Since the middle of the twentieth century Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, has been dogged by war and its ever present partners; conquest, famine and death. Much debate can be, and is, had about who or what is to blame for this sorry state of affairs, and what is certain is that there are no shortage of political commentators who are all too happy to tell you their theories. In B’Maso I have attempted, but not always succeeded, to avoid any such postulating.
Instead of politics, what the gamer will find inside is lots of information that will, I hope, allow him to refight a selection of African wars, stretching from the 1950s up to the 1990s across thousands of miles and hundreds of cultures. There are rule changes and additions that will help the gamer produce games that capture the feel of the various conflicts – some generic to Africa, others specific to one conflict. As will be seen, so much of the fighting in Africa was, in effect, the embodiment of the cold war fought by proxies. This can mean that all sorts of weird and wonderful equipment can turn up, from pre-WWII armoured trucks to the most modern technology.
In many places it is impossible to provide detailed orders of battle, as formations operated on an entirely ad hoc basis, using anything that they could lay their hands on. What we have done throughout, however, is provide information on organisational structures and equipment that was used by the various nations, factions, tribes and groups. These are backed up with some introductory scenarios that, we hope, will capture some of the aspects of each conflict. Demands of space dictate that we cannot give a comprehensive breakdown of every conflict, what there is will hopefully be enough to inspire the gamer on to themselves research the conflicts that interest them.
The wars that I have chosen to represent here, in what is a double supplement that can be used for both our I Ain’t Been Shot Mum company level rules and Troops Weapons & Tactics for smaller platoon sized games, are conflicts that I can only attempt to describe as colonial wars. It is, I fear, a messy description. The conflict in Nigeria and Biafra along with that in the Congo were, without doubt, post-colonial, as indeed was the struggle for power that occurred in Angola in 1975, however these events are so closely related to those nations’ independence that I have felt them important to include here, especially as the influence of the white man in Africa, in the shape of the ubiquitous mercenary, played such an important part in those conflicts.
I struggle even more when I apply the term “colonial” to South Africa and her conflicts. The South African government was not a colonial government, however her presence in South West Africa, originally by Mandate and then later without it, fits well with the nature of the conflicts covered.
Which brings me on to terminology used. Guerrilla, Freedom Fighter, Rebel, Terrorist; the arguments are as long as your arm, and usually tedious, typified by the statement that “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”; a stupid cliché most often used by people who have never seen, nor are likely to see, the results of a terrorist’s actions at first hand. In B’Maso have used the terminology that I am most comfortable with. To my mind a guerrilla is a fighter who uses irregular tactics, a terrorist is someone who wages war through terrorising a civilian population, a freedom fighter is someone who can do either but you just happen to agree with his view point. In all of the above cases, be it “colonial”, “terrorist” or “rebel”, I hope that the terms that I use do not cause offence.
The Africa presented in this supplement is a big continent, where larger than life characters walked the stage, both politically and militarily. Hopefully this supplement can provide us with a window on these conflicts and give us an insight into the interesting tactical lessons of our historical counterparts.
Richard Clarke Lard Island, 2008
Introduction to Guerrilla
Warfare in Africa
Page 4
Rule Changes For B’Maso! Page
11
Kenya – The Mau Mau Revolt
Page 19
The Congo – Guns for Hire
Page 27
Nigerian - The Biafran War
Page 46
Rhodesia – War In the Bush
Page 56
Angola, Guinea, Mozambique
Portugal’s
Wars
Page
69
Angola, the Battle For Power Page 81
South West Africa
War on the Border
Page 90
Blinds & Markers for B’Maso
Page 105
Scenarios for B’Maso!
Page 107
“Put yourself in their shoes: ‘Man, if I talk to the police the terrs are going to come in and kill me and my whole family.’ The same thing happened in Rhodesia, in Kenya during the Mau Mau, in Angola and Mozambique – in fact in about every African country where Russian backed “liberation movements” have operated. Believe me, it works”
Senior Officer, Koevoet, South West Africa Police
There is a tendency to consider guerrilla warfare as a modern manifestation, almost a new, somewhat abhorrent, form of war that is somehow inferior to the gentlemanly conflict that occurred in earlier times. Some commentators deny this, pointing out that two thousand years ago Sun Tzu was advocating the use of deception and cunning to defeat his opponents, concentrating your own strength, and striking where your foe is weakest.
In fact there is truth in both arguments. There have indeed always been small forces that have attempted to strike blows against a larger opponent – the guerrillas in Spain who gave birth to the name being a classic example. What had changed, as we entered the middle of the twentieth century was the existence of military forces that owed their allegiance to a political creed rather than specifically to a nation state and the supercedence of this within the context of a global political struggle. Indeed it was Chairman Mao who took the writings of Sun Tsu and applied them to modern warfare, and provided a blueprint that many left wing groups around the world have used as their model every since.
The Mao’ Blueprint
In its simplest form Mao’s blueprint was based on avoiding direct confrontation with a stronger opponent. The first stage was to establish a network of bases within the general population from where the guerrilla forces could operate. Mao is quite clear in his instructions to Chinese communist forces during their civil war that they should behave in a manner that will endear the local population. These were, specifically as follows: (1) Not to do what is likely to damage the land and crops or spoil the houses and belongings of the people; (2) Not to insist on buying or borrowing what the people are not willing to sell or lend; (3) Never to break our word; (4) Not to do or speak what is likely to make people believe that we hold them in contempt; (5) To help them in their daily work; harvesting, fetching firewood, carrying water, sewing, and so on. This was not to suggest that Mao was attempting to make an omelette without break eggs, far from it, he was more than prepared to ingratiate himself with the peasant population by ruthlessly murdering “enemies of the people”. However in a country with a predominantly peasant population this was (initially) a relatively small percentage of people and could be presented as a way of freeing the peasants from landowners and money lenders. Indeed Mao’s whole policy with regards the civilian population was to differentiate his communist forces from those of the Nationalist warlords who had scant, if any, consideration for the population at large. The next phase of Mao’s plan was to strike hard at carefully selected points, causing maximum harm to his opponents, before withdrawing rapidly in order to fight again another day. Small outposts and supply convoys were the obvious targets. Not only were they relatively easy meat, but this approach had two very specific benefits. Firstly the morale of the enemy forces took a blow; they were losing troops with little or no hope of striking back in a “fair fight”. Secondly manpower resources were stretched as in order to maintain a presence in an area the outposts had to be strengthened in order to resist more effectively if attacked. This kept large numbers of troops tied down facing the mere possibility of a threat. Thirdly the life blood of the army, its ammunition and supplies, were restricted, in theory to the point where they were unable to function effectively.
It was at this point, with his opponent degraded to the point of ineffectiveness and shackled by having to maintain huge garrisons, that Mao recommended moving to conventional warfare and defeating his enemies in detail. In essence this is a simple and effective strategic plan. Naturally the Devil is in the detail, and how the blueprint is applied will determine success or failure, but it certainly served as the model used throughout sub-Saharan Africa.
Of course Mao’s blueprint was devised for China where he had the advantage of operating in an environment that was largely exclusively Chinese with a peasantry that had little to lose. In Africa the liberation movements that sprung up from 1951 onwards were usually dealing with a colonial power that was well established in the area; the Portuguese, for example, first establish bases in West Africa in 1483. In many cases the colonial governments had a significant degree of support from the indigenous population who had gradually been increasingly empowered and encouraged to invest in the status quo. Indeed the political mantra of the left, with the downtrodden native oppressed by the evil white colonialist, was a simplistic parody of what was actually a complex co-existence, the nature of which varied from one area to another reflecting local circumstance and history. Let us look then at the systems that existed in sub-Saharan Africa before independence.
Portugal
In the case of Portugal the “colonies” of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau were, in fact, not colonies at all; from the 1950’s onwards they were overseas provinces of Portugal itself. In these provinces the goal of the Portuguese government was to assimilate the black population to the point where they were equal Portuguese citizens (a policy that had its roots in pronouncements dating back to the 1600’s). Indeed a person of African or mixed race who spoke Portuguese, was a Christian, had signed a declaration of loyalty and could support himself financially was in every respect a Portuguese citizen with no colour bar. This is, of course, fine in theory, however it excluded 99% of Africans who due to accident of birth and lack of educational opportunity were unable to achieve this lofty ideal
Interestingly it was these Assimilados, assimilated Africans with Portuguese status, who provided the intellectual core of the independence movement, objecting in principle to the presence of the Portuguese in their land despite their own personal advantages. Nevertheless the fact remains that relationships between the Portuguese and their African citizens were generally good and after the Lisbon coup of 1974 the hand-over of power to the African population was good natured if embarrassingly hasty.
Britain
In Britain’s colonies the relationship between the administration and their black population was somewhat different. The colonies were largely governed from Britain through the Colonial Office, historically they had been administered as cheaply as possible so that they paid their way within the British Empire. This statement suggests that the British were in Africa purely to exploit the resources, and to an extent that is true, however unlike India, where this was largely the plan of the Honourable East India Company from the outset, the colonisation of Africa was in many ways accidental. Indeed much of the expansion into the African hinterland occurred more to stop other nations, such as France, Germany, Portugal and Belgium getting their first. A poor blueprint for an Empire.
Once in place, however, the British were typically efficient in all that they did and the energy of the settlers ensured that the colonies’ development took on its own dynamic. Mines and farms were the first commercial concerns, followed by low-level industrialisation within the cities that grew as more settlers arrived from the UK, and more Africans were drawn to the cities by the wages that were offered for willing workers. Rightly or wrongly the sums of monies available for Africans was far less than that paid to the British settlers, but relative to their traditional income it was still a King’s ransom that allowed many to purchase items that their parents could not have imagined, let alone afforded.
A system of District Officers meant that the Colonial administration was in touch with local concerns and issues, and the men who took these posts formed a strong link with the indigenous population, being the dispenser of justice on the more trivial cases that punctuated every day life. What emerged was a paternalistic approach that, whilst sincere, would appear patronising when a more educated black middle class emerged.
From the end of the nineteenth century onwards these colonies were on a path of development that saw a modern infrastructure established. Roads, water, medical services and the law were all provided, whilst
education for the Africans was largely the preserve of the Church until the mid-twentieth century when the colonial administrations recognised that if they were going to develop and modernise the colonies further they would need to educate the indigenous population. Indeed by the 1950s the Colonial Office was recognising that the future was based on an orderly transition of power to the indigenous population. What they failed to recognise was the speed with which this would have to happen, with their own projections suggesting that the colonies would remain just that until the early twenty-first century. In most of Britain’s colonies the white settler population was small enough to recognise that they could not stand in the way of the winds of change that were about to sweep through the continent. Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Uganda and even Northern Rhodesia slipped quietly away to be replaced with Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In Kenya the 55,000 white settlers, supported by 165,000 Asians, had aspirations to become a self-governing colony. Despite their limited numbers (there were 6.5 million Africans in the colony) they were firmly in control of the political and economic structures. The experience of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya was, however, sufficient to show that the African population had aspirations that, were Britain to retain any influence in the area, would have to be met. Only in one colony, Southern Rhodesia, was the settler population strong enough to challenge the plans of the British government.
Rhodesia
Unique within Africa, Southern Rhodesia had been a self-governing colony since 1923, the next step that the white population envisaged would be to move to a Dominion status like New Zealand, Canada and Australia. By the early 1960’s, however, the British government saw the next step as being independence of a different kind; with a black majority government. This was unacceptable to the settlers who by 1965 had had ample opportunity to see the events in the Belgian Congo unfold into a bestial conflict. Their call was for a continuation of “civilised rule”, and they elected a Prime Minister in the shape of Ian Smith who was prepared to force the political pace and unilaterally declare Independence for what by then was known simply as Rhodesia.
In Rhodesia the form of government was one of limited franchise based upon reaching a threshold in Income Tax payment. There could be no doubt that the system was unfairly skewed, white housewives, for example, could vote despite not paying any income tax as it was argued that the white Rhodesians’ collectively paid sufficient tax to allow them to quality. For black Rhodesians there were no such concessions and on average they earned a tenth of the average white Rhodesian’s salary (albeit for different jobs). The main tribal chiefs were present as Senators in the Upper House of government, but by and large the Africans were not represented in Parliament.
That said, the political situation in Rhodesia was very different to that in neighbouring South Africa. Land was divided into three main types (I am ignoring National Parks, the fourth type). The White farming areas represented around 35% of the country, this was largely the land that had been sold to the Pioneer Column by King Lobenguela, the last King of the N’debele (Matabele) in the 1890’s. It was land that he considered worthless as it was at too high an altitude to be well watered; however he had not heard of irrigation. The Tribal Trust Lands, 50% of the nation’s land, were the next area where the whites could not purchase land and the African population was free to live their traditional pastoral existence. Finally there were the African Purchase Areas with the remaining 15% of the country. This was established land suitable for farming that the government restricted to black ownership. In both the latter cases, the TTLs and the APAs as they were known, the government invested heavily to help the African population in the hope that they would “buy into” the success of the nation as a whole.
Belgium
The Belgian Congo had one of the most unusual histories in that it began its existence not as a colony, but rather as the personal possession of King Leopold II of Belgium. Exploration of the area had been first undertaken in the 1870’s, but it was the Treaty of Berlin in 1885 that saw Leopold’s acquisition of this prime piece of real estate which he named the Congo Free State.
Largely Leopold’s interests in the region were financial, with rubber being the first major product that was exploited, coinciding with the development of the motor car. What investment that was ploughed into the country was largely to facilitate the movement of goods to the coast and subsequently to European markets. Sadly the African population were treated as a commodity to be exploited for their
labour, and the actions of the Force Publique, Leopold’s militia, were to generate international condemnation.
In 1908 the Belgian government were obliged to act by the weight of criticism and took on responsibility for running what was then a colony administered from Boma and divided into fifteen administrative districts. In truth the colony was perpetually under-funded by a government that had little interest in the area. African education was almost exclusively in the hands of the Roman Catholic church but the levels of education were minimal and often largely religious in content. Indeed the state attempted to have as little involvement as possible in the area, with no real connection with the local population other than the relationship of employer/labourer. The African had almost no rights and certainly only a miniscule chance of social advancement due to extremely low wages and the lack of opportunity to purchase property.
White Belgians within the colony were lured there by generous pay and conditions, but as a rule they were not settlers who saw their labour as an investment in their future in the Congo, and this added to the feeling that the colony was just one large commercial venture.
Attempts by the Governor General in the 1950s to modernise the colony, with a plan to enfranchise the African population and to create an educated class capable of taking the country to independence over a thirty year timetable were met with suspicion by the Belgian government, and ultimately only a very small educated black middle class emerged in time for independence.
South Africa
It is difficult to pass comment on South Africa without entering a minefield of opinion. To start, and in order to provide some perspective, I would say that whilst African nationalists may have been able to shout “Settlers go home” at white Kenyans, Congolese or even Rhodesians, they could not do the same with white South Africans. Indeed the European settlers who founded the Afrikaaner “tribe” had arrived in the Cape province in the 1600’s, earlier than the African tribes that were to migrate down from equatorial Africa. Whatever the rights and wrongs of this argument, the fact was that whilst the white Kenyan, the Belgian, the Rhodesian could all “go home” the white South African had nowhere to go, and as a result he dug his toes in and said “No further”.
It is notable that the fear of African majority rule was clearly deeper in South Africa than anywhere else. This can only be put down to the fact that collectively they had more to lose than any other white group in Africa. With the domino effect of colonial independence starting in the north and working its way southwards they also had longer to observe the impact that this had had on those newly created nations, and what they saw left them concerned for their future. Civil Wars, economic mismanagement, corruption, tribalism, all were there clearly to be seen throughout Africa. Their response was a desperate knee-jerk reaction; Apartheid.
In the Portuguese colonies the emergence of the nationalist movements saw the regime responding by becoming increasingly liberal and investing large sums of money to provide facilities and opportunities for the black population. In South Africa the reverse was true. Apartheid, or “separate development”, was an unapologetically racist concept, where “modern” whites and “backward” blacks would be separated and allowed to evolve at their separate paces. In practice this meant a political system under which black South Africans lost all rights, even their nationality as the regime attempted to categorise them according to a network of black homelands, Bantustans based loosely on the Indian Reservations in the US, apportioning almost all the Africans to their tribal homelands and treating them as migrant workers in a white South Africa.
Initially much of the English speaking white population of South Africa were both offended and shocked by the policies of the largely Afrikaans National Party government, however Harold McMillan’s “Winds of Change” speech to the parliament in Cape Town in 1960, now much lauded as a great and prophetic address, backfired in that it served to persuade the English section of South African society that Britain was abandoning them. The result being that they fell into line behind the National Party and any brake on the march towards racial extremism was now removed.
The list of laws passed to support this oppressive system is too long to list, suffice to say that they were repressive and guaranteed to trigger resistance and ultimately conflict. However any black nationalist
organisation would have to confront a regime that was ready to use force to crush any threat to its existence.
South West Africa
At the end of the Great War the League of Nations made what had been German South West Africa a mandate territory to be administered by the South Africans. In 1946 South Africa requested permission from the United Nations to annex South West Africa but this was refused, but that refusal was ignored and an informal de facto annexation resulted.
Unsurprisingly the South African administration was not well disposed to the black population. The white settlers who made up fourteen percent of the population were the main political power, with the ten main tribes being given self-government within homelands in the north of the country in a downscaled version of apartheid.
Mao - An African Variation
What is clear is that the colonial political systems and consequently the attitude of the black African population were varied in the extreme. Most critically one also needs to factor in the issue of tribalism within African culture. In most of Africa before the arrival of the Europeans the indigenous population lived a primitive existence, at best associated with the bronze age in its development, at worst stone age. Their existence was largely as hunter-gatherers with some limited agrarian activity and the tribe formed a central part of that, providing a community where labour could be divided and security was provided through safety in numbers. Leadership of these tribes was often a combination of hereditary royal lines heavily influenced by the ethos of a strong-man culture. It was not enough to be born of the right blood line, tribal rulers also had to provide strong leadership; if they failed they were more than likely to find themselves overthrown and killed by stronger figures.
For hundreds or thousands of years these groups had been clashing with their neighbouring tribes and strong links, alliances, and antipathies had been formed. Whilst the advent of colonial rule largely ended inter-tribal warfare it would be wrong to assume that this peaceful co-existence represented an end to hostility and even hatred. Indeed the colonial powers had a vested interest in ensuring that vestiges of the old systems were retained in order to best divide and rule the subjugate peoples. In this environment tribal loyalties were often stronger than adherence to any political creed, something that Mao had not had to contend with in China.
In such an environment it rapidly became clear to the nationalist movements that Mao’s blueprint for guerrilla warfare was not always suitable. Even in their own tribal areas the nationalist guerrillas found that the strong-man culture did not mean that they would get support. The colonial power, often personified by the local District Commissioner, was generally regarded as the strong figure; the bringer of peace, the provider of modern medicine, the advisor on agricultural matters, the arbiter of the law. In order to usurp power the nationalists recognised that they would have to be seen as collectively stronger than the colonial power. Without a base among the people it was necessary to find an alternative, and this was more often than not across a border in a sympathetic neighbouring county.
It is notable that the spread of African nationalism was a domino effect from the north to the south, as one country became independent they provided support for the neighbouring nationalist movements. This was absent in Kenya and Nigeria/Biafra (the emergency in the former occurring in one isolated province, in the latter the war being a complex inter-tribal religious civil war) but was very much the case elsewhere. The Congo and Zambia provided safe-havens for Angolan nationalists, Tanzania and Zambia for those in Mozambique, Zambia and Mozambique for the war against Rhodesia and Angola and Zambia for the nationalists operating in South West Africa. Indeed this was a new and very African blueprint that relied on world opinion, and the United Nations in particular, condemning the colonial governments that neighboured these independent countries, thereby avoiding any legal issues about using cross-border bases. It is notable that when the Rhodesians and South Africans resorted to cross border incursions to strike against nationalist bases in neighbouring countries they received international condemnation, whereas the nationalists did exactly the same thing in reverse without any comment.
With seemingly secure bases provided the nationalist movements were free to prosecute their campaigns. Almost universally the guerrilla forces were inadequately armed or organised to even consider confronting the colonial armed forces. In such a situation the nationalists turned to intimidation of the local
population, seeking to achieve power through the weapon of fear. Tribal leaders were killed, as were those individuals who were associated with the colonial authority; be they police officers or health workers. Their objective was to reduce the population’s confidence in the ability of the authorities to protect them, there by replacing them in the minds of the people as the strong men. With the traditional figures of authority removed the nationalists were able to exert their influence through fear, creating the base of compliant support within the people that allowed them to move to the next phase of Mao’s formula; to strike blows against the enemy.
With the imbalance between the military power of the terrorists and the security forces these targets were not the enemy’s soldiers, as had been the case with Mao, but the enemy’s economy, and through that their ability and determination to wage war. Yet even this presented significant problems for the nationalists. Industry was largely concentrated in towns and cities where large populations were protected by the authorities. The commercial infrastructure, railway lines and roads where industry’s produce was taken to market was, however, a much easier target. Commercial ventures away from urban areas were also popular. Farms are, by definition, isolated and away from towns. By striking at white farmers the nationalists were able to hit the colony’s economy. When farmers began to protect themselves it was discovered that a farm could be put out of production by eliminating the black workforce. The by-product of attacks on such targets was that other farmers would, it was hoped, be terrorised into abandoning their farms as well. It also served to stretch the security forces thinly and place more economic strain on the states concerned due to manpower shortages.
This policy, terror combined with economic warfare, was made all the more effective when combined with international sanctions that restricted the ability of the colonial power to trade normally. Indeed it was rare than any nationalist movement had to consider moving to Mao’s third phase, that of conventional warfare. Indeed only ZIPRA in Rhodesia considered such an option and it is extremely likely that had they attempted it they would have been heavily defeated due to lack of air support. In the Portuguese Empire a collective war weariness sapped the morale of the Portuguese people even though in Angola they were winning the war and elsewhere achieving a winning draw at worst. In Rhodesia the impact of the terrorist war and international sanctions on the economy was sufficient to bring the Rhodesia Front government to the table and the country to its knees. In South Africa, the African military superpower who had been able to fight and win their war on the Namibia-Angola border it was the impact of sanctions and the necessity to maintain a large and expensive armed forces due to internal unrest that brought independence for Namibia and eventually majority rule in South Africa.
Indeed Mao’s third phase was arguably replaced by a new one, the battle for the media and therefore the hearts and minds of the United Nations. It is interesting to view press coverage of the conflicts outlined here. From as early as 1960 in the Congo one sees an orchestrated campaign being run to discredit any body that opposed the communist sponsored side. As time progressed this becomes increasingly effective. A classic case in point are the Rhodesian Selous Scouts who, following the lead set by the British in Kenya, infiltrated terrorist forces in the field with a view to destroying them. Almost immediately after the war concluded senior ZANLA commanders who were on the sharp end of their activities went on record to state how effective the Selous Scouts had been. This contrasted notably with the coverage that they were given during the conflict, when every atrocity committed by the terrorists, the killing of clergymen, the raping of Nuns, the murder of innocents, was laid at their door. What was more this was not just to be found in the columns of the terrorist organisations’ news sheets or Pravda, but in the pages of western newspapers in Europe and the United States. Indeed one can see exactly the same treatment of South Africa’s 32 Battalion which also operated in a pseudo role, and Koevoet in South West Africa.
It is no coincidence that the military successes of these units were directly mirrored by the campaigns of demonisation in the press. The opening of the Soviet archives showed what the authorities in Rhodesia and South Africa had known all along; these were co-ordinated attacks carried out to the Soviet blueprint for a new third phase. What was more the Soviets were hugely successful in this area and they found that they had an all too willing ally in the western press corps that was ever ready to see the conflicts as a two dimensional fight between “good” blacks and “bad” whites. What was more the United Nations and western governments were equally happy to take their lead from the press.
In summary, the wars that brought so much unrest and trouble to Africa were fought in a manner that reflected the diverse and complex societies in which they were fought rather than following any exact blueprint, be that Mao’s or Sun Tzu’s. What is now clear is that the wars of independence in Africa were
largely a manifestation of the cold war being fought by proxy and that the winners, with their manipulation of the United Nations and their promotion of their own brand of global politics, were the Politburos in Moscow and Havana. The losers, sadly, were the Africans of all colours, many of whom are still paying the price today.
Section One - CARDS
Sundowner
Whilst stopping to brew tea was very popular ritual
throughout the armed forces of British Commonwealth (membership past or present) Africa would not be Africa without the ubiquitous alcoholic “sundowner”. We suggest that the Tea Break card be replaced with a Sundowner card. It’s effect, however, remains unchanged.
DEATH FROM ABOVE
This represents a bonus card for one aerial unit, be that fixed wing or helicopter. It may not be used by a fast moving jet propelled fixed wing aeroplane. On this card the aircraft of choice may undertake one additional move.
B’’Maso!
This card allows one unit (up to platoon size in IABSM, section size in TW&T) that has already been spotted but is not now in line of sight of enemy forces to return to Blinds, being replaced with one real Blind and one Dummy. On returning to Blinds a “Spoor” marker must be placed on the table at the last point at which the unit could be seen.
A unit that is on a Blind (whether it has or has not been previously spotted does not matter) may use the B’Maso! card to remove the blind completely if it is taking up a position in cover. To do this it must declare it’s intentions on the B’Maso card and then remain stationary until the next B’Maso card is drawn. At that point the blind will be removed and replaced with a spoor marker. The unit is now considered to have taken a position in cover within 9” of where the blind was situated. Any wounds on the unit or units will be reduced by 50% (round down) and any Big Men with the unit will have their cards removed from the deck (or ignored) until they are again spotted or reveal themselves (militarily!). If an umpire is present he may be advised of their fresh position, if no umpire is available the player should mark this new position on a sketch map.
If, in between the two B’Maso cards, the blind is spotted the unit is deployed on the table as normal. If a tracking unit reaches the spoor and tracks successfully then the hidden unit is put on the table as spotted.
Looting
Looting was a potential problem with any soldiers, and with poorer quality ones it can lead to the near disintegration of a unit for a period of time. Units that are prone to looting will have a Loot card in the deck. They will only be prone to its effects when they are within 12” of a source of potential loot (European buildings, rather than mud huts) and can neither see any enemy nor are under small arms fire. If those conditions are met then a Looting card kicks in.
Roll a dice for any looting prone unit (section in IABSM, team in TW&T). On a 1 or 2 they will disappear into the building in search of loot. To stop them they must be contacted physically by a Big Man.
SECTION TWO - Aerial Forces
Both helicopters and fixed wing aircraft have unlimited movement over the table, but must actually be represented on the table if they are operating in a tactical role. If making a ground attack, they must be placed directly over their target once the attack is made, being removed once the “Sundowner” card appears. Helicopters attacking a ground target will be susceptible to AA fire in the turn that they are making an attack; most fixed wing aircraft, especially fast moving jets, are only susceptible to certain types of AA attack, however they may be driven off by fire.
To clarify with an example. In a certain turn the Air Support card is turned, and the player decides to attack a village containing enemy forces. The attacking aircraft is immediately placed on the table directly above the village. Any enemy forces with reserved dice that are able to fire on the attacking aircraft may now do so, with the aircraft either surviving the attack or being downed or driven off. Supposing the aircraft survives, it now performs its attack. It then remains on table, susceptible to AA fire from enemy units as their cards appear. Once the “Sundowner” card appears, any surviving aircraft are removed from the table.
Inserting and Evacuating Ground Troops
Helicopters inserting or evacuating ground troops from the table will spend one turn hovering above a suitable landing zone (LZ). On the following turn, they may be on or just above the ground as the troops leave or enter. On the next turn they will hover above the LZ again. During these three turns, they are susceptible to AA fire.
Helicopters may carry a certain number of troops safely, carrying more at increasing levels of risk. Below One you will find a list of the helicopters used in Africa. Each helicopter has a standard number of passengers that can be carried. Helicopters attempting to carry more than this standard load must roll 2d6 and add the number of passengers over this standard level. A score of over 12 means the helicopter crashes as it attempts to take off.
Previously established stop Positions may be used in a scenario for troops who have aerial insertion capability. Having these in place before the scenario begins will allow the stop positions to be hidden until enemy units are driven onto them.
Helicopters in African Service
Type Load Armament Service
Alouette III 4-5 troops Twin MGs Rhodesia, Portugal, South Africa Aloutette III Gunship - 20mm cannon Rhodesia, Portugal, South Africa
Alouette III Dalmatian - Quad 0.30 MMGs Rhodesia
Bell 205 UH1D 8 troops Twin MGs Rhodesia
Puma SA330 14 troops None or twin 0.30 South Africa, Portugal
Super Frelon 38 troops None South Africa
Mi-17/Mi-18 24 troops Rockets Angola
Mi 24 Hind 8 troops 23mm cannon
HMG
AT-2 Swatter missiles
Angola
Parachute Drops
Parachute drops were used extensively by the more professional military forces in Africa, the Belgians, the Congo, the Portuguese, Rhodesians and South Africans all used them to great effect in their wars. To represent these the player needs to know the method of insertion. With large transports, such as the C130 Hercules, the paras may exit two at a time, whereas with the older C47 Dakota they are restricted to one at a time. Dropping paras is a two stage process, as follows.
On the first turn of the unit card the player should indicate his Drop Zone on the table. He then rolls a deviation dice and 4D6. The DZ is then shifted accordingly to the new position and the first paratrooper (or two paratroopers if deploying from a large transport) is placed on that spot. The rest of the paratroopers are now placed on the table in a direct line from that point that reflect the line of the plane’s approach (this is entirely the player’s choice) at intervals of 1”.
These paratroopers are now on the ground, but are busy removing their chutes, getting friends down who are stuck in trees and the like. If they are attacked now they will always be considered a Great target. On the next turn of the unit card the unit may move off and deploy as they desire.
For larger drops, such as when using IABSM, the above mechanism will suffice. For smaller drops some kind of deviation may be preferred to reflect the immediate disorder after a drop. In that case roll a deviation dice and 2D6 for each paratrooper. Any paratrooper landing on anything other than flat terrain
will roll a D6. On a 1 they are immobile for the rest of the game. They may, however shoot or throw grenades in TW&T.
ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE
Anti-Aircraft fire is undertaken either when an aircraft is attacking a position or a helicopter is deployed tactically, i.e. either inserting or evacuating ground troops. The unit attacked may fire, along with any anti-aircraft weapons within 24” of the target that has line of sight to the aircraft.
To make the attack roll 2D6 and add the AA Strike factor of the weapon to the result. Consult the table below to see if a hit has been achieved.
Effect of Hits
If a hit is achieved roll 1D6 and again add the weapon’s AA Strike factor.
Anti Aircraft Strike Factors
Air-strikes against troops
These are covered in IABSM, but not in TW&T. Air support is treated as fire support in a similar way to artillery, however without any ranging shots.
The firer names his target, uses a deviation dice and a number of D6 to see where his strike actually lands, and then uses the number of strike dice named against any sections or weapons teams in the kill zone that is given for that weapon.
Where kill zones are given they either specify an area in terms of dimensions, or give a blast radius, the latter normally for single weapons or bursts. With the former the longer side of the kill zone follows the line of the attacking aircraft’s approach run. As aircraft movement is abstracted in the rules the aircraft can be said to be coming from any direction, however in certain scenarios the approach path may be specified. The accompanying diagram best shows the two types of strikes, either a specified kill zone or a blast radius.
Target Total Required
Fixed wing jet 14
Fixed wing prop 13
Helicopter 11
Adjusted Roll Result
1-5 Attacker aborts current action 6 Attacker aborts mission, return to base 7 Attacker badly damaged, crash lands off-table
8 or 9 Attacker shot down.
Fixed wing crashes off table Helicopter crashes on table, roll 2D6 and deviation dice. One hit per crew member.
Weapon Strike
Small Arms/GPMGs 0
HMG, Cannon 1
Heavy Cannon (30mm +), RPG 2
Weapon Kill Zones and Deviation
Weapon Kill Zone Deviation
Rockets 4” on blast 2D6
Napalm/Frantan 12” x 24” 3D6
Single bomb 4” on blast 3D6
Multiple bombs or heavy single bomb 9” x 12” 3D6
Saturation Bombing 18” x 24” 4D6
Straffing Aircraft MGs or Cannon 3” x 6” 2D6
Gunship Cannon 3” on blast 1D6
The above are intentionally vague, I have no intention of listing every piece of ordnance that could be used over a thirty year time frame, however they do serve as a good guide that should satisfy all but the most obsessive technofiles. Saturation bombing will be unusual, however the Rhodesians did develop the Alpha bomb which when dropped in sufficient numbers from the Canberra could produce astounding devastation in a strip 100m wide by 1000m long due to the hundreds of ball bearings in each of the 300 football sized bombs that the Canberra carry. Feel free to adjust the damage area to reflect larger or smaller bombs, or specific weapons.
Weapon Effect
The effect of the air-strikes should be against any infantry section or weapons team in the kill zone or blast radius, so the more troops in there the more effective the weapons will be. Use the Direct Fire Support table in the rules with the following damage dice. Some columns give a choice of two sets of dice to use, such a 2/3, in that case the first number is the dice that should be used if the target is within the kill zone or blast radius, the second is the dice that should be used if a direct hit is achieved.
Weapon IABSM TW&T
Rockets 2/3 3/4
Napalm/Frantan 2/3 4/5
Single bomb 2/3 3/4
Multiple bombs or heavy single bomb 4 5
Saturation Bombing 5 7
Strafing Aircraft MGs or Cannon 2 3
Gunship Cannon 3 4
The following adjustments should be made to air-strikes: ¾ Attacks from the air ignore one level of cover
¾ Soft ground reduces the effect of cannon fire by one dice
¾ Top pilots or gunners may reduce the number of deviation dice by one ¾ Poor pilots will increase the number of deviation dice by one
¾ Forward Air Controllers may reduce the number deviation dice by one
SECTION THREE –- ON THE GROUND
Terrain
It is worth mentioning that whilst dense foliage may not stop bullets it does affect the ability of the firer to see, and therefore aim at, his target.
animals
Africa is full of animals which will generally avoid human beings. Largely the effect of blinds on the players will reflect noise in the bush or unexpected movement, all of which can be put down to animals. If an umpire is present he may wish to add some specific blinds that represent animals.
Mini-blinds
In games of IABSM it may be necessary to use smaller blinds to just represent one single section or fire team. Ordinarily this will be restricted to situations where their opponent will be aware of number restrictions, such as when deploying from a helicopter. In this situation a blind 3” round will be used.
An often used tactic to confuse their enemy was for helicopters to land several times in quick succession so as to conceal where the troops actually deployed. In that situation mini-blinds should be used.
MORALE
This supplement contains some basic morale parameters for the participating forces, specifically these are stated as a point where the number of wounds on a section causes it to retire. How many wounds, and how far they retire depends on the unit.
A unit forced to retire will do so immediately. If it has not been activated already in this turn this will count as the sections go, no other action being allowed unless it is on a bonus card. Big Men with the section are obliged to withdraw with it, however on the subsequent turn of their card they may rally the unit with their initiative (TW&T) or dice (IABSM), or they may choose to move away.
Off-Road Wheeled vehicles
With the Second World War highlighting the importance of mobility in warfare the post war period saw military forces seeking wheeled vehicles that could operate effectively off-road. These are not subject to the same penalties that other wheeled vehicles are, using the following for movement.
Clearly some commonsense needs to be applied here with regards what constitutes broken ground, however a good rule of thumb would be that if a man could run on that surface then it can be driven on by one of these vehicles.
Not Real Soldiers
Many of the troops encountered in Africa are not “real” soldiers. This relates to their lack of proper training and their capacity to do “The wrong thing” on the battlefield. Regular forces are trained to know that when under fire the best way to stay safe is to keep your head down and use whatever cover is available. Troops who are not real soldiers are far more likely to do the wrong thing and just run away from the threat.
In B’Maso troops who are not real soldiers ignore wounds when running away from their enemy. The wounds, therefore, only have a negative impact on movement when attempting to close with the enemy. Some troops who are not real soldiers are unable to initiate close combat. They may be within 4” of their opponent but the casualties are calculated using the fire table rather than close combat. This does not apply to all troops who are not real soldiers, just the more cowardly ones.
Regular troops may not fire on enemy forces who are within 4” or friendly troops. Units who are not real soldiers may do so, however any near misses on their target will count as hits on friendly troops.
Technology gap
The wars in Africa saw some of the Cold War’s most impressive technology used in action, however the man operating it was often without even the most basic education. As a result weapons that require a “to hit” roll will fire with a minus one or two on their roll if the technology gap exists between the man and the weapon. It should be noted that even poorly educated troops can be trained to operate complex weapons systems efficiently, however not all were.
Primitive ranged weapons
Some units in Africa, whether through tribal custom or lack of an alternative, were armed with primitive ranged weapons, bow, arrows, spears, darts and so on. These units may only fire at short range, but will used the medium range table (9”-18” in IABSM, 12”-24” in TW&T) for effect. Some of these were undoubtedly poisoned (especially in equatorial Africa, such as the Congo), but there is no need for any specific rule to cover this with this level game.
Hard Ground Broken Ground Double Initiative Dice +2 pips per dice
Horse Mounted Troops
Mounted troops were used to good effect in southern Africa, the Portuguese, Rhodesians and South Africans using them for long range tracking and patrolling. To represent this we use the following rules. Cavalry Movement
At the walk cavalry move at the same rate as infantry +1 pip per dice. Trackers may follow spoor at this speed as normal.
Cavalry moving at the trot will move with +3 pips per dice. Trackers may follow spoor of a unit with a fieldcraft rating of 0 as normal and with fieldcraft rating of 1 with a -1 on the tracking dice.
Cavalry may charge towards an enemy that is in line of sight. They move with one extra dice and +3 pips per dice. If fired on when charging they are always a Great target.
Mounted units’ movement is affected by wounds as normal unless moving directly away from the enemy when all wounds are ignored.
In Action
Firing from horseback is particularly difficult and, therefore, is done at one range band further than is actually the case. A mounted target is also a good target, with losing much of the benefits of any cover due to their height. As such these troops would normally fight dismounted.
Horses are prone to be scared by firing and sudden movement, and were prone to ride away if that happened. Normally they would ride back to wherever they had camped the previous night and could be found there. Horse holders are not required, however horses left in the line of fire will roll a D6 each turn. On a 1 they will bolt, adding +1 for any other horses within 9” that have bolted this turn.
Civilians
Civilians are notoriously difficult to control in games. When firing starts they can behave in such a wide range of manners as to be impossible to truly represent. The following table should be used as a guide along with common sense to tell you what any civilians in your games will do when they see combatants or when the firing starts.
Dice Upon Seeing “Unfriendly” Combatants When the Firing Starts
1 Ignore it
2 Attempt to hide where they are
3
Ignore them
4 Move away, diverting them from any friends
Run directly away from unfriendly troops 5 Move away, diverting them towards friends
6 Run away in a random direction
Run away in A random direction
It is, of course, possible that the scenario designer may wish for civilians to have a role to play in his game. For example a terrorist group may instruct the civilians to walk across spoor in order to hide their tracks. A simple guide here is that civilians may do as they are told, the easier and more simple the instructions the greater chance you have of it being done. Civilians are unlikely to intentionally risk their lives in any heroics.
Fieldcraft and Tracking
Units may attempt to pick up the trail of an enemy from the Spoor marker. On subsequent turns of this card a Blind may attempt to use anti-tracking techniques. See Fieldcraft & Tracking.
All units will be allocated a Fieldcraft Factor to represent their capabilities in the field with tracking and anti-tracking techniques. These are described as follows:
0 Cannot follow spoor, only rudimentary attempts may be made to use anti-tracking techniques. 1 Follows basic trails, such as litter, blood and similar, have some knowledge of anti-tracking 2 Track across most terrain, good level of anti-tracking
Tracking
Tracking units use their Initiative Dice to track. Once they are at a spoor marker, or once they are already following a trail, they will roll a die to see how successful they are.
Adjust as follows:
¾ Target has a Fieldcraft of 0: +1 ¾ Target has Fieldcraft of 1: As roll ¾ Target has Fieldcraft of 2: -1 on roll ¾ Target has Fieldcraft of 3: -2 on roll
¾ Tracker has dogs*: +1
¾ Spoor is in bad ground, solid rock or water -1 on roll
If they get a “follow spoor” result they have been successful in reading the spoor. One enemy Blind has been identified, either as a fake or real. A tracker with 1 or 2 fieldcraft rolls a dice to randomly see which of the enemy blinds has been “Spotted” and must be revealed. A Tracker with a fieldcraft factor of 3 may choose the blind he wants revealed. Once the blind has been revealed the tracking unit may then use its remaining Initiative dice as it wishes.
Trackers who are following spoor may move towards the enemy blind or blinds that they are following and be considered to be on spoor without following the exact path that their target unit took. If their target moved through bad ground they may not, however, avoid this by moving to the side of it.
If the result is “Follow the Spoor with no ID loss” then the process above is followed exactly, but the spoor has been found with ease and no Initiative dice has been used in tracking.
*Dogs rely on vapour to track their target which is fine in all but hot, dry countries, so in Africa, where those conditions combine they are of limited use. Nevertheless there was rumour that the Greys Scouts used foxhounds in some circumstances, which could make for a rather unusual game.
Anti-tracking
A unit that has reverted to a Blind may attempt to use anti-tracking techniques to reduce the chance of it being followed at the cost of one Initiative Dice. If they are successful they may split one of their Blinds, real or Dummy, into two. To do this they roll against their Fieldcraft Factor.
If successful they split one Blind and place a spoor marker at that point.
Spoiling Spoor
If friendly units move across the spoor then it is lost completely and will only be picked up at another spoor marker.
Rating Big Men
Each of the conflict specific section advises the gamer of the number of Big Men who should be present with a force and gives a general indicator of what quality they should be, from poor to excellent. As a guide the following table should be used to allocate ratings to Big Men based upon quality. It is entirely possible to dice randomly to allocate ratings should you wish.
Fieldcraft Follow Spoor Follow Spoor with no ID loss
1 4 or 5 6
2 3 or 4 5 or 6
3 2 or 3 4, 5 or 6
Fieldcraft Anti-tracking successful
1 5-6 2 4-6 3 3-6
Quality IABSM TW&T
Poor D4-2, D4-1, D4, DAv-1 Grades I or II
Average DAv, D4+1, D6 Grades I, II or III
Good D6, DAv+1, D6+1 Grades II or III
Excellent DAv+1, DAv+2, D6+1, D6+2 Grades II, III or IV
Clearly the gamer should feel free to adjust this are required, however adhering broadly to this will give the balance that we intend.
Anti Tank Weapons
The range of anti tank weapons used was wide, and we have attempted to cover as many as we can here. As a guideline man portable systems should have a -1 to hit compared to mounted weapons.
Infantry Anti-Tank 0-12” 12-24” 24-36” Direct Anti-infantry
84mm Carl Gustav 12 12 12 3 dice
AT-3 Sagger* - - 16 @ 48” plus -
Milan‡ - - 18 @48” plus - RPG 7 10 10 10 2 dice 66mm LAW 9 9 - 2 dice Up to 59mm Recoilless Rifle 6 6 6 2D6 60mm to 79mm Recoilless Rifle 9 9 9 2D6 80mm to 99mm Recoilless Rifle 12 12 12 3D6 100mm + Recoilless Rifle 14 14 14 3D6 Bazooka 8 8 - 2D6 HMG 4 3 2 - MMG 2 1 1 -
*The Sagger was a wire guided system that required the target to be fired on at a range of between 500 and 3000 metres in order to work effectively. This generally makes it irrelevant for the level of game that we are representing with TW&T or IABSM. However if you wish to use this we recommend applying a minimum range of 48”. It is worth noting that a two man Sagger team would normally deploy with an RPG-7 so as to cover any targets under 500m.
‡The Milan is an equivalent NATO system to the Sagger, being wire guided and with a minimum range of 400m and a maximum range of 2000m on the early model.
A Big continent for big men
When playing TW&T we recommend that the gamer removes all section or squad cards from the deck, thereby putting more importance in the leadership of Big Men. Any unit not activated by a Big Man during a turn will consequently be able to fire on the Sundowner card as normal. The exception here is support weapon cards which are retained in the deck.
“When the Missionaries arrived, the Africans had the Land and the Missionaries had the Bible. They taught us how to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened them, they had the land and we had the Bible”. Jomo Kenyatta
Unrest in Kenya had been brewing since the end of the Second World War. The African population were largely tied to their own tribal areas or employed on a network of European farms, being allowed to work their own patch of land of several acres in exchange for their labour during the busy periods of the year. This was generally four months at the most, and the land, up to five acres, was sufficient for the Africans to earn a reasonable income. After the war, however, things were to change. Basic commodities increased in price whilst the settlers were calling on the Africans to give up more of their time and simultaneously reduce the plots of land that they were allowed. This was clearly a recipe for disaster, and nowhere more so than in the Kikuyu lands. Situated in the central highlands the high altitude meant that the land here perfect for European farming, and more and more of what the tribe considered their ancient homelands were swallowed up by farms.
This situation was exacerbated by several other annoyances. The tribal chiefs were appointed by the colonial government and were generally unpopular. Many Kenyan Africans had served with the British forces during the war where, with no colour bar, they were treated in the same way as any British soldier. To return home and again assume the role of a second class citizen was difficult to swallow, and the Forty Group, men who had enlisted in 1940, formed to provide the basis for the Mau Mau insurrection.
Most serious of all was the refusal of the British Colonial Secretary to allow a sensible level of African representation on the colony’s legislative council. The Kenya African Union were bitterly disappointed when, in 1951, they were informed that whilst 50,000 white settlers were to have 14 representative on the council that five million Africans were to have only five, and those would be appointed by the British rather than directly elected. A nationalist campaign, based around swearing an oath to end British colonial rule, was begun.
The slide into revolt was, unusually, a slow one. Throughout early 1952 acts of defiance escalated, murders of Africans loyal to the British began and then increased, white farms were set on fire or livestock killed, and the lack of action by the colonial authorities served to encourage the perpetrators. It was only when the campaign was in full swing that a new Governor arrived and, in October 1952, a state of emergency was declared.
The Mau Mau were organised in a very simplistic fashion. Largely it was made up of men and, to a smaller degree, women of the Kikuyu tribe. The associated Meru and Embu tribes were also involved, but to a lesser extent. The Central Committee was located in the capital, Nairobi, whilst its “Passive Wing” provided logistical support from the tribal lands. The “Land and Freedom Army” created its operational bases in the forests, and from there launched their attacks into the tribal lands or the white farming areas. Theoretically this force was broken down into sections of 10 to 35 men, platoons of 35 to 100 men, Companies of 100 to 250 men and battalions above that. In practice it had almost no organisation at all, and certainly very little communication between its component parts.
Whilst the prevailing image in the British press was of white settlers being done to death with pangas in the most gruesome fashion, the truth was that lack of weapons meant that the Mau Mau would largely avoid contact with the white population whenever possible. Raids were made on police stations in the hope of getting weapons that could be used, but their targets were chiefly African civilians who were known to support the British and their livestock; in particular the unpopular chiefs. Indeed it is striking just how much of the violence was perpetrated against people who that particular Mau Mau group did not like. The 1953 massacre at Lari, for example, saw 100 people hacked to death by men who had lost out in an administrative land ruling that had gone in favour of the victims.
Unlike later anti-colonial wars the Mau Mau were peculiar in that they represented only a small proportion of the population, the vast majority of Kenya – geographically 90% - was untroubled by the revolt. Also they lacked external support, with no safe havens in neighbouring countries and no arms supplied by interested parties overseas. The latter was a particular issue for them, with a complete dearth of firearms meaning that even high ranking General officers in the Mau Mau were obliged to use home made guns that were of very dubious reliability.
Indeed this reliance on pangas and axes was to be the hallmark of what can only be described as a terror campaign. The standard practice was to horribly mutilate victims before killing them and dismembering the bodies. This was a policy that was to prove the undoing of the Mau Mau. So sensational were their methods that they revolted the vast majority of Africans, let alone the white settlers and administrators. This was sufficient to ensure that the British and colonial government could not even consider negotiations, their policy had to be to defeat and destroy the Mau Mau outright. It also resulted in a large number of Kikuyu volunteering to assist the British and forming Home Guard units that worked hand in hand with the Police and military.
On the British side, their reaction to the Mau Mau was one of total horror. In 1952 the idea of the loyal African behaving in such a beastly fashion was one that had terrible implications for all of Britain’s possessions in Africa. Once galvanised their reaction was speedy if not altogether well co-ordinated at first.
The British had many years experience of counter-insurgency warfare dating back as far as the Boer War. Contemporary experiences in Malaya provided some very fresh ideas that were applied as the emergency progressed. The first step was to ensure that the command infrastructure was in place, linking the military and the government so that the two were working as a single entity. Secondly the British moved troops into the colony, both Kings African Rifles from neighbouring Tanganyika and Uganda and British regiments from the Canal Zone in Egypt. Initially the British troops were assigned to protect the European areas and the KAR to the African ones. The key decision, however, was to work with the African population to win hearts and minds and protect them from the Mau Mau, a policy that paid dividends in spades.
Initially the campaign floundered as the commander, Major General Hinde, and governor, Sir Phillip Mitchell, were too careful to balance the wishes of the settlers with those of the British and colonial government. The arrival of General Sir George Erskine in May of 1953 put an end to such dalliance. The police Special Branch was expanded in order to gather information. At that stage the British were unsure of the structure of their opponents’ forces, having assumed that their command and logistics network were scattered through the Kikuyu tribal lands. Erskine identified that the Mau Mau operating in the highlands and the forest
were undoubtedly receiving succour from the civilians in the African reserve. To counter this he established a cordon sanitaire between the two, clearing a mile wide strip of bush and placing police outposts along the length of this. The initial large scale sweeps that had first been used unsuccessfully were now replaced with small patrols backed up by light aircraft spotting over the area.
The result of improved intelligence, aggressive patrolling and a general disgust for Mau Mau tactics among the African population was now turning the tide. The Kikuyu Home Guard was formed from loyal Africans. With over 24,000 members they were similarly armed to the Mau Mau at first, but were significantly better motivated as they were defending their own homes. They were also trained by the British to construct Guard posts protected by wire and punji pits and with sandbag firing positions when they did eventually get rifles. This was mirrored by the construction of a series of Protected Villages, moving over a million Kikuyu into these where they could be protected by Home Guard positions and British forces. This, as in Malaya, was key to stopping the Mau Mau.
A network of informers and loyal Africans were used, forming Pseudo Gangs to infiltrate the Mau Mau’s operational areas, locate the enemy and then destroy them. Initially these were led by white officers who blacked-up to fit in with their African troops and captured Mau Mau who had been persuaded to turn against their former comrades. Each gang would visit African villages at night, gathering information and, if they were lucky, meeting with real Mau Mau gangs. They could then arrest these, ambush them later or, if outnumbered, alert the regular British forces in the area.
A key breakthrough came in April 1954 when the British realised that Nairobi was the nerve centre of the Mau Mau operations. In Operation Anvil they effectively cordoned off the city and swept through it sector by sector. Sixteen thousand suspected Mau Mau were arrested after being identified by loyal Kikuyu. Their detention in prison camps was effective in cutting off the cells operating in the field from their commanders and this, linked with the Protected Villages, also wiped out the Passive Wing that had been responsible for providing food for the forces in the field. Coincidentally it also almost completely put an end to crime in the Nairobi area for a long period of time.
With the local population thus protected the British regular forces were free to conduct sweep operations without worrying about innocent lives. The Aberdare Mountains and Mount Kenya were now declared Prohibited Areas, where anyone present could be shot. Again Psuedo Groups, now named Special Force Groups, were used to identify Mau Mau forces. The Royal Air Force could be called on to operate in a ground attack role, with Vampires, Meteors and converted Harvard trainers used for this.
One of the most successful, if grisly, tactics was the “Grouse Shoot”, where British forces formed stop positions in a horseshoe around an area known to have Mau Mau forces present. Local Africans armed with pangas would then act as beaters, moving through the bush, chopping their way through as they swept the area. The Mau Mau could then either evade them by moving into the British stop positions or be chopped to bits by the Africans. Most chose to surrender to the British troops where they were likely to go to prison but live.
By 1956 the Mau Mau were largely leaderless. The capture of “General China”, Dedan Kimathi, signalled the end of their offensive capability, and whilst the State of Emergency was kept in place until 1960 the fighting and the atrocities were over in 1956. In all the British security forces lost over 600 men (at best estimate, some sources say up to 1,600), 63 of whom were white. Two thousand African civilians who had been loyal to the government had been killed, 32 white civilians had also died. Estimates of the numbers of Mau Mau who died range from 11,000 to 20,000 and another 2,500 were captured. 78,000 people were detained at one time or another during the eight year emergency and just over a thousand were hanged for their role in the revolt.
Wargaming the Mau Mau Revolt
In essence the war against the Mau Mau was split into three distinct phases. Firstly the initial search, locate and destroy sweeps, where the Colonial authorities had little idea what they were up against or where to find it. The second was the implementation of the cordon sanitaire, and then the third, post Operation Anvil, where the British were operating in areas cleared of the civilian population and sweeping through to destroy Mau Mau forces.
When designing a scenario featuring the Mau Mau it is important to consider the imbalance between the forces concerned. It is a challenge to create a good scenario for this conflict, but by no means beyond the
wit of man. The first phase of the conflict is more appropriate to I Ain’t Been Shot Mun, with larger forces involved, but this is not particularly gameable as the Mau Mau would normally leave the area when they came across such an operation. Troops, Weapons & Tactics, with smaller forces involved, would be good for a small Police garrison fighting off a Mau Mau force attempting to break in and seize weapons, or the second phase of operations where small patrols are seeking out the Mau Mau. Finally I Ain’t Been Shot Mum can deal with the Company level sweeps in the mountains. Tracking Operations in the Kikuyu lands or the Aberdare Mountains can be represented using the Tracking rules in the Generic Rules section. The war in Kenya is best described as a policing action, with the Mau Mau having little in the way of modern armament that would enable them to stand up to the British Army in a conventional sense and not attempting to do so. Rather they used intimidation and fear in a clumsy attempt to persuade the African population to support them. As such we need some special rules to represent the conflict, as follows. Mau Mau Firepower. There were very few occasions when the Mau Mau were able to source modern weapons, and when they did they quickly ran out of ammunition. In normal circumstances the Mau Mau will have no ranged fire capability, their home made guns being used at very close quarters and considered to be part of close combat. That said some Mau Mau did resort to loading home made weapons with shot gun cartridges, an extremely dangerous thing to do, however it could be effective.
One Mau Mau may have a one shot home made shotgun. It may only be fired at short range, but will roll 2D6 for effect in IABSM and 3D6 in TW&T. If more 1’s than 6’s are rolled then any hits are on the firing unit rather than the target. This weapon will not kill, but all hits will be diced for as follows, irrespective of troop type.
Near Miss Wound
1 2-6
Special Branch. Due to information that Special Branch have ascertained from loyal Kikuyu tribesmen the British player may have between one and three attempts at spotting on the whole table. Each spot will cover an area 12” square and any Mau Mau in that area will be shown by blinds.
British Air Support. The British may only employ their aircraft when operating in an area where the civilian population has been removed for fear of casualties among the innocent.
Aggressive Troops. Both the Mau Mau and the Home Guard should count as aggressive troops in close combat as they are more than happy to use their pangas and traditional swords to terrible effect.
