ABSTRACT
PLUMMER, LYNN MICHELLE. Women in the United States Military Negotiating Work and Family Conflicts in the Republic of Korea. (Under the direction of Theodore N. Greenstein).
Prior research on women’s work and family conflicts virtually ignored women serving in
the military. Research on women in the military tends to focus on health issues and retention
problems, missing the day to day negotiations women undertake to balance two greedy
institutions such as the family and the military. Through an online survey, administered to 564
U.S. women on active duty in the Republic of Korea, I seek to remedy these gaps in the
literature. My overarching research questions are: how do women resolve the competing
demands of these two rapacious institutions? What trade-offs must women make in order to
satisfy the obligations of work and family?
In my first study, I compare the likelihood of having children for officers and enlisted
personnel. My logistic model suggests that family formation is affected by a woman’s trajectory
in the military. Additionally, the more satisfied a woman is with her career, the less likely she is
to have children. This seems stronger for officers than enlisted.
My second study examines work and family conflict for two cohorts of women in the
military, those who have served over ten years and those who have served under ten years. The
premise is that the military, in adapting to changes in social issues, and in attempts to bolster
retention, has become more family friendly. Through a series of regression models, I examine
the conflicts women face in balancing work and family. The models support my hypotheses that
woman serving in the military prior to 2007 face more conflicts. Moreover, officers seem to
experience more gendered work and family conflict than enlisted members, speaking to the
In my third study, I focus on mothers’ responses to the survey questions. In particular I
ask, do women who mother from afar experience more indicators of parenting and employment
stress than those residing with their children? In order to examine this, I utilize Hock’s MSAS
which measures maternal stress in three distinct ways. This is a complicated question and the
models suggest that not only does it matter where the child resides, but who the child resides
with when not with the mother is predictive of maternal stress. Furthermore, it appears that when
© Copyright 2019 by Chelli Plummer
Women in the United States Military Negotiating Work and Family Conflicts in the Republic of Korea
by
Lynn Michelle Plummer
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of North Carolina State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Sociology
Raleigh, North Carolina 2019
APPROVED BY:
_______________________________ _______________________________ Theodore N. Greenstein Toby L. Parcel
Committee Chair
DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my mother who never saw me graduate and the temporary rescue
that stayed until it was time to go. I miss you both. And to winter Storm Bruce, without you my
BIOGRAPHY
Born and raised in Southern California, Chelli Plummer attended the University of California
at Los Angeles, as well as California State University, Chico. As a military spouse and mother of
four, she decided to attend graduate school in 2009. She graduated from North Carolina State
University with her Master’s in Sociology in 2011. She collected data in the Republic of Korea for
four years. In her spare time she likes to explore the world, having made it to all fifty states and five
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my committee for your constant support and dedication in this
endeavor. Your words of wisdom, experience and guidance are invaluable. Thank you for your
patience during this journey and constant reminders that I could do this. And a special thank you to
my committee chair who, no matter what, kept with me on this project. I would also like to thank my
family, in particular, my husband, Major William Plummer, who has always believed in my ability to
complete anything I set out to conquer. You never let me give up on my dream, even when it seemed
impossible. To my sons who at times tried me more than I thought I could handle, thanks for your
encouragement. To my beautiful daughters, Veronica, without realizing this, you challenged me to
continue my education, and for that I thank you. And sweet Julia, you were my constant cheerleader
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ………..viii
LIST OF FIGURES……….x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ……….1
Literature Review………2
Changes in the Family and Women’s Work Participation………..2
Division of Household Labor and 2nd and 3rd Shifts……….2
Work and Family Conflict………...4
The Motherhood Penalty……….7
Women’s Long History of Service in the Military………..9
The Culture of Hegemonic Masculinity as a Limitation to Service...………9
From the Revolutionary War to the Spanish American War……….11
From World War I and II to Korea and Vietnam………...13
All-Volunteer Force and Wars in the Middle East………15
Military Integration………17
Military Recognition of Families Historically………...18
Revolutionary War Up to the 20th Century………...18
World Wars I and II………...20
Post-World Wars………21
Structure of the Dissertation………..…23
CHAPTER TWO: THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEASURES OF CAREER SALIENCE AND THE PROBABILITY OF HAVING CHILDREN: COMPARING COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY………26
Introduction………26
Literature Review………...28
Choices in Having Children………...28
Macro-Level Influences in Childbearing………...29
Micro-Level Influences on Childbearing………...31
Greedy Institutions……….33
Pregnancy in the Military………...34
Research Questions………36
Data and Methods………..37
Sampling Issues……….37
Survey Construction………...39
Dependent Variable of Interest………..41
Independent Variables of Interest………..41
Factor Analysis………..42
Control Variables………...43
Analysis………..43
Results ………44
Discussion and Conclusion………50
Introduction………53
Literature Review………...55
Gender in the Military ………55
Gender Theory………...55
Hegemonic Masculinity……….56
Privileging Male Jobs ………58
Hostile Work Environments………..59
Othering Women………59
Bullying, Harassment and Horizontal Violence (BHHV)……….60
Cohorts………...61
Research Questions………63
Data and Methods………..64
Sampling Issues……….64
Survey Construction………...66
Dependent Variables of Interest……….67
Independent Variables………...68
Control Variables………...69
Analysis……….70
Results ………71
Discussion and Conclusion………79
CHAPTER FOUR: A COMPARISON OF MATERNAL STRESS INDICATORS FOR WOMEN MOTHERING FROM AFAR AND PROXIMALLY………..82
Introduction………82
Literature Review………...83
Long Distance Parenting………83
Deployment Parenting………..84
Maternal Stress………...86
Career Salience………..88
Research Questions………89
Data and Methods………..90
Sampling Issues……….90
Survey Construction………...91
Dependent Variables………..91
Independent Variables………...92
Control Variables………...92
Analysis………..92
Results ………93
Discussion and Conclusion………..106
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION……….110
Introduction of Research Topic………...110
Summary of Findings ………..111
Assessment………...117
Policy Implication………120
Limitations………...123
Future Research………...125
REFERENCES………129
APPENDICES……….158
Appendix A: Survey Questions………...…159
Appendix B: Factor Analysis of Work and Family Conflict Variable………182
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2. 1 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables in Models Predicting Having a Child………...46
Table 2. 2 Sample Characteristics for Models Predicting Having a Child……….46
Table 2. 3 Logistic Regression Models for the Effects of Military Category of Rank and Career Salience on the Probability of Having a Child N=538………...48
Table 3. 1 Survey Items Used to Create Measure of Gendered Work and Family
Conflict……….. ………68
Table 3. 2 Survey Items Used to Create Measure of Gender Work and Family Conflict for Those Who Have a Child and/or Partner………...68
Table 3. 3 Survey Items Used to Create Measure of Horizontal Violence………69
Table 3. 4 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables in Models Predicting Gendered Work and Family Conflict……….71
Table 3. 5 Sample Characteristics for Models Predicting Gendered Work and Family
Conflict ……….72
Table 3. 6 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables in Models Predicting Women who Have a Child and/or Partner………...72
Table 3. 7 Sample Characteristics for Models Predicting Gendered Work and Family
Conflict for Those Women who Have a Child and/or a Partner………73
Table 3. 8 OLS Regression Predicting the Effects of Time in Service and Horizontal
Violence on Gendered Work and Family Conflict Na=538………..74
Table 3. 9 OLS Regression Predicting the Effects of Time in Service and Horizontal
Violence on WFCa N=407………77
Table 4. 1 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables in Models Predicting Maternal Stress……….94
Table 4. 2 Sample Characteristics for Models Predicting Maternal Stress N=315a………..95
Table 4. 3 Variables that Make up MSA (alpha .8535)……….96
Table 4. 4 Survey Items Used to Create PSE Index (alpha .7866)………....96
Table 4. 6 OLS Regression Predicting the Effects of Where Child Resides on Maternal Separation Anxiety (MSA)………99
Table 4. 7 OLS Regression Predicting the Effects of Where a Child Resides on Perceived Separation Effects (PSE) N=315……….102
Table 4. 8 OLS Regression Predicting the Effects of Where a Child Resides on
Employment-Related Stress (ERS) N=315………..105
LIST OF FIGURES
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Work and family research spans disciplines in the social sciences, and its presence is felt
strongly in sociology in particular. As men dominated paid work for most of the 20th century,
research focused on the traditional nuclear family, with the stay-at-home mother/bread-winner
father model (Newmark and Postlewaite 1998; Smith and Ward 1985). As a result of women’s
mass entrance into the workforce, spurred by the equal rights movements of the 1960s among
other factors, researchers began taking an academic interest in working women in the 1980s
(Vatter 1994). However, very little research on work and family conflict for military members
existed prior to the change to an all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973 (Strohmer 2016).
Furthermore, until the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1975 ordered each branch to rescind its
policy of involuntary discharge of pregnant women, there were no mothers in the military
(Fitzgerald et al., 2013).
While Desert Storm sparked some interest in women’s work and family conflict, the
primary focus of studies on women in the military was retention, physical health and sexual
abuse (Vinokur et al., 1999). Multiple wars in the Middle East over the past two decades inspired
the need for new research in PTSD and other trauma-related injuries (Ames et al., 2018). Family
research of service members generally focused on the effects of separation on the child, not the
service member. This is especially evident when the military member is a woman. Adding to this
knowledge gap, most research to date on women in the military relies on small qualitative studies
or secondary data from the DoD, which can be problematic given the source.
Women’s participation in the United States military has increased every year since AVF;
currently, women make up 15% of those on active duty (DoD 2015). As the military draws
examined women’s compromises in highly-demanding jobs, researchers continue to neglect the
unique constellation of demands military women face as mothers. This dissertation seeks to add
to the large body of research on work and family conflict by examining women in a
nontraditional, highly-demanding work environment. With this in mind, the overarching research
questions are: how do women resolve the competing demands of two greedy institutions? What
compromises must they make in satisfying both their military obligation and their familial ones?
My study looks at these broad questions in three different chapters, utilizing survey data
collected from 2015-2016 by me. In this introductory chapter, I begin by outlining historical
changes in the family and women’s work participation. Next, I extend the literature into women
in the military, looking at women’s participation trends, along with the military’s treatment of
families throughout its history. The chapter will conclude with a brief description of the
remaining chapters of the dissertation.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Changes in the Family and Women’s Work Participation
Division of Household Labor and 2nd and 3rd Shifts
Women working outside the home for pay has increased dramatically since the 1970s
(Bianchi and Raley 2005; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). Men who work more hours do
less housework and hold more traditional values, but this relationship does not hold for women
(Bianchi et al., 2000; Raley et al., 2012). The number of women working outside the home
significantly outpaces the increase in men’s participation in the division of household labor
(Bianchi and Raley 2005: Young and Schieman 2018). The presence of children increases
housework undertaken by both men and women, but more so for women (Bianchi et al., 2000;
and three times more childcare (Bianchi et al., 2000; Mattingly and Bianchi 2003; Young and
Schieman 2018). Hochschild (1989) calls this the “second shift” while the third shift is the
emotion work women must do at home because of the hurried pace of the 2nd shift (Hochschild
1997). The 3rd shift is particularly salient to military women whose careers take them away from
their families for long periods of time (Iskra 2010). Changes in the gendered division of
household labor have occurred over time (Sayer 2005; Young and Schieman 2018). Men are
doing more unpaid work, while women are doing less. However, women do about three times as
much “routine” housework on average as men (Coltrane 2000; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard
2010; Moreno-Colom 2017).
The proposed study focuses on the effect of 2nd shift work on women’s perceptions of
their mothering and how this influences the compromises they make in terms of work and family
conflict. Operating between two extremely greedy institutions, women in the military must
manage a difficult balance (De Angeles and Segal 2015). Coupled with the masculine work
environment, how military women negotiate the 2nd shift can illuminate the experiences of other
women in masculine jobs as well. In studying military mothers it will be possible to examine the
2nd and 3rd shifts and how they play out in different scenarios, such as deployments, when that
shift work is managed (or not) from afar. Previous research of working women more broadly
demonstrated that women perform the majority of housework, despite working outside the home
(Coltrane 2000; Greenstein 2000; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010; Moreno-Colom 2017;
Padavic and Reskin 2002). Combined with this 2nd shift of family labor is the cultural move
towards more intensive parenting. While more women have entered the work force, expectations
of time spent parenting have also increased (Arsenault 2018; Hays 1996). In this study, I will
ideal worker; more succinctly, how do they mediate the competing devotions of two greedy
institutions?
Work and Family Conflict
Much of the research on work and family conflict focuses on individual choices, without
acknowledging existing institutional and cultural structures (Blair-Loy 2003). Researchers often
depict work and family demands as being external to the actor, however “deep-seated,
taken-for-granted powerfully compelling cultural schemas help shape constraints and people’s
interpretations of them (Blair-Loy 2003:175)…” Because of these external factors, work and
family conflict becomes much larger than the individual making cost-benefit decisions. The
schemas dictate a moral definition of “good mothering” or a “good worker,” with the word
“good” being value-laden.
Devotion schemas demand complete dedication, and the ideal worker is an
unencumbered, fully committed man (Blair-Loy 2003; Kelly et al., 2010; Williams 1989). For
women, this leads to conflict between work and family. The research I propose will contribute to
our understanding of work and family conflict and how, as women become a more integral part
of a highly-demanding, traditionally male career, they face greater conflict from family demands.
The concept of agency frames the debate of how women perceive their actions as their own
while being influenced by larger institutions. This discourse and its framing are integral to
understanding the barriers women fight through daily in the workplace.
Both the military and the family are greedy institutions (Segal 1986), competing for
loyalty and commitment (Wadsworth and Southwell 2010). Family is becoming even greedier,
especially for women (Segal 1986). Demands on parents in general have increased, as Lareau’s
children’s happiness, they are responsible for setting their children up for future successes. While
parenting becomes a more equal partnership, society still expects mothers to be primary
caregivers (Arsenault 2018; Hays 1996). Many civilian careers share similar demands as the
military, but the constellation of demands is unique to service members. The four factors that
influence the interplay of work and family conflict for service members are: long separations,
exposure to danger, heavy work demands cutting into personal time, and the difficulties
associated with the geographic mobility of the job (Wadsworth and Southwell 2010; Wadsworth
and Riggs 2014).1 These work stressors only add to the already challenging dynamics of work
and family conflict.
The research questions put forth here address the acute situation women in the military
face juggling work and family conflicts. Previous research on work and family conflict, in
general, examines one or two such factors (Kelley 1994; Kelley et al. 2001; King et al. 2006),
but no body of work covers such a multifaceted web of circumstances. This approach contributes
to our knowledge of women in highly demanding fields that require long separations and have
palpable elements of danger. How these women negotiate work and family conflicts under such
pressure is important as women gain access to more powerful positions within the workforce.
In Blair-Loy’s (2003) research of professional working women, she found three ways of
handling competing devotions, or the schemas of work and family. The conformers obeyed
schemas, the innovators combined the two in some form, and the mavericks challenged the
system. The mavericks found new ways of combining work and family. A distinct difference
arose between cohorts, with the youngest cohort having “successfully transposed the egalitarian
schema from the workplace onto their families’ definitions of marriage and motherhood”
(Blair-Loy 2003). Her study demonstrated that cultural schemas constrain even the more affluent
women in our society. The constraints of schemas are in constant conflict for women in the
military, however, much like Blair-Loy, I expect to find cohort differences in the reconciliation
of work and family.
In the civilian world, women who become mothers have the option of reducing work
hours, moving to less demanding work, or leaving the job temporarily. These options are not
available to military women (Bissonette 2012; Sinclair 2004). Since the military requires
unwavering commitment, women with families feel pulls in different directions, with career and
social mothering incongruent at times. In general, women experience more conflict in the two
loyalties than men (Bissonette 2012; Harris 2009; Sinclair 2004). While previous research on
work and family conflict confirms the family pull is stronger for women, the intersection of
gender within a highly masculine workplace, coupled with intense expectations, both at work
and home, lead to ever-growing demands in women’s lives. The research I propose will bring to
light the heightened difficulties women face in such a situation.
The Motherhood Penalty
Due to the scarcity of prior research on women in the military, I turn to the general body
of literature on women in the workplace. Mothers face stereotypes in the workplace (Berdahl and
Moon 2013; Hoobler 2014; Mattis 2002). Mattis found a persisting stereotype that “because of
this in terms of the penalties female officers must weight when contemplating a family. With the
difficulties women face in leadership positions in the military already, one must carefully pay
special attention to the perceptions involved in becoming a mother. According to Krolokke and
Sorensen (2006), “women who have children are viewed as mothers first and workers second.”
Correll et al. (2007) found that men benefit in their careers from becoming fathers while women
suffer from becoming mothers (Berdahl and Moon 2013). Women are held back and placed on a
“motherhood track” without their consultation, as bosses assume that the work and family
conflict will decrease their efficiency (Berdahl and Moon 2013; Murphy and Graff 2006).
Williams (2001) defined the ideal worker as unencumbered and committed to long arduous hours
of work, with no outside limitations. As men and women make the choice to have or not have
children, they face different repercussions.
When a man becomes a parent, he gains the appearance of warmth while maintaining the
perception of competence; while women gain in perceptions of warmth, they lose perceptions of
competence when compared to men and non-mothers (Berdahl and Moon 2013; Harris 2009;
Miller 2011; Stevens et al., 2007; Correll et al, 2007). Additionally, when a woman becomes
pregnant, her perceived commitment decreases (Harris 2009; Halpert et al., 1993; Miller 2011).
Mothers are seen as less capable at work than non-mothers (Berdahl and Moon 2013; Correll et
al, 2007; Harris 2009; Miller 2011). Correll et al. (2007) found that mothers were perceived as
less competent, committed, deserving of less salary and leniency and less upwardly mobile.
Fathers, conversely, were viewed as more competent, committed, deserving of larger salaries and
leniency, and more upwardly mobile. Aisenbrey et.al, (2009) support these findings and add to
them in a cross-national study, finding that mothers in the United States suffered greater
atmosphere where women are already viewed as less competent, this can become a critical
tipping point for successful command (Iskra 2010).
Wilde et al. (2010) found that women pay a motherhood penalty across all skill levels,
with the price for higher-skilled women being much greater. Wage growth slows considerably
after childbirth, with the pay penalty growing as time since birth passes. Lower-skilled women
who have children see a 12% lower wage ten years after childbirth than their non-childbearing
counterparts; highly skilled women experience a 35% deficit. When controlling for loss of labor
market experience or reduction in hours for mothers, lower-skilled women still saw wages 6%
less than their non-childbearing counterparts, whereas higher skilled women suffered a 24%
penalty. Other authors found more modest differences (Budig and England 2001; England et al.,
2016; Waldfogel 1997). Wilde et al. (2010) found that, while lower-skilled women do not benefit
much from delaying childbirth economically, higher-skilled women do benefit, although the
penalty is still quite large. England et al. (2014) reexamined studies by Wilde et al. (2010) and
Budig and England (2001), determining that white women who are more skilled and higher-paid
suffer a higher motherhood penalty. Black women experience a much lower penalty; when
controlling for experience, the statistical significance for Black women disappears. Of
importance to my study is the work done by Fouarge et al. (2010), which found cohort
differences in post-birth versus pre-birth work participation cross-nationally. Building on the
findings of Fouarge et al. (2010), younger cohorts seem to be less inclined to withdraw from
economic participation than older cohorts, leading the authors to believe that the creation of
more favorable institutional supports contributes to this change. As such, I expect to extend their
findings in my research of women in the military such that younger cohorts may not be as
them to “have it all”. Younger cohorts seem to have stronger preferences for combining work
and family and are better able to do so than older cohorts (Fouarge et al., 2010).
Women’s Long History of Service in the Military
The Culture of Hegemonic Masculinity as a Limitation to Service
Women’s service in the United States military dates back to the Revolutionary War era,
although their reception has not always been cordial. Prior to 2012 women could not be assigned
to combat units. They could, however, be attached to these units and thus experience combat
(Crowley and Sandoff 2017). Combat embodies the most masculine space in the military and is
not viewed as a space for females. Crowley and Sandoff (2017), as well as Archer (2013), found
that women attached to combat units tried to minimize their femininity, in order to belong to the
masculine hegemony. Females in the military identify with the standards of a good service
member - standards steeped in masculinity - and will go so far as to denigrate femininity in order
to demonstrate their belonging (Brownson 2016; Crowley and Sandoff 2017).
Women view men in the military as strong and masculine, embodying physical fitness
and power, while also being intelligent and maintaining a certain aloofness (Mankayi 2006).
While men in the military are viewed as able to conquer hostile environs and lay claim to
dangerous land, women are delicate, frail and many times viewed as sex objects (Mankayi 2006;
Woodward 2000). Additionally, many women trivialize sexual harassment; being a victim is not
associated with masculinity, and so they tend to treat these acts as jokes (Crowley and Sandoff
2017).
The diametrically opposed masculine and feminine constructs in the military organization
lead to binary thinking, which in turn drives the notion that the existence of women in the
sexuality troubles the sexualization process, as women around the military are viewed as
playthings for men, not equals (Furia 2010; Mankayi 2006; Woodward 2000). Women face
harsher scrutiny for their sexuality than men due to the belief that men have sex because they get
lonely while women do it to get ahead (Furia 2010). This can translate into negative perceptions
when women choose to become mothers. In other words, women are either sluts and available or
bitches and sexually unavailable in the military (King 2015).
Women walk a tightrope of identity in the military: if they display too much femininity,
their soldiering ability is questioned; if they are too good a service member, their feminism is
called into question, and they risk being labeled a “dyke” (Furia 2010; King 2015; Mankayi
2006; Woodward 2000). Additionally, complicating women’s existence in the military is W.E.B
Du Bois’ (1903) “double consciousness” and Collins’ (1986) “outsider within.” Feminine
qualities are inappropriate for the military, but some masculine qualities are viewed as
inappropriate for women, leading to this double consciousness. Being the outsider within the
military culture, women also must negotiate multiple identities for multiple audiences, making it
difficult to have one united self (Doan and Portillo 2017; Furia 2010). She must figure out how
to be a woman in a masculine institution. Negative feelings toward other women are part of the
military structure, which leads to a culture of little camaraderie or mentorship among female
military members (Brownson 2016; Archer 2013). For example, Silva (2008), found that military
cadets reproduced traditional female and male roles that privileged men, leading Silva to
describe gender as bigger than the military. Adding to these difficulties, women in the military
understand that the behavior of one woman reflects on all women, leading to a form of
self-policing and horizontal violence, which is the violence/abuse occurring between workers,
Furia 2010; Mankayi 2006). Furthermore, women are more hindered by work and family conflict
than men, but even more so in the military, because the military is an organization that is
centered around male bodies and their needs (Snyder 2003).
The military is a masculine institution, dominated by men and rejecting feminine traits as
a sign of weakness (Wentz 2015). Likewise, the military is ripe for bullying, which flourishes in
highly competitive atmospheres with extreme degrees of obedience and group pressures. These
environments legitimize the existence of dominance and punishment rituals (Koeszegi,
Zedlacher and Hudribusch 2016). This leaves room for potential abuses of power and coercive
actions by “in members of the group” against weaker “out members.” Further, the gendered
division of labor increases the level of aggression demonstrated, leading researchers to conclude
that hyper-masculine military groups denigrate everyone who does not comply with masculine
standards, viewing them as deficient (Koeszegi, Zedlacher and Hudribusch 2016).
From the Revolutionary War to the Spanish American War
Women have always served America’s military, whether covertly or out in the open next
to men. During the American War for Independence, tens of thousands of women served in the
military. They generally served in one of three ways: in the branch known as the Women of the
Army, enlisted as regular troops in uniforms side by side with the men, or as irregular fighters
with local militia. The militias included both independent women’s groups and those integrated
with men (De Pauw 1981). Washington saw the value of the Women of the Army and gave them
full rations as soldiers (De Pauw 1981). They served in hospitals and on battlefields and were
ordered to march with the baggage trains. Women were not allowed to ride on the wagons. They
the hospitals (Higginbotham 1971; Lazar 2016). Women of the Army were subject to court
martials just like the men.
Women of the Army were regular troops, sanctioned by Congress at a rate in the medical
field of 1 matron and 10 nurses per 100 wounded. Congress wanted 7 matrons and 30 nurses for
every 15 doctors, but there were simply not enough women (De Pauw 1981). Artillery units did
not face the same shortage of women. Women serving in combat during the revolution are
embodied in the legend of Molly Pitcher, a heroic woman identified with the battle of
Monmouth, who carried water for the troops’ cannons and took over her husband’s cannon when
he collapsed. In actuality, Molly was a combination of many women, but by the time the story
was written in 1859, the idea of females serving in combat was incongruous with social norms
and would continue to be so for many, many years (De Pauw 1981; Higginbotham 1971; Lazar
2016).
The second group of women who served the Continental Army were regular soldiers in
men’s uniforms, even though it was against regulations to recruit females into the traditionally
male branches. Many of the women did little to conceal their gender besides wearing pants and
later collected pensions (De Pauw 1981; Lazar 2016). Additionally, women served in militias in
both integrated and segregated units. Their service on this local level was important as so many
men were being drafted into Washington’s Army. Unfortunately, there are few accounts of these
women, as it was seen as routine for women to perform these roles in the absence of men (De
Pauw 1981).
On the frontier, in the war with Native Americans, women fought beside men and did not
shirk responsibilities in hand to hand combat. Many times, women were home alone or with
boiling water, and whatever else was on hand in defense (De Pauw 1981). Women also served
out in the fields against the Natives, some donning buckskins and riding horses. The end of this
period meant women were no longer needed for military service as there were ample men to
serve the needs of the government (Murdoch et al., 2006).
The Civil War saw volunteer female nurses forcing their unpaid service on both sides,
against the violent protests of both Army surgeons and officers (De Pauw 1981; Lazar 2016).
Women were only welcomed if they were older, so as not to distract the soldiers (De Pauw 1981;
Lazar 2006). The military preferenced the male gaze and kept women from serving. During the
Victorian era, it was unthinkable to have women in the military, but this changed with the
Spanish-American War. As typhoid spread through the male troops, nurses were needed more
than ever before (Lazar 2016; Murdoch et al., 2006). The Nurse Corps was formed in 1901;
however, Corps women were denied rank, pay and pensions. These women tended to the
wounded and sick directly on the battlefield in harm’s way.
From World War I and II to Korea and Vietnam
During World War I (WWI) women made their greatest gains in the military, serving as
secretaries, nurses and administrators (De Pauw 1981; Lazar 2006; Miller 1997). Women’s
service changed in other ways during WWI; middle and upper-class women served in addition to
those who were working class or poor. That being said, upper class women tended to be the
founders of wartime organizations, while those occupying lower statuses did the actual work.
The Secretary of the Navy recruited women to fill many positions, including clerical, radio,
draftsman and translator positions, freeing up men for more dangerous duty (Lazar 2016;
Murdoch et al., 2006). Approximately two dozen African American women were recruited into
World War II (WWII) saw African American women make more inroads when 2,000
enrolled in the Cadet Nurse Corps (Murdoch et al., 2006; Miller 1995). Women in general made
great gains during WWII. In 1942, in anticipation of shortfalls during the war effort, Congress
established the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), the Women’s Naval Reserve
(WAVES) and the precursor to the Women Air Force Service Pilots (WASPS) (Murdoch et al.
2006). In 1943, women were given full military status and afforded opportunities as pilots and in
military intelligence (Lazar 2016, Murdoch et al., 2006). Women were again acknowledged as
part of the military.
In 1948, the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act made women permanent members
of all of the services, but limited their numbers to just 2% (Lazar 2016, Murdoch et al., 2006;
Miller 1997). Other provisions in the Act limited the number of mid-level female officers,
prohibited all women from becoming generals or admirals and required automatic discharge for
pregnancy (Lazar 2016; Murdoch et al., 2006). Pre-1948 quotas and caps prevented black
women from re-enlisting after WWII; at the time of the Korean Conflict only 22,000 women
were serving, and of these, 4 officers and 121 enlisted were women of color (Miller 1995;
Murdoch et al., 2006). The Cold War saw women’s roles even more restricted to clerical and
nursing fields.
The Department of Defense (DoD) so strongly resisted including women in the military
that during the Vietnam Conflict they enlisted 300,000 men with low aptitude test scores before
allowing any women to serve (Lazar 2016; Murdoch et al., 2006). However, by 1968, the war
was taking a toll on the military; Congress passed Public Law 90-130, removing restrictions on
rank attainment for women and eliminating the 2% cap on female troops. Women continued to
took many decades to recover (Lazar 2016; Miller 1995; Murdoch et al., 2006). Not until
conscription ended in 1973 did women’s participation in the military begin to climb
significantly.
All-Volunteer Force and Wars in the Middle East
In 1973, the United States military became an all-volunteer force (AVF), expanding
women’s opportunities greatly (Murdoch et al., 2006; Snyder 2003). With the end of
conscription, the DoD set goals to increase female participation by 170%, which was met rapidly
in a matter of a few years (Murdoch et al., 2006). In 1973 the Navy also opened pilot training to
females, and the Air Force did the same in 1976 (Kamarack 2016). In 1974, the age at which
women could be enlisted dropped to the same age as men, and in the next year women could be
admitted to the service academies (Kamarack 2016). Motherhood in the military took a different
path. Prior to 1975, women faced discharge summarily if pregnant. As a result of the protracted
war in Vietnam, the military found difficulties in retaining well-trained troops, especially
women. With retention a priority, the military implemented more family-friendly policies,
allowing for voluntary separation of women becoming mothers.2 However, it would take many
years for all five services to adapt to this policy change.
Today’s policies allow women choices: stay in the military or leave when becoming a
mother. However, if a woman becomes pregnant during her basic training or advanced individual
training (AIT is training for a particular job) the military can discharge her, or, not allow her to
progress to active duty until she is no longer pregnant (Fitzgerald et al., 2013). In 1978, the
Women’s Army Corps (WAC) was eliminated, and women were integrated fully into the Army.
2When a service member joins the military, they sign an agreement to serve for a certain period of time. This is a
Another improvement came in the form of lessening women’s selection criteria, which until this
time had been more stringent than men’s (Murdoch et al., 2006). By 1980, most restrictions on
the occupations women could pursue were lifted, with the exception of combat roles because
women were seen as a potential distraction for men, reinforcing the male gaze and marginalizing
women’s service (Lazar 2016; Murdoch et al., 2006).
The Gulf War began in 1991 with women making up 11% of active duty personnel.
Fewer than half of these women were in administrative or medical specialties (Lazar 2016;
Murdoch et al., 2006). Over 40,000 women served in combat support positions, driving trucks,
flying aircraft or directing artillery. Four percent of battlefield casualties were women; 71% of
women in the Gulf reported at least one combat exposure, compared to 70% of men (Kang et al.,
2002; Murdoch et al., 2006). The changing face of war, with the blurring of battle lines, made the
distinction between combat support and combat arbitrary.
Service members participating in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan experienced more
blurred lines. Rear and front no longer have concrete meanings, and approximately 11% of those
serving are women (Lazar 2016; Murdoch et al., 2006). Women are dying in combat at a higher
rate than their male counterparts. Because women were excluded from serving in the infantry,
and yet were in combat, the Army developed the Combat Action Badge to honor any eligible
soldier for their exposure to combat conditions.
Military Integration
After much debate, primarily focused on women being a distraction to men, the Pentagon
integration, however, began in the early 1970s. As women found more places to serve in the
military, Congress felt the need to protect them on duty. In 1977, Congress directed the Secretary
of Defense to define “combat” and recommend ways to expand women’s presence in the services
while ensuring they were not in harm’s way (Burrelli 2013; Kamarck 2016). By 1978 women
were assigned on noncombatant Navy ships and up to six months’ duty on other ships. Because
of leadership’s discontinuity in the determination of where women should serve, the DoD
adopted the “risk rule” in 1988. The risk rule “excluded women from noncombat units/missions
if risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire or capture were equal to or greater than the risks
in the combat units they supported” (Burrelli 2013; Kamarack 2016). The risk rule essentially
prohibited women from serving in support of combat units.
In 1994, the risk rule was repealed and replaced with the Direct Combat Exclusion rule
(Burrelli 2013; Kamarack 2016). Under this rule, service members could be assigned to all
positions they qualified for; however, women were excluded from units with a primary mission
of direct ground combat. The cultural ethos of protecting fragile females persisted. The military
defines direct ground combat as “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew
served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to high probability of direct physical
contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the
battlefield” (Burrelli 2013; Kamarack 2016). This opened more opportunities for women to serve
- approximately one-half of military jobs were now available - while still protecting them from
combat of traditional warfare.
The 21st century saw radical changes in warfare. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began in
2003, and its nonlinear battlefield blurred the lines between forward and rear operating areas
massive restructuring of rotation, training and readiness. Brigade Combat Teams served as large
tactical combat units, and multi-functional support units assisted them, collocating noncombat
personnel with combat, in direct conflict with the 1994 rule (Burrelli 2013; Kamarck 2016).
Women on convoy missions experienced being fired upon and being utilized as engagement
teams to interact with female locals. Women were already in combat.
The previous rules keeping women out of combat needed revising. The Duncan Hunter
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 established the Military Leadership
Diversity Commission. The Commission found that in order to establish and maintain fair
promotion and command opportunities, the DoD should do away with combat exclusion policies
(Burrelli 2013; Kamarack 2016). To this end, in 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
announced the lifting of the Direct Combat Exclusion Rule. In December 2015, then-Secretary of
Defense, Ash Carter, ordered the military to open all combat jobs to women who meet the
occupational standards, and the implementation of plans was approved in March 2016. An era of
gender neutrality and diversity arrived (Brownson 2016).
Military Recognition of Families Historically
Revolutionary War Up to the 20th Century
Families have always been part of the United States military organizations, at times as a
detriment to mission readiness. Current research, however, views the family as crucial to the
mission in the support and well-being of military members. Because of this, there is a great need
to explore work and family conflict in the military, and in particular, how the growing population
of mothers is managing. During the Revolutionary War, focus was on the single soldier; there
was no way of providing for families, as the Continental Army struggled to pay its troops
part, neglected, with the exception of a few high-ranking officers. The neglect was so absolute
that Army regulations purposely omitted any references to families (Albano 1994; Bell and
Iadeluca 1987). The foundation of the Army was young, single men, so it made sense in a
strained, poor Army, to focus on them, rather than providing for dependents. Any monies paid to
dependents were in the form of employment. Soldiers were offered bounties, gratuities and land
grants as incentive to volunteer for the Army, receiving $10-$20 every three years of service,
along with 100 acres of land. The Army first acknowledged responsibility for families in 1794 by
providing cash payments to widows and orphans of officers and, in 1802, these benefits were
extended to enlisted families (Albano 1994). The Army did not provide for living soldiers’
families.
In 1847, Congress enacted a law that prohibited married men from enlisting. Policies
such as these continued to discourage military family formation until World War II. That did not
stop military families from following their soldiers onto the frontier in the pre-Civil War period
(Albano 1994; Bell and Iadeluca 1987). Frontier posts provided family quarters to senior
officers, but even officers were barred from marrying until the rank of captain. The assumption
was that enlisted men did not marry during the pre-Civil War frontier era because they were too
poor.
At the onset of the Civil War, Congress passed U.S. Statute 268, providing allotment
tickets allowing family members to receive subsistence during the soldier’s service, although it is
not clear if the system was ever successfully employed (Albano 1994; Bell and Iadeluca 1987).
The Conscription Act of 1863 authorized exemptions for family consideration. The Army shifted
its position on the acceptance of families shortly thereafter, but only for officers and senior
and nursing. This continued post-Civil War, despite acts discouraging family formation. Acts
prohibited separate housing for enlisted members’ families or transportation for their family
members (Albano 1994; Bell and Iadeluca 1987). Junior enlisted families were viewed as a
burden and something to discourage.
World Wars I and II
The great World Wars were a time of ambivalence on the part of the military toward
families (Albano 1994; Bell and Iadeluca 1987). 1913 saw regulations enacted to discourage
marriage more strongly, while Congress also mandated soldiers set up allotments for their
dependents, further discouraging those with familial obligations from service. Military wives’
clubs were expected to fill the gaps of family support left by the government (Albano 1994; Bell
and Iadeluca 1987).
In the time period between WWI and WWII, the Army expanded provisions for families,
such as basic allowance for quarters and providing base housing for lower enlisted for the first
time. Public Law 490, the Selective Training and Service Act, passed in 1940, required all adult
men under the age of 35, and later 45, to register for the draft, which served to quickly swell the
potential ranks of military families (Albano 1994). In 1942, the Army repealed a ban on married
men enlisting during peacetime and established the Army Emergency Relief program to assist
families in emergency situations. The Army also provided an allowance of $50 per month for a
wife and $20 per month for each child.
Post-World Wars
The living conditions of military families were brought to the attention of President
men that exist in the vicinity of many military posts” (Albano 1994). Additionally, Wickenden’s
1952 study identified gaps in basic social services. Bell and Iadeluca (1987) credit Wickenden’s
study with pushing the enactment of military social policies that worked to address housing,
education of children and health insurance. Additional research into retention following the
Korean Conflict uncovered that the needs of their families played into troops’ decisions to
reenlist (Albano 1994).
Prior to WWII, the military drew from young single men to fill its ranks, but in 1960,
family members outnumbered troops for the first time, forcing the DoD to change how it handled
families (Albano 1994; Bell and Iadeluca 1987). The process of integrating families into the
military was painfully slow (Albano 1994). With an eye toward mission readiness, the Army
developed the Army Community Service (ACS) organization in 1965. This organization
functions as an umbrella of family support and limits the distractions of familial needs in order to
keep troops prepared to work (Albano 1994). Following the establishment of ACS, a group of
retiree spouses formed the National Military Wives Association in 1969 to lobby for more
family-friendly policies; it is known today as the National Military Family Association and holds
significant political influence with a membership in the millions (Albano 1994). The Army was
the tip of the spear in family-focused policy reforms, but the Air Force and Navy followed
closely behind.
In 1979, General Lew Allen issued an Air Force directive that formally recognized the
family in mission readiness and set goals to revitalize family support structures (Albano 1994;
Bell and Iadeluca 1987). Subsequent studies discovered links between family satisfaction and
Air Force work objectives, so the Air Force established family support centers worldwide. The
branches of the military supporting family conferences in the early 1980s. The Army too
understands the connection between family and readiness and thus created the Army Family
Action Plan (AFAP) in 1983 as a blueprint to aiding families (Albano 1994; Bell and Iadeluca
1987). Perhaps the most significant change during this time in military history is that of allowing
women to become mothers while continuing their military career.
With the advent of the AVF, the military made shifts in policy to accommodate families.
However, during the drawdown of the 1990s, many programs saw drastic cuts. The old adage “if
the military wanted you to have a family they would have issued one,” resurged in the ranks
(Aldridge et al., 1997). The drawdowns stopped post-9/11, and the early 2000s saw returns to
prior levels of support for families. While the military easily met recruiting goals in the early
2000s, by 2005 the shortfalls numbered in the tens of thousands or more (Daniel 2011; Lush
2011). With the buildup for the surge in 2007, the military needed more troops and so lessened
enlistment requirements, while also looking at more family-friendly policies to retain existing
troops (Kapp and Henning 2009).
Building on the AFAP, the Army created the Army Family Covenant in 2007 to address
the issues of day-to-day living for families (Posture of the US Army 2008). The military made
improvements in housing allowances, built new base housing and added community amenities
one would experience in a gated neighborhood, such as state of the art gyms. The Covenant also
worked to standardize and fund family programs, while improving the quality of child, youth and
school age services. Additionally, the Covenant provided for the expansion of education and
employment opportunities for family members through training programs and scholarships.
Finally, the Covenant funded and trained family life consultants to help families in many
Dual military couples benefited from the family-friendly policies as well. Prior to the
Surge, couples in combat zones could not share quarters. In its push to improve retention, the
military eventually allowed couples to bunk together in trailers (AP 2008). The military also
looked at ways to increase dwell time, or the time a military member is home between
deployments. Prior to these changes, dwell time was 15 months deployed to 12 months at home.
Revisions to AR 624-30 changed this ratio to 1:1. Financially, the Montgomery G.I. Bill, a draw
for young men and women looking for a way to pay for college, became transferable to
dependents (VA 2009). Additionally, military spouses were given hiring preference for federal
jobs, and the DoD prioritized the expansion of childcare centers.
The toll of multiple deployments placed great emotional strain on military members and
their families. While still a concern, the military is focusing on helping members and their
families deal with the emotional scars of war. For instance, the DoD has funded multiple studies
conducted by the RAND Corporation to assess and improve wellness programs. Moreover, in
order to remove the stigma of mental health assistance, service members or their family can now
self-refer to see a counselor (TRICARE).
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
This chapter reviews changes in women’s workforce participation over time. I extend this
literature to women serving in the United States military on active duty in the Republic of Korea
(ROK) in order to demonstrate how women navigate the two disparate realms of the military and
the family. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are analytic chapters with empirical examinations of these data.
Chapter 5 is a conclusion of the results with a discussion of limitations of the research project,
areas for future research and policy implications.
children for women who are officers and those who are enlisted. I suggest that family formation
is affected by a woman’s career trajectory in the military. Additionally, a concept I refer to as
career salience interacts with a woman’s career trajectory to influence her decisions on family
formation. The focus of this chapter is whether military officers are less likely to have children
than enlisted members and how career salience affects family formation. I argue that, for lower
levels of career salience, officers are more likely to have a child than enlisted members;
however, the propensity drops off dramatically as career salience improves for both, and more so
for officers. The findings from the logistic model support my hypothesis and demonstrate that
officers who are more highly satisfied with their careers are less likely to have children than
women who are enlisted.
In Chapter 3, I assert that the military has transformed into a gentler, more family-friendly
employer. I compare different aspects of work and family conflict first for all women in my
study, and then for women who are either in a relationship, have a child or both. I estimate
models to compare work and family conflict between those women who have been in the
military longer than ten years and those serving less than ten years. My research question for this
study is: Who experiences higher levels of work and family conflict, older or younger cohorts? I
ask this question because of the drastic changes in military policy, a shift from ignoring families
to considering families part of mission readiness. The findings from this model support my
hypothesis that women serving more than ten years have experienced more conflict than those
who have served less than ten years.
In Chapter 4, I attempt to measure stress that mothers experience in multiple dimensions,
so as to encompass the entire interplay of work and family in women’s lives. Through three
Korea is a unique environment for women in the United States military, as they are often given
the choice of whether to bring their family with them. If the family deploys with them, the tour is
for a minimum of two years, whereas if the service member deploys alone, the tour is limited to
one year. Korea is known as a hardship tour, causing many women opt for the shorter tour and
find alternate arrangements for their children. For this study, I focus on the mothers in my
sample and ask whether they are mothering from afar or proximally. My question is: Do women
who mother from afar experience more indicators of parenting stress and employment stress than
those residing with their children? These are complicated relationships. It matters not only if the
child is in Korea but who the child resides with and what their relationship to the mother is. My
models demonstrate that where a child lives does affect levels of stress for the mother. However,
who the child lives with, as well as what type of stress is being measured, influence mothers’
responses. The models also uncover interesting relationships between the mother’s job duties and
whether she is an officer or enlisted member.
Chapter 5 reviews the findings in the three analytic chapters and summarizes
contributions made to the work and family literature. I examine women’s work and family
conflict in a non-traditional, multi-faceted, demanding profession and how women reconcile
competing demands. I also further the understanding of the social construction of gender in a
highly-masculinized world. I address limitations of this study as well as suggest areas for future
CHAPTER TWO: THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEASURES OF CAREER SALIENCE AND THE PROBABILITY OF HAVING CHILDREN: COMPARING COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY
INTRODUCTION
Women’s service in the United States military extends back to the country’s inception,
ebbing and flowing with the military demands of the times. Historically women who served
endured restrictions, however the change to an all-volunteer force in 1973 stimulated expansions
in opportunities available to women (Murdoch et al., 2006; Snyder 2003). With the end of
conscription, the military faced shortfalls unless it loosened previous restrictions. The 20th
century ended with all but direct combat fields open to women, and women’s military
participation increased dramatically.
The 21st century saw women becoming more integrated into all roles in the military. The
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 established the
Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC 2011). The Commission found that in order
to establish and maintain fair promotion and command opportunities, the Department of Defense
(DoD) should do away with combat exclusion policies (Burrelli 2013; Kamarack 2016). To this
end, in December 2015, then-Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, directed all branches of the
military to open all combat positions to women. Even as the military shrinks, the percentage of
women serving increases. Today, over 15% of active duty service members are women. Among
the service academies, women’s enrollment is presently 22-38% of the student body (DoD
2015).
Recent research on women in the military tends to focus on sexual assault/harassment,
retention and/or career advancement (Agazio et al., 2002; Bell and Richie 2003; Czerwinski et
concentrates on retaining service members by means of promotion opportunities or providing
services to victims of sexual violence. When researchers study women’s roles in families, the
focal point is usually child resiliency/outcomes, or the effects of motherhood on women’s health
(Agazio et al, 2002; Bell and Ritchie 2003; Norwood 1997; Wadsworth 2010; Wadsworth and
Riggs 2014; Wilson et al, 2011). With the exception of Kelley (1994) and Kelley et al. (2001),
no research on work-family conflict for women in the military exists that utilizes a large sample
and quantitative methods; most studies have a sample size of N<40 and are qualitative in nature.
Kelley and Kelley et al. (1994, 2001) focus on retention in the Navy by way of limiting
deployments but do not explore work-family conflict for women on a daily basis. The authors
accept that women experience such conflict, however, they fall short in determining contributing
factors. While Tucker and Kelley (2009) examine stress and support of single mothers, the
research is missing an examination of women’s choices regarding motherhood in the military.
This study examines the childbearing patterns of women in the military. Specifically, I
examine the differences between women in two different career tracks, commissioned officers
and enlisted personnel. I investigate not only the differences in childbearing between these two
career tracks but also what effect career salience has on the decision to have or not have children.
I argue that, as career salience increases, women are less likely to have children. While this holds
for both commissioned officers and enlisted personnel, the mechanism of career salience is more
pronounced for officers than those enlisted. In the remainder of this paper I will review the
literature on women and motherhood in the military, introduce my research study, discuss the
LITERATURE REVIEW
Choices in Having Children
The second demographic transition saw an explosion in family forms with children no
longer central to the family. The center shifted to the couple (Osiewalska 2015). Motherhood is
no longer an obligation but a choice, and we have experienced a reduction in social sanctions for
women who do not reproduce (Tanturri and Mencarini 2008). However, Vinson et al. (2010)
found that women who chose to be childfree were perceived as selfish, unwomanly and cold,
while Morrell (2000) and Blackstone and Stewart (2012) found them to be perceived as
deficient, unfulfilled as measured by the idealized mother standard.
Today, many women are childfree. Stobert and Kemeny (2003) found that 7% of
Canadian women are childfree by choice. Blackstone (2014) characterized women without
children as one of two forms: articulators, or those who knew early they did not want children,
and postponers, who keep putting off having children until it’s too late. Additionally, Blair-Loy
(2001) saw articulators as a response to the irreconcilable competition between two demanding
realms. Professional and managerial women tend to opt out in order to pursue meaningful
careers, likewise those with more education are more likely to have fewer or no children
(Osiewalska 2015; Tanturri and Mencarini 2008). Less religious women are also more likely to
choose being childfree than more religious women (Osiewalska 2015; Tanturri and Mencarini
2008).
With the lessening strength of institutions to shape fertility, women are choosing to
cohabitate and remain childfree rather than marry and bear children (Tanturri and Mencarini
their parents’ homes to adult independent homes. With increases in education and urbanization,
and a decrease in religiosity, women are more likely to choose to be childfree.
Macro-Level Influences in Childbearing
In examining the differences in childbearing choices for women in the military, it is
important to study the macro-level influences that shape these decisions. Officers and enlisted
personnel inhabit different socio-economic positions, with disparities in education and income
(Sheehan et al., 2015). Women’s fertility was thought to be negatively correlated with women’s
education; however, Osiewalska (2015) found that this relationship is curvilinear, with women at
the lowest and highest levels of education having the highest fertility rates, while women at
medium levels seem most likely to postpone childbirth. Moreover, women in more
family-oriented educational fields, such as teaching or nursing, tend to have higher fertility rates than
their counterparts (Begall and Mills 2012; Osiewalska 2015; Solera and Martin-Garcia 2017).
The difference in fertility rates by occupational field may reflect feelings about balancing
work and family, or it may be influenced by socialization within particular fields (Begall and
Mills 2012). Conversely, women could be self-selecting into these more family friendly
occupations. In either case, education is seen as the reason for family postponement. More
education affords women more opportunities and alternatives to the traditional mother/wife role.
Economics influences a woman’s choice of having children or not. Becker (1991) argued
that having children was a rational decision based on limited resources and saw women’s
economic success as making children costlier. As women made gains in education and the
workforce, the cost of having children increased and so reduced the demand for a child. Lee and
Mason (2010) referred to this as the opportunity cost for women. The price of fertility is greater
education process or as a result of education, leads to less frequent transitions to motherhood,
with those transitions occurring later in life for women with higher human capital (Lee and
Mason 2010; Miller 2010). Buckles (2006) adds that women see a three percent increase in
salary per year of delay in childbearing, with those women who are more economically
advantaged benefiting the most. Generally, women who delay childbearing tend to be more
educated and skilled, holding professional or managerial positions (Buckles 2006).
Institutional effects vary based on whether the institution’s focus is on individuals or the
family (Osiewalska 1015). While women may have equal access to the workforce, they pay a
higher price than men when choosing to have children (Osiewalska 2015). Perceptions of women
who become mothers devalues their worth as employees, whereas men gain in value and
competence (Berdahl and Moon 2013; Hoobler 2014). Women are seen as mothers first and
workers second (Krolokke and Sorensen 2006). The ideal worker is unencumbered and
committed to long arduous hours of work, with little outside limitations, not the way society
views mothers (Berdahl and Moon 2013; Murphy and Graff 2006; Williams 2001). Women may
gain in perceptions of warmth when they become mothers, but they lose in perceptions of
competence (Berdahl and Moon 2013; Correll et al., 2007; Harris 2009; Miller 2011). A
pregnancy is viewed socially as a lack of commitment (Halpert et al., 1993; Harris 2009; Miller
2011). Across all skill levels, women pay a high price for becoming pregnant (Wilde 2010).
While highly skilled women seem to pay the highest price, delaying of childbearing only slightly
mitigates this problem (Budig and England 2001; England et al., 2016). In general women are
seen as delicate and fragile, where men are virile and powerful (Crowley and Sandoff 2017).
penalized as the ideal soldier is a man and becoming a mother is the antithesis of this (Harris
2009).
Policy measures influence parental choice, as Bernardi and White (2009) found, with
more traditional cultures experiencing declines in childbearing, while Nordic social democratic
countries see higher fertility rates. Traditional cultures tend to have a stronger belief in
self-reliance, whereas Nordic countries offer more state support of the family (Bernardi and White
2009; Billari 2004; Osiewalska 2015). More progressive countries embrace policies to reduce the
burden of having children in order to encourage fertility (Shreffler and Johnson 2013).
Lalive and Zweimuller (2009) found differences in public policy incentives for having
children between high and low wage workers. Monetary assistance was more effective for low
income moms, while job protections were more encouraging to higher wage women. In Sweden,
Ohlsson-Wijk (2015) demonstrated that job security and family-friendly policies make women
more likely to have children. Additionally, Ohlsson-Wijk (2015a) found that work environment
matters: the public sector and caring fields having higher fertility rates than private sector and
more competitive fields.
Micro-Level Influences on Childbearing
While policy is generated at the macro-level, it is experienced most saliently at the
micro-level, influencing decisions and choices women make in terms of family formation. Almquist
and Angrist (1970) discovered that women with high levels of career salience and those in
atypical occupations tend to have more commitment to career than those in traditional female
jobs (Burgard 2003). Additionally, these women tend to have strong female mentors, building
the foundation for Ohlsson-Wijk’s (2015) assertion that women experience gender role