Legprof digests: (yellow yung kulang, bale ito lang yung sa last 12 cases, for the other Legprof digests: (yellow yung kulang, bale ito lang yung sa last 12 cases, for the other digests, consult the one uploaded by max
digests, consult the one uploaded by max sa facebook group)sa facebook group) 1. In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA
1. In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 581)581)page 1page 1 2. Zaldival v. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316)
2. Zaldival v. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316)page 2page 2 3. Maceda v. Ombudsman (GR No. 102781)
3. Maceda v. Ombudsman (GR No. 102781)page 4page 4 4. Wicker v. Archangel 252 SCRA 445
4. Wicker v. Archangel 252 SCRA 445page 5page 5 5. Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo 36 SCRA 137 -> can’t fi
5. Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo 36 SCRA 137 -> can’t find online.nd online.page 5 (slightpage 5 (slight comment lang, wag pagkatiwalaan kung may orig copy kayo)
comment lang, wag pagkatiwalaan kung may orig copy kayo) 6. People v. Cawili 34 SCRA 728 – relationship
6. People v. Cawili 34 SCRA 728 – relationshippage 6page 6 7. Mejia v. Reyes 4 SCRA 648
7. Mejia v. Reyes 4 SCRA 648page 6page 6 8. Uychico v Unionlife Assurance
8. Uychico v Unionlife Assurancepage 7page 7 9. Regala v. Sandiganbayan 262 SCRA 125
9. Regala v. Sandiganbayan 262 SCRA 125page 8page 8 10. Hilado v. David 84 Phil 571
10. Hilado v. David 84 Phil 571page 12page 12 11. Nakpil v. Valdez March 4,
11. Nakpil v. Valdez March 4, 19981998page 13page 13 12. De Jesus v. Hon. Tan 106 Phil 560 12. De Jesus v. Hon. Tan 106 Phil 560walawala
1.) IN RE:
1.) IN RE: ALMACEN ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562 2(31 SCRA 562 2/18/70)/18/70) FACTS:
FACTS:
Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to
Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,”Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed against his client by Suprem
committed against his client by Supreme Court”. e Court”. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, asHe indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled by men who are ca
a tribunal “peopled by men who are ca lloused to our pleas for justice, lloused to our pleas for justice, who ignorewho ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of theand commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.”
Constitution with impunity.” His client, he continues, who was deeply His client, he continues, who was deeply aggrieved byaggrieved by this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one of
this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one of the sacrificial victims before thethe sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.”
altar of hypocrisy.”
He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the cause of his client ”in the people’s forum,” so that “ people He then vows to argue the cause of his client ”in the people’s forum,” so that “ people may know of the silent inj
may know of the silent injustices committed by this court’ and that ustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever “whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were com
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated.mitted must never be repeated.” ” HeHe ends his petition with a prayer that:
ends his petition with a prayer that:
“………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk
“………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificateof Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve
our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the our title to assume the practice of thepractice of the noblest profession.”
noblest profession.”
The genesis of this
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v.Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was coun
Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. sel for the defendant. The trial courtThe trial court rencered judgment again
rencered judgment agains his client. s his client. On June 15, 196On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy6 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision.
of the decision. Twenty days later on hTwenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration be moved for its reconsideration but did notut did not notify the latter of the time and p
notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on said mlce of hearing on said motion. otion. Meanwhile, onJulyMeanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintif
18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of f moved for execution of the judgment. the judgment. For lack of prooFor lack of proof of f of service, ‘the trial court denied bo
service, ‘the trial court denied both motions. th motions. To prove that he did sTo prove that he did serve on theerve on the adverse party a copy of his
adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed onon August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was
August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was orderedordered withdrawn by the trial court on
Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.
HELD:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful te rms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.
2.) 166 SCRA 316 – Legal Ethics – Contemptuous Language – Duty of a Lawyer
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course”.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six
justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the s ystem of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that
members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
3.)Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781)
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
4.) Kelly R. Wicker et. al vs. hon. Paul T. Arcangel G.R. No. 112869. Jan. 29, 1996. 252 SCRA 444 PONENTE: Mendoza
FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent Judge Arcangel from the case. Respondent judge found offense in the allegations on the motion for inhibition filed by complainants, and in an order, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of Dec 17, 1993.
HELD: The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail.
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His cli ent came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client. Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case."
5.) Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo, 36 SCRA 137
The aim of the lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rulesare precisely designed to accomplice such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation.
Rule 10.03 ng canon (Rule 10.03.A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice)
or at least yun pagkaintindi ko.
6.) People vs Cawili (Duty of diligence)
Failure to submit brief by counsel de parte within the reglementary period was the occasion of a reprimand in People v. Cawili.27 The lawyer in this case sought to minimize his non-feasance by alleging that his client was in a state of indigence, resulting in the non-payment of his services and his assumption of part of the expenses entailed in the defense e.g., printing of the brief. He also advanced the
cavalier opinion that a mere review of the case will readily show that the lower court's decision is contrary to law and the evidence, This explanation did not warrant full exculpation, according to the Court's measure, since the lawyer could have sought permission to file a mimeographed brief, or at the very least informed thecourt of his
difficulties. Sympathizing on the other hand inhis travails, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded respondent and admonishedhim to be more careful in the fulfillment of his obligations to hisclients and to the Court.
7. Mejia vs Reyes
Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case (Cantorne vs. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23 and In re: De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258). The respondent's act of appearing and acting as counsel for the complainantsJose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him bank attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice. However, it does not appear
satisfactorily proventhat during the pendency of their case the complaints did not know of the respondents connection with the bank as attorney and notary public. On the other hand, it appears that notwithstanding the letter dated 21 July 1955 written by Mr. L.D. Herrera, manager of the BaguioBranch, quoting a part of a previous letter sent to him (Herrera) by attorney Ramon B. de los Reyes, chief legal counsel of the Philippine National Bank, stating that —
We note that the complaint is signed by our Bank Attorney and Notary Public, Atty. Francisco S. Reyes, in behalf of the Law Office of Reyes and Cabato. Needless to say, it is unethical for Atty. Reyes, who is presently the attorney of the Bank, to represent the plaintiffs here whose interest are diametrically opposed to those of the Bank. As this is certainly embarrassing both for Atty. Reyes and for the Bank, it is requested that you please take this matter with Atty. Reyes with the end in view of advising him to desist from representing the plaintiffs in this case, otherwise, we will be compelled, much to our regret, to recommend severance of his official connection with this Bank,.
which shows that the Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was appearing as counsel for the complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his
appointment as bank attorney and notary public; that i n the civil case the respondent did not appear as counsel for the Bank which was represented by attorneys Ramon B. de los Reyes and Nemesio P. Libunao; that no appeal was taken from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio, because the complainants had chosen to pay the principal of their loan on or before 31 December 1956 in order t hat
the interests thereon be condoned as provided for in Republic Act No. 1286 (Exhibits 13 to 17); and that the respondent was deeply devoted to his duties as counsel for the complainants and collected a very small attorney's fees of P90, the malpractice
committed by the respondent is not so serious. He is just admonished and warned not to repeat it.
Canon 21 !!!!! (yung uy chico)
8.) Uy Chico vs. The Union Life Assurance Society, Limited G.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915
Facts: In 1897 petitioner’s father died. He continued the business still in the name of his father after buying the share of his brother in the said business. Petitioner filed a case seeking therecovery of the proceeds of 2 insurance policies on stock of dry goods that was destroyedin a fire. These policies were surrendered by the petitioner’s lawyer to the administrator of his father’s estate, who had compromised with the defendant for ½ of the face value of theinsurance that was paid to the court. He alleged that said policies belong to him and that hewas not bound by the compromised agreement
made by the administrator. The companyintroduced evidence showing that the
petitioner had agreed to the settlement of the policieswhen his lawyer surrendered the same to the estate’s administrator. Petitioner, on thewitness stand had been asked if he had any objection as to his lawyer testifying concerningthe surrender of the policies to which he negatively replied. Whereupon, the lawyer of the petiti oner formally
withdraw the waiver given by the petitioner and objected to thetestimony on the ground of privileged communication.
Issue: Whether or not instruction of the client to be delivered to a third person is considered privilege
Held: No. A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the same Act. It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such
communications are not intended for theinformation of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising theclient as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistentwith the confidential
relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a t hird person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
9. Regala vs Sandiganbayan
REGALA ET AL. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR NO. 105938, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 FACTS :
Clients consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the deeds
of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought,i.e the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.
1. July 31, 1987 – complaint before the Sandiganbayan of PCGG vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., (principal defendant) et al. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, i. e., shares of stocks in named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "R. P. v.
Cojuangco, et al."
2. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners (plus private respondent Raul S. Roco) - then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm). 3. ACCRA Law Firm –
acquired info on assets of clients, personal and business circumstances;
assisted in organization and acquisition of
business associations and/or organizations (companies listed in Civil Case 0033), where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders etc; delivered documents which substantiate the clie nt's equity holdings,i.e(1) stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name, and (2) a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares; acted as
nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings (as office practice)
4. August 20, 1991 - respondent PCGG’s "Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" excluded private respondent Raul Roco from complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 because of his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
5. Third Amended Complaint – said defendants conspired i n helping set up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, UCPB, UNICOM,
COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than 20 other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the acquisition of San MiguelCorporation shares 6. ACCRA Investments Corporation - became the holder of
approximately 15 million shares (roughly 3.3%) of total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987; 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB (about 1,400,000 shareholders); a
wholly-owned investment arm
7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately3,744shares as of February, 1984 ofUCPB
8. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA – said that is only in legitimate lawyering; became holders of shares of s tock in the
corporations listed but do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock; said Avelino V. Cruz an incorporator in 1976 of
Mermaid Marketing Corporation but for legitimate business purposes and already transferred shares.
9. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini - denied being involved in the alleged ill-gottenwealth. 10. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with
Counter-Motion of ACCRA – moving that respondent PCGG similarly
grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants)as accorded Roco. 11. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely
(PCGG’s Comment): (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) deeds of assignments petitioners executed for clients covering shares
12. PCGG’s supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of his the counsel reiterating previous request for reinvestigation; (b) Affidavit as Attachment; (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence of PCGG against Roco 13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal identity of the client, nor undertook to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
14. March 18, 1992 - respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated
Resolution herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners for their refusal to comply with the conditions by PCGG
15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict application of the law of agency; absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, disclosure not constitute a substantial distinction for equal protection clause, favoritism and undue preference; not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG; unreasonable or unjust ISSUE:
Privileged Information
Whether or not the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei)
may beasserted in refusing to disclose the identity of clients [name of
petitioners' client(s)] under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case HELD:
The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information. Sandiganbayan resolution annulled and set
aside. Petitioners excluded from complaint.
1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client.
Reasons:
1. Court has a right to knowthat the client whose privileged information is sought to be protectedis flesh and blood.
2. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclientrelationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege
does not attach until there is a client.
3. Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
4. Due process considerations
require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
2. BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that discl osure would then reveal client confidences
1. A strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. (Baird exception for freedom of consultation) 2. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability. (case at bar) 3. Government's lawyers have no case a gainst an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (case at bar – BAIRD EXCEPTION) 4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance (case at bar)
5.Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential
3. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients, after the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance — the names of their clients in exchange for
exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG Mario Ongkiko) - "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients)
4. No valid cause of action. It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers.
5. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum
(contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires themwithout reference to the object of which the services are to be
performed. Their services may be compensated by honorarium
or forhire, andmandato(contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him.
6. OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws Applicable
a. Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment."
b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: “Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: “An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of…”
c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: “duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept ept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.”
d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.”
e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,"
7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven
applicationof legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment.
8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right against
self-incriminationand subverts the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. 10.) 74 HILADO v DAVID
Facts:
Blandina Hilado (ganda ng pangalan!) brought an action against Selim Assad
to annul the sale of several houses and lot exected by Hilado’s husband.
Delgado et al. was counsel for Hilado, while Ohnick et al filed an answer for
Assad.
Later on, Atty Vicente Francisco entered his appearance for Assad substituting
Ohnick et al.
The firm of Delgado urged Atty Francisco to stop representing Assad since
there exists an atty-client relationship between him (Francisco) and the other party (Hilado) in the same case.
It was alleged that Hilado consulted Francisco regarding the case and that the
former turned over papers to the latter. From such documents, Francisco sent a written opinion to Hilado.
Since makulit si Francisco, Delgado et al. sought to disqualify Francisco from
representing Assad in the case.
Francisco’s defense was that he only met Hilado once and this was when the
latter informed him about the case. He added that when Hilado left documents in their office, he told his assistant to tell Hilado that their firm would not handle her case. And that the written opinion was made by his assistant, which he signed without reading, and only for t he purpose of explaining to Hilado why his firm rejected the case.
David is the judge trying the case who dismissed the complaint for
disqualification against Francisco. Said judge reasoned that no attorney-client relationship existed between Hilado and Francisco.
Issue:
Was there an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado? Should Atty Francisco be disqualified from representing Assad?
Held:
The firm of Francisco mailed a written opinion to Hilado on the merits of the case (with Francisco’s signature); this opinion was reached on the basis of papers
submitted at his office; and that Hilado’s purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Francisco’s professional services. From these ultimate facts, an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado can be said to have ensued.
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. When a person consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view of obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces in s uch consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
The existence of attorney-client relationship precludes the attorney from representing (and receiving a retainer from) the opposite party in the same case.
An information professionally obtained by an attorney from a client is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it be used in the interest of another, or in the interest of the adverse party is to strike at the element of confidence which forms the basis of an attorney-client relationship.
The rule inhibiting an attorney from acting in behalf of both parties is implied in the Rules of Court (wala pang codified codes of professional responsibility noon). The defense that Francisco never read the written opinion nor the documents
submitted by Hilado will not preclude the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The fact remains that his firm did give Hilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the relation. The letter bi nds and estops him in the same manner and degree as if he wrote it personally. And an information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of the firm is information imparted to the firm.
The failure to object to counsel’s appearance does not operate as a waiver of the right to ask for counsel’s disqualification.
Motion for disqualification against Attorney Francisco should be a llowed.
*A retaining fee (just in case itanong) is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. 11.) NAKPIL v VALDES
Facts:
Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio.
He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil.
Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands’ titles were
transferred to his name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of
Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil.
What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets
of Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans he contracted.
What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the
case was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Valdes.
The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI. The complaint for reconveyance went up to t he SC and was decided in favor
Issue:
W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely:
o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil; o Including his loans as claims on the estate; and
o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm
prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.
Held:
The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year. The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust
reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his
professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came to an agreement that the latter would be buying the property in trust for Jose. By his act of excluding the property from the estate
and including the loans he contracted (and used for his own benefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose and him (they had a close relationship since the 50’s), which was the basis for Imelda’s decision to use his services.
As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are
adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
