/illness reports;
(4)Non-registration of establishment under Rule 1020 of Occupational and Health Standards; and
Due to the petitioner’s failure to appear in the summary investigations conducted by the DOLE, an Orderwas issued on June 18, 2003 finding in favor of the respondents and adopting the computation of the claims submitted. Petitioner and Luz were ordered, among others, to pay respondents their total claims in the amount of Eight Hundred Forty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Three Pesos and 38/100 (P 840,463.38).
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that respondents are not its employees but of Lancer and that they pay Lancer in lump sum for the services rendered. The DOLE, however, denied its motion because petitioner failed to support its claim that the respondents are not its employees, and even assuming that they were employed by Lancer, the petitioner still cannot escape liability as Section 13 of the Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997, makes a principal jointly and severally liable with the contractor to contractual employees to the extent of the work performed when the contractor fails to pay its employees wages.
Their appeal to the Secretary of DOLE was dismissed thus, l petitioner and Luz filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).
On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed the Secretary of DOLEs orders, with the modification in that Luz was absolved of any personal liability under the award.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not DOLE has authority to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship? Whether Superior Packaging Corporation may be held solidarily liable with Lancer Staffing & Services Network, Inc. (Lancer) for respondents unpaid money claims?
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
The DOLE clearly acted within its authority when it determined the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and respondents as it falls within the purview of its visitorial and
enforcement power under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code. The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be respected.
With regard to the contention that there is no evidence to support the finding that the respondents rendered overtime work and that they worked on their rest day, the resolution of this argument requires a review of the factual findings and the evidence presented, Court said that it is not a trier of facts and it applies with greater force in labor cases. Hence, where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by, the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding to Supreme Court.
It was the consistent conclusion of the DOLE and the CA that Lancer was not an independent contractor but was engaged in "labor-only contracting"; hence, the petitioner was considered an indirect employer of respondents and liable to the latter for their unpaid money claims.
At the time of the respondents employment in 1998, the applicable regulation was DOLE Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997. Under said Department Order, labor-only contracting was defined as follows:
Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting. (a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer shall be deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where such person:
(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials; and
(2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business or operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed.
Labor-only contracting is prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
According to the CA, the totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances of this case point to such conclusion that Lancer was, indeed, a labor-only contractor. Aside from these is the undisputed fact that the petitioner failed to produce any written service contract that might serve as proof of its alleged agreement with Lancer.
Finally, a finding that a contractor is a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and the "labor only" contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer. The former becomes solidarily liable for all the rightful claims of the employees.
Petitioner therefore, being the principal employer and Lancer, being the labor-only contractor, are solidarily liable for respondents unpaid money claims.
WAGE PROTECTION PROVISIONS & PROHIBITIONS REGARDING WAGES
Locsin II vs. Mekeni Food Corp. GR No. 192105, December 9, 2013
Facts: Petitioner Antonio Locsin II was the Regional Sales Manager of respondent Mekeni Food Corporation. He was hired on February 2004 to oversee the NCR and Luzon operation. In addition to his compensation and benefit package, a car was offered to him under which one-half of the cost of the vehicle is to be paid by the company and the other half to be deducted from petitioner's salary. The car valued at 280,000 which Locsin paid through salary deductions of 5,000 per month.
On February 2006, Locsin resigned. A total of 112,500.00 had already been deducted from his monthly salary and applied as part of his share in the car plan. Upon resignation, petitioner made personal and written follow-ups regarding his unpaid salaries, commissions, benefits, and offer to purchase his service vehicle. Mekeni replied that the company car plan benefit applied only to employees who have been with the company for five years; for this reason, the balance that petitioner should pay on his service vehicle stood at P116,380.00 if he opts to purchase the same.
On May 3, 2007, petitioner filed against Mekeni and/or its President, Prudencio S. Garcia, a Complaint for the recovery of monetary claims consisting of unpaid salaries, commissions, sick/vacation leave
benefits, and recovery of monthly salary deductions which were earmarked for his cost-sharing in the car plan.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund of all the amounts applied to the cost of the service vehicle under the car plan. Ruling: Any benefit or privilege enjoyed by petitioner from using the service vehicle was merely incidental and insignificant, because for the most part the vehicle was under Mekeni's control and supervision. Free and complete disposal is given to the petitioner only after the vehicle's cost is covered or paid in full. Until then, the vehicle remains at the beck and call of Mekeni. Given the vast territory petitioner had to cover to be able to perform his work effectively and generate business for his employer, the service vehicle was an absolute necessity, or else Mekeni's business would suffer adversely. Thus, it is clear that while petitioner was paying for half of the vehicle's value, Mekeni was reaping the full benefits from the use thereof.
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, “every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." Article 2142 of the same Code likewise clarifies that there are certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts which give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract, to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. In the absence of specific terms and conditions governing the car plan arrangement between the petitioner and Mekeni, a quasi-contractual relation was created between them. Consequently, Mekeni may not enrich itself by charging petitioner for the use of its vehicle which is otherwise absolutely necessary to the full and effective promotion of its business. It may not, under the claim that petitioner's payments constitute rents for the use of the company vehicle, refuse to refund what petitioner had paid, for the reasons that the car plan did not carry such a condition; the subject vehicle is an old car that is substantially, if not fully, depreciated; the car plan arrangement benefited Mekeni for the most part; and any personal benefit obtained by petitioner from using the vehicle was merely incidental.
Conversely, petitioner cannot recover the monetary value of Mekeni's counterpart contribution to the cost of the vehicle; that is not property or money that belongs to him, nor was it intended to be given to him in lieu of the car plan. Mekeni's share of the vehicle's cost was not part of petitioner's compensation package. The vehicle is an asset that belonged to Mekeni. Just as Mekeni is unjustly enriched by failing to refund petitioner's payments, so should petitioner not be awarded the value of Mekeni's counterpart contribution to the car plan, as this would unjustly enrich him at Mekeni's expense.
Thus, Mekeni Food Corporation should refund petitioner Antonio Locsin II's payments under the car plan agreement amounting only to the extent of the contribution Locsin made, totalling to the amount of P112,500.00.
TH Shopfitters Corp., et al., vs. T&H Shopfitters Corp., Union GR No. 191714, Feb 26, 2014
Facts: On September 7, 2004, the T&H Shopfitters Corporation/ Gin Queen Corporation workers union (THS-GQ Union) filed their Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) by way of union busting, and Illegal Lockout, with moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, against T&H Shopfitters Corporation (T&H Shopfitters) and Gin Queen Corporation before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
1st CAUSE:
In their desire to improve their working conditions, respondents and other employees of held their first formal meeting on November 23, 2003 to discuss the formation of a union. The following day, seventeen (17) employees were barred from entering petitioners’ factory premises located in Castillejos, Zambales, and ordered to transfer to T&H Shopfitters’ warehouse at Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) purportedly because of its expansion. Afterwards, the said seventeen (17) employees were repeatedly ordered to go on forced leave due to the unavailability of work.
Respondents contended that the affected employees were not given regular work assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired to perform their functions. Respondents sought the assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Subsequently, an agreement between petitioners and THS-GQ Union was reached. Petitioners agreed to give priority to regular employees in the distribution of work assignments. Respondents averred, however, that petitioners never complied with its commitment but instead hired contractual workers. Instead, Respondents claimed that the work weeks of those employees in the SBFZ plant were drastically reduced to only three (3) days in a month.
2nd CAUSE:
On March 24, 2004, THS-GQ Union filed a petition for certification election and an order was issued to hold the certification election in both T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen.
On October 10, 2004, petitioners sponsored a field trip to Iba, Zambales, for its employees. The officers and members of the THS-GQ Union were purportedly excluded from the field trip. On the evening of the field trip, a certain Angel Madriaga, a sales officer of petitioners, campaigned against the union in the forthcoming certification election. When the certification election was scheduled on October 11, 2004, the employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center in Zambales to cast their votes. The remaining employees situated at the SBFZ plant cast their votes as well. Due to the heavy pressure exerted by petitioners, the votes for "no union" prevailed.
3rd CAUSE:
A memorandum was issued by petitioner Ben Huang (Huang), Director for Gin Queen, informed its employees of the expiration of the lease contract between Gin Queen and its lessor in Castillejos, Zambales and announced the relocation of its office and workers to Cabangan, Zambales.
When the respondents, visited the site in Cabangan, discovered that it was a "talahiban" or grassland. The said union officers and members were made to work as grass cutters in Cabangan, under the supervision of a certain Barangay Captain Greg Pangan. Due to these circumstances, the employees assigned in Cabangan did not report for work. The other employees who likewise failed to report in Cabangan were meted out with suspension.
PETITIONERS’ DEFENSE:
In its defense, Petitioners also stress that they cannot be held liable for ULP for the reason that there is no employer-employee relationship between the former and respondents. Further, Gin Queen avers that its decision to implement an enforced rotation of work assignments for respondents was a management prerogative permitted by law, justified due to the decrease in orders from its customers, they had to resort to cost cutting measures to avoid anticipated financial losses. Thus, it assigned work on a rotational basis. It explains that its failure to present concrete proof of its decreasing orders was due to the impossibility of proving a negative assertion. It also asserts that the transfer from Castillejos to Cabangan was made in good faith and solely because of the expiration of its lease contract in Castillejos. It was of the impression that the employees, who opposed its economic measures, were merely motivated by spite in filing the complaint for ULP against it.
Issues: Whether ULP acts were committed by petitioners against respondents.
Ruling: ULP were committed by petitioners against respondents.
Petitioners are being accused of violations of paragraphs (a), (c), and (e) of Article 257 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code,13 to wit:
Article 257. Unfair labor practices of employers.––It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
x x x x
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; x x x x
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. x x x
The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled certification election; 2) the active campaign by the sales officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the field trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center; 4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents’ functions; 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site to work as grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union members, taken together, reasonably support an inference that, indeed, such were all
orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free exercise of their right to self-organization.
The Court is of the considered view those petitioners’ undisputed actions prior and immediately before the scheduled certification election, while seemingly innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in selecting their exclusive bargaining representative.
Wesleyan University-Phils., vs. Wesleyan University-Phils., Faculty & Staff Asso.
GR No. 181806, March 12, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Wesleyan University-Philippines is a stock, non-profit educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Respondent Wesleyan University-Philippines Faculty and Staff Association, on the other hand, is a duly registered labor organization acting as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file faculty and staff employees of petitioner.
In December 2003, the parties signed a 5-year CBA effective June 1, 2003 until May 31, 2008.
On August 16, 2005, petitioner, through its President, Atty. Maglaya , issued a Memorandum providing guidelines on the implementation of vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave commutation which states that vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits would be earned on a month-to-month and only vacation leave is commuted or monetized to cash which is effected after the second year of continuous service of an employee.
Respondents questioned the guidelines for being violative of existing practices and the CBA which provide that all covered employees are entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days vacation leave with pay every year and that after the second year of service, all unused vacation leave shall be converted to cash and paid to the employee at the end of each school year, not later than August 30 of each year. Respondent file a grievance complaint on the implementation of the vacation and sick leave policy. Petitioner also announced its plan of implementing a one-retirement policy which was unacceptable to respondent.
Respondent submitted affidavits to prove that there is an established practice of giving two retirement benefits, one from the Private Education Retirement Annuity Association (PERAA) Plan and another from the CBA Retirement Plan.
The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision declaring the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 contrary to law. CA also affirmed the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator. Petitioner argues that there is only one retirement plan as the CBA Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and the same. It maintains that there is no established company practice or policy of giving two retirement benefits to its employees. Respondent belies the claims of petitioner and asserts that there are two retirement plans as
the PERAA Retirement Plan, which has been implemented for more than 30 years, is different from the CBA Retirement Plan. Respondent further avers that it has always been a practice of petitioner to give two retirement benefits and that this practice was established by substantial evidence as found by both the Voluntary Arbitrator and the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents are entitled to two retirement plans.
Ruling: The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits employers from eliminating or reducing the benefits received by their employees. This rule, however, applies only if the benefit is based on an express policy, a written contract, or has ripened into a practice. To be considered a practice, it must be consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a long period of time. Respondent was able to present substantial evidence in the form of affidavits to support its claim that there are two retirement plans. Based on the affidavits, petitioner has been giving two retirement benefits as early as 1997. Petitioner, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence to refute the veracity of these affidavits. Petitioner's assertion that there is only one retirement plan as the CBA Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and the same is not supported by any evidence.
The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 is contrary to the existing CBA. It limits the available leave credits of an employee at the start of the school year. The Memorandum dated imposes a limitation not agreed upon by the parties nor stated in the CBA, so it must be struck down.
Handwritten
Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Co., vs. Esteban
Citing 2011 Nina Jewelry Manufacturing of Metal Arts Inc. vs. Montecillo
GR No. 192582, April 7, 2014, Facts:
The respondent was employed as a sales clerk and assigned at the petitioner’s boutique. Her primary tasks were attending to all customer needs, ensuring efficient inventory, coordinating orders from clients, cashiering and reporting to the accounting department. The petitioner learned that some of their employees had access to their POS system with the use of a universal password given to them by a certain Elmer Flores, who in turn learned of the password from the respondent. The petitioner then conducted an investigation and asked the petitioner to explain why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with. During the investigation the respondent was placed under preventive suspension. After investigation the petitioner terminated the respondent on the grounds of loss of trust or confidence. This respondent was given her final wage and benefits less the inventory variance incurred by the store. This urged the respondent to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension, holiday pay, rest day and separation pay. The labor arbiter ruled in her favour awarding her backwages. The petitioner appealed the decision in the NLRC and the decision was reversed. However, upon the respondent’s petition for certiorari in the court of appeals the decision was reinstated. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the negative sales variance could be validly deducted from the respondent’s wage?
Ruling: No, it cannot be deducted in this case.
Article 113 of the Labor Code provides that no employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees, except in cases where the employer is
authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, among others. The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, meanwhile, provides:
SECTION 14. Deduction for loss or damage. — Where the employer is engaged in a trade, occupation or business where the practice of making deductions or requiring deposits is
recognized to answer for the reimbursement of loss or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer to the employee, the employer may make wage deductions or require the employees to make deposits from which deductions shall be made, subject to the following conditions:
a) That the employee concerned is clearly shown to be responsible for the loss or damage;
b) That the employee is given reasonable opportunity to show cause why deduction should not be made;
c) That the amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable and shall not exceed the actual loss or damage; and
d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does not exceed 20 percent of the employee's wages in a week. In this case, the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that Esteban was responsible for the negative variance it had in its sales for the year 2005 to 2006 and that Esteban was given the opportunity to show cause the deduction from her last salary should not be made.
Furthermore, the court ruled, in Nina Jewelry Marketing of Metal Arts, Inc. v. Montecillo, that:
[T]he petitioners should first establish that the making of
deductions from the salaries is authorized by law, or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. Further, the posting of cash bonds should be proven as a recognized practice in the jewelry manufacturing business, or alternatively, the petitioners should seek for the determination by the Secretary of Labor through the
issuance of appropriate rules and regulations that the policy the former seeks to implement is necessary or desirable in the conduct of business. The petitioners failed in this respect. It bears stressing that without proofs that requiring deposits and effecting deductions are recognized practices, or without
securing the Secretary of Labor's determination of the necessity or desirability of the same, the imposition of new policies relative to deductions and deposits can be made subject to abuse by the employers. This is not what the law intends.
Netlink Computer Inc. vs. Delmo GR No. 160827, June 18, 2014
Libcap Marketing Cor., vs. Baquial GR No. 1921011, June 30, 2014
PLDT vs. Estranero
GR No. 192518 Oct. 15, 2014
Milan vs. National Labor Relations Commission GR No. 202961, Feb. 4, 2015
MINIMUM LABOR STANDARD BENEFITS
Radio Mindanao Network Inc. et al., vs. Ybarola, Jr. G.R. No. 198662, Sept. 12, 2012
David/Yiels Hog Dealer vs. Macasio GR No. 195466, July 2, 2014
OTHER SPECIAL BENEFITS
Radio Mindanao Network Inc, et al., vs. Ybarola, Jr. et al. G.R. No. 198662, September 12, 2012
Padillo vs. Rural Bank of Nabunturan Inc. G.R. No. 199338, Jan. 21, 2013
Phil Spring Water Resources Inc. vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 205278, June 11, 2014
Goodyear Philippines Inc. vs. Angus GR No. 185449, November 12, 2015
RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE
Herrera Manois vs. St. Scholastica’s College GR No. 188914, Dec. 11, 2013
Facts: SSC, situated in the City of Manila, is a private educational institution offering elementary, secondary, and tertiary education. Manaois graduated from SSC in October 1992 with a degree in Bachelor of Arts in English. In 1994, she returned to her alma mater as a part-time English teacher. After taking a leave of absence for one year, she was again rehired by SSC for the same position. Four years into the service, she was later on recommended by her Department Chairperson to become a full-time faculty member of the English Department.
Manaois thus applied for a position as full-time instructor for school year 2000-2001.
She mentioned in her application letter that she had been taking the course Master of Arts in English Studies, Major in Creative Writing, at the University of the Philippines, Diliman (UP); that she was completing her master's thesis; and that her oral defense was scheduled for June 2000. In a reply letter 4 dated 17 April 2000, the Dean of Arts and Sciences informed her of the SSC Administrative Council's approval of her application. SSC hired her as a probationary full-time faculty member with the assigned task of instructor for the school year 2000-2001. Her probationary employment continued for a total of three consecutive years.
Because of the forthcoming completion of her third year of probationary employment, Manaois wrote the Dean of Arts and Sciences requesting an extension of her teaching load for the school year 2003-2004. Manaois eventually received a letter from the Dean of College and Chairperson of the Promotions and Permanency Board officially informing her of the board's decision not to renew her contract.
Issue: Whether the completion of a master's degree is required in order for a tertiary level educator to earn the status of permanency in a private educational institution.
Held:
Probationary employment refers to the trial stage or period during which the employer examines the competency and qualifications of job applicants, and determines whether they are qualified to be extended permanent employment status. Such an arrangement affords an employer the opportunity — before the full force of the guarantee of security of tenure comes into play — to fully scrutinize and observe the fitness and worth of probationers while on the job and to determine whether they would become proper and efficient employees. It also gives the probationers the chance to prove to the employer that they possess the necessary qualities and qualifications to meet reasonable standards for permanent employment.
Viewed next to the statements and actions of Manaois — i.e., the references to obtaining a master's degree in her application letter, in the subsequent correspondences between her and SSC, and in the letter seeking the extension of a teaching load for the school year 2003-2004; and her submission of certifications from UP and from her thesis adviser — we find that there is indeed substantial evidence proving that she knew about the necessary academic qualifications to obtain the status of permanency.
At this juncture, we reiterate the rule that mere completion of the three-year probation, even with an above-average performance, does not guarantee that the employee will automatically acquire a permanent employment status. It is settled jurisprudence that the probationer can only qualify upon fulfillment of the reasonable standards set for permanent employment as a member of the teaching personnel.
Thus, pursuant to the 1992 Manual, private educational institutions in the tertiary level may extend "full-time faculty" status only to those who possess, inter alia, a master's degree in the field of study that will be taught. This minimum requirement is neither subject to the prerogative of the school nor to the agreement between the parties. For all intents and purposes, this qualification must be deemed impliedly written in the employment contracts between private educational institutions and prospective faculty members. The issue of whether probationers were informed of this academic requirement before they were engaged as probationary employees is thus no longer material, as those who are seeking to be educators are presumed to know these mandated qualifications. In the light of the failure of Manaois to satisfy the academic requirements for the position, she may only be considered as a part-time instructor pursuant to Section 45 of the 1992 Manual.
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp., vs. Acibo GR No. 186439, January 15, 2014
Facts: URSUMCO is a domestic corporation engaged in the sugar cane milling business; Cabati is URSUMCO's Business Unit General Manager. The complainants were employees of URSUMCO. They were hired on various dates (between February 1988 and April 1996) and on different capacities, 8 i.e., drivers, crane operators, bucket hookers, welders, mechanics, laboratory attendants and aides, steel workers, laborers, carpenters and masons, among others. At the start of their respective engagements, the complainants signed contracts of employment for a period of one (1) month or for a given season. URSUMCO repeatedly hired the complainants to perform the same duties and, for every engagement, required the latter to sign new employment contracts for the same duration of one month or a given season.
The complainants filed before the LA complaints for regularization, entitlement to the benefits under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), and attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are regular employees of URSUMCO
Held: We find the respondents to be regular seasonal employees of URSUMCO.
Seasonal employment operates much in the same way as project employment, albeit it involves work or service that is seasonal in nature or lasting for the duration of the season. As with project employment, although the seasonal employment arrangement involves work that is seasonal or periodic in nature, the employment itself is not automatically considered seasonal so as to prevent the employee from attaining regular status. To exclude the asserted "seasonal" employee from those classified as regular employees, the employer must show that: (1) the employee must be performing work or services that are seasonal in nature; and (2) he had been employed for the duration of the season. Hence, when the "seasonal" workers are continuously and repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks or activities for several seasons or even after the cessation of the season, this length of time may likewise serve as badge of regular employment. In fact, even though denominated as "seasonal workers," if these workers are called to work from time to time and are only temporarily laid off during the off-season, the law does not consider them separated from the service during the off-season period. The law simply considers these seasonal workers on leave until re-employed.
The nature of the employment depends on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the nature of the employer's business, the duration and scope to be done, and, in some
cases, even the length of time of the performance and its continued existence. In light of the above legal parameters laid down by the law and applicable jurisprudence, the respondents are neither project, seasonal nor fixed-term employees, but regular seasonal workers of URSUMCO.
(1) The respondents were made to perform various tasks that did not at all pertain to any specific phase of URSUMCO's strict milling operations that would ultimately cease upon completion of a particular phase in the milling of sugar; rather, they were tasked to perform duties regularly and habitually needed in URSUMCO's operations during the milling season.
(2) The respondents were regularly and repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks year after year.
Handwritten
Abbott Laboratories vs. Alcaraz, En Banc Resolution
GR No. 192571, April 22, 2014; see main decision of July 23, 2013
Noblejas vs. Italian Maritime Academy Phils GR No. 207888, June 9, 2014
Phil Spring Water Resources Inc. vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 205278, June 11, 2014
Omni hauling Services Inc. et al., vs. Tortoles GR No. 199388, Sept. 3, 2014
Hacienda Ledd vs. Villegas GR No. 179654, Sept. 22, 2014
FVR Skills & Services Exponents Inc. et al., vs. Seva, et al. GR No. 200857, Oct. 22, 2014
Manalo vs.TNS Phils, Inc. GR No. 208567, Nov. 26, 2014
Fuji Television Network vs Espiritu GR no. 204944-45, December 3, 2014
Gadia vs. Sykes
GR No. 209499, January 28, 2015
Basan vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. GR No. 174365, Feb. 4, 2015
Hacienda Cataywa vs. Lorezo GR No. 179640, March 18, 2015
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
Celdran vs. Forza Integrated Services GR No. 189460, June 5, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Leo Mario C. Celdran was hired by private respondent City Service as Vice-President for the Visayas Regional Office in Cebu City. Private respondents City Service Corporation and Peerless Integrated Services, Incorporated are affiliate companies of respondent FORZA Integrated Corporation. According to petitioner, his compensation package included a car plan wherein they would assume the remaining balance of his car plan, with 50% by the company and the other 50% by Celdran himself; but, to private respondents, it was a car lease arrangement. Celdran consistently refused to sign the said lease contract as it was contrary to what he allegedly agreed with private respondent Valentin B. Prieto, Jr. during his employment interview way back in May 2005.
On November 10, 2005, Celdran was accused of dishonesty, for charging a personal lunch to the company, and was demanded to resign by the Chief Operating Officer Santiago. Celdran received a termination notice signed by private respondent Santiago which led the former to file a complaint for illegal dismissal on November 22, 2005, before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, the said case was settled as he was reinstated to his position on December 27, 2005.
However, upon his return, Celdran was told to occupy the last open cubicle at the ground floor ands given a new copy of the motor vehicle lease contract for his signature which he refused to sign. He was relieved as Mancom Chairman for no reason at all. He was subjected to check and inspection by the security guard and his transportation and cellular phone allowances were subjected to new guidelines. Private
