P
P
O
O
L
L
I
I
T
T
I
I
C
C
A
A
L
L
L
L
A
A
W
W
R
R
E
E
V
V
I
I
E
E
W
W
E
E
R
R
S
S
U
U
P
P
P
P
L
L
E
E
M
M
E
E
N
N
T
T
F
F
O
O
R
R
4
4
-
-
D
D
ARTICLE II - DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Doctrines
Some provisions of the Health Sector Reform Agenda are challenged on the ground that they violate 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. However, these provisions are not self-executory. Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA. G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007.
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CA President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units.
Issue: WON EO102 is constitutional?
Held: YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded.
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non
self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Doctrines
The LTFRB and the DOTC cannot order owners of PUV to use CNG as an alternative to gasoline. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Henares v. LTFRB, GR 158290, October 23, 2006.
HENARES V. LTFRB
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." Issue: WON LTFRB CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUVs TO USE CNG THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS? Held: NO. Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa, where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come."
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
ARTICLE III - BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Doctrines
An EO ordering the closure of bus terminals in the city is an unreasonable exercise of police power. Moreover, even if the E.O. were valid, the MMD is the wrong person to carry it out since this matter has been given by law to DOTC. MMDA v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 170657, August 15, 2007; Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 174, 185.
The PD that orders discontinuance of a pension of a retired military officer if he becomes a citizen of another country does not violate equal protection. Parreño v. COA, G.R. 162224 June 7, 2007
MMDA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PGMA issued the E.O. “Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System.” As the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA had “recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities” which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project. The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT 179 IS CONSTITUTIONAL? Held: No, the petition fails. EO179 is null and void for being ultra vires. Petitioners submit that the real issue concerns the President’s authority to undertake or to cause the implementation of the Project. They assert that the authority of the President is derived from E.O. No. 125, “Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes,” her residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also a valid exercise of the police power.
EO125 mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. Further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the authority and responsibility to exercise the mandate given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, it follows that the President may exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the President’s power of control over all executive departments as well as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution. This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987.
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. But are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
This Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of respondents’ terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents’ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of “colorum” buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might
even be more effective in easing the traffic situation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major thoroughfares.
LUCENA TERMINAL, INC. V. JAC LINER, INC. JAC Liner, Inc. assails City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the ordinances.
Issue: WHETHER POLICE POWER WAS PROPERLY EXERCISED WHEN THE SUBJECT ORDINANCES WERE ENACTED?
Held: NO. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems. As for petitioner’s argument that the challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to "[r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places": Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not extend to terminals.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.
But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se. Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.
PARREÑO V. COA
Salvador Parreño served in the AFP for 32 years. In 1982, petitioner retired, availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, he started receiving his monthly pension. He migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD1638, providing that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Parreno then requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.
He then filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension. COA denied petitioner’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alleged that the COA has the power and authority to incidentally rule on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner alleged that a direct recourse to the court would be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioner further alleged that since his monthly pension involves government funds, the reason for the termination of the pension is subject to COA’s authority and jurisdiction.
COA denied the motion. It ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply if the administrative body has, in the first place, no jurisdiction over the case. COA also ruled that assuming it has jurisdiction over the claim, petitioner’s entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
Issue: Whether COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of PD 1638?
Held: NO. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, money claims against the government shall be filed before the COA. The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. Petitioner’s money claim essentially involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim.
Petitioner submits that the COA has the authority to order the restoration of his pension even without ruling on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. However, COA effectively denied petitioner’s claim because of the loss of his Filipino citizenship. Petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Unless the provision is amended or repealed in the future, the AFP has to apply Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrines
Q. EO 420 orders all government agencies and government owned and controlled corporations to streamline and harmonize their ID systems. The EO is challenged on the ground that (1) it requires legislation and (2) it violates the right to privacy. A. (1) EO 420 applies only to executive entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420.
(2) EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of their governmental functions. KMU v. Director General, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006.
NOTE: A private entity may be held liable for illegal search under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Silahis Internatinal v. Soluta, G.R. 163087, February 20, 2006.
KMU V. DIRECTOR GENERAL
Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. Petitioners allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
Issues/Held:
1. WON EO 420 IS A USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY THE PRESIDENT.
NO. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Under her constitutional power of control, the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.
Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power - the President’s constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a person as an employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee, student or member of a club.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that presently issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure integrity and reliability of identification.
There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for government
entities under the Executive department. If government entities under the Executive department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power.
2. WON EO 420 INFRINGES ON RIGHT TO PRIVACY? NO. On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other public services. Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, "The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court."
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a "National Computerized Identification Reference System," a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the President’s constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the
President’s constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL V. SOLUTA
Marijuana was allegedly found in the Union Office by officers of the Corporation. As a result of the discovery of marijuana, and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed before the Manila RTC a Complaint for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. Lower court adjudged that there was an illegal search and that the officers of the Corporation were civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides civil liability for private individuals who violate the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: WON THERE WAS AN ILLEGAL SEARCH?
Held: YES, hence the petitioners are civilly liable. Petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay. As for petitioners’ contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the same does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure. While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof.28 There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise, however.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.30 Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code.
Petitioners cite People v. Marti31 to support their thesis that the determinants in the validity of the constitutional right against searches and seizure cannot be invoked against private individuals. But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case, bears on the issue of whether "an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of [one’s] constitutional rights, [may] be invoked against the State." In other words, the issue in that case was whether the evidence obtained by a private person, acting
in a private capacity without the participation of the State, is admissible. The issue in the present civil case, however, is whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. As reflected above, Article 32, in relation to Arts. 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Doctrines
Q. Petitioners assail B.P. No. 880, “The Public Assembly Act of 1985,” either in toto or in some parts, as being violative of the right of assembly and petition. They also assail the policy of “calibrated preemptive response.”
A. Calibrated preemptive response has been denied by Ermita. At any rate, it has no place in the constitutional firmament. As to BP 880, it codifies the JBL Reyes case. But BP’s order to set up freedom parks must be followed and implemented within 30 days, otherwise all public parks in the local unit concerned will be considered freedom parks. Bayan v Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006.
Q. GMA Network aired a telecast by Rey Vidal reporting the case filed by members of the Medical Board Exams reporting alleged anomalies in the Medical Board exams. The report was based on the court pleadings but it was accompanied by an old file video of doctors in black armbands parading in front of PGH. Was the video report libelous?
A. The report based on the content of the complaint was privileged. The file video did not constitute malice. Malice means the offender is prompted by ill-will or spite with intent to injure. GMA Network v. Bustos, G.R. 146848, October 17, 2006.
BAYAN V. ERMITA
Petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides:
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements. All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. (h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf; (c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the
application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares; 4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA – “The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.”
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
Issue: WON BP 880 IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
Held: YES. B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes. The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard - the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time.
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the law’s system of regulation of the people’s exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880.
At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, meaning “the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.”
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as
provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
GMA NETWORK V. BUSTOS
The Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the physicians’ licensure examinations. Out of the total 2,835 examinees who took the examinations, 941 failed. A certain Abello and over 200 other unsuccessful examinees filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers.
As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, among other beats, Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news coverage for the evening news edition of GMA’s Channel 7 Headline News.
Stung by what they claim to be a false, malicious and one-sided report filed and narrated by a remorseless reporter, the herein respondents instituted a damage suit against Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then known as the Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. They added that, as a measure to make a forceful impact on their audience, the defendants made use of an unrelated and old footage (showing physicians wearing black armbands) to make it appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the video footage in question actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital management. Lower court dismissed the action, but the CA reversed and ordered respondents to pay damages.
Issues/Held:
(1) WON THE TELEVISED NEWS REPORT IN QUESTION ON THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS IS LIBELOUS?
NO. An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches present the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact) or may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the imputation (malice in law). Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown
that the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Conceding hypothetically that some failing specifically against the respondents had been ascribed in that news telecast, it bears to stress that not all imputations of some discreditable act or omission, if there be any, are considered malicious thus supplying the ground for actionable libel. For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the presumption.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of these are speeches or debates made by Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in any of its committees. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
To be sure, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest.
In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter, the same being the product of a simple narration of the allegations set forth in the mandamus petition of examinees Abello, et al., devoid of any comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found the narration to be without accompanying distortive or defamatory comments or remarks. What at bottom petitioners Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then did was simply to inform the public of the mandamus petition filed against the respondent doctors who were admittedly the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine. It was clearly within petitioner Vidal’s job as news writer and reporter assigned to cover government institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments therein. It must be reiterated that the courts a quo had determined the news report in question to be qualifiedly privileged communication protected under the 1987 Constitution.
(2) WON INSERTION OF OLD FILM FOOTAGE CONSTITUTES MALICE TO WARRANT DAMAGES? NO. Contrary to the CA’s findings, the identifying character-generated words "file video" appeared to have been superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of televiewers of the idea that a particular footage is current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public." The trial court added the
observation that "the use of file footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice." At any rate, the absence of the accompanying character-generated words "file video" would not change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. For, with the view we take of the state of things, the video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.
In all, the Court holds and so rules that the subject news report was clearly a fair and true report, a simple narration of the allegations contained in and circumstances surrounding the filing by the unsuccessful examinees of the petition for mandamus before the court, and made without malice. Thus, we find the petitioners entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. It follows that they too cannot be held liable for damages sought by the respondents, who, during the period material, were holding public office.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Doctrines
Q. Petitioners’ counsel requested public respondent to allow Atty. Paredes to personally check the records of the intestate case. Acting on the request, the Officer-In- Charge/Legal Researcher of the court advised petitioners’ counsel in writing that “per instruction of the Hon. Presiding Judge, only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of a case pending in this Court,” and that they may be “allowed to go over the records of the above-entitled case upon presentation of written authority from the administratrix.” Correct?
A. Decisions and opinions of a court are, of course, matters of public concern or interest. Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or interest. They are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. Hilado et al vs. Judge Reyes, G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006.
The refusal of the Comelec to reveal the names of the nominees for party-list seats violates the right of the people to information on maters of public concern. It also violate the rule on transparency in II,27. Ba-Ra 7941 v. Comelec, GR 177271, May 4, 2007.
HILADO ET AL VS. JUDGE REYES
Julita Campos Benedicto, the surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto S. Benedicto, was appointed Administratrix of the estate of Benedicto, and letters of administration were thereafter issued in her favor. Herein petitioners had, during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed two complaints for damages or collection of sums of money, against Roberto Benedicto et al. In the initial inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted in the case before the Manila RTC, she listed, among other liabilities of the estate, the claims of petitioners subject of the above-said Bacolod RTC cases. From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC allowed petitioners through counsel Sedigo and Associates to regularly and periodically examine the records of the case and to secure certified true copies thereof.
By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an associate of petitioners’ counsel, was denied access to the last folder-record of the case which, according to the court’s clerical staff, could not be located and was probably inside the chambers of public respondent for safekeeping.
In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the public has the right to access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof, recognition of which right is enjoined under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: WON the petitioner’s right to information was violated? Held: Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial records, the term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter’s notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has received in a case.
It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in the administration of justice, to the end that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial proceedings, safeguard the integrity of the fact-finding process, and foster an informed public discussion of governmental affairs. Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public.
Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of
public concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed to, the purpose for which the parties filed them is to be considered. In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the purpose of establishing their right to a share of the estate. As for the creditors, their purpose is to establish their claim to the estate and be paid therefor before the disposition of the estate. Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the manner by which his private estate may ultimately be settled is not a matter of general, public concern or one in which a citizen or the public has an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities maybe affected. Granting unrestricted public access and publicity to personal financial information may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an individual may have an interest in limiting its disclosure or dissemination. If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen’s constitutional right to information.
The accessory right to access public records may, however, be restricted on a showing of good cause. How "good cause" can be determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Republican Company v. Appeals Court teaches: “The public’s right of access to judicial records, including transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and court orders, maybe restricted, but only on a showing of "good cause." "To determine whether good cause is shown, a judge must balance the rights of the parties based on the particular facts of each case." In so doing, the judge "must take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the nature of the parties and the controversy, the type of information and the privacy interests involved, the extent of community interest, and the reason for the request.” And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and protective powers of every court over its own records and files. In fine, this Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners being "interested persons" who have a legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records of the case.
BA-RA 7941 VS. COMELEC
Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales’ earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the Comelec, “collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying … the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx” Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows: “RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m.