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Master Thesis Crisis and Security Management
Leiden University – Faculty of Governance & Global Affairs
Intelligence failures in Western Europe in the post 9/11-era
Research conducted on the current state of intelligence services in
Western Europe, taken into account their recent failures
Name: Menno Isaac Leonard Beijaert
Student number: s1285114
Supervisor: Dr. C.W. Hijzen
Second reader: Dr. M.C.A. Liem
Date of submission: July 23rd, 2018
2 Abstract
Intelligence services are traditionally assigned with the task of ensuring the security of a nation
by providing information to governments regarding threats of national security. In modern
history, however, there are cases in which intelligence services have failed to fulfil this task. In
more recent history, i.e. the post-9/11 era, failures of intelligence services still occur
occasionally. Focussing on Western Europe in particular, this thesis highlights the murder of
the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, the Brussels attacks in 2016
in Belgium, and the suicide bombings at a crowded pop concert in Manchester in 2017.
As a result of comprehensively explaining the concept of intelligence failures, this
research presents indicators which are used to assess the different cases. These indicators are
used in order to determine to what extent the cases can be explained through the traditional
academic concept of intelligence failures.
This research shows that the extent to which this is possible, is limited. When applying
the different indicators to the three cases, it becomes apparent the indicators are meaningless in
determining to what extent each case can be considered a failure of intelligence. This is due to
the fact that the domain in which intelligence failures occur in the current era, a domain of
terrorist nature, differs from the domain in which the academic literature about intelligence
failures is studied, a domain of military nature. Primarily the concepts of knowledge-sharing
and collaboration between intelligence services are vital in determining intelligence failures in
3 Table of contents
Abstract 2
List of abbreviations 5
Part 1. Introduction 6
1.1 The failure of intelligence 6
1.2 Research question 7
1.3 Academic and societal relevance 8
Part 2. Theoretical framework 10
2.1 Characteristics of intelligence services 10
2.2 Intelligence failures 12
2.3 Other perspective of intelligence failures 19
2.4 Concluding notes 21
Part 3. Methodology 23
3.1 Research design 23
3.2 Case-selection 24
3.3 Data collection 25
3.4 Operationalization 27
3.5 Validity and reliability 29
Part 4. Analysis 31
4.1 The Netherlands: The murder of Theo van Gogh 31
4.1.1 Case description 31
4.1.2 Official reports 32
4.1.3 Indicators of intelligence failures 33
4.2 Belgium: The Brussels attacks 34
4.2.1 Case description 34
4.2.2 Official reports 35
4.2.3 Indicators of intelligence failures 36
4.3 The United Kingdom: The Manchester attack 37
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4.3.2 Official reports 37
4.3.3 Indicators of intelligence failures 38
4.4 Comparative analysis 39
Part 5. Conclusion 42
5.1 Summary of the results 42
5.2 Answer on the research question 43
5.3 Limitations of the research 44
5.4 Recommendations for future research 44
List of references 46
Academic resources 46
5 List of abbreviations
AIVD Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst
ADIV Algemene Dienst Inlichting en Veiligheid
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CTIVD Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten
i.e. id est
MI5 Military Intelligence, Section 5
Q.C. Queen's Counsel
UK United Kingdom
SOI Subject of Interest
VSSE Dienst voor de Veiligheid van de Staat
6 Part 1. Introduction
1.1 The failure of intelligence
Intelligence services are traditionally assigned with the task of ensuring the security of a nation
by providing information to governments regarding threats of national security (Laquer, 1985:
255; Díaz, 2005: 1-2; Johnson, 2007: 68). In modern history, however, there are cases in which
intelligence services have failed to fulfil this task. A prime example here is the attack on Pearl
Harbour, which the United States of America (USA) at the time did not foresee. In more recent
history, i.e. the post-9/11 era, failures of intelligence services still occur occasionally. Focussing
on Western Europe in particular, this thesis highlights the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo
van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004 (Derix, 2008, March 19), the Brussels attacks in 2016 in
Belgium (“Belgie krijgt”, 2016, March 24), and the suicide bombings at a crowded pop concert
in Manchester in 2017 (Dodd et al., 2017, May 23).
A failure of intelligence means intelligence services failed to foresee an attack, despite
in most cases being in the possession of information to forecast the attack. These so-called
‘intelligence failures’ will be elaborated on extensively in the theoretical section. In the post
9/11 era, intelligence services focus mainly on threats from terrorist organizations and foreign
intelligence services (Shelton, 2013: 813-814). It thus becomes apparent that intelligence
services fell short in counterterrorism, even though this had become one of their primary tasks.
The modern history of intelligence roughly starts in the beginning of the 20th century (Warner, 2014: 1). About a century ago, using intelligence to gather information about other
states or actors was not as predominant in society as it is today. In fact, espionage was in most
cases the way in which states gathered information about other states. At the time, according to
Warner (2014), any state, large or small, had the possibility to be competitive at espionage.
Espionage, however, is something different than the intelligence activities which developed
during the second part of last century. “Spying might be as old as history, but what we call intelligence is much newer” (Warner, 2014: 1). The concept of intelligence nowadays is much
more comprehensive. Moreover, Warner (2014: 63) uses the term ‘cultureshock’ to illustrate
how much intelligence changed after World War 1. In the Cold War and the years following
the Cold War, intelligence services were mostly used for close monitoring between the East
and the West (Lahneman, 2004: 629). The next era of intelligence, so to say, is the post-9/11
era. Lahneman (2004) argues the post 9/11 era is characterized by a very different form of
intelligence. The events of 9/11 showed the world that the intelligence community needed to
reform its working methods (Lahneman, 2004: 629). These new working methods entail
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as lone wolf-terrorists (Bakker and De Graaf, 2011: 43-44), engaged in different types of
activities, for example cyber security (Warner, 2012: 798-799), which are all relatively new in
the world of intelligence (Lahneman, 2004: 629-630). Monitoring potential threats, especially
nonstate actors, has become a key activity of intelligence and security services (Nicander, 2011:
544-546). “The threat posed by nonstate actors arguably requires the greatest knowledge-sharing, both within and across intelligence and law enforcement organizations, including foreign ones” (Lahneman, 2004: 629). It therefore becomes apparent that intelligence has
experienced several changes and nowadays sharing information about potential threats has
become vital in ensuring the security of a nation or state.
1.2 Research question
The issue above regarding the failures of intelligence, results in the following question, which
in this thesis will serve as the research question: “To what extent can the errors within intelligence services in the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, the Brussels attacks in 2016, and the Manchester attacks in 2017 be explained through the traditional academic concept of intelligence failures?”
In the next parts of this thesis, the different concepts of the research question will be
explained. Beginning with intelligence failures, this concept will be elaborated on extensively
in the theory section. This theoretical groundwork seeks to define a theoretical framework
regarding intelligence failures. The section thereafter describes the research design. Both the
way in which the research will be conducted, as well as a justification regarding the
case-selection, will be presented. Also, the unit of analysis will be described. Then, the theoretical
framework regarding intelligence failures will be applied to the three different cases. Thereafter,
the analysis seeks to present a comparative analysis regarding the Western European
intelligence services and its errors. This thesis will end with a conclusion which contains the
answer to the research question. The conclusion also includes limitations of this research as
well as suggestions for further academic research.
This part of the thesis will continue with explaining how an answer to the research
question will be found, what the gap in knowledge is what is going to be addressed, and what
the academic and societal relevance of the chosen topic is.
The goal of this thesis is to provide the academic intelligence studies with a clear
framework on how to research and determine intelligence failures, in particular in Western
Europe. With regards to the main goal of the thesis, several sub-questions will be used to divide
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the opportunity to extensively elaborate on the different components of the research question.
Presumably, the answers on the sub-questions combined will be fundamental in answering the
research question. The first sub-question entails case descriptions of the three different cases
used in this thesis. Sub-questions 2, 3 and 4 analyse to what extent these cases can be considered
an intelligence failure. Then, sub-question 5 will go in detail regarding the comparative analysis
and its results.
The sub-questions are:
1. With regards to the attacks, what happened prior, during, and after the murder of Theo
van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, the Brussels attacks in 2016, and the suicide
bombings at a concert in Manchester in 2017?
2. To what extent can the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004 be
considered an intelligence failure?
3. To what extent can the Brussels attacks in 2016 be considered an intelligence failure?
4. To what extent can the suicide bombings at a concert in Manchester in 2017 be
considered an intelligence failure?
5. To what extent is the discourse regarding the traditional academic concept of
intelligence failures applicable to the three cases presented?
1.3 Academic and societal relevance
It can be argued that, in the academic world, a relatively large body of knowledge about the
role of intelligence services exists (Warner, 2014: ix). This includes, amongst others, the role
of intelligence services within society and in particular counterterrorism. On the other hand,
however, one can argue intelligence studies have a relative lack of comparative analyses.
Intelligence literature used to focus mostly on isolated cases, lacking comparative case analysis
(Aldrich, 2004: 750-751). Peter Gill (2007) acknowledges this. Gill (2007) cites Glenn Hastedt
who in 1991 pointed out the comparative component of the study of intelligence was negligible.
With stating: “Only by making comparisons can one come to appreciate what is a unique or a shared characteristic” (Hastedt 1991: 55), Hastedt (1991) argues that a subject of study cannot
be viewed in isolation from comparable phenomena. Gill (2007) continues this trend by
stressing the need of comparative analysis and, by stating “it is still the case that too much writing is structured with too little thought given as to how it might facilitate comparison”, he
argues the amount of comparative analysis within intelligence studies is still insufficient (Gill,
2007: 82). Hijzen (2017) also acknowledges this by arguing that, within intelligence,
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The literature about intelligence failures, which mostly focuses on military intelligence
failures, can be considered extensive as well. Moreover, within the academic literature
regarding intelligence failures, several case studies have been conducted (see for example:
Wohlsetter, 1962; Shlaim, 1977; Handel, 1977; Wirtz, 1991). The units of observation and
analysis of these case studies nonetheless all stem from multiple decades ago. It is wrong to
assume, though, there have been little recent case studies in intelligence failures. However, the
prime subject of these case studies has mostly been the 9/11-attacks in 2001 or other failures of
American intelligence services such as in the case of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) (Jervis, 2006; Kruys, 2006) . There has especially been a lack of post 9/11 case study
research in Western Europe. That is where this research comes in place. Moreover, the process
of the intelligence cycle in Western European intelligence services has not seen much research
either. Also, as Constant Hijzen argued during a research seminar on March 20th, 2018, in which
he presented his new research project, most literature focuses on the normative aspect of
intelligence services, rather than on empirical research (Universiteit Leiden, 2018).
All in all, this research focuses on the current state of intelligence services in Western
Europe. A comparative study contributes to a full-scale body of knowledge of intelligence
studies. This research is unique in the fact that, apart from the existing knowledge regarding
intelligence services, counterterrorism, and intelligence failures, there is little to no comparative
reference regarding intelligence failures. Consequently, this thesis will apply the theory of
intelligence failures on counterterrorism and compares the three different cases. Especially
within the context of Western Europe, this research can therefore function as a springboard to
future research.
The goal of intelligence services, in short, is to ensure security. It goes without saying
that a better understanding of our intelligence services illustrates the societal relevance of this
research. Moreover, as the intelligence services in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United
Kingdom are all in a way interlinked (part 3.1 will go into detail regarding this statement), a
conclusion on the functioning of these intelligence services can help to shed light on possible
weaknesses within the functioning and collaboration of each of the intelligence services.
Another aspect of societal relevance stems from the fact that intelligence services in general
have a lot of secrecy around them. The public has, thus, little to no knowledge about how these
services operate. This research can possibly raise the awareness of the public opinion and enable
critical thinking, without endangering the people and the process of work within the intelligence
10 Part 2. Theoretical framework
To gain a full understanding of the concept of intelligence failures, the general characteristics
of the world of intelligence are to be examined first. By understanding the meaning of
intelligence, one can conclude what the essence of intelligence failures really is (Díaz, 2005:
2). This part of the thesis will start with a brief overview of the development of the discipline
of intelligence studies. Then, the discussion regarding the definition of intelligence will be
elaborated on. This general outline of the concept of intelligence facilitates an extensive look
into the theory regarding intelligence failures. Consequently, this section will continue with a
comprehensive explanation of intelligence failures. This part of the thesis will finalize with the
presentation of a framework of the characteristics of intelligence failures.
2.1 Characteristics of intelligence services
The debate regarding the definition of intelligence roughly started with the introduction of
intelligence studies. One of the earliest theorists in the field of intelligence studies is Sherman
Kent, a former analyst of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Yale University professor.
Kent (1949: vii) argued that intelligence is, according to him, the knowledge the government
and the military should possess to safeguard the national welfare. As this thesis focuses on the
post 9/11-era, it is important to put emphasize on how more recent theorists describe the current
terms of standards regarding the definition of intelligence. An important author is Loch K.
Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia and
editor of the journal ‘Intelligence and National Security’. In his handbook of intelligence,
Johnson defines intelligence as “knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us – the prelude to Presidential decision and action” (Johnson, 2007: 1). Johnson (2007: 1) also
considers intelligence as the attempt by leaders to fully understand the potential risks on both
the national and the international level. This includes terrorists inside a nation’s border or
threats overseas.
Johnson (2007: 2) furthermore emphasizes that information used in intelligence, which
usually has a secret component, differs from the everyday information one can find. Shulsky
(1993: 193) shares this opinion as he argues intelligence in most cases refers to information
which other parties try to hide and deny. Another important scholar in the field is Mark M.
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safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities” (Lowenthal, 2012: 9).
Compared to Kent (1949) and Johnson (2007), Lowenthal’s definition is rather broad.
Despite some differences in the definitions, the overall view of the definition is corresponding.
This can be illustrated by the statement of Michael Warner. Warner (2002), on the one hand,
states that even today there is no accepted definition of intelligence. Yet, he sees the importance
of having a definition to develop a theory around it. Consequently, Warner (2002: 21) composed
an all-encompassing definition of intelligence. “Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities” (Warner, 2002: 21).
The above presented (somewhat) different perspectives, according to several main
authors in the field of intelligence studies, on the definition of intelligence. Combining the
differing views of the authors, intelligence can be considered information which is relevant for
policymakers, which is collected through open and clandestine means, subject to analysis, for
the purposes of enlightening and helping decision-makers in formulating their national security
and foreign policy (Turner, 2005: 4). This definition is chosen as it reflects the different aspects
of intelligence to the fullest.
The academic discipline of intelligence, i.e. the field of study, has been subject to
different kinds of interpretations. Stephen Marrin (2014), firstly, considers intelligence studies
as the “academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence” (Marrin, 2014:
266). Marrin furthermore argues intelligence studies form a body of knowledge that is (often)
embedded in broader social studies and is useful for the intelligence professional (Marrin, 2014:
266-267). In addition, Varouhakis (2012: 176) states that, when compared to other disciplines
such as social sciences and humanities, the academic discipline of intelligence studies is a rather
young field. Marrin (2014) acknowledges this by stating: “Currently intelligence studies as a field of knowledge is subordinate to other more traditional academic disciplines including political science, history, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and communications disciplines” (Marrin, 2014: 278).
Since the second half of the 20th century, the academic discipline underwent significant growth. The number of journals on intelligence grew rapidly. Moreover, within the area of
education on the subject of intelligence, Varouhakis (2012: 176-177) states significant progress
has taken place in the last decades. This can be considered a result of experienced intelligence
officers starting to retire and instead started to take up teaching positions (Rudner, 2009: 111).
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scholars and practitioners, Marrin (2014: 279) argues the academic discipline requires a return
to best practices and scholarly fundamentals.
The brief introduction above on intelligence studies served as a springboard towards the
concept of intelligence failures. This concept will thoroughly be explained in the section
hereafter.
2.2 Intelligence failures
Regarding failures within intelligence operations, the functions of the intelligence services and
its modus operandi will serve to introduce the concept of intelligence failures. With regards to
the arguments for intelligence agencies to exist, i.e. the functions of intelligence services,
Lowenthal (2012) distinguishes three major reasons. These three reasons serve to illustrate that
intelligence failures are incredibly closely connected to intelligence services and are present
within the core of intelligence services. The first reason as mentioned by Lowenthal (2012) is
the goal of intelligence services to avoid strategic surprise. Here, it is of importance to clarify
what a strategic surprise entails. (More important, however, why this is the angle of approach
here, instead of its counterpart tactical surprise.) Strategic intelligence, as Lowenthal (2012: 2)
argues, entails keeping track of events, forces, threats, and developments that may endanger a
nation or state to prevent an undiscovered event from happening. In other words, intelligence
on the level of national and international interest regarding changes in the character of the threat
(Turner, 2005: 2). Tactical surprise, on the other hand, occurs in a more tactical or narrow level
Davis, 2003: 2). Tactical intelligence refers to the timing, the type, and the target of an attack
being planned by an enemy (Kruys, 2006: 67-68). To put it more simple, tactical surprise
happens when it is unknown where, when, and how an attack will take place (Lowenthal, 2012:
2-3). Turner (2005: 1-2) considers explaining this distinction essential to understanding the
nature of intelligence failures. Kruys (2006: 88-89) acknowledges the importance of strategic
intelligence within intelligence analysis. He argues intelligence analysts should be given the
facilities and the time to produce strategic intelligence. This in order to, as Kruys (2006) argues,
prevent a comparable failure as when the United States failed to foresee the collapse of the Iraqi
state in 2003, when searching for the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq, which
turned out to be a result of wrongly provided intelligence (Kruys, 2006: 91).
Returning to Lowenthal’s first reason for intelligence services to exist, more
undisputable examples of intelligence failures come to mind. The failure to anticipate the Yom
Kippur War (Shlaim, 1976: 351) and the failure to foresee the 9/11 attacks (Lowenthal, 2012:
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intelligence services here failed to keep track of threats to its nation’s existence (Lowenthal,
2012: 2-3). Nevertheless, as Wirtz (1991) already noticed in the era of his research regarding
the failure of American intelligence services to foresee the Tet Offensive, avoiding an
intelligence failure is not an easy task. Difficulty, in fact, is inherent in avoiding failures of
intelligence (Wirtz, 1991: 275).
The second function of intelligence services, according to Lowenthal (2012), is to
provide long-term expertise in, and knowledge about, national security. This creates stability
as it assures no information will be lost when positions within the agencies shift. B.G.J. de
Graaff (2010), however, argues that shortcomings in intelligence analysis do in fact occur due
to inexperience of the analyst which, in turn, is a result from the shift of positions within the
agencies. Shlaim (1976) acknowledges this and adds that it is misleading and counterproductive
to attribute responsibility for mistakes to the incompetence of the intelligence officers
concerned. In fact, deeper and more pervasive factors need to be considered (Shlaim, 1976:
349). All in all, the occurrence of intelligence failures is, again, something which is not an
uncommon event.
Finally, the third major reason for the existence of intelligence agencies is to support
the policy process. Policy makers are in a constant need for information. In this way,
intelligence services function, in short, as a supportive branch of the executive (Lowenthal,
2012: 2-4). The fact intelligence services function is a supportive branch, needs explanation. It
is up to the policymaker to what extent they implement the insights of the intelligence analyst.
This can lead to wrong or unjust policy regarding a certain issue which, in turn, can eventually
lead up to intelligence services receiving the blame for the errors. These errors will be further
explained in the section below.
To sum up the above, intelligence failures can be considered as a constituent element
within intelligence services. In other words, it is not uncommon for intelligence services to
experience intelligence failures. They can be the result of both faults and misinterpretation and
can range from failures on a small scale, to failures with consequences for an entire nation or
even a whole region (Shlaim, 1976: 348-349). Nonetheless, as Lowenthal (2012: 7) stresses, it
is wrong to assume failures are always present.
Intelligence failures are considered as a puzzling aspect of modern warfare and, as a
concept, experiences extensive definitional debates (Díaz, 2005: 2; Copeland, 2007: 4-8).
Amongst the academic literature, the concept of intelligence failures is perhaps the most
advanced field in the study of intelligence (Hedley, 2005: 437), launched mostly by the analysis
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Harbour (Wirtz, 1991: 11-12; Díaz, 2005: 1; Bar-Joseph and Levy, 2009: 461). Wohlsetter
(1962: vii) argues the U.S. government did not make a mistake in expecting an attack launched
towards them. Rather, they expected the wrong kind of attack. In other words, they were aware
an attack in all likelihood was coming, they just did not expect the Japanese to attack their naval
base at Pearl Harbour. “And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis.” (Wohlsetter, 1962: vii). Ever since this first analysis by Wohlsetter, the concept of
intelligence failures has increasingly been subject to research. Scholars do not entirely agree on
a definition for the concept of intelligence failures. On the contrary, scholars often mention
what intelligence failures are not. Johnson (2007), for instance, distinguishes the difference
between an intelligence failure and an intelligence scandal. A scandal is usually intentional. To
achieve a certain goal, an actor breaks either a law, a regulation or a standard operation
procedure and, above all, hopes to avoid being exposed (Johnson: 2007: 350-351). De Graaff
(2010) also contributes to this trend within scholars of describing what an intelligence failure
is not, by mentioning an intelligence failure is not just a matter of bad luck or an incident. Also,
it is not a failure of intelligence when the enemy suddenly, without any indication, changes a
plan (De Graaff, 2010: 554).
On the other hand, both Johnson (2007: 350) and De Graaff (2010: 554) consider an
intelligence failure as unintentional. According to Johnson (2007), nonetheless, intelligence
scandals are as inevitable as intelligence failures. Richard K. Betts (1978) already stated in 1978
that, because of limited time decision makers have, intelligence failures are not only inevitable,
they are natural (Betts, 1978: 88). In the current era, this point of view amongst scholars has
not changed (see for example: Brady, 1993: 92; Kuhns, in: Betts and Mahnken, 2003: 77;
Marrin, 2004-2005: 661; Díaz, 2005: 2; Hedley, 2005: 435). Betts’ statement surely is not
unique. It has rather developed. As Hedley (2005) argues, intelligence failures should be
expected and accepted. Whatever the case, as failures are a result of human fallibility
(Bar-Joseph, in: Betts and Mahnken, 2003: 176), considering human activity is imperfect (Díaz,
2005: 12), the probability of it happening can never be eliminated (Hulnick, 1999: 2; Johnson,
2007: 350).
To summarize the above, an intelligence failure is an unintentional, inevitable
phenomenon within intelligence services. Also, there is no obvious way in which failures of
intelligence can be prevented (Kuhns, in: Betts and Mahnken, 2003: 89). As Jervis (2010) puts
it fittingly: “the existence of failures is unfortunate but not mysterious.” (Jervis, 2010: 2)
To further shape a framework around intelligence failures, different aspects of
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on its academic field of study and presented a definition. This part will go more into detail
regarding the actual process within the intelligence services in which intelligence failures can
occur. In general, as stated by Jensen (2012), intelligence failures are a result of inaccurate
analytic judgements or the occurrence of significant surprise. Hammond (2010) describes
intelligence failures as a process in which, after a successful surprise attack, the defender
discovers it already was in the possession of substantial information which suggests an attack
was on the way (Hammond, 2010: 680). In other words, a mismatch between the estimates and
what later information reveals (Jervis, 2010: 2). A side note here, is that there are different
perceptions of what intelligence failures entail and that they are context-dependent. Hedley
(2005), for example, mentions the fact that from a United States’ perspective, just about anytime
something happens that Washington does not want to happen, it is considered an intelligence
failure (Hedley: 2005: 436).
To continue on the different aspects of intelligence failures, Jervis (2010: 2) mentions
that scholars do not, and policymakers should not, be surprised by the occurrence of errors
within the analysis of intelligence. Jervis (2010) illustrates this by stating intentions mostly only
exist in a few heads and are subject to rapid change. It does not come as a surprise this can
easily lead to deception within the intelligence analysis (Bar-Joseph and Levy, 2009: 464).
Michael Handel considers deception, both passively and actively, as one of the main “noise barriers” which contribute to intelligence failures (Handel, 1977: 462-468).
The intelligence agencies encounter quite a challenge in meeting the government’s
needs. Decisions made by the government rely on complete, accurate, timely, and unbiased
information about the intentions and capabilities of other nations, organizations, and terrorists.
(Johnson, 2007: 5-6). The modus operandi of intelligence services, i.e. the process in which the
intelligence services collect and present their information, formally refers to the ‘intelligence cycle’ (Lowenthal, 2012: 57). For a schematic overview, see figure 1.
To gain a thorough understanding of intelligence failures, this part will describe the
intelligence cycle and explains why and where in the cycle intelligence failures mostly occur.
It is important to be aware that, as De Graaff (2010: 554) argues, intelligence failures can occur
in every stage of the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle will be discussed extensively, as
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most authors in the field of intelligence failure discuss intelligence failures on the basis of the
intelligence cycle (see for example Wirtz, 1991; Hughes-Wilson, 1999; Hedley, 2005; Turner,
2005; Johnson, 2007; De Graaff 2010; Lowenthal 2012).
The intelligence cycle starts with identifying the requirements (Lowenthal, 2012: 57).
Here, setting the right requirements can be troublesome. Certain issues may receive too much
or too little attention which can lead to wrong analysis and thus a possible failure (De Graaff,
2010: 557). Also, policymakers may try to use intelligence for political purposes. This can range
from helping to make new policy decisions to acquiring information to defend policy. On the
other hand, policymakers may also ignore intelligence in case it is contradictory to their policies
or preconceived notions (Gries, 1990: 4-5; Turner, 2005: 75).
The next stage within the intelligence cycle, is the collection of intelligence. During this
stage, problems can occur with regards to resources. Either a resource is unavailable, the wrong
resource is used, or risk-averse behaviour to an available source can be a cause for a possible
failure (Baer, 2002: xix-xx; Jervis, 2010: 2). Turner (2005) acknowledges and illustrates this
by presenting example questions of the difficulty of gathering the right information. “Where is the needed information? Who has it? (…) How valuable and perishable is this information?” (Turner, 2005: 11). Paradoxical, however, is the concept of information overload. Failures
within intelligence can also occur as a result of too much information. The need to, for example,
use keywords to find any useful information within a large amount of available information
can, according to De Graaff (2010 558), lead to unintentionally missing out on important
information. Anyway, it is important to note, however, that a lack of information is seldom the
most important cause of an intelligence failure (Bar-Joseph and Levy, 2009: 463).
Subsequently, the processing and exploitation of information can, with regards to
intelligence failures, be considered the odd one out within the intelligence cycle. Apart from
coded information from which the code is unbreakable, De Graaff (2010: 558-559) states that
not many errors happen within this stage of the intelligence cycle. The legitimacy for this
statement also stems from the fact that in his book, Turner (2005) systematically, chapter by
chapter, explains the different stages in the intelligence cycle, yet does not cover the processing
and exploitation stage. Therefore, in this thesis, this part of the intelligence cycle will not be
discussed extensively either.
Within the stage of analysis, on the other hand, intelligence failures are far more likely
to happen and are probably the most complex sources of intelligence failures (Turner, 2005:
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policy leaders and the requirements which intelligence objectivity demands (Turner, 2005:
11-12). Within the stage of analysis, individual-level errors and misperception are most likely to
happen (Bar-Joseph and Levy, 2009: 464-465). As Handel states, “The root of the problem – the weakest link in the intelligence process – is human nature.” (Handel, 1989: 34).
One of most well-known and most common types of failures in the stage of analysis
concerns mirror imaging. This phenomenon entails that intentions and estimates, which are common in the home country, will be projected on the enemy (Lowenthal, 2012: 8). In other
words, interpreting another actor’s behaviour using one’s own experiences, beliefs or values,
can be considered mirror imaging (Wirtz, in: Johnson, 2007: 32-33). This occurs, for example, when a country does not believe that starting a war is beneficial for the enemy country, while
the enemy country in fact is more than confident about starting a war. Grabo (2004) argues an
intelligence analyst should always make an imaginative and conscientious effort to see the
situation from the other side’s point of view (Grabo, 2004: 47). De Graaff (2010) agrees as he
states doing so is a mayor task of intelligence services. De Graaff (2010) therefore considers
mirror imaging as one of the most important sins within intelligence services.
Another error, which can occur during the intelligence analysis is the result of using a
constructed model. Douglas MacEachin argues that, once an intellectual model is built, every
new piece of information will be weighed in accordance with the model (Hedley, 2005: 443).
This way of acting routinely – a result of both cognitive reasons as well as time pressure or
simply laziness – may result in failures in the analysis of intelligence. This is because of the
concepts of information repetition and warning fatigue. In other words, when similar information will be presented repeatedly, which has previously appeared to be wrong, analysts
might conclude any new information is wrong once more (De Graaf, 559-562).
Finally, a potential pitfall within intelligence analysis is the fact that intelligence
analysis and conventional wisdom can in some cases become similar. That is, the new analysis
of some cases may be no more sophisticated than the existing knowledge on that given issue,
prior to the analysis. All in all, it becomes apparent the intelligence analysis can be considered
as a bottleneck in order to achieve intelligence success. Nonetheless, as Bar-Jospeh and Levy
(2009: 467) argue, in nearly all intelligence failures, not every analyst is to blame. It is important
to identify variation in the assessment of intelligence across individuals and intelligence units.
After the intelligence has been produced, it will be transmitted to customers in the
dissemination and consumption stage. Providing information to policymakers comes, however,
with more complications than it at first appears. Besides intelligence failures related to
18
decision-maker (Betts, 1978, 88; Jensen, 2012: 274-278). According to Díaz (2005: 3), perfect
intelligence production does not necessarily lead to perfect consuming of the intelligence.
Turner (2005: 122) acknowledges this and notices a paradox here. He argues that, on the one
hand, analysts should at all time maintain objectivity. On the other hand, analysts should
provide policy support. Political principles do, however, not always correspond to reality,
according to Turner (2005). Policy makers cannot be forced to pay attention to the intelligence
they are offered, no matter what the possible outcome may be (Lowenthal 2012: 7-8). The
intelligence product might not be as engaging as is desired to draw the attention of the
policymaker. When delivering the information onto the customer, the intelligence analyst must
know the customers preferences.
President Reagan from the United States of America, for example, preferred to receive
information in video form. The intelligence product provided by the analyst might also not be
relevant, timely, and accurate which might result in the policymaker ignoring the intelligence
information or turning to other sources of information (Turner, 2005: 12). This is “tantamount to an intelligence failure”, Turner posits (Turner, 2005: 12). De Graaff (2010: 564) further
explains this phenomenon. As a result of ‘cognitive blockades’, which are based on a certain
viewpoint by the policymaker on an enemy, De Graaff (2010) argues the policymaker can make
incorrect assessments regarding the provided information. Betts (in: Cohen and Gooch, 2003:
41) agrees and considers both the unwillingness of political leaders to adopt the conclusions
from intelligence analysts, as well as the failure of policymakers to act timely, as the most
important reasons behind intelligence failures. Ben-Zvi (1976), in turn, states that intelligence
failures mostly are the result of decision makers who let their personal assumptions overrule
indicators presented by intelligence analysts (Ben-Zvi, 1976: 394). A prime example of this
occurred during the Second World War, in which the British prime-minister rejected the
intelligence presented to him regarding a possible alliance between the Soviets and the Nazis.
As Richelson (1995) states: “The preconceptions of national leaders might have again overridden intelligence” (Richelson, 1995: 101).
The intelligence cycle ends with consumer feedback. Hereafter, the cycle restarts
(Lowenthal, 2012: 57-70). The end product, nevertheless, cannot be considered as finished
intelligence. It in fact may raise new questions. According to the theory of the intelligence cycle,
these new questions are to be considered the basis of new requirements. Turner (2005),
however, states this is “too neat of a formulation” for an intelligence cycle, as he believes every
19
other words, using possible previous failures for setting up new requirements, is contradictory
to how the intelligence cycle should in fact work, according to Turner (2005).
To sum up the above, intelligence failures happen within every stage of the intelligence
cycle. Nonetheless, it is commonly accepted that within the collection and processing stage in
the intelligence cycle, rarely problems occur which result in intelligence failures (Brady, 1993:
86). In fact, the stages of analysis and dissemination encounter most of the intelligence failures
(Heuer, 1999: 65-66). Ergo, it becomes apparent intelligence failures occur more in a later stage
in the intelligence cycle. The principal cause of intelligence failures is not a lack of information,
it rather is the incorrect comprehension of the meaning of information which is available
(Bar-Joseph, in: Betts and Mahnken, 2003: 176).
2.3 Other perspectives of intelligence failures
Aside from failures occurring during the intelligence cycle, intelligence failures can also happen
as a result from the way in which the intelligence agencies are organised (Díaz, 2005: 12). Ergo,
also from the organisational perspective, possible explanations for intelligence failures can be
found, according to De Graaff (2010: 564). This ‘intelligence culture’, as first coined by Davies
(2004), entails the cultural context, social practices and the institutional forms of intelligence
and security (Hijzen, 2017: 122). As Davies (2004) states: “In the case of intelligence failures, one can take two or more national intelligence systems performing similar tasks in similar ways, with a similar outcome in the form of a failure of warning—but they may fail in different
ways.” (Davies, 2004: 496). It thus depends on the way in which intelligence is conceptualised
by a state. In his article, Davies (2004) presents a comparison between how intelligence is set
up in the United States and in the United Kingdom. It becomes apparent that, in general, the
function of the various intelligence services does not differ much, rather the intelligence
practice differs. Not just institutional, organisational or judicial differences, but also differences
in norms, values and concepts “… that lie behind the customs of practices of the people and organizations involved can be rather different.” (Hijzen, 2017: 122).
De Graaff for example argues that hierarchical organisations may encounter errors due
to the fact that the quality of primary analysis decreases, the higher it gets within the hierarchy
(De Graaff, 2010: 564-565). Turner (2005) acknowledges this and notices another bureaucratic
malfunction. An organisation which is heavily layered, has quite the supervision or review. The
fact that coordination processes in an organisation as such can be considered as cumbersome,
contributes to the possibility of an intelligence failure happening, according to Turner (2005:
20
several scholars, amongst which are O’Connell (2004), Davies (2004), and Warner (2009),
hinted this should be higher on the research agenda within the academic world of intelligence
studies.
Finally, it is important to highlight that intelligence failures, caused by whatever reason,
do not intrinsically require a reorganization of an intelligence agency. Only when the frequency
of repeated failures increases, a reorganization can be required (Handel, in: Betts and Mahnken,
2003: 17-18). To conclude this part, it can be argued that, when approaching an intelligence
failure in a certain state or country, the way the intelligence services are organised should
always be kept in mind in order to make a thought-out statement regarding the failure.
The opposite of an intelligence failure can be defined as an intelligence success.
Nonetheless, intelligence failures will generally be more highlighted than intelligence successes
(De Graaff, 2010: 570). Betts (1978: 88-89) argued that, as intelligence failures are
consequential, they are less forgivable and are thus highlighted more. In addition, Jensen (2012)
states intelligence failures receive more attention because it seems intelligence is typically
considered the major reason for unsuccessful policies in national security matters. Considering
the primary task of intelligence services, which in short can be defined as ensuring the security
of a nation or state, one might argue that it is only normal to highlight failures. This however,
is unjust and sketches a somewhat negative representation of intelligence services (Jensen,
2012: 261-262). “It is not always easy. Your successes are unheralded – your failures are trumpeted.” (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1996). This statement by John F. Kennedy
illustrates well how successes of intelligence services do not experience much attention, in
contrast to failures of intelligence services which get a lot of attention. This, however, is
contradictory to reality. Intelligence services do in fact achieve successes on a frequent basis
while only experience failures occasionally (Hedley, in: Johnson 2007: 223-224). Moreover, as
Hedley (in: Johnson 2007: 223-224) argues, because of the inevitability of intelligence failures,
allegations of intelligence failures are inevitable as well. However, these allegations of
intelligence failures are, in some cases, unjustified. Nevertheless, as Hedley (2005) argues,
these allegations can be expected in a democratic political system with freedom of speech. All
in all, it can be argued that intelligence failures result in negative publicity as well as an increase
in criticism directed at the intelligence services.
This part elaborates on the failure of intelligence against terrorism. To do so, three
assumptions regarding the difficulty of terrorism for intelligence services, as presented by Dahl
(2005), which terrorism analysts tend to share, will be elaborated on. First, as terrorism differs
21
terrorist groups are often small and dispersed, in contradiction to the large infrastructure of
conventional threats, intelligence is limited in using its traditional tools and techniques (Dahl,
2005: 35).
Second, the importance of human intelligence (Humint) in the fight against terror does
not appear to be similar to the Humint capabilities of intelligence services (Dahl, 2005: 36).
Ergo, gathering intelligence through human action is vital in successfully fighting terrorism
(Pillar, 2001: 111; Betts, 2002: 45-59). Nevertheless, intelligence services do, according do
Dahl (2005), lack the capability to effectively do so.
Third, as terrorist attacks in all likelihood will not be preceded by tactical warning,
which traditionally intelligence services heavily relied on, this as well poses a threat for the
intelligence community (Dahl, 2005: 35-36).
In contradiction to the assumptions above, in his article, Dahl (2005) argues that the
view among terrorism experts which entails terrorism being a new and dramatically different
challenge for the intelligence community, is faulty. Instead, Dahl (2005) argues the causes of
intelligence failures against terrorism are in fact quite similar to ‘traditional’ intelligence
failures (Dahl, 2005: 48-49). As a result, Dahl (2005) concludes his article by stating that
intelligence failures against terrorism occur because of a lack of imagination of the intelligence
community. The threat itself has not significantly changed over the years, the intelligence
community instead “[…] lacked the focused imagination that would have been necessary to anticipate this innovation on the part of the enemy” (Dahl, 2005: 51). Bar-Joseph and Levy
(2009: 466) acknowledge this and argue this lack of imagination has become central in
post-mortems on the 9/11 attacks.
2.4 Concluding notes
This part of the thesis sought to create a framework around intelligence failures, fitting the
subject of this thesis. Different aspects of intelligence failures have been elaborated on. The
importance of the intelligence cycle became apparent throughout the section above and it
became apparent intelligence failure are a constituent element within intelligence services.
A first concluding note is that, within intelligence services, intelligence failures are
inevitable and unintentional. Also, intelligence failures are present in all aspects of intelligence.
Thus, from the performance of intelligence agencies, to how the public perceives intelligence
and from all the different steps of the intelligence cycle all the way to how policy makers
22
With regards to the intelligence cycle, it can be argued intelligence failures are more
present in the later stages of the cycle. Ergo, both the analysis stage and the dissemination stage
encounter the biggest number of problems. This is a result of incorrect comprehension of the
available information. As Díaz (2005: 3) states, these failures are a result of errors in the
intelligence process and in the way decision makers respond to the analysis.
Also, this section highlighted the importance of keeping the organisational perspective
of intelligence services in mind, as this may also factor in the explanation of an intelligence
failure.
Furthermore, it becomes apparent that, as De Graaff (2010: 568) rightfully argues, the
extent to which intelligence services fail, strongly depends on what is demanded from them.
Thus, the more that is asked from intelligence services, the larger the likelihood that intelligence
failures occur.
Finally, intelligence failures can be considered the undesirable normative state of
intelligence, which perhaps is the reason why we should just accept it when they happen (Díaz,
2005: 11). As one of the prime authors within the field of intelligence services, Richard K.
Betts, fittingly states: “That is perhaps the most outrageously fatalistic of all: tolerance for disaster” (Betts, 2007: 52).
The somewhat broad definition of intelligence failures by Copeland (2007) rightfully
illustrates the concluding notes as presented above: “Policy makers or analysts knew or reasonably should have known, under the circumstances and relative to the complex decision-making environment and priorities of policy makers, enough information to assess accurately the probability and consequences of the eventual action or incident.” (Copeland, 2007: 6). It is
important to highlight, though, that the traditional concept of intelligence failures stems from
an era in which military warfare was the dominant field of work of intelligence services.
23 Part 3. Methodology
This section of the thesis covers the methodology of the research. This entails elaborating on
the way in which the research will be conducted. The research design which will be used will
be presented first. Both the pros and cons of the chosen research design will be examined as
well. Second, the case-selection will be justified. Hereafter, the methods of data collection will
be defined. The operationalization of the concepts and definitions into indicators will then
follow. This section will be finalized with defining the validity and reliability of the chosen
research design.
3.1 Research design
Starting with the choice of methodology, the research design which will be used in this thesis
is a comparative case study analysis. More comprehensively, the form this case study will take
is a holistic multiple-case design. The overall subject, i.e. the unit of analysis, is intelligence
services in Western Europe in the post 9/11 era. Within this context, three different cases will
be examined. (The cases are, as mentioned in the introduction, the murder of Theo van Gogh
in the Netherlands in 2004, the Brussels attacks in 2016, and the suicide bombings at a concert
in Manchester in 2017.) The reasons for this selection will be presented later in this section. As
Lijphart (1971: 691) stated, using a case study design gives clear insight in the ongoing
processes which in turn enables more intensive examination. Subsequently, the use of multiple
cases provides more compelling evidence which is why this type of case study is regarded more
robust than a single-case design (Herriot and Firestone, in: Yin, 2009: 45).
Within the academic study of intelligence, Shlaim (1976) highlights the importance of
case studies by stating that a theory without systematic research and case studies only results in
tentative conclusions. Furthermore, as intelligence is not an isolated activity (Herman, 2001:
138), using comparative analysis within intelligence should be considered vital, according to
Gill (in: Johnson, 2007: 83). Another reason why multiple-case study is an important aspect
within intelligence studies, results from the fact that the blurring of national borders has led to
the need for great cross-national cooperation and intelligence-sharing. Ergo, the need for
awareness of the different traditions and practices within intelligence has dramatically increased
(Gill, in: Johnson, 2007: 83). With regards to intelligence failures Kruys (2006: 73) states that
case studies are of definite value as they bring out lessons learnt and show how natural failures
are.
By contrast, a pitfall regarding multiple-case studies lies in the fact that this type of
24
Johnson, 2007: 88), in turn, highlights the difficulty of different languages within multiple-case
studies. Fortunately, the data regarding the case selection within this thesis requires just the
English and the Dutch languages which the author both has sufficient knowledge of. Another
problem in using a multiple-case study design within intelligence concerns the difficulty of
getting access to data. Some data might be easier to access than other (Gill, in: Johnson, 2007:
88). A possible negative consequence here lies in the fact that the overall conclusions may be
considered as incomplete or as somewhat ungrounded.
3.2 Case-selection
The author is aware of the fact any incident regarding a failure of intelligence services could
have been chosen to conduct research on. Nevertheless, as Lowenthal (2012) argues, the role
and function of the intelligence services would in each case be the same. It is evident there are
clear reasons these cases have been selected, instead of other cases. First, the fact primary
sources regarding the cases are plentiful (see section 3.3) lies at the root of the selection. Second,
as research is conducted on intelligence services in Western Europe, geographical distribution
is required. Selecting cases in respectively the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom
meets this requirement. Third, when selecting more cases or cases without the availability of
both primary and secondary sources regarding the subject, the feasibility of this research would
be in jeopardy. This is due to the limited time frame available for this research.
Furthermore, there are several similarities between the content of the three cases which
justifies the case-selection. Aside from the obvious, all cases being from the post-9/11 era and
are thus within the same period of time, each case is somewhat alike in their context as well.
First, this set of Western European countries has been chosen as they all have
experienced terrorist attacks on a relatively large scale and with a big impact. Compared to
Belgium and the United Kingdom, one might argue the Netherlands have not experienced an
attack of the same scale. Nevertheless, the American embassy in the Netherlands acknowledged
the large impact of the murder of Theo van Gogh on Dutch society. It even compared it to the
9/11 attacks, in the way of it being a wake-up call for the country (Froma, 2011, January 26).
Moreover, as there is no such thing as ‘the terrorist attack’, the impact of the attacks at first
sight does not seem similar when compared to each other. The attacks can nevertheless be
subject to comparative analysis because of the fact they all have had severe consequences on
25
Second, each of these European countries has been part of the same international
development regarding security.1 With the blurring of national borders (Franko Aas, 2003; Amoore, 2006; Andreas, 2007), the cooperation between the intelligence services within the
three countries has increased dramatically as well.
Third, according to Hijzen (Universiteit Leiden, 2018), the manpower and the budget
of the intelligence services in the three countries can be considered comparable. This also
justifies the comparison.
The case-selection as presented above comes with several implications. First, it is
important to stress that the selected cases are not representative of all intelligence failures in the
set of countries. The cases rather serve to illustrate the issue of intelligence failures, as presented
in the introduction. It is apparent prime examples of major intelligence failures in Western
Europe in the post-9/11 era will be examined. This does, however, not mean the results of this
research are applicable to other intelligence failures in Western Europe in the post-9/11 era.
Second, as this research attempts to shed light on the Western European intelligence
services, selecting the different cases implies the cases are in a way comparable. As a result,
taken the feasibility of this research into account, less important factors of each case such as the
history of the intelligence services, the political aspect, and regulations regarding intelligence
services are to be ignored. The reason these factors are ignored stems from the fact they have,
compared to factors such as the intelligence analysis, received relatively little attention in the
academic literature regarding intelligence failures.
3.3 Data collection
One of the unique strengths of case studies is its ability to be able to deal with a full variety of
different types of evidence, such as observations and documents (Yin, 2009: 8). This enables
and justifies the use of different types of data. In this thesis, data collection will be based on the
fact this research is a qualitative research. Consequently, the use of document analysis shall be
the predominant way of information gathering. This implies the use of scientific articles,
academic books, news articles, press releases, official commission reports, and written
government publications. The scientific articles and academic books serve as the main sources
for the framework of intelligence failures. The news articles, commission reports, government
publications, and press releases will be used to shed light on the three different cases. The
1 The author is aware of the fact the United Kingdom is, at the time of writing this thesis, engaged in the ‘Brexit’.
26
analysis will be conducted by combining the knowledge of all data sources. Document analysis
is chosen as this research method is particularly applicable to studies of qualitative nature
(Bowen, 2009: 29). Also, as documents are stable data sources, they can be read and reviewed
multiple times without being changed (Bowen, 2009: 31). Furthermore, the accessibility and
reliability of this source of data makes the research more cost and time efficient (Bowen, 2009:
31). Moreover, using multiple types of documents helps discovering insights which are relevant
to the research, helps developing understanding, and helps uncovering meaning (Merriam,
1988: 118). A possible concern regarding document analysis is that a document might be
incomplete and will thus not provide all the necessary information to answer the research
question. This is, however, more a concern rather than a disadvantage. Another concern to keep
in mind when deciding to use document analysis for research is the potential presence of biases
by the authors of the documents (O’Leary, 2014).
The author is aware that there are several types of data collection. Nevertheless, taken
the feasibility of this research into consideration, time-consuming data collection methods such
as archival analysis or conducting interviews has been elected not to implement in this research.
Aside from secondary sources used to present a framework of intelligence failures,
primary sources serve as the most important source for the analysis of the cases. The selection
of primary sources is based on several reasons and criteria. First, official investigations have
been conducted for each case. Official reports followed the investigations. The official
documents are: Reports by the Dutch Review Committee on Intelligence and Security Services,
the Belgian Permanent Oversight Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services’ activity
report of 2016, and an independent assessment of the British MI5 and Police internal reviews.
Detailed analysis regarding these documents will be presented in the analysis section.
Second, additional information is collected through news media. As there is no
indication of any politicization for the cases presented, this research does not take into account
possible political colours connected to any news media. In fact, the selected primary sources
are amongst the highest numerical size of the news medium in the specific countries, i.e. the
highest circulation of the newspaper (Greenslade, 2016; “Telegraaf verliest”, 2017; Vlaamse
Regulator voor de Media, 2017: p. 58).
Third, for this research parliamentary debates have deliberately been excluded. This
stems from the fact that, rather than politicized debates regarding the cases, independent
assessments and supervision reports are considered to be more impartial in order to
27 3.4 Operationalization
With regards to the operationalization of the concepts within these thesis, the prime concepts
used here, i.e. intelligence failures, has been discussed extensively in the previous section. This
section will go into detail regarding the measurable units of intelligence failures. The
all-encompassing operationalization is presented schematically on the next page. See figure 2. The
numbering of the indicators in figure 2 corresponds to the order in which the indicators have
been presented in the theoretical framework and has thus not any other purpose or meaning.
Concept Operational definition Indicators Sources
Intelligence
failures
The failure of policy
makers or analysts to,
under the circumstances
and relative to the
complex
decision-making environment
and priorities of policy
makers, to assess
accurately the
probability and
consequences of an
eventual action or
incident.
1. The intelligence services
did not meet the requested
quality of service
2. An error occurred
somewhere in the
intelligence cycle
3. Unintentional (Ergo, no
scandal)
4. Either the policy maker or
the intelligence analyst
misinterpreted or ignored
(a portion) of the available
information
5. The organisation of the
intelligence service cannot
be considered flawless
- Written
government
publications
- Commission
reports
- News articles
- Press releases
- Scientific
articles
- Academic
books
Figure 2:Operationalisation
The indicators as chosen in this research are chosen as a result of the theoretical
framework as presented in part 2 of this thesis. As the indicators cannot be expressed in
numbers, the indicators are not measurable in numbers either. It can be determined, however,
to what extent which indicator factors in the determination of the intelligence failures in the
three cases used in this research. For this research, a distinction will be made between major
and minor indicators. Major indicators are to be considered indicators that are relatively more
28
intelligence can be considered an intelligence failure as referred to in academic literature. This
distinction should be based on the academic literature regarding the concept of intelligence
failures. As the theoretical framework reflects the academic literature, the theoretical
framework of this thesis will thus serve as the basis for the distinction. Consequently, the more
an indicator is concentrated on in the theoretical framework, the more it is of importance in the
analysis of this research.
Resulting from the above, as most authors in the field of intelligence failure discuss
intelligence failures on the basis of the intelligence cycle, combined with the fact that the stages
of analysis and dissemination encounter most of the intelligence failures, indicator 2 and
indicator 4 are considered to be major indicators in this research.
Contrariwise, there are minor indicators. Intelligence services are traditionally assigned
with ensuring the security of a nation or state. Logically, in case of an intelligence failure, an
intelligence service did not meet the requested quality of service (indicator 1). Also, in case of
an actual intelligence scandal, the primary sources of research would rather be judicial
documents or police reports than commission reports and governmental publications (indicator
3). As a result, the appearances of indicator 1 and indicator 3 are, compared to indicator 2 and
indicator 4, less meaningful as they are more obvious when determining intelligence failures.
Consequently, indicator 1 and 3 are considered to be minor indicators in this research.
Indicator 5 can be seen as the odd one out. On the one hand, this indicator has, when
compared to indicator 2 and indicator 4, no primary role within the theoretical framework which
would not qualify the indicator as a major indicator. On the other hand, however, the appearance
of indicator 5 cannot be considered obvious or not. This is because this indicator is more about
the detailed organizational structure rather than about the intelligence production as are the
other indicators. Therefore, indicator 5 cannot be considered a minor indicator either. As a
result, indicator 5 will be seen as a more intermediate indicator.
As for the analysis, the more indicators which are present in the three different cases,
the more the incident can be considered an intelligence failure. Especially the appearance of the
major indicators is vital in determining whether or not a case can be considered an intelligence
failure. As this research is a qualitative research, and thus lacks the use of abstract numbers,
there will be no pre-defined score table or some degree which has to be met in order to qualify
a case as an intelligence failure. In fact, as each case of a failure of intelligence is
context-dependent (Hedley, 2005), this research will per case analyse, on the basis of primary and
secondary sources, determine if, and if so to what extent, the case can be considered a failure
