1. ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES V. NLRC, 238 SCRA 232
FACTS: On 27 June 1987, petitioner Alhambra Industries, Inc. (ALHAMBRA for brevity), a Filipino cigar and cigarette manufacturing and distribution company, employed private respondent Danilo C. Rupisan as salesman on a six-month probationary basis. From 9-12 December 1989, ALHAMBRA conducted a surprise audit of the records of Rupisan. He was then called to the Head Office on 3 January 1990 where alleged violations of company rules purportedly committed by him were brought to his attention. On 8 January 1990, Rupisan was placed under a one-month preventive suspension for serious violations of company policies, rules and regulations, as reflected in the results of the surprise audit.
On 22 January 1990, Rupisan protested his suspension, reiterating vehement denial of the charges against him and exposing the threat of termination at their meeting of 3 January 1990. He alleges that as of 30 December 1989 the charges against him had become academic when he was given a clearance of all his accountabilities.
On 6 February 1990, a day before the end of his suspension, ALHAMBRA wrote Rupisan terminating his services effective 8 February 1990.
On 23 March 1990, Rupisan sued ALHAMBRA for illegal dismissal and unpaid wages or commissions. The suit was later amended on 24 April 1990 to include charges of illegal suspension and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether Rupisan was illegally dismissed by Alhambra?
Whether Rupisan was accorded due process when he was terminated?
HELD: The Labor Arbiter found valid grounds for the termination of Rupisan due to his violation of the rules and regulations of the Alhambra. The issue regarding the validity of the dismissal no longer needs to be tackled at length since the Labor Arbiter’s findings shall be binding upon the Court.
With regard to the lack of due process, Rupisan did not have a copy of the audit report which was the basis of his termination. Also, he never had the chance to defend himself against the allegations of his employer prior to his termination. Hence, it was found that there was lack of due process. In line with these findings, since there was valid cause for termination, reinstatement is no longer proper. However, damages should be granted due to the lack of due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of NLRC dated 29 May 1992 is SET ASIDE. The decision of Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr., dated 19 November 1990 is REINSTATED except as to the award of separation pay which is deleted. In addition, petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent Danilo Rupisan P10,000.00 for having been denied procedural due process.
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2. INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES V. NLRC, 235 SCRA 268
Facts: The instant petition seeks the reversal and/or modification of the Resolution dated March 30, 1994 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dismissing the appeals of petitioners and affirming the decision dated November 16, 1992 of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Administrator Felicisimo C. Joson, This is a claim for death compensation benefits filed by Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son, seaman Jeremias Pineda, against Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation and the Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. The following facts were found by the POEA Administrator.
On September 28, 1989, he finished his contract and was discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila; that his flight schedule from Dubai to the Philippines necessitated a stopover at Bangkok, Thailand, and during said stopover he disembarked on his own free will and failed to join the connecting flight to Hongkong with final destination to Manila; that on October 5, 1990, it received a fax transmission from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the effect that Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on duty on October 2, 1989 at around 4:00 P.M.; that the police report submitted to the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who "approached and tried to stab the police sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was
forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda"
Petitioner contends that they are not liable to pay any death/burial benefits pursuant to the provisions of Par. 6, Section C. Part II, POEA Standard Format of Employment which state(s) that "no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, (in)capacity, disability or death resulting from a willful (sic) act on his own life by the seaman"; that the deceased seaman died due to his own willful (sic) act in attacking a policeman in Bangkok who shot him in self-defense. After the parties presented their respective evidence, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision holding petitioners liable for death compensation benefits and burial expenses.
Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to the public respondent. In a Decision dated March 30, 1994, public respondent upheld the POEA. Thus, this recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari per Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: W the petitioners can be held liable for the death of seaman Jeremias Pineda? Held: The petitioners contention that the assailed Resolution has no factual and legal bases is belied by the adoption with approval by the public respondent of the findings of the POEA Administrator, which recites at length the reasons for holding that the deceased Pineda was mentally sick prior to his death and concomitantly, was no longer
in full control of his mental faculties.
In this instance, seaman Pineda, who was discharged in Dubai, a foreign land, could not reasonably be expected to immediately resort to and avail of psychiatric examination,
assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time, not to mention the fact that when he disembarked in Dubai, he was already discharged and without employment — his contract having already run its full term — and he had already been put on a plane bound for the Philippines. Such mental disorder became evident when he failed to join his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during said stopover wandered out of the Bangkok airport's immigration area on his own. This Court agrees with the POEA Administrator that seaman Pineda was no longer acting sanely when he attacked the Thai policeman. The report of the Philippine Embassy in Thailand dated October 9, 1990 depicting the deceased's strange behavior shortly before he was shot dead, after having wandered around Bangkok for four days, clearly shows that the man was not in full control of his own self. The POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court agrees, that since Pineda attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his mental faculties, the aforequoted provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exemption the employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that thereby, his will must have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no wise be characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part. Secondly, and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased's mental condition, petitioners "should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said seaman to travel home alone", and their failure to do so rendered them liable for the
death of Pineda.
Petitioners further argue that the cause of Pineda's death "is not one of the occupational diseases listed by law", and that in the case of De Jesus vs. Employee's Compensation Commission, this Court held that ". . . for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of the Rules (the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation) with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise
lost their usefulness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision assailed in this petition is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
__________________________________________________________________ 3. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN VS. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF LETRAN
G.R. No. 141471 | September 18, 2000
Facts: On December 1992, in the course of its renegotiation of the CBA with the Colegio de San Juan de Letran, Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, the union elected a new set of officers wherein private respondent Eleanor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioner but was later on reversed on appeal.
While negotiating on a new CBA, Ambas was informed through a letter that her work schedule was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA. Petitioner then dismissed Ambas for alleged insubordination. Ambas has been in the service for more than 10 years and has been a recipient of Loyalty Award.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment declared petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two counts and directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas with backwages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the Secretary.
Issue: Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees' right to self-organization.
Held: YES. The dismissal was effected in violation of the employees' right to self-organization.
While the Court recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.iThe employer's right to terminate the services of an employee for just or authorized cause must be exercised in good faith. It must not amount to interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization because it would amount to, as in this case, unlawful labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination. But when the exercise of such management right tends to interfere with the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.
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4. FARROL V. CA. 325 SCRA 331 FACTS
- Winifredo Farrol was the station cashier of RCPI (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.) Cotabato City Station.
- There was a P50K cash shortage in the branch’s Peragram, Petty and General Cash Funds. Farrol was required to explain the cash shortage. He paid to P25K to RCPI. - He was then required to explain why he should not be dismissed. Petitioner wrote to the Field Auditor stating that the missing funds were used for the payment of the retirement benefits earlier referred by the Branch Manager and that he already paid P25k. After he made 2 more payments of the cash shortage, he was placed under preventive suspensions. He still made 2 payments of the balance.
- RCPI then sent Farrol a letter informing him of the termination of his services for alleging that part of the cash shortage was used for payment of salaries and retirement benefits, disregard of policies involving statistical reports, malversation /misappropriation (which is a ground for dismissal), and loss of trust and confidence. - Unaware of the termination letter, he requested his reinstatement since his preventive suspension had expired. Ferrol even manifested his willingness to settle the case. RCPI informed him that his employment had already been terminated. The conflict was sent to the grievance committee. Two years later, it was submitted for voluntary arbitration. - VA ruled in favor of Farrol. RCPI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which reversed VA decision. CA also dismissed MFR.
- Farrol now filed a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that his dismissal was illegal because he was not afforded due process and that he cannot be held liable for the loss of trust and confidence reposed in him.
ISSUE WON he was illegally terminated HELD YES
- Burden of proof resides on the employer to prove that there was valid cause for dismissal, and that he was afforded the opportunity to be heard and defend himself. - For the 1st notice, RCPI required petitioner to explain why he failed to account for the shortage. The 2nd notice was that informing Farrol of his termination. It does not clearly cite the reasons for dismissal, nor were there facts and circumstances in support thereof.
- Even assuming there was a breach of trust and confidence, there was no evidence that Farrol was a managerial employee. The term “trust and confidence” is restricted to managerial employees.
- RCPI alleges that under its rules, petitioner’s infarction is punishable by dismissal. However, employer’s rules cannot preclude the state from inquiring whether strict and
rigid application or interpretation would be too harsh to the employee. This is Farrol’s 1st offense, to which the Court holds that dismissal is too harsh and grossly disproportionate.
Disposition
CA is REVERSED and SETASIDE and new one entered REINSTATING the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator subject to the MODIFICATION that petitioner’s separation pay be recomputed to include the period within which backwages are due. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Voluntary Arbitrator for proper computation of backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay, sick leave conversion and vacation leave conversion.
__________________________________________________________________ 5. VH MANUFACTURING INC. V. NLRC, 322 SCRA 417
FACTS Since November 5, 1985 Gamido was employed in VH Manufacturing’s business of manufacturing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. He served as a quality control inspector with the principal duty of inspecting LPG cylinders for any possible defects. His service with the company was abruptly interrupted on February 14, 1995, when he was served a notice of termination of his employment.
- His dismissal stemmed from an incident on February 10, 1995 wherein VH’s company President, Alejandro Dy Juanco, allegedly caught private Gamido sleeping on the job. On that same day, private respondent was asked through a written notice from the petitioner’s Personnel Department to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his violation of Company Rule 15-b which provides for a penalty of separation for sleeping during working hours. Without delay, private respondent replied in a letter which reads: "Sir, ipagpaumanhin po ninyo kung nakapikit ako sa aking puwesto dahil hinihintay ko po ang niliha hi Abreu para i quality pasensiya na po kung hindi ko po namalayan ang pagdaan ninyo dahil maingay po ang painting booth." Notwithstanding his foregoing reply, he was terminated. - Feeling aggrieved, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for reinstatement to his position as quality control inspector. Labor Arbiter declared that Gamido’s dismissal is anchored on a valid and just cause. NLRC reversed the decision.
ISSUE WON Gamido’s dismissal was too harsh a penaltly for his violation of company rule 15-b
HELDYES. Basically, the reason cited for the dismissal of private respondent is sleeping on the job in violation of Company Rule 15-b. But according to Gamido, he was not sleeping on the job but was merely idle, waiting for the next cylinder to be checked.
- In view of the gravity of the penalty of separation, as provided by the Company Rules and Regulation., in termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause. What is at stake here is not
only the job itself of the employee but also his regular income therefrom which is the means of livelihood of his family.
- A thorough review of the record discloses that, contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner’s claim that private respondent slept on the job was not substantiated by any convincing evidence other than the bare allegation of the officer.
- Next, VH’s reliance on the authorities it cited that sleeping on the job is always a valid ground for dismissal, is misplaced. The authorities cited involved security guards whose duty necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times inasmuch as their function, to use the words in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, is "to protect the company from pilferage or loss." Accordingly, the doctrine laid down in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar.
- Finally, while an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the case at bar, the dismissal meted out on private respondent for allegedly sleeping on the job, under the attendant circumstances, appears to be too harsh a penalty, considering that he was being held liable for first time, after nine 9 of unblemished service, for an alleged offense which caused no prejudice to the employer, aside from absence of substantiation of the alleged offense. Neither was it shown that private respondent’s alleged negligence or neglect of duty, if any, was gross and habitual. Thus, reinstatement is just and proper.
Disposition petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the challenged Decision and Order of public respondent NLRC are AFFIRMED.
__________________________________________________________________ 6. CEBU FILVENEER CORPORATION VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION | GR No. 126601| February 24, 1998
FACTS: Jessielyn Villaflor was hired as chief accountant of petitioner Cebu Filveneer Corporation. Ms. Rhodora M. Guillermo served as her accounting clerk. The top executives of petitioner corporation were Italians: Mr. Carlo Cordaro, President; Mr. John Chapman Kun, General Manager; and, Mr. Renato Marinoni, Production Manager. Mr. Kun informed Mr. Cordaro of his desire to resign as general manager effective March 1, 1992. He requested for the liquidation of his investment in the company in the sum of P125,000.00.
Mr. Kun secured one blank check and blank check voucher from Ms. Guillermo. Ms. Guillermo failed to immediately inform the private respondent of the blank check and voucher taken by Mr. Kun. Private respondent, however, noticed the missing check voucher. She asked Ms. Guillermo about the check voucher and was told that it was with Mr. Kun. Mr. Kun was able to prepare the check in the amount of P125,000.00, had it signed by Mr. Marinoni and encashed.
Private respondent learned of Mr. Kun's act and forthwith informed Mr. Cordaro who was then in Italy. Mr. Cordaro suspended Mr. Kun and designated Mr. Marinoni and the private complainant as responsible persons for the company funds. He also directed the private complainant to assist the company lawyer in filing a criminal case against Mr. Kun. On her part, the private complainant wrote to the PNB MEPZ Branch demanding the return of the encashed check.
Mr. Marinoni confronted the private respondent and charged her with complicity in Mr. Kun's irregular disbursement of company funds. On February 17, 1992, the private respondent reported for work late and was prevented entry by the security guards. A Restriction Order has been issued against her by Mr. Marinoni upon authority of Mr. Cordaro. Mr. Marinoni also caused the forcible opening of private respondent's table and the vault inside her office.
Private respondent complained to the MEPZ Labor Relations Officer. The next day, Mr. Marinoni issued a memorandum suspending the private respondent for thirty (30) days without pay effective February 17, 1992 for failure to report to office for half a day. On February 19, 1992, the private respondent filed a case against the petitioners for illegal dismissal. On February 20, 1992, Mr. Marinoni issued another memorandum preventively suspending her for thirty (30) days effective the next day pending investigation on her involvement in the unauthorized encashment by Mr. Kun of company funds.
ISSUES: Whether private respondent Villaflor was illegally dismissed? Whether the amount earned of an employee during the termination should be deducted from the amount awarded to the employee? Whether the award for moral damages is warranted to the employee? Whether the President, Mr. Cordaro, should be solidarily liable with the corporation for the payment to the employee?
RULING: In labor-management relations, there can be no higher penalty than dismissal from employment. Dismissal severs employment ties and could well be the economic death sentence of an employee. Dismissal prejudices the socio-economic well being of the employee's family and threatens the industrial peace. Due to its far reaching implications, our Labor Code decrees that an employee cannot be dismissed, except for the most serious causes. The overly concern of our laws for the welfare of employees is in accord with the social justice philosophy of our Constitution.
Prescinding from these premises, petitioners' insistence that they legally dismissed the private respondent for loss of trust stands on quicksand. At the very most, petitioners were only able to prove that private respondent failed to inform immediately her superiors of the act of Mr. Kun in getting a blank check and blank voucher from Ms. Guillermo. The omission of the private respondent can hardly be described as "willful" to justify her dismissal. For one, the omission did not last for long. For another, the subsequent actions of the private respondent upon learning of the encashment of the unauthorized check by Mr. Kun negate any implication that she willfully or intentionally defaulted in reporting to prejudice petitioners. Indeed, she reported the matter to petitioner Cordaro and wrote to the PNB MEPZ Branch to retrieve the encashed check. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely. Petitioners merely proved the omission of the private respondent but there is no evidence whatsoever that it was done intentionally.
Petitioners' demand that the backwages should he reduced in view of the time she spent in the United States deserves scant attention. On 21 March 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 took effect, amending the Labor Code. Article 279 thereof states in part: Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation is withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not, as a general rule, be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality (illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee.
We hold that public respondent should not have awarded moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of the private respondent. To be sure, the private respondent was negligent when she did not immediately inform her superior about the blank check and voucher taken by Mr. Kun, although, as aforediscussed, it is not the specie of negligence that will justify dismissal. Thus, petitioners should not and cannot be made to pay moral damages and attorney's fees for their dismissal of the private respondent was not motivated by bad faith or malice.
Finally, we hold that Mr. Cordaro cannot be made solidarily liable with petitioner corporation for the illegal dismissal of the private respondent. In dismissing the private respondent, he acted as President of petitioner corporation and he did so in good faith. His act as an officer of the corporation cannot result in his private liability. This is too fundamental. a rule to deserve further discussion.
__________________________________________________________________ 7. GOLDEN THREAD KNITTING INDUSTIRES V NLRC (MACASPAC)
304 SCRA 720
FACTS: Several employees of Golden Thread Knitting Industries (GTK) were dismissed for different reasons. Two employees were dismissed for allegedly slashing the company’s products (towels), 2 for redundancy, 1 for threatening the personnel manager and violating the company rules, and 1 for abandonment of work. The laborers filed complaints for illegal dismissal. They allege that the company dismissed them in retaliation for establishing and being members of the Labor Union.
GTK, on the other hand, contend that there were valid causes for the terminations. The dismissals were allegedly a result of the slashing of their products, rotation of work, which in turn was caused by the low demand for their products, and abandonment of work. WRT to the cases involving the slashing of their products and threats to the personnel manager, the dismissals were in effect a form of punishment. The labor arbiter ruled partially in favor of GTK. He said that there was no showing that the
dismissals were in retaliation for establishing a union. He, however, awarded separation pay tosome employees. NLRC, however, appreciated the evidence differently. It heldthat there was illegal dismissal and ordered reinstatement.
ISSUE:WON there was illegal dismissal?
HELD: YES. Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. It must therefore be based on a clear and not on an ambiguous or ambivalent ground. WRT to the case involving slashing of towels, the employees were not given procedural due process. There was no notice and hearing, only outright denial of their entry to the work premises by the security guards. The charges of serious misconduct were not sufficiently proved.WRT to the employees dismissed for redundancy, there was also denial of procedural due process. Hearing and notice were not observed. Thus, although the characterization of an employee’s services is a management function, it must first be proved with evidence, which was not done in this case. thecompany cannot merely declare that it was overmanned.WRT to the employee dismissed for disrespect, the SC believed the story version of the company (which essentially said that the personnel manager was threatened upon mere service of a suspension order to the employee), but ruled that he dismissal could not be upheld. “the dismissal will not be upheld where it appears that the employee’s act of disrespect was provoked by the employer.
xxx the employee hurled incentives at the personnel manager because she was provoked by the baseless suspension imposed on her. The penalty of dismissal must be commensurate with the act, conduct, or omission to the employee.”
- The dismissal was too harsh a penalty; a suspension of 1 week would have sufficed. “GTK exercised their authority to dismiss without due regard to the provisions of the Labor Code. The right to terminate should be utilized with extreme caution because its immediate effect is to put an end to an employee's present means of livelihood while its distant effect, upon a subsequent finding of illegal dismissal, is just as pernicious to the employer who will most likely be required to reinstate thes ubject employee and grant him full back wages and other benefits.
Doctrine: Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. It must therefore be based on a clear and not on an ambiguous or ambivalent ground. From our assessment of the records, we find that petitioners exercised their authority to dismiss without due regard to the pertinent exacting provisions of the Labor Code. The right to terminate should be utilized with extreme caution because its immediate effect is to put an end to an employee's present means of livelihood while its distant effect, upon a subsequent finding of illegal dismissal, is just as pernicious to the employer who will most likely be required to reinstate the subject employee and grant him full back wages and other benefits.
__________________________________________________________________ 8. CENTRAL PANGASINAN ELECTRIC COOP INC. V. MACARAEG, 395 SCRA 720
This is a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. challenges the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55128 affirming the decision of the voluntary arbitrator in NCMB-RBI-PM-VA-5-03-99 ordering the reinstatement of respondents to petitioner’s employ and payment of their backwages.
Petitioner is an electric cooperative while the respondents, Geronima Macaraeg and Maribeth de Vera are employees of petitioner at its office in Area V, Bayambang, Pangasinan. Respondent de Vera was employed as teller whose primary duty was to accept payments from petitioner’s consumers in Bayambang and remit her collections to the cashier, herein co-respondent Geronima Macaraeg.
From January 1998 to January 1999, respondent de Vera accommodated and encashed the crossed checks of her sister, Evelyn Joy Estrada amounting to P6,945,128.95 payable to petitioner cooperative. In turn, respondent de Vera, with the knowledge and consent of respondent Macaraeg, paid the full value of these checks from the cash collections of petitioner. Such act was discovered in January 1999 by the petitioner, through its Finance Department. Petitioner confronted respondents with their discovery. Respondent de Vera admitted that the checks were issued by her sister and that she encashed them from the money collected from petitioner’s customers. A memo was submitted to the GM detailing the findings about the bounced checks. Petitioner, through de Guzman, issued a memorandum to respondents placing them under preventive suspension and requiring them to explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours why they misappropriated cooperative funds. A hearing was also held at the board room of the petitioner with the assistance of respondents counsel. Respondents provided answers/explanations. On March 10, 1999, Atty. Fernandez submitted his findings to the General Manager of petitioner.
On the basis of said findings and recommendation, the General Manager issued to respondents separate notices of termination, effective April 9, 1999, for “serious misconduct, and breach of trust and confidence reposed on them by management.”
Respondents, with the help of the President and representative of the Union, Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative (CENPELCO) Employees’ Association-Tupas Local Chapter No. R01-0012, questioned their dismissal before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). They claimed that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which requires that the case should first be brought before a grievance committee. Eventually, the parties agreed to submit the case to a voluntary arbitrator for arbitration.
On August 12, 1999, the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision in favor of respondents and asffirmed by the CA on August 17, 2000. Hence, this petition;
ISSUE: Whether respondents were validly dismissed.
HELD: YES. The SC held that there exists a valid reason to dismiss both employees. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to dismiss employees for willful breach of trust or loss of confidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of their misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for
the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that they are responsible for the misconduct and their participation therein rendered them unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of their position.
Here, the acts of the respondents were clearly inimical to the financial interest of the petitioner. During the investigation, they admitted accommodating Evelyn Joy Estrada by encashing her checks from its funds. They did so without petitioner’s knowledge, much less its permission. These inimical acts lasted for more than a year, and probably would have continued had it not been discovered in time. All along, they were aware that these acts were prohibited by the Coop Checks Policy. Clearly, there was willful breach of trust on the respondents’ part, as they took advantage of their highly sensitive positions to violate their duties.
Also, petitioner observed procedural due process in dismissing the respondents. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55128 (affirming the decision of the voluntary arbitrator in NCMB-RBI-PM-VA-5-03-99) are reversed and set aside.
__________________________________________________________________ 9. JOSE V. SALVADOR, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE MINING SERVICE CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 148766. JANUARY 22, 2003
FACTS: Respondent company Philippine Mining Service Corporation is engaged in developing dolomite ore deposits in Cebu used in glass, fertilizer and steel manufacture. Their products also include contaminated ore and dolomite spillage.
Petitioner Jose Salvador is a “shift boss” or foreman who oversees both mining and plant operations. As shift boss, he was entrusted with the care, supervision and protection of the entire plant. Aside from his employment with respondent company, petitioner is also the business partner of Ondo Alcantara in the manufacture and sale of hollow blocks.
One evening, respondent's Assistant Resident Manager Koji Sawa chanced upon petitioner hauling fine ore from the stockpile, using their payloader to petitioner's private truck, contrary to standard operating procedure. Sawa checked the delivery receipt which indicated that it was dolomite spillage that was purchased by buyer Ondo Alcantara, not the fine ore that he saw petitioner loading on his truck. The receipt also showed it was the buyer who should load the spillage he purchased from the plant with the use of his own equipment.
Consequently, petitioner was investigated for and found guilty of pilferage and violation of company rules and policy that resulted in loss of confidence. Hence, respondent company dismissed petitioner from service.
Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter which found for the petitioner but did not order him reinstated on account of antagonistic relations between the parties. The arbiter only ordered separation pay and not backwages because he did not deserve it due to his “indiscretion amounting to gross neglect of duty.” Both parties
appealed the decision to the NLRC which affirmed the arbiter's decision, modifying it to reinstate petitioner.
Respondent company assailed the NLRC decision before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ruled that “there was valid and just cause for petitioner’s dismissal as it was proved that he was guilty of pilferage, serious misconduct and dishonesty.” Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of pilferage against petitioner was supported by substantial evidence to warrant his dismissal from the service.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative after evaluation of the parties' evidence indubitably showed that petitioner’s dismissal for loss of trust and confidence was duly supported by substantial evidence.
The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just cause and this must be supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the settled rule is that the required proof in determining the legality of an employee's dismissal is substantial evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence.
According to the Court, substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. Thus, substantial evidence is the least demanding in the hierarchy of evidence. The Court said, “In the case at bar, respondent has every right to dismiss petitioner, a managerial employee, for breach of trust and loss of confidence as a measure of self-preservation against acts patently inimical to its interests. Indeed, in cases of this nature, the fact that petitioner has been employed with the respondent for a long time, if to be considered at all, should be taken against him, as his act of pilferage reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty which he should have strengthened, instead of betrayed.” __________________________________________________________________ 10. HABANA V. NLRC |298 SCRA 537 | SEPTEMBER 10, 1999
FACTS: Rodrigo Habana was hired by OMANFIL to work for its foreign principal, HYUNDAI, in Kuwait, for 2 years based on the employment contract. However, after 1 year, HYUNDAI issued a Resignation Notice terminating his employment. Habana was forced to return to the Philippines. Together with another dismissed employee, Adjuthor De Guzman, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against OMANFIL and HYUNDAI (private respondents).
Summons was issued to OMANFIL and HYUNDAI to file their answer within 10 days from receipt thereof. After 2 days beyond the period set, the two filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars instead, alleging that the complaint sheet filed by Habana and De Guzman lacked the required narration of facts constituting causes of action. Habana and De Guzman moved to declare default on private respondents for failure to submit answer
on time. Private respondents opposed the motion. The parties later agreed to submit their motions for consideration to the Labor Arbiter.
Without waiting for the resolution, complainants filed their Bill of Particulars. Thereafter, the LA rendered decision in favor of complainants holding that due to failure of private respondents to file their answers, the case is resolved on the basis of complainants position paper and other supporting documents.
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the decision of the LA and remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, ruling that OMANFIL and HYUNDAI were denied due process for not having allowed private respondents present their answers considering that there are still factual issues that need to be taken into consideration into.
ISSUE: Were OMANFIL and HYUNDAI denied due process?
HELD:Yes. First, there was only one conciliatory conference held wherein the parties did not discuss at all the possibility of amicable settlement due to complainants insistence of default on private respondents. Second, the parties agreed to submit their respective motions for consideration of the LA. Third, since the conference, no order or notice was sent by the LA to the private respondents as to what happened on their motions and they were not also declared in default by the LA. Fourth, neither there was any order or notice requiring private respondents to file their position paper, nor an order informing the parties that the case was already submitted for decision.
Based on the foregoing, there was utter absence of opportunity to be heard at the arbitration level, as the procedure adopted by the LA virtually prevented private respondents from explaining matters fully and presenting their side.
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence he may have in support of his defense. Where, as in this case, sufficient opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or position paper and other pleadings is not accorded a party to a case, there is undoubtedly a denial of due process.
In the instant case, what should have been done by the Labor Arbiter was to rule on the pending motions, or at least notify private respondents that he would no longer resolve their motions, and to direct them forthwith to submit within a reasonable time their position paper as well as all the evidence they might want to introduce before the case would be resolved. These are essential not only in the interest of orderly procedure but, more importantly, as part of due process. But as has been said, not a single order or notice was received by private respondents from the Labor Arbiter, other than the assailed decision.
Decision of NLRC to remand the case to the court of origin for further hearings affirmed. __________________________________________________________________
11. PLDT V. TOLENTINO | G.R. No. 143171 | September 21, 2004
Facts: Respondent Tolentino was employed in petitioner PLDT for 23 years. He started in 1972 as an installer/helper and, at the time of his termination in 1995, was the division manager of the Project Support Division and Provincial Expansion Center. In 1995, Jonathan de Rivera, a supervisor directly under respondent Tolentino, was found to have entered into an “internal arrangement” with the sellers of a parcel of land which he recommended for acquisition under PLDT’s expansion program. Quirino Donato, the attorney-in-fact of the landowner, executed an affidavit disclosing his “internal arrangement” with de Rivera. Donato’s affidavit revealed that all follow-up calls regarding the transaction were to be directed to the office of respondent and de Rivera. Upon being apprised of this “internal arrangement,” PLDT dismissed de Rivera. Afterwards, de Rivera submitted a sworn statement to PLDT implicating respondent as the person behind the anomalous “internal arrangement.” Respondent denied involvement to said agreement. PLDT sent a notice of dismissal to respondent. Attached to this notice was a handwritten note from Vice-President of the Provincial Expansion Center, giving Tolentino the option to resign. Petitioner did not grant respondent’s request for a formal hearing but delayed the implementation of his dismissal. Later on, petitioner informed respondent that his dismissal was already final and effective on December 5, 1995.
Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter found that petitioner PLDT failed to prove and substantiate the charges against respondent. NLRC reversed decision on the ground that respondent was a managerial employee and that loss of trust and confidence was enough reason to dismiss him. CA reinstated Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Issue: W/N the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the dismissal was not founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant separation from employment.
Held:The petition is without merit. PLDT’s basis for respondent’s dismissal was not enough to defeat respondent’s security of tenure. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required provided there is a valid reason for the loss of trust and confidence, such as when the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the managerial employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct and the nature of his participation renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
However, the right of the management to dismiss must be balanced against the managerial employee’s right to security of tenure which is not one of the guaranties he gives up upon his acceptance of his promotion. Managerial employees enjoy security of tenure and, although the standards for their dismissal are less stringent, the loss of trust and confidence must be substantial and founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the managerial employee’s separation from the company. Substantial evidence is of critical importance and the burden rests on the employer to prove it. Due to its subjective nature, it can easily be concocted by an abusive employer and used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified.
Petitioner’s dismissal was not founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant separation from employment. The evidence relied upon by petitioner PLDT - de Rivera’s
sworn statement and Donato’s affidavit - does not, in our view, establish respondent Tolentino’s complicity in the “internal arrangement” engineered by his subordinate de Rivera.
It is true that respondent Tolentino was remiss in his duties as division manager for failing to discover the “internal arrangement” contrived by his subordinate. However, we disagree that dismissal was the proper sanction for such negligence. It was not commensurate to the lapse committed, especially in the light of respondent’s unblemished record of long and dedicated service to the company.
Although a managerial employee, respondent should be reinstated to his former position or its equivalent without loss of seniority rights inasmuch as the alleged strained relations between the parties were not adequately proven by petitioner PLDT which had the burden of doing so. No competent evidence exists in the records to support PLDT’s assertion that a peaceful working relationship with respondent Tolentino was no longer possible. In fact, the records of the case show that PLDT, through VP Sacdalan, gave respondent Tolentino the option to resign. Such a deferential act by management makes us doubt PLDT’s claim that its relations with respondent were “strained.” The option to resign would not have been given had animosity existed between them. Furthermore, respondent was dismissed in December, 1995 when petitioner PLDT was still under the Cojuangco group. PLDT has since then passed to the ownership and control of its new owners, the First Pacific group which has absolutely nothing to do so with this controversy. Since there are no strained relations between the new management and respondent, reinstatement is feasible. Tolentino was reinstated with full backwages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. The Court of Appeals decision reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of attorney’s fees is reduced to 5% of the total amount due respondent Tolentino. The award of moral and exemplary damages is deleted for reasons already explained.
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12. FUJITSU COMPUTER PRODUCTS CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERNESTO ESPINOSA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR DE GUZMAN and ANTHONY P. ALVAREZ, respondents.
Facts: Respondent Victor de Guzman works for petitioner Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines (FCPP) as Facilities Section Manager. He was also holding in a concurrent capacity the position of Coordinator ISO 14000 Secretariat. Respondent Allan Alvarez, on the other hand, was employed as a Senior Engineer. He was assigned at the Facilities Department under the supervision of respondent De Guzman. The garbage and scrap materials of FCPP were collected and bought by the Saro’s Trucking Services and Enterprises (Saro’s).
On January 15, 1999, respondent De Guzman as Facilities Section Manager, for and in behalf of FCPP, signed a Garbage Collection Agreement with Saro’s. The latter’s signatory therein was its owner and general manager, Larry Manaig. Petitioner Ernesto Espinosa, HRD and General Affairs Director of FCPP, then received a disturbing report from Manaig. He reported that respondent De Guzman had caused the “anomalous disposal of steel [purlins] owned by FCPP.” Petitioner Espinosa sent a two-page Inter-Office Memorandum to respondent De Guzman, effectively placing him under preventive suspension. He was likewise directed to submit his written explanation on the charges against him. In the Memorandum, petitioner said that Manaig disclosed to them that sometime in the first week of July 1999, De Guzman personally approached Mr. Roberto Pumarez, Supervisor of Saro’s, and intimated to him, his interest in the scrap metals. De Guzman allegedly told Pumarez that since Saro’s is paying FCPP P2.50 per kilo of metal, he will buy it from Saro’s for P3.00 per kilo. The Memorandum further stated that approximately 2,800 kgs of scrap metals were delivered by Saro’s to Sta. Rosa Baptist Church per De Guzman’s instructions. It was likewise reported by Mr. Manaig that there were previous occasions in the past where De Guzman solicited from him empty drums, pails, and corrugated cartons, which were all part of those picked up from FCPP. Petitioner stated in the Memorandum that De Guzman’s actions constitute qualified theft, grave abuse of authority, and willful breach of trust and confidence. De Guzman is directed to submit his written explanation within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt why no disciplinary sanction should be imposed against him, including dismissal from the service.
In his Explanation dated July 26, 1999, respondent De Guzman alleged that came to know from Rev. Mario de Torres, Pastor of St. Rosa Bible Baptist Church that they are in need of some steel [purlins] to be used by the church for its roof deck construction. He told him that Saro’s Trucking Services is the regular buyer of FCPP’s scrap materials and they can buy from them. He referred the matter therefore to Mr. Roberto [Pumarez], Supervisor of Saro’s and told him of the intension of the Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church (SRBBC) to buy scrap metal. He further told him that since Saro’s is paying FCPP P2.60 of scrap metal, Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church can buy it from Saro’s at P3.00 per kilo a price higher than FCPP. Acknowledging that Mr. [Pumarez] is amenable to sell the scrap to Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church after consultation from his boss, De Guzman advised the Pastor of Sta. Rosa Bible Baptist Church that Saro’s agreed. His part of the transaction ended there. Respondent De Guzman also pointed out that he could not be charged for qualified theft since he merely issued gate passes to Saro’s after the scrap metals were declared ready for disposal by SNK, the company in charge thereof. The scrap metals in question were all accounted for and collected by Saro’s, and upon collection would be considered sold to the latter.
On July 28, 1999, respondent Alvarez sent an e-mail message to his co-employees, expressing sympathy for the plight of respondent De Guzman. Respondent Alvarez used a different computer, but the event viewer system installed in the premises of petitioner FCPP was able to trace the e-mail message to him. Petitioner Espinosa issued an Inter-Office Memorandum wherein he asked Alvarez to explain in writing within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be filed against him, including dismissal, for grossly presenting information, which is highly confidential while an investigation on Mr. De Guzman is going on. Respondent Alvarez submitted a written Explanation dated September 29, 1999 where he apologized, readily admitted that he was the sender of the e-mail message in question, and claimed that he “acted alone
with his own conviction.” He alleged, however, that he was only expressing his sentiments, and that he was led by his desire to help a friend in distress, since the case is based on pure hearsay. Respondent Alvarez was informed that his services were terminated on the ground of serious misconduct effective August 13, 1999 through a Memorandum. Respondent De Guzman’s employment was thereafter terminated effective August 23, 1999 through an Inter-Office Memorandum.
The respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners with prayer for reinstatement, full backwages, damages and attorney’s fees before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch, Region IV. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of FCPP, stating that it was justified in terminating the employment of the respondents. Respondent De Guzman, a managerial employee, was validly dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. The NLRC sustained the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the respondents’ appeal for lack of merit. In so far as the dismissal of respondent Alvarez was concerned, the Commission held that the circumstances surrounding the sending of the clearly “malicious and premeditated e-mail message” constituted no less than serious misconduct. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC likewise ruled that as borne out by the records, the respondents were not denied due process since they were sufficiently accorded an opportunity to be heard. The respondents then elevated their case to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling of the NLRC and held that the respondents were illegally dismissed.
Issue: whether respondents De Guzman and Alvarez were illegally dismissed from employment.
Held: It is settled that to constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. This means that an employer can terminate the services of an employee for just and valid causes, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. It also means that, procedurally, the employee must be given notice, with adequate opportunity to be heard, before he is notified of his actual dismissal for cause. However, to be valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. The act complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. The guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence are as follows: a. loss of confidence should not be simulated; b. it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; c. it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and d. it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
In the case at bar, the grounds relied upon by petitioner FCPP in terminating the employment of respondent De Guzman is misplaced. First, the scrap metals, including the steel purlins, were already classified as scrap materials and ready for disposal. Second, no fraud or bad faith could be attributed to respondent De Guzman, as evinced by his readiness to disclose his participation in the transaction between Saro’s and Sta. Rosa. Third, respondent De Guzman was never charged with qualified theft as
earlier alluded to by the petitioner FCPP in its Inter-Office Memorandum. Fourth, respondent De Guzman was merely recommending a buyer for such scrap materials, an act which could hardly be considered as deserving of such a harsh penalty as dismissal from employment. Respondent De Guzman’s actuations do not amount to willful breach of trust and confidence. It bears stressing that in termination cases, the employer bears the onus of proving that the dismissal was for just cause. When the breach of trust or loss of confidence theorized upon is not borne by clearly established facts, as in this case, such dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence cannot be allowed. Moreover, the fact that one is a managerial employee does not by itself exclude him from the protection of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
The Court likewise rules that the dismissal of respondent Alvarez from employment for gross misconduct was illegal. Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. In this case, the Court finds that respondent Alvarez’s act of sending an e-mail message as an expression of sympathy for the plight of a superior can hardly be characterized as serious misconduct as to merit the penalty of dismissal. There is no showing that the sending of such e-mail message had any bearing or relation on respondent Alvarez’s competence and proficiency in his job.
In fine, the petitioners failed to show that the respondents’ acts were sufficient to warrant their dismissal from employment, for loss of trust and confidence on one hand for respondent De Guzman, and for gross misconduct as against respondent Alvarez on the other. To reiterate, it has not been shown that the respondents had been previously found guilty of any infraction of company rules and regulations during the period of their employment.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, and employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to the payment of his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him (which, as a rule, is from the time of his illegal dismissal) up to the time of his actual reinstatement. These remedies give life to the worker’s constitutional right to security of tenure. While an employer has its own interest to protect, and pursuant thereto, it may terminate a managerial employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay-off an employee must be exercised without abuse of discretion. Its implementation should be tempered with compassion and understanding. The employer should bear in mind that, in the execution of the said prerogative, what is at stake is not only the employee’s position, but his very livelihood. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not be visited with a consequence so severe as dismissal from employment. Indeed, the consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
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13. GENUINO ICE CO INC V. MAGPANTAY, 493 SCRA 195
FACTS: Alfonso Magpantay (respondent) was employed as a machine operator with Genuino Ice Company, Inc. (petitioner) from March 1988 to December 1995. On November 18, 1996, respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for moral and exemplary damages. In his Position Paper, respondent alleged that he was dismissed from service effective immediately by virtue of a memorandum, after which he was not allowed anymore to enter the company premises. Respondent bewailed that his termination from employment was done without due process.
Petitioner countered that he was not illegally dismissed, since the dismissal was based on a valid ground, i.e., he led an illegal strike at petitioner’s sister company, Genuino Agro Industrial Development Corporation, which lasted from November 18 to 22, 1995, resulting in big operation losses on the latter’s part. Petitioner also maintained that respondent’s dismissal was made after he was accorded due process.
Respondent replied, however, that assuming that he led such illegal strike, he could not be liable therefore because it was done in petitioner’s sister company which is a separate and distinct entity from petitioner.
Petitioner initially claimed that respondent’s acts were tantamount to serious misconduct or willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and breach of trust. Subsequently, petitioner amended its position paper to include insubordination among the grounds for his dismissal, since it came out during respondent’s cross-examination, and the matter was reported only after the new personnel manager assumed his position in August 1996.
ISUUE: Whether or not the Court a quo erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the respondent was illegally dismissed from employment.
HELD: On the issue of illegal dismissal, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in concluding that petitioner had just cause for dismissing respondent, as his act of leading a strike at petitioner’s company for four days, his absence from work during such time, and his failure to perform his duties during such absence, make up a cause for habitual neglect of duties, while his failure to comply with petitioner’s order for him to transfer to the GMA, Cavite Plant constituted insubordination or willful disobedience. The CA, however, differed with said conclusion and found that respondent’s attitude “has not been proved to be visited with any wrongdoing”, and that his four-day absence does not appear to be both gross and habitual.
The Court sustains the CA’s finding that respondent’s four-day absence does not amount to a habitual neglect of duty; however, the Court finds that respondent was validly dismissed on ground of willful disobedience or insubordination.
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, an employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed
in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and, (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just cause; failure to show this would necessarily mean that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal.
Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one’s duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. On the other hand, fraud and willful neglect of duties imply bad faith on the part of the employee in failing to perform his job to the detriment of the employer and the latter’s business. Thus, the single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.
Thus, the Court agrees with the CA that respondent’s four-day absence is not tantamount to a gross and habitual neglect of duty. As aptly stated by the CA, “(W)hile he may be found by the labor courts to be grossly negligent of his duties, he has never been proven to be habitually absent in a span of seven (7) years as GICI’s employee. The factual circumstances and evidence do not clearly demonstrate that petitioner’s [respondent] absences contributed to the detriment of GICI’s operations and caused irreparable damage to the company.”
Petitioner, however, insists that during his four-day absence, respondent was leading an illegal strike in its sister company. In the first place, there is no showing that the strike held at the Genuino Agro Industrial Development Corporation is illegal. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove his affirmative allegations in the complaint and the defendant or the respondent has to prove the affirmative allegation in his affirmative defenses and counterclaim. Since it was petitioner who alleged that such strike is illegal, petitioner must, therefore, prove it. Except for such bare allegation, there is a dearth of evidence in this case proving the illegality of said strike.
However, as previously stated, the Court finds that respondent was validly dismissed on the ground of insubordination or willful disobedience.
Willful disobedience, or insubordination as otherwise branded in this case, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employer’s prerogatives. The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employee’s salary, benefits and other privileges.
In this case, petitioner’s order for respondent to transfer to the GMA, Cavite Plant is a reasonable and lawful order was made known to him and pertains to his duties as a machine operator. There was no demotion involved or diminution of salary, benefits and other privileges, and in fact, petitioner was even willing to provide respondent with monetary allowance to defray whatever additional expenses he may incur with the transfer.
__________________________________________________________________ 14. LAKPUE V. BELGA, 473 SCRA 617
Facts: Petitioner Tropical Biological Phils., Inc. (Tropical), a subsidiary of Lakpue Group of Companies, hired Belga as bookkeeper and subsequently promoted as assistant cashier. On March 2001, Belga brought her daughter to the PGH for treatment of broncho-pneumonia. On her way to the hospital, Belga dropped by the house of Vegafria, Technical Manager of Tropical, to hand over the documents she worked on over the weekend and to give notice of her emergency leave.
While at the PGH, Belga who was pregnant experienced labor pains and gave birth on the same day. On March 22, 2001, or two days after giving birth, Tropical summoned Belga to report for work but the latter replied that she could not comply because of her situation. On March 30, 2001, Tropical sent Belga another memorandum ordering her to report for work and also informing her of the clarificatory conference scheduled on April 2, 2001. Belga requested that the conference be moved to April 4, 2001 as her newborn was scheduled for check-up on April 2, 2001. When Belga attended the clarificatory conference on April 4, 2001, she was informed of her dismissal effective that day. Belga thus filed a complaint with the Public Assistance and Complaint Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Attempts to settle the case failed, hence the parties brought the case before the NLRC-NCR. Tropical, for its part, averred that it hired Belga on March 1, 1995 as a bookkeeper and later promoted to various positions the last of which was as “Treasury Assistant”. Tropical also alleged that Belga concealed her pregnancy from the company. She did not apply for leave and her absence disrupted Tropical’s financial transactions. On March 21, 2001, it required Belga to explain her unauthorized absence and on March 30, 2001, it informed her of a conference scheduled on April 2, 2001. Tropical claimed that Belga refused to receive the second memorandum and did not attend the conference. She reported for work only on April 4, 2001 where she was given a chance to explain.
On April 17, 2001, Tropical terminated Belga on the following grounds: (1) Absence without official leave for 16 days; (2) Dishonesty, for deliberately concealing her pregnancy; (3) Insubordination, for her deliberate refusal to heed and comply with the memoranda sent by the Personnel Department on March 21 and 30, 2001 respectively. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Belga and found that she was illegally dismissed. NLRC reversed. CA favoured Belga.
Issue: W Belga was illegally dismissed
Held: Yes. Tropical’s ground for terminating Belga is her alleged concealment of pregnancy. It argues that such non-disclosure is tantamount to dishonesty and impresses upon this Court the importance of Belga’s position and the gravity of the disruption her unexpected absence brought to the company. Tropical also charges