'The problem of Trinity College Dublin': a historical perspective on rationalisation in higher education in Ireland'

‘The problem of Trinity College Dublin’:

A historical perspective on

rationalisation in higher education

in Ireland

‘

The problem of Trinity College Dublin’:

a historical perspective on rationalisation in higher education

in Ireland

Abstract

This paper offers a historical perspective on government policies for the rationalisation of higher education (HE) in Ireland through a critical re-appraisal of the initiative for ‘merger’ of Trinity College and University College Dublin. The initiative launched by Donogh O’Malley in 1967 was the first significant attempt by an Irish government to transform the institutional architecture of higher education. This study sheds new light on the rationale for merger. A key motivation for the merger was to overcome ‘the problem of Trinity College Dublin’: policy-makers sought to integrate Trinity College, long regarded as a Protestant ‘enclave’ in a predominantly Catholic society, within the Irish HE system. O’Malley’s initiative sought to bring TCD firmly under the control of the state and transcend traditional religious divisions, by circumventing the ‘ban’ on the attendance of Catholics at TCD imposed by the Catholic bishops. This paper also explores the emergence of pro-active, interventionist approaches by Irish ministers and officials to policy formulation and implementation in HE.

Keywords:

Higher education, rationalisation, merger, state intervention, policy

Dr. John Walsh

‘

The problem of Trinity College Dublin’:

A historical perspective on rationalisation

in higher education in Ireland

The prospect of merger between higher education institutions is an intermittent but persistent theme in Irish educational policy. Contemporary debates around the rationalisation of the higher education landscape, framed by a discourse asserting the primacy of the ‘knowledge economy’ and the central place of higher education in national economic revival, offer the latest testimony to the persistence of the idea of institutional merger as a convenient solution for economic and societal problems. The famous initiative for the merger of Trinity College Dublin and University College Dublin, brought forward by Donogh O’Malley in April 1967, fell short of realisation but continues to fascinate scholars and commentators – not least because it signalled the beginning of far-reaching policy change in higher education. The initiative also offers valuable insights regarding the practice of policy-making during the 1960s. .While the rhetoric and official justification for the merger differs significantly from contemporary discourse on higher education, the initiative underlines the emergence of pro-active, interventionist approaches to policy-making by the political centre, which would remain an enduring feature of Irish HE over the following half a century.

exploration of O’Malley’s initiative for a university merger offers valuable insights into the evolution of higher education policies in the Irish state at a time of far-reaching societal and cultural change. The policy changes of the 1960s triggered a profound transformation in the Irish higher education system and inaugurated a gradual but far-reaching transition in the relations between the state and traditionally autonomous universities. The study draws mainly upon documentary analysis of archival collections, official documents and newspapers. This documentary analysis is supplemented by a small number of interviews with former officials and academics.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) contributed significantly to policy change: the Investment in

Education study, completed by an OECD survey team in 1965, was

particularly influential, applying an economic lens to educational

challenges and chronicling the shortcomings of the existing

educational systems at all levels (Government of Ireland, 1965). Irish

political and administrative elites were profoundly influenced by theories of human capital formation, which emerged as the most significant ideological rationale for the rapid expansion of the educational sector since the 1960s (Gleeson and Ó Donnabháin 2009, 29-30). Clancy highlights the firmly utilitarian orientation of higher education policy from the 1970s, driven by vocational priorities linked to national economic development (Clancy, 1989 in Mulcahy and O’Sullivan, 123). This broad ideological reorientation underpinned a gradual transformation of Irish higher education from

an ‘elite’ to a ‘mass’ system as identified by Trow (1974, 61-63).

This did not entail a complete break with inherited patterns of policy-making, not least due to the persistent legacy of the dominant religious and cultural influences of the previous generation. Newly important economic imperatives co-existed uneasily with traditional denominational and

cultural norms.

The historical legacy

established universities, Trinity College Dublin (TCD) and the three

constituent colleges of the National University of Ireland (NUI), were

largely left to their own devices by successive Irish governments.

Yet autonomy came at a high price: all four university colleges were severely under-resourced, with net state expenditure on higher

education in 1958-59 amounting only to 0.62% of overall

appropriations (Public Accounts Committee 1959, 88). The policy of

successive governments towards higher education between 1922

and the late 1950s appeared to reflect a traditional idea of

university autonomy, involving ‘a self-denying ordinance of

non-intervention’ in higher education on the part of the state (Neave 1982, 233). Yet in practice the state’s policy amounted to little more than benign neglect, as universities hardly featured at all in a national discourse

dominated by conservative Catholicism, protectionism and

nationalism.

public debate for a generation, in which higher education impinged hardly at all on the preoccupations of the nationalist elite which guided the fortunes of the new Irish state.

difficulties of Trinity’s position in a memorandum to the government in December 1966, commenting that:

The College is in a position which calls for some sympathy. Circumstances have left it with a working machine which, as far as most Irish students are concerned, is not attracting material for the winnowing (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education, 15 December 1966, 10).

The rigorous implementation of the ecclesiastical ‘ban’ had an undeniable impact on TCD, with the proportion of Catholic entrants falling to only 17% of student admissions in 1960 (J.V. Luce 1992, 196). The college was heavily dependent on its ability to attract non-Irish students, with a majority of the student population drawn from outside the Republic of Ireland in the early 1960s. Trinity College traditionally attracted a far higher proportion of entrants drawn from Britain and the unionist community in Northern Ireland than the NUI, due to its history, international prestige and association with the Protestant tradition in Ireland. Moreover, TCD experienced a rapidly expanding intake of British students after the second world war. While about a third of the TCD student population of approximately 2,000 was drawn from outside the island of Ireland in 1952-53, the proportion of non-Irish students amounted to 46% of a student population of 3,000 by 1962-63 (Lyons 1972, 655; Luce 1992, 183). This increased dependence on British students soon attracted hostile attention from official elites

did not command universal support among the college’s academic staff and a possible merger with TCD emerged as an alternative favoured by opponents of the Belfield project. John J. O’Meara, Professor of Classical Languages at UCD, proposed a close association between the two universities in Dublin on 27 March 1958 in a public lecture entitled ‘Reform in Education’, arguing that ‘Dublin would have one of the greatest universities in the English-speaking world, if to the old and great tradition of Trinity College were joined the traditions of Newman’s Catholic University’ (O’Meara 1958, 18-19). But a merger never became a credible prospect in the late 1950s, not least because the transfer of UCD to Belfield commanded influential political support, including the decisive endorsement of Eamon de Valera in his final term as Taoiseach. A commission to examine accommodation needs for the NUI, established by de Valera, endorsed the transfer of UCD to the new site in 1959 despite a strong dissent by one of its members, Aodhogán O’Rahilly (Government of Ireland 1959, 47-8). When the proposed transfer was considered by the Dáil in March 1960, Dr. Patrick Hillery, the Minister for Education, explicitly ruled out amalgamation between Trinity and UCD on the basis that it would deny protection to the religious preferences of parents, which were guaranteed by the constitution (Dáil Debates 180, 23 March 1960, 940-41). The minister’s statement was framed carefully to avoid conflict with the Catholic bishops.

to Belfield. The Commission rejected the option of a merger between Trinity College and UCD, recommending instead close collaboration between the two institutions and the establishment of UCD as an independent university (Government of Ireland 1967, pp.47-51). The commission’s report was not submitted until 1967 and its lengthy deliberations limited its influence in an era when educational policy was being transformed. Government policies on HE were about to undergo a radical shift with far-reaching implications for the higher education sector.

‘O’Malley announces wedding plans’

The influence of key agents in policy-making - notably politicians and senior officials - was a notable feature of policy change in HE. The government’s decision to sponsor the transfer of UCD to Belfield was influenced by de Valera within the government and by Dr. Tarlach Ó Raifeartaigh, the secretary of the Department of Education, within the administrative elite. Hillery’s statement in favour of the transfer of UCD was drafted by Ó Raifeartaigh, who was a devout lay Catholic and confidant of McQuaid (Walsh 2009, 54). This decision underlined the residual influence of ‘integralist’ Catholicism, forcefully represented by McQuaid. .

designed to accelerate policy change, notably the announcement of free second-level education in September 1966 (Walsh 2009, 313). The minister was disposed to seek a merger of Trinity College and UCD from the outset and found a plausible rationale in the changing demographic profile of higher education.

duplication of academic activity and resources as a key issue and emerged as a catalyst for the proposed university merger..

O’Malley first raised the prospect of a university merger with the Cabinet on 15 December 1966, even before the commission had completed its report (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education, 15 December 1966). O’Malley’s confidential submission to the government, bluntly entitled ‘The

Problem of Trinity College Dublin’, was much more revealing about the official

motivations for a merger than his subsequent policy announcement. O’Malley warned the government that ‘…the problem is now brought to a head by Trinity’s present student numbers, policy and capital claim. Its present policy, if accepted, would evidently not stop there and would indeed draw in its train implicit further commitment on the part of the State’ (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education, 15 December 1966, 21-2). He argued that ‘the State should not have to shoulder the enormous expense of duplication that will be involved’ in financing the expansion of two rival universities in Dublin, especially as the additional funding for TCD represented a commitment to the education of non-Irish students (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education, 15 December 1966, 2). The composition of Trinity’s student body drew criticism on the basis that it guaranteed the export of a majority of its graduates and reduced the university’s value to Irish society: indeed the departmental memorandum commented that the majority of non-Irish and Northern Ireland students ‘constitute a present to Britain and other countries of technical assistance of the highest quality’ (December 1966, 9).

both were present to varying degrees in his reflections on the university question. The minister perceived TCD as a non-Catholic institution, dominated by a narrow elite of mainly Protestant senior academics, dependent on British students for its survival and isolated from contemporary Irish society. O’Malley’s position was admirably summarised by his officials:

The Minister feels that we cannot allow a position to continue in which one University in Dublin would be allowed to remain apart from the main stream of the nation and continue to recruit its student body to a large extent from foreigners (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education, 9 March 1967, 1).

The answer is not in anything that the Trinity authorities may be expected to do, for a body with absolute power has never been known willingly to abdicate it…If Trinity is really to fit into Irish life… then it would appear to be necessary for its constitution and government organisation to be democratised in the same way as are those of the other University Colleges. As such a reform cannot be expected to come from within, it can only be effected by the Government (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education, 15 December 1966, 11-12).

universities in Dublin. The department sought to integrate Trinity College firmly within a restructured system of higher education, responsive to the government’s policy priorities and characterised by greater official control of higher education.

The minister quickly publicised the government’s decision, making his policy announcement at a press conference on 18 April 1967. O’Malley informed the Provost of TCD, Dr. Albert J. McConnell and the President of UCD, Prof. Jeremiah Hogan, of the initiative only on the morning of his press conference. (Irish Times, 19 April 1967). The policy announcement reflected not only O’Malley’s favoured tactic of pre-empting potential opposition by publicly announcing new policy initiatives in advance of any consultation with stakeholders, but also the abrupt emergence of a more authoritative approach to policy-making in higher education by political and official elites..

O’Malley’s policy statement identified the merger of Trinity College and UCD as the government’s most urgent priority within a wider process of reform and expansion in higher education: the government later endorsed the dissolution of the NUI and the establishment of UCC and UCG as independent universities. O’Malley proposed the creation of a single university authority, established on a statutory basis, with a subsidiary authority for each constituent college. The powers and composition of each governing body were not yet decided and no specific details were given on a possible re-allocation of faculties. He commented that the government had taken the basic policy decision and expressed confidence that a viable solution would be found provided that the necessary goodwill was forthcoming. The Irish

Times accurately commented that the Minister had assumed ‘a cheerful,

confident, shoot-first-and-ask-questions-afterwards mood’ (Irish Times, 19 April 1967).

not be expected to subsidise ‘avoidable duplication’ of university services due to the competing claims of two universities in a single metropolitan area, emphasising that ‘the whole thing cries out for some kind of complementary allocation’ (O’Malley 1967, 113-21). The prospect of a substantial increase in student numbers and the considerable commitment of the state to the university building programmes meant that the government had to insist upon ‘a joining of forces with a view to obviating all unnecessary duplication.’ (O’Malley 1967, 116). He offered examples of departments which faced amalgamation, arguing that the veterinary science faculties of the two colleges should be merged: it would make economic sense too for all Science students to be taught under a single roof. Economic and financial considerations certainly loomed large in the minister’s proposal for an institutional merger.

together staff and facilities would automatically enhance educational standards. Moreover, O’Malley’s commentary on the educational benefits of merger was brief and defensive, acknowledging that he had ‘treated mostly of the economic side of things and of training for the professions’ and consisting mainly of a ritualistic reference to Newman – ‘we are all to some extent followers of Newman in the belief that a university has something more to give its students than mere training’ (O’Malley 1967, 121).

O’Malley was more eloquent in developing a wider political rationale for his initiative. He mixed idealistic appeals to history and national tradition with his pragmatic analysis of economic realities, arguing that the existing situation was culturally and politically undesirable. He asserted that merger would end ‘a most insidious form of partition on our doorstep’, namely the traditional division between Trinity College, once the bastion of the Protestant ascendancy, and UCD, which had evolved from the original core of Newman’s Catholic University. The minister waxed lyrical in evoking the cultural and political benefits of a merger for the nation in general and Trinity College in particular:

Trinity is not going to pass away. It will be merely taking the final step across the threshold of that mansion to which it properly belongs, the Irish nation (O’Malley 1967, 118).

removal of the ‘ban’, but intended to make their policy redundant through the merger: the new University of Dublin would be multi-denominational, giving full respect and recognition to all denominations of students (O’Malley 1967, 121; Hyland and Milne 1992, 418-20). This wider political vision lent support to O’Malley’s confident claim that ‘we are at the opening of a new era in higher education’ (Irish Times, 19 April 1967). O’Malley’s statement marked the first significant attempt by an Irish government to transform the traditional institutional architecture of higher education since the foundation of the state.

. Yet O’Malley’s strategy of announcing a policy decision in advance of consultation with the institutional stakeholders proved much less effective than it had in securing the introduction of free second-level education. On this occasion O’Malley’s confident rhetoric did not reflect the reality of the situation. The minister had easily brushed aside the views of the Commission on Higher Education, but he faced far greater obstacles in securing the agreement of the two universities to a radical reshaping of higher education.

intention of accepting a merger based on unification of schools and departments, which was correctly regarded as a thinly veiled attempt to absorb Trinity into a larger institution with a very different cultural inheritance. McConnell issued a personal statement expressing confidence that Trinity College would ‘look at the Minister’s plans with the utmost sympathy’, which was followed by a statement from the Board endorsing a single university based on a two-college model. (Irish Times, 19 April 1967). The college administration’s willingness to accept merger on a conditional basis reflected McConnell’s determination to integrate TCD fully within Irish society and awareness among college officers of the weakness of Trinity’s position compared to UCD due to its difficulties in attracting Irish students (Luce 1992, 187).

MacHale’s generous interpretation of the official UCD response was not shared in Trinity College. Basil Chubb, professor of political science and college bursar (1964-74), spoke for many academic staff when he commented that a unitary university was unacceptable to the staff and graduates of TCD (Chubb 1967, 130-7). Chubb supported the O’Malley proposal for a single university with two colleges, as such a structure would allow the preservation of Trinity College’s existing academic community; it would also protect TCD’s contribution to Irish society, a quality that Chubb considered essential to ‘help combat the dreary and stifling conformity that is perhaps the greatest danger to this nation’ (Chubb 1967, 130-7). Chubb’s opposition to a unitary structure was endorsed by all the other TCD contributors to Studies: this position was reiterated with particular force by T.W. Moody, professor of modern history and a former member of the Commission on Higher Education. Moody warned that a unitary university would mean ‘the extinction of TCD’ and only a two-college structure stood any chance of acceptance by the college’s staff: ‘There being no death-wish in TCD, it will resist a unitary university to the utmost’ (Moody 1967, 173-5).

‘Many of us feared the battle could not be won…’

John Coolahan highlights the failure of the government to consult adequately among stakeholders or offer a convincing conception of what constituted university education as key weaknesses which undermined the minister’s plans (Coolahan 2008, 267). Yet O’Malley’s decision not to consult the institutions in advance was deliberate and had worked successfully in presenting prominent stakeholders in second-level education with a fait

accompli when he announced his initiative for free post-primary education.

privately regarded the outlook for merger as problematic from an early stage in the debate. O’Connor commented subsequently that even during O’Malley’s term, ‘many of us feared that the battle could not be won’ (O’Connor 1986, 204).

The detailed proposals for the merger announced by O’Malley’s successor, Brian Lenihan, on 6 July 1968 underlined the virtual impossibility of reaching agreement in practice. The new minister set out to provide a practical blueprint for the reconstituted university by setting out a redistribution of faculties between the two colleges, arguing that the initiative provided for ‘a fruitful intermingling’ of the best qualities of the two institutions (NAI D/T 2000/6/655, Minister for Education, 6 July 1968, 8). Lenihan proposed that the professional disciplines of law, medicine, veterinary science, dentistry and pharmacy would all go to Trinity (Minister for Education, 6 July 1968, 4-6). Engineering, social science and commerce would be based in UCD, with each college retaining its existing range of disciplines in Arts and Science. While Lenihan’s statement provided much of the detail missing from O’Malley’s earlier announcements, a convincing educational rationale which engaged with the aims and mission of the university was still conspicuous by its absence.

faculties: ‘It could be said with great truth that University College has never been so united about any issue throughout its existence as it is about this’ (Meenan 1968, 314-20). Lenihan succeeded only in uniting previously antagonistic forces within UCD against the merger itself (O’Flynn 2012, 121-22). The ASA in UCD approved two resolutions on 4 November 1968, which endorsed co-operation between two independent universities in Dublin (NAI D/T 2000/6/655, Ó Dálaigh to Ó Dubhda, 5 February 1969). The governing body of UCD in turn produced a detailed critique of the minister’s plans, entitled The Case for University College Dublin, which condemned Lenihan’s proposal as a recipe for ‘the partial destruction and total discouragement’ of UCD as a university institution (UCD Governing Body 1969, 14). The authorities of UCD were particularly opposed to the proposals for the transfer of the schools of Medicine (the cornerstone of the original Catholic university) and Law to Trinity College. They made a strong case for the reconstitution of UCD as an independent university, co-operating closely with TCD. The rejection of the official plans by academic staff in both Trinity and UCD reflected the mobilisation of resistance by a professional class against encroachment on its traditional power and autonomy by the political centre.

an increasingly rapid expansion of undergraduate student numbers across the university sector. Official assumptions that Trinity College was unattractive to Irish students were outdated, as the ‘ban’ had a steadily declining impact during the late 1960s. The college’s records indicated that Catholics comprised 48% of the first year undergraduate cohort in 1969-70 (Luce 1992, 197), while departmental estimates suggested that Catholics already formed a small majority of the new intake in 1968: either way the college had crossed a significant watershed in its ability to attract Catholic students from the Republic. Ó Raifeartaigh advised Taoiseach Jack Lynch on 5 February 1969 that TCD would have a large majority of Catholic students within a decade – a prediction that proved accurate (NAI D/T 2000/6/655, Ó Raifeartaigh to Lynch,

6 February 1969, 2-3). The upsurge in applications in the late 1960s reflected an embrace of Trinity College by the Catholic middle class.

1972, 655). Traditional denominational divisions ceased to be a significant dividing line in higher education, as Trinity broadened its appeal to encompass a larger, more diverse and increasingly more liberal Catholic middle class.

The removal of the ecclesiastical ban itself dealt a further blow to the prospects for university re-organisation. The Catholic bishops agreed in June 1970 to repeal their regulation restricting the entry of Catholics to Trinity College (DDA AB8/B/XV/b/07, Irish Hierarchy, 22-24 June 1970, 5). The bishops announced publicly that they were acting to remove the ban in response to constructive developments in the relations between the two universities (DDA AB8/B/XV/b/07, Irish Hierarchy, 25/6/1970): but the hierarchy was also responding to the reality that the ban was increasingly a dead letter. This episcopal volte-face rendered redundant the key political rationale for merger, promoted by successive ministers as a solution to traditional political and religious divisions.

constructive relationship with the institutions within its remit, which generally recognised the value of a ‘buffer agency’ between universities and the state (Ó Cathail, 1982, pp.44-55). Moreover, Ó Raifeartaigh, the first chairman of the HEA, was never enthusiastic about an institutional merger: as departmental secretary he had been instrumental in advising Hillery to reject it in 1960. The HEA proved receptive to increasingly tenacious lobbying by both universities to maintain their independent status.

The universities found common ground in their scepticism about the government’s policy. The authorities of Trinity College and the NUI agreed to propose an alternative solution to the HEA in April 1970 (HEA 1972, 83-7). The NUI/TCD agreement envisaged two independent universities in Dublin, which would collaborate closely together and rationalise their academic activity in a number of disciplines, including science, engineering and health sciences. The successful negotiations between the NUI and TCD appeared to offer the prospect of significant rationalisation between the two universities without a merger. The agreement was a defensive innovation designed to prevent a restructuring imposed by the state. It was a strategic defence of institutional power by previously antagonistic elements of a professional elite, who ultimately united to forestall a further assertion of power by the political centre. It was perhaps the ultimate irony of O’Malley’s initiative that it succeeded in uniting academic elites within the two institutions only against the proposed merger itself and the undermining of institutional power and autonomy which it represented.

December 1971. The authority accepted that there should be two separate universities in Dublin, broadly endorsing the proposals for disciplinary collaboration made by the university authorities: the HEA stipulated, however, that a statutory conjoint board should be established to co-ordinate rationalisation between the two institutions (HEA 1972, 59). The HEA considered that the proposed merger was no longer a compelling necessity, as circumstances had changed dramatically since the policy was adopted, with the removal of the ecclesiastical ban, the reduction in the proportion of non-Irish students in Trinity College and the NUI/TCD agreement. The authority believed that the university accord signalled the end of an ‘insidious partition’ in higher education, offering the prospect of overcoming duplication by agreement between the universities (Ferriter 2012, 635-6). The HEA’s recommendation for policy change enhanced its reputation with the universities, which generally opposed a merger (Clancy 1989, 106-7). Yet despite the authority’s hopes for reducing duplication by agreement, institutional barriers to large-scale rationalisation proved enduring. The NUI/TCD agreement was not implemented in its original form, although a limited co-ordination of subject areas occurred during the 1970s, with veterinary science being offered exclusively in UCD, while Trinity secured dentistry and pharmacy (Coolahan 2003, 785; O’Flynn 2012, 153). The government ultimately abandoned not only the merger, but also any attempt to undertake a wider re-organisation of the university sector: ultimately comprehensive universities legislation would be postponed until the 1990s.

The merger was intended to assert the power of the political centre over a university sector that had previously been largely autonomous, particularly TCD with its distinctive governance structure. In this context the initiative was a failure, due to a successful defence of institutional power, which ultimately brought together previously antagonistic professional elites to forestall a radical reshaping of established disciplines and institutional structures. The effective resistance of a professional university elite to the expansion of the authority of the state in HE played a key role in the failure of the initiative. Moreover wider policy and cultural changes in this period began a transformation of the higher education system that decisively undermined traditional denominational divisions in HE and made a merger appear redundant. Ultimately maintaining the institutional status quo, with significantly greater collaboration and some relatively minor discipline-based adjustments, proved to be the alternative that divided politicians, officials and institutional stakeholders least.

traditional ideological influences were by no means extinct and newly minted economic priorities were usually combined in official discourse with political and cultural objectives. The diverse nature of central power and the extent to which official policies were in a state of transition facilitated successful professional and institutional resistance to the merger.

Yet while O’Malley’s initiative for merger proved abortive, this did not signal any retraction of state intervention within HE, still less a long-term re-assertion of institutional power. Indeed the initiative foreshadowed a long-term expansion of the role and power of the state in HE, which was also exemplified by the foundation of the HEA as a statutory intermediary agency between the department and HEIs (Walsh, 2009). O’Malley’s intervention not only sidelined the report of the Commission on Higher Education, but made institutional reform and rationalisation at higher level a central theme of the state’s policy for the first time. While O’Malley’s successors abandoned plans to merge the two oldest university institutions in Dublin, they were determined to influence not only the institutional shape of the HE system but increasingly also the nature of future developments at institutional and programme level (Ó Buachalla 1992, 69-78)..O’Malley’s initiative testified to the emergence of a newly pro-active, authoritative style of policy-making, incorporating interventionist approaches by politicians, officials and state agencies, which sought a reshaping of HE in pursuit of wider economic and societal objectives.

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Interviews

Mr. James Dukes, 28 April 2003 Mr. Tony Ó Dálaigh, 3 May 2002