Table of contents:
page Agency . . . .1-2 Partnership . . . . 2-3 Land Titles . . . .3-13 Torts & Damages . . . . .14-22 Oblicon . . . .22-40 Sales . . . . 40-42 Succession . . . . 43-49 Property . . . 49-62 Persons . . . . 63-71 AGENCY 2000
VICTORIAS MILLING CO. v. CA (G.R. No. 117356, June 19, 2000)
Civil Law/Agency/Distinguished from Sale: The basis of agency is representation. On the part of
the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions; and on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it, and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency.
One factor which most clearly distinguishes agency from other legal concepts is control; one person — the agent — agrees to act under the control or direction of another — the principal. Indeed, the very word "agency" has come to connote control by the principal. Where the relation of agency is dependent upon the acts of the parties, the law makes no presumption of agency, and it is always a fact to be proved, with the burden of proof resting upon the persons alleging the agency, to show not only the fact of its existence, but also its nature and extent.
The question of whether a contract is one of sale or agency depends on the intention of the parties as gathered from the whole scope and effect of the language employed. Ultimately, what is decisive is the intention of the parties. In this case, the use of the words "sold and endorsed" in CSC’s communication means that STM and CSC intended a contract of sale, and not an agency. Also, the terms and conditions clearly show that petitioner transferred title to the sugar to the buyer or his assignee upon payment of the purchase price. Said terms clearly establish a contract of sale, not a contract to sell. Petitioner is now estopped from alleging the contrary.
1996 LIM v. CA (February 1996)
Contract of Agency/Validity & Enforceability: There are some provisions of the law which require
certain formalities for particular contracts:
1) When the form is required for the validity of the contract
2) When it is required to make the contract effective as against third parties (Arts. 1357 & 1358, Civil Code)
3) When form is required for the purpose of proving the existence of the contract (Statute of Frauds).
A contract to sell on commission basis does not belong to any of these three categories, hence, it is valid and enforceable in whatever form it may be entered into.
VELOSO v. CA (G.R. No. 102737, Aug. 21, 1996)
Civil Law/Agency & Land Titles/GPA to sell land & innocent purchaser for value: Documents
acknowledged before a notary have the evidentiary weight with respect to their due execution. The questioned GPA and deed of sale, were notarized and therefore, presumed to be valid and duly executed. While it is true that it was denominated as a GPA, a perusal thereof revealed that it stated an authority to sell. Thus, there was no need for a separate SPA as the document expressly authorized the agent to sell the subject property. The SPA can be included in the GPA when it is specified therein the act or transaction for which the special power is required.
As to the issue of forgery, the Court ruled that mere variance of the signatures is not conclusive proof of forgery for forgery cannot be presumed. (Tenio-Obsequio v. CA, G.R. No. 107967, 1 Mar. 1994)
Even granting that petitioner’s signature was falsified, and the GPA and deed of sale void, such would not revoke title subsequently issued in favor of private respondent, an innocent purchaser for value, one relying on the notarized GPA presented by petitioner’s wife. Being the wife of the owner and having with her the title to the property, there was no reason for private respondent not to believe in her authority.
COSMIC LUMBER v. CA (G.R.No. 114311, November 1996)
Civil Law/Agency’Power to Sue and Compromise vis-à-vis Power to Sell Land: The explicit and
exclusionary authority granted to the agent under the SPA for her to sue to eject all persons found on the lots so that petitioner could take material possession thereof, and for this purpose, to appear at pre-trial and enter into a compromise agreement, but only insofar as this was protective of petitioner’s rights does not grant to the agent expressly or impliedly, the power to sell the lot or portion thereof. In the context of the grant of powers to the agent, alienation by sale cannot be deemed protective of petitioner’s rights, more so when the land was being sold for P80/sq. m., very much less than its assessed value of P250.00/sq. m.
When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void. For the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell real estate, a POA must so express the powers of the agent in clear and unmistakable language. Where there is any reasonable doubt, no such construction shall be given the document. (citations omitted)
As the sale was void, so were the compromise agreement and the judgement based thereon.
The principal is chargeable with and bound by the knowledge of or notice to his agent received while the agent was acting as such. But the general rule is intended to protect those who exercise good faith and not as a shield for unfair dealing. Hence, there is a well-established exception to the general rule as where the conduct and dealings of the agent are such as to raise a clear presumption that he will not communicate to the principal the facts in controversy. (Mutual Life v. Hilton Green, 241 US 613) The logical reason for this exception is that where the agent is committing fraud, it would be contrary to common sense to expect that he would communicate this to the principal. Verily, when an agent is engaged in the perpetration of fraud upon his principal, he is not really acting for the principal but is acting for himself, entirely outside the scope of his agency. (Aetna Casualty v. Local Bldg., 19P2d 612, 616)
1995 TOYOTA SHAW v. CA (244 SCRA 320, May 1995)
Civil Law/Agency/Sales/Contract to sell: A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and
must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent
PARTNERSHIP 2000 HEIRS OF TAN ENG KEE V. CA (3 Oct 2000)
Particular partnership distinguished from joint venture – A particular partnership is distinguished
from joint venture, to wit:
1. a joint venture (an American concept similar to out joint account) is a sort of informal partnership, with no firm name and no legal personality. In a joint account, the participating merchants can transact business under their own name, and can be individually liable therefore; and
2. usually, but not necessarily a joint venture is limited to a single transaction, although the business of pursuing to a successful termination may continue for a number of years; a partnership generally relates to a continuing business of various
transactions of a certain kind.
It would seem that under the Philippine law, a joint venture is a form of partnership, specifically particular partnership which has for its object specific undertaking. The Supreme Court has however recognized a distinction between these 2 business forms and has held that although a corporation cannot enter into a partnership, it may however engage in a joint venture with others.
TOCAO V. CA ( Oct 2000)
Existence of a partnership – The issue of whether or not a partnership exists is a factual matter
which are within the exclusive domain of both the trial court and CA.
Since a contract of partnership is consensual, an oral contract of partnership is a good as a written one; when no immovable property or real rights are involved, what matters is that the parties have complied with the requisites of partnership.
The best evidence of the existence of the partnership, which is not yet terminated (though in the winding up stage), are the unsold goods and uncollected receivables.
A mere falling out or misunderstanding between the partners does not convert the partnership into a sham organization – the partnership exists until dissolved under the law.
Anyone of the partners, may at his own pleasure dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will, though hew must however, act in good faith, not that attendance of bad faith can prevent the dissolution of the partnership, but that its can result in a liability for damages.
Even if one partner had effected her own withdrawal from the partnership and
considered herself as having ceased to be associated with the partnership in the carrying on of the business, the partnership was not terminated thereby, it continues until the winding up of the business.
1999 AFISCO INSURANCE CORP. v. CA (Jan. 25, 1999)
Civil Law/Partnership/Creation Of/Requisites (1) Art. 1767 of the CC recognizes the creation of
a contract of partnership when “2 or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.” Its requisites are: (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the profits.” In other words, a partnership is formed when persons contract “to devote
to a common purpose either money, property, or labor with the intention of dividing the profits between themselves.” Meanwhile, an association implies associates who enter into a “joint enterprise x x x for the transaction of business.”
(2) Where in the case before us, the ceding companies entered into a Pool Agreement or an association that would handle all the insurance businesses covered under their quota-share reinsurance treaty and surplus reinsurance treaty in Munich, the following unmistakably indicates a partnership, or an association covered by Section 24 of the NIRC
1998 IDOS v. CA (September 1998)
Civil Law/Partnership/Final 3 Stages: There are three final stages of a partnership: (1)
dissolution; (2) winding-up; and (3) termination. Dissolution is the change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on of the business. It is that point of time that the partners cease to carry on the business together. Winding up is the process of settling the business affairs after dissolution. Termination is the point in time after all the partnership affairs have been wound up.
Art. 1829 of the NCC states that “On dissolution, a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed.
The best evidence of the existence of the partnership, which was not yet terminated (though in the winding up stage) were the unsold goods and uncollected receivables, which were presented to the trial court. Since the partnership has not been terminated, the petitioner and complainant remained as co-partners. The check was thus issued by the petitioner to complainant as would a partner to another, and not as payment from a debtor to a creditor.
LAND TITLES 2001
SEVILLE v. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (G.R. No. 129401, February 2, 2001) Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Public lands/Prescription: Based on the Regalian Doctrine that all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are thus presumed to belong to the State. Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence, occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership.
CERVANTES v. CA (G.R. No. 118982, February 19, 2001)
Civil Law/ Land titles/ Certificate of registration: The certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. A title once registered under the Torrens System cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. Petitioners cannot prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land through tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
2000 DUARTE v. ONG (May 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Validity of Adverse Claim: The Court upheld the Sajonas v. CA (258
SCRA 79) ruling that a notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period. For as long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains subsisting.
The law provides that after the lapse of said period, the annotation of the adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest. If the adverse claim
has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be conducted. The hearing will afford the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim. Petitioner in this case was unlawfully denied this opportunity when the Registrar of Deeds automatically cancelled the adverse claim. Needless to state, the cancellation of her adverse claim is ineffective.
CORPUZ v. SPS. GROSPE (G.R. No. 135297, June 8, 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Conveyance of Land Reform Rights: The sale, transfer or conveyance of
land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus negating the government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil.
Surrender of possession did not amount to an abandonment in this case because there was an obligation on the part of private respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court approval as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD
27. …what was prohibited was the perpetration of the tenancy or leasehold relationship between the landlord and the farmer beneficiary.
SANTIAGO v. CA (G.R. No. 109111, June 28, 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Property/ Ownership: A torrens certificate of title covers only the land
described therein together with improvements existing thereon, if any, nothing more. The titles presented by petitioners covering as they do land adjacent to that claimed in MWSS’ application for registration, do not support their claim, but even defeat it.
If petitioners’ predecessors were truly the owners of the subject parcels of land, they would have taken steps to have the land properly titled long ago. The land was possessed by MWSS long before World War II. Petitioners "slept on the rights" they claim to possess. Relief is denied to a claimant whose right has become "stale" by reason of negligence or inattention for a long period of time.
By placing the pipelines under the land, there was material occupation of the land by MWSS, subjecting the land to its will and control. [Under Article 531 of the Civil Code, "Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right."] Petitioners cannot argue that MWSS’ possession was not "open". The existence of the pipes was indicated above the ground by "pilapils".
ALBERTO v. CA (June 30, 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/Property/Lis pendens: The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to
the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. In Viewmaster Construction Corporation v. Maulit, this Court did not confine the availability of lis pendens only to cases involving the title to or possession of real property. A notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz.:
a)....An action to recover possession of real estate; b)....An action to quiet title thereto;
c)....An action to remove clouds thereon; d)....An action for partition; and
e)....Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon."
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA (G.R. No. 130174, July 14, 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Public Lands/ Res Judicata: An applicant seeking to establish ownership
over land must conclusively show that he is the owner thereof in fee simple, for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.
The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all. Its claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for were declared public land by decision of the Cadastral Court. Such being the case, the application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 1529 [Formerly Act No. 496.] is barred by the prior judgment of the Cadastral Court. The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and declared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary application under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by res-judicata. As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no
title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration."
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTIPULAR (G.R. No. 136588, July 20, 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Reconstitution of Title: Before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction to
hear and decide a reconstitution case, compliance with the following requisites is imperative: 1. That the notice of the petition be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing;
2. That the notice state among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificates of title if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim of objection to the petition;
3. That a copy of the notice also be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein (i.e. the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties) whose address is known at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing; and
4. That at the hearing, petitioner submit proof of publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.
These requisites are mandatory and compliance with them is jurisdictional.
DE GUZMAN v. THE NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. No. 143281, August 3, 2000)
Civil law/Land Titles/Recovery from Assurance Fund under the Property Registration Decree: The ff. persons may recover from the Assurance Fund:
1) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions: a. that there was no negligence on his part; and
b. that the loss or damage sustained was through any omission, mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel, or the Registrar of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the performance of their respective duties under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now, the Property Registration Decree; or
2) Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein under the following conditions:
a. that there was no negligence on his part;
b. that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest therein under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or by the registration by any other person as owner of such land; or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate of owner's duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book or by any cancellation; and
c. that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or interest therein, or claim upon the same.
The Assurance Fund is intended to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a certificate is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land. That petitioners eventually lost the property to the original owners, however, does not entitle them to compensation under the Assurance Fund. Petitioners' recourse is not against the Assurance Fund but against the rogues who duped them.
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs. CA (G. R. No. 114348, September 20, 2000) Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Property/ Easements/ Buyers in Good Faith: Under the Original
Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and condition that the land is subject to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law This reservation, unlike the other imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition. Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, further provides that lands granted by patent shall further be subject to a right of way.
In the present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.
As to the issue of good faith, one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system is charged with notice of burdens and claims that are annotated on the title
DOLFO v. REGISTER OF DEEDS (G.R. No. 133465, September 25, 2000)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Registration: The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is
presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.
SPOUSES ZARAGOZA v. CA (G.R. No. 106401, September 29, 2000)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Certificate of Title Not Subject to Collateral Attack: The certificate
of title, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. A Torrens title cannot thus be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
1999 ITUTRALDE v. FALCASANTOS (Jan. 20, 1999)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/Forest Lands Not Subject to Private Ownership unless Declassified: As
held in Republic v. Register of Deeds (244 SCRA 537), “Forest land, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.” Before any land may be declassified form the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
RP v CA (Jan. 21, 1999)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Government Immunity from Laches: As a general rule, estoppels against
the public are not favored; they must be invoked only in rare and unusual circumstances as they could operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. However, the government may not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its
citizens. In the case at bar, for nearly 20 years, petitioner failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in the lands area of St. Jude. Its prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause, as its is tantamount to laches.
URQUIAGA v. CA (Jan. 22, 1999)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/Public Lands/Only the State Can Institute Reversion Proceedings: Even
assuming that the land was acquired through fraud and misrepresentation, it is only the State which may institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act, considering the finding that the subject lot was public land at the time of the sales applications.
DIR. OF LANDS v. CA (Feb. 23, 1999)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Land Registration/ Effect of Withdrawal of Application for Land Registration: Section 37 of the Land Registration Act (Act 246) mandates that the withdrawal of
the application for land registration should not mean that the conflicting interests of the parties ceased to exist and therefore the land registration proceedings must be pursued to its conclusion. An oppositor who claims ownership over the property covered by the application, or part thereof, may now claim in his answer that the land be registered in his name in the same proceeding. And if the Dir. Of Lands registers an adverse claim, the lower court is bound to determine the conflicting interest of the claimant and the applicant and incase neither succeeds through evidence of proper title for registration, the court may dismiss the case. An opposition presented by the Dir. Of Lands is for all intents and purposes, a conflicting interest as against that of the applicant or of the private oppositors, asserting a claim over the land registered. Consequently, the withdrawal by either the applicant or any of the private oppositors doesn’t ipso fact obliterate the conflicting interests in the case. Neither is the case terminated because under the law, as amended, the trial court is required to resolve the claims of the remaining parties, the withdrawal of the application by the applicant and/or some private oppositors notwithstanding.
VOLUNTAD v. SPS. DIZON (August 1999)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/Reliance on Reliance on Torrens Title/ Exception: The general rule is that
a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens Certificate of Title without the need of inquiring further. But this rule cannot apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.
1998 SPS. MATHAY, JR v. CA (September 1998)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Sale of Registered Land/ Buyers in Good Faith /Two Transfer Certificates of Title on Same Land, Rule: In the three cases merged in this one petition, petitioners, Sps.
Mathay, claim title to three lots, which have been also bought and thereafter occupied by three different parties. Petition dismissed.
A purchaser in good faith is “one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.” As a rule, he who asserts the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value, has the burden of proving such assertion. Petitioners can’t invoke good faith because at the time the property was sold to them, the private respondents were occupying and cultivating the property.
As stated in the case of Baltazar v. CA, between two persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights. In the instant case, petitioners have no rights against private respondents. Their recourse is against their vendors.
Where two transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, to two different persons, for the same parcel of land, even if both are presumed to be titleholders in good faith, it does not necessarily follow that he who holds the earlier title should prevail. The better approach, assuming a regularity in the issuance of the two titles, is to trace the original certificates from which the disputed certificates of title were derived. Should there be only one common original certificate, the transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration.
DAWSON v. REGISTER OF DEEDS (September 1998)
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Land Registration/ Amendment and Alteration of Certificate of Title: The
case revolves around the issue of whether Sec. 108 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) applies in the instant case where a contract to sell is involved. The first buyer, Louis Dawson, died without having finished paying the whole amount, which obligation was assumed by petitioners, his heirs. The RTC and CA refused the cancellation of the certificate in the name of Louis Dawson and issuance of a new title in the name of petitioners.
The SC allowed the application of Sec 108 of PD 1529 contending that this is a case of a contract to sell and not a contract of sale. In the case of Salazar v. CA, in a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a contact to sell, ownership is by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Thus, since Louis Dawson was unable to pay the whole price, which was completely paid by petitioners, the property did not become part of the estate of Louis Dawson. Partition is therefore not the proper remedy to determine the ownership of the lot whose title had not been vested in Louis Dawson during his lifetime as his death caused the loss of his juridical personality, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations.
1997
SPOUSES PALOMO v. CA (G.R. No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Public Lands/ Adverse Possession/Grant of Title: The adverse possession
which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain.
As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Civil Law/Land Titles/Redemption of Titled Real Estate Foreclosed by a Rural Bank: The
mortgagor of titled real estate acquired under the Public Land Act but foreclosed by a rural bank, may redeem said property within 2 years from registration of the sheriff's certificate of sale; and if said mortgagor fails to expire such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the land within 5 years from the expiration of the two-year redemption period.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. CA (July 1997)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Original Land Registration/Publication of Notice of initial Hearing:
Newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory. Absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation (NOGC), the land registration court cannot validly confirm and register the title. uirement in its detailed provision. It may be asked why publication in a NOGC is mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the OG, mailing and posting. The reason is due process and the reality that the OG is not as widely read and circulated and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation.
Further, a land registration proceeding is in rem, hence it must be validated essentially through publication.
ORTIGAS & CO. v. JUDGE VELASCO (August 1997)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Reconstitution: R.A. No. 26, §13, lays down the requisites for acquisition
by the court of jurisdiction over a proceeding for reconstitution of title:
1) Publication, at petitioner's expense, of notice of the petition for reconstitution twice in
successive issues of the OG, and posting thereof on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing;
2) Specific statement in the notice of the number of the lost or destroyed certificates of title
if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objection to the petition;
3) Sending, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of petitioner, of a copy of the
notice to every person named therein (i.e., the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties) whose address is known, at least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing; and
4) Submission by petitioner at the hearing of proof of the publication, posting and service of
notice as directed by the court.
CARVAJAL v. CA (G.R. No. 98328, October 1997)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Authority of Land Registration Court:
There was nothing irregular in the trial court’s order to the LRA and DENR to submit reports on the location of the land covered by petitioner’s application and private respondent’s certificate of title. The authority of the land registration court to require the filing of additional papers to aid it in its determination of the propriety of the application is based on P.D. No. 1529, §21, from which, it is also clear that ocular inspection of the property was merely discretionary, not mandatory. Likewise, the land registration court was not obliged to order the survey of the contested lot, especially when another government agency had already submitted a report finding that the contested lot was identical with that described in private respondent’s certificate of title and recommending dismissal of the application for registration.
LEGARDA v. CA (October 1997)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Reconveyance: One who deals with registered property under the Torrens
system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title; he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. (Sandoval v. CA, 260 SCRA 283 [1996]) Here, no notice of lis pendens was ever annotated on any of the titles. And even if there were such a notice, it would not have created a lien over the property as the main office of a lien is to warn prospective buyers that the property they intend to purchase is the subject of a pending litigation. Therefore, since the property is already in the hands of Luminlun, an innocent purchaser for value, it can no longer be returned to Cabrera, much less to NCH.
VILLANUEVA v. CA (November 1997) Civil Law/Land Titles/Notice of Lis Pendens:
In Magdalena Homeowners v. CA (184 SCRA 325, 329-30 [1990]), this Court enumerated the cases where a notice of lis pendens is proper:
1) action to recover possession of real estate 2) action to quiet title
3) action to remove clouds 4) action for partition
5) any other proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
The elements to annotate a notice of lis pendens are that: (1) property must be of such character as to be subject to the rule; (2) court must have jurisdiction both over the person and the res; and (3) property or res involved must be sufficiently described in the pleadings.
Although it is not necessary for the applicant to prove his ownership or interest over the property sought to be affected by lis pendens, the applicant must, in the complaint or answer filed in the case, assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property in order to give due course to his application. As settled, lis pendens may be annotated only where there is an action or proceeding in court which affects the title to, or possession of, real property.
To require that an applicant must prove his ownership or his interest over the property sought to be affected with the notice of lis pendens will unduly restrict the scope of the rule. In such case, a party questioning the ownership of the registered owner will litigate his or her case without an assurance that the property will be protected from unwanted alienation or encumbrance during the pendency of the action, thereby defeating the very purpose and rationale of the registration.
CRUZ v. CA (November 1997)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Innocent Purchaser for Value: Although under Art. 1490, a husband and
wife cannot sell property to one another as a rule which, for policy considerations requires that the prohibition apply to common-law relationships (Calimlim v. Fortun, 129 SCRA 675 [1984]), petitioner can no longer seek reconveyance of the property as it has already been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value (Vizconde). This is without prejudice to any appropriate remedy petitioner may take against her live-in companion Romy who sold the property to Vizconde .
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA (November 1997)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Property/Encumbrance of a Free Patent Land/Reversion of Foreshore Land to Public Domain: The lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired through free
patent within 5 years from such grant constitute sufficient ground for the nullification of the grant, as the pledge and/or mortgage are encumbrances for which the use and transfer of property is impaired.
A patent land becoming foreshore land can no longer be subject of a free patent. Govt.
an owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned the land and permitted it to be totally destroyed so as to become part of the seashore, the land passes on to the public domain but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting from their new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain and not subject to indemnity. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain.
HEIRS OF NAGAÑO v. CA (November 1997)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Free Patent Over Private Land: A free patent issued over private land is
void. Further, private respondents' claim of open, public, etc., possession since 1029 and its illegal inclusion in petitioners' free patent gave private respondents a cause of action for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible. Thus private respondents' complaint may thus likewise be considered an action for quieting of title.
1996 GARBIN v. CA (February 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/ Adverse Claim: The registration of an adverse claim cannot prevail over
the title which was registered subsequent to the adverse claim. In the case at bench, what was registered was merely the adverse claim, and not the Deed of Sale. Therefore, there is still need to resolve the former's validity in separate proceedings, as there is an absence of registration of the actual conveyance of the portion of land therein claimed by private respondents.
NEW DURAWOOD v. CA (February 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/ Reconstitution: As ruled in Demetriou v. CA (238 SCRA 158, 162 [1994]),
we ruled that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked at any time. In case at bench, the owner's duplicate certificates of title were not "lost or destroyed," hence, there was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the "Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title x x x." The law provides that in case of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the remedy is a petition in court to compel surrender thereof to the Register of Deeds, and not a petition for reconstitution.
STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE v. CA (March 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Unregistered Sale Prevails Over Subsequent Registered Mortgage:
Petitioner's registered mortgage over the property is inferior to that of respondents-spouses' unregistered right. The unrecorded sale between respondents-spouses and Solid is preferred for the reason that if the original owner (Solid) had parted with his ownership of the thing sold then he no longer had ownership and free disposal of that thing so as to be able to mortgage it again. Registration of the mortgage is of no moment since it is understood to be without prejudice to the better right of third parties.
As a general rule, where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. This rule, however, admits of an exception as where the purchaser or mortgagee, has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor.
REPUBLIC v. CA (March 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Public Lands/Registration of Patent/Reversion: Once a patent is registered
under Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529) and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands will no longer have either control or jurisdiction. (Dir. of Lands v. De Luna, 110 Phil. 28 [1960]) The Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free or homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent. However, even after the lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action under §101 of the Public Land Act for the reversion to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private individuals. This has been the consistent ruling of this Court. (citations omitted)
HALILI v. CIR (May 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Certificate of Title not subject to collateral attack/Innocent Purchaser For Value:The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the Certificate of Title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate.
REPUBLIC v. CA (July 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Claim by the State Even After A Year of the OCT’s Transcription/Prescription Against the State: The Republic w is not barred from claiming the
property, even if one year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity said certificate of title became incontrovertible. First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of decree. In the second place, there are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 55 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud. Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund. Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. "Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
REPUBLIC v. CA (July 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Tax Declarations as Proof of Ownership/Registration: Although tax
declarations not conclusive, they are good indicia of possession in concept of owner. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Furthermore, registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title.
VDA. DE PANALIGAN v. CA (July 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141/Redemption of Foreclosed Land/Tender of Payment: Where the land mortgaged and foreclosed is granted under a homestead or free
patent, tender of payment of the repurchase price is not among the requisites of the law and is therefore unnecessary. In PNB v. CA (179 SCRA 619 [1989]), the Court held that it was not even necessary for the preservation of the right of redemption to make an offer to redeem or
tender of payment of purchase price within 5 years. The filing of an action to redeem within that period is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem. There is not even a need for consignation of the redemption price.
But where the land mortgaged and foreclosed is an ordinary parcel, the State
Investment House v. CA (215 SCRA 734 [1992]) ruling applies in that tender of payment of the
repurchase price is necessary in exercising the right of redemption. This is so because in this case, redemption is being exercised under Civil Law provisions and not under §119, C.A. No. 141.
HEIRS OF GONZAGA v. CA (September 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/ Two Certificates of Title for the Same Land: In Pamintuan v. San Agustin,
this Court ruled that in a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. Where two certificates of title purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate. Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence.
ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING v. IAC (G.R. No. 63528, September 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Public Lands/Effect of Recording of Mining Claims: The recording of
mining claims could not have been intended to be the operative act of classifying lands into mineral lands. The recording only operates to reserve to the registrant exclusive rights to undertake mining activities upon the subject land. The power to classify lands into mineral lands could not have been intended under the Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in just anyone who records a mining claim. This strengthens our holding that the rights of a mining claimant are confined to possessing the land for purposes of extraction of minerals. Thus, if no minerals are extracted, notwithstanding the recording of the claim, the land is not mineral land and registration thereof is not precluded by such recorded claim. Thus, in case at bench, the mining claimant, who had failed to comply with the annual minimum work requirement, could not, all the more, be expected to have extracted minerals from the mining location.
Thus, it can be said (1) that the rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 of a mining claim holder has been made subject by the Bill itself to the strict requirement that he actually performs work or undertakes improvements on the mine every year and does not merely file his affidavit of annual assessment, which requirement was correctly identified and declared in E.O. No. 141; and (2) That the same rights have been terminated by P.D. No. 1214, a police power enactment, under which non-application for mining lease amounts to waiver of all rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and application for mining lease amounts to waiver of the right under the Bill to apply for a patent. In light of these conditions upon the right of a mining claim holder under the Bill, there should remain no doubt now that such rights were not, in the first place, absolute or in the nature of ownership, and neither were they intended to be so.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO y ESTEBAN v. CA (Dec.
18, 1996)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Rights Under Spanish Titles and Grants/Remedial Law/Jurisdiction of A Probate Court: A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs
are and what shares are due them as regards the decedent's estate. Neither is it confirmed to the issue of the validity of wills. Thus in Trinidad v. CA (202 SCRA 106, 116 [1991]), we held
that questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to the estate of the deceased may be passed upon in probate with the consent of all parties, without prejudice to third persons. Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain properties ought to be included or excluded from inventory and accounting may be resolved by the probate court. (Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353, 356-357 [1939])
Under P.D. 892 (effective 16 Feb. 1976), all holders of Spanish titles/grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under Act No. 496 within 6 months from date of effectivity or until 16 Aug. 1976. Otherwise, non-compliance results in a re-classification of their land. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.
Petitioners, however, are not without recourse. P.D. 892 grants all holders of Spanish titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, within 6 months from the effectivity of P.D. 892. Thereafter, however, any Spanish title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system. All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
1995 LIGON v. CA (244 SCRA 693)
Civil Law/Land Titles/Registration of Voluntary Instruments in the Register of Deeds: No
voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon court order.
IGNACIO v. COURT OF APPEALS (246 SCRA 242 [1995 July])
Civil Law/ Land Titles/ Action for Consolidation of Ownership/ Jurisdiction of RTC as Land
Registration Court: 1) An action for consolidation of ownership must be filed as an ordinary civil action, not as a land registration case.
2) Whether a particular issue should be resolved by the RTC in its limited jurisdiction as a land registration court is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural question.
3) The distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a land registration court has been eliminated by P.D. No. 1529, to avoid multiplicity of suits. The RTCs now have the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after the original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions. The land registration court can now hear and decide controversial and contentious cases and those involving substantial issues.
PILAPIL v. CA (G.R. No. 55134, Dec. 4, 1995)
Civil Law/Land Titles/ Sale of Land/ Registration: To affect the land sold, the presentation of the
deed of sale and its entry in the day book must be done with the surrender of the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title. Production of the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title is required by Section 55 of Act No. 496 (not Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529), and only after compliance with this and other requirements shall actual registration retroact to the date of entry in the day book. Nonproduction of the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title, however, may not invalidate petitioners' claim of ownership over the lot involved considering the factual circumstances of this case, i.e., constructive knowledge of the prior sale.
TORTS & DAMAGES 2000
MMTC v. CA (May 2000)
Torts; Vicarious Liability of Employers; Damages . X Company is the operator of buses.
Spouses Y sued the bus company for the death of their daughter who was hit by one of the buses of X. . RTC found X & their driver guilty of negligence & who ordered to pay actual, moral & exemplary damages, including atty's. fees & costs of lawsuit.
RULINGS: Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within the scope of their assigned tasks only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, “ both in the selection of the employee who committed the quasi-delict and in the supervision of the performance of his duties.
Moral damages. - The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the
limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
Compensation for loss of earning capacity - Compensation of this nature is awarded not
for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. Evidence must be presented that the victim, if not yet employed at the time of death, was reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession. It is not necessary that education, as a guide to future earnings, relate to a specific occupation like lawyer or doctor. Evidence of education in general studies is admissible to ascertain future earning.
FOOD TERMINAL INC. vs. CA (G.R. No. 108397, June 21, 2000.) Torts; Negligence; Damages
X engaged the services to Y company for the care and custody of X’s goods. The basic issue raised is whether or not the Y was negligent in the care and custody of the goods during storage. Y practically admitted that it failed to maintain the agreed temperature of the cold storage area at 2 to 4 degrees centigrade at all times, and this caused the deterioration of the yeast stored therein. But Y claimed that temperature was not the sole cause for the deterioration of the goods. Since negligence has been established, Y is liable for damages.
PEOPLE V. LIBRANDO (GR No, 132251, July 6, 2000)
Damages as Earning Capacity - X killed Y and was convicted of murder. The heirs of Y was
awarded compensation for the loss of the earning capacity of Y.
The Sc has consistently fixed the indemnity for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased by taking into consideration the victim’s net income at the time of his death and his probable life expectancy.
Net earning capacity =
2/3 (80- age of victim at time of his death) X net income (i.e. gross annual income less living expenses)
In the absence of proof showing the deceased’s living expenses, net income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income.
RADIOWEALTH V. DEL ROSARIO (GR No. 138739, July 6, 2000)
Liquidated Damages - X executed a promissory note (PN) in favor of Y company. The PN
due in case legal action is instituted and 10% of the same as liquidated damages. X defaulted payment despite repeated demand. Y filed complaint against X.
Liquidated damages should no longer be imposed for being unconscionable. Such damages should also be deemed included in the 2.5% monthly penalty. Y is entitled only to atty.’s fees, but only in a sum equal to 10% of the amount due which the SC deem reasonable under the proven facts.
PEOPLE V. DAROY (Gr No. 118942, July 18, 2000)
Damages as Earning Capacity - X was convicted of murder for the death of Y. Heirs of Y were
awarded indemnity for loss of earning capacity despite absence of evidence to support the widow’s claim for loss of earning capacity.
An indemnity for loss of earning capacity is justified, it appearing from the testimony of the surviving spouse that the deceased was 40 years old at the time of his untimely death and earned P4,200 monthly. The testimony of the surviving spouse is sufficient to establish a basis from which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss of the earning capacity of the victim.
PEOPLE V. DE LA TONGGA (GR No. 133246, July 31, 2000)
Damages, Actual and Temperate - X was found guilty by the trial court , of murdering Y. X was
sentenced by the TC to pay the heirs of Y indemnity as well as actual damages. X questioned the award of actual damages because other than the testimony of the widow for hospital and funeral expenses, no documentary evidence was presented by the prosecution to support this claim.
The SC agrees with X. To recover actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, on the basis of competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. In this case, there were no such proof to sustain award of actual damages.
In lieu of actual damages, X should pay temperate damage. Art 2224 of the Civil Code provides that temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case be proved with certainty.
MAGAT V. CA (GR No. 124221, Aug 4, 2000)
Damages, Actual and Exemplary - X&Y entered into a contract whereon X would purchase for Y radio transreceivers from Japan. Y commenced operations after winning a bid in Subic Naval Base without the transreceivers from Japan by borrowing radio units from third party. X thus cancelled his order with this Japanese supplier. X filed complaint for breach of contract.
Damages cannot be awarded even if assuming there was breach. Damnum absque
injure.
There was no bad faith. Y borrowed the equipment because he was faced with the danger of his bid with Subic cancelled if he did not commence operations immediately. Exemplary damages is awarded only if breach is wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, malevolent. Neither can actual damages be awarded. The amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The claim must be premised upon competent proof or upon best evidence obtainable, such as receipts or other documentary proof. Only the testimonies of X’s witnesses were presented.
PEOPLE V. DIAZ (337 SCRA 521 August 9, 2000)
Crime of rape was committed. The award of civil indemnity to the victim must be increased to P50,000 in accordance with current jurisprudence. In addition, moral damages in
the amount of P50,000 must be awarded to the victim without need of further proof other than tat rape was committed against the victim.
PEOPLE V. PACINA (GR No. 123150 August 16, 2000)
Moral damages, Rape - X was convicted of rape by the Trial Court. The TC granted P500,000
to the victim as moral damages.
SC ruled that the grant of moral damages amounting to P500,000 is unreasonable. Moral damages are not intended to enrich the victim, rather they are awarded to allow them to obtain means for diversion and amusement that could serve to alleviate their moral and psychological sufferings.
ACE HAULERS CORP V. CA (GR No. 127934, 23 August 2000) Civil liability in Criminal Cases
A vehicular mishap occurred involving a truck, a jeepney and a motorcycle. The motorcycle was bumped by the jeepney and X, the motorcycle rider was run over by the truck. X died. Issue is whether or not in an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident, X may recover damages against the employer of the accused driver both in the criminal case (delict) and the civil case for damages based on culpa aquiliana.
In negligence case, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under RPC and action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. But he cannot recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.
Consequently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled only to the bigger amount of the 2, assuming the awards vary in 2 cases.
PEOPLE V. TOQUERO (25 August 2000)
Award in Rape cases – In rape cases, P50,000 is awarded as moral damages without need of
proof of mental and physical suffering. In addition, P50,000 is awarded to the complainant as civil indemnity ex-delicto.
PEOPLE V. DUBRIA (26 September 2000)
Loss of earning capacity as damages – The fact that the prosecution did not present
documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages. The testimony of the mother of the victim, as to the earning capacity of her son, sufficiently establishes the basis ofr making such an award.
1999 BORJAL v. CA (Jan. 14, 1999)
Civil Law/Damages: Damages cannot be awarded in the absence of ill-motive in the filing of the
complaint. Private respondent can’t be said to have instituted the present suit in abuse of the legal processes and with hostility to the press; or that he acted maliciously, wantonly oppressively, fraudulently and for the sole purpose of harassing petitioners, thereby entitling the latter to damages. On the contrary, private respondent acted with his right to protect his honor from what he perceived to be malicious imputations against him. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted be a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victim to damages. The law could not
have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, nor should counsel’s fees be awarded every time a party wins a suit.
1998 BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION v. CA
Civil Law/ Moral Damages/ Terms and Conditions of Credit Card and New Agreement/ Abuse of Right/ Damages and Injury Distinguished: This is a case where private respondent, Marasigan,
won an award in the trial court and in the CA for damages allegedly sustained when his BPI credit card was rejected by a restaurant where he was entertaining some guests on December 8, 1989. The SC reversed the CA and held that there was no injury suffered by Marasigan as it was shown that he was at fault why his credit card was dishonored. He was sent a letter by BPI informing him that he was indebted to them and ordering him to pay his obligation. Marasigan did pay using a postdated check, dated December 15, 1989.
By using the postdated check as payment, Marasigan failed to comply with his agreement with the bank to settle his account in order that his credit card would not be suspended. Settled is the doctrine that a check is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself operate as payment. Thus, the BPI was justified in suspending his credit card. As such, BPI did not abuse its right under the terms and conditions of the contract.
The following are the elements for an abuse of right to exist: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Lastly, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damages suffered. Thus, in cases where there is damage without injury, in those instances in which the harm or loss was not the result of the violation of a legal duty, the injured party bears the consequences alone. The award for tort damages is based on the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. There must be a breach of a duty, which breach must primarily cause the injury.
1997 PNB v. CA (G.R. No. 116181, Jan. 6, 1997)
Civil Law/Damages/ Quantum Meruit: Quantum meruit allows recovery of the reasonable value
regardless of any agreement as to value. It entitles the party to as much as he reasonably deserves, as distinguished from quantum valebant, ot ro as what is reasonably worth.
Unliquidated claims present a justiciable question ripe for judicial determination which is beyond the powers of COA to adjudicate. (See Phil. Operations v. Auditor-General, 94 Phil. 868 [1954]) Recovery based on quantum meruit is in the nature of such claim because its settlement requires the application of judgment and discretion and cannot be adjusted by simple arithmetical processes. In Eslao, the Court found it necessary to refer to the COA the task of determining the total compensation due to the claimants considering that the matter on the exact amount was not in issue and the determination thereof involves a review of the factual findings and evidence in support thereof. On the other hand, the lower court here, had already made a factual finding on the amount reasonably due to petitioner and scrutinized the evidence to sustain the claim. Besides, there is nothing in the cited cases which would imply that only the COA can determine the specific amount due to a contractor guided by the established principle
