OIOIDWS for Healthcare Token Profile for Authentication Tokens

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Digital  Health  Denmark  


OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare  Token  Profile  

for  Authentication  Tokens  



Document  History ...3  

Introduction ...4  

Notation ... 5  

Related  Profiles ... 5  

Authentication  Token  Requirements ...5  

Authentication  Token  Processing... 6  

Authentication  Token  Attributes... 7  

WS-­‐Trust  Binding...8  


Authentication  Token  (non-­‐normative)... 9  

Profile  and  architectural  decisions...12  

Allowed  credential  types... 12  

Protocol  binding... 12  

Authentication  token  format ... 13  

Claims  in  RequestSecurityToken  messages ... 13  

References ...15  


Document  History  

Date   Version   Initials   Changes  

01-­‐09-­‐2009   0.9   KKJ,  BVT   Initial  version  

08-­‐02-­‐2010   1.0   KKJ   Internal  release  



This  document  describes  the  requirements  for  authentication  tokens  used  in  the  Danish  health  sector   federation  of  services.  


Figure  1:  End  user  authenticates  to  IdP  via  WSC  

An  authentication  token  is  used  by  a  Web  Service  Client  (WSC)  to  convey  to  an  Identity  Provider  (IdP)  proof   of  identity  on  behalf  of  a  user  or  system.  In  particular:  

A  WSC  that  needs  to  invoke  a  web  service  in  the  federation  must  first  authenticate  with  an  IdP.  A  successful   authentication  results  in  the  issuance  of  an  OIOIDWS  bootstrap  token  signed  by  the  IdP  [OIOBOOT].  The   authentication  token  used  in  the  web  services  scenarios  in  the  Danish  health  sector  is  a  special  SAML  2.0   token.  This  profile  mandates  the  use  of  OCES  digital  signatures  for  authentication,  and  does  not  allow  other   credential  types.  

Prior  to  authentication,  the  WSC  will  generate  the  authentication  token  (a  SAML  2.0  assertion)  and  have  it   signed  by  the  end  user  (step  1  on  Figure  1).  Next,  the  WSC  will  embed  the  authentication  token  in  a  WS-­‐ Trust  RequestSecurityToken  message  and  send  it  to  the  IdP  for  authentication  (step  2  on  Figure  1).   Bootstrap  tokens  are  similarly  returned  from  the  IdP  to  the  WSC  via  a  WS-­‐Trust  

RequestSecurityTokenResponse  (step  3  on  Figure  1).  

Disclaimer:  Authentication  tokens  are  not  profiled  in  OIOIDWS,  and  hence  the  authentication  mechanism   described  in  this  document  is  proprietary  to  OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare.  The  result  of  authentication,  the   bootstrap  token,  however,  is  not  proprietary  to  OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare,  and  it  is  intended  that  this  token   can  be  used  in  the  context  of  other  non-­‐healthcare  OIOIDWS  compliant  services.  



Namespaces  are  abbreviated  to  commonly  used  monikers.  The  table  below  expands  the  namespaces  in  use   by  this  profile  to  their  respective  URNs:  

Moniker   Namespace   ds   http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#   saml2   urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion   soap   http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/   wsa   http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing   wsp   http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/policy   wst   http://docs.oasis-­‐open.org/ws-­‐sx/ws-­‐trust/200512    

The  keywords  "MUST",  "MUST  NOT",  "REQUIRED",  "SHALL",  "SHALL  NOT",  "SHOULD",  "SHOULD  NOT",   "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY",  and  "OPTIONAL"  used  in  this  document  must  be  interpreted  according  to   [RFC2119].  

Related  Profiles  

The  reader  is  assumed  to  be  familiar  with  OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare,  OIOIDWS  in  general  and  the  following   sub-­‐profiles  in  particular:  

• The  OIO  Bootstrap  Token  Profile  [OIO-­‐BOOT]  describes  the  requirements  for  bootstrap  tokens   issued  by  an  IdP  after  successful  authentication.  

• The  OIO  WS-­‐Trust  Profile  [OIO-­‐WST]  describes  the  WS-­‐Trust  binding  for  security  tokens  in  context   of  OIOIDWS  and  hence  OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare.  

Authentication  Token  Requirements  

OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare  Authentication  Tokens  are  SAML  2.0  assertions  conforming  to  the  requirements   for  OIOSAML  assertions  for  web  SSO  as  defined  in  [OIO-­‐SAML-­‐SSO]  chapters  7-­‐9  unless  explicitly  stated   otherwise  below:      

• The  token  MUST  use  holder-­‐of-­‐key  semantics  and  be  signed  by  the  person  on  whose  behalf  the   WSC  attempts  to  obtain  an  authentication  token.  

• The  <saml2:Conditions>  element  MUST  include  one  <saml2:AudienceRestriction>  with  the  entity  ID   of  the  IdP  that  will  perform  the  authentication.  

• The  bootstrap  token  MUST  not  be  encrypted  (saml2:EncryptedAssertion)  or  contain  encrypted   identifiers.  


• <saml2:AuthnStatement>  MAY  be  present.  

• The  <saml2:AttributeStatement>  MUST  conform  to  the  OCES  attribute  profile  or  the  persistent   pseudonym  profile  described  in  [OIO-­‐SAML-­‐SSO].  

• The  authentication  token  SHOULD  NOT  include  private  attributes  (defined  in  a  separate   namespace).  Any  extra  attributes  sent  by  the  WSC  to  the  IdP  may  be  ignored.  

• The  life-­‐time  of  the  authentication  token  SHOULD  BE  5  minutes  from  the  time  of  issuance  as   defined  in  the  saml2:Assertion@IssueInstant  attribute.  Please  see  the  discussion  on  time   synchronization  in  [OIOIDWSH-­‐MAIN]  

• The  certificate  of  the  signing  party  MUST  be  included  in  the  <ds:Signature>  element  of  the   <saml2:Assertion>.  

Authentication  Token  Processing  

An  IdP  that  receives  an  Authentication  token  MUST  perform  at  least  the  following  validation  steps:   • Validate  the  XML  for  wellformedness  and  schema  validity.  

• Check  that  it  is  listed  in  the  <saml2:AudienceRestriction>  element.   • Verify  the  signature  over  the  <saml2:Assertion>  element:  

o Check  that  the  embedded  certificate  has  not  expired  

o Check  that  the  embedded  certificate  has  not  been  revoked  through  [OCSP]  lookup  or  [CRL]   check.  

o Check  that  the  embedded  certificate  is  issued  by  the  OCES  certificate  authority  (CA)  ie.  that   the  entire  certificate  chain  of  trust  is  intact.  

o Compute  the  signature  digest  over  the  <saml2:Assertion>   o Decrypt  the  signature  element  

o Check  that  the  signature  digest  and  the  decrypted  signature  element  match.  

• Validate  that  the  supplied  identity  is  allowed  to  access  services  in  the  health  sector.  Users  that   identify  themselves  with  a  valid  MOCES  signature  may  e.g.  be  checked  via  CVR-­‐RID  to  CPR  lookup   followed  by  a  check  that  the  CPR  does  indeed  represent  a  health  professional.  

• Validate  the  holder-­‐of-­‐key  relation  between  the  WS-­‐Trust  request  and  the  contained   Authentication  Token.    


Authentication  Token  Attributes  

The  authentication  token  needs  to  convey  the  identity  of  a  health  professional  using  a  digital  signature   created  via  MOCES.  Information  about  name  and  organization  is  already  in  the  certificate,  but  these  values   may  be  overridden  by  also  specifying  such  information  in  assertions.  

Some  attributes  including  organizational  unit  and  it-­‐system-­‐name  cannot  be  determined  or  validated  by  the   IdP  and  must  hence  be  provided  by  the  WSC.  The  IdP  has  no  other  choice  but  to  trust  these  elements  and   will  faithfully  copy  them  to  bootstrap  tokens.  These  attributes  will  later  be  copied  to  Identity  Tokens  via   token  exchange  at  an  STS  and  finally  be  consumed  by  a  WSP  who  should  be  aware  of  the  fact  that  these   attributes  have  not  been  validated  and  must  decide  whether  or  not  to  trust  the  WSC  to  supply  such  data.   Please  refer  to  [OIOIDWSH-­‐MAIN]  for  details  on  how  a  WSP  can  determine  whether  or  not  an  attribute  has   been  verified  by  the  IdP.    

Please  note  that  the  end  user’s  certificate  must  always  be  present,  but  values  taken  from  it  (e.g.  surname,   CommonName,  etc.)  are  optional.  The  IdP  must  ensure  that  when  specified,  attributes  that  originate  from   the  end  user  certificate  must  match  those  in  the  supplied  certificate  (userCertificate  attribute).    

Authentication  tokens  leverages  attributes  specified  in  [OIO-­‐SAML-­‐SSO]  as  summarized  in  the  table  below:  

Name   Friendly  Name   Category   Mandatory?  

urn:oid:   surname   CORE   No  

urn:oid:   CommonName   CORE   No  

urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1   Uid   CORE   No  

urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3   Email   CORE   No  

dk:gov:saml:attribute:AssuranceLevel     CORE   Yes  

dk:gov:saml:attribute:SpecVer     CORE   Yes  

dk:gov:saml:attribute:CvrNumberIdentifier     CORE   No  

dk:gov:saml:attribute:UniqueAccountKey     CORE   No  

urn:liberty:disco:2006-­‐08:DiscoveryEPR     CORE   No  

urn:oid:   serialNumber   OCES   No  

urn:oid:   organizationName   OCES   No  

urn:oid:   organizationUnit   OCES   No  

urn:oid:   Title   OCES   No  


dk:gov:saml:attribute:IsYouthCert     OCES   No    

urn:oid:   userCertificate   OCES   Yes  

dk:gov:saml:attribute:PidNumberIdentifier     OCES   No  

dk:gov:saml:attribute:CprNumberIdentifier     OCES   No  

dk:gov:saml:attribute:RidNumberIdentifier     OCES   No  

dk:healthcare:saml:attribute:UserAuthorizationCode   UserAuthorizationCode   HEALTH   No  

dk:healthcare:saml:attribute:ITSystemName   ITSystemName     HEALTH   Yes  

dk:healthcare:saml:attribute:UserEducationCode   UserEducationCode   HEALTH   No   dk:healthcare:saml:attribute:UserEducationType   UserEducationType   HEALTH   No    

The  CORE  and  OCES  categories  of  attributes  are  defined  in  detail  in  [OIO-­‐SAML-­‐SSO]  and  the  HEALTH   category  is  defined  in  detail  in  [OIOIDWSH-­‐ID].  

WS-­Trust  Binding  

A  WSC  communicates  with  the  IdP  using  the  WS-­‐Trust  messages  RequestSecurityToken  and  

RequestSecurityTokenResponse  [OIO-­‐WST].  An  authentication  token  is  added  to  the  SOAP  header  of  the   message  carrying  the  RequestSecurityToken  element  in  the  <soap:Body>  part.  Before  sending  the  message   to  the  IdP,  the  WSC  signs  the  <soap:Body>,  the  <saml2:Assertion>,  and  various  other  headers  with  its   VOCES  certificate.    

OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare  complies  with  [OIO-­‐WST]  and  [OIO-­‐WSTDP]  with  the  following  clarifications:   • A  WSC  MAY  add  claims  to  the  RequestSecurityToken  message,  but  cannot  expect  these  to  be  

processed  by  the  IdP.  Please  see  the  architectural  issues  section  for  a  discussion  of  this  decision  and   [OIO-­‐WST]  p.  13.  

• OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare  bootstrap  tokens  SHOULD  currently  only  be  obtained  via  an  external   Identity  Provider,  and  not  via  an  STS  local  to  the  WSC’s  organization  (see  [OIO-­‐WSTDP]  p.5).   • When  a  service  is  requesting  a  token  on  behalf  of  a  user,  an  <wst:ActAs>  element  defined  in  WS-­‐  

Trust  1.4  MUST  be  present  and  include  an  authentication  token  representing  the  user.  The  token   SHOULD  be  embedded  directly  and  thus  not  be  a  token  reference.  (see  [OIO-­‐WST]  p.  6).  

• The  <wsp:AppliesTo>  element  SHOULD  contain  an  <wsa:EndpointReference>  identifying  the  STS  for   which  the  bootstrap  token  should  be  issued.  (see  [OIO-­‐WST]  p.  6).  

Figure  2  below  illustrates  the  request-­‐response  pattern  for  WS-­‐Trust  messages  in  the  context  of  OIOIDWS   for  Healthcare.  The  notation  of  figure  2  is  described  in  [OIOIDWSH-­‐MAIN]:  



Figure  2:  Requesting  a  bootstrap  token  with  an  authentication  token  via  WS-­‐Trust  

Please  notice  how  the  SAML  tokens  of  both  messages  are  carried  in  the  <soap:Body>  part  of  the  message   and  not  in  the  headers  as  could  be  expected.  For  details  of  the  binding,  please  refer  to  [OIO-­‐WST].  


Please  refer  to  [OIO-­‐WST]  p.  8  and  p.  10  for  examples  on  RequestSecurityToken  and   RequestSecurityTokenResponse  messages.  

Authentication  Token  (non-­normative)  

The  example  below  shows  a  minimal  authentication  token  issued  by  a  WSC  (http://someWSC.dk)  on  behalf   of  a  user  who  is  represented  by  a  MOCES  signature.  

<!-- Token compliant with OIODWS for Healthcare SAML Profile for Authentication Tokens -->

<saml:Assertion ID="_660c60a3-c490-49a4-813d-eb527e186ff5" IssueInstant="2009-12-31T12:00:00Z"

Version="2.0" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"



<!-- Identification of the WSC that has issued this authentication token -->


<!-- A signature created with the user's MOCES certificate over the entire assertion -->




<ds:Reference URI="#_660c60a3-c490-49a4-813d-eb527e186ff5">


<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#envelopedsignature"/>


<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>


</ds:Reference> </ds:SignedInfo> <ds:SignatureValue>x/GyPbzmFEe85pGD3c1aXG4Vspb9V9jGCjwcRCKrtwPS6vdVNCcY5rHaFPYWkf+5 EIYcPzx+pX1h43SmwviCqXRjRtMANWbHLhWAptaK1ywS7gFgsD01qjyen3CP+m3D w6vKhaqledl0BYyrIzb4KkHO4ahNyBVXbJwqv5pUaE4=</ds:SignatureValue> <ds:KeyInfo> <ds:X509Data>

<!-- The end-user's MOCES certificate -->

<ds:X509Certificate> MIICyjCCAjOgAwIBAgICAnUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgakxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVT MRIwEAYDVQQIEwlXaXNjb25zaW4xEDAOBgNVBAcTB01hZGlzb24xIDAeBgNVBAoT F1VuaXZlcnNpdHkgb2YgV2lzY29uc2luMSswKQYDVQQLEyJEaXZpc2l... </ds:X509Certificate> </ds:X509Data> </ds:KeyInfo> </ds:Signature>

<!-- This section identifies the web service client (WSC) on whose behalf this identity token was issued. Identification is by means of the WSC's certificate -->


<saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:X509SubjectName"> C=DK,O=Ingen organisatorisk tilknytning,CN=Hans Hansen,Serial=CVR:1234-RID:1234 </saml:NameID>

<saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:holder-of-key">

<!-- Here comes a NameID indicating the ID of the sender (WSC) who must confirm with a key -->

<saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:entity"> https://SomeWSC.dk


<saml:SubjectConfirmationData xsi:type="saml:KeyInfoConfirmationDataType"




<!-- Here comes the WSC's X.509 cert (VOCES) -->

<ds:X509Certificate> MIICyjCCAjOgAwIBA.... </ds:X509Certificate>






<!-- How and when did the End-user authenticate -->

<saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2009-01-31T12:00:00Z"> <saml:AuthnContext> <saml:AuthnContextClassRef> urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:X509 </saml:AuthnContextClassRef> </saml:AuthnContext> </saml:AuthnStatement> <saml:AttributeStatement>

<!-- *** Core attributes which must always be part of an authentication token *** -->

<!-- Sur Name Core Attribute -->

<saml:Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"

Name="urn:oid:" FriendlyName="surName">

<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">Jensen</saml:AttributeValue>


<!-- Common Name Core Attribute -->

<saml:Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"


<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">Hans Jensen</saml:AttributeValue>


<!-- Uid Core Attribute this is the Subject Serial Number -->

<saml:Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"


<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">CVR:20688092-RID:1234</saml:AttributeValue>


<!-- Email Core Attribute -->

<saml:Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"

Name="urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3" FriendlyName="email">

<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">jens@email.dk</saml:AttributeValue>


<!-- SpecVer Core Attribute -->

<saml:Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"


<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">DK-SAML-2.0</saml:AttributeValue>


<!-- Assurance Level Core Attribute -->

<saml:Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"


<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">3</saml:AttributeValue>


<!--- CVR Number Core Attribute -->

<saml:Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"


<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">20688092</saml:AttributeValue>


<!--- IT-System Name Attribute -->

<saml:Attribute NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"

Name="dk:healthcare:saml:attribute:ITSystemName" FriendlyName="ITSystemName">

<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">SuperCare</saml:AttributeValue>


</saml:AttributeStatement> </saml:Assertion>


Profile  and  architectural  decisions  

Allowed  credential  types  

Architectural Decision

Support digital signatures

Issue or Problem Statement

There is a multitude of credential types that could be used for authenticating a user, including symmetric keys, digital signatures, usernames and password, pin codes, and more. Not all credentials are of equal strength (level of authentication) and as the Danish health sector needs a high degree of confidence in the authenticity of the requester, many are not relevant. It must be determined which one(s) will at least be supported.

Possible solutions

1. Support digital signatures. 2. Support username / password. 3. Support pin-code or symmetric keys Architectural

Decision (detailed)

Use digital X.509 certificates – in particular OCES – for authentication.

Assumptions Motivation for decision

Currently digital signatures are the strongest credentials available to the health sector, and sufficient for the level of authenticity required to communicate patient information. Additionally, OIOIDWS uses OCES certificates for authentication in the public sector in general and the health sector can thus leverage existing infrastructure. Usernames and passwords, pin-codes and symmetric keys all require an a priori exchange and a registry to be kept with the authenticating party, which is not desirable as it puts additional burden on this party. Additionally usernames and pin-codes are not strong enough to be used when communicating patient information.

Implications Derived requirements Related Decisions  

Protocol  binding  

Architectural Decision

Use WS-Trust which is also used for obtaining an identity token with an STS

Issue or Problem Statement

OIOIDWS doesn’t specify how authentication tokens are sent to the IdP, but does define a web based mechanism by which a bootstrap token ends up at a WSP. There is therefore a need to specify:

a) How authentication tokens are sent from WSC to IdP and b) How bootstrap tokens are sent from IdP to WSC.

Possible solutions

1. Use WS-Trust which is also used for obtaining an identity token with an STS 2. Use SAML AuthenticationRequest and AuthenticationResponse messages 3. Use some other means

Architectural Decision (detailed)

A WSC uses the WS-Trust RequestSecurityToken to send a SAML 2.0 authentication token to an IdP and receives a bootstrap token from the IdP via a


Assumptions Motivation for decision

WS-Trust is already used in the communication between a WSC and an STS in order to exchange a bootstrap token for an identity token. WSCs will therefore readily have the ability to communicate via WS-Trust, and since IdP and STS will likely be co-located, the IdP will also be able to receive WS-Trust messages.

Implications Derived requirements Related Decisions  

Authentication  token  format  

Architectural Decision

Use SAML 2.0 assertions signed by the end-user / WSC

Issue or Problem Statement

Rich clients that need to invoke a web service will not have retrieved a bootstrap token via web SSO as assumed by the OIO profiles and can generally not use the same protocol to obtain one. It is therefore necessary to define a token, which can be used in place of the web based signon-mechanism.

Possible solutions

4. Use SAML 2.0 assertions signed by the end-user / WSC 5. Use some other token mechanism e.g. Kerberos. Architectural

Decision (detailed)

A WSC creates a SAML 2.0 assertion, signs it and sends it to the IdP for authentication.

Assumptions Motivation for decision

SAML 2.0 assertions are used both for bootstrap tokens and for identity tokens. Using SAML 2.0 assertions for authentication tokens as well will therefore be unproblematic for all involved parties as they must already be able to create and / or process these credentials.

Implications The WSC must be able to create SAML 2.0 assertions and the IdP must be able to consume them. Derived requirements Related Decisions  

Claims  in  RequestSecurityToken  messages  

Architectural Decision

Have the IdP ignore claims altogether

Issue or Problem Statement

WS-Trust allows a requester – in this case the WSC – to add a set of <Claim> elements to the RequestSecurityToken message in order to indicate which attributes it requires from the IDP.

Possible solutions

1. Allow claims in RequestSecurityToken messages and have the IdP add extra attributes to the bootstrap token when possible.

2. Have the IdP ignore claims altogether Architectural


When a WSC decides to add claims to a RequestSecurityToken message, the IdP should not be expected to process these.


(detailed) Assumptions Motivation for decision

In the Danish health sector, attributes are either provided by the WSC in the SAML authentication token or looked up by the IdP based on the WSC’s credentials. Claims are potentially useful when exchanging a bootstrap token for an identity token, but only if the STS does not leverage a priori information on what attributes a given WSP needs. In other words, claims add no value when authenticating to an IdP in the health sector scenario and hence are not needed.

Implications WSCs cannot ask for specific attributes to be added to the bootstrap token. Derived

requirements Related Decisions

“Claims in Request” [OIO-WST] p. 13




[CRL]   Internet  X.509  Public  Key  Infrastructure  Certificate  and  Certificate  Revocation  List   (CRL)  Profile,  The  Internet  Society,  2002  

[OIOIDWSH-­‐ID]   OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare,  Identity  Token  Profile,  Version  1.0,  SDSD  2009   [OIOIDWSH-­‐MAIN]   OIOIDWS  for  Healthcare  Overview,  Version  1.0,  SDSD  2009  

[OCSP]     X.509  Internet  Public  Key  Infrastructure  Online  Certificate  Status  Protocol  –  OCSP,   The  Internet  Society,  1999  

[OIO-­‐BOOT]   “OIO  Bootstrap  Token  Profile”,  Version  0.95,  It-­‐  og  Telestyrelsen,  2009  

[OIO-­‐SAML-­‐SSO]   “OIO  Web  SSO  Profile  V2.0  (DK-­‐SAML  2.0)  -­‐  Examples”,  Version  1.3,  November  2007,   http://www.itst.dk/arkitektur-­‐og-­‐standarder/fora/inaktive-­‐fora/oio-­‐it-­‐

arkitekturkomiteen/moder/mode-­‐i-­‐it-­‐arkitekturkomiteen-­‐den-­‐13-­‐12-­‐ 07/Pkt.%203e,%20bilag%203.pdf    

[OIO-­‐WST]   “OIO  WS-­‐Trust  Profile”,  Version  0.99,  It-­‐  og  Telestyrelsen,  2009  

[OIO-­‐WSTDP]   “OIO  WS-­‐Trust  Deployment  Profile”,  Version  0.9,  It-­‐  og  Telestyrelsen,  2009.   [RFC2119]   S.  Bradner,  "Key  words  for  use  in  RFCs  to  Indicate  Requirement  Levels",  RFC  2119,  

Harvard  University,  March  1997.  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt      




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