not f i n a l l y r e d u c i b l e to a g i v e n n o t i o n of s e x u a l difference? In-d e e In-d , to w h a t extent are o u r n o t i o n s of the m a s c u l i n e a n In-d the f e m i n i n e f o r m e d t h r o u g h the lost attachments w h i c h they are s a i d t o occasion? C a n w e f i n a l l y ever resolve the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r s e x u a l difference is the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of a m e l a n -c h o l i -c heterosexuality, s a -c r a l i z e d as theory, or w h e t h e r it is the g i v e n c o n d i t i o n o f loss a n d attachment i n a n y set o f h u m a n relations? It seems clear that in s o m e cases it is b o t h , b u t that w e w o u l d lose a v i t a l t e r m i n o l o g y for u n d e r s t a n d i n g loss a n d its f o r m a t i v e effects if we w e r e to a s s u m e f r o m the outset that we o n l y a n d a l w a y s lose the other sex, for it is as often the case that w e are often i n the m e l a n c h o l i c b i n d o f h a v i n g lost o u r o w n sex i n o r d e r , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t o b e c o m e it.
Psychic Inceptions
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage
C o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n the e g o a n d t h e i d e a l . . . u l t i m a t e l y reflect t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n w h a t i s r e a l a n d w h a t i s p s y c h i c a l , b e t w e e n t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d a n d t h e i n t e r n a l w o r l d .
— F r e u d , The Ego and the Id
I
n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a , " m e l a n c h o l y at first appears t o b e a n aberrant f o r m o f m o u r n i n g , i n w h i c h one denies the loss of an object (an other or an ideal) a n d refuses the task of grief, u n d e r s t o o d as b r e a k i n g attachment to the one w h o is lost. T h i s lost object is m a g i c a l l y r e t a i n e d as part of one's p s y -c h i -c life. T h e s o -c i a l w o r l d appears t o b e e -c l i p s e d i n m e l a n -c h o l y , a n d a n i n t e r n a l w o r l d s t r u c t u r e d i n a m b i v a l e n c e emerges a s the consequence. It is n o t i m m e d i a t e l y clear h o w m e l a n c h o l y m i g h t b e r e a d , then, i n t e r m s o f s o c i a l life,1 i n p a r t i c u l a r , i nt e r m s of the s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n of p s y c h i c life. Yet the a c c o u n t of m e l a n c h o l y i s a n a c c o u n t o f h o w p s y c h i c a n d s o c i a l d o m a i n s are p r o d u c e d i n r e l a t i o n t o one another. A s s u c h , m e l a n c h o l y offers p o t e n t i a l i n s i g h t i n t o h o w the b o u n d a r i e s o f the s o c i a l are i n s t i t u t e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d , not o n l y at the expense of p s y
c h i c life, b u t t h r o u g h b i n d i n g p s y c h i c life i n t o f o r m s o f m e l a n -c h o l i -c a m b i v a l e n -c e .
M e l a n c h o l i a thus r e t u r n s us to the figure of the " t u r n " as a f o u n d i n g t r o p e i n the d i s c o u r s e o f the p s y c h e . I n H e g e l , t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n oneself comes t o s i g n i f y the ascetic a n d s k e p t i -c a l m o d e s o f r e f l e x i v i t y that m a r k the u n h a p p y -cons-ciousness; in N i e t z s c h e , t u r n i n g b a c k on oneself suggests a r e t r a c t i n g of w h a t one has s a i d o r done, o r a r e c o i l i n g i n s h a m e i n the face of w h a t one has done. In A l t h u s s e r , the t u r n that the p e d e s -t r i a n m a k e s -t o w a r d -the v o i c e of -the l a w is a-t once reflexive (the m o m e n t of b e c o m i n g a subject w h o s e self-consciousness i s m e d i a t e d b y the l a w ) a n d self-subjugating.
A c c o r d i n g t o the n a r r a t i v e o f m e l a n c h o l i a that F r e u d p r o -v i d e s , the ego is s a i d to " t u r n b a c k u p o n itself" once l o -v e fails to f i n d its object a n d i n s t e a d takes itself as not o n l y an object of l o v e , b u t of aggression a n d hate as w e l l . B u t w h a t is this "self" that takes itself as its o w n object? Is the one w h o "takes" itself a n d the one w h o i s " t a k e n " the same? T h i s s e d u c t i o n o f reflex-i v reflex-i t y seems to f o u n d e r l o g reflex-i c a l l y , sreflex-ince reflex-it reflex-is u n c l e a r that threflex-is ego c a n exist p r i o r t o its m e l a n c h o l i a . T h e " t u r n " that m a r k s the m e l a n c h o l i c response to loss appears to initiate the r e d o u b l i n g of the ego as an object; o n l y by t u r n i n g b a c k on itself does the ego a c q u i r e the status of a p e r c e p t u a l object. M o r e o v e r , the at-t a c h m e n at-t at-to at-the objecat-t at-thaat-t is u n d e r s at-t o o d in m e l a n c h o l i a at-to be r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d the ego u n d e r g o e s a f u n d a m e n t a l transfor-m a t i o n i n the c o u r s e o f that r e d i r e c t i o n . N o t o n l y i s the attach-m e n t s a i d to go f r o attach-m l o v e to hate as it attach-m o v e s f r o attach-m the object to the ego, b u t the ego itself is p r o d u c e d as a psychic object; in fact, the v e r y a r t i c u l a t i o n of this p s y c h i c space, s o m e t i m e s fig-u r e d a s " i n t e r n a l , " d e p e n d s o n this m e l a n c h o l i c t fig-u r n .
T h e t u r n f r o m the object to the ego p r o d u c e s the ego, w h i c h substitutes for the object lost. T h i s p r o d u c t i o n is a t r o p o l o g i c a l
g e n e r a t i o n a n d f o l l o w s f r o m the p s y c h i c c o m p u l s i o n t o s u b -stitute for objects lost. T h u s , i n m e l a n c h o l i a not o n l y does the ego substitute for the object, b u t this act of s u b s t i t u t i o n
insti-tutes the ego as a necessary response to or "defense" against
loss. To the extent that the ego is "the p r e c i p i t a t e of its a b a n -d o n e -d object-cathexes," it is the c o n g e a l m e n t of a h i s t o r y of loss, the s e d i m e n t a t i o n of relations of s u b s t i t u t i o n o v e r t i m e , the r e s o l u t i o n of a t r o p o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n i n t o the o n t o l o g i c a l effect of the self.
M o r e o v e r , this s u b s t i t u t i o n of ego for object does not q u i t e w o r k . T h e ego is a p o o r substitute for the lost object, a n d its f a i l u r e to substitute in a w a y that satisfies (that is, to o v e r c o m e its status as a s u b s t i t u t i o n ) , leads to the a m b i v a l e n c e that d i s -t i n g u i s h e s m e l a n c h o l i a . T h e -t u r n f r o m -the objec-t -to -the ego c a n n e v e r q u i t e b e a c c o m p l i s h e d ; i t i n v o l v e s f i g u r i n g the ego o n the m o d e l of the object (as suggested in the i n t r o d u c t o r y p a r a -g r a p h s o f " O n N a r c i s s i s m " ) ; i t also i n v o l v e s the u n c o n s c i o u s belief that the ego m i g h t c o m p e n s a t e for the loss that is suffered. To the extent that the ego fails to p r o v i d e s u c h c o m p e n -sation, i t exposes the f a u l t l i n e s i n its o w n t e n u o u s f o u n d a t i o n s .
A r e we to accept that the ego t u r n s f r o m the object to the ego, or that the ego t u r n s its p a s s i o n , as one m i g h t r e d i r e c t a w h e e l , f r o m the object to itself 1 D o e s the same ego t u r n its i n -v e s t m e n t f r o m the object to itself, or is the ego f u n d a m e n t a l l y a l t e r e d by v i r t u e of b e c o m i n g the object of s u c h a t u r n ? W h a t i s the status o f " i n v e s t m e n t " a n d "attachment"? D o they i n d i -cate a free-floating desire that r e m a i n s the same regardless of the k i n d o f object t o w h i c h i t i s d i r e c t e d ? D o e s the t u r n not o n l y p r o d u c e the ego b y w h i c h i t i s o s t e n s i b l y i n i t i a t e d b u t also s t r u c t u r e the attachment it is s a i d to redirect?
Is s u c h a t u r n or r e d i r e c t i o n e v e n p o s s i b l e ? T h e loss for w h i c h the t u r n seeks t o c o m p e n s a t e i s not o v e r c o m e , a n d the
object is not restored; rather, the loss b e c o m e s the o p a q u e c o n -d i t i o n for the e m e r g e n c e of the ego, a loss that h a u n t s it f r o m the start a s c o n s t i t u t i v e a n d a v o w a b l e . F r e u d r e m a r k s that i n m o u r n i n g the object i s " d e c l a r e d " lost o r d e a d , b u t i n m e l a n -c h o l i a , i t f o l l o w s , n o s u -c h d e -c l a r a t i o n i s possible.2 M e l a n c h o
-l i a is p r e c i s e -l y the effect of u n a v o w a b -l e -loss. A -loss p r i o r to s p e e c h a n d d e c l a r a t i o n , i t i s the l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n o f its p o s -s i b i l i t y : a w i t h d r a w a l or r e t r a c t i o n f r o m -s p e e c h that m a k e -s s p e e c h possible. I n this sense, m e l a n c h o l i a m a k e s m o u r n i n g possible, a v i e w that F r e u d c a m e to accept in The Ego and the Id. T h e i n a b i l i t y to declare s u c h a loss signifies the " r e t r a c t i o n " or " a b s o r p t i o n " of the loss by the ego. C l e a r l y , the ego does not l i t e r a l l y take an object i n s i d e itself, as if the ego w e r e a k i n d of shelter p r i o r t o its m e l a n c h o l y . T h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s c o u r s e s that p r e s u m e the t o p o g r a p h i c a l s t a b i l i t y o f a n " i n t e r n a l w o r l d " a n d its v a r i o u s " p a r t s " m i s s the c r u c i a l p o i n t that m e l a n c h o l y is p r e c i s e l y w h a t i n t e r i o r i z e s the p s y c h e , that is, m a k e s it p o s -sible to refer to the p s y c h e t h r o u g h s u c h t o p o g r a p h i c a l tropes. T h e t u r n f r o m object to ego is the m o v e m e n t that m a k e s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m p o s s i b l e , that m a r k s the d i v i s i o n , the s e p a r a t i o n or loss, that f o r m s the ego to b e g i n w i t h . In this sense, the t u r n f r o m the object to the ego fails successfully to substitute the latter for the former, b u t does s u c c e e d in m a r k -i n g a n d p e r p e t u a t -i n g the p a r t -i t -i o n b e t w e e n the t w o . T h e t u r n thus p r o d u c e s the d i v i d e b e t w e e n ego a n d object, the i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l w o r l d s that it appears to p r e s u m e .
If a p r e c o n s t i t u t e d ego w e r e able to m a k e s u c h a t u r n f r o m an object to itself, it appears that it w o u l d have to t u r n f r o m a p r e c o n s t i t u t e d e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y t o a n i n t e r n a l one. B u t s u c h a n e x p l a n a t i o n c o u l d not a c c o u n t for the v e r y d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l o n w h i c h i t d e p e n d s . I n d e e d , i t i s u n c l e a r
that s u c h a d i v i s i o n c a n be u n d e r s t o o d apart f r o m its context i n m e l a n c h o l i a . I n w h a t f o l l o w s , I h o p e t o c l a r i f y h o w m e l -a n c h o l i -a i n v o l v e s the p r o d u c t i o n o f -a n i n t e r n -a l w o r l d -a s w e l l as a t o p o g r a p h i c a l set of fictions that s t r u c t u r e s the p s y c h e . If the m e l a n c h o l i c t u r n i s the m e c h a n i s m b y w h i c h the d i s t i n c -t i o n b e -t w e e n i n -t e r n a l a n d e x -t e r n a l w o r l d s i s i n s -t i -t u -t e d , -t h e n m e l a n c h o l i a initiates a v a r i a b l e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n the p s y c h i c a n d the s o c i a l , a b o u n d a r y , I h o p e to s h o w , that d i s t r i b u t e s a n d regulates the p s y c h i c sphere i n r e l a t i o n t o p r e v a i l i n g n o r m s o f s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n .
T h a t a l o v e or desire or l i b i d i n a l attachment is u n d e r -s t o o d to take it-self a-s it-s object, a n d to do thi-s t h r o u g h the figure of the t u r n , suggests once a g a i n the t r o p o l o g i c a l b e g i n -n i -n g s of subject f o r m a t i o -n . F r e u d ' s essay p r e s u m e s that l o v e of the object comes first, a n d o n l y u p o n the loss of the o b -ject does m e l a n c h o l y emerge. C o n s i d e r e d closely, h o w e v e r , F r e u d ' s essay m a k e s clear that there c a n be no ego w i t h o u t m e l a n c h o l i a , that the ego's loss is c o n s t i t u t i v e . T h e n a r r a t i v e g r a m m a r that m i g h t a c c o u n t for this r e l a t i o n s h i p is n e c e s s a r i l y c o n f o u n d e d f r o m the start.
M e l a n c h o l i a does not n a m e a p s y c h i c process that m i g h t be r e c o u n t e d t h r o u g h an adequate e x p l a n a t o r y scheme. It tends t o c o n f o u n d a n y e x p l a n a t i o n o f p s y c h i c process that w e m i g h t b e i n c l i n e d t o offer. A n d the r e a s o n i t c o n f o u n d s a n y s u c h effort is that it m a k e s clear that o u r a b i l i t y to refer to the p s y c h e t h r o u g h t r o p e s of i n t e r n a l i t y are themselves effects of a m e l a n c h o l i c c o n d i t i o n . M e l a n c h o l i a p r o d u c e s a set of s p a -t i a l i z i n g -t r o p e s for p s y c h i c life, d o m i c i l e s o f p r e s e r v a -t i o n a n d shelter as w e l l as arenas for struggle a n d p e r s e c u t i o n . S u c h t r o p e s d o not " e x p l a i n " m e l a n c h o l i a : they constitute s o m e o f its tabular d i s c u r s i v e effects.3 In a m a n n e r that recalls N i e t z
-sche's a c c o u n t of the f a b r i c a t i o n of conscience, F r e u d offers a v i e w o f conscience a s a n agency a n d " i n s t i t u t i o n " p r o d u c e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d b y m e l a n c h o l y .
A l t h o u g h F r e u d seeks t o d i s t i n g u i s h m o u r n i n g a n d m e l a n -c h o l i a in this essay, he offers a p o r t r a i t of m e l a n -c h o l i a that c o n t i n u a l l y b l u r s i n t o h i s v i e w o f m o u r n i n g . H e b e g i n s his d e -s c r i p t i o n , for in-stance, b y r e m a r k i n g that m o u r n i n g m a y b e a " r e a c t i o n to the loss of a l o v e d p e r s o n , or to the loss of s o m e a b s t r a c t i o n that has t a k e n the place of one, s u c h as one's c o u n -try, l i b e r t y , a n i d e a l , a n d s o o n " (243). A t first, m o u r n i n g seems t o h a v e t w o f o r m s , one i n w h i c h s o m e o n e i s lost, s o m e o n e r e a l i s lost, a n d another, i n w h i c h w h a t i s lost i n the s o m e o n e r e a l is i d e a l , the loss of an i d e a l . As the essay progresses, it appears that the loss of the i d e a l , "the loss of a m o r e i d e a l k i n d " is c o r r e l a t e d w i t h m e l a n c h o l i a . A l r e a d y w i t h i n m o u r n i n g , h o w -ever, the loss m a y be of an a b s t r a c t i o n or an i d e a l , one that has t a k e n the p l a c e of the one w h o is lost. A f e w p a r a g r a p h s later, he notes that " m e l a n c h o l i a too m a y be the r e a c t i o n to the loss of a l o v e d object" a n d that " w h e r e the e x c i t i n g causes are different [from m o u r n i n g ] one c a n r e c o g n i z e that there is a loss of a m o r e i d e a l k i n d . " If one m o u r n s for the loss of a n i d e a l , a n d that i d e a l m a y substitute for a p e r s o n w h o has b e e n lost, or w h o s e l o v e is b e l i e v e d to be lost, t h e n it m a k e s no sense to c l a i m that m e l a n c h o l i a is d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a loss o f " a m o r e i d e a l k i n d . " A n d yet, a different k i n d o f d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o emerges w h e n F r e u d c l a i m s , w i t h reference t o m o u r n i n g , that the i d e a l m a y have s u b s t i t u t e d for the p e r -s o n a n d , w i t h reference t o m e l a n c h o l i a , that the m e l a n c h o l i c " k n o w s w h o m h e has lost b u t not what h e has lost i n h i m . " I n m e l a n c h o l i a , the i d e a l that the p e r s o n represents appears to be u n k n o w a b l e ; i n m o u r n i n g , the p e r s o n , o r the i d e a l that s u b s t i
-tutes for the p e r s o n a n d that, p r e s u m a b l y , r e n d e r s the p e r s o n lost, is u n k n o w a b l e .
F r e u d says m e l a n c h o l i a i s related t o "an objectloss w i t h -d r a w n f r o m consciousness," b u t t o the extent that m o u r n i n g is related to substitute ideals a n d abstractions s u c h as " c o u n -t r y a n d l i b e r -t y , " i-t -too is c l e a r l y c o n s -t i -t u -t e d -t h r o u g h -the loss of the object, a d o u b l e loss that i n v o l v e s b o t h the substitute i d e a l a n d the p e r s o n . W h e r e a s i n m e l a n c h o l i a the i d e a l i s o c c l u d e d a n d one does not k n o w w h a t one has lost " i n " the p e r s o n lost, i n m o u r n i n g one r i s k s not k n o w i n g w h o m one has lost " i n " l o s i n g the i d e a l .
L a t e r i n the essay F r e u d specifies the p s y c h i c systems i n w h i c h m e l a n c h o l y takes p l a c e a n d w h a t i t m e a n s for m e l a n c h o l y t o b e related t o "an objectloss w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n -sciousness." H e w r i t e s that "the u n c o n s c i o u s [thing-]presen-t a [thing-]presen-t i o n [Dingvors[thing-]presen-tellung] of [thing-]presen-the objec[thing-]presen-t has b e e n a b a n d o n e d by the l i b i d o " (256)." T h e " t h i n g - p r e s e n t a t i o n " of the object is not the object itself, b u t a cathected trace, one that is, in re-l a t i o n to the object, a re-l r e a d y a substitute a n d a d e r i v a t i v e . In m o u r n i n g , the traces of the object, its i n n u m e r a b l e " l i n k s , " are o v e r c o m e p i e c e m e a l o v e r t i m e . I n m e l a n c h o l i a , the presence o f a m b i v a l e n c e i n r e l a t i o n t o the object m a k e s a n y s u c h p r o -gressive d e - l i n k i n g o f l i b i d i n a l attachment i m p o s s i b l e . Rather, "countless separate struggles are c a r r i e d on o v e r the object, in w h i c h l o v e a n d hate c o n t e n d w i t h each other; the one seeks to d e t a c h the l i b i d o f r o m the object, the other to m a i n t a i n this p o s i t i o n of the l i b i d o against the assault." T h i s strange battle-f i e l d i s t o b e battle-f o u n d , F r e u d m a i n t a i n s , i n "the r e g i o n o battle-f the m e m o r y - t r a c e s of things."
A m b i v a l e n c e m a y be a characteristic feature of e v e r y l o v e attachment that a p a r t i c u l a r ego m a k e s , or it m a y " p r o c e e d
p r e c i s e l y f r o m those experiences that i n v o l v e d the threat of l o s i n g the object" (256). T h i s last r e m a r k suggests, h o w e v e r , that ambivalence may well be a result of loss, that the loss of an object p r e c i p i t a t e s an a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d it as p a r t of the process of l e t t i n g it go.5 If so, t h e n m e l a n c h o l i a , d e n n e d as the
a m b i v a l e n t r e a c t i o n t o loss, m a y b e coextensive w i t h loss, s o that m o u r n i n g i s s u b s u m e d i n m e l a n c h o l i a . F r e u d ' s statement that m e l a n c h o l i a arises f r o m "an object-loss w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n s c i o u s n e s s " i s thus s p e c i f i e d i n r e l a t i o n t o a m b i v a l e n c e : " e v e r y t h i n g t o d o w i t h these struggles d u e t o a m b i v a l e n c e r e -m a i n s w i t h d r a w n f r o -m consciousness, u n t i l the o u t c o -m e char-acteristic o f m e l a n c h o l i a has set i n . " T h e a m b i v a l e n c e r e m a i n s
entzogen—withdrawn—only to take on a specific f o r m in m e l
-a n c h o l i -a , one i n w h i c h different -aspects o f the p s y c h e -are - ac-c o r d e d o p p o s i n g p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n the r e l a t i o n o f a m b i v a l e n ac-c e . F r e u d offers this p s y c h i c a r t i c u l a t i o n of a m b i v a l e n c e as "a c o n -flict b e t w e e n one part of the ego a n d the c r i t i c a l a g e n c y " as an a c c o u n t of the f o r m a t i o n of the s u p e r - e g o in its c r i t i c a l r e l a t i o n to the ego. A m b i v a l e n c e thus precedes the p s y c h i c t o p o g r a -p h y of su-per-ego/ego; its m e l a n c h o l i c a r t i c u l a t i o n is offered as the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y of that v e r y t o p o g r a p h y . T h u s , it w o u l d m a k e no sense to seek r e c o u r s e to s u c h a t o p o g r a p h y
to explain m e l a n c h o l i a , if the a m b i v a l e n c e that is s a i d to d i s
-t i n g u i s h m e l a n c h o l i a i s w h a -t -t h e n b e c o m e s a r -t i c u l a -t e d — a f -t e r a p e r i o d o f b e i n g w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n s c i o u s n e s s — a s ego a n d super-ego. T h e i n t e r n a l t o p o g r a p h y b y w h i c h m e l a n c h o l i a i s p a r t i a l l y e x p l a i n e d is itself the effect of that m e l a n c h o l i a . W a l -ter B e n j a m i n r e m a r k s that m e l a n c h o l i a spatializes, a n d that its effort to reverse or s u s p e n d t i m e p r o d u c e s " l a n d s c a p e s " as its s i g n a t u r e effect.6 O n e m i g h t p r o f i t a b l y r e a d the F r e u d i a n
t o p o g r a p h y that m e l a n c h o l y occasions as p r e c i s e l y s u c h a spa-t i a l i z e d l a n d s c a p e o f spa-the m i n d .
T h e a m b i v a l e n c e that i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m consciousness re-m a i n s w i t h d r a w n " n o t u n t i l the o u t c o re-m e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f m e l a n c h o l y has set i n " (257; " b i s n i c h t d e r f u r d i e M e l a n c h o l i e c h a r a k t e r i s t i s c h e A u s g a n g eingetreten i s t " [211]). W h a t is this characteristic "exit" o r " p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e " that m e l a n c h o l y takes? F r e u d w r i t e s , "this, a s w e k n o w , consists i n the threat-e n threat-e d l i b i d i n a l caththreat-exis at l threat-e n g t h a b a n d o n i n g ththreat-e objthreat-ect, only, h o w e v e r , t o d r a w b a c k t o the p l a c e i n the ego f r o m w h i c h i t has p r o c e e d e d . " A m o r e p r e c i s e t r a n s l a t i o n w o u l d c l a r i f y that m e l a n c h o l i a i n v o l v e s an attempt to substitute the ego for that cathexis, one that i n v o l v e s a r e t u r n of the cathexis to its p o i n t of o r i g i n : the threatened cathexis is a b a n d o n e d , b u t o n l y to
pull itself back onto the place of the ego ("aber n u r , um s i c h auf
d i e Stelle des Ichs . . . z u r ù c k z u z i e h e n " ) , a place f r o m w h i c h the threatened attachment has d e p a r t e d ("von der sie ausge-g a n ausge-g e n w a r " ) .
In m e l a n c h o l i a , cathexis is u n d e r s t o o d to engage reflexi v e l y w reflexi t h reflexitself ( " u m s reflexi c h auf d reflexi e Stelle des Ichs . . . z u r ù c k -z u -z i e h e n " ) a n d , specifically, t o d r a w o r p u l l itself i n a n d b a c k t o the p l a c e o f its o w n d e p a r t u r e o r g o i n g - o u t . T h i s " p l a c e " of the ego is not q u i t e the s a m e as the ego itself, b u t seems to represent a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , an Ausgangspunkt, for the l i b i d o , as w e l l as the m e l a n c h o l i c site of its r e t u r n . In this re-t u r n of l i b i d o re-to ire-ts p l a c e of d e p a r re-t u r e , a place of re-the ego, a m e l a n c h o l i c c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n o f l i b i d o takes place.
T h i s r e t u r n is d e s c r i b e d as a w i t h d r a w a l , a d r a w i n g or p u l l -i n g b a c k (zur-i-ickz-iehung), b u t also, -in the next l -i n e , as a fl-ight: " D i e L i e b e hat s i c h s o d u r c h i h r e F l u c h t ins Ich der A u f h e b u n g e n t z o g e n " (210).7 A l t h o u g h this l i n e i s t r a n s l a t e d i n f a m o u s l y
as "So by t a k i n g flight i n t o the ego l o v e escapes e x t i n c t i o n " (257), the sense of e s c a p i n g e x t i n c t i o n is not p r e c i s e l y r i g h t . T h e w o r d entzogen, for instance, w a s p r e v i o u s l y t r a n s l a t e d as
" w i t h d r a w n " a n d Aufhebung carries a n o t o r i o u s l y a m b i g u o u s set o f m e a n i n g s f r o m its c i r c u l a t i o n w i t h i n H e g e l i a n d i s c o u r s e : c a n c e l l a t i o n b u t not q u i t e e x t i n c t i o n ; s u s p e n s i o n , p r e s e r v a -t i o n , a n d o v e r c o m i n g . T h r o u g h i-ts fligh-t i n -t o -the ego, o r i n -the ego, l o v e has w i t h d r a w n o r t a k e n a w a y its o w n o v e r c o m i n g , w i t h d r a w n a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , r e n d e r e d it p s y c h i c . H e r e it is not a q u e s t i o n o f l o v e "escaping a n e x t i n c t i o n " m a n d a t e d f r o m elsewhere; rather, l o v e itself w i t h d r a w s or takes a w a y the de-s t r u c t i o n of the object, takede-s it on ade-s itde-s o w n dede-structivenede-sde-s. Instead of b r e a k i n g w i t h the object, or t r a n s f o r m i n g the object t h r o u g h m o u r n i n g , this Aufhebung—this active, n e g a t i n g , a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i v e m o v e m e n t — i s t a k e n i n t o the ego. T h e " f l i g h t " of l o v e i n t o the ego is this effort to s q u i r r e l the Aufhebung a w a y i n s i d e , t o w i t h d r a w i t f r o m e x t e r n a l reality, a n d t o i n s t i t u t e a n i n t e r n a l t o p o g r a p h y i n w h i c h the a m b i v a l e n c e m i g h t f i n d a n a l t e r e d a r t i c u l a t i o n . T h e w i t h d r a w a l o f a m b i v a l e n c e thus p r o -d u c e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of a p s y c h i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , i n -d e e -d , a f a b u l a t i o n o f p s y c h i c t o p o g r a p h y .
T h i s flight a n d w i t h d r a w a l i s n a m e d , i n the next l i n e , a s a r e g r e s s i o n , one that m a k e s p o s s i b l e the c o n s c i o u s representat i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a : "Afrepresentater representathis r e g r e s s i o n o f representathe l i b i d o representathe p r o -cess c a n b e c o m e c o n s c i o u s , and it is represented to consciousness
as a conflict between one part of the ego and the critical agency [ u n d
reprasentiert s i c h d e m B e w u s s t s e i n als e i n K o n f l i k t z w i s c h e n e i n e m T e i l des Ichs a n d der k r i t i s c h e n I n s t a n z ; m y e m p h a s i s ] . " W h e r e a s one m i g h t expect that the r e g r e s s i o n of the l i b i d o , its b e i n g w i t h d r a w n i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s (as w e l l a s the w i t h -d r a w a l of a m b i v a l e n c e i n t o consciousness) is the f a i l u r e of its a r t i c u l a t i o n , the o p p o s i t e a p p e a r s t o b e the case. O n l y u p o n the c o n d i t i o n of s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l does m e l a n c h o l i a take a c o n s c i o u s f o r m . T h e w i t h d r a w a l or r e g r e s s i o n of l i b i d o is
r e p r e s e n t e d to c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a conflict b e t w e e n parts of the ego; i n d e e d , the ego c o m e s t o b e r e p r e s e n t e d i n parts o n l y o n the c o n d i t i o n that s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l or r e g r e s s i o n has t a k e n place. If m e l a n c h o l i a constitutes the w i t h d r a w a l or r e g r e s s i o n o f a m b i v a l e n c e , a n d i f that a m b i v a l e n c e b e c o m e s c o n s c i o u s t h r o u g h b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d as o p p o s i t i o n a l parts of the ego, a n d that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s m a d e p o s s i b l e o n the c o n d i t i o n o f that w i t h d r a w a l , t h e n it f o l l o w s that this préfiguration of the t o p o g r a p h i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ego a n d s u p e r - e g o i s itself d e p e n d e n t u p o n m e l a n c h o l i a . M e l a n c h o l i a p r o d u c e s the p o s -s i b i l i t y for the r e p r e -s e n t a t i o n of p -s y c h i c life. T h e Aufhebung that i s w i t h d r a w n — o n e that m i g h t have m e a n t the o v e r c o m i n g of loss t h r o u g h attachment to a substitute o b j e c t — i s an
Aufhebung that reemerges w i t h i n a n d as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a c a n c e l
-l a t i o n a n d p r e s e r v a t i o n of the object, a set of " w o r d - t r a c e s " (to use F r e u d ' s term) that b e c o m e s the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c r e p r e s e n -t a -t i o n of p s y c h i c life.
T o w h a t extent does m e l a n c h o l i a represent a n o t h e r w i s e u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e a m b i v a l e n c e b y f a b u l a t i n g p s y c h i c t o p o g r a -phies? R e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s itself i m p l i c a t e d i n m e l a n c h o l i a , that is, the effort to re-present that is at an i n f i n i t e d i s t a n c e f r o m its object. M o r e specifically, m e l a n c h o l i a p r o v i d e s the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y for the a r t i c u l a t i o n of p s y c h i c t o p o g r a p h i e s , of the ego in its c o n s t i t u t i v e r e l a t i o n to the s u p e r - e g o a n d thus of the ego itself. A l t h o u g h the ego is s a i d to be the p o i n t of d e p a r -t u r e for a l i b i d o -tha-t is s u b s e q u e n -t l y w i -t h d r a w n in-to -the ego, i t n o w a p p e a r s that o n l y u p o n s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l c a n the ego e m e r g e as an object for consciousness, s o m e t h i n g that m i g h t be r e p r e s e n t e d at a l l , w h e t h e r as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e or a site of r e t u r n . I n d e e d , the p h r a s e " w i t h d r a w n i n t o the ego" is the r e t r o a c t i v e p r o d u c t o f the m e l a n c h o l i c p r o c e s s i t p u r p o r t s t o
describe. T h u s it does not, s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , d e s c r i b e a p r e -c o n s t i t u t e d p s y -c h i -c pro-cess b u t emerges in a belated f a s h i o n as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n d i t i o n e d by m e l a n c h o l i c w i t h d r a w a l .
T h i s last p o i n t raises the q u e s t i o n of the status of the p s y -c h i -c t o p o g r a p h i e s that p r e d o m i n a t e i n this a n d other essays b y F r e u d . A l t h o u g h one m i g h t expect that s u c h t o p o g r a p h i e s are to be r e a d as the e x p l a n a t o r y a p p a r a t u s of p s y c h o a n a l y -sis a n d not, as it w e r e , one of its t e x t u a l i z e d s y m p t o m s , F r e u d suggests that the v e r y d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ego a n d super-ego c a n be t r a c e d to an a m b i v a l e n c e that is first w i t h d r a w n f r o m consciousness a n d t h e n reemerges as a p s y c h i c t o p o g r a p h y i n w h i c h " c r i t i c a l a g e n c y " i s s p l i t off f r o m the ego. S i m i l a r l y , in his d i s c u s s i o n of the self-beratements of the super-ego, he refers t e l l i n g l y to conscience as "one of the major i n s t i t u t i o n s of the ego."
C l e a r l y p l a y i n g on a m e t a p h o r of a s o c i a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d d o -m a i n of p o w e r , F r e u d ' s reference to conscience as " a -m o n g the major i n s t i t u t i o n s of the ego [Ichinstitutionen]" (247) suggests not o n l y that conscience i s i n s t i t u t e d , p r o d u c e d , a n d m a i n -t a i n e d w i -t h i n a larger p o l i -t y a n d i-ts o r g a n i z a -t i o n , b u -t -tha-t -the ego a n d its v a r i o u s parts are accessible t h r o u g h a m e t a p h o r i c a l language that attributes a s o c i a l content a n d s t r u c t u r e to these p r e s u m a b l y p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n a . A l t h o u g h F r e u d b e g i n s his essay b y i n s i s t i n g o n the i n d i s p u t a b l y " p s y c h o g e n i c n a t u r e " (243) o f the m e l a n c h o l i a a n d m o u r n i n g u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n in the essay, he also p r o v i d e s s o c i a l m e t a p h o r s that not o n l y g o v e r n the t o p o g r a p h i c d e s c r i p t i o n s o f m e l a n c h o l y ' s o p e r a -t i o n , b u -t i m p l i c i -t l y u n d o h i s o w n c l a i m -t o p r o v i d e a specifi-c a l l y p s y specifi-c h o g e n i specifi-c e x p l a n a t i o n o f these p s y specifi-c h i specifi-c states. F r e u d describes "one p a r t of the ego [that] sets itself o v e r against the other, judges it c r i t i c a l l y , a n d , as it w e r e , takes it as its object." A c r i t i c a l agency is s a i d to be "split off" (abgespalten) f r o m the
ego, s u g g e s t i n g that i n s o m e p r i o r state, this c r i t i c a l f a c u l t y w a s not yet separate. H o w , precisely, this s p l i t t i n g of the ego into parts o c c u r s is, it seems, p a r t of the strange, f a b u l a t i n g scene i n i t i a t e d b y m e l a n c h o l y , the w i t h d r a w a l o f cathexis f r o m the object to the ego, a n d the subsequent e m e r g e n c e of a r e p -resentation of the p s y c h e in terms of splits a n d parts, articulat-i n g a m b articulat-i v a l e n c e a n d articulat-i n t e r n a l a n t a g o n articulat-i s m . I s tharticulat-is t o p o g r a p h y not s y m p t o m a t i c o f w h a t i t seeks t o e x p l a i n ? H o w else d o w e e x p l a i n this i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n of the p s y c h e a n d its e x p r e s s i o n here as a scene of p a r t i t i o n a n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n ? Is there an i m -p l i c i t s o c i a l text i n this t o -p o g r a -p h i c a l r e n d i t i o n o f -p s y c h i c life, one that installs a n t a g o n i s m (the threat of j u d g m e n t ) as the s t r u c t u r a l necessity of the t o p o g r a p h i c a l m o d e l , one that f o l -l o w s f r o m m e -l a n c h o -l i a a n d f r o m a w i t h d r a w a -l o f attachment?
M e l a n c h o l i a describes a process b y w h i c h a n o r i g i n a l l y ex-t e r n a l objecex-t is losex-t, or an i d e a l is losex-t, a n d ex-the r e f u s a l ex-to break the attachment to s u c h an object or i d e a l leads to the w i t h -d r a w a l of the object i n t o the ego, the r e p l a c e m e n t of the object b y the ego, a n d the setting u p o f a n i n n e r w o r l d i n w h i c h a c r i t i c a l agency is s p l i t off f r o m the ego a n d p r o c e e d s to take the ego as its object. In a w e l l - k n o w n passage, F r e u d m a k e s clear that the accusations that the c r i t i c a l agency is s a i d to l e v e l against the ego t u r n o u t to be v e r y m u c h l i k e the accusations that the ego w o u l d have l e v e l e d against the object or the i d e a l . T h u s , the ego absorbs b o t h l o v e a n d rage against the object. M e l a n c h o l i a appears to be a process of i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , a n d one m i g h t w e l l r e a d its effects as a p s y c h i c state that has effectively s u b s t i t u t e d itself for the w o r l d i n w h i c h i t d w e l l s . T h e effect o f m e l a n c h o l i a , then, appears to be the loss of the s o c i a l w o r l d , the s u b s t i t u t i o n o f p s y c h i c parts a n d a n t a g o n i s m s for e x t e r n a l relations a m o n g s o c i a l actors: "an object-loss w a s t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o an ego-loss a n d the conflict b e t w e e n the ego a n d the l o v e d
p e r s o n i n t o a cleavage b e t w e e n the c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of the ego a n d the ego as altered by i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " (249).
T h e object is lost, a n d the ego is s a i d to w i t h d r a w the o b -ject i n t o itself. T h e "ob-ject" thus w i t h d r a w n is a l r e a d y m a g i c a l , a trace of s o m e k i n d , a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the object, b u t not the object itself, w h i c h is, after a l l , gone. T h e ego i n t o w h i c h this r e m n a n t is " b r o u g h t " is not e x a c t l y a shelter for lost p a r t -objects, a l t h o u g h it is s o m e t i m e s d e s c r i b e d that way. T h e ego is "altered by i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , " that is, a l t e r e d by v i r t u e of ab-s o r b i n g the object or p u l l i n g b a c k itab-s o w n cathexiab-s onto itab-self. T h e " p r i c e " of s u c h an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , h o w e v e r , is that the ego splits i n t o the c r i t i c a l agency a n d the ego as object of c r i t i c i s m a n d j u d g m e n t . T h u s the r e l a t i o n t o the object r e a p p e a r s " i n " the ego, not m e r e l y as a m e n t a l event or s i n g u l a r r e p r e s e n -tation, b u t as a scene of self-beratement that reconfigures the t o p o g r a p h y of the ego, a fantasy of i n t e r n a l p a r t i t i o n a n d j u d g -m e n t that c o -m e s to s t r u c t u r e the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p s y c h i c life
tout court. T h e ego n o w stands for the object, a n d the c r i t i c a l
agency c o m e s to represent the ego's d i s o w n e d rage, r e i f i e d as a p s y c h i c agency separate f r o m the ego itself. T h a t rage, a n d the attachment it i m p l i e s , are " t u r n e d b a c k u p o n " the ego, b u t f r o m w h e r e ?
Yet c e r t a i n s o c i a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e features of the m e l a n c h o l i c , i n c l u d i n g " c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e s s , " suggest that m e l a n c h o l i a i s not a n a s o c i a l p s y c h i c state. I n fact, m e l a n c h o l i a i s p r o d u c e d to the extent that the s o c i a l w o r l d is e c l i p s e d by the p s y c h i c , that a c e r t a i n transfer of attachment f r o m objects to ego takes place, n o t w i t h o u t a c o n t a m i n a t i o n of the p s y c h i c sphere by the s o c i a l sphere that is a b a n d o n e d . F r e u d suggests as m u c h w h e n h e e x p l a i n s that the lost other i s not s i m p l y b r o u g h t i n -side the ego, as one m i g h t shelter a w a y w a r d d o g . T h e act of i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n (to be c o n s t r u e d as a fantasy rather t h a n as a
p r o c e s s8) t r a n s f o r m s the object (one m i g h t e v e n use the t e r m
Aufhebung for s u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ) ; the other is t a k e n in
a n d t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n ego, b u t a n ego t o b e r e v i l e d , t h e r e b y b o t h p r o d u c i n g a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g the c r i t i c a l "agency . . . c o m m o n l y c a l l e d conscience." A f o r m of m o r a l r e f l e x i v i t y is p r o d u c e d i n w h i c h the ego splits itself t o f u r n i s h a n intern a l p e r s p e c t i v e b y w h i c h t o j u d g e itself. T h i s reflexive r e l a -t i o n b y w h i c h -the ego b e c o m e s a n objec-t for i-tself -t u r n s o u -t to be a w i t h d r a w n a n d t r a n s f o r m e d (entzogen a n d aufgehoben) r e l a t i o n to the lost other; in this sense, r e f l e x i v i t y appears to d e p e n d u p o n the p r i o r o p e r a t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a . T h e ego i s also f i g u r e d as h a v i n g a voice t h r o u g h this process, a n d it a p -pears i m p e r a t i v e w i t h i n m e l a n c h o l i a that self-beratement b e v o i c e d , not m e r e l y to oneself, b u t in the presence of others. T h e self-reproaches of the ego are not s i m p l y the i m i t a t i o n of r e p r o a c h e s once l e v e l e d against the ego f r o m the one lost, as is c o m m o n l y a s s u m e d ; rather, they are r e p r o a c h e s l e v e l e d against the other that n o w t u r n b a c k u p o n the ego.
Before w e c o n s i d e r m o r e c l o s e l y w h a t i t m e a n s for s o m e t h i n g t o " t u r n b a c k u p o n itself" i n this w a y , i t seems i m p o r -tant to note that the p s y c h i c f o r m of r e f l e x i v i t y m e l a n c h o l i a elaborates carries the trace of the other w i t h i n it as a d i s s i m u -lated sociality, a n d that the p e r f o r m a n c e of m e l a n c h o l i a as the shameless v o i c i n g of self-beratement in front of others effects a d e t o u r that rejoins m e l a n c h o l i a to its lost or w i t h d r a w n s o c i -ality. In m e l a n c h o l i a , not o n l y is the loss of an other or an i d e a l lost t o consciousness, b u t the s o c i a l w o r l d i n w h i c h s u c h a loss b e c a m e p o s s i b l e is also lost. T h e m e l a n c h o l i c does not m e r e l y w i t h d r a w the lost object f r o m consciousness, b u t w i t h d r a w s i n t o the p s y c h e a c o n f i g u r a t i o n of the s o c i a l w o r l d as w e l l . T h e ego thus becomes a " p o l i t y " a n d conscience one of its "major i n s t i t u t i o n s , " p r e c i s e l y because p s y c h i c life w i t h d r a w s a s o c i a l
w o r l d i n t o itself i n a n effort t o a n n u l the losses that w o r l d d e -m a n d s . W i t h i n -m e l a n c h o l i a , the p s y c h e b e c o -m e s the topos i n w h i c h there i s n o loss a n d , i n d e e d , n o n e g a t i o n . M e l a n c h o l i a refuses to a c k n o w l e d g e loss, a n d in this sense "preserves" its lost objects as p s y c h i c effects.
F r e u d r e m a r k s the s o c i a l c o n d u c t o f the m e l a n c h o l i c , e m -p h a s i z i n g h i s or her shameless self-ex-posure: "the m e l a n c h o l i c does not b e h a v e in q u i t e the same w a y as a p e r s o n w h o is c r u s h e d b y r e m o r s e a n d self-reproach i n a n o r m a l f a s h i o n . F e e l i n g s o f s h a m e are l a c k i n g . . . o r . . . are not p r o m i n e n t . . . . O n e m i g h t e m p h a s i z e the presence i n h i m o f a n a l m o s t o p p o -site trait of insistent c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e s s w h i c h finds satisfact i o n i n s e l f e x p o s u r e " (247). T h e m e l a n c h o l i c sussatisfactains a n i n -d i r e c t a n -d -deflecte-d r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the s o c i a l i t y f r o m w h i c h he or she has w i t h d r a w n . O n e would have d e n o u n c e d the lost other i f one c o u l d — f o r d e p a r t i n g , i f for n o other reason. F u l -f i l l i n g a w i s h w h o s e -f o r m , the past subjunctive, p r e c l u d e s a n y s u c h f u l f i l l m e n t , the m e l a n c h o l i c seeks not o n l y t o r e -verse t i m e , r e i n s t a t i n g the i m a g i n a r y past as the present, b u t to o c c u p y e v e r y p o s i t i o n a n d thereby to p r e c l u d e the loss of the addressee. T h e m e l a n c h o l i c w o u l d h a v e said something, if h e o r she c o u l d , b u t d i d not, a n d n o w believes i n the sus-t a i n i n g p o w e r o f sus-the voice. V a i n l y , sus-the m e l a n c h o l i c n o w says w h a t he or she w o u l d have s a i d , a d d r e s s e d o n l y to h i m s e l f , as one w h o i s a l r e a d y split off f r o m h i m s e l f , b u t w h o s e p o w e r o f selfaddress d e p e n d s u p o n this selfforfeiture. T h e m e l a n -c h o l i -c thus b u r r o w s i n a d i r e -c t i o n o p p o s i t e t o that i n w h i -c h h e m i g h t f i n d a fresher trace of the lost other, a t t e m p t i n g to re-solve the loss t h r o u g h p s y c h i c substitutions a n d c o m p o u n d i n g the loss as he goes. A f a i l u r e of address, a f a i l u r e to s u s t a i n the other t h r o u g h the v o i c e that addresses, m e l a n c h o l i a emerges as a c o m p e n s a t o r y f o r m of negative n a r c i s s i s m : I r e v i l e m y
-self a n d rehabilitate the other i n the f o r m o f m y o w n i n t e r n a l a m b i v a l e n c e . I refuse to speak to or of the other, b u t I speak v o l u m i n o u s l y about myself, l e a v i n g a refracted t r a i l of w h a t I d i d not say to or about the other. T h e stronger the i n h i b i t i o n against e x p r e s s i o n , the stronger the e x p r e s s i o n of conscience.
H o w does this p r o b l e m o f the u n c o n s c i o u s loss, the r e f u s e d loss, that m a r k s m e l a n c h o l i a r e t u r n us to the p r o b l e m of the re-l a t i o n b e t w e e n the p s y c h i c a n d the sociare-l? I n m o u r n i n g , F r e u d tells us, there is n o t h i n g about the loss that is u n c o n s c i o u s . In m e l a n c h o l i a , h e m a i n t a i n s , "the object-loss i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n s c i o u s n e s s " : the object is not o n l y lost, b u t that loss itself is lost, w i t h d r a w n a n d p r e s e r v e d i n the s u s p e n d e d t i m e o f p s y -c h i -c life. In other w o r d s , a -c -c o r d i n g to the m e l a n -c h o l i -c , "I have lost n o t h i n g . "
T h e u n s p e a k a b i l i t y a n d u n r e p r e s e n t a b i l i t y o f this loss t r a n s -lates d i r e c t l y i n t o a h e i g h t e n i n g of conscience. W h e r e one m i g h t expect that conscience w o u l d w a x a n d w a n e a c c o r d i n g to the s t r e n g t h of e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d p r o h i b i t i o n s , it appears that its s t r e n g t h has m o r e t o d o w i t h m a r s h a l l i n g aggres-s i o n in the aggres-s e r v i c e of r e f u aggres-s i n g to a c k n o w l e d g e a loaggres-saggres-s that haaggres-s a l r e a d y t a k e n place, a refusal to lose a t i m e that is a l r e a d y gone. O d d l y , the p s y c h e ' s m o r a l i s m a p p e a r s t o b e a n i n d e x o f its o w n t h w a r t e d grief a n d i l l e g i b l e rage. T h u s , i f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m e l a n c h o l i a a n d s o c i a l life is to be reestablished, it is not to be m e a s u r e d by r e g a r d i n g the selfberatements of c o n -science as m i m e t i c i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n s of the beratements l e v e l e d b y s o c i a l agencies o f j u d g m e n t o r p r o h i b i t i o n . Rather, f o r m s o f s o c i a l p o w e r emerge that regulate w h a t losses w i l l a n d w i l l not b e g r i e v e d ; i n the s o c i a l f o r e c l o s u r e o f grief w e m i g h t f i n d w h a t fuels the i n t e r n a l v i o l e n c e of conscience.
A l t h o u g h s o c i a l p o w e r regulates w h a t losses c a n b e g r i e v e d , it is not a l w a y s as effective as it a i m s to be. T h e loss c a n
-not f u l l y be d e n i e d , b u t neither does it a p p e a r in a w a y that c a n d i r e c t l y b e affirmed. T h e " p l a i n t s " o f the m e l a n c h o l i c are i n v a r i a b l y m i s d i r e c t e d , yet in this m i s d i r e c t i o n resides a n a -scent p o l i t i c a l text. T h e p r o h i b i t i o n on grief registers as a loss of s p e e c h for its addressee. T h e p a i n of loss is " c r e d i t e d " to the one w h o suffers it, at w h i c h p o i n t the loss is u n d e r s t o o d as a fault or i n j u r y d e s e r v i n g of redress; one seeks redress for h a r m s d o n e to oneself, b u t f r o m no one except oneself.
T h e v i o l e n c e o f s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n i s not t o b e f o u n d i n its u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n , b u t i n the c i r c u i t o u s r o u t e b y w h i c h the p s y -che accuses itself of its o w n worthlessness. No d o u b t , this is a strange a n d o p a q u e s y m p t o m o f u n r e s o l v e d grief. W h y does the r e t r a c t i o n of the lost other i n t o the ego, the refusal to ac-k n o w l e d g e loss, c u l m i n a t e in a d e p r i v a t i o n of the ego? Is the loss resituated in a w a y that n u l l i f i e s the ego in order, p s y -chically, to save the object? T h e decrease in self-esteem that is s a i d t o d i s t i n g u i s h m e l a n c h o l i a f r o m m o u r n i n g appears t o r e -sult f r o m p r o d i g i o u s efforts b y the c r i t i c a l agency t o d e p r i v e the ego of its esteem. B u t one c o u l d e q u a l l y say that there is no q u e s t i o n o f h i g h o r l o w self-esteem p r i o r t o the o p e r a t i o n o f this c r i t i c a l agency, no "esteem" that b e l o n g s to the ego p r i o r to its p a r t i t i o n i n t o ego a n d super-ego. P r i o r to the o p e r a t i o n of a c r i t i c a l agency, it w o u l d be difficult to gauge the ego against an i d e a l , a j u d g m e n t that p r e s u p p o s e s a c r i t i c a l agency that m i g h t a p p r o v e or d i s a p p r o v e of the ego's m o r a l state. In this sense, self-esteem appears t o b e p r o d u c e d b y the v e r y c r i t i c a l agency b y w h i c h i t i s p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t r o y e d .
F r e u d does refer to this r e s i t u a t i n g of loss in the ego w h e n he refers to the ego as i m p o v e r i s h e d , as h a v i n g b e c o m e p o o r , a n d "an object-loss . . . t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o an ego-loss" (249). T h i s loss in the ego is a p p a r e n t l y a loss of an i d e a l of itself, a n d in F r e u d ' s later w o r k , he specifies that the j u d g m e n t s of c o n
-science w o r k in s u c h a w a y that the super-ego gauges the ego against the "ego-ideal." T h e ego is f o u n d to be i m p o v e r i s h e d b e s i d e this i d e a l , a n d the " l o s s " that the ego suffers is a loss o f c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n itself a n d the i d e a l b y w h i c h i t is j u d g e d . W h e r e does this i d e a l emerge f r o m ? Is it a r b i t r a r i l y m a n u f a c t u r e d by the ego, or do s u c h ideals r e t a i n the trace of s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n a n d n o r m a t i v i t y ? F r e u d r e m a r k s that m e l a n -c h o l i a is a response not just to d e a t h , b u t to other o r d e r s of loss, i n c l u d i n g "slights a n d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s " (250). A n d w h e n h e i n t r o d u c e s the n o t i o n that b o t h m o u r n i n g a n d m e l a n c h o l i a c a n be responses to the loss of an i d e a l , s u c h as " c o u n t r y " or " l i b e r t y , " he m a k e s clear by h i s e x a m p l e s that s u c h i d e a l s are s o c i a l i n character.
T h e ideals b y w h i c h the ego judges itself c l e a r l y are ones b y w h i c h the ego w i l l b e f o u n d w a n t i n g . T h e m e l a n c h o l i c c o m -pares h i m - o r herself i n v i d i o u s l y w i t h s u c h s o c i a l ideals. I f they are the p s y c h i c s a n c t i f i c a t i o n of o n c e - e x t e r n a l objects or ideals, t h e n they are s e e m i n g l y also the target of aggression. Indeed, w e m i g h t w e l l ask w h e t h e r the s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h the ego is, as it were, berated by the i d e a l is not the i n v e r s i o n of a p r i o r s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h the ego w o u l d , i f i t c o u l d , have berated the i d e a l . Is the p s y c h i c v i o l e n c e of conscience not a r e -fracted i n d i c t m e n t of the s o c i a l f o r m s that have m a d e c e r t a i n k i n d s of losses u n g r i e v a b l e ?
T h u s , a loss in the w o r l d that c a n n o t be d e c l a r e d enrages, generates a m b i v a l e n c e , a n d becomes the loss " i n " the ego that is nameless a n d diffuse a n d that p r o m p t s p u b l i c r i t u a l s of self-beratement. O f m o u r n i n g , F r e u d w r i t e s that i t " i m p e l s the ego to g i v e up the object by declaring the object to be d e a d " (257, m y emphasis). M e l a n c h o l i a , i t w o u l d f o l l o w , refuses t o m a k e a n y s u c h d e c l a r a t i o n , declines speech, s u s p e n d i n g the " v e r d i c t of r e a l i t y that the object no longer exists" (255). We
i 8 6 Psychic Inceptions
k n o w , h o w e v e r , that the m e l a n c h o l i c is also " c o m m u n i c a t i v e , " w h i c h suggests that h i s or her s p e e c h is neither v e r d i c t i v e n o r d e c l a r a t i v e (assertoric), b u t i n e v i t a b l y i n d i r e c t a n d c i r c u -itous. W h a t cannot b e d e c l a r e d b y the m e l a n c h o l i c i s never-theless w h a t g o v e r n s m e l a n c h o l i c speech — a n u n s p e a k a b i l i t y that o r g a n i z e s the f i e l d of the speakable.
" T h e loss of the m e l a n c h o l i c seems p u z z l i n g to us because
we cannot see what it is that is a b s o r b i n g h i m so e n t i r e l y " (247).
W h a t c a n n o t b e d i r e c t l y s p o k e n i s also w h a t i s o c c l u d e d f r o m sight, absent f r o m the v i s u a l f i e l d that o r g a n i z e d m e l a n c h o -l i a . M e -l a n c h o -l i a i s k e p t f r o m v i e w ; i t i s a n a b s o r p t i o n b y s o m e t h i n g that cannot b e a c c o m m o d a t e d b y v i s i o n , that re-sists b e i n g b r o u g h t i n t o the o p e n , neither seen n o r d e c l a r e d . A s p r i v a t e a n d i r r e c o v e r a b l e a s this loss seems, the m e l a n c h o l i c i s strangely o u t g o i n g , p u r s u i n g a n "insistent c o m m u n i -cativeness w h i c h finds satisfaction i n s e l f - e x p o s u r e " (247). T h e w o r t h l e s s n e s s o f the ego i s i n s i s t e n t l y c o m m u n i c a t e d . M e l -a n c h o l i c speech, neither v e r d i c t i v e n o r decl-ar-ative, r e m -a i n s unable to speak its loss. W h a t the m e l a n c h o l i c does declare, n a m e l y , his o w n worthlessness, identifies the loss at the sight of the ego a n d , hence, c o n t i n u e s to f a i l to i d e n t i f y the loss. Self-beratement takes the p l a c e of a b a n d o n m e n t , a n d b e c o m e s the t o k e n of its refusal.
T h e h e i g h t e n i n g o f conscience u n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s attests to the u n a v o w e d status of the loss. T h e ego b e c o m e s m o r a l i z e d o n the c o n d i t i o n o f u n g r i e v e d loss. B u t w h a t c o n d i -tions m a k e it p o s s i b l e to grieve, or not to grieve, loss?
T h e ego not o n l y b r i n g s the object i n s i d e b u t b r i n g s ag-gression against the object a l o n g w i t h it. T h e m o r e this object is b r o u g h t i n s i d e , as it w e r e , the h i g h e r the self-debasement, the p o o r e r the ego b e c o m e s : d e l u s i o n a l self-abasement "over-comes the i n s t i n c t w h i c h c o m p e l s e v e r y l i v i n g t h i n g t o l i f e "
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 187
(246). T h e aggression t u r n e d against the ego has the p o w e r t o contest a n d o v e r c o m e the desire t o live. A t this p o i n t i n F r e u d ' s theory, a g g r e s s i o n against oneself i s d e r i v e d f r o m a n o u t w a r d l y d i r e c t e d aggression against a n other. B u t one c a n d i s c e r n in this f o r m u l a t i o n the b e g i n n i n g s of reflection on a d r i v e that m i g h t b e s a i d t o c o u n t e r the p l e a s u r e p r i n c i p l e , w h a t is later referred to as the death d r i v e .
In m e l a n c h o l i a , the ego contracts s o m e t h i n g of the loss or a b a n d o n m e n t b y w h i c h the object i s n o w m a r k e d , a n a b a n -d o n m e n t that is refuse-d a n -d , as refuse-d, is i n c o r p o r a t e -d . In this sense, to refuse a loss is to b e c o m e it. If the ego c a n n o t accept the loss of the other, t h e n the loss that the other c o m e s to represent b e c o m e s the loss that n o w characterizes the ego: the ego b e c o m e s p o o r a n d i m p o v e r i s h e d . A loss suffered in the w o r l d b e c o m e s n o w the characteristic l a c k in the ego (a s p l i t that is, as it w e r e , i m p o r t e d t h r o u g h the necessary w o r k of i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n ) .
In this way, m e l a n c h o l i a operates in a d i r e c t i o n d i r e c t l y c o u n t e r to n a r c i s s i s m . E c h o i n g the b i b l i c a l cadence of "the s h a d o w o f death," a w a y i n w h i c h d e a t h i m p o s e s its presence o n life, F r e u d r e m a r k s that i n m e l a n c h o l i a "the s h a d o w o f the object fell u p o n the ego" (249). In L a c a n ' s essays on n a r c i s -s i -s m , the f o r m u l a t i o n i-s i m p o r t a n t l y rever-sed: the -s h a d o w of the ego falls u p o n the object.9 N a r c i s s i s m continues to c o n t r o l
love, e v e n w h e n that n a r c i s s i s m a p p e a r s to g i v e w a y to object-love: it is s t i l l m y s e l f that I f i n d there at the site of the object, m y absence. I n m e l a n c h o l i a this f o r m u l a t i o n i s reversed: i n the p l a c e of the loss that the other comes to represent, I f i n d m y -self to be that loss, i m p o v e r i s h e d , w a n t i n g . In narcissistic love, the other contracts my a b u n d a n c e . In m e l a n c h o l i a , I contract the other's absence.
gestures t o w a r d the d u a l d r i v e theory. F r e u d is clear that m e l a n -c h o l i a m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d in part as a nar-cissisti-c d i s t u r b a n -c e . S o m e of its features c o m e f r o m n a r c i s s i s m , b u t some c o m e f r o m m o u r n i n g . I n m a k i n g this c l a i m , F r e u d appears t o set m o u r n i n g as a l i m i t to n a r c i s s i s m , or p e r h a p s , as its counter-d i r e c t i o n . W h a t erocounter-des the ego i n m e l a n c h o l i a i s u n counter-d e r s t o o counter-d to be a loss that w a s o r i g i n a l l y external, b u t by The Ego and
the Id F r e u d comes to r e c o g n i z e that the w o r k of m e l a n c h o
-l i a m a y w e -l -l b e i n the service o f the death d r i v e . H e asks, " H o w i s i t then that i n m e l a n c h o l i a the super-ego c a n be-c o m e a gathering-plabe-ce for the d e a t h i n s t i n be-c t s ? "1 0 H o w is it
that the e g o - e r o d i n g effects of m e l a n c h o l i a , the ones that over-c o m e "the i n s t i n over-c t w h i over-c h over-c o m p e l s every l i v i n g t h i n g t o life," c o m e to w o r k in the service of a d r i v e that seeks to o v e r c o m e life? F r e u d goes further a n d r e m a r k s that the "merciless v i o -l e n c e " o f conscience s h o w s that " w h a t i s n o w h o -l d i n g s w a y in the super-ego is, as it w e r e , a p u r e c u l t u r e of the death i n s t i n c t [Todestrieb]" (53). In m e l a n c h o l i a , t h e n , a c c o r d i n g to this r e v i s e d theory p u b l i s h e d in The Ego and the Id, it w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e to separate the death d r i v e f r o m the conscience h e i g h t e n e d t h r o u g h m e l a n c h o l i a . In either case, the ego r i s k s its life in the face of its f a i l u r e to l i v e up to the s t a n d a r d s e n -c o d e d i n the ego-ideal. A n d the aggression i t takes u p o n itself is in part p r o p o r t i o n a l to the aggression against the other that it has m a n a g e d to b r i n g u n d e r c o n t r o l .
In this account of m e l a n c h o l i a , r e f l e x i v i t y emerges, as it does for N i e t z s c h e , as a t r a n s p o s e d aggressivity. As we have seen, for F r e u d i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a , " aggression is p r i m a r i l y a r e l a t i o n to others a n d o n l y s e c o n d a r i l y a rela-t i o n rela-t o oneself. H e r e m a r k s rela-tharela-t rela-the s u i c i d a l p e r s o n m u s rela-t firsrela-t have u n d e r g o n e m u r d e r o u s i m p u l s e s , a n d suggests that self-t o r m e n self-t saself-tisfies s a d i s m a n d haself-te. B o self-t h of self-these i m p u l s e s have
b e e n e x p e r i e n c e d a s " t u r n e d a r o u n d u p o n the subject's o w n self" (251) — " e i n e W e n d u n g gegen d i e eigene Person erfahren h a b e n . " T h e a m b i v a l e n c e that contains this aggression splits the cathexis, w h i c h is then d i s t r i b u t e d i n t o "parts": p a r t of the erotic cathexis regresses to i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; the other p a r t to s a d i s m . Set up as i n t e r n a l parts of the ego, the sadistic part takes a i m at the part that identifies, a n d the p s y c h i c a l l y v i o l e n t d r a m a of the super-ego proceeds. F r e u d appears to a s s u m e a m b i v a l e n c e at the scene of loss: a w i s h for the other to d i e or to go (a w i s h that is s o m e t i m e s i n s t i g a t e d by the desire of the ego to l i v e a n d , hence, break its attachment to w h a t has gone or died). F r e u d interprets this a m b i v a l e n c e as at once an i n -stance of s a d i s m a n d a w i s h to p r e s e r v e the other as oneself. Self-torment i s this s a d i s m t u r n e d b a c k o n the ego, e n c o d i n g a n d d i s s i m u l a t i n g the d u a l desire to v a n q u i s h a n d to save the object. S e l f - p u n i s h m e n t , he notes, is "the c i r c u i t o u s p a t h " of s a d i s m ; we m i g h t a d d , it is the c i r c u i t o u s p a t h of i d e n t i f i c a -t i o n as w e l l .
F r e u d appears clear here that s a d i s m precedes m a s o c h i s m . ( H i s later emphasis o n the d e a t h d r i v e w i l l invert this p r i o r i t y . ) Reflexive a r t i c u l a t i o n s o f aggression are a l w a y s d e r i v e d f r o m o u t w a r d l y d i r e c t e d ones. W e have k n o w n for s o m e t i m e , h e w r i t e s , that "no n e u r o t i c h a r b o r s thoughts of s u i c i d e w h i c h he has not t u r n e d back u p o n h i m s e l f [auf sich zuruckwendet] f r o m m u r d e r o u s i m p u l s e s t o w a r d o t h e r s " (252). T h e ego takes itself as an object in the place of t a k i n g the other as an object. I n d e e d , the ego first takes itself as an object on the c o n d i t i o n that it has
already t a k e n the other as an object, a n d that the other b e c o m e s
the m o d e l b y w h i c h the ego assumes its b o u n d a r y a s a n o b -ject for i t s e l f — a k i n d o f m i m e s i s , not u n l i k e that d e s c r i b e d b y M i k k e l Borch-Jacobsen,1 1 i n w h i c h m i m e t i c a c t i v i t y p r o d u c e s
m e l a n c h o l i a p e r f o r m s this a c t i v i t y as the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the other " i n t o the ego." T h i s is an effort to preserve the other a n d at the same t i m e to d i s s i m u l a t e aggression t o w a r d the other.
C l e a r l y n o F r e u d i a n t h e o r y that takes the ego a s p r i m a r y o r p r e g i v e n c a n account for the w a y i n w h i c h the ego first b e c o m e s an object on the c o n d i t i o n of the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of aggression a n d the refusal of loss. M e l a n c h o l i a establishes the t e n u o u s basis of the ego, a n d indicates s o m e t h i n g of its status as an i n s t r u m e n t of containment. T h e significance of the ego a s c o n t a i n i n g aggression b e c o m e s clear w h e n w e c o n s i d e r F r e u d ' s e x p l i c i t l y s o c i a l m e t a p h o r i c s i n these d e s c r i p t i o n s . O n e passage, n o t e d b y H o m i B h a b h a ,1 2 suggests s o m e t h i n g o f
the p o l i t i c a l a n a l o g y at issue. " M e l a n c h o l i c . . . r e a c t i o n . . . p r o c e e d s f r o m a m e n t a l constellation of r e v o l t [seelischen
Kon-stellation der Auflehnung], w h i c h has then, by a c e r t a i n process,
p a s s e d o v e r into the c r u s h e d state of m e l a n c h o l i a [die
melan-cholische Zerknirschung]" (248).
B h a b h a argues that m e l a n c h o l i a is not a f o r m of p a s s i v i t y , b u t a f o r m of revolt that takes place t h r o u g h r e p e t i t i o n a n d m e t o n y m y . T h e m e l a n c h o l i c inverts against itself the i n d i c t -m e n t it w o u l d l e v e l against the other; this " i n c o r p o r a t i o n " of the other is also, B h a b h a notes, a " d i s i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the M a s -ter." U n d e r s c o r i n g that "the L a w is e n t o m b e d as loss at the p o i n t of its i d e a l authority," he argues that m e l a n c h o l i a c o n -tests the i d e a l i t y of that a u t h o r i t y p r e c i s e l y by i n c o r p o r a t i n g i t .1 3 A u t h o r i t y ' s i d e a l i t y i s i n c o r p o r a b l e elsewhere, n o longer
t i e d in a n y absolute sense to one figure of the law.
M e l a n c h o l i a is a r e b e l l i o n that has b e e n p u t d o w n , c r u s h e d . Yet it is not a static affair; it c o n t i n u e s as a k i n d of " w o r k " that takes p l a c e b y deflection. F i g u r e d w i t h i n the w o r k i n g s o f the p s y c h e is the p o w e r of the state to p r e e m p t an i n s u r r e c t i o n -a r y r-age. T h e " c r i t i c -a l -a g e n c y " of the m e l -a n c h o l i c is -at once -a
s o c i a l a n d p s y c h i c i n s t r u m e n t . T h i s super-egoic conscience i s not s i m p l y analogous to the state's m i l i t a r y p o w e r o v e r its c i t i z e n r y ; the state cultivates m e l a n c h o l i a a m o n g its c i t i z e n r y p r e -cisely a s a w a y o f d i s s i m u l a t i n g a n d d i s p l a c i n g its o w n i d e a l a u t h o r i t y . T h i s is not to suggest that conscience is a s i m p l e i n s t a n t i a t i o n of the state; on the contrary, it is the v a n i s h i n g p o i n t o f the state's a u t h o r i t y , its p s y c h i c i d e a l i z a t i o n , a n d , i n that sense, its d i s a p p e a r a n c e as an e x t e r n a l object. T h e p r o c e s s of f o r m i n g the subject is a process of r e n d e r i n g the t e r r o r i z -i n g p o w e r o f the state -i n v -i s -i b l e — a n d effect-ive—as the -i d e a l -i t y of conscience. F u r t h e r m o r e , the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the i d e a l of " L a w " u n d e r s c o r e s the c o n t i n g e n t r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a g i v e n state a n d the i d e a l i t y of its p o w e r . T h i s i d e a l i t y c a n a l w a y s be i n c o r p o r a t e d elsewhere a n d r e m a i n s i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h a n y o f its g i v e n i n c o r p o r a t i o n s . T h a t this i d e a l i t y c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to a n y of its i n c o r p o r a t i o n s does not m e a n , h o w e v e r , that it subsists in a n o u m e n a l sphere b e y o n d a l l e m b o d i m e n t s . Rather, the i n c o r p o r a t i o n s are sites of r e a r t i c u l a t i o n , c o n d i -tions for a " w o r k i n g t h r o u g h " a n d , p o t e n t i a l l y , a " t h r o w i n g off" (Auflehnung).
T h e revolt i n m e l a n c h o l i a c a n b e d i s t i l l e d b y m a r s h a l l i n g aggression i n the service o f m o u r n i n g , b u t also, necessarily, o f life. A s a n i n s t r u m e n t o f p s y c h i c terror, conscience w i e l d s the p o w e r of c o n d e m n a t i o n that, q u i t e literally, poses a threat to one's life. F r e u d notes that i t "often e n o u g h succeeds i n d r i v -i n g the ego -i n t o death, -if the latter does not fend off -its tyrant -in t i m e b y the change r o u n d i n t o m a n i a . "1 4 M a n i a a p p e a r s t o b e
the energetic t h r o w i n g off of the attachment to the lost object, e n s h r i n e d i n the w o r k i n g s o f conscience. Yet i n m a n i a , " w h a t the ego has s u r m o u n t e d a n d w h a t it is t r i u m p h i n g o v e r re-m a i n h i d d e n f r o re-m i t . "1 5 I n m a n i a , the t y r a n t i s f e n d e d off, b u t