1. Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as the Primary Object ** As expressed in the literal reading of the text
1. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule) IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong
GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663) Facts:
On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner’s complaint for payment of holiday pay.
Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.
On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The
controversial section thereof reads as “Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.
On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing the bank’s appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for
reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Issue:
Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
Held:
From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: “employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
Power to construe
THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary of Labor, and THE CHARTERED BANK
G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985Facts:
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, fo r the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974.
The Minister of Labor dismissed the Chartered Bank Employees Association’s claim for lack of merit basin g its decision on Section 2,Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated Rules and
Policy Instruction No. 9, which respectively provide:
Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less
than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.
POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All Regional Directors
SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The rules implementing PD 850 have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered important in determining entitlement to the benefit.
Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days, he was considered definitely already paid. If he was working for less than 313, there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal holidays were already paid to him or not.
The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily
employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit. the rules implementing PD 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this: 'If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. These new interpretations must be uniformly and consistently upheld.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law in promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9.
Held:
Y e s . T h e S e c r e t a r y ( M i n i s t e r ) o f L a b o r h a d e x c e e d e d h i s statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. While it is true that the Minister has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified.
**a. Dura lex sed lex Pascual vs. pascual-Bautista
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.
ESPERANZA C. BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT,
and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992 PARAS, J.: FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that the term “illegitimate children” as described in art 992 should be construed as “spurious children”).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
HELD:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
Aguila v. CFI of Batangas G.R. No. L-48335. April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession, namely, Escolastico Alabastro and, after his death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is claiming the disputed property as the only surviving child of the second marriage. The private respondents are resisting this claim as the children of Maria Alabastro, the sole offspring of the first marriage and had sued for partition and damages against the petitioner, alleging that some properties held by them pertained to the first marriage as Juliana and her second husband had not acquired anything during their marriage.
On motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court then issued a writ of execution pursuant to which the properties held by the defendants were levied upon and sold at public auction to the plaintiffs as the highest bidders. The defendants filed a complaint for reconveyance of the properties acquired by the defendants in the earlier action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. In their answer, the defendants alleged res judicata as one of their affirmative defenses.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner may rightfully alleged res judicata in this case.
(2) Whether or not the Court should allow reconveyance of the properties in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
HELD:
(1) No since the petitioner does not seek to do away with the rule of res judicata but merely proposes to undo a grave and serious wrong perpetuated in the name of justice. As a matter of fact, he was not denied the opportunity to submit evidence which the due process guarantees. Records show that he did not have the ooprtunity to be heard because of the gross ineptitude of petitioner’s original counsel.
(3) No. The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-settled. This remedy is available in cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud, property is registered in the name of a person not its owner. However, it cannot be employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a court of justice determining the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties in an appropriate proceeding, as in Civil Case No. 1562. The decision in that case was a valid resolution of the question of ownership over the disputed properties and cannot be reversed now through the remedy of reconveyance.
Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. All abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim is "aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.
**Inapplicability in criminal cases People v. Santayana
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division
Facts:
On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent” by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms Held:
The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People
v.Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bring as as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional release; with costs de oficio.
People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the accused is not exempted.
As determined through Construction
**General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative. ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order:
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment. ** 2. Specific Rules
a. Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purpose of the law Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who
has not been acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. 335.
ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother.
HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption.
CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
KING vs HERNAEZ
MACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ETAL., respondents-appellants.
FACTS
Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen Import Meat and Produce" Philippine Cold Stores, Inc permission from the President of the Philippines(Secretary of Commerce
and Industry)DENIED petition for declaratory relief, injunction and mandamus(Court of First Instance of Manila)
writ of preliminary
appeal __
(RETAIL TRADE LAW)Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180
No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no association, partnership, or corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail business: . ." emphasis supplied)(x) merely to ban them from its ownership and not from its management control or operation.
(Anti-Dummy Law )Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act No.134)
which seeks "to punish acts of evasion of the law s of nationalization of certain rights,f r a n c h i s e s o r p r i v i l e g e s . " R e a d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h
t h e R e t a i l T r a d e L a w , t h e A n t i - Dummy Law would punish acts intended to circumvent the provisions of the former law which nationalize the retail business.
Itchong Case ISSUE
Is the employment of aliens in non -control position in a retail establishment or trade prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?
RULING
Yes, it is prohibited. Against retail trade law and Anti-dummy law(X )unconsti-right of employer to choose The nationalization of an economic measure when founded on grounds of public policy c a n n o t b e b r a n d e d a s u n j u s t , a r b i t r a r y o r o p p r e s s i v e o r c o n t r a r y t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n because its aim is merely to further the material progress and welfare of the citizens of a country. Indeed, in nationalizing employment in retail trade the right of choice of an employer is not impaired but its sphere is merely limited to the citizens to the exclusion of those of other nationalities. falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens
W H E R E F O R E , t h e d e c i s i o n a p p e a l e d f r o m i s r e v e r s e d . T h i s p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n issued by the trial court on December 6, 1958 is hereby lifted. The petition for mandamus is dismissed, with costs against appellees.
Bustamante vs. NLRC, 1996 Petitioner
Osmalik S. Bustamante, Paulino A. Bantayan, Fernando L. Bustamante, Mario D. Sumonod, and Sabu J. Lamaran
Respondent
National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and Evergreen Farms, Inc. Ponente
Padilla, J.
Docket Number and Date of Decision G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996 Significance of the Case
In this landmark case, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that backwages due an employee on account of his illegal dismissal should not be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.
This case finally abandoned the “Mercury Drug” rule and “deduction of earnings elsewhere” rule then prevailing at that time.
Historical Backdrop
Prior to the present case, SC had applied different methods in the computation of backwages. Backwages under RA 875. Under RA 875, the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) was given wide discretion to grant or disallow payment of backpay (backwages) to an employee, it also had the implied power of reducing the backpay where backpay was allowed. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the CIR can increase or diminish the award of backpay, depending on several
circumstances, among them, the good faith of the employer, the employee’s employment in other establishments during the period of illegal dismissal, or the probability that the employee could have realized net earnings from outside employment if he had exercised due diligence to search for outside employment.
This method caused undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal cases. Cases are usually held up in the determination of whether or not the computation of the award of backwages is correct. Mercury Drug Rule . In order prevent undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal cases, the SC found occasion in the case of Mercury Drug Co vs. CIR, 1974, to rule that a fixed amount of backwages without further qualifications should be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee. In subsequent cases (adopting the proposal of Justice Teehankee), backwages equivalent to three years (unless the case is not terminated sooner) was made the base figure for such awards without deduction, subject to deduction where there are mitigating circumstances in favor of the employer but subject to increase by way of exemplary damages where there are aggravating circumstances (e.g. oppression or dilatory appeals) on the employer’s part.
On 1 November 1974, the Labor Code of the Philippines took effect. Article 279 of the said code provides:
“*...+ An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his back wages computed from the time his compensation was was withheld from him up to the time of his reinstatement.”
The above provision nothwithstanding, the rule generally applied by the Court after the promulgation of theMercury Drug case, and during the effectivity of P.D. No. 442 was still the Mercury Drug rule. In effect, this qualified the provision under P.D. No. 442 by limiting the award of backwages to 3 years.
“Deduction of Earnings Elsewhere” Rule. When RA 6715 took effect on 21 March 1989, the pertinent portion of Article 279 of the Labor Code was amended to read as follows:
“*...+ An employee who unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.”
In accordance with the above provision, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to his full backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Despite the amendment, however, in a subsequent case, Pines City Educational Center vs. NLRC, 1993, the Court returned to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug rule that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted from backwages.
The rationale for such ruling was that, the earning derived elsewhere by the dismissed employee while litigating the legality of his dismissal, should be deducted from the full amount of backwages which the law grants him upon reinstatement, so as not to unduly or unjustly enrich the employee at the expense of the employer.
Issue
Whether or not the income derived by the employee elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal should be deducted from the award of backwages.
Ruling
Conformably with the evident legislative intent of RA 6715, backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not, as a general rule, be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.
The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality (illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee.
The clear legislative intent of the amendment in RA 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the “deduction of earnings elsewhere” rule.
Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind RA 6715 points to “full backwages” as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for “full backwages” to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo est (literally “speech is the index of intention”).
US v. Toribio
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/jan1910/gr_l-5060_1910.html Facts:
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition contained in Section 30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases:
(1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal slaughter house without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and
(2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer.
Held:
The prohibition contained in section 30 refers
(1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and
(2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN NEGROS INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO T. PONFERRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 42; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; BINALBAGAN – ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, INC., and NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP),respondents.
D E C I S I O N PURISIMA, J.:
“Nowhere is the economic disparity between labor and capital so evident than in the sugar industry. While it is the lowly farm worker who must toil in the field under the harshness of conditions, it is the planter who gets to enjoy more the fruits of production. While the planter lives in the comfort of his palatial home, the living condition of the sugar farm worker more often than not defies the basic tenets of human dignity.”[1]
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the August 8, 1993 Decision[2] and January 21, 1994 Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 42,[4] Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 6894 for Declaratory Relief.
The antecedent facts that matter can be culled as follows:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act Strengthening the Sugar
Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its Implementation, and for other Purposes, there were two principal laws providing additional financial benefits to sugar farm workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621.
Republic Act No. 809[5] (implementable in milling districts with an annual gross production of 150,000 piculs or more), institutionalized production sharing scheme, in the absence of any private agreement between the planters and farm workers, depending on the mill’s total production for each immediately preceding crop year; and specifically providing that any increase in the planters’ share shall be divided in the following manner: 40% of the increase shall accrue to the planter and 60% to the farm workers.[6]
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621,[7] as amended, charged a lien of P2.00 per picul on all sugar produced, to be pooled into a fund for subsequent distribution as bonuses to sugar workers.[8]
Thus, before R.A. No.6982, there were two sets of beneficiaries under the social amelioration program in the sugar industry:
1) Beneficiaries under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621; and
2) Beneficiaries under P.D. No. 621 only. (In milling districts where the annual gross production is less than 150,000 piculs)
On May 24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It imposed a lien of P5.00 per picul on the gross production of sugar beginning sugar crop year 1991-1992, with an automatic additional lien of P1.00 for every two (2) years for the succeeding ten (10) years from the effectivity of the Act subject to the discretion of the Secretary of Labor and Employment and upon recommendation of the Sugar Tripartite Council.[9]
Directly addressing the effect of the new P5.00 per picul lien vis-à-vis the two previously existing laws, Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, provides:
“Section. 12. Benefits under Republic Act No. 809 and P.D. 621, as Amended. - All liens and other forms of production sharing in favor of the workers in the sugar industry under Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621, as amended, are hereby substituted by the benefits under this Act: Provided, That cases arising from such laws pending in the courts or administrative bodies at the time of the effectivity of this Act shall not be affected thereby.
In connection therewith, Section 14 of the same Act further states:
“Section 14. Non-Diminution of Benefits.-The provisions of Section 12 hereof notwithstanding, nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce any benefit, interest, right or participation enjoyed by the workers at the time of the enactment of this Act, and no amount received by any beneficiary under this Act shall be subject to any form of taxation.”
Private respondent Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company (BISCOM) is engaged in the business of, among others, milling raw sugar cane of various sugar plantations in their milling district. For the crop year 1991–1992, the sugar farm workers’ share in BISCOM, under R.A. No. 809 amounted to P30, 590,086.92.[10]
Under P.D. No.621, the workers’ benefit for the same crop year amounted to P2,233,285.26, computed as follows:
Gross production of BISCOM 1,595,184.46 (In Piculs)
Less: 30% BISCOM Share 478,555.33 70% Planter Share 2,116,626.13 Multiplied by P2.00 lien x P2.00 TOTAL P2,233,258.26[11]
But considering that the P2.00 lien under P.D. No.621 is obviously lesser than the P5.00 lien under R.A. No.6982, the same was no longer imposed by BISCOM pursuant to R.A. No.6982.
Hence, before R.A. No.6982 took effect, the total farm workers’ benefit was: Under R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92
Under P.D. No. 621 2,233,258.16
P32,823,345.18
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No.6982, the total workers’ benefit in BISCOM’s milling district was computed as follows:
Gross Production of BISCOM 1,595,184.46 (In Piculs)
Less: 30% BISCOM share 478,555.34 70% Planter Share 1,116,629.12 Multiplied by P5.00 lien x P5.00 TOTAL FARMWORKERS’ BENEFIT P5,583,145.61[12]
Meanwhile, pending a definite ruling on the effect of R.A. No. 6982 to R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621, respondent Secretary of Labor issued Department Order No.2 (1992),[13] directing, inter alia, the three milling districts in Negros Occidental, namely: SONDECO, San Carlos and herein private
respondent BISCOM, to continue implementing R.A. No.809 per recommendation of the Sugar Tripartite Council.
Consequently, the petitioner, Planters Association of Southern Negros Inc. (PASON), an
organization of sugar farm plantation owners milling with private respondent BISCOM, filed with the respondent court a Petition for Declaratory Relief against the implementation of the said D.O. No. 2. It theorized that in view of the substitution of benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, whatever monetary rewards previously granted to the sugar farm workers under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 were deemed totally abrogated and/or superseded.[14]
On August 18, 1993, the respondent Court came out with the assailed Decision; the dispositive portion of which held:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares:
1. That the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot supersede or substitute the benefits under RA 809 in milling districts where the latter law was already in implementation at the time of the effectivity of RA 6982; and
2. That the sugarcane workers in the BISCOM milling district shall continue to enjoy the benefits under RA 809 in addition to the benefits that will henceforth be provided for by RA 6982 now being implemented by private respondent.
SO ORDERED.”[15]
With the denial of its motion to reconsider the aforesaid Decision, petitioner found its way to this Court via the present petition.
The petition is not visited by merit.
From a cursory reading of Section 12[16] of R.A. No. 6892, the inevitable conclusion would be that the benefits under R.A. No.809 and P.D. No. 621 have been superseded by those granted under the new law. This substitution, however, appears to be qualified by Section 14[17] which disallows substitution if its effect would be to diminish or reduce whatever financial benefits the sugar farm workers are receiving under existing laws at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6289.
How then should Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982 be interpreted in light of the qualification under Section 14 of the same Act?
Petitioner insists that the word “substitution” in Section 12 should be taken in its literal sense considering that the intention of Congress to effect a substitution of benefits is clear and unequivocal. Under this interpretation of “unqualified substitution”, the sugar farm workers in the subject milling district will receive onlyP5,583,145.61 under R.A. No.6289, as against the P32,823,345.18 to which the workers were entitled under P.D. 621 and R.A. No. 809. So also, invoking the Opinion[18] “It is believed that the benefits conferred upon labor by RA 809 have been superseded by those granted to it under RA 6982. This conclusion is inescapable from a reading of Section 12 of the latter law, as well as its repealing clause (Sec. 16). Indeed, the production-sharing scheme decreed in RA 809 cannot remain in force upon the effectivity of the new production-sharing procedure prescribed in RA 6982; otherwise, sugar workers would be receiving two kinds of financial benefits simultaneously.
The substitution, however, of sugar workers benefits under RA 809 by RA 6982 is qualified by Section 14 of the latter. This section provides that if the effect of such substitution will be to diminish or reduce whatever monetary rewards sugar industry laborers are receiving under RA 809, then such workers shall continue to be entitled to the benefits provided in such
law. Expressed otherwise the production-sharing scheme in RA 6982 does not apply to sugar industry workers in milling districts where its application would be financially disadvantageous to them, in which case the existing production-sharing agreement based on RA 809 shall still govern.” (Opinion No. 115, S. 1992 dated September 2, 1992, signed by Justice Secretary Franklin
Drilon.)18 of the Secretary of Justice, petitioner contends, in the alternative, that the application of R.A. No. 809 can be maintained but in no case should the benefits thereunder be implemented
in addition to R.A. No. 6982. Applying this interpretation, the share of the sugar farm workers would amount toP30,590,086.92.
On the other hand, under the interpretation espoused by the public respondent (that the benefits conferred by R.A. No.6982 should complement those granted by R.A. No. 809 which cannot be superseded by the former Act since Section 14 thereof prohibits diminution of benefits), the total worker’s benefit would be as follows:
R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92 R.A. No. 6982 __,583,145.61 P36,173,232.53
It is a well-settled rule of legal hermeneutics that each provision of law should be construed in connection with every other part so as to produce a harmonious whole and every meaning to be given to each word or phrase is ascertained from the context of the body of the statute.[19] Ut magis valeat quam pereat.[20]Consequently, laws are given a reasonable construction such that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.[21]
Applying the abovestated doctrine, Section 12 therefore, which apparently mandates a total substitution by R. A. No. 6982 of all the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 existing at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982, can not be construed apart from Section 14 which prohibits such substitution if the effect thereof would be to reduce any benefit, interest, right or participation enjoyed by the worker at the time R.A. No. 6982 took effect. The Court finds as untenable the interpretation of the petitioner based an unqualified substitution of the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 by the monertary rewards conferred by R.A. No. 6982 in the amount of P5,583,145.61 as against the P36,173,232.53 previously enjoyed by the sugar farm workers under the former laws.
It bears stressing that the primordial objective behind the enactment of R.A. No. 6982 was to augment the income of sugar workers by establishing a social amelioration program in cases where sugar farm workers had none, and at the same time, to improve whatever amelioration schemes already existing in the sugar districts concerned.[22] In recognition of the avowed guarantee under Section 3, Article 13 of the Constitution to uphold the right of workers to a just share in the fruits of production, the policy of R.A. No. 6982 states:
“Section 1. Policy. – It is the policy of the State to further strengthen the rights of workers in the sugar industry to their just share in the fruits of production by augmenting their income and, among other schemes, institutionalizing the mechanism among the partners in the sugar industry to enable the workers and their families to enjoy a decent living.” (Emphasis supplied) The foregoing studiedly considered, there can be no other construction that would best promote the welfare of the sugar farm workers, than the interpretation of the public respondent, implementing R.A. No. 6982 as a complement to R.A. No. 809.
Citing the floor deliberations of Congress,[23] petitioner insists that the non-diminution of benefits referred to in Section 14 pertains only to pending claims of the workers at the time of the effectivity of the Act. Stated differently, it is contended that the benefits to which the workers are entitled under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 601 can be validly diminished by virtue of the application of R.A. No. 6982, because the non-diminution provision in Section 14 thereof refers to pending claims accruing under P.D. 621 and R.A. No. 809, and not to the very benefits previously enjoyed by the workers under the said laws. With this construction, from a total benefit of P32,823,345.18 conferred by R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621, the sugar workers would only be entitled to a meager amount of P5,583,145.61.
The contention is barren of sustainable merit. To limit the application of the non-diminution principle only to pending claims would be repulsive not only to the policy of the Act but also to the salutory provisions of the Constitution. Verily, the glaring disparity
of P27,240,199.57 between P32,823,345.18 andP5,583,145.61 would not warrant such an interpretation. As aptly ratiocinated[24] by the respondent Court, the evolution of legislation in the sugar industry had always had for its foremost concern the advancement of the lot of the sugar farm worker. Hence, through the years every law or decree enacted pursuant thereto had always provided for an increase in wages and benefits. The reason is obvious. Amidst the rapidly changing, if not worsening, economic conditions prevalent in the industry, the sugar worker can hardly cope with his meager income to lean on.
Equally wanting of merit is the alleged double recovery under the interpretation subscribed by the public respondent. Note that had not R.A. No. 6982 been enacted, sugar farmworkers would be entitled to a total a share of P32,823,345.18 under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621; whereas under the alternative view of the petitioner, maintaining the benefits (P30, 509,086.92) granted by R.A. No. 809 to the exclusion of the benefits provided by R.A. No. 6982, sugar farm workers stand to lose the difference of P2,233,258.56, from a total of P32,823,345.18 which they were entitled before RA 6982 took effect. Certainly, such a disadvantageous construction cannot be
countenanced, being violative of the non-diminution principle under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6982. In view of the foregoing, the addition of the monetary rewards under R.A. No. 6982 to the benefits granted by R.A. No. 809, is what is called for in the case under consideration. While it is true that “addition” is different from “substitution”, the circumstances involving subject milling districts (where the sugar farm workers are enjoying benefits both from R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982), necessitate the grant of pecuniary advantage under R.A. No. 809 as a complement to R.A. No. 6982. Otherwise, the workers would suffer a diminution of benefits. Therefore, the increase of monetary advantage in favor of the sugar farm workers, as a consequence of such interpretation, is merely incidental to the application of the non-diminution policy of R.A. No. 6982, a labor provision which should be liberally construed to further its purpose.[25]
Neither does the Court find convincing the interpretation proposed by private respondent BISCOM. While maintaining the application of R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 (where the total share of the workers is P32,823,345.18), and disregarding R.A. No. 6892, would be beneficial to the sugar farm workers, to the mind of the Court, the assailed construction of the public respondent (where the total share of the workers is P36,173,232.53), would be more in keeping with the spirit of R.A. No. 6982 which is: to improve the living condition of workers in the sugar industry. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.[26]
Premises studiedly considered, the Court is of the ineluctable conclusion, and so holds, that the respondent Court ventured not in any judicial legislation but merely gave life to the avowed policy of the State under Section 18, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
“Sec. 18. The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall guarantee the rights of workers and promote their welfare.”
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED; and the assailed Decision in Civil Case No. 6894, dated August 18, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 42, Bacolod City, AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Villanueva v. COMELEC Case Digest
Villanueva v. COMELEC
No. L – 54718 (December 4, 1986) FACTS:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the
presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the
grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was e ffective, Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4. ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects. HELD:
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the
substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candi dacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have
guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates.
**When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991] Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WENCESLAO ALMUETE FERNANDO FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION and CIPRIANO FRONDA, defendants-appellees.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for appellant.
Emiliano D. Castellanes for appellees. AQUINO, J.:
Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that in
December, 1963, in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five (5) cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan (Criminal Case No. SD-179, Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Sto. Domingo Branch VI).chanrobles virtual law library
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of particulars as to the exact date of the commission of the offense charged. The lower court denied their motion because they had already entered their plea.chanrobles virtual law library
Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds (1) that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged; (2) that there is no law punishing it, and
(3) that the court has, no jurisdiction over the alleged time The fiscal opposed the motion.
The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the information in its order of August 11, 1966. It held that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe lie circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest.The prosecution appealed from the order of dismissal. The Solicitor General argues in his brief that the information in this case alleges all the elements of the offense defined in section 39 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended of Republic Act No. 2263. Sections 39 and 57 of the same law reads as follows:
SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. - It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing- That if the tenant n food for his family and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to allow the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for its threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his net share in the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the landholder or his representative. Any violation of this situation by either party shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general provisions of law applicable to that act committed.
SEC. 57. Penal Provision. - Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine of this Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court. ... *
We hold that the order of dismissal should be affirmed because as held in People vs. Adillo, L-23M, November 27, 1975, a case similar to the instant case, section 99 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) and as implemented by Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 and 316. That Code was already in force when the act complained of was committed. The repeal may be rationalized in this manner:
The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests.chanrobles virtual law library
The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law (except as qualified in sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain conditions indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39 is not reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose section 172 repeals "all laws or part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.chanrobles virtual law library
Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more raison d'etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.chanrobles virtual law library
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area". Presidential Decree No. 27 emancipated the tenant from the bondage of the soil. And Presidential Decree No. 316 interdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding until the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 27. (See People vs. Adillo, supra).chanrobles virtual law library
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that, as already noted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine reaping and
pre-threshing.chanrobles virtual law library
All indications point to a deliberate and manifest legislative design to replace the Agricultural Tenancy Law with the Code of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the Agricultural Land Reform Code, at least as far as ricelands are concerned.chanrobles virtual law library
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.chanrobles virtual law library
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contain in the old act and not included in the amendatory act" (Crawford, Construction of Statutes, p. 621 cited in the Adillo case).chanrobles virtual law library
A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, and evidently intended as a substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising statute is in effect a 'legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).chanrobles virtual law library
The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225; People vs. Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; People vs. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431. See dissent in Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252, 254).chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs de oficio.chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtual law library
Barredo, J., took no part.chanrobles virtual law library Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
