INTRODUCTI ON
BASIS AND COMPONENTS OF REMEDIAL LAW Article VIII, Section 13, Constitution
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Civil Procedure (Section 3a, ROC)
Ordinary Civil Action: one by which a party sues another for ...the enforcement or protection of a right,
...or the prevention or redress of a wrong
Special Civil Action: similar to an ordinary civil action but subject to specific rules prescribed for it Special Proceedings
-a remedy by which a party seeks to establish ...a status
…a right
…or a particular fact Criminal procedure
-criminal Action: one by which the State …prosecutes a person
…for an act or omission punishable by law Evidence
R128.1 Evidence is the means Sanctioned by these rules
Of ascertaining in a judicial proceedings The truth
In relation to a matter of fact Importance of Procedural Rules
REPUBLIC V. KENRICH DEV'T CORPORATION 498 SCRA 220 Facts:
-Kenrick Development Corp built a perimeter wall which encroached upon some parcels of land occupied by ATO based on TCTs derived from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion. When ATO verified the TCTs with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), it was found that there were no record of TCT no. 17508 and its ascendant title. Land was also covered by Villamor Air Base.
-so OSG, on behalf of LRA, filed a COMPLAINT FOR REVOCATION, ANNULMENT AND CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE in behalf of RP vs. Kenrick and Alfonso Concepcion
-Alfonso Concepcion cannot be found so alias summon by publication done
-Kenrick allegedly filed an answer signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr as their counsel (but later on, during a Senate hearing, it was found that somebody else signed for Atty. Garlitos but he did not authorize such signing)
-case punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, MTDs, Motion to declare defendant in default, et al.
-Pending hearing, Senate conducted hearing in aid of legislation on the issuances of fake titles and focused on how Kenrick was able to obtain title to lands wherein it built perimeter fence. Here is where atty. Garlitos denied that he signed the answer before the RTC
-with that admission before the senate, OSG filed Urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default. - answer no signature of counsel so mere scrap of paper
-RTC: granted, declared defendant in default, allowed RP to present evidence ex parte -MR: Denied, so petition for certiorari
-CA: reversed RTC
statements of Atty. Garlitos in the Senate hearing unreliable, not subject to cross examination Acts of Atty Garlitos after the filing of the answer: although he did not sign it, he prepared the draft of the answer and even if it was signed by another person, he did not contest it and even represented Kenrick in another case - these acts supposedly cured whatever defect the answer had
ISSUE: WON CA erred ? YES. Kenrick is really in default, for their answer was not signed therefore the said pleading is deemed as a mere scrap of paper and thus they are not considered to have submitted any answer at all.
On the alleged blanket authority given by Atty. Garlitos for anyone to sign the draft answer he prepared
-acts of Kenrick was deemed to have adopted the statements of Atty. Garlitos (that the answer submitted was not signed by him therefore, they have submitted a defective answer) - adoptive admission
-SIGNED PLEADING: signed by the counsel or the party himself; counsel's signature cannot be delegated and means that he certifies that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
On liberal interpretation of rules (rules are mere technicalities….)
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. 19
The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules. As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct. SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION V. CIR 492 SCRA 192
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation was assessed by the BIR for DEFICIENCY miller's tax and manufacturer's sales tax. It was imposed on the sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed the assessment but their protest was denied. SPMC appealed to CTA.
-CTA: cancelled deficiency manufacturer's tax on sales of corn and edible oils but not deficiency miller's tax. MR denied
-SPMC appealed to CA BUT the attached VERIFICATION and CNFS to the appeal was WITHOUT THE CORPORATE SECRETARY'S CERTIFICATE, BOARD RESOLUTION OR POWER OF ATTORNEY but only with the SPMC's chief financial officer who did not appear to have authority to sign the verification and CNFS. MR DENIED
ISSUE: WON CA should have given cognizance to the appeal? NO
On SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE (as the merits would allegedly show that SPMC was not liable for the miller's tax as the crude oil was sold to UNICHEM and UNICHEM exported it as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine)
-R43.5 (appeals to CA from CTA): Needs pleading to be verified + CNFS. If w/o proper verification, treated as an unsigned pleading. If w/o CNFS, ground for dismissal.
WHO MAY BE SIGNATORIES TO CORPORATION'S DOCUMENTS: only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific acts of the board of directors. In the absence of authority from the BoD, no person, not even the officers of the corporation, can bind the corporation. Here: AS SPMC'S PETITION DID NOT INDICATE THAT THE PERSON WHO SIGNED THE VERIFICATION/CNFS WAS AUTHORIZED BY BOD.
WHY: IT ONLY RELIED ON THE ALLEGED POWER OF THE CHIEF FINANCING OFFICER TO REPRESENT SPMC IN ALL MATTERS REGARDING FINANCES OF CORPORATION - INCLUDING FILING OF SUITS
BUT: no power of attorney, no authorization from the BoD = unsigned pleading
strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance such as the requirement on non-forum shopping, as well as verification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.
Even if grant substantial compliance, SPMC still is liable for miller's tax
-The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller himself.
-The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMC’s situation was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller’s tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
TRINIDAD V. ACAPULCO 493 SCRA 179 Facts
Backstory: Acapulco owed Trinidad around P566k.
Trinidad's version: as payment for the P566k, Acapulco gave him the Mercedez Benz she bought from Canete for P500k by way of dacion en pago. A deed of sale was executed to that effect. He did not give instructions to Acapulco to buy it from Canete, he did not borrow it from Acapulco and Acapulco did not demand for its return
Acapulco's version: Acapulco was asked by Canete to sell the Mercedes Benz for P580k (but she could buy it herself for P500k). While she was finding a buyer, Trinidad borrowed the car from her and
instructed her to buy the car from Canete herself then Trinidad would then pay her (so bayaran muna nya para mura bili then saka bibilhin ni Trinidad). However, after buying the Benz from Canete, Trinidad did not return the car and did not pay Acapulco, saying that he would just offset whatever Acapulco owes to him. As a result, the checks issued by Acapulco in favor of Canete (to pay the P500k) were not funded and bounced. Criminal charges were filed against her by Canete.
-Acapulco filed Complaint for nullification of sale she made in favor of Trinidad, prayed that the car be returned to her and that Trinidad pay damages.
-Trinidad alleged that there was dacion en pago between them (and alleged those above) -Pre-trial order focused on WON there was dacion en pago between them
RTC: NO DACION EN PAGO because no common consent (for Acapulco);
-MR :he alleged that there was implied consent on the part of Acapulco because she delivered the car herself after he threatened that he'll file an estafa case against her
-Supplemental Motion: assuming no consent from Acapulco, there was legal compensation (since Acapulco owed him P566k and the cost of the car was P500k)
-appealed to CA CA: affirm
(1) legal compensation allegation filed too late
(2) parties already agreed that the issue would only be WON there was dacion en pago (3) dacion en pago was not present - Acapulco did not give consent
(4) no legal compensation (obligation in money not equivalent to delivery of car)
(5) admission that the sale price of the car was not paid by him (as he wanted that the car be given as payment for Acapulco's debts) entitled Acapulco to file action for rescission of sale ISSUE: WON legal compensation argument of Trinidad should still be appreciated, though not expressly stated in his Answer to the Complaint before RTC, as his allegations in the answer and the facts proven in TC shows the presence of legal compensation
HELD: For TRINIDAD. There's legal compensation
On technical rules (late raising of issue of legal compensation):
-Our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. The interest of justice dictates that the Court consider and resolve issues even though not particularly raised if it is necessary for the complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and it falls within the issues already found by them. While it is true that petitioner failed to raise the issue of legal compensation at the earliest opportunity, this should not preclude the courts from appreciating the same especially in this case, where ignoring the same would only result to unnecessary and circuitous filing of cases.
Indeed, the doctrine that higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal, is subject to exceptions, such as when:
a. grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; b. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
c. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
d. matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
e. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and f. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent. ON WON there was LEGAL COMPENSATION
-Compensation takes effect by operation of law even without the consent or knowledge of the parties concerned when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 of the Civil Code are present. This is in consonance with Article 1290 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Article 1290. When all the requisites mentioned in article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation.
Since it takes place ipso jure, when used as a defense, it retroacts to the date when all its requisites are fulfilled.
Article 1279 provides that in order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
that each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other;
that both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
that the two debts be due;
that they be liquidated and demandable;
that over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.
Here, petitioner’s stance is that legal compensation has taken place and operates even against the will of the parties because:
respondent and petitioner were personally both creditor and debtor of each other;
the monetary obligation of respondent was P566,000.00 and that of the petitioner was P500,000.00 showing that both indebtedness were monetary obligations the amount of which were also both known and liquidated; - of no moment if the other obligation was the delivery of the car
both monetary obligations had become due and demandable—petitioner’s obligation as shown in the deed of sale and respondent’s indebtedness as shown in the dishonored checks; and
neither of the debts or obligations are subject of a controversy commenced by a third person.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS 458 SCRA 200 (2005) Facts:
-Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc wanted a declaration of the presumptive death of her husband Clemente Jomoc, who has been absent for 9 years, to be able to marry again.
-RTC: granted it, declared her husband presumptively dead
…basis: Article 41,par2, FC: four consecutive years only required; must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of absentee spouse
-Republic, through OSG, sought to appeal by filing ONLY A NOTICE OF APPEAL
-TC disapporved the Notice of appeal: based on Rule 41, Section 2(a), there should also be a RECORD OF APPEAL filed and served as the present case was a special proceeding
-OSG filed MR: denied
-OSG filed Petition for certiorari before CA: declaration of presumptive death is NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING or a case of multiple or separate appeals which would require a record on appeal
-CA: denied Petition for certiorari:
(1) OSG failed to attach CTC of assailed order (TC's denial of MR)
(2) OSG failed to attach a copy of the order declaring Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead ---based on (1) and (2) alone + Rule 46.3: the case should have been dismissed!
(3) Declaration of presumptive death is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING as it merely seeks for a declaration of the trial court of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse. It does not seek enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of a right or a COA that can be enforced
ISSUE: WON THE DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH OF AN ABSENTEE SPOUSE IS A SPECIAL PROCEEDIGN OR A SUMMARY PROCEEDING (IF NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING, DOES NOT NEED A RECORD ON APPEAL)
HELD: it is NOT A SPECIAL RPOCEEDING! RULE 72: SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. – Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following:
a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons; b. Escheat;
c. Guardianship and custody of children; d. Trustees;
e. Adoption;
f. Rescission and revocation of adoption; g. Hospitalization of insane persons; h. Habeas corpus;
i. Change of name;
j. Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
k. Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children; l. Constitution of family home;
m. Declaration of absence and death;
n. Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. – In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
CIVIL CODE
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) FAMILY CODE
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RULES OF COURT ON WHEN RECORD ON APPEAL REQUIRED
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioner’s Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By the trial court’s citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia:
x x x
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s order sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), seals the case in petitioner’s favor.
*IN SHORT, SINCE THE TRIAL COURT USED THE FAMILY CODE, AND THE FAMILY CODE DESIGNATES SUCH CASES AS A SUMMARY PROCEEDING AND NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING, IT IS NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING…
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner’s petition before the appellate court. Petitioner’s failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial court’s order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules
of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.
As for petitioner’s failure to submit copy of the trial court’s order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate court’s observation that petitioner was also assailing it, petitioner’s 8-page petition filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
DEFINITION: R2.2, RO C Cause of action defined: a COA -is the act or omission
By which a party violates the right of another
DISTINGUISHED FROM C IVIL ACTION R2.1 AND 2 .2 R2.1: Ordinary Civil Actions, basis of -
every civil action
Must be based on a cause of action R2.2 COA
SUBJECT MATTER RULE 72.1, ROC
Rules of Special proceedings are provided for in the following cases: a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons
b. Escheat
c. Guardianship and custody of children d. Trustees
e. Adoption
f. Rescission and revocation of adoption g. Hospitalization of insane persons h. Habeas corpus
i. Change of name
j. Voluntary dissolution of corporations
k. Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children l. Constitution of family home
m. Declaration of absence and death
n. Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry APPLICABILITY OF RUL ES OF CI VIL ACTIONS
RULE 12.2, ROC
In the absence of special provisions
The rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be As far as practicable
Be applicable in special proceedings
II. SETTLEMENT OF ES TATE OF DECEASED PER SONS VENUE AND PROCESS – RULE 7 3, SECTIONS 1 -4
Section 1 – Where estate of deceased persons settled.
If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, Whether a citizen or an alien
His will shall be proved,
Or letters of administration granted And his estate settled,
In the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
The Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent Shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court
So far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent Or of the location of his estate
Shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding Except in an appeal from that court
In the original sense
Or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Section 2 – Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage When the marriage is dissolved
By death of the husband or wife The community property shall be
…Inventoried …Administered …And liquidated
…And the debts thereof paid
In the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse If both spouses have died,
the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Section 3 – Process
In the exercise of probate jurisdiction,
Courts of First Instance may issue warrants and process Necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses Or to carry into effect their orders and judgments And all other powers granted to them by law. If a person does not perform an
order or judgment
rendered by a court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction it may issue a warrant for the apprehension
and imprisonment of such person until he performs such order or judgment or is released.
Section 4. Presumption of death For purposes of settlement of his estate, A person shall be presumed dead
If absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code But if such person proves to be alive,
He shall be entitled to the balance o his estate After payment of all his debts.
The balance may be recovered by motion in the same proceeding. Civil Code Provisions relevant:
Article 390: 10yr-absence for purposes of opening succession If 75 years: absence of 5 years
Article 391: danger of death: 4 years a. On board a vessel lost during a sea voyage b. On board a plane which is missing
c. Was in the armed forces and has taken part in war d. Has been in danger of death under other circumstances Article 392: recovery of property upon reappearance If the absentee appears
Or without appearing his existence is proved
He shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be found And the price of any property that may have been alienated Or the property acquired therewith;
But he cannot claim either fruits or rents
Regalado: Article 392 + Rule 73.4: conditions of recovery of absentee (a) All debts must have been paid
(b) He shall recover his property in the condition in which it may have been found, together with the price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith (c) He is not entitled to fruits or rents
SAN JUAN V. CRUZ, 479 SCRA 410
SHORT SUMMARY: THIS IS THE CASE WHEREIN A DEVISEE OF A DECEASED PENDING PETITION FOR PROBATE DIED, AND HIS HEIRS WERE PRESENTED TO SUBSTITUTE HIM, BUT ONE OF THE HEIRS OF THE DECEDENT OPPOSED SAID SUBSTITUTION, INSISTING THAT A COURT-APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OR EXECUTOR SHOULD INSTEAD BE THE PROPER SUBSTITUTE
Decedent: Loreto Samia San Juan
Last will and testament: Oscar Casa as one of the devisees Death: October 25, 1988
-Atty. Teodorico Aquino filed PETITION FOR PROBATE with QC RTC
-pending petition, Oscar died intestate on May 24, 1999: so Firs of Aquino et al. entered their appearances as counsel for Federico Casa, Jr. (one of Oscar's heirs) - entry of appearance DENIED: Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee
-RTC ordered Aquino to secure appointment of administrator or executor of estate of Oscar Casa -Aquino filed pleading "Appointment of Administrator" signed by alleged heirs of Oscar Casa, praying that Federico Casa Jr. be designated as administrator of Oscar Casa's estate and that he may be substituted (Federico is the nearest accessible heir to attend the hearing of the probate of the will + most competent to assume the responsibilities and duties of the ADMINISTRATOR)
-Epifanio San Juan filed MOTION TO DECLARE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR AS INADEQUATE OR INSUFFICIENT: heirs should present an administrator of Oscar Casa's estate as representative
>reply: (1) R3.16: heirs of Oscar may be substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate
(2) Court enjoined to require the representative to appear before the court
-RTC: San Juan's motion DENIED: no need for appointment of administrator or executor, enough that a representative be appointed (R3.16)
-San Juan filed MR, citing LAWAS V. CA: R3.16: priority still given to the legal representative of deceased (executor/administrator of estate)
-in case the heirs of the deceased will be substituted, there must be a prior determination by the probate court of who the rightful heirs are, in line with A1058 NCC and R78.6 and R79.2. (so insist that there should be petition for appointment of an administrator of Oscar Casa's estate)
-MR DENIED
-2nd MR, append TORRES V. CA: purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of every party to due process, to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate…
…ONLY in the absence of an executor or administrator that the heirs may be allowed to substitute for the deceased party
…2nd MR DENIED: (1) same arguments; (2) MONTANONO V. SUESA & RIERA V. PALMANORI: no need for the appointment of an administrator since a legatee is not considered either an indispensable or necessary party
-MR AGAIN of San Juan:
(1) cases cited did not rule on issue of WON a substitution of a legatee under the will who died during probate may be done by simply submitting an "appointment of administrator"…cases involved WON the probate court can rule on the validity of the provisions of the will
>Opposition: 3rd MR prohibited by R37.3 >DENIED 3rd MR
CA: dismissed
(1) filed beyond the 60-day period counted from notice of denial of first MR
(2) Subsequent MRs pro forma because it sought the same relief - so did not toll the running of the 60-day period.
-MR (only interlocutory, not final judgment so should not run 60-d period from denial of 1st MR) - DENIED
WON 60-day period for filing of petition for certiorari is reckoned from notice of denial of 1st MR even though a 2nd and 3rd MR of same interlocutory order had been filed and later denied
YES, but different rule:
-the proscription against a pro forma motion applies only to a final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one.
-2nd MR, though based on same grounds, is not pro forma BUT may still be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of the grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court
-cannot reject 2nd MR on the ground that 2nd MR of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law Thus, there are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order:
(1) the date when notice of the judgment, resolution or order was received;
(2) when a motion for a new trial or reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted; and
(3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by petitioner.
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness, considering that a petition is required to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be nullified
BUT Agree with CA that Petition for certiorari should have been filed 60 days after notice of denial of 1st MR, otherwise indefinite delays will enuse
WON a person nominated as "administrator" by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee despite the fact that such "administrator" is not court-appointed YES. The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an
administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate.42 Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court.
The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased. The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true. In Gochan v. Young,a case of fairly recent vintage, the Court ruled as follows:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper
representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC. (Emphasis supplied)
VDA. DE REYES V. CA, 169 SCRA 524 (1989)
Short Facts: Beatriz, (not sure if illegit or legit child) opposes the correction of judgment and the re-opening of the probate proceedings to correct a alleged typographical error in the sqm of the Antipolo
land in question, claiming that there was no typographical error and the parties intended to share only that area of land.
Decedent: Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.
Pilar Ibanez de Susuarregui: surviving spouse of decedent -administratix of the estate
Illegit children:
Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr. Enrique de Zuzuarregui Jose de Zuzuarregui
*Beatriz de Zuzuarregui vda. Re reyes: daughter of Antonio Sr. by another mother Pacita Javier: niece of administratix
-mother of the three illegit children
Project of partition:
Pilar: 12/16, inclusive of 1/2 of the assets (share of conjugal partnership) Beatriz: 1/16
Antonio, Jr.: 1/16 Enrique: 1/16 Jose: 1/16
Antipolo, Rizal property: mentioned 4x in document
-adjudicated to Pilar (12/15), Antonio Jr. (1/15), Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15)
-Pacita relinquished her right "in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property"
-administratix and other three distributees filed a MOTION TO REOPEN SPECIAL PROCEEDIGNS for the purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the parcel of land (correct land area: 803,781.51, not 83,781sqm)
-opposition to motion TC:
(1) opened for purpose of correcting clerical error in description of land (2) correct land area to conform with description of land area in TCT (3) correction be made in the project of partition
-CA: Affirm
Pacita's allegation: no clerical area. The area in the project of partition is correct. She would not have relinquished her share in the Antipolo land if she new nothing would remain from the land. It was even repeated 4x in the project of partition
WON there was a clerical error, which is an exemption to correcting or supplying a final judgment already entered?
NONE.
On correction of clerical errors:
It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered. The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become final. The court may make this amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision.
-TC already found that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by inadvertence in the project of partition
-probate proceeding, nature:
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the ENTIRE estate of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares.
-It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and complete adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate, necessarily including the entire area of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus as perceptively posed by the queries of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was to make only a partial adjudication and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did not make any further disposition of the remaining balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound reason would the heirs have in holding in suspense the distribution of the difference of 720,000 square meters?
-if they cannot see eye to eye, why share properties as co-owners?
-weird that the parties came up with 83,781, just omitting the zeroes. So only logical reason is that they just forgot to put zero.
-according to her own computation, she already received her 1/16 share in the estate. There would not be a substantial difference in value in their shares...
REYNOSO V. SANTIAGO, 85 PHIL 268
Short summary: husband and eldest son wanted to reopen the probate proceedings of the deceased wife/mom and wanted the reappointment of the surviving husband as the executor
Facts:
Decedent: Salvadora Obispo S.Spouse: Victorio Reynoso Eldest son: Juan Reynoso
-Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of decedent Salvadora Obispo presented an application in CFI for administration of Salvadora's property (No. 2914)
-Father and son opposed application and filed a document, allegedly the last will and testament of Salvadora, w/ a counter petition for probate
TC: alleged last will and testament is a forgery CA: reversed
-Father and son filed 2 petitions, one special proceedign (No. 2914) an another under a separate and new docket number (3107) and with different title (Testate Estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo) 1st petition: (1) special administrator, Meliton Palabrica (2914), be ordered to turn over the properties of the deceased and proceeds of copra, nuts and other agricultural products to Victorio Reynoso, and render accounting within reasonable time;
(2) render an accounting w/n a reasonable time (3) closing of intestate proceeding
2nd petition: estate be administered and settled in special proceeding, Victorio Reynoso be appointed as executor
-prayer for accounting
-delivery by him to the new executor of the properties
1st petition: substitution unnecessary, inconvenient and expensive + intestate proceeding should not be converted into a testate proceeding in the same original expediente w/o the necessity of changing its number, name or title
-withheld: because of the pendency on appeal of a case in which special administrator is plaintiff and appellee and Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant (re: parcel of coconut land)
WON the intestate proceeding should be discontinued and a new proceeding should be instituted instead?
-this is in the sound discretion of the court. In no manner does it prejudice the substantial rights of any heirs or creditors. Amor propio is perhaps the only thing is at stake on this phase of the controversy.
WON a regular executor should be appointed?
-appointment of the deceased's husband as executor or administrator: If one other than the surviving spouse is appointed, which is possible, the feared conflict will not materialize. If Victorio Reynoso is chosen, a special administrator may be named to represent the estate in the suit against him. Section 8 of Rule 87 provides that "If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of the claims." The situation in which Victorio Reynoso is found with reference to the land within the spirit if not exactly within the letter of this provision.
-Subject to this observation, an administrator should be appointed without delay in accordance with the final decision of the Court of Appeals. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will or some other cause. The Court of Appeals having decreed the probate of the will and the appointment of an albacea, there is no valid reason for the further retention of a special administrator. The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement and distribution of the estate. There are important duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator can not perform, and there are many actions to be taken by the court which could not be accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed.
B. EXTRAJUDICIAL SET TLEMENT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HEIRS – SU MMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE S
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs If the decedent left no will
And no debts
And the heirs are all of age
Or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose The parties may,
Without securing letters of administration Divide the estate among themselves as they see fit
By means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds And should they disagree
They may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir
He may adjudicate to himself the entire estate
by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds The parties to an extrajudicial settlement,
Whether by public instrument
or by stipulation in a pending action for partition
or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
shall file,
simultaneously with
and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument or stipulation in the action for partition
or the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds a bond with the said register of deeds,
in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned
and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts
If no creditor files a petition for letters of administration Within two (2) years after the death of the decedent. The fact of the extrajudicial settlement
Or administration
Shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation In the manner provided in the next succeeding section; But no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person Who has not participated therein
Or had no notice thereof.
Section 2 – Summary settlement of estates of small value Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person Whether he died testate or intestate,
Does not exceed Php10,000.00
And that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate By the petition of an interested persn
And upon hearing,
Which shall be held not less than 1 month Nor more than 3 months
From the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week
for 3 consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province,
and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,
without the appointment of an executor or administrator,
and without delay, to grant, if proper,
allowance of the will, if there be,
to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them
after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons,
if they are of lawful age and legal capacity,
or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise,
shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of
the portions of the estate to be awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such orders as may be just
Respecting the costs of the proceedings,
And all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof Shall be recorded in the office of the clerk
And the order of partition or award, If it involves real estate,
Shall be recorded in the proper register’s office. Section 3 – Bond to be filed by distributees The court,
Before allowing a partition
in accordance with the provisions of the proceeding section, may require the distributes,
if property other than real is to be distributed, to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of any just claim which may be filed under the next succeeding section. Section 4 – Liability of distributees and estate
If it shall appear at any time within 2 years after the settlement and distribution of an estate In accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule,
That an heir Or other person
Has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, Such heir or such other person
May compel the settlement of the estate In the courts
in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of 2 years,
It shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, Or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, The court having jurisdiction of the estate may,
by order for that purpose, After hearing,
Settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation And order how much and in what manner
Each distribute shall contribute in the payment thereof, And may issue execution,
If circumstances require,
Against the bond provided in the next preceding section Or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, Or both.
Such bond and such real estate
Shall remain charged with a liability to Creditors,
Heirs,
Or other persons
For the full period of 2 years after such distribution,
Notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made. Section 5 – Period for claim of minor or incapacitated person
If on the date of the expiration of the period of 2 years prescribed in the preceding section The person authorized to file a claim is
a minor
or mentally incapacitated, Or is in prison
Or outside of the Philippines,
He may present his claim within 1 year after such disability is removed. Cases
CRUZ VS. CRISTOBAL, 498 SCRA 37
Short Summary: Children of first marriage of dad found out after 60 years that the children of 2nd marriage had an EJ Partition of the only property left by their dad, excluding them, so they filed for annulment of said partition but both TC and CA ruled that their right is already barred by laches. 1st marriage children:
Buenaventura Cristobal and Ignacia Cristobal >Elisa-bunso
>Mercedes - eldest sister >Anselmo
>Socorro (SAME)
2nd marriage children:
Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez >Norberto >Florencio >Eufrosina >Jose (JENF)
Dad bought land in San Juan in 1926. He died in 1930. So children squabble over property.
-Children of 2nd marriage executed an EJ partition of San Juan property w/o knowledge of 1st marriage children (1st marriage children only found out about it after 6 decades)
-they attempted to settle at the barangay level but failed to do so.
-1st marriage children filed COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AND DAMAGES: (1) Annulment of deed of partition
(2) cancellation of TCTs in favor of 2nd marriage children (3) re-partitioning of the subject property
(4) damages
-evidence presented to prove filiation (by 1st marriage children) *baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo and Socorro
*Certification from Local Civil Registrar for Socorro that the records in 1909 (when she was born) were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear
*Testimonies:
>Elisa: mom (Ignacia) died when she was only 1y7m
…lived with aunt Martina Cristobal because dad married again …brother Anselmo and sister Socorro lived with 2nd family in San Juan
…when dad died, Anselmo lived with her and their aunt then Socorro lived with Mercedes …when Stepmom Donata died, 2nd family children lived with Elisa, Anselmo and their aunt …she is now living in the disputed San Juan property since 1948. Other houses in the area belonged to half brothers and sisters
-out of the 535sqm, she only occupies 36sqm of the San Juan lot
-2nd marriage children divided the property among themselves w/o giving 1st marriage children their share
-she was offered by Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the land or money but said she'll have to consult the other 1st marriage children. When she inquired, she found out that the 2nd marriage children already divided amongst themselves the said property to the exclusion of the 1st marriage children
CROSS: knew that the 2nd marriage children were the ones paying real estate tax due to the land
>Ester Santos: corroborated what Elisa already said
…said that the children had harmonious relationship, until when the 1st marriage children and their grandchildren were called squatters by the 2nd marriage children and their grandchildren CROSS: did not know the name of the 1st wife though she knew Buenaventura was married prior to marriage with Donata
>Jose (presented by the 1st FC though belonging to the 2nd FC): only found out about the 1st FC when they lived with aunt Martina, and did not admit that Elisa was their sister but only offered land so that she could have a piece of property of her own
Evidence of 2nd FC (respondents): *Testimonies:
>Eufrosina: parents (Donata and Buenaventura) were married in 1919. They bought the San Juan property in 1926.
…they lived with Aunt Martina since their parents died and knew since they were kids about the 1st FC (that they were their brothers and sisters)
…admitted that they did execute an EJ Partition of the San Juan property but asserted that the 1st FC never asserted their alleged right over the property
…that they were the ones paying for the real estate tax of said property
TC: dismissed case: petitioners failed to prove their filiation with Buenaventura Cristobal …baptismal and birth certificates have scant evidentiary value
…inaction for a long period of time amounted to laches
CA: were able to prove their filiation thru "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws" BUT they are barred by lachees
WON LACHES APPLY WHEN IT RESULTS TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY SUCH PRINCIPLE
NO.
-PRELIMINARY MATTER: although the title of the pleading filed by the petitioners is for annulment of title and damages, they prayed for the re-partitioning of the subject land so the court would not limit their decision on the title
-WON Filiation proved:
A172. Filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws: may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
-in this case, the petitioners were able to present many evidences which would show that they were indeed children of Buenaventura. The respondents on the other hand failed to refute the claim of the petitioners that they were Buenaventura's children (some even admitted that they were their half bro and sis)
-WON DEED OF PARTITION VALID: R74.1
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied)
-here: the sole property of Buenaventura's estate is the San Juan property, thus, it is equivalent to the EJ settlement of t his estate. As the 1st MC were excluded from said partition (and did not have notice thereof), the said partition would not bind them.
-WON Action has already prescribed No.
*Article 494, NCC: "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." ... "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
*Budlong vs. Bondoc: action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription
-how divided:
Old civil code applies (as Donata and Buenaventura both died in the 1930s when the NCC was only effective 1950).
Art 921 and 931: intestate succession = all children would divide the estate equally
Art834: widow was only entitled to usufruct over property, which would terminate upon her death
WON Laches would apply. NO.
-Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.
-There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner. Laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.
*Nominal damages awarded CUA V. VARGAS, 506 SCRA 374
SHORT SUMMARY: Chua bought Catanduanes property from some of the co-heirs but when the non-signatory co-heirs found out about it and he refused to resell the land to the latter, the latter instituted case against him, which was won in the CA (holding that the partition and sale were void and not binding on the part of the non-signatory co-heirs who were not informed of the said transactions)
Mom/Decedent: Paulina Vargas Heirs: Ester Visitacion Juan Zenaida Rosario <> Andres Gloria Antonina Florentino
Those who signed the notarized EJ Settlement: Ester
Visitacion Juan Zenaida Rosario
-the said EJ Settlement was published in Catanduanes Tribune for 3 consecutive weeks -they were also the ones who executed an EJ Settlement Among Heirs with Sale with Cua *the latter 4 never signed any document
*all documents executed and published in 1994
-one of the heirs (Gloria Vargas, widow of Santiago Vargas) claimed that she only knew of the EJ Settlement + Sale when the original house was demolished sometime in 1995; claimed she was unaware of said settlement
-tried to redeem the property from Cua but Cua refused their offer -amicable settlement not reached in barangay level
-ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF EJ SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL REDEMPTION OF LOT, MTC: 30-d period ff a written notice by vendors to co-owners not sent to them so the EJ Settlement and Sale were null and void and had no legal effect on them
MTC: DISMISS
-transaction occurred after partition so the co-owners could validly dispose of their shares
-written notice of sale under A1088, though not sent, was cured by the ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF SALE (which was more than 30d before filing of complaint)
-no bad faith on part of Cua
RTC, appeal: affirm MTC CA: Reversed RTC and MTC
-pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.
-MR Denied
WON PUBLICATION of the EJ Partition was binding on the non-signatory heirs because it constitutes due notice and therefore, the non-signatory co-heirs were already estopped from assailing the partition and sale
NO. Publication was made AFTER THE PARTITION WAS MADE, NOT BEFORE WHICH WAS REQUIRED IN R74.1
-The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
-The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
WON THE RESPONDENTS NON-SIGNATORY CO-HEIRS HAD RIGHT TO REDEEM? YES.
-sale of pro indiviso shares allowed, subject to right of redemption of other co-heirs. This right was never lost because the non-signatory co-heirs were never notified in writing of the actual sale. NOTIFICATION IN WRITING OF THE SALE BY THE VENDOR is required to start the period of redemption (w/n 1 month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale); even if the co-heirs have actual knowledge of sale, the notification in writing is still required. As there was no such notice here, the right to redeem the shares is still with the non-signatory co-heirs.
-method of notification remains exclusive, no alternative provided by law -purpose of A1088: keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership
-not in GF because he was very much aware that NOT ALL THE HEIRS PARTICIPATED IN THE EJ SETTLEMENT + SALE, as evident from the face of the document itself
-since no valid partition yet, no sale could occur. Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of the respondents, he still constructed improvements on the property
WON MTC does not have jurisdiction, this being incapable of pecuniary estimation Cua estopped thru active participation in the MTC
WON it should still be dismissed for non-joinder of indispensable parties NO.
-indispensable party: party-in-interest, without whom there can be no final determination of an action and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or defendant.
-here: prayer of complaint was that they be allowed to redeem shares in property sold. The other co-heirs already relinquished their right over their shares to Cua with the alleged sale. As a result, the other co-heirs who sold him the property are not anymore needed.
On improper verification and CNFS
Rule may be relaxed. And since the respondent share a common interest with the other respondent, her sole signature complies with the rules.
C. PRODUCTION OF WIL L ; ALL OWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY – RULE 75, SECTIONS 1 -5 Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution.
No will shall pass
Either real or personal estate
Unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal,
Such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution. Section 2. Custodian of will to deliver.
The person who has custody of a will shall,
within 20 days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction,
or to the executor named in the will.
Section 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust. A person named as executor in a will
Shall,
Within 20 days after he knows of the death of the testator, Or
Within 20 days after he knows that he is named executor If he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, Present such will to the court having jurisdiction,
Unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, And shall,
Within such period, Signify to the court In writing
His acceptance of the trust Or his refusal to accept it.
Section 4. Custodian and Executor subject to fine for neglect A person
Who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections Without excuse satisfactory to the court
Shall be fined not exceeding P2k.
Section 5. Person retaining will may be committed. A person
Having custody of a will after the death of the testator Who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, When ordered so to do,
To the court having jurisdiction,
May be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will. VITUG V. COURT OF APPEALS
Short Summary: Romarico and Dolores had a joint account with Bank of American National Trust and Savings Assn. and a SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT wherein it was agreed that upon death of one of them, the surviving spouse would own the proceeds of the account. Romarico withdrew the said funds and used it to pay for estate tax, and now wants to acquire authority to dispose of other properties of his wife’s estate for reimbursement of the “advance” he made. The oppositor alleged that he is not entitled to the said reimbursement as the funds used, i.e. the funds of the Joint account, was part of the conjugal property. The Court upheld the SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT.
Digest:
-Romarico Vitug and Dolores Luchangco-Vitug had a joint account in the Bank of American National Trust and Savings Associations. They also have a survivorship agreement wherein it was agreed that upon death of 1 spouse, the surviving spouse would own all the collectibles from the said account. -Dolores died. Romarico paid for the estate tax and other dues using the money in the joint savings account. Pending probate proceedings, Romarico and Rowena Faustino-Corona were appointed as cospecial administrator, the appointed executrix being in the states.
-Romarico filed a motion for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate.
-Rowena opposed, arguing that the money spent was part of the estate, it being part of the conjugal property of the spouses.
TC: upheld survivorship agreement, granted Romarico's motion
CA: survivorship agreement is a conveyance mortis cause, should comply with the formalities of a valid will. If it's a donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation.
HELD: Survivorship agreement valid. Grant motion of Romarico.
1. NOT A CONVEYANCE MORTIS CAUSA = WILL
-because the property conveyed is not exclusively owned by DOLORES (decedent)
A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his
death." 14 In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. 15 In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds
RIVERA V. PBTC (CASE WHERE THE MAID WAS GIVEN THE PROCEEDS OF THE JOINT ACCOUNT): not a conveyance mortis causa if the property sought to be conveyed is not the exclusive property of the conveyor
