Scholarship at UWindsor
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Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers
1-1-1964
The distinction of the powers of the soul from the essence of the
The distinction of the powers of the soul from the essence of the
soul.
soul.
John M. Kiss
University of Windsor
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Kiss, John M., "The distinction of the powers of the soul from the essence of the soul." (1964). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 6355.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6355
FROM THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL
BY
JOHN M. KISS
B. Sc, Assumption U n iv ersity of Windsor, 1962.
A T hesis
Submitted to the F a c u lty of Graduate S tu d ies through th e Department of Philosophy, in P a r t i a l F u lfillm e n t
of th e Requirements f o r the Degree of M aster of A rts a t th e
U n iv ersity of Windsor
Windsor, O n tario , Canada
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T his th e s is examines the d is tin c tio n which S t. Thomas Aquinas
m aintains between the powers of the soul and i t s essence, h is c r i t i c ism of those who id e n tif y the powers w ith th e essence, and th e meta
p h y sical b a s is f o r both h is own views and h is c r itic is m s .
S t. A ugustine, P e te r the Lombard, and e s p e c ia lly W illiam of Auvergne, a l l hold "whole man" views which id e n tif y th e powers of the soul w ith i t s essence. For W illiam, th e p rin c ip le of every
o p eratio n must be s u b s ta n tia l, and the powers m erely name the vario u s o p eratio n s of th e one essence which a c ts im m ediately,
Thomas d is tin g u is h e s every c r e a tu r e 's o p eratio n s from i t s esse and consequently i t s powers from i t s essence. Also th e id e n t
i f i c a t i o n of th e powers w ith the essence would mean th a t every crea
tu re would always be e x e rc isin g each of i t s o p e ra tio n s. The powers of th e soul a re acc id e n ts of the second species of q u a lity ; as
a c c id e n ts , th e powers have o n to lo g ic al r e a l i t y . To c a l l th e powers n a tu ra l p ro p e rtie s i s to speak only lo g ic a lly .
Since a c tio n i s n a tu r a lly p r io r to p o t e n t i a l it y , a l l of th e
powers a re named from and d istin g u is h e d by t h e ir o p e ra tio n s. The operations a re d istin g u ish ed in tu rn by t h e i r o b je c ts , which th e r e fore u ltim a te ly d is tin g u is h the powers. The powers, d i s t i n c t from th e essence of th e s o u l, a re a lso r e a lly d i s t i n c t one from th e o th e r.
powers and essence, and esse and essence a re seen to be req u ired i f man i s to be d if f e r e n t from God. The "whole man" view i s seen
to p resen t man as though he were God.
One o u tstan d in g fe a tu re of modern popular C atholicism i s th e d i chotomy between th e soul and the body. We are c o n sta n tly enjoined from
the p u lp it and in r e lig io u s l i t e r a t u r e to value only s p i r i t u a l th in g s and to put asid e the d e s ire s of th e body. The s p i r i t alone i s worth
w hile : the body i s e v il . The two, as pop u larly p o rtray ed , are two sep arate th in g s which are to be kept sep arate a t a l l c o s ts .
I t h ard ly needs to be said th a t t h i s ra d ic a l dichotomy of mind and body i s th e r e s u l t of th ree c e n tu rie s of C artesian th in k in g . G enerally speaking, man f o r D escartes i s a machine d ire c te d by a s p i r i t u a l so u l. His d e fin itio n s of th in k in g and extended substances e sta b lis h e d th e d i
chotomy, and h is in flu en ce has been f e l t ever sin c e . The m echanical and s p i r i t u a l elements are com pletely sep arate but somehow th e s p i r i t u a l
element r u le s th e body, d ir e c tin g i t to v ario u s a c tio n s .
A modem re a c tio n to th e C a rte sian mind-body dichotomy i s the
view point th a t m aintains t h a t i t i s th e "whole man" th a t a c t s . Man i s a u n ity . I t i s in h is u n ity , in h is wholeness, th a t he performs h is
every a c tio n , whether i t be th in k in g , o r sensing, o r growing, e tc . By the "whole man" i s g e n e ra lly meant t h a t man i s such a u n ity th a t th e re
can be no d is tin c tio n of p a rts or powers in him. No a c tio n i s c a rrie d out by a p a r t in him: man in h is e n tir e ty c a r r ie s out each and every a c tio n .
tin c tio n of p a r ts w ith in the so u l. There was no allowance f o r any d is
tin c tio n of th e powers from th e essence of the so u l. For W illiam no m atter what a c tio n s man performed, he performed them in the e n ti r e t y of
h is essence. The whole man acted alw ays. Since i t i s th e whole man
a c tin g , W illiam m aintained th a t the p rin c ip le of each a c tio n had to be
a substance. And since the whole man a c tin g i s only one substance th ere
can be no r e a l d is tin c tio n of th e p rin c ip le s of h is d iv erse a c tio n s .
W illiam 's id e n tif ic a tio n of the powers w ith the essence of th e soul aroused th e c r i t i c a l i r e of S t. Thomas Aquinas. S t. Thonas' d is tin g u ish in g of the essence from e s s e , and h is r e la tin g of essence to
esse as potency to a c t , forced him to d is tin g u is h th e powers of the
soul from i t s essence. He could not accept the extreme u n ity of W illiam 's "whole man" th eo ry of o p eratio n . In i t s place Thomas main
ta in e d th a t i t was by a c c id e n ta l p rin c ip le s or powers of the so u l,
th a t man a c te d , w ith each s p e c if ic a lly d if f e r e n t o p eratio n re q u irin g
a r e a lly d i s t i n c t power.
Thomas would concur th a t i t i s the whole man th a t a c ts , but h is
meaning would be d if f e r e n t from W illia m 's. For Thomas, man would be a
whole composed of body and soul: th e soul being th e s u b s ta n tia l form of the body. Man i s one in the u n ity of h is being; and he i s one in
th e remote p rin c ip le of h is a c tio n s , namely, h is essence, because i t i s by the essence t h a t the powers were able to a c t . But th e powers
man" view point upheld by W illiam of Auvergne, and then to p resen t the c r itic is m of i t by S t. Thomas Aquinas. S t. Thomas' own view s, p o in t by point in opposition to W illia m 's, w ill be given, along w ith a d is
cussion o f h is m etaphysical notion of actu s e sse n d i, which i s th e u ltim a te b a sis f o r h is theory of th e powers of the so u l. VIhile none
of th e b a sic id e a s o ffered here p u rp o rts to be o r ig in a l, one p o in t
has a ris e n t h a t has not been explored b e fo re . This p o in t i s t h a t in
view of Thomas' th eo ry o f th e powers of the soul and t h e i r d is tin c tio n from i t s essence, any th eo ry which i d e n t i f i e s the powers w ith the
essence of the so u l makes man operate in the same fash io n as God. God
alone i s a b so lu te ly sim ple. In God alone i s th ere no d i s t in c t io n of
essence and e s s e . In God alone i s h is power th e same as His opera
tio n s . To say th e same of man i s to make man in to God.
In t h i s t h e s is , a l l q u o ta tio n s a re given in E nglish t r a n s la tio n , The tr a n s la tio n s from th e L atin of S t. Augustine, P e te r the
Lanbard, W illiam of Auvergne, and S t. Thomas Aquinas a re e it h e r standard, or done by the a u th o r. In any c ase , the author f u l ly endorses them and accep ts a l l r e s p o n s ib ility fo r them. The L a tin
fo r each q u o tatio n appears i n th e ap p ro p riate fo o tn o te . The Greek
fo r A r i s t o t l e 's refe ren c es i s not given. A ll q u o tatio n s and r e f e r
ences to A r is to tle are taken from the Oxford tr a n s la tio n of The Works of A r i s t o t l e , e d ite d by W. D. Ross.
I express my deepest a p p re c ia tio n t o Dr. Joseph M. Graham, who d ire c te d the i n i t i a l work of t h i s t h e s is , and to Dr. John N. Deck, who brought i t to completion, and who made i t p o ssib le in the f i r s t
McNamara who read the th e s is and o ffered many c r itic is m s . F in a lly I
thank Mrs. Norah Badour who adds t h i s to the l i s t o f th e se s she has typed.
Page
A b s t r a c t i i i - iv
P r e f a c e ... v - v i i i
I The R elatio n sh ip of th e Powers of th e Soul to th e Essence in Several P re-T h o n istic
P h ilo s o p h e r s ... 1 - 15 I I S t. Thomas' C ritic ism of th e Previous
T h in k e r s ... 16 - 27
I I I The Soul as Form and Act of th e Body , 28 - 48
IV The Powers as A c c i d e n t s 4 9 - 59 V The D is tin c tio n of the Powers by T heir Acts
and O b j e c t s ... 6 0 - 72
VI The D istin c tio n of Essence and Esse in
C r e a t u r e s ...73 - 92 VII C o n c lu s io n ...93 - 96
B ib lio g ra p h y ... . 97 - 101
PRE-THCMISTIC PHILOSOPHERS
What i s th e re la tio n s h ip e x is tin g between the powers of th e soul and the essence of the soul? This problem has a long h is to r y in media
eval philosophy. I t was mentioned very e a rly by S t. Augustine and brought
up again around 1150 A. D. by P e te r th e Lombard. Then in the t h ir te e n th century i t was thoroughly discu ssed by a l l th e major ph ilo so p h ers and
th eo lo g ian s, of whcm two, W illiam of Auvergne and S t. Thomas Aquinas give
views which a re e s p e c ia lly re le v a n t to t h i s th e s is . S t. Augustine and
P e te r th e Lombard s ta te th a t the powers of th e soul are i d e n tic a l w ith i t s essence, W illiam of Auvergne vehemently upholds t h i s view and develops
i t s lo g ic a l conclusions. On the o th er hand, S t. Thomas m ain tain s t h a t the
powers a re a cc id e n ts of th e soul d i s t i n c t from i t s essen ce. Two d if f e r e n t view points then are m aintained w ith re sp e c t to the re la tio n s h ip of the
powers to the essence of th e so u l. These two view points, t h e i r ra m ifi
c a tio n s , and t h e i r t o t a l opposition one to th e o th er, a re what w ill be developed in t h i s th e s is .
Thomas summarizes the p o s itio n of those who hold the soul to be i t s
powers by saying t h a t "they th in k th a t the essence of the soul i s the immediate p rin c ip le of a l l of i t s o p e ra tio n s;"^ meaning by t h i s t h a t by
the essence of the soul a man would understand, sense th in g s , carry out a c tio n s , e t c . , and th a t t h i s same essence of th e soul would be c a lle d
i n t e l l e c t inasmuch as i t was th e p rin c ip le of i n t e l l e c t i o n , and so on
f o r a l l the o th er powers. Thomas compares t h i s view to saying th e h eat of f i r e i s i t s liq u if y in g power, i t s h e atin g power, and i t s drying power,
2
because th e same heat does a l l th ree o p e ra tio n s,
Thomas re p o rts th a t those who upheld th e id e n t i ty of th e soul and i t s powers were led to t h i s p o s itio n because th ey considered t h a t the
s im p lic ity of the soul would not perm it such g rea t d iv e r s ity as appears 3
in the powers of the so u l. They could not re c o n c ile the d i v e r s i t i e s
which the powers must have to be able to perform so many d iv erse oper a tio n s , w ith the sim p lic ity which the soul has. The same simple soul
could not have as " p a rts" of i t s e l f c o n trary and d iv erse p r in c ip le s of
o p e ra tio n . R ather th e whole simple soul i t s e l f was the p rin c ip le of
each and every o p eratio n no m a tte r how many or how d iv erse th ese oper
a tio n s were.
I t i s pu zzlin g t h a t the people who allowed no d iv e r s ity in the
soul and who g r e a tly emphasized th e u n ity of the so u l did not see the problem involved in having th a t one simple soul be th e immediate p r in c i
ple of d iv erse o p e ra tio n s. I f th e soul i s one and simple and a t the
same time a p rin c ip le of o p eratio n , i t can be the p rin c ip le of only one
o p eratio n . Two d iv erse o p eratio n s would need two d iv e rse p rin c ip le s ,
in no way could one and the same p r in c ip le , o p eratin g in one and the same manner, perform two or more d if f e r e n t kinds of o p eratio n .
To see the relevance of S t. Thomas* p o rtra y a l of th e p o s itio n
2 D. ^ Anima, a . 12, c.
S t. A ugustine, P e te r the Lanbard, and William of Auvergne w ill be ex
amined. These men by no means are the only upholders of t h i s p o s itio n but th ey are men whose thought would e s p e c ia lly have been known to S t.
Thomas. S t. A ugustine, being one of the g rea t L a tin d o cto rs of the Church, was regarded w ith deep re sp e c t by C h ris tia n th eo lo g ian s and p h ilo so p h ers; and h is works were known and thoroughly stu d ied by a l l except some lik e the L a tin A v e rro is ts . The larg e number of refe ren c es
he makes to Augustine shows Thomas' f a m ilia r ity w ith A u g u stin e's views.
The Sentences of P e te r the Lombard which had wide in flu e n c e , were
conmented on by a l l men, in clu d in g S t. Thomas, who were a s p irin g to
teach in the u n iv e r s itie s of th e tim e. William of Auvergne was an
im p o rtan t, source to S t. Thomas because of h is eminent p o sitio n as
Bishop of P a ris from 1228 to 1249. Because of th e a u th o rity of h is p o s itio n , W illia m 's views would have been w e ll known to S t. Thomas, who, a t W illiam 's d eath , would have ju s t r e a lly begun h is own c a re e r. How
ever i t should be noted th a t w hile S t. Thomas d i r e c t l y answers many of
the views upheld by W illiam of Auvergne, he never a c tu a lly names W illiam as the man he i s r e f u tin g . R ather W illiam 's views are included under
those of "sane philosophers" whom S t. Thomas happens to be d e a lin g w ith
a t the tim e.
Concerning t h i s problem the source in S t..A u g u stin e which Thomas 4
mentions most o ften i s the De T r i n i t a t e . Two statem ents from t h i s
work of S t. Augustine are used by Thomas to s ta te the p o sitio n th a t the
i s th a t mind, knowledge and love e x is t in th e soul s u b s ta n tia lly , or e s s e n tia lly : they are not in the soul as in a su b je c t, a s , f o r i n s t
ance, co lo u r, or shape, or any o th er q u a lity or q u a n tity a re in a body,^ Augustine ex p lain s t h i s by saying th a t a cc id e n ts are confined to the
p a r tic u la r su b je ct in which they e x is t while the mind can love both i t s e l f and th in g s e x te rn a l to i t w ith th e same lo v e; and i t can also
know th in g s e x te rn a l to i t s e l f . Love and knowledge then a re substan
t i a l j u s t as the mind ( s ic u t ip sa mens) . And th e r e la tio n s h ip e x is tin g
among th ese th re e i s not lik e th a t of colour in a coloured su b je c t, where the colour has no substance of i t s own but e x is ts in th e substance
of the coloured body. R ather th e re la tio n s h ip i s lik e th a t e x is tin g
between frie n d s who are a ls o men. The men are each substances in them
se lv e s. They are not men r e l a ti v e ly , but th ey are frie n d s r e l a ti v e ly .^ 7
Mind, knowledge, and love a re found " a l l in a l l " . Augustine e x p lain s
t h i s by saying th a t the mind i s in i t s e l f , w hile in r e la tio n to i t s knowledge i t i s said to be both knowing and known, and in r e la tio n to i t s love i t i s said to be both lo v in g and loved. Knowledge to o , w hile
i t i s re fe rre d to a mind th a t knows or i s known, even in re s p e c t to
5 A ugustine, De T r i n i t a t e , IX, 4 , Q '.L. 42, 9 6 ^ , pp. 82, 84. (See B ibliography): Simul etiam admonemur, s i utcumque v id ere possumus, haec i n anima e x is te r a , e t tanquam in v o lu ta ev o lv i u t s e n tia n tu r e t dinumerentur s u b s ta n t ia l it e r , v e l, u t i t a dicam, e s s e n t i a l i t e r , non tanquam in su b jecto , u t c o lo r, au t fig u ra in corpora, a u t u l l a a l i a q u a lité s au t q u a n tité s . S t. Thomas gives t h is passage of A u g u stin e's w ith minor v a ria tio n s in : Sum. Theol. I , q. 77, a . 1, o b j. 1 and o b j.
5; De S p ir . C re at. , a . 11, obj. 1. 6 I b id . , p. 84.
to a mind t h a t lo v es, i s love in i t s e l f both as loving and loved. Mind,
knowledge and lo v e, th en , e x is t, each in i t s e l f , but s t i l l m utually in each o ther so t h a t th e mind th a t loves i s in the love, and love i s in the knowledge of one t h a t lo v e s, and knowledge i s in th e mind t h a t knows.
"These th r e e , th e re fo re , are in a marvelous manner in se p ara b le from one an o th er; and y e t each of them i s a substance, and a l l to g e th e r a re one
substance or essence, w hile th e terms them selves express a m utual g
r e la tio n s h ip ."
The second statem ent of Augustine t h a t Thomas uses i s t h a t memory,
Q
understanding, and w i l l, a re one l i f e , one mind, and one e s s e n c e .'
Indeed Thomas' statem ent i s not so emphatic or ex p lan ato ry a s A ug u stin e's
own words: "Since th ese th re e , the memory, the understanding, and the
w i l l , a re , th e r e f o r e , not th re e liv e s but one l i f e , not th re e minds but
one mind, i t follow s th a t th ey are c e r ta in ly not th re e su b stan ces, but
one s u b s t a n c e . M e m o r y , understanding, and w i l l are one substance be cause, each of them, when considered in i t s e l f , i s l i f e , mind, and sub
stan ce. But th ey a re th re e in t h e i r mutual referen ce to one a n o th er. Each i s comprehended by each one and a l l are comprehended by each one.
8 I b id . , p. 90: Miro ita q u e modo t r i a i s t a in s e p a r a b ilia sunt a se m etip sis, e t tamen eorum singulum quoique su b s ta n tia e s t , e t simul omnia una su b sta n tia v e l e s s e n tia , cum r e la tiv e d ic a n tu r ad invicem .
9 A ugustine, De T r i n i t a t e , X, 11 [P .L . 42, 9 ^ , p. 156: Et haec t r i a Qtiemoria, i n t e l l i g e n t i a , v o lu n ta s] unum, una v i t a , una mens, una e s s e n tia . S t. Thomas s l i ^ t l y m odifies t h i s reading to : Memoria, in t e l l i g e n t i a , e t voluntas sunt una v i t a , una mens, e t una e s s e n tia . See: Sum. T heol. I , q. 77, a . 1, obj. 1; and De S p ir . C reat. . a . U obj. 8; a ls o g . D. ^ Anima, a . 13, o b j. 4«
and w i l l; and he understands th a t he understands, w i l ls , and remembers;
and he w ills th a t he w i l ls , remembers, and understands: and he remembers h is whole memory, h is whole understanding, h is whole w i l l; and he under
stands and w ills h is whole memory, h is whole understanding and h is whole
w i l l . Each i s a whole equal to a l l th e o th ers to g e th e r as wholes.
The p o in t which Thomas r e f e r s to in Augustine pervades both of these statem ents of A u g u stin e's p o s itio n . Augustine i s c e n te rin g h is a tte n tio n on the human mind, searching th ere f o r images of th e Blessed
T r in ity . He fin d s two: the image found in the mind, knowledge, and love
of man, and the image in h is memory, understanding, and w i l l . In both of these images i t has been seen above how Augustine i n s is te d th a t th e
p a rts were r e la te d as in d iv id u a l substances, a l l th e w hile emphasizing th a t the r e la tio n s h ip was such as to form only one substance. A ll of
the p a rts are substances in them selves and so encompass a l l th e o th ers a s to be equal to them in the whole, and y e t in se p ara b le from them.
The id e n tif ic a tio n of th ese p a rts or powers w ith the one substance of
man i s what S t. Thomas w ill have to contend w ith.
But long before S t. Thomas was to ta c k le the q u e stio n , P e te r the Lombard puzzled over th ese same te x ts of S t. A ugustine. In h is
Sentences P e te r s ta te s th a t th e mind of man i s a r a tio n a l s p i r i t ;
and th a t h is essence i s s p i r i t u a l and in c o rp o re a l. He goes on then immediately to say th a t memory, understanding, and w i l l , which are " n a tu ra l p ro p e rtie s or powers" of the soul a re d if f e r e n t from the
" n a tu r a l p r o p e r t ie s or powers" sh ou ld be n o ted h ere b eca u se o f th e
developm ent S t . Thomas w i l l g iv e t o i t , and w hich w i l l be examined
b elo w .
P e te r the Lombard, in l i g h t of h is view point wondered how the th re e powers could be considered as only one essence. He did not long
dwell on i t though, working out an answer from A u g u stin e's p o s itio n th a t the powers are not in th e soul in the same way th a t th e a cc id e n ts
of colour and shape a re . P e te r says th e th re e powers a re said to be one substance w ith the soul because th ey e x is t in the soul s u b s ta n tia lly
and are n o t a b le to come and go in th e same way as acc id e n ts in a sub-
12
j e c t . S t, Thomas came to know the views of P e te r th e Lombard when
he commented on the Sentences, From P e te r he took th e term " n a tu ra l property" and gave i t p re c ise and la s tin g meaning in th e context of the problem of powers and t h e i r r e la tio n to the essence of th e so u l.
A fte r P e te r the Lombard's c o n sid era tio n of th e re la tio n s h ip
between the powers and th e essence of th e so u l, no new developments took place in referen ce to the problem f o r over a cen tu ry . Odon L o ttin
has searched in v ain the works of such men as Gandulph of Bologna,
11 P e te r the Lombard, L ib ri IV Sententiarum , l i b . I , d. i i i , cap. 2, to m .I, p. 35j (See B ibliography, P e te r th e Lombard): Mens enim, id e s t s p i r i tu s r a t i o n a l i s , e s s e n tia e s t s p i r i t u a l i s e t in co rp o re s. I l i a vero t r i a [memoria, i n t e l l i g e n t i a , v o lu n ta s]n a tu ra le s p r o p rie ta te s seu v ir e s sunt ip s iu s m entis e t a se invicem d if f e r u n t, quia memoria non e s t i n t e l l i g e n t i a v e l v o lu n ta s, nec i n t e l l i g e n t i a v o lu n tas sive amor. [ I t a l i c s mineT[
Simon of T ournai, P rev o stin of Cremona, Master M artin, Stephen Langton,
P e te r of Capua, and Godefrey of P o i t i e r s , f o r some tr a c e of the problem.
In S t. Thomas' own tim e however th e problem was being d iscu ssed again q u ite a v id ly and th e man who most immediately s ta te d th e pos i t i o n Thomas was to oppose was W illiam of Auvergne. The p o sitio n
which William of Auvergne upholds, id e n tify in g th e soul and i t s powers,
a r is e s fra n h is n o tio n of th e soul as being a b s o lu te ly w ithout com
p o s itio n . W illiam conceives th e soul as a u n ity , a b s o lu te ly sim ple,
and t h i s sim p lic ity precludes any p a r t i ti o n in i t . So stro n g ly does W illiam uphold h is th e s is f o r th e sim p lic ity o f th e soul t h a t he con
sid e rs as c h ild is h and im becile any who would say th a t th e so u l i s a
p o te n tia l or v i r t u a l whole composed of many n a tu ra l p o w e rs ,^ S t. Thomas
would agree w ith W illiam th a t th e sim p lic ity of the soul preclu d es any
d iv is io n of i t in to p a r ts . For Thomas the whole soul i s t o t a l l y in
each p a rt of the body, but i t op erates through th e v a rio u s p a rts of th e body by means of the v ario u s powers.
The substance of th e human soul i s one according to W illiam of Auvergne, and the p l u r a l it y of powers th a t i s a ttr ib u te d to i t i s
reduced to th e p l u r a l it y of operations in which th e soul co o p erates.
13 Odon L o ttin , Psychologie e t Morale dans l e X lle e t X llle S iè c le s , Vol. I , p. 484, note 3, iSee B ibliography]?
14 W illiam of Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i , pars l a ; p. 87 of Supplementum; (See B ibliography, W illiam of Auvergne): Verum quoniam in hoc adhuc sum, u t removeam ab anima humana compositionem cmnem, faciam te s c ire unitatem ac sim plicitatem e ju s quae p ro h ib et ab ea partem e t partem, e t a g g re d iar d e stru e re errorem quorundam q u i
and d e s irin g to the w ill and to the d e s id e ra tiv e power, W illiam s t i l l m aintains th a t i t i s th e one soul i t s e l f which u nderstands, w i l l s , and
d e s ir e s . Moreover the soul knows a l l t h i s in i t s e l f by a f e e lin g or
i n t u i t io n . W illiam says th a t th e so u l w ith a b so lu te c e r ta in ty , con s ta n tly a s s e r ts i n i t s e l f , concerning i t s e l f , th a t i t i s i t i t s e l f
th a t understands, th a t has knowledge of th in g s , th a t becomes acq u ain ted ,
t h a t w i l ls , d e s ir e s , and l u s t s a f t e r th in g s , th a t in q u ire s a f t e r th e
th in g s d e s ire d , and when a b le , la y s hold of what i s d e s ire d . The soul a s s e r ts th a t i t i s i t i t s e l f th a t remains one and in d iv is ib le through
out a l l th ese o p e ra tio n s, w ith o u t which o p eratio n s i t would be im
p o ssib le even to d isc e rn th e d if f e r in g powers which are a ttr ib u te d to
i t . Whether th e powers are substances o th er than th e soul i t s e l f , or
whether they a re a c c id e n ts of the so u l, William says i t i s im possible
to speak of them in any way a t a l l a p a rt from t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s . H e i n s i s t s t h a t i t i s proper to speak of the powers of th e soul only in
15 W illiam o f Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i , pars 10a; p. 98 of the Supplementum; Una e s t su b s ta n tia animae humanae, e t p l u r a l i t a s virium quae p o n itu r e i non p o n itu r n i s i secundum p lu ra lita te m operationum i l l i u s e t cooperationum ejusdem ad i l i a s . Et quamquam i n t e l l i g e r e v i r t u t i in te l le c t i v a e a tt r ib u a t u r , v elleq u e e t d e sid e ra re v i r t u t i
d e sid e ra tiv a e atque v o lu n ta ti, ip sa tamen anima una e s t q u a e i n t e l l i g i t , v u lt atque d e s id e r a t, e t hoc cmnis anima humana s e n t it in sem etipsa, cognoscit c e rtis s im e , atque t e s t i f i c a t u r , nec p o s s ib ile e s t e i u t m en tiatu r super hoc. Absque enim u lla d u b ita tio n e constantissim eque
r e l a t i o n t o , or com parison w it h , t h e p l u r a l i t y or m u ltitu d e o f th e
a c t s and o p e r a tio n s o f th e s o u l.^ ^ How h e a r t i l y Thomas A quinas would
agree w ith W illiam of Auvergne's l a s t p o in t, t h a t th e powers a re
spoken of only in r e l a ti o n to t h e i r o p e ra tio n s. But how d i f f e r e n t l y
they w i l l use th is p o in t, how d if f e r e n t w ill be t h e i r f i n a l so lu tio n s
to the problem of relating the powers to the essence of the soul,
W illiam continues on from t h i s p o in t to s ta te t h a t th e o p e ra tio n s
of the soul cctne from the soul i t s e l f and cannot be enumerated except 17
as being in the soul i t s e l f . He means th a t in ste a d of th e re being
many d if f e r e n t powers th ere i s one soul e x e rc isin g many o p e ra tio n s, and
each operation gives i t s name to a d if f e r e n t "power". "Power in the human so u l i s nothing o th er th an the soul i t s e l f in those th in g s which
18
i t does by i t s e sse n c e ." As an example William says th a t in saying the human soul i s ab le to understand, o r to know, the verb " i s able"
adds nothing to the essence of the so u l. In t h i s re sp e c t W illiam
compares the soul to God because he says t h a t n e ith e r in th e C reato r
nor in th e human so u l i s th e re any power, except th e essence both of
God and of th e so u l, which i s th e p rin c ip le and cause of any
16 W illiam of Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i , pars 6a; pp. 92-3 of th e Supplementum; Ex i i s i g i t u r quae hie a u d iv is ti manifestum e s t quia m in o rita s e t p l u r a l it a s potentiarum non d i c i t u r apud animam humanum n i s i re la tio n e v e l ccmparatione ad p lu ra lita te m sive m ultitudinem actuum e t operationum quae ab ip sa anima su n t, neque a l i t e r e s t p o s s ib ile eas num erari, aut numerum in anima humana in v e n ire ,
17 I b id .
He e x p la in s t h i s comparison more f u l l y when he says t h a t since i t i s most tru e t h a t the C reator i s pow erful, i t i s most proper and tr u e to
say He has power. But t h i s power i s nothing o th er than H im self, and
to p re d ic a te power of God adds nothing to His essence. S im ila rly W ill iam says th a t th e human so u l, or anything e ls e which e x is ts only by i t s
20
essence, has nothing added to t h a t essence by p re d ic a tin g power of i t .
19 I b id . : Jam i g i t u r f e c i t e s c ire per hoc quod p o te n tia apud animam humanam n i h i l e s t a liu d quam ip sa anima in i i s quae o p eratu r per essentiam suam. Exempli g r a t i a , cum d i c i t u r ; anima humana p o te st in t e l l i g e r e v e l p o te s t s c ir e , e t ad hunc modum de a l i i s , d ico quod hoc verbum p o te st n i h i l a d d it super essentiam ip s iu s quemadmodum d i c i t u r de C reators ben ed icto . Causa autem in hoc e s t , quoniam neque apud C re a to r- em, neque apud animam humanam e s t p o te n tia , principium e t causa hujus modi o p e ra tio n is n i s i u triu sq u e e s s e n tia , s ic u t verbum i l l u d in hujus modi sermonibus p ra e d ic a t potentiam ex qua sunt hujusmodi o p e ra tio n e s,
in d u b ita n te r non p ra e d ic a t n i s i essentiam u t r i u s l i b e t earum in hujus modi o p era tio n ib u s. In e is vero quae anima humana non o p eratu r per
essentiam suam n i h i l pro h ib et p ra e d ic a ri a liu d v e l a l i a , s i qua tamen hujusmodi su n t.
20 W illiam of Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i , p a rs. 5> p. 90 of the Supplementum; Dico i g i t u r quia c re a to r s ic u t v erissim e potens e s t , sic verissim e ac p ro p rie posse d i c i t u r , quapropter verissim a ac proprissim a e s t e n u n tia tio haec de eo, c re a to r p o te s t, c re a to r e s t potens. Jam autem declaratum e s t in prima p a rte primi s a p ie n tia lis ac d i v in a l is mag- i s t e r i i , quoniam ip se non p o te s t, nec potens e s t ,
p ro p ter hoc quod p o te n tia qua p o te s t v e l potens e s t , non e s t a liu d ab ip so , a liu d inquam su b jecto , v e l e s s e n tia , seu v e r i t a t e : q uapropter cum d i c i t u r de eo quia p o te s t v e l potens e s t , non a d d itu r a liq u id per
huiusmodi praedicationem , v e l p o n itu r supra ipsum. Q uapropter p o te n tia quae huiusmodi sermonibus p ra e d ic a tu r, v e l a ffirm a tu r non e s t a liu d additum supra ipsum, v e l in ip so . Et eadem v ia d e c la r a b itu r t i b i hoc de omnibus quae non possunt n i s i per sem etipsas v e l e s s e n tia s suas. Et s i anima humana secundum hunc modum p o te st v e l potens e s t q u o tie s d ic i t u r de ea quia p o te s t v e l potens e s t , non s i t a d d itio supra ipsam v e l ejus essentiam , nec p o s itio in ip s a , cum n i h i l addi p o s s it s i b i i p s i supra se v e l poni in se ip so . And he adds f u r th e r ; I b id . , p. 91: Declaratum i g i t u r e s t t i b i in huiusmodi sermonibus, albedo p o te s t
S t. Thomas w ill pay p a r tic u la r a tte n tio n to the type of argument ju s t advanced by W illiam . That W illiam could draw so clo se an analogy between th e o p eratio n s of God and th e o p eratio n s of man shows how
r a d ic a lly d if f e r e n t h is m etaphysical b a s is must be from t h a t of S t. Thomas.
Three arguments of W illiam of Auvergne provide support f o r h is i d e n tif ic a tio n of th e powers w ith the essence of the so u l. In the
f i r s t , he s ta te s a th e s is which S t. Thomas w ill spend much e f f o r t to ex p lain : W illiam denies t h a t th e re can be any medium between a sub
stance and an a c c id e n t. He says, using d e ris iv e term inology again f o r
emphasis, th a t i t i s im possible f o r an accid en t to understand o r d e sire
something, or t o do anything of the s o r t; and th a t only an im becile
would say th a t i t could. Only a substance, and a liv in g substance a t
t h a t , can understand, and lo v e, and g et angry, e tc . A ll the powers then
must be substances and th e re fo re th ey must be the whole soul i t s e l f
o p e ra tin g . But then W illiam adds the curious phrase: "o r p a rt of i t " ( th a t i s , th e s o u l), which seems to imply th a t a p a rt of the soul
could o p e ra te. This in te r p r e ta tio n however i s c o n trary to every th in g W illiam holds w ith re sp e c t to the a b so lu te sim p lic ity and u n ity of the
soul.^^
The second argument i s t h i s very sim p lic ity of th e so u l. With no
p o s s ib i l i ty of th e re being any p a r ts in the so u l, W illiam says th a t i t
i s necessary f o r th e human soul in i t s t o t a l i t y to be every power th a t
21 W illiam of Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i , pars 6a; p. 92 of th e Supplementum: Et quia i g i t u r non e s t p o s s ib ile accidens a liq u id
o p erates in any way. To f u r th e r develop t h i s , W illiam says t h a t when
a power i s considered to be a principle of operation, this does not
p o s it sane e ff e c tiv e p rin c ip le am the soul and p red ic ated of i t , but r a th e r i t i s sonething from th e so u l. The many powers a re not in the
soul by number and by power but r a th e r only by r e la tio n to and com
parison w ith the many o p eratio n s of th e whole so u l. The soul has i t s
22
powers in the same way th a t i t has i t s essence o r substance. Under
ly in g t h i s p o s itio n of W illiam of Auvergne i s again an analogy between the soul and God. W illiam holds th a t th e many o p eratio n s flow from th e
simple soul in th e same way th a t many Divine Ideas flow from God w ith out in any way d estro y in g His s im p lic ity .
In h is t h ir d argument in support of th e i d e n tif ic a tio n of the
powers with the soul William introduces a principle of distinguishing
th e powers. He says t h a t the powers a re not d istin g u ish e d according to t h e i r essence but according to t h e i r o f f ic e ; and by way of i l l u s t r a t i o n
compares th e powers to a man ex ercisin g v ario u s o f f i c i a l c a p a c itie s in
c i v i l so c ie ty . In the same way th a t one and the same man i s a t th e same time a duke, a c o u r tie r , a le a d e r of a c it y , and sometimes a
counselor or se n a to r, so one and the same so u l, r e ta in in g always i t s u n ity and i n d i v i s i b i l i t y , a t th e same time i s i t s power of understanding,
i t s power of reasoning, and i t s power of w illin g . The powers of the
soul a re named from th e v ario u s o p eratio n s of the whole soul in the
23
same way th a t a man i s named f o r h is v ario u s c i v i l p o s itio n s .
The b asic theme common to th e te x ts of S t. A ugustine, P e te r th e Lombard, and W illiam of Auvergne presented above, i s th a t the essence
of the soul i s the immediate p rin c ip le o f a l l of th e s o u l's o p e ra tio n s. The essence and the powers of th e soul are id e n t i f i e d , W illiam , how
ev er, goes on much more stro n g ly to emphasize th a t the powers could
not be a cc id e n ts of the so u l; and t h a t the d is tin c tio n of the powers i s
m erely nominal, id e n tify in g the d if f e r e n t o p eratio n s of th e one essence of the so u l. Now u n less S t. Thomas i s to adopt th e same p o s itio n
concerning the soul and i t s powers as j u s t presented he w i l l have to
in tro d u ce some r a d ic a lly new element in to th e d isc u ssio n . But he w ill
n o t support th ese views: p o in t by p o in t he r e j e c t s them. In t h e i r place
he s u b s titu te s h is own id ea s concerning the soul and i t s powers, based
on the m etaphysical foundation of a c tu s e sse n d i. From h is d e v a sta tin g
c ritic is m of th e i d e n t if ic a tio n of th e powers w ith th e so u l; through
h is development of the powers as p ro p e rtie s and a cc id e n ts of th e so u l;
t o h is d is tin g u is h in g of th e powers by t h e i r a c ts and o b je c ts ; S t.
Thomas c o n tin u a lly has in mind h is n o tio n o f a ctu s essendi as th e b a sis f o r th e whole development of th e problem. How S t. Thonas' n o tio n of
a ctu s essen d i u n d e rlie s h is c ritic is m of e a rly th in k e rs on the problem
23 I b id . : Quod autem d iv id itu r v e l d is tin g u itu r in p o te n tia s au t v i r tu t e s sive per i l l a s , non secundum essentiam e s t , v e l s i t hoc, sed
secunda o f f i c i a . Quemadmodum enim apud homines vivos e t idem homo, e t dux, e t comes e s t , e t m archio, e t p o te s ta s a lic u ju s c i v i t a t i s , e t consul interdum atque se n ato r: s ic una e t eadem anima, in u n ita te atque im- p a r t i b i l i t a t e sua p e rs is te n s ac peraanens, simul e s t v is i n t e l l e c t i v e , e t v is r a t i o n a l i s , e t v o len s, quod e s t d ic e re v i r tu s v o len d i. Eodem modo c o n c u p is c ib ilis v e l i r a s c i b i l i s , sed pro v a r ie ta te operationum quas
e f f i c i t , seu p e r f i c i t , d iv e rsa e v i r tu t e s ac p o te n tia e nom inatur,
The exam ination of the te x ts from S t. A ugustine, P e te r the Lombard,
and W illiam of Auvergne in the preceding s e c tio n , bore out S t. Thomas'
summary th a t they held th e essence of th e soul to be th e immediate
p rin c ip le of i t s o p eratio n . This p o in t i s more b asic than the
o th er two which were a ls o ra is e d th e r e , concerning th e d is t in c t io n of the powers and whether they were substances of a c c id e n ts , because th ese
u ltim a te ly depend on th e f i r s t p o in t. Since the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the powers w ith the essence of th e so u l i s th e more b a sic p o in t i t i s im
p o rtan t th a t i t be examined before th e o th er two. T herefore t h i s se c tio n
of the th e s is w i l l p resen t S t. Thomas' c ritic is m of th e th eo ry which main
ta in s the id e n tity of the powers of the soul w ith i t s essence. Because t h i s i s th e f i r s t time in t h i s th e s is th a t Thomas has been allow ed to
speak a t le n g th , i t w ill be th e f i r s t time th a t the no tio n of a ctu s
essendi w ill make i t s weight f e l t . How much i t pervades Thomas' C r i t i cism of h is predecessors w ill be r e a d ily seen.
S t. Thomas does not agree th a t the essence of th e soul i s the im
m ediate p rin c ip le of i t s o p eratio n s and goes to some co nsiderable e f f o r t
w ith many d if f e r e n t types of arguments to show th a t i t i s im possible to uphold. The f i r s t of th ese arguments th a t Thomas uses i s based on the m etaphysical notion which i s basic to h is vdiole philosophy, namely, th e d is tin c tio n of essence and e s s e .
The simple statem ent of the argument i s ; when the o p eratio n i t s e l f of a th in g i s th a t same t h i n g 's e s s e , then i t i s th a t th e essence of th e th in g t h a t op erates i s alone th e immediate p rin c ip le of o p e ra tio n ; fo r
j u s t a s power i s r e l a t e d t o i t s o p e r a tio n a s t o i t s a c t , s o i s e s s e n c e
r e l a t e d t o e s s e . Now o n ly i n God i s H is a c t ( i n t h i s c a s e t o u n d ersta n d )
th e same a s H is e s s e ; and s o o n ly i n God i s H is power ( i n t h i s c a se i n t e l
l e c t ) th e same a s H is e s s e n c e . In a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l c r e a t u r e s t h e n , th e
i n t e l l e c t i s a power and n o t th e e s s e n c e .^ That i s , th e power i s d i s t i n c t
from th e e s s e n c e .
Here S t. Thomas has used g e n e ra lly a p ro p o rtio n , i f i t may be so
c a lle d , r e la tin g power to i t s o p eratio n in the same way th a t essence i s r e la te d to e s s e . For the essence to be i t s power th en , in t h i s pro
p o rtio n , esse would have to be i t s o p e ra tio n s. But t h i s i s so only in
Gicdj and th e re fo re in man and every o th er c re a tu re the p rin c ip le of
o p eratio n i s i t s power, not i t s essence.
Thomas a ls o r e l i e s on the f a c t th a t esse and o p eratio n a re the same only in God f o r another argument to show th a t th e powers cannot be id
e n tif ie d w ith th e essence of th e so u l. He s t a r t s by saying t h a t d iv erse
a c ts belong to d iv erse th in g s since a c ts are proportioned to the th in g s
of which th ey are the a c ts . And then he goes on to s e t up an o th er pro
p o rtio n : as ipsum esse i s a kind of a c tu a lity of an essence, so a c tin g
i s the a c t u a l i ty of a power. In t h i s resp ec t th en , essence i s i n a c t w ith regard to esse and power i s in a c t w ith regard to a c tin g . Thomas
concludes then t h a t since in no c re a tu re i s i t s a c t iv i t y th e same as i t s e s s e , ( th is belongs to God a lo n e ), the power of no c re a tu re i s the same
2
as i t s essen ce, ( t h is a ls o belongs to God a lo n e ).
S t. Thomas continues h is a tta c k on a s l ig h tly d if f e r e n t lin e when
1 Sum. Theol. I , 2. 79, a . 1, c. The re la tio n s h ip between the operations of a th in g and i t s esse i s shown on pp. 3 ( - 34-and on p p .7 4 - 75" below; the re la tio n s h ip between essence and esse on pp .7 ^"^^ below.
he says t h a t potency and a c t divide being ( en s) and every genus of be
in g ; so th a t a potency and i t s a c t must be re fe rre d to the same genus. From t h i s i t follow s th a t i f an a c t i s not in the genus of substance,
then the potency r e la te d to th a t a c t a ls o i s not in the genus us sub sta n ce , But, Thomas, say s, the o perations of th e soul a re not i n the
genus of substance, and hence th e p o ten cies which are th e p rin c ip le s of
th ese o p eratio n s cannot be in th e genus of substance, th a t i s , th ey are
not th e essence of the so u l. Only in God i s His power th e same as His 3 essence because only i n Him i s th e o p eratio n the same as His substance.
Continuing in t h i s vein of thought, Thomas says t h a t since proper and immediate e f f e c ts are proportioned to t h e i r causes, a l l th in g s having t h e i r proximate p rin c ip le of o p eratio n in the genus of substance have
substances f o r o p e ra tio n s. But t h i s i s tru e of God alo n ej and so only
He does not a c t by a m ediate power d if f e r e n t from His substance. For a l l
c re a tu re s , o p eratio n i s an accid en t and so the proximate p rin c ip le of 4
o p eratio n a ls o must be an a c c id e n t.
I t should be noted th a t the lin e s of reasoning which Thomas i s using to show the powers of the so u l are not i t s essence and e s p e c ia lly
the l a s t two arguments which show th a t the p rin c ip le s of o p eratio n must
be in the same genus as t h e i r o p e ra tio n s, are lead in g in ex o rab ly t o the
conclusion th a t the powers of the so u l are accid en ts of the so u l. The next
argument, which expands g r e a tly on the l a s t one, w i l l b rin g t h i s home even more sh arp ly .
Thomas s t a r t s th e argument by s ta tin g th a t whatever a c ts , a c ts a c
-3 Sum. Theol. I , q. 77, a . 1, c . : Primo, quia cum p o te n tia e t . . . . 4 Scriptum super L ibros Sententiarum M ag istri P e t r i Lombardi, l i b , I , d. 3, q. 4 , a . 2 (See B ibliography, Thomas Aquinas, S a in t, 26);
cording as i t i s i n a c t , f o r example, f i r e h e ats because i t i s a c tu a lly
h o t, not because i t i s a c tu a lly b r ig h t. Because of t h i s , every agent pro duces an e f f e c t s im ila r to i t s e l f , and from t h i s conform ity, by examining
an e f f e c t , th e p rin c ip le of the a g e n t's a c tio n can be considered, "When, th e re fo re th a t which a c ts does not p e rta in to the s u b s ta n tia l esse of a
th in g , i t i s im possible th a t th e p rin c ip le by which i t a c ts be anything
of the essence of the t h i n g .T h o m a s goes on to show how t h i s i s very- evident in the case of n a tu ra l agents which in gen eratio n a c t by
changing m a tte r w ith re sp e c t to sane form. M atter i s f i r s t disposed to
receiv e the form, and then does receiv e i t , according as g en eratio n i s the term inus of a l t e r a t i o n . I t i s necessary on the p a rt of the agent th a t th a t which imm ediately a c ts be the a c c id e n ta l form corresponding to
the d is p o s itio n of the m a tte r. This a c c id e n ta l form a c ts by th e power of th e s u b s ta n tia l form, as i f i t were i t s in stru m en t; otherw ise i t would not
induce a s u b s ta n tia l form by i t s a c tin g . For example, a r t i f a c t s are pro
duced by the a c tio n of an in stru m en t, which a c tio n term in ates in th e form
d e sired by th e a r t i s t . Any agent which d i r e c t l y and imm ediately produces a substance by i t s a c tio n , i s a c tin g by i t s essence, and no a c tiv e power
w ill be p resen t o th er th an th a t essence.
Thomas continues t h i s long e x p o sitio n by saying t h a t passive powers
ordered to s u b s ta n tia l a c ts are in th e genus of substance, w hile those ordered to a c c id e n ta l a c ts are i n the genus of accid en t by red u c tio n , as
a p rin c ip le and not as a complete sp e cie s; because every genus i s divided by potency and a c t. So a p o te n tia l man ( p o te n tia homo) i s i n the genus of substance; and p o te n tia l w hite ( p o te n tia album) i s i n the genus of
q u a lity , "Mow" S t. Thomas say s, " i t i s evident th a t th e powers of the
so u l, whether a c tiv e or p a ssiv e , are not spoken of d i r e c tl y w ith re sp e c t
■6
to s o m e th in g 'su b sta n tia l, but r a th e r w ith re s p e c t to something a c c id e n ta l,"
He ex p lain s t h i s f u r th e r by using i l l u s t r a t i o n s from the powers of the so u l; the o p eratio n s of understanding and sensing which are c a rrie d out by
the powers of i n t e l l e c t and sense, are not the s u b s ta n tia l esse of the 7
o p e ra to r, but r a th e r th ey are only i t s a c c id e n ts . In th e same way, to be
la rg e or sm all i s an a c c id e n ta l mode of e x isten ce to which th e augmen
t a t i v e power i s ordained. The g en erativ e and n u tr itiv e powers produce and
conserve sub stan ces, but th ey do t h i s by changing m a tte r; and so , such an a c tio n , lik e th e a c tio n of o th er n a tu ra l a g e n ts, i s performed by a sub
stance through the medium of an a c c id e n ta l p r in c ip le . So i t i s e v id e n t, Thomas concludes, th a t th e essence of the so u l i s not th e immediate
p rin c ip le of i t s o p e ra tio n s, but th a t i t op erates through a c c id e n ta l
8
p r in c ip le s . And so the powers of the soul are not i t s essence.
To b r i e f l y sum up t h i s l a s t argument, note th a t Thomas s t a r t s from
th e a s s e r tio n t h a t e f f e c ts are sim ila r to t h e i r causes. Because of t h i s , e f f e c ts i n th e genus of substance w ill be produced by an e s s e n tia l p r in c i
ple of the ag en t. Then he in v e s tig a te s n a tu ra l ag en ts, a c tiv e and pas
siv e powers, and th e powers of the so u l, showing how t h e i r various a c t io n s are a l l by way of some a c c id e n ta l p rin c ip le , from which he con
cludes th a t th e powers of th e soul are not i t s essence.
6 Thomas Aquinas, lo c . c i t . ; Manifestum e s t autem quod p o ten tiae animae, siv e s in t a c tiv a s sive p a ssiv e s, non d icu n tu r d ir e c ts per r e s - pectum ad a liq u id s u b s ta n tia le , sed ad a liq u id a c c id e n ta ls .
7 I b id . ; Et s im ilte r esse i n te llig e n s v e l se n tie n s a c tu non e s t esse s u b s ta n tia le , sed a c c id e n ta ls , ad quod o rd in a tu r i n t e l l e c t u s e t sensus.
Notice how a ls o once again the argument has led to th e conclusion th a t the powers are a c c id e n ta l p rin c ip le s of o p eratio n , not s u b s ta n tia l.
This idea w i l l be expanded on by S t, Thomas and tr e a te d a t len g th below. This argument a ls o b rin g s to a close the lin e of reasoning which Thomas has d ir e c tly based on the p ro p o rtio n s between power and o p eratio n and
essence and e s s e , th a t i s , on the d is tin c tio n between essence and esse in c re a tu re s .
The f i r s t argument which might be said to depend only in d ir e c tly on th e d is tin c tio n of essence and esse i n c re a tu re s , i s an argument which
S t, Thomas b u ild s on the nature or essence of the so u l. I t should be
noted th a t although Thomas t r e a t s the essence of th e soul as an a c t here, ju s t how and why t h i s i s so w ill not be shown u n t i l th e next se c tio n follow
in g , which w i l l t r e a t of th e essence of th e so u l. In co n sid erin g the soul
Thomas says th a t i t i s im possible f o r th e essence of the soul to be i t s powers because th e essence of th e soul i s an a c t . So i f th e essence of th e
so u l were a ls o the immediate p rin c ip le of o p e ra tio n , th en whatever has a soul would always be a c tu a lly e x e rc isin g the o perations of l i f e , in th e same
9
way th a t whatever has a soul i s always a c tu a lly a liv e . S t. Thomas means here th a t a substance, th e essence of whose soul was a ls o th e immediate
p rin c ip le of i t s o p eratio n s would always be making use of a l l of i t s powers, f o r example, a man would always be understanding, would always be seein g ,
would always be f e e lin g , would always be moving h is lim bs, e t c . , ju s t as th e
substance i s always a liv e when th e soul i s p re s e n t. S t. Thomas continues by saying th a t the soul i s an u ltim a te term inus of g en eratio n ; i t i s not an a c t
ordained to some f u r th e r second a c t , i n so f a r as i t i s a form. I t s p o te n ti a l i t y to an o th er a c t th en belongs to i t s power not to i t s essence as form.
I t s p o t e n t i a l it y to another a c t then belongs to i t s power n o t to i t s essence as form. As su b je c t o f i t s power, th en , th e soul i s said to be f i r s t a c t , ordained to second a c t,^ ^ Now nothing having a soul i s ob served always a c tu a lly to e x e rc ise a l l the o p eratio n s o f l i f e , and so
Thomas g iv es A r i s t o t le ’s d e f in itio n o f the so u l: "The a c t o f a body having l i f e p o te n tia lly , which p o t e n t i a l it y however does n o t exclude
th e so u l."^ ^ And so Thomas concludes t h a t the essence o f the soul i s
n o t i t s power because nothing can be in potency according to an a c t , in s o fa r as i t i s an a c t ,
Moving on to another tjqje o f argument, which Thomas says i s e sp ec i
a l l y ap p lica b le to the so u l, as a g a in st a l l c re a tu re s in g e n e ra l, he says
t h a t th e re are many powers on account o f the d iv e r s ity o f a c ts and obj e c ts : th ese a c ts and o b je c ts d iv e r s if y the powers which a re r e la te d to
them because a potency i s named only in r e la tio n to i t s a c t,^ ^ These many a c tio n s o f man, some o f which are a c tiv e and some o f which are pas s iv e , d i f f e r g e n e ric a lly and must be a ttr ib u te d to d i f f e r e n t p r in c ip le s ,
n o t to j u s t one immediate p r in c ip le . But the essence o f th e soul i s one p rin c ip le o n ly . The essence then cannot be th e immediate p rin c ip le o f
a l l th e d iv erse a c tio n s o f the so u l, but r a th e r the soul must have many d if f e r e n t powers corresponding to a l l i t s d if f e r e n t a c tio n s , because a
15
power i s re la te d re c ip ro c a lly t o , and i s named from, i t s a c t .
10 See: A r is to tle , De Anima, I I , 1 , (412 a27)» (See B ib lio g rap h y ), 11 Sum. Theol. I , q. 77» a . 1, o .s Actus c o rp o ris p o te n tia vitom h a b e n tis , quae taraen p o te n tia non a b i i c i t animam. See a ls o : A r is to tle , Do Anima. I I , 1, (412 a25) ,
12 De S p ir . G re a t., a . 11, c . : Primo quidem quia e s s e n tia . . . .
Thomas f u r th e r ex p lain s why i t i s im possible f o r the essen ce, since
i t i s only one p r in c ip le , to be th e p rin c ip le of many d iv erse and even opposite a c tio n s ; he says " i t i s im possible th a t one and th e same th in g in one and the same re sp e c t could n a tu r a lly be th e p rin c ip le of many and
d iv erse a c tio n s , much le s s opposite o n e s ." ^ Rather one p rin c ip le could be the p rin c ip le of only one a c tio n . Thomas' meaning becomes more c le a r
in the l i g h t of A r i s t o t l e 's d isc u ssio n on self-m overs. ^ A r is to tle says here th a t "the same th in g in re sp e c t of the same th in g a t the same tim e"
could not move i t s e l f as a whole. Otherwise th e same th in g could be both hot and not hot and the same tim e; or th e same person could be teach in g and being tau g h t th e same th in g a t th e same tim e; or could be re s to rin g to and being re sto re d to th e same h e a lth . What A r is to tle and Thomas are
both g e ttin g a t i s t h a t one p rin c ip le cannot be the p rin c ip le of many
o p e ra tio n s. Many p rin c ip le s are needed; one f o r each s p e c if ic a lly d i f f e r ent o p eratio n . This argument convincingly c o rro b o rates th e c r itic is m
16
lev eled above a t th e th in k e rs who saw no c o n tra d ic tio n in having the
essence of th e soul be the sin g le p rin c ip le of the many d iv erse o p eratio n s of which man i s capable,
Thomas d e riv e s an o th er argument from th e d iv erse su b je c ts of the
powers of man. Sane of the powers are subjected in c e r ta in p a rts of the body, f o r in s ta n c e , th e s e n s itiv e and n u tr itiv e p a r ts . Other powers are
not a c ts of the body a t a l l but e x is t in th e soul a lo n e, f o r in s ta n c e , the i n t e l l e c t and t t e w i l l. This double su b je ct fo r th e powers would be
14 Q uaestiones Q u o d lib etales, X, q. 3, a . 1 (See B ibliography, Thomas Aquinas, S a in t, 25); Im possibile e s t u t idem secundum idem s i t n a tu r a li t e r principium plurium e t diversorum numéro, immo q u asi oppos- itorum . [H e re a fte r abbreviated as Q uodl^
im possible i f the powers and the essence of the soul were th e same, because one and the same th in g could not be the a c t of a body and y et
17 something sep arate a t th e same time and in the same re s p e c t.
C ontinuing, S t. Thomas uses the order of the powers and t h e i r r e la tio n to one another to show th a t essence and power are d i f f e r e n t .
One power can move another in to o p eratio n , f o r example, the i n t e l l e c t moves the w i l l. But A r is to tle has shown th a t the same th in g cannot
18
move i t s e l f in the same re s p e c t; and so i f the powers of the soul were
i t s essen ce, one power could not move an o th er. But since th ey do move 19 one an o th er the powers must be d if f e r e n t from the essence of the soul.
In th e f i n a l c o n sid eratio n of t h i s problem S t. Thomas gives a
view which adm its of a sense in which the soul i s said to be i t s own
powers. Thcmas i s not r e a l l y hedging h e re , but he i s lea n in g over back wards not to impugn the words and a u th o rity of S t. Augustine who says
20
th a t memory, understanding and w ill are one l i f e , one mind, one essence.
Thomas r e l a t e s th e argument of "some" philosophers who say t h a t th e above statem ent of S t. A u g u stin e's i s tru e in the same sense th a t the p o te n tia l whole i s p red icated of i t s p a r ts ; the p o te n tia l whole being
17 De S p ir . G reat. . a . 11, c . : Secundo idem ap p aret ex p o ten - tio ru m .. .
18 A r i s t o t le , P h y sica. V III, 5, (257 a 33- b l3 ).
19 De S p ir . G reat. . a . 11, c . î T e rtio apparet idem ex o r d in e ...
No attem pt w i l l be made in t h i s th e s is to develop Thomas' d o c trin e concerning the order and r e la tio n of th e powers. For t h i s d o c trin e see: Summa Theologiae I , q. 77, aa. 4 ;7 .
21
midway between th e u n iv e rs a l whole and an in te g r a l whole. The u n iv e rs a l whole i s p resen t to each of i t s p a rts in i t s whole essence and power in th e way th a t anim al i s p red icated both of man and of
horse. The u n iv e rs a l whole i s p ro p erly p red ic ated of each of i t s p a rts .
What i s meant here (keeping the same example) i s t h a t animal considered
as a u n iv e rsa l whole i s in both man and horse e s s e n tia lly . Both man and horse contain w ith in them selves th e essence of a n im a lity to i t s utm ost.
And each and ev ery o ther man and horse and o th er animal co n tain s w ith in i t s e l f th e essence of an im ality . The essence i s in each animal and
each animal has th e f u lln e s s of th e essence.
On the o th er hand, the in te g r a l whole i s not p resen t in each
p a r t, e it h e r according to i t s whole essence o r i t s whole power, and
so i t cannot be p red icated of each of i t s p a rts . What i s meant by an
in te g r a l whole i s something th a t i s a composition of p a r ts . For ex
ample, a house i s an in te g r a l whole composed of a l l of i t s p a r ts , th a t i s , i t c o n s is ts of a foundation, w a lls , a ro o f, windows, doors, plumbing,
e tc . The in te g r a l whole cannot be p red icated of i t s p a rts because t h i s
would be to say, f o r example, th a t a house i s i t s foundation, o r a house i s i t s doors, and so on, which i s obviously f a l s e . Thomas does
say though th a t in an improper way of speaking th e in te g r a l whole can be p red icated of a l l of i t s p a r ts when th ey are taken c o lle c tiv e ly .
For example, the w a lls , the ro o f, foundation, e t c . , a l l taken to g e th e r do c o n s titu te a house.
The p o te n tia l whole i s a medium between the f i r s t two; i t i s in each p a rt according to i t s whole essence but not according to i t s whole
power. I t can be p red icated of each p a rt but not so p ro p erly as i s
the u n iv e rs a l whole. To explain the p o te n tia l whole by an example, the soul i s in each p a rt of the body in i t s essence because as a su b sta n t i a l foim i t i s the form of the whole body and each p a rt of i t . How ev er, the soul i s not i n each p a rt according to i t s whole power.
R ather i t i s only in any one p a rt of the body w ith re sp e c t to the power
th a t i s ex ercised through th a t p a r t. For example, the power of sig h t i s in the eye, i t i s not in th e mouth. I t i s in the sense of p o ten t
i a l whole, according to S t. Thomas, th a t S t. Augustine says memory,
22
understanding, and w i l l are th e one essence of th e so u l.
To draw an analogy between the th ree powers Augustine gives and th e example j u s t given above, the essence of the soul f o r Augustine
would be the whole body informed by th e s u b s ta n tia l form, and each of
the th re e powers would be p a rts of the body by which th e soul e x e rc ise s
i t s in d iv id u a l powers. In th e same way th a t the whole soul i s in each p a rt of the p a rt by being th e s u b s ta n tia l form of the body, so the
essence of the soul f o r S t. Augustine would be in each of th e memory,
understanding, and w ill in i t s t o t a l i t y . Hence i t would be tr u e to say th a t th e memory, understanding, and w ill a re the one essence of the
1 23
soul.
The powers are d i s t i n c t from the essence of the so u l. No o th er
conclusion i s p o ssib le follow ing S t. Thcmas' thorough, v a rie d , and d e v a sta tin g c ritic is m of h is p red ecesso rs. He showed from h is arguments
22 Sum. Theol. I , q. 77, a . 1, ad 1; see a ls o ; De S p ir . G reat. , a . 11, ad 2.
