A Reevaluation of the Operation Desert Storm’s Air Campaign and its Implication on the Future of Warfare
By: Andrew Mitchell
Honors Thesis
Curriculum of Peace, War, and Defense University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Spring 2017
Approved:
X_______________________________ Joseph W. Caddell
Advisor
Department of History
X_______________________________ Joseph T. Glatthaar
Reader
Table of Contents
Introduction … 3
Beginning of Conflict … 11
What Was the Air Campaign? … 13
Was the Air Campaign a Success? … 17
Effect on economy and infrastructure … 18 Effect on civilian casualties … 20
Effect on Iraqi morale … 21
Effect on Iraqi supply and communications … 24
Effect on nuclear, biological, chemical capabilities and missile systems… 25
Was the Air Campaign a Failure … 28
RAND Corporation … 28 Robert Pape … 33 Daryl Press … 36
Commentary on Evidence and Bias … 44
Analysis and Legacies… 47
Was the strategic bombing campaign successful?... 47 Was strategic bombing a decisive factor? … 54 What was the legacy of the air campaign? … 58
Conclusions … 62
Introduction
The dawn of American air power arrived in December of 1907, when the United
States Army Signal Corps announced Specification #486, inviting bids for a flying machine
to be used for military purposes. In less than a century, air power became one of the most
important means of force projection for the United States military. While many think of
World War II or the Vietnam War as the point air power turned from being complementary
to being necessary, some believe that the Gulf War was the most pivotal in terms of air
power’s adoption and evolution. Overlooked by some due to its brevity, the Gulf War
represents the lessons learned from past conflicts, becoming a litmus test for the use of air
power in modern warfare.
Among air power advocates, the Gulf War represented a release from the political
gridlock of the past. As air power doctrines evolved and the severity of its application was
realized, more and more restrictions were applied to its use. The earliest doctrine was
produced by men like Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell, who believed that
air power could be a decisive force when used to attack an enemy’s will to fight. Such a
belief allowed, and sometimes advocated, for indiscriminate terror bombing of civilian
populations and infrastructure in an effort to break morale at home. Evidenced by the
devastation of Dresden and Tokyo, the doctrine resulted in horrifying civilian casualties. In
the post-World War II era, politicians and strategists reviewed these effects, leading to heavy
restrictions on future air campaigns. Moreover, the nuclear strikes that seemed to end the war
policy makers to overemphasize the production of aircraft suited for a nuclear war
environment.1
These ghosts of World War II, coupled with a dysfunctional leadership structure,
spelled failure for the use of air power in the Vietnam War. Leadership imposed hazy rules of
engagement, in effect “[fighting] an air war to send signals and messages,” which turned air
power into a force of deterrence rather than decisiveness, according to Dr. Richard Hallion,
the Air Force Historian from 1991 to 2002.2 These restrictions, in turn, were partly
responsible for the inefficiency of the oft-criticized Operation Rolling Thunder during the
Vietnam War, where the need to comply with political restrictions often forced pilots to
bomb targets that were not operationally significant. Issues were exacerbated by the fact that
the means of projecting air power, namely the vehicles and munitions, were not suitable for
the environment, nor were the pilots properly equipped with the necessary ammunition and
training.3
Such disappointments made American policy makers reluctant to emphasize air
power for many years, as they did not want to rely on strategies that had been accused of
underperformance in previous conflicts. Though, given the sudden and urgent situation that
unfolded in the Middle East during the summer of 1990, strategists had few choices outside
of air power for an immediate response to the Iraqi aggression. The Gulf War became a
chance for air power advocates to unleash several decades of technological advancement and
to show that air power could be decisive in war. Thus, this paper aims to extract lessons on
1 Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution,
2015), 20.
2 Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, 19.
air power doctrine from the Gulf War, in an effort to better prepare strategists for future
warfare.
What emerged from these circumstances was the air campaign that was prosecuted
during Operation Desert Storm. There is no doubt that the overall operation was a decisive
success, with the Iraqi government agreeing to a ceasefire just six weeks after the first bomb
was dropped. The results of the war are not a point of contention. Instead, arguments over the
effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign have become controversial in the review of
the Gulf War. There are both proponents and opponents of the United States’ use of strategic
bombing, with the former mostly hailing from within the armed forces, while the majority of
the latter are academics and policy makers.
Twenty-five years has elapsed since the beginning of the Gulf War, yet there has been
insufficient scholarship with regards to the legacies and lessons learned from the air
campaign. To decide which argument is stronger, each will be analyzed through the scope of
a series of questions. Was the strategic bombing campaign successful in achieving the
military’s overall objectives in the Gulf War? Was strategic bombing a decisive factor? What
was the legacy of the strategic bombing campaign in future policy?
In order to extract meaning from the argument over the effectiveness of the strategic
bombing campaign during Operation Desert Storm, it is important to understand the
background and context of the original conflict. Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations had deteriorated
rapidly in the months leading up to the Gulf War. Iraqi officials were worried about a
conspiracy against the state, as Kuwait had begun diplomatic talks with Iran, Iraq’s bitter
both to forgive Iraqi debts from that war and to cease alleged “slant-drilling” into the
Rumaila Oil Field, an oil field close to the Iraq-Kuwait border.4
The invasion took Kuwait by complete surprise, despite ominous suggestions by the
Iraqi government in the months leading up to the conflict. In hindsight, the signs of a future
conflict were all there. In the time between the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq began acting
more and more belligerently. In a national broadcast, Saddam threatened the use of force
against neighboring oil-exporting states, demanding the termination of excess oil
production.5 Blaming American influences in the region, President Hussein was indirectly
addressing Kuwait and the UAE, as these states had strong economic ties with the United
States. Perhaps feeling as though these threats were not being taken seriously, the Iraqi
military began troop mobilization in the summer of 1990.
On July 23, Iraq followed up a complaint about Kuwait overproducing its oil quota by
moving thirty thousand soldiers to the border.6 However, Kuwait’s lack of preparation was
not entirely unfounded. Despite the bellicose behavior of Iraq, the two states had a series of
negotiations in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to broker a compromise regarding oil
production. On August 1, Kuwait met Iraq’s demand for ten billion dollars in compensation
with a counter offer of nine billion dollars. The consensus among world leaders was that the
issue would be resolved diplomatically, as Kuwait’s initial counteroffer was closer to the
demand than expected. However, Iraqi diplomats walked away from the table, and the
invasion commenced the next day, perhaps indicating President Hussein’s intention all
along.7
4 Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Iraq Threatens Emirates And Kuwait on Oil Glut,” New York Times, July 18, 1990.
5 Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Iraq Threatens Emirates And Kuwait on Oil Glut,” New York Times, July 18, 1990.
6 Geoff Simons, Iraq: from Sumer to post-Saddam, (Basngstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 343.
7 Hassan Al-Ebraheem, “The Gulf Crisis: A Kuwaiti Perspective: An Interview with Hassan Al-Ebraheem,”
On the morning of August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces unexpectedly invaded Kuwait along
its northwestern border, with the majority of Iraqi forces advancing down Highway 80 en
route to capturing Kuwait City. The bulk of the attacking force consisted of four Iraqi
Republican Guard divisions with a division-sized contingent of Special Forces in support,
totaling around 88,000 soldiers. In contrast, the Kuwaiti force tasked with defending the state
only mustered 16,000 soldiers, of which a quarter were killed and the remainder were
captured by the end of the invasion, compared to just a few hundred Iraqi casualties.8 Within
twelve hours, the majority of Kuwait’s armed forces had been overrun, with their final
military base falling by nightfall on August 3. Five days later, President Saddam Hussein
declared Kuwait the 19th province of Iraq.9
While the invasion was a shock to Kuwaiti leadership, they could have done very
little to counter a full Iraqi offensive. At the time, Iraq boasted the fourth largest armed forces
in the world, albeit one still using some outdated equipment provided by the Soviet Union a
decade prior. Technology aside, the legacy of the Iran-Iraq War that ended just a few years
prior to the Gulf War left advantageous effects on the Iraqi military. In 1990, Iraq had not
reduced its muster roll very much from the previous war, which allowed the military to boast
955,000 soldiers in the standing army, 650,000 in paramilitary forces, and several hundred
thousand in reserve.10 Additionally, many of these Iraqi soldiers were considered
combat-experienced, as their battles with Iran had seasoned many of the troops. Barring outside
intervention, the Kuwaiti government stood little chance at defending their state. Moreover, it
8 Bryan Glyn Williams, Counter Jihad: America's Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.), 26.
9Colin Warbrick, "The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 40, no.
2 (1991): 483.
10 Michael Knights, Cradle of Conflict: Iraq And the Birth of Modern U.S. Military Power (Annapolis: US
is unlikely outside intervention could have helped, given the sudden and expeditious nature
of the invasion.
Just as Kuwait was surprised by the Iraqi invasion, so too was the international
community. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 had informally signaled the
collapse of the Soviet Union. In the grave of the Soviet Union was not just the former super
power, but also the majority of United States foreign policy and military strategies. After
decades of building policy around combatting the Soviet Bloc, the United States had no
reliable contingency plan for a unipolar world. While transitional plans were beginning to
take place, none could deal with the advent of full-scale war in the Middle East; in fact, the
United States did not anticipate a concrete post-Cold War policy until the summer of 1991.11
The transitional plans in place were revealed to be insufficient. Just six days before
the invasion, a military exercise, Internal Look 90, conducted by Central Command
(CENTCOM) in Kuwait revealed glaring problems, namely the lack of munitions, supply
vehicles both in the air and at sea, and its ability to assess conditions of target damage.12 As
planning lagged behind, so too did troop readiness in the region. With most Cold-War era
military plans concentrated on keeping resources in Europe to fight a Soviet push, the Middle
East had almost no garrison readily available for deployment. Given a few days, the best the
United States could muster for response was twelve fighter squadrons, one bomber squadron,
two carrier battle groups, one airborne division, and a single Marine brigade. Projections
indicated that it would be seventeen weeks before enough troops for a ground invasion could
be assembled.13
11 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington D.C.:
US Government Printing Office, 1993), 29.
12 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 30.
The conclusion of the invasion of Kuwait offered no reprieve to regional strategists,
as the Iraqi military continued to pose several grave threats to theater stability. First, Iraqi
leadership postured their defenses to the South, aimed at the Saudi Arabian border, which at
the time could have been easily confused for a second mobilization and invasion preparation.
An invasion of Saudi Arabia would put one of the United States’ most reliable Middle
Eastern allies in jeopardy, which in turn could prevent the United States from responding.
Second, Iraqi leadership announced in October that if war came, Saudi Arabia and Israel
would be attacked with missile strikes, a threat exacerbated by the fact that Iraq had recently
used chemical and biological munitions in missile attacks against Iran. Third, Saddam took
Americans and other foreigners that had been in Kuwait hostage, rather than returning them
home.14 These short-term threats eliminated the United States’ and the United Nations
Coalition’s ability to remain on the sidelines.
Launched into crisis mode, the United States military command was forced to create a
strategy that would involve shipping a massive force 8,000 miles, to fight one of the world’s
largest militaries, that would have months to prepare and fortify, in an environment in which
the United States had limited fighting experience with modern technology. Whereas
pre-crisis planning centered on a defensive campaign, the task ahead was strictly offensive in
nature. The United States had to overcome Iraqi defenses and drive them from the Kuwaiti
theater, as well as shatter Iraqi power.15 Meeting with officials from countless committees,
CENTCOM Commander, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf set about creating an entirely novel,
offensive strategy. The outcome was Operation Desert Shield, the plan to amass troops on the
Arab Peninsula, and Operation Desert Storm, the combat phase of the campaign. While
14 Jerrod M. Post, “Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile,” Political Psychology 12, no. 2
(1991): 283.
Operation Desert Shield is in itself a testament to the benefits of air power, it is the combat
Beginning of Conflict
On August 8, 1990, President George H. W. Bush approved deployment of U.S.
forces and defined the overarching objectives of the entire operation, which were fourfold:
secure Kuwait, restore the government of Kuwait, assure security of the Persian Gulf, and
protect American lives.16 Given these rather vague guidelines, Schwarzkopf was tasked with
establishing concrete directives that would comply with the administration’s overall goal. At
the conclusion of Operation Desert Shield, the United States would move to the combat
stage, Operation Desert Storm, a joint operation between the various branches of the United
States military and a United Nations Coalition. Each branch had an integral role in the
success of the mission and each had a different method for contributing to Bush’s general
objectives. Perhaps none, however, is more controversial than the air campaign, carried out
largely by the United States Air Force.17
Schwarzkopf tasked Lieutenant General Charles “Chuck” Horner, Commander of the
Air Force Component, Central Command (CENTAF), with operational duties responsible for
planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking theater air operations that were consistent with
Schwarzkopf’s apportionment. As such planning took place during Operation Desert Shield,
Horner was busy with landing forces, planning defenses, and handling logistics, forcing him
to delegate the task of planning an offensive air campaign to Brigadier General Buster
Glosson, who was given a position as a director of a special planning group. Glosson
assembled a team of Air Force officers, along with several Saudi and British officers to plan
the campaign. Known as The Black Hole, the team worked in complete secrecy, with most of
16 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 27.
17 See Dr. Robert Pape’s Bombing to Win: Air Power and the Coercion in War, The Limits of Precision Guided
their work confidential to all but a very few senior officers.18 The result was a four-phased air
campaign that was proposed by mid-September. The four phases outlined by the Black Hole
were: a strategic air campaign against Iraq, suppression of enemy air defenses in the Kuwait
Theater of Operation (KTO), preparation of the battle field, and the ground campaign.
The result of these outlined intentions was an air campaign that demonstrated the
concentrated power of an advanced air force. Beginning on January 17, 1991, at
approximately 2:10AM local time, the air campaign lasted just five short weeks, concluding
on February 23, 1991, though air power was available to assist in a close air support function
during the ground invasion. In this brief period, over 100,000 sorties were flown into both the
Iraq and Kuwait Theaters of Operation, resulting in massive destruction of military and civil
infrastructure.19 These missions preceded a ground offensive that lasted just 100 hours before
coalition soldiers drove the Iraqi military out of Kuwait and a ceasefire was declared on
February 28, 2016.
18 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 38.
What Was the Air Campaign?
By the time the dust settled in Kuwait in August 1990, it became clear to
Schwarzkopf and his team that the hastily constructed OPLAN 1002-90 would not be a
sufficient response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In effect, OPLAN 1002-90 had been a
placeholder that was supposed to be improved upon and reconfigured to the post-Cold War
environment. Defensive in nature, the plan assumed that the United States would be ready
before hostilities commenced, whereas in reality, the military would have to act offensively
in order to recapture Kuwait.20 The four aforementioned phases put forth by the Black Hole
transitioned from theory to reality at Schwarzkopf’s request. Above the goals for each phase
of the air campaign, Schwarzkopf was directed by Washington during the planning process to
“strenuously avoid civilian casualties, and, indeed, any long-term damage to the Iraqi
economy.”21
Glosson and members of the Black Hole were tasked with designing phase one, the
strategic air campaign into Iraq. Unlike other phases of the air campaign, phase one was
conducted in a higher security classification, due to sensitivity to the concerns that an
offensive military campaign might sway other Arab nations against the United States and the
United Nations Coalition.22 The team built a list of target sets, including leadership,
manufacturing, transportation, military, and several other cogs deemed necessary to keep the
Iraqi war machine running. By the end of December, the list of targets had grown to 237, a
significant increase from the 84 considered essential in August under OPLAN 1002-90.23
20 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 35.
21 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 36.
22 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 38.
The second phase of the air campaign, suppression of enemy air defenses in the KTO,
was initially seen by both the Black Hole and CENTAF as a part of phase three, but Horner
requested that it receive its own objective.24 Both the Black Hole and CENTAF were hesitant
to include suppression of enemy air defense in the KTO as a stand-alone objective because
they assumed that command of the air would be a part of preparing the battlefield. Though it
might seem like the four phases would be conducted in order, phase two would need to be
addressed first and then maintained throughout the conflict. In prior conflicts, command of
the air was important in order to allow for constant bombing access and security for pilots. It
had additional importance in this war both in the short and long term. First, air supremacy
would prevent Iraqi reconnaissance that might identify the US XVIII Airborne Corps’s
sweeping attack on the left flank, a maneuver that would shatter the Iraqi defense. Second, air
supremacy would remove the possibility of a chemical or biological attack via Scud missile,
an attack that Israel threatened would force them to conduct a total war, which in turn, would
provoke responses from other neighboring nations and further destabilize the region.25
The third phase of the air campaign, preparation of the battlefield, was tasked to
CENTAF for planning. Air power was called on to weaken ground forces to a degree that
had not been asked of nor achieved by an air force before.26 In the early days of planning in
August, Schwarzkopf concluded that a fifty percent attrition of ground forces would be
necessary before phase four, the ground campaign, could commence. Though vague in
semantics, the criteria were determined as a fifty percent destruction of enemy equipment,
notably armor and artillery. Under such a large umbrella, CENTAF divided these strikes into
two categories, those against the Republican Guard, and those against the remaining forces in
24 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 48.
25 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 43.
Kuwait.27 With these objectives, Glosson briefed Schwarzkopf in December, stating that the
attrition rate could be achieved in five days against the Republican Guard and twelve days
against the remaining forces. In total, phase three would require the destruction of over five
thousand pieces of heavily fortified Iraqi equipment, in addition to new targets that were
found every day.28
The fourth and final phase, support of the ground campaign, was almost
anti-climactic, given the swift nature of the ground invasion. Objectives for this phase included
liberating Kuwait, cutting lines of communication into Iraq, and destruction of the
Republican Guard. With the bridges and railways cut in the previous stages, the Iraqi military
would be isolated under constant B-52 strikes and tactical air support.29 Planners provided
close air support using a push system, where aircraft would be constantly circling overheard,
ready to strike within minutes. If support was not needed, aircraft were instructed to remain
in the area and to conduct back-up interdiction strikes before returning to base. Limited
resistance from the Iraqi military meant that the Coalition ground forces often moved
forward too quickly for close air support to keep up with, making this phase less necessary
than initially believed.
By the end of the planning phase, the Coalition air force had more than one thousand
fixed wing attack aircraft and eight hundred air defense fighters ready for tasking.30 At the
time of the ceasefire on February 23, 1991, the Coalition had flown over 100,000 sorties,
while dropping more than 88,000 tons of ordnance.31 The operation was by far the most
27 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 49.
28 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 51.
29 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 51.
30 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 53.
31 Thomas B. Allen, F. Clifton Berry, and Norman Polmar, CNN: War in the Gulf: From the Invasion of Kuwait
extensive air campaign on a per day basis, with more than ten times the sortie count per day
than in Operation Rolling Thunder.32 In its entirety, Schwarzkopf and his team believed that
the air campaign would force the Iraqi military out of Kuwait within a month and that
Saddam’s control over Iraq would be either destroyed or broken beyond repair.
32 Based on calculations using data from Allen, Berry, and Polmar’s War in the Gulf and Thompson’s To Hanoi
Was the Air Campaign a Success?
The immediate aftermath of the Gulf War saw massive support for air power in both
the military and the civilian worlds. In the first major war involving American soldiers
against another modern military since the Vietnam War, the United States and the Coalition
scored a decisive victory in thirty-seven days of conflict, with the ground offensive lasting
just one hundred hours. The United States Air Force commissioned the Gulf War Air Power
Survey on August 22, 1991, to assess all uses of air power in the Gulf War. Directed by Dr.
Eliot Cohen of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, and staffed by civilian analysts, professors, and policy makers, in addition to
retired officers from each branch of the military, the Survey attempted to compile all relevant
information and then determine the degree of success the air campaign had. The opinion of
its authors is made clear on the first page, that “from the outset, U.S. air power was central to
the accomplishment of United States’ and United Nations’ political and military objectives; it
enabled the Coalition to deploy its forces and subsequently cripple Iraqi military capabilities,
paving the way for Baghdad’s defeat on the battlefield.”33
In total, the Gulf War Air Power Survey is comprised of five volumes, encompassing
thousands of pages of research, though it is the summary report that provides the most
relevant information for this paper. The authors of this study, in addition to many privately
commissioned authors, represent the camp of Gulf War air power advocates, who all believe
that air power was pivotal in destroying the Iraqi military during the lead up to the ground
campaign.34 Specifically, these advocates believe that air power fulfilled the objectives set
33 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1.
34 In addition to the contributors for the Gulf War Air Power Survey, see Dr. Thomas Keaney’s The Linkage of
Air and Ground Power in the Future of Conflict, Rick Atkinson’s Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, Dr. Stephen Hosmer’s Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, Aharon Levran’s
out by both President Bush and Gen. Schwarzkopf, and that those objectives were
requirements for a swift and decisive Coalition victory.
Arguments in favor of air power and its use in the Gulf War center around five main
objectives that were identified by CENTCOM, along with its subordinate branches, and the
degree to which they were successfully fulfilled. Each objective, some of which are closely
tied together, applies to either one or both of the United States’ and CENTCOM’s overall
goals, to restore and ensure stability in the Persian Gulf and to protect American lives in the
process. Those five objectives were to minimize long term damage to the Iraqi economy,
limit civilian casualties, break the morale of the Iraqi military, debilitate the supply and
communication networks of the Iraqi Army, and destroy Iraqi nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) capabilities along with their ballistic missile capabilities.
Effect on economy and infrastructure
As a major indicator of success, advocates point to the effect air power had on the
Iraqi economy and civilian infrastructure in both the short and long term. Strategists sought
to disrupt and inconvenience the Iraqi population as much as possible, without doing any
direct harm to citizens as individuals. To straddle this fine line between nuisance and
destruction, air power strategists targeted distribution of resource rather than production, with
the “intent to convince the Iraqi populace that a bright economic and political future will
result from the replacement of the Saddam Hussein regime” while “preserving the Iraqi and
Kuwait capability to quickly reconstitute their economies.”35 Thus, planners included
switching yards, control buildings, and transformers, rather than generator halls, boilers, and
turbines on their strike lists. Similarly, they targeted oil storage facilitates, rather than
refineries and pumps, unless they were assumed to be used in a military capacity.36
By most statistics and metrics, air power achieved these goals of limiting short run
operation while preserving long run opportunity. At the end of the air campaign, eighty-eight
percent of Iraq’s electrical capacity had been destroyed, with the remainder only available
locally due to the destruction of switching yards. However, despite continued United Nations
sanctions in the post-war period, Iraq restored power faster than projections had predicted,
with Baghdad’s power working at ninety percent capacity in 1992 and then suffered no
blackouts during a scorching summer.37 Likewise, Coalition strikes on Iraqi oil rendered
ninety percent of all capabilities unusable. Just one year later, Iraqi officials stated that their
oil production was back up to two-thirds of prewar capacity, more than enough for Iraqi
domestic needs and exports to Jordan.38 Air power proponents viewed this as a tremendous
success, as power was shut off for central and southern Iraq, the areas where the military had
been dug in. In addition to debilitating the military, it also caused strife within the civilian
population, as this mass inconvenience turned into mass disgruntlement. Moreover, these
attacks were incredibly efficient, as they constituted just two percent of the Coalition’s
strikes.39
Effect on civilian casualties
36 J.W. Crawford III, “The Law of Noncombat Immunity and the Targeting of National Electric Power
Systems.” (Naval War College, 1996), 23.
37 Walid Doleh, Warren Piper, Abdel Qahieh, and Kamel el Tallaq, “Electrical Facilities Survey,” Health and
Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis: An In-Depth Assessment (1991): 1.
38 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 76.
Proponents also look to the minimal cost of civilian lives when viewing the overall
success of the air campaign. Knowing that the conflict would be broadcast around the world,
the United States and the Coalition could not afford mounting civilian death tolls. In fact,
Saddam’s strategy involved winning popular opinion by playing the victim and publicizing
atrocities committed against his people.40 Gulf War planners put a special emphasis on
reducing civilian casualties, both in terms of direct casualties, those hit by Coalition
ordnance, and indirect casualties, those killed by effects like lack of medical supply due to
supply interdiction. Most estimates have the number of Iraqi casualties between 2,500 and
3,000.41 Though every civilian casualty is a tragedy, these numbers are minimal in
comparison to previous wars like the Iran-Iraq War, and future wars like the Iraq War, albeit
the Gulf War was significantly shorter.
Those lauding air power in the Gulf War also point to the fact that the Iraqi leadership
had a significant part in the death of civilians with the tactics they employed to deter
Coalition air strikes. When it became obvious that the Coalition had gained air superiority,
the Iraqi Air Force began hiding planes in residential neighbors, while the Iraqi Army did the
same with radar facilities and anti-air batteries, going as far as mounting SAM defense
systems on hospitals.42 Moreover, the Iraqi government allowed civilians to occupy the top
floors of military bunkers often used by leadership, which resulted in the accidental deaths of
several hundred. Though, it should be noted that Coalition air strikes had not previously been
used on residential properties intentionally or to any significant degree, meaning that entering
these ‘safe’ military bunker was actually more dangerous.43
40 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 44.
41 Beth Osborne Daponte, "A Case Study in Estimating Casualties from War and Its Aftermath: The 1991
Persian Gulf War," Medicine & Global Survival 3, no. 2 (1993): 59. 42 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 40.
Indirectly, damage caused by the air campaign actually resulted in less collateral
damage than some had projected. Critical analysis determined that the campaign would
contribute to between seventy and ninety thousand deaths in the post-war period, most due to
lack of medical supplies and attention, but proponents point out that these projections did not
account for the speed in which Iraq was able to rebuild their electrical and transportation
grids, and are therefore grossly exaggerated.44 By keeping civilian casualties low, the United
States and the Coalition helped achieve their objective of regional stability, since collateral
damage in the form of innocent lives would surely incite anger from neighboring Arab
countries.
Effect on Iraqi morale
Another major argument in favor of the use of strategic bombing was the
achievement of significant psychological damage to the Iraqi military. This attack on morale
had several consequences, the first and most obvious of which is the weakening of enemy
defenses. The bulk of Saddam’s frontline force was made up of his regular army, many of
which were Shia conscripts, who had little desire to fight even before the bombs began to
fall.45 With their commitment to fighting already in doubt, the Coalition prosecuted the air
campaign to an extent that would further shake the resolve of the Iraqi frontline soldiers.
Though difficult to quantify, air power advocates looked to prisoner of war interviews as
evidence that these air strikes did have a significant effect on enemy morale.46
44 William Arkin. "Tactical Bombing of Iraqi Forces Outstripped Value of Strategic Hits. Analyst Contends."
Aviation Week & Space Technology 136, no. 4 (1992). p 62.
45 William Thomas Allison. The Gulf War 1990-1991. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 126.
46 Stephen Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars: 1941-1991, (Santa Monica,
Across several interviews, multiple prisoners stated that they expect the bombing to
last a week, but “when it did not end, the sense of futility and inevitability of the outcome
became more apparent.”47 Another soldier captured at the Battle of Khafji said “his brigade
underwent more damage in thirty minutes than it had in eight years in the [Iran-Iraq War].”48
While such stories may appear anecdotal, the rates of desertion within the Iraqi Army seem
to corroborate this notion. Indeed, the air campaign inflicted significant casualties upon the
Iraqi army, with about ten percent of the force falling victim in some way, but these statistics
pale in comparison to the twenty-five to thirty percent desertion rate that the air campaign
likely instigated.49 In the eyes of the Coalition leadership, a soldier deserting with his life was
preferable to one killed by Western ordnance in terms of maintaining peace with other Arab
nations. The authors of the Gulf War Air Power Survey conclude the success of the objective
best in saying, “the Iraqi soldier, by and large, lost his determination to fight.”50
To defend against critics who would argue that the remaining forces were still battle
ready, bombing advocates point out that these desertion numbers were largely from the
frontline soldiers. Though the least valuable in the eyes of the Iraqi military leadership, they
were still pivotal in the Iraqi plan to retreat into strategic choke points and inflict massive
casualties and buy the stronger units time.51 Without the frontline soldiers there to cause
delays, Coalition forces crashed into the heavy divisions and Republican Guard divisions
before they could maneuver into defensive positions.52 Despite being labeled as cannon
47 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 108.
48 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 108.
49 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 107.
50 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 107.
51 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 10.
fodder, those frontline soldiers were of significant importance and without them, any real
attempt at defense was unlikely.
Effects on Iraqi supply and communications
Closely tied to the attack on soldier morale was the goal of destroying Iraqi supply
and communication networks, which is often the lynchpin of most pro-air power policy
makers. At the time of the ceasefire, Coalition strikes had destroyed thirty-seven highway
bridges, leaving just two in poor condition, and nine railway bridges, all but isolating soldiers
in the KTO.53 Even a shift from using multiple vehicle convoys during the day to singular
supply vehicles at night was negated by superior Coalition technology, which allowed for
effective night operations. Captured soldiers indicated that most trucks within the KTO were
broken down for lack of spare parts or that drivers refused to risk their lives behind the
wheel.54 These reports were verified when the Coalition ground forces moved forward, as
supply depots were found overstocked, while captured soldiers were starving and sick,
indicating a break down in the distribution of necessary supplies.55
This targeting of equipment did not just stop Iraqi forces from having the necessary
tools to fight back, but it indirectly prevented soldiers from being ready to fight when the
Coalition advanced on the ground. Iraqi soldiers quickly realized that air strikes were
targeting their equipment, rather than personnel. “Tank-plinking” missions, those missions
that used laser-guided bombs to destroy Iraqi tanks, proved effective even on those tanks that
were not hit. As a psychological effect, tank operators began to spend their down time a great
53 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 97.
54 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 97.
distance away from their vehicles, as they knew that any tank would likely be targeted by
Coalition aircraft.56 This meant that when Coalition ground forces began their assaults, the
Iraqis were left unready and unable to adequately defend themselves.
In addition to the assault on Iraqi equipment and supply, the concentrated disruption
of communication networks is thought to be one of air power’s greatest successes. The
effects of the attack on communication were twofold. First, it prevented Saddam from
communicating with his people and the international community. As previously mentioned,
Saddam sought to broadcast the conflict on the world stage in hopes that he could incite his
Arab neighbors to join against the Western aggressors. Beyond that, he sought to show the
world the atrocities committed against his people, as every civilian death was more evidence
of the Coalition’s wrongdoing. Conversely, the Coalition’s ability to silence him and prevent
him from distributing propaganda, in effect, showed the people that the Ba’athist regime was
not as powerful as they had thought.57
Second, Saddam’s lack of communication capability both prevented him from
contacting his military leadership and his leadership in the field from coordinating with each
other. This had one of the more direct effects on ensuring the ground invasion’s success, as
officers in the field could neither coordinate with each other, nor could they ask for directives
from Baghdad. The air campaign’s attention to lines of communication was so extensive and
detailed, that it rendered field commanders unwilling to use telecommunications. Ironically, a
significant portion of the telecommunications network remained intact, but fear of giving
away the position caused officers to avoid using them.58 For many directives, messages were
passed by a physical courier, including messages from Baghdad into the KTO. The level of
56 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 56.
57 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 44.
fear was so high, some officers issued death penalties for personnel who used two-way radios
to communicate.59 While more primitive means existed and did allow some degree of contact,
they were less efficient, and frequently left units vulnerable to sudden attack by Coalition
forces.
Effects on nuclear, biological, chemical capabilities and missile systems
The last major argument that advocates use to promote the use of air power during the
Gulf War was its ability to attack and disrupt the Iraqi military’s ability to use its NBC
capabilities, and the corresponding ballistic missile systems. Prior to the war, the intelligence
community estimated that Iraq was producing almost one thousand tons of chemical agents
every year. More ominously, Saddam’s regime had proven during the Iran-Iraq War that they
were more than willing to use these illegal munitions.60 The Ba’athists heightened tensions
when they announced a willingness to launch ballistic missile attacks on neighboring
countries if war came to Iraq.61 Thus, these NBC capabilities posed a very real threat, both to
the lives of Coalition soldiers and to the stability of the Middle East. With this in mind,
planners paid special attention to identifying stationary missile sites as well as mobile
launchers.
The intelligence community provided very specific information on the chemical and
biological munitions production and research facilities, which allowed United States and
Coalition forces to achieve both short term and long term objectives. The facilities that were
identified fell into two categories, storage and production facilities, and research complexes.
59 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 98.
60 Michael J. Eisenstadt, “"The Sword of the Arabs": Iraq's Strategic Weapons.” Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 1990, p. 6.
With both groups addressed, the Coalition prevented the Iraqi military from producing and
using these munitions against the invading ground forces, while also destroying research,
which in turn prevented long term dangers to regional security. Furthermore, earlier attrition
to artillery capability and communications made it all but impossible for the Iraqi military to
mount any type of coordinated chemical or biological assault.62 Some advocates would go as
far as postulating that the intensity of the air campaign deterred the military from using these
means for fear of even greater retaliation by Coalition forces.63 Though nuclear weapons
were never used by the Iraqis, even proponents acknowledge that the air campaign did very
little more than inconvenience these programs.
Despite the successes against the Iraqi chemical and biological facilities, the air
campaign did have problems with regards to directly stopping the ballistic missile
capabilities. The air campaign proved effective against the stationary missile sites, but did
not appear to have the same effect against mobile Scud launchers. The elusiveness of the
Scud launchers has been attributed to better than expected training by Iraqi personnel, more
effective tactics derived from the Soviet-inspired doctrine that the Coalition had expected,
and an exhaustive commitment to the use of decoys and deception. However, advocates will
point to the minimal use (between seventy-five and eighty launches) as evidence that the
large commitment to the “Great Scud Chase,” prevented the Iraqi military from being able to
prosecute their campaign to the desired extent.64 In all, Scud attacks were responsible for a
minimal amount of casualties, as the combination of Coalition air supremacy and Patriot
defense systems all but negated their usefulness.
62 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 82.
63 Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 82.
Overall, the data collected after the war corroborates the fact that air power
significantly attrited the Iraqi military’s ability to defend. On a theater level, CENTCOM
described attrition estimates of thirty-nine percent of Iraqi tanks, thirty-two percent of
armored personnel carriers, and forty-seven percent of artillery.65 Though later assessments
would claim that these numbers of damaged equipment would appear inflated, the
proportional attrition remained true. Furthermore, these numbers were theater wide estimates,
as combat units further from the frontline received less attention during the air campaign,
while combat units closer in Kuwait received more. From an overall perspective, advocates
of air power stand by the notion that there exists no greater proof of the air campaign’s
success than the expeditious and relatively casualty-free nature of the 100 hour ground
campaign that followed its conclusion.
Was the Air Campaign a Failure?
Despite the age of the Gulf War Air Power Survey and its lack of analysis for long
term implications, the air campaign during the Gulf War remains celebrated throughout Air
Force circles. Seen as an overwhelming success, few insiders have come forward to question
its accuracy. However, in the world of academia and policy making, scholars have been more
critical of the air campaign’s tactics. Questioning the methods and scope of the campaign and
their effects on implications regarding the United States security agenda in the future, several
experts and think tanks, including the RAND Corporation, Robert Pape, and Daryl Press,
have criticized the Gulf War air campaign. A review of these three sources provides a critical
evaluation of the Gulf War air campaign strategy.
RAND Corporation’s criticisms
The RAND Corporation published A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf
War in 1994 in an attempt to provide a more objective analysis of the air campaign than the
Gulf War Air Power Survey. Though the RAND Corporation has significant ties to the
United States armed forces, it remains one of the more credible policy think tanks and prides
itself on its impartial assessments. Directed by James Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana
Johnson, A League of Airman provides two significant criticisms of the air campaign during
its overarching analysis. These criticisms are that air power could not successfully address
the Iraqi NBC threats, nor did they counter the Iraqi Scud program. In failing with regard to
these two key issues, the air campaign left potentially decisive options available for the Iraqi
leadership.66
66 James Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson. A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf
The identification and destruction of Iraqi nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
capabilities was one of the first objectives laid out during the early planning phases of the air
campaign. Iraq’s recent history of using chemical munitions, coupled with the intelligence
community’s suspicions concerning biological and nuclear development gave a real reason
for fear within the Coalition leadership. However, due to intelligence failures and
overconfidence, these programs remained relatively intact, a fact that analysts at the RAND
Corporation point to as evidence of the air campaign’s failure.67 Early intelligence briefings
from before the conflict lacked information on the extensive network of research, production,
and storage facilities that the Iraqi regime maintained, and aerial reconnaissance did little
more than corroborate these inaccurate findings. Even many of those that were identified and
targeted remained in a usable state, despite confirmations of their destruction.68 Perhaps due
to a low five percent commitment of daily sorties, many facilities that were key in producing
and researching NBC munitions continued their work throughout the war.
Moreover, RAND analysts point to the very nature of these munitions as an obstacle
for the air campaign’s success. Many of the weapons, most notably the chemical warheads,
are extremely small, making them very easy to conceal and transport without alerting the
Coalition.69 Additionally, the nuclear program was both much larger and closer to
weaponization than the Coalition had predicted.70 In such a stage, the Iraqi regime had a
much easier job hiding and dispersing its evidence. Matters were only exacerbated by the six
month build-up of Coalition forces, giving Saddam even more time to properly hide and
disguise the program.71
67 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, 129.
68 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, 132.
69 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, 132.
A post-war assessment of Iraqi NBC capabilities by the United Nations in 1992 cast a
serious doubt on the air campaign’s effectiveness, as many hidden facilities were discovered,
and those thought to have been disabled were still operational. The United States intelligence
community predicted that within two years, the Iraqi NBC programs would be back operating
at prewar capacity, giving little credit to the idea that the air campaign ensured any long-term
stability in the Gulf region.72 RAND analysts summed up the campaign against Iraqi NBC
capabilities in saying, “[the] setback to the Iraqi program was thus not nearly as significant as
it had been hoped.”73
Second, analysts at the RAND Corporation have pointed to the air campaign’s
inability to combat the Iraqi ballistic missile capabilities as evidence of failure. Unlike Iraqi
NBC programs, who were seen as a top priority, the Iraqi Scud arsenal was deemed
“militarily insignificant” in the early planning phases by the intelligence community and
planners in Riyadh and Washington.74 These missiles, though capable of delivering nuclear
and chemical warheads, were not seen as a serious military threat to troops on the ground,
largely due to their inaccuracy and unreliability. While the air campaign did pivot towards a
focus on missile capabilities, the Iraqi military had already made serious progress in
dispersing and disguising both their fixed launch sites and mobile launching vehicles. This
early lack of attention and commitment spiraled into one of the air campaign’s biggest
problems.
Prior to the air campaign, planners of the air campaign suggested that the Iraqis had
about thirty fixed launching sites and a few dozen mobile launchers, thus they assumed they
72 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War,143.
73 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War,158.
would need only a relatively low sortie count to eliminate these threats.75 Though they
appeared correct in their estimation of fixed sites, the mobile launchers would prove to be
much more numerous and more elusive than strategists had expected. Based on prior
experience with the Soviets, planners assumed mobile Scud teams would need more than half
an hour for dispersal following a launch; however, Iraqi teams proved far more adept,
shaving their time to five minutes.76 Even with constant aerial patrols, Coalition forces were
not fast enough to identify and strike these targets before they scattered. The Iraqis proved
especially clever at disguising their launchers, employing incredibly convincing decoys that
shielded their actual launch vehicles. These tactics fooled Coalition forces on countless
occasions and at the time of the ceasefire, there had been no confirmed kills of mobile
launchers.77
RAND Corporation analysts point out that the mobile launchers were especially
effective at disrupting the air campaign because of the immense diversion of Coalition
resources that it caused. Partly due to intense media coverage, the Coalition was forced to
divert more and more sorties from other tasks and assign them to “Scud hunting” missions
half way through the air campaign.78 Since any missile could potentially carry an NBC
warhead, it was imperative that the Coalition prevent even a single one from reaching its
target. Again, due to the incredible elusiveness of the mobile launchers, the Coalition had to
increase the number of aircraft patrolling and readily available on the ground, in order to
improve their chances at catching them. CENTAF devoted between thirty and forty A-10s
every day to the cause, which amounted to more than twenty percent of the available A-10s
75 Mark Crispin Miller, “Operation Desert Sham,” New York Times, June 24, 1992.
76 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, 132.
77 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, 134.
in the theater.79 These aircraft were some of the most effective for tactical support, and losing
twenty percent to Scud hunting was a significant reduction of Coalition resources. At the
height of the effort, Schwarzkopf estimated one-third of daily sorties were diverted to Scud
hunting.80
Throughout the conflict, the Iraqi military was able to employ Scud attacks, but there
is argument over how effective they were. While advocates point to the low death toll, the
authors of A League of Airman contest that such an argument does not address the Iraqi
strategy. They contend that the goal of Scud attacks was to fracture the Coalition by inciting
Saudi Arabia and Israel to overreact and to retaliate unilaterally. 81 Furthermore, there is
evidence that even with the limited number of strikes initiated, the Iraqi government almost
achieved its goal. In an interview with the New York Times, Schwarzkopf admitted that in
response to Scuds exploding in Tel-Aviv, the Israeli government had one hundred aircraft on
route to attack Iraq, but were talked down just minutes before launching the attack.82 Had this
happened, it is very possible that Iran, a bitter rival of Israel, would have opposed the
Coalition. The air campaign’s failure to combat the Scud program would have had dramatic
consequences, had it not been for some very savvy diplomacy by the United States.
Overall, the evidence provided by the RAND Corporation suggests that the air
campaign left a few key vulnerabilities for the Coalition. Despite a large devotion of time and
resource to the operations, Coalition air planners were unable to achieve the desired effects
against Iraqi NBC and ballistic missile capabilities. Moreover, these objectives were some of
79 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, 134.
80 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, 134.
81 Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airman: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, 133.
82 Herbert Mitgang, “’It Doesn’t Take a Hero’: It’s Not the Last Word, but It’s Firsthand and Fast,” The New
the most important to fulfilling CENTCOM’s goals of ensuring the safety of Coalition
ground forces and regional stability.
Dr. Robert Pape’s criticisms
Additionally, Dr. Robert Pape, a professor of Political Science at the University of
Chicago has put forth several criticisms of the use of air power during the Gulf War. Beyond
his work as a professor, Pape is the founder and director of the Chicago Project on Security
and Terrorism. Having written extensively on the subject of air power, including several
books and numerous articles, Pape contends that the strategic bombing campaign against
Iraq’s infrastructure and economy had little effect on the outcome of the ground invasion and
that the use of advanced weapon technologies gave the Coalition a false sense of success.83
Pape first addresses the Coalition’s strategic bombing campaign into Iraq, which
targeted transportation hubs, electrical grids, and oil production. Undoubtedly, the air
campaign did severely damage to each of these components. However, strategists assumed
that denying the Iraqi leadership, and more importantly the population, these necessities
would cause significant inconvenience to the people and subsequently the regime, which was
a false inference. Pape claims that there is no evidence that there were any uprisings due to
the population’s lack of necessities. 84 While there were minor rebellions, those were
perpetrated by the Kurds, who had a long standing grudge towards the Ba’athist regime. In
fact, Pape points out that despite the reality that ninety percent of Baghdad was without
power and basic necessities, there were no significant public demonstrations.85
83 Robert A. Pape, "The Limits of Precision‐Guided Air Power." Security Studies 7, no. 2 (1997): 103. 84 Pape, “The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power,” 99.
Pape explains this phenomenon by pointing to the length of the conflict. Lasting less
than two months, the war was over before civilians could experience a serious lack of
resources and turn on the government. Pape argues that this is the issue with claiming
strategic bombing was the decisive factor, as there was not enough time to really understand
its implications. 86 While there were certainly minor inconveniences that came with losing
power and supply lines, temperate weather prevented demands for things like air
conditioning, while stockpiled supplies met most needs during the thirty-seven day
campaign. If the goal of strategic bombing is to attrite the enemy’s long term will and ability
to continue fighting, Pape criticizes the notion that such a brief conflict is a worthwhile bench
mark of such a long term strategy.87
Moreover, Pape argues that the Coalition air power strategists developed a false sense
of success due to a lack of understanding of their opponent’s capabilities when targeting
communication networks. Using advanced precision-guided munitions (PGMs), the Coalition
was able to quickly take down much of the communication networks they believed to be
necessary. However, after the first few days of the campaign, these strikes did marginally
less and less to stop communications. Though major nodes had been disrupted, planners
could not account for the countless other means of communications the Iraqis had, including
cell phones, courier, and mobile radios to name a few.88 The bombs had been useful in
destroying large, obvious targets, but did little to combat these improvised methods.
Even when the Coalition did destroy what they thought were critical hubs, the
intelligence that air planners were given was sometimes misguided. In one example, the
Coalition bombed the central telephone exchange in Baghdad, which they assumed would
86 Pape, “The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power,” 108.
87 Pape, “The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power,” 108.
knock out a significant line of communication from the regime to the military. However, in
the months of build-up prior to the campaign, the Iraqis had moved the important equipment
to another location. 89 This led planners to over report the effect that the strike had on the
overall Iraqi communication network.
By and large, Pape argues, that the Iraqi leadership and military commands were still
able to communicate. In a briefing to the president, the Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted that
seventy-five percent of national command telecommunications and thirty percent of military
communications were still operational.90 These shortcomings had a noticeable effect on
battlefield operations. During the Battle of Khaji, the invading Iraqi forces proved capable of
coordination, maneuvering division-sized ground units in the face of Coalition fire. Though
the Iraqis would be routed, much of that was likely due to a technological gap between
armies, not a lack of communication. With regards to the rest of the Iraqi military, Pape
claims their lack of maneuvering was due to a shortage of intelligence, as they did not have
the same access to satellite imaging, and their ground-based radar had been jammed. 91
From an overall perspective of the air campaign, Pape argues that this new ability to
accurately target infrastructure and troops in the field with PGMs had a somewhat protracting
effect on the war. Iraqi officials interviewed after the war believed that the lack of bombing
of densely populated areas of the nation showed a lack of commitment to the war by the
Coalition. Pressed further, one official said the lack of extensive bombing on Baghdad and
Basra indicated that they should “hold tight and the Americans will go away.”92 Such a
statement gives weight to the arguments of critics, like Pape, who believe that this less
89 Pape, “The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power,” 106.
90 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014):
240.
91 Pape, Bombing to win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 240.
extensive but more precise form of strategic bombing is not decisive, and possibly even
harmful.
Dr. Daryl Press’s criticisms
Dr. Daryl Press is a professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College
and responsible for perhaps the most thorough criticism of the Gulf War air campaign
strategy. In addition to an extensive list of publications, Press worked several years as a
consultant for the Department of Defense and the RAND Corporation. With a substantial
background in policy analysis and history, Press challenges the consensus that the air
campaign was both necessary and decisive. His argument contests five major points put forth
by proponents of the GWAPS. These include the assertions that air power pinned down Iraqi
forces preventing them from maneuvering and reinforcing; that Iraqi forces were rendered
ineffective by the loss of command, control, communications and intelligence (CCCI); that
air strikes cut Iraqi supply lines; that air power destroyed enough Iraqi equipment and
soldiers in the KTO to prevent resistance; and that five weeks of bombing broke Iraqi morale.
He disputes the veracity of the first and third phase of the air campaign’s success, the
strategic bombing campaign into Iraq and the preparation of the battlefield. Lastly, Press
applies the legacies of the Gulf War air campaign to future conflicts undertaken by the
United States military.93
Press’s first point of contention tests the notion that overwhelming air power
immobilized the Iraqi military, similar to some of Pape’s arguments, and he provides several
93Daryl Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,” International
examples that cast doubt on this claim. With the exception of the Republic Guard, the mobile
divisions of the Iraqi regular Iraqi Army posed the greatest threat to coalition troops. Out of
nine heavy divisions deployed by the regular army in the KTO, eight maneuvered into new
positions, four retreated back into Iraq, two counterattacked the advancing United States
Marine divisions to the south, and two more advanced west in an attempt to block the
coalition’s flanking attack.94
Moreover, three divisions of Republican Guards moved to bolster the western line of
units fortified against the coalition’s flank attempt. The only division that remained “pinned
down” was overrun within hours of the initial ground invasion, before orders could be
received. Despite movements in the open, these soldiers crossed the desert almost unabated,
directly challenging the idea that movement under coalition-controlled air space would be
impossible. Of three thousand armored vehicles that maneuvered during the ground invasion,
just one hundred fifty were destroyed by air attacks. It appears as though air command was
only able to interdict forces moving on roads, yet the desert landscape allowed for off-road
maneuvering. 95
In addressing the argument that CENTCOM was able to successfully disrupt Iraqi
CCCI capabilities, Press does concede a degree of merit. Evidence suggests that
communications broke down significantly enough that Saddam began issuing some orders
via courier, while Iraqi commanders gave up encrypting broadcasts, as they no longer had the
ability to communicate by such means, showing that there was a real impact on CCCI.96 Such
an evaluation of Iraqi CCCI capability, or lack thereof, is only half true. Despite a break
down in CCCI, the Iraqi military was able to correctly diagnose the flanking attack from the
94 Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,”27.
95 Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,”27.
