GROWING UP EXCEPTIONAL – THE WANING AMERICAN CENTURY: THE U.S.’ WITHDRAWAL FROM THE JCPOA THROUGH THE LENS OF
ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY THEORY
Dila Cebeci
A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political
Science, Concentration TransAtlantic Studies.
Chapel Hill 2019
Approved by: John D. Stephens Donald Searing
© 2019 Dila Cebeci
ABSTRACT
Dila Cebeci: Growing Up Exceptional – The Waning American Century:
The U.S.’ Withdrawal From the JCPOA Through the Lens of Ontological Security Theory (Under the Direction of Holger Moroff)
The U.S.’ withdrawal from the JCPOA has been subject to much debate, as there has been no significant change to U.S. material interest or the relationship between Iran and the U.S., hence the reason triggering President Trump’s decision to pull out of the deal must lie within different, or rather outside traditional, realms of IR theory. For the purpose of offering an alternative perspective on the matter, ontological security theory will enhance our overall comprehension of the dynamics at play. Ultimately, it will be argued that the Trump
administration relies on narrational qualities such as American exceptionalism and their global hegemony, though the contemporary political climate appears much more rewarding to
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: PRESENTING THE CASE ... 1
Introduction ... 1
JCPOA ... 5
CHAPTER 2: THEORY, CHANGE, NARRATIVE ... 10
Theory: Ontological Security ... 10
Change: Obama vs. Trump ... 17
Narrative: The American Experience ... 20
CHAPTER 3: UNITED STATES WITHIN THE WORLD ORDER ... 27
Iran and the United States ... 27
European Union and the United States ... 31
Examining the United States Within the Global Order ... 35
CONCLUSION ... 43
CHAPTER 1: PRESENTING THE CASE
Introduction
While the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has received criticism from many, it was mostly a widely praised deal that garnered global support and saw key regional players gather and reap the fruits of multilateralism that, for the time being, ensured the status quo of the number of countries with nuclear capabilities. Hence the withdrawal decision by the Trump administration seemingly reversed years of arduous negotiations under President Obama and under the leadership of their European allies. Many have weighed in as to what factored into Donald Trump’s announcement to pull the United States out of what he has called “the worst deal ever”1, however, the arguments presented do not seem to fully and compellingly account for a decision to withdraw. Ostensibly, the reason to justify such an announcement lies within a different spectrum of approaches; one that caused a complete change of heart of a country within the span and change of a single administration with seemingly unchanged conditions. Therefore, the so-called “exceptionalist” and “hegemonic”2 traditions in American history offer a helpful lens through which the different layers in their discourse can be analyzed and applied more specifically to this case; with ontological security theory providing a useful framework through which to account for the influence of these narratives in foreign policy. The authors Reich and
1 Ward, Alex. "6 Questions about the Iran Deal You Were Too Embarrassed to Ask." Vox. May 08, 2018.
Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.vox.com/2018/5/8/17319608/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-announcement-explained.
2 Reich, Simon, and Richard Ned Lebow. Good-bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global
Lebow discuss the American discourse that posits the United States as a hegemon in the global world order, especially after World War II, and reveal that there is in fact little evidence to support the idea and assertion that an “American hegemony was beneficial to democracy and development and was welcomed by major actors everywhere”; instead they [American scholars] deluded themselves into believing that what were “only partial and short-lived […] efforts to maintain order, were a primary source of disorder in the international system”3.
The peculiar historical trajectory of the United States, in which they steadfastly grown attached to the “American Creed”, that describes their “liberal political values” which they believe is “the most desirable political order within states”4 was further fueled after the mid-1940s and comfortably built on previous beliefs of exceptionalism and a responsibility for global leadership. Throughout the years this narrative has both matured and suffered, but most
importantly it has provided comfort, meaning, and certainty to its people who relied on it in times of turmoil and nurtured it in times of peace. The post-war period was marked by multilateral agreements and newly emerging countries aligning themselves in two separate camps in a bipolar world, separated between the ideological and political divisions of the United States and the Soviet Union. In a world that came to understand itself through alliances and placing itself within one narrative over the other, the eventual victory of the United States
appeared to have shown that their way of life was evidently superior and worthy of pursuing. In a period that is marked by the decline of liberal democracy after it had appeared to become the
3 Reich, Simon, and Richard Ned Lebow. xi.
4 Bouchet, Nicolas. "The Democracy Tradition in US Foreign Policy and the Obama
predominant way of life in the post-war order5, the United States’ role within that order
underwent adjustments and experienced modifications to their strategic positioning towards other political actors, that all were informed and sieved through their historic standing and narrative. The dynamic historic processes have left their marks on the U.S. national identity and caused it to adapt accordingly to societal and global structures; the constant fluctuation within the
narrative has sometimes seen certain strands accentuated and others neglected for political purposes, such as emerging victorious from of the two world wars and the Cold War on the one hand and experiencing setbacks in form of the defeat in Vietnam and a seemingly never-ending involvement in the Middle East that has seen contaminating effects on their image of
superiority6.
The signing of the JCPOA was a historic moment for the countries involved, as it saw the major powers gathered for the oversight and prevention of Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and constituted the “best possible assurance that Iran would never obtain a nuclear weapon”7. That makes the withdrawal from this agreement even more peculiar to understand and has even been predicted to “go down as one of the worst foreign policy blunders in U.S.
history”8, projecting the mindset of many, including realists, who believe the deal to be a success9. How then can this ostensibly unreasonable and destructive decision be explained,
5Deudney, Daniel, and John G. Ikenberry. "Liberal World: The Resilient Order." Foreign Affairs97, no. 4
(July/August 2018): 16-24. Accessed March 3, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world. 16.
6Reich, Simon and Richard Ned Lebow. 3.
7 Sherman, Wendy. "How We Got the Iran Deal - And Why We'll Miss It." Foreign Affairs, August 13,
2018.
8 Ibid.
9 Kahl, Colin. "The Myth of a 'Better' Iran Deal." Foreign Policy. September 26, 2017. Accessed March
properly contextualized, and correctly interpreted to understand the motivations for the Trump administration? For this undertaking the lens of ontological security theory lends itself rather seamlessly to examine the underlying factors for the Trump administration to pursue this path of action and provoking such outcry from almost every other political actor, with notable
exceptions such as Israel and Saudi Arabia10. While the withdrawal from the JCPOA and the pressure exercised by the Trump White House is explained through ontological security theory, it will also point out that they are securing their identity in this particular narrative merely
temporarily. It will also argue that the consequences of failure to acknowledge the political world’s increasingly multipolar nature, accompanied by a diminishing U.S. position with a foreign policy strategy neglecting to recognize the need for cooperation instead of unilateral imposition of their demands, carries great risk to destabilize and cause ontological insecurity in the future.
After establishing the foundations of the nuclear deal, the occurring shift from one administration to the following will be placed into the larger theoretical framework of ontological security theory and subsequently examined. To explain and contextualize the decision further with the theory the pervasive dominant narrative of the American identity will be laid out as a basis and examined by focusing on the U.S. – Iran experience and attempt to illuminate how the already scarred relationship, through decades of animosity, went from signing the deal multilaterally to withdrawing from it unilaterally over the course of one administration change. The final analytical section will highlight the ramifications of the withdrawal, more specifically how it affects the U.S.’ relationship with its European allies, its wider global position and how it contributes further to an already diminishing status. The conclusion will summarize
10Stevenson, Jonathan. "The Future of the JCPOA." Strategic Comments24, no. 4 (2018): Vi-Vii.
and pull together all strands in the pursuit to illustrate the multifaceted spheres this decision has affected and disrupted. Ultimately, it will illuminate the rationale behind policy choices, add further understanding to how circumstantial conditions were influential and how it is likely to develop and unfold in the future for the United States of America.
JCPOA
The Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was an agreement between multiple countries that worked together over numerous years to ultimately sign a deal that would prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon for the foreseeable future11. It was the culmination of tireless diplomacy that saw the gathering of politically big names working towards a common goal, designed to enhance global security and reduce existing threats. The political actors mentioned are the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and the European Union, also known as the P5+112, that at the end of many negotiations “agreed to lift crippling sanctions imposed on Iran’s nuclear program” allowing them to have “greater access to the global economy”, “in return, Iran agreed to take concrete steps to curb its nuclear program, limiting it to strictly peaceful applications, and to allow comprehensive inspections of key nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure compliance”13. While the deal does not completely rule out Iran’s eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons, it does indeed, prolong and slow down its process considerably14. As the representative leading the team of American diplomats in the negotiations,
11 Ward, Alex.
12 Beauchamp, Zack. "The Iran Deal, Explained in 9 Graphics." Vox. May 08, 2018. Accessed March 20,
2019. https://www.vox.com/world/2018/5/8/17328858/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-announcement-chart.
Wendy Sherman, is quick to admit and clarify, “the Iran deal was not perfect; no deal ever is. Nonetheless, the [JCPOA…] offered the best possible assurance that Iran would never obtain a nuclear weapon”15. Reasons for Iran to be in possession of a nuclear weapon is both defensive as they are offensive, however, if there is one immediate conclusion from it, it is that it would act as a further destabilizing factor in the wider region of the Middle East one way or the other16. Hence, the desire to prevent Iran from obtaining such weaponry is in the best interest of all actors involved, which is why President Obama decided to approach Iran diplomatically as an
alternative to military attack. Ward points out, “experts doubt that airstrikes alone could end Iran’s nuclear program” and that even “strikes [carried out ‘to near perfection’] would still be only a four-year delay in Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapon”17.
Shortly before the signatories concluded their negotiations and were finally set to sign the agreement on April 7, 201518, Obama explained his motivations for sitting down with Iran and choosing the route of diplomacy, he wanted “to make sure that Iran did not get a nuclear weapon and thereby trigger a nuclear arms race in the most volatile part of the world”, stating that prior sanctions helped in bringing Iran to the table that has eventually put them “in a position where Iran has agreed to unprecedented inspections and verifications of its program, providing
assurances that it is peaceful in nature”19. Another statement pointed out by Ward demonstrates the limited options that were available to his administration, “there really are only two
15 Sherman, Wendy.
16 Ward, Alex. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.
19 "Transcript: President Obama's Full NPR Interview On Iran Nuclear Deal." NPR. April 07, 2015.
alternatives here: either Iran getting a nuclear weapon is resolved diplomatically through negotiation or it is resolved through force”20 and as pointed out before, relying solely on force would not have been sufficient in thwarting Iran’s ambitious nuclear program. Ultimately, the deal was signed and, despite the infamous ‘sunset clause’ and other imperfections, it achieved the best results political conditions allowed for at the time in securing several more years to create more favorable circumstances leading to further and more stabilized agreements
surrounded by political actors that are more inclined to cooperate than before. This also speaks to President Obama’s strong belief in multilateralism, which he displayed on various occasions and reiterated in 2014 during a speech he gave at West Point, when he said, “the effectiveness of multilateral action” is “often [downplayed]”21 before he specifically highlighted the example of Iran and how his administration opted to “[extend] the hand of diplomacy to the Iranian
government” and that it provided “an opportunity to resolve our difference peacefully”22. Not everyone agreed. Among the leading voices in the opposition, is current President Donald Trump who, after stalling for a couple of months, 474 days to be more specific, followed through on his campaign promise, announcing, “when I make promises, I keep them”23. The reasons listed by the Trump administration as to why a withdrawal is more beneficial for American interests does not quite constitute a sound argument, as it seems to fail to accurately
20 Ward, Alex.
21 "Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony."
National Archives and Records Administration. May 28, 2014. Accessed March 24, 2019.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony.
22 Ibid.
23 "Trump Kept His Promise on Iran. But Was It the Right Promise?" NBCNews.com. Accessed March
evaluate the circumstantial restrictions and hard facts. According to Ward, Trump is criticizing the “spirit” of the deal, pointing to the fact that “Iran remains a US enemy, and Obama failed to address that with the deal”; however, while the deal was designed to curb Iranian efforts in achieving nuclear status it certainly was never intended to transform either side into any form resembling an ally and therefore Iran will naturally remain a hostile power vis-à-vis the United States24. The second reason points to the so-called ‘sunset provision’ in the deal which “stipulate when the various restrictions imposed on Iran’s nuclear program expire and which critics say provide Iran a patient pathway to acquiring nuclear weapons”25, which goes back to Wendy Sherman’s point, while imperfect, it reflects the “best possible assurance”. So how then,
considering no fundamental variables changed; no immediate physical threat arose, as Iran was abiding by the agreement26; and it seemingly was a crucial and necessary step closer instead of ^12wno progress at all, is the decision to pull out from the agreement justified?
Ostensibly, there is an accompanying current to these events that go beyond the abilities of mainstream realist and liberalist explanations for foreign policy actions. The threat that was perceived by the Trump administration was not of realist or liberalist nature, instead, it will be argued, it is a threat that strikes much deeper and alarming the United States to its very core. The driving motivator for President Trump was the crack in routinized behavior that is embedded in its historic national biography and violated familiar patterns with a longtime adversary such as Iran; furthermore, it destabilized a firmly established self-identity that also stands at odds with
24 Ward, Alex.
25 Vaez, Ali. "The Iranian Nuclear Deal's Sunset Clauses." Foreign Affairs. October 03, 2017. Accessed
March 22, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2017-10-03/iranian-nuclear-deals-sunset-clauses.
26 Murphy, Francois. "Iran Still Holding up Its End of Nuclear Deal, IAEA Report Shows." Reuters.
CHAPTER 2: THEORY, CHANGE, NARRATIVE
Theory: Ontological Security
The reason why this particular theory lends itself so reasonably to the explanation and interpretation of the decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA lies within the fact that it looks beyond more traditional angles in International Relations and offers a distinctive layer, unveiling underlying narratives at work. Specifically, the question of what has caused the decision to champion the deal and withdraw from it within the span and change of a single administration is illuminated and seemingly better understood within the frame of ontological security theory. As there has been no significant change to U.S. material interest or the
relationship between Iran and the U.S., the reason triggering President Trump’s decision to pull out of the deal must therefore lie within a different, or rather outside traditional, realm of IR theory and it will be argued that ontological security theory provides a rich dimension to our overall comprehension.
narratives” that drives, motivates, and enables choices of a nation. The main idea behind the theory of ontological security lies in the understanding that only social actors who feel a stable sense of Self are able to exert a sense of agency in the world and perform actions and decisions. This security “is formed and sustained in day-to-day practices, mainly our routines, and in the narratives through which we organize our sense of self, which in turn rely on our embeddedness in social and material structures”27. These scholars then conceptualized and utilized it to
understand “how ontological security needs might drive state level processes, choices, and outcomes” and put forth theories “with the premise that individuals need or seek ontological security and propose that states, as their citizens’ ontological security providers, make foreign policy choices to address societal ontological security needs”, conclusively arguing that this particular “lens [effectively] endogenizes that state’s self-understanding or identity to its foreign policy”28.
In order to understand how national narratives, their collective national biography, might come to impact foreign policy, it helps to turn to the growing literature around ontological security. Ontological security theory scholars predominantly build on the work of Anthony Giddens, who contends that ontological security describes “the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and the constancy of the
surrounding social and material environment of action”29. While we are usually unaware
of the sustained ontological security that is experienced on a day-to-day basis, we become
conscious and more alert to it if there is breach or destabilization, “when that self-stability is
27 Mitzen, Jennifer, and Kyle Larson. "Ontological Security and Foreign Policy." Oxford Research
Encyclopedia of Politics, September 13, 2017. 3.
28 Ibid., 2
threatened” and causes “profound anxiety”, as we are “emotionally invested in […] our routines and sustained self-narratives”30. In moments or periods of instability nations fall back and “[reassert] routines and appeal to comfortable narratives […] that remind [them] of and
reproduce who [they] feel [themselves] to be”31. The maintenance of the self-identity’s stability is therefore directly reflected in its ability to act and its strength of agency.
The most encompassing and summarizing research in the field is done by Mitzen and Larson, who contextualize the wide variety of how ontological security theory becomes relevant in varying degrees and forms for countries and their foreign policy agenda, mechanisms, and outcomes32. The two main types that are put forth within the scholarship of ontological security theory are the scholars that “propose that states, as their citizens’ ontological security providers, make foreign policy choices to address societal ontological needs”, while others “treat states as if they were individuals [… assuming] that states seek security to include that states seek physical and ontological security”. A critique of the latter has frequently been addressed by scholars such as Croft and Vaughn-Williams, and Krolikowski, as is argued, this merely “freezes social processes that must be treated as in process, and thus limits rather than enhances our
understanding of patterns of conflict and violence”33. Even though this particular difference in approaches will not be dealt with in this paper, it is important to note the differing views within the field as to demonstrate the continuous evolving expansion that is made in the field.
In the context of foreign policy and ontological security Mitzen and Larson identify several cases in the existing literature. They point out that much of it “addresses the need to
30 Mitzen, Jennifer, and Kyle Larson. 3. 31 Ibid., 4.
reconcile contradictory material and ontological security demands”, however, the spectrum widens when looked at cases such as Belgium’s decision to resist and fight Germany in World War II; acting otherwise would be defeatist and considered “antithetical to its self-understanding: Belgium’s honor demanded that if fight”, as theorized by Steele, who examines the relation of honor and states among others. In this instance, even though the material and ontological needs were irreconcilable, Belgium “knowingly [sacrificed] their [material] interest”, “despite being unable to match Germany in the field” their decision was to fight instead of handing over their independence34. Ontological security theory has also been utilized to further illuminate the security dilemma more intimately. Jennifer Mitzen points out that while the realist argument assumes states want to escape security dilemmas, it is the uncertainty that will prevent them, however, “ontological security-seeking suggests that states may not want to escape dilemmatic conflict” and might in fact even become attached to those conflicts as they establish a routine they are familiarized with, as is the case with Israel and Palestine after Oslo35. Even though some relationships are by nature conflictual, regardless of how stagnant or damaging as they may be, they can be “more comfortable than the uncertainty that results from changing [the]
relationships”36.
Other scholars such as Bahar Rumelili agree with this theory and conclude that at times the removal or solution of a hostile relationship can cause even greater anxiety and disrupt the well-established and matured routines between countries that have historically been at odds and even threaten each others existence, which can even lead them to “reactivate longstanding
34 Mitzen, Jennifer, and Kyle Larson. 6.
35 Mitzen, Jennifer. "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security
Dilemma." European Journal of International Relations12, no. 3 (2006): 341-70. 341.
routines of conflict” had there been “the prospect of peace”; these conflicts might “threaten physical security but provided ontological security” and can even “frustrate peace building initiatives”37. Such is the argument made by Zarakol, who takes a closer look at the reluctance of some countries to issue an apology, that would render no material or physical cost for them and might even benefit them materially, nonetheless, the insistence to reject certain claims made by the international community, as with Japan and its imperial history, are strategically denied as that is “unacceptable affront to national pride […] and ontological security takes precedence”38.
Instances in which ontological security is reconcilable with material interests is theorized by Jelena Subotić, whose work is also highly relevant for the case of U.S. and its withdrawal from the JCPOA, as she examines Serbia’s foreign policy regarding Kosovo and how the status of it played such an integral role in Serbia’s ontological security needs. She analyzes one of the conundrums for ontological security theory scholars, namely the question of how to account for change, especially given the focus on trying to preserve national narratives. As a historically key region for Serbia, they refuse to recognize Kosovo, however Subotić argues that Serbian elites have managed to mute certain aspects and layers of their national narrative that “were
deliberately manipulated […] through selective activation of tropes of Serbian sacrifice and victimhood”39, therefore creating a policy that was ultimately more palatable for the Serbian people even though it normally would have been extremely difficult, or highly unlikely, before without adjusting the narrative.
The effects of elites or influential individuals is further documented by Chernobrov’s research and asserts that the notion of “illusion of recognition” exists, “whereby individuals
37 Mitzen, Jennifer, and Kyle Larson. 7. 38 Ibid., 8.
misrecognize uncertain events as familiar to maintain their sense of continuity [… and] imagined in ways that reaffirm that narrative”. Going beyond ideas of narcissism they “tend to imagine the self as virtuous and the stranger as inferior”, which is a comfortable and convenient point of view to perceive the world order through, promises to underline the self-created version of oneself and the nation, and it renders uncertainty and anxiety creation highly unlikely, therefore firmly preserves its ontological security40.
The centrality and functionality of a national biography is realized and legitimized through its skillful agents who maximize the possibilities within its narrative infrastructure without disturbing it boundaries. Berenskoetter identifies the “political potency of a national biography” is in its ability “to provide a community with a basic discourse, or master narrative, which guides and legitimizes courses of action and provides ontological security”41. The formulation and maintenance of the “network of narratives” is in itself a “form of governance” according to Berenskoetter42. The successful agent who shapes and defines the paradigms of the narrative they are carving out “can claim expertise and legitimacy” by highlighting certain “memories and visions” and display as well as “possess the resources to affirm with tangible practices” their ability to “carry the narrative along”43. While the formulation of the narrative is principally restricted to a certain degree as “the debate [cannot] reach a stage where it unsettles a stable sense of being in the world”, “the limits of what is ‘known’ and what is deemed
‘possible’” need to be respected and not disturbed as this would lead to severe ontological
40 Mitzen, Jennifer, and Kyle Larson. 10.
41 Berenskoetter, Felix. "Parameters of a National Biography." European Journal of International
Relations20, no. 1 (2014). P.279-280. 279.
insecurity44. While the borders of a biography are clear, the narratives remain an extremely interpretative act, that is “open to contestation”, “never homogenous and always hold potential for alternative, and can “even [hold] competing accounts of its past and future”45; this ultimately, lends this its flexibility that allows for fluctuations in major foreign policy decisions leading to differing, even contradicting actions.
Brent Steele extensively discusses ontological security with regard to foreign policy choices of states and how they are linked and intertwined with their national narratives and biographies. He contends that nation-states pursue ontological security “because they want to maintain consistent self-concepts, and the ‘Self’ of states is constituted and maintained through a narrative which gives life to routinized foreign policy actions” and their disruption is “when a state realizes that its narrative actions no longer reflect or are reflected by how it sees itself” leading the dislocated agent “[seeking] to re-establish routines that, once again, consistently maintain self-identity”46. Steele highlights the idea of a “biographical narrative” that essentially “[creates] meaning for actions” and that “[promotes] a healthy vision of the self to others”, acknowledging that an important component in the creation of the self-identity is reflexive, as “reflexivity is the way in which people actively make social reality”47. Considering that “states ‘talk’ about their actions in identity terms [… as] ‘only in the telling of the event does it acquire meaning, the meaning that makes such events politically relevant’”48, narratives acquire quite a
44 Berenskoetter, Felix. 280. 45 Ibid. 279.
46 Steele, Brent J. Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-identity and the IR State. Milton
Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007. 3.
central role in a state’s identity and therefore stability. Thus it becomes the “locus from which [… one] can begin to grasp how self-identity constrains and enables states to pursue certain actions over others”49. The importance assigned to certain aspects of certain events in the
biographical narrative is predicated upon the purpose and goal of what a particular political agent desires to achieve by utilizing the whole biographical infrastructure available that do not threaten to destabilize the overarching self-identity.
Change: Obama vs. Trump
How then does this account for the drastic and complete change of direction from one administration to the other if both are embedded within the same biography and desire to create a stable and secure self? Jelena Subotić dealt with a similar question when she tried to explain the rather unusual shift in the foreign policy decision of Serbia’s changing foreign policy approach towards the controversial status of Kosovo. Her “principal argument is that at times of great crises and threats to multiple state securities (physical, social, as well as ontological), narratives are selectively activated to provide a cognitive bridge between policy change that resolves the physical security challenge”50. While the selected layers of a narrative that are amplified by the political actor in charge and exploiting precisely that aspect might appear to be contradictory it will still be arranged within a coherent overarching narrative of the nation51. She points to the centrality of narratives within our sense of Self and the key role it plays in the “construction of our political behavior”, as they are crucial in “providing cultural cognitive boundaries which
49 Steele, Brent. 10.
50 Subotić, Jelena. "Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change." Foreign Policy
Analysis, 2016. 611.
sanction or constrain activities of political actors”52. In the case of Trump’s decision to withdraw from the deal, he weighed his options and considered the “short-term political loss, but
[believed] it will be a heroic sacrifice for the greater good”53 and therefore demonstrated that he acted on behalf of the state, that the “state may be willing to compromise some aspects of their physical security in order to maintain their identity, their view of self. States need predictability and order; they thrive for routine and secure relationships with others”54. Having an abundance of routinized adversarial behavior to fall back on and invoking negative past experiences with them while highlighting their inherent incompatibility with their respective ideological and political approaches, Trump emphasized those differences and reminded the global community of the American hegemony that is deeply enshrined in their own political identity and biography.
Robert Krebs explains the possible discrepancies that are detectable from one
administration to the other as flexibility in the narrative, for which the American example lends itself easily, “American exceptionalism has been sufficiently flexible to have sustained policies that are diametrically opposed - from George Washington’s valedictory warning against
‘artificial ties’ and foreign entanglements, legitimizing America’s purity, to Woodrow Wilson’s crusade to remake world order, similarly legitimized with reference to America’s superiority, but now confident that values would stream only east across the Atlantic”55; the elasticity given to these narratives allows them to stretch and encapsulate formerly unfamiliar aspects into its national narrative, as long as it poses no disturbance or tension with the identity.
52 Subotić, Jelena. 613.
53 Ibid., 621. 54 Ibid., 614.
55 Krebs, Ronald R. Narrative and the Making of US National Security. Cambridge: Cambridge
This approach can be further illuminated with Mitzen’s theory of “externalist” and “internalist” perspective within ontological security, ascribing importance to different
dimensions of a state’s foreign policy decision-making components. The externalist perspective highlights “the importance of inter-state relationships and routines for an individual state’s ontological security”, whereas the “internalist” would emphasize the “continuity of a state’s biographical self-narrative, i.e., the domestic production and maintenance self-understanding”56. While then-president Obama recognized the high and unprecedented levels of interconnectivity in the global community and saw advantages in keeping the ties close in order to avoid conflict even though it took great pains in form of negotiations and concessions;President Trump opted for the internalist perspective and returned the country to a more dominant role that sees the rest of the world as a fellowship at best under their leadership towards the universally superior American values. Nonetheless, as implied before, this does not mean identities are static and unchanging, ontological security simply “refers to the feeling of stability: when we feel our identity is stable we are ontologically secure”57. It is, however, integral to “engage self-consciously in practices that remind us of and reproduce who we feel ourselves to be”58. This reproduction can align itself more closely with one strand of the nation’s identity and build upon the other, so when Trump announced his disapproval of the Iran deal and put forth the idea of “America First” he made a campaign promise he will continue to uphold to the best of his abilities, until backlash from it becomes too powerful to withstand, and it circumstances become more demanding to discover other strands within the narrative that allow for a combination of all those needs to secure the Self. Both President Obama and President Trump sought to undertake
56 Mitzen and Larson, 7. 57 Ibid., 3.
foreign policy in line with national biographies and were trying to ensure their choices and decisions were aligned with the nation’s biography, with the single difference that they had a divergent view on what is included in this, which layers and strands were emphasized and which were neglected.For these theories to truly unfold its explanatory dimensions and be properly conceptualized it is crucial to first sketch out the American narrative that is tantamount in forming the foreign policy course of action and all the entailing decision-making mechanisms. Narrative: The American Experience
With a longstanding history, dating back to its early colonial days, that is injected with notions of exceptionalism and a leadership role, the United States has always been regarding itself differently from other states and global developments eventually helped in the realization of the narrative of a “city upon a hill”, with eyes turned to them for leadership and direction. To fully understand the origins of this particular narrative that is woven throughout the U.S.’ history it is best to examine the first of many that goes back to the earliest colonizers. Without ever having stepped foot on American soil, on board of the Arbella headed for what was to become part of the founding colonies in North America, the future governor John Winthrop proclaimed, “we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us”59. Winthrop infused the young and yet-to-become early ancestry of current American society with notions of American exceptionalism and communicated to them that not only will they be watched and every single one of their steps will come under scrutiny but they would also be admired, hence they ought to be “determined to be a beacon for the rest of Europe” implemented through “a modell of Christian charity” as the governor described it60. As a result, the early colonies not only
59 "Massachusetts Bay - "The City Upon a Hill"." Ushistory.org. Accessed February 10, 2019.
http://www.ushistory.org/us/3c.asp.
embarked on this journey to escape persecution and establish a tolerant and peaceful colony but also perceived themselves as an exemplary society that is destined to lead the rest of the world through their principles and values and ultimately be emulated by them due to their admiration. While many scholarshave argued that Winthrop had in fact no such aspirational intentions during his speech, it is nonetheless a figure of speech that has been conveniently adapted in the American lore and canon to evoke ideas of American exceptionalism and their leadership role61. Regardless of the fact that governor “Winthrop’s thinking implied no vision for America as a new nation”, presidents such as Reagan reiterated the conviction that the United States is a “shining city upon a hill”62 thereby linking the entire trajectory of the U.S. to a historical framework and projecting a future embedded in past affirmative narratives.
The first use of the term “exceptional” with regard to the United States, however, came much later than Winthrop’s sermon on board of the Arbella in 1630, though its influence cannot be denied. It was Alexis de Tocqueville who first described America as exceptional, that soon led revolutionary figures such as Thomas Paine to declare that “America had the ‘power to begin the world over again’” and prescribed it to “America’s providential nature”, that “it could escape the trappings of monarchy, hereditary elites, and all of the other ills that plagued Europe in the late 18th century” 63. This idea was sown into the psyche of Americans “that God chose the United States for a special role in history” and materializes in foreign policy decisions as the “U.S. argument that its role in the world is always performed with good intentions […] and
61 Brooks, Rosa. "Winthrop's Warning." Foreign Policy. March 17, 2014. Accessed March 23, 2019.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/17/winthrops-warning/.
62 Tomes, Robert R. "American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century." Survival56, no. 1
(2014): 27-50. doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.882150. 31.
63 Edwards, Jason A. "Debating America’s Role in the World: Representative Ron Paul’s Exceptionalist
proclaims that the United States is qualitatively different from the Old World, or Europe”64. The legacy from these precepts can easily be traced to contemporary foreign policy attitudes
exhibited particularly by the Trump presidency that posits the United States as fundamentally dominant and worthy of leadership with regard to its European allies as well as the rest of the even more inferior world.
The notion of American exceptionalism and what the meaning entails has come under scrutiny throughout the years but it mainly “refers to a pervasive faith in the uniqueness, immutability, and superiority of the country’s founding liberal principles accompanied by a conviction that the United States has a special destiny among nations”65. While this notion has become increasingly “synonymous with ‘the American way of life’” as well as being “exemplary – […] a beacon for other nations”66 there has been some tension in how this was reflected and practiced in their interaction with other countries; this exceptionalism has seen desires to both, “’go with others’ and an urge to ‘go it alone’”, on the one hand the United States “[sponsored] and [led] multilateral institutions, on the other hand there is a “determination to preserve the unique values and institutions […] from corruption or dilution by foreign contact and vigilance to defend U.S. national interests, sovereignty, and freedom of action against infringement by global rules and supranational bodies”67. These beliefs have been seeping through the American social and political narratives that have remained influential to this day.
64 Edwards, Jason. 255.
65 Patrick, Stewart. “Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S.
Ambivalence“. Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement. Edited by Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 2002. 7.
The experiences of two world wars in the first half of the 20th century, both resulting in victories for the United States, saw an exponential expansion in their economy, and were instrumental in the famous branding and creation of the so-called “American Century”.
Particularly World War II catapulted the United States to the status of a superpower; ironically, initially a rather hesitant U.S. came to dominate the post-war period with the Soviet Union in a bipolar world. The phrase “American Century” was first introduced by Henry Luce, founder of the likes such as TIME magazine, in 1941 when he published an editorial under the same title, in which he called upon the American public and government to assume a leadership role during this tumultuous period in which the world is in desperate need to “[replace] Britain as the world leader and completely transform the system of international relations through the global
application of ‘American principles’”68. Urging a reluctant U.S. government to get involved in one of the most atrocious wars in history Luce skillfully resorted back to familiar narratives within the American identity that resonated with ease and characterized decades preceding and decades following its publication. He relied on and appealed to the notion that the United States “had both the right and the moral obligation to use its military and economic might in the service of promoting higher ideals of freedom and democracy around the world”69. During the years immediately prior to their entry into World War II, the U.S. had adopted a somewhat isolationist foreign policy orientation70 until it followed the lead of an internationalist and broke with that tradition without looking back again as it “[ascended… to] lead the international system”71. It
68 U.S. Department of State. Accessed February 10, 2019.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/internationalism.
69 Ibid.
was this spirit that helped shape the national narrative around its entry into the Second World War and defined itself in those ideational and aspirational terms for its later outlook on
establishing a post-war order they expected the remaining parties of the world to strive towards. What followed in the victorious footsteps of being on the succeeding end of World War II was a relentless and adamant conflict that came to be known as the Cold War in which the newly emerged superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, entered into a new period of dualism and fought a battle that not only spread around the globe but spanned across various dimensions, going beyond traditional physical battlegrounds. Naturally, when this prevalent conflict that had lasted for multiple decades and commanded the attention of all politicians and countries ended in the victory of the United States, their leadership evolved into an even more pronounced one. The U.S had officially become the sole leader on the global stage, directing the free world,
triumphant as the shining beacon of democracy and a rampant economy to maintain their way of life and spread it even further. The finis of this historic stand-off of two powers in front of the whole world even went as far as declaring it is the “end of history” by scholars such as Francis Fukuyama. His impactful article published in 1989 identifies the end of the Cold War as the “end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”72. Even though this could have resulted in a heightened sense of uncertainty as there had suddenly been a clear disruption of “day-to-day practices, mainly our routines, and in the narratives through which we organize our sense of Self” as those routines are “sustained self-narratives [that] are crucial to our well-being, we get attached to and emotionally invested in them and would feel
profound anxiety at the thought of their destabilization”73; nevertheless, the United States’ position quite to the contrary, appeared to be solidified as reflected in future foreign policy actions and presidencies. The U.S. emerged as the superior and victorious party following years of unprecedented rivalry, the erosion and dissolution of its archenemy underlined the U.S.’ meaning network.
The legacy from two world wars was that American had “saved Europe twice” that created the framework in which “American political ideals (liberty, democracy, and
progressivism) and economic principles (free markets) could expand with the new post-war order”, this theme was only expanding during and through the Cold War74. Particularly beginning with John F. Kennedy’s presidency the idea that Americans “must not only seek to protect liberty at home” began to shape the current form of American exceptionalism that the U.S. was “unique and morally superior to other nations […], a confrontation between good and evil was accepted by most Americans” writes Richard Payne75. What followed were decades of narrative building between the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence standing in stark contrast with the United States and its allies under clear U.S. leadership, that “[derives its] validity of the country’s liberal principles from their presumed universality” that the founders envisioned as a “community dedicated to the Enlightenment principles of rule of law, […] representative government, freedom of speech and religion, and commercial liberty”76. Time and again, this conviction flowed into the rhetoric of presidents, of which, President Reagan “was among the most successful presidents in combining a sense of American exceptionalism with a duty to
73 Mitzen and Larson. 3. 74 Tomes, Robert. 39. 75 Ibid.
lead”, giving the nation a sense of mission, that wove itself through until the Soviet Union collapsed and left the U.S. with “the impulse to project power abroad as part of a mission or duty to maintain a leadership role […] in global affairs”77. The presidency of George G.W. Bush emphasized the highly influential “shift away from accommodating old Europe; a firm belief that America should use its power more broadly and forcefully to shape world affairs; the conviction that, if the U.S. acted firmly and decisively, other nations would follow; and a myopic view of the long-term consequences of this general approach to foreign affairs”78. The 43rd president, therefore, carried America away from its decades long “tradition of promoting U.S. security through liberal international regimes based on cooperation and collective security arrangements”. Evidently, the constant tension between several strands of American identity has seen one
overpower the other, at times more successful and often to the nation’s detriment. Presidents, their administrations, and the varying degrees of political and global threats determined the narrative that needed to be activated to define U.S. foreign and domestic policy and make them acceptable to the public.
77 Patrick, Stewart. 7.
CHAPTER 3: UNITED STATES WITHIN THE WORLD ORDER
Iran and the United States
Taking a closer look at the relationship between Iran and the United States it quickly becomes clear that there is no shortage of grievances on either side towards the other that have only been exacerbated over the years, certainly assisting in solidifying their respective narratives with regard to their sense of Self and vice versa. As is correctly highlighted by Steven and Stevenson for Foreign Affairs, “[Trump’s] administration’s inordinate antagonism is rooted in a deeper inability, going all the way back to 1979, of the United States to find a way forward with Iran”79. They continue to highlight how the Middle East in general has become a personal battleground for the United States in which they have “difficulty coming to terms with the limits of power”, which is particularly debilitating for the American identity and overall narrative through which they secure their stability80. The history between the two rivals dates back to the late 1970s Iranian Revolution that kicked off the sentiment of being “arguably a singularly deep and painful irritant to the United States” as it “represented a significant loss as well as an
embarrassment”81. The hostage crisis that continued from November 1979 to January 1981, in which Iranians took 52 Americans hostage for a total of 444 days is still deeply engrained into the memories of many Americans and has been a turning point in their respective narratives, that has only been worsened by the killing of 241 U.S. marines “in a suicide truck bomb attack on
79 Simon, Steven, and Jonathan Stevenson. "Trump's Dangerous Obsession with Iran." Foreign Affairs,
August 13, 2018.
their barracks in Beirut” in 1983 under the Reagan administration82. Hence when Subotić references Saunders who explains that “policymakers [can] perceive threats as arising from regime types or others states’ foreign policy choices, based on the memory of their past policy experiences” it all becomes part of a bigger narrative the United States has already loyally
subscribed to long preceding the Trump administration, “demonstrating how collective memories of past traumas impact ongoing negotiation styles“83.
This remains in accordance with theories that emphasize the enhanced image of one’s own nation and narrative and viewing and presenting itself as the positive component of the relationship that also functions to further marginalize the Other. Subotić describes this
phenomenon as follows; “states construct their biographical continuity through internal efforts to maintain their self-reflexive narratives, their positive views of self, at times of crisis”84. This becomes particularly evident in the article written by U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo for Foreign Affairs in the last quarter of 2018. In this piece the Secretary lays out the Trump
presidency’s strategy regarding Iran and conveniently places it within the narrative of the American identity, evoking memories of their decades long animosity with the Iranians, thereby reflecting the centrality of narratives and how they are used to legitimize decisions and strategies in the eye of the wider (global) public. What Pompeo illustrates through his inferences in the publication is “to provide autobiographical justification and continuity with the ‘good past’”85, exemplary of this is when he mentions iconic president Ronald Reagan and compares the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw to the “power of exposure when [President Reagan] cast
82 Simon, Steven, and Jonathan Stevenson. 83 Subotić, Jelena. 611.
the Soviet Union as ‘an evil empire’”86. Pompeo effectively links Trump’s strategy with Iran to the presumably successful strategy of President Reagan with the Soviet Union; just as Reagan was shedding “light on the regime’s abuses, he was pledging solidarity with a people who had long suffered under communism”, so was Trump87. The reasoning behind the decision to
withdraw suddenly becomes a humanitarian cause that is not to be confused with power politics: it becomes an effort “for the sake of the Iranian people” one which the “Trump administration has not been afraid to expose” as “the regime’s merciless domestic repression”, pinpointing to several incidents in which the Iranian regime has exercised oppressive tactics towards its
people88. Notably, the Secretary of State states, “it is in keeping with the character of the United States that we expose these abuses”89, which effortlessly overlaps with Subotić’s argument that states create so-called “national security cultures [over time], which are in part constructed by national mythologies of past events and relationships with historical friends or foes”, such “narratives for example of a ‘western civilization’, served as boundaries to demarcate desirable security communities and exclude others”90. It is within these narratives that states come to understand themselves and their position within the world and construct therefore a sense of stability and consequently a sense of Self. By creating the binary to the glorified success story of the collapse of the Soviet Union during the Reagan era, he makes explicit implications that distract from actual motivations, as these fit more neatly into the national narrative.
86 Pompeo, Michael R. "Confronting Iran - The Trump Administration's Strategy." Foreign Affairs. 97,
no. 6 (November/December 2018).
87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid.
What becomes even more pronounced examining the piece by Pompeo is how
desperately they attempt to forge the relationship into something of old familiarity, force them into patterns they are used to and cannot possibly escape, and break out from as to stabilize their routines once again as they reclaim their global position. As Mitzen and Larson point out, “not knowing how to respond can produce anxiety, which can undermine the state’s ability to feel as if it is preserving its identity on the world stage (great power, civilized state)”91, hence returning to parallels that are more similar to past routines will help the United States in reclaiming their security and reassert their power. A discontinuation of old habits will almost certainly cause a certain level of anxiety if not lead to worse consequences; the routinized and carefully polished relationship becomes a strand of reality that is difficult to break apart from, as it then is “no longer be able to predict the consequences of actions it has previously taken for granted […] stable routines which are more comfortable than the uncertainty that results from changing relationships”92. Unfortunately, as a conservative need, it causes a level of “discomfort [they perceive] with change, even when change would be materially beneficial, [it likely] leads to the perpetuation of existing conflicts”93, consequently leaving little room for possible change in their foreseeable future. The perpetuation of conflict and unlikeliness to transgress routinized practices and relationship is partly due to what Chernobrov describes as having a “continuously positive version of self” that joins together with the appeal and stability of predictable routines; the
routinization of “new encounters” can only be realized “within familiar self-affirming frames and
91 Mitzen and Larson. 7.
the illusion of predictability”94 but will ultimately fall prey to “known and well-rehearsed routine of policy escalation and popular suspicion” coupled with the awareness that “knowing the other enables self to act within continuous narrative” as well95. Mitzen and Larson have also alluded to this issue in ontological security theory, as the politically secure actors navigate through the intricacies of the global order and come into conflict with each other, that in itself can become the routinized relationship they are building with one another, hence the “prospect of peace can generate existential anxiety in states accustomed to longstanding routines of conflict […] that the conflict may have threatened physical security, but it provided ontological security […] premise that ontological security needs can frustrate peace building initiatives”96. Placed within the context the connections made and conclusions drawn in Pompeo’s approach are difficult to miss and problematic to ignore, the administration’s outlook on foreign policy being rooted in
“America First” and “everyone else ought to follow their lead” approach leaves them with limited options and little room for policy maneuvering. The decades of hostility with memories of adversarial behavior, rarely managing to even convene for negotiations, let alone to find common grounds, have deeply shaped this relationship to this day and despite efforts made by the Obama administration is still very much built upon mistrust and suspicion that has allowed for an decisive withdrawal from the United States.
European Union and the United States
The relationship between the European countries and the United States especially in the aftermath of World War II is mostly shaped through deep and extensive cooperation and an
94 Chernobrov, Dmitry. "Ontological Security and Public (Mis)Recognition of International Crises:
Uncertainty, Political Imagining, and the Self." Political Psychology37, no. 5 (2016): 581-96.
95 Ibid. 582-3.
alliance that shows what can be achieved through a unified partnership that only grew closer over the years. Even though many realists argued that the alliance was only formed because of a common enemy, the Soviet Union, it persisted throughout the years despite the fact that there no longer was a common enemy holding it together, especially regarding their military alliance realized through NATO97. As much as this transatlantic alliance has been praised and exhibited as the powerhouse success of U.S. aid and assistance in its reconstruction, recovery and
integration of the European countries that eventually formed the European Union, it has been experiencing some significant tensions notably in unprecedented degree under the Trump administration. That being said and examined further in a moment, it is crucial to note that even this unusually cooperative alliance has never been on equal footing and has often seen the United States being described as a “’benign hegemon’ in relation to its European allies”98. Within this special relationship it was understood that “U.S. power would be constrained […] and
cooperation would proceed on the basis of consultation. America allowed itself to be treated as the ‘first among equals’ and subordinated its strength and the superiority of its power by exercising it within the constitutional order of the Western alliance”99. Over time the ties between the allies have become stronger in some sense, however, other aspects have suffered immeasurably under recent circumstances and with many grievances surfacing in unlikely manner and with little hope of correction considering the increasingly strenuous and standoffish relationship.
97Sjursen, Helene. "On the Identity of NATO." International Affairs80, no. 4 (2004): 687-703.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00411.x. p.687.
98 Rees, G. Wyn. The US-EU Security Relationship: The Tensions between a European and a Global
Agenda. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 38.
The U.S.’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, despite European efforts of preventing it, signaled not only to the European allies, but also to the world, that the U.S. is still regarding itself as the primary leader on the global stage. The Iran deal “was supposed to be a flagship achievement of the EU’s common foreign policy and a symbol of the organization’s growing strength” writes Robert Czulda for the Atlantic Council soon after the Trump administration announced its move100. He even goes as far as referring to the EU as a “paper tiger” implying it has no more power and not much else to offer than being a bureaucratic institution that is acting at the behest of the United States and neither is nor will be on par with them anytime soon. What was celebrated as one of the greatest achievements in diplomacy and was supposed to be the European Union’s shining moment to demonstrate there is certain degree of mutual recognition and ability to influence each other’s position to act jointly towards a common goal as equals was soon torpedoed by the United States. As the European Union is facing a multiplicity of
challenges, most of them carrying the weight of crisis potential, and has therefore been under high pressure and scrutiny for quite some time, the JCPOA in particular was a critical deal because it “marked a rare instance in which a coordinated effort the Europeans decisively influenced Washington’s decision on a critical international security issue”101. Hence the withdrawal did not only leave the EU in an awkward position in which they try to remain
committed to the deal as much and as long as possible to show credibility and assume the role for themselves they have preaching for decades as the “promoter for peace and stability”102 and
100 Czulda, Robert. "European Failure to Safeguard Iran Deal Shows EU Is Still a Paper Tiger." Atlantic
Council. August 14, 2018. Accessed February 10, 2019.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/european-failure-to-safeguard-iran-deal-shows-eu-is-still-a-paper-tiger.
concerned with the general well-being of the world. It was also a “threat to regional stability and nonproliferation […], a repudiation of the notion that Europe can influence the United States on difficult security issues”103. While this move potentially caused a catastrophic ontological disruption for the EU, it is also the U.S.’ way, and more specifically the Trump administrations policy, to reestablish and reassert their hegemony, superiority, and clear independence. The causes for the U.S. reasserting their stance may be rooted in attempting to secure and return to their dominant narrative in which they have been influencing not only most of the globe, but more strikingly the EU, is in turn causing the EU to feel exceedingly insecure and uncertain in their Self, resulting in an ontological imbalance that almost appears to be mutually exclusive within the current balance of the relationship. Vincent Della Sala points out that while one
country will create certain narratives to establish security domestically, “it may lead to increasing mutual ontological insecurity” in other actors”104, conclusively, the moment one of the parties disturbs a well-established balance in order to feel more stability and do justice to their nation’s narrative they risk disturbing other involved elements, as in political actors.
The most recent efforts by a frustrated European Union to save the Iran nuclear deal have been met by angry responses from the Trump White House, threatening with secondary sanctions that would affect companies and countries continuing to do business with the Iranians. This, the so-called INSTEX trade vehicle, “instrument for support of trade exchanges”, is a hopeful attempt by the Europeans “to assert economic sovereignty in the face of Washington’s
103 Shapiro, Jeremy.
104 Sala, Vincent Della. “Narrating Europe: the EUs Ontological Security Dilemma.” European Security,
determination to impose its foreign policy on Europe”105 explains diplomatic editor for the Guardian Patrick Wintour. This will eventually allow Europeans to “trade more freely with Iran in a range of goods, including those subject to US sanctions” and potentially “pave the way for something more ambitious […] that the US would find difficult to target with political legitimacy given its humanitarian focus”106. This vehicle will mainly act as a ”payment channel from
Europe to Iran, and vice versa” and has naturally already caught the attention of the U.S. that “has warned any European entity trading with Iran with U.S. connections or using dollars can be subject to punitive fines”107. This is a remarkably defiant step taken by the Europeans that have rarely stood up for themselves quite in this manner and even less so against the United States, which has historically assumed the primary role in the balance of powers. The implementation and future interaction between the transatlantic partners will have to further unfold to
conclusively land on an accurate analysis, however, the current trajectory is suggesting a rather difficult future for the transatlantic alliance but appears to provide a fertile breeding ground to further destabilize their respective narratives.
Examining the United States Within the Global Order
Aptly titled the “Munich Insecurity Conference” in POLITICO the authors recap the annual security conference held in Munich since the 1960s and allude to the widening chasm between once unquestioned allies, that is the European Union and the United States as well as their respective current and future relationship with Iran. What is traditionally a stage to express “the solidity of the post-war Western alliance and America’s enduring commitment to European
105 Wintour, Patrick. "Europe Sets up Scheme to Get round US Sanctions on Iran." The Guardian. January
31, 2019. Accessed February 10, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/31/europe-sets-up-scheme-to-get-round-us-sanctions-on-iran.
security” is compared this year to a “funeral”108. The American rhetoric, presented by Vice President Mike Pence, is described as a “live with” and “you’d better join us, or else” attitude, marking a stark contrast to the unapologetic defensive mentality expressed right before by Chancellor Merkel109, who unabashedly reiterated her support and “commitment to
multilateralism, the rules-based order and to diplomacy”110. Merkel, with unusual frankness, lamented about the stance the U.S. had taken vis-à-vis their transatlantic partners and their policies regarding the Iranians111. Pence’s jarring speech following that of Chancellor Merkel’s was further display of the estrangement that has taken hold in the relationship as it “drew a tepid reaction when he lauded President Donald Trump’s more isolationist foreign policy”112,
underscoring their increasingly diverging alliance and vision for its future.
As a result from this administration’s attitude towards other countries, by deteriorating existing clashes and widening past gaps between them, they have grown increasingly isolated and fail to reach well-known, familiar tightly-knit connection with them opening up huge potentials to leave them more and more insecure in the future. It is this exact notion Subotić highlights when she explains, “it is not enough for states to feel secure in their view of Self; they also need to feel secure in the company of other states”113; while it holds true that the internal
108 Karnitschnig, Matthew, and David M. Herszenhorn. "Munich Insecurity Conference." POLITICO.
February 18, 2019. Accessed March 23, 2019. https://www.politico.eu/article/munich-security-conference-angela-merkel-mike-pence/.
109 Peel, Michael. "Pence and Merkel Offer Contrasting Visions of Global Security." Financial Times.
February 17, 2019. Accessed March 22, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/9f1626ec-32ba-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5.
110 Karnitschnig, Matthew, and David M. Herszenhorn. 111 Ibid.
