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Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest

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Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Patria Capay, et al G.R. No. 118862, Sept. 24, 1999 (315 SCRA 190)

"Torrens System" "latches"

Facts:

A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and new one was entered in TRB’s name without the notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision declaring the mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled TRB’s title and issued new cert. of title for the Capays.

Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before the court. Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.

Issue:

1. Who has the better right over the land in dispute? 2. Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Ruling:

The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in good faith and for value. On one hand, the

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Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years to find out the status of the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no legal effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property it has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time they sold it to Santiago.

Casimiro Development Corporation vs. Renato L. Mateo

Casimiro Development Corporation vs. Renato L. Mateo G.R. No. 175485, July 17, 2011

FACTS:

In 1988, petitioner purchased from China Bank the land in question which was previously sold by the mother of Mateo to Rodolfo Pe who in turn

constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China Bank as security for a loan. China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and consolidated its ownership of the property after Rodolfo failed to redeem. A TCT was issued in the name of China Bank. In 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detatiner against the respondent’s siblings. Respondent counters that CDC acquired the

property from China Bank in bad faith because it had actual knowledge of the possession of the property by the respondent and his siblings.

ISSUE:

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HELD:

One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. China Bank’s TCT’s was a clean title, that is, it was free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it

purchased the property, solely upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank. The respondent’s siblings’ possession did not translate to an adverse claim of ownership. They even characterized their possession only as that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession grounded on tenancy a status that might create a defect or inflict a law in the title of the owner. CDC having paid the full and fair price of the land, was an innocent purchaser for value. The TCT in the name of CDC was declared valid and subsisting.

Heirs of Pedro Lopez et. al. v Honesto C. de Castro, et. al. GR No. 112905, February 3, 2000

“two applications of a parcel of land”

Facts:

The petitioners filed an application for registration of parcel of land located in Tagaytay City with the CFI in Cavite. The Municipality ofSilang, Cavite files an opposition alleging that the land is its patrimonial property. The petitioners claim that the land is a part of the whole tract of land as their inheritance sought to be registered in Cavite but was excluded from their application upon recommendation of the chief surveyor of the Land Reg. Office because the land is located in the Province of Laguna. The motion to dismiss by the Municipality ofSilang was denied by the court due to lack of merit on ground that the municipality has no personality to intervene

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because the lot was outside its territorial limits. And even if it is a communal property of both municipalities, the incorporation of Cavite to the city of Tagaytaymakes it a property of the latter. Thus the right to action accrues to the municipality of Tagaytay. Upon deliberation, the Clerk of Court recommended to grant the application with its report disclosing that since time immemorial, the De Los Reyes family owned and possessed the land and sold it to the father of the applicant, Pedro Lopez who later took over the ownership and possession of the land. Upon his death, his heirs succeeded over the property and subsequently partitioned it. The court thus approved the application and ordered the registration of the land in favor of the petitioner.

While examining the records in the course of granting the registration to the petitioners, it was found out that the land was already registered in favor of the respondents Honesto de Castro. Apparently, de Castro filed the registration of land in the CFI of Cavite in its Branch IV in Tagaytay City and a decision was promulgated to issue the decree of registration in his favor. The said land was allegedly owned by Hermogenes Orte who sold it to the father of the respondent by virtue of a deed of sale that was destroyed during Japanese occupation. His father continued possession and occupation of the land until his death and his wife and children continued the possession thereof and finally registered it in their name. 7 years later, the petitioner files a complaint for the execution of the judgment rendered in their favor by the court and cancellation of title of the respondents and order the respondents to vacate the property. In their counterclaim, the respondents interpose the defense of latches, prescription and estoppel against the petitioners and asserting the indefeasibility of their title under the Torrens System.

Lower court: held that it could not enforce the judgment against the respondents considering they were not made parties to the case. Nor can it order the register of deeds of Tagaytay City to cancel the title of respondents since it was not also made a party to the case thus the court does not acquire jurisdiction over it. Further, the court held that the action brought by

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the petitioners would be tantamount to the nature of collaterally attacking the validity of the title of the respondents.

Court of appeals: Upon appeal to the CA, it re-affirms the lower court’s decision with emphasis on the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title while citing the Civil Code provisions on Article 1544 on sale of property to different vendees where in case the land has been registered in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date of registration shall prevail.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners can question the validity of the title of the respondents over the property in dispute?

Ruling: The court held that a land registration is an in rem proceeding which involves a constructive notice against all persons including the state which is effective through the publication of the application for land registration. The court held that when more than one certificate of title is issued over the land, the person holding the prior certificate of title is entitled to a better right against the person who relies on the subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not on the date of filing the application for registration of title. In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. The publication made with respect to the application of the respondents served as a constructive notice against the whole world thus the court upheld the validity of their title and its indefeasibility against collateral attack from the petitioners.

Granting that the petitioners did not have actual knowledge about the respondent’s application to the land, they waited for 7 more years after knowing that the property was already registered in the name of the respondents to demand for the execution of judgment and cancellation of the respondent’s title. Therefore the SC finds them guilty of latches. Petitioner’s petition was denied.

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Note:

Jurisdiction issue:

The governing law when the respondent sought registration of their land was the Judiciary Act of 1948 providing permanent station of 2 district judges in Cavite, thus the application was filed before the court in Cavite. This was later amended providing for the 4 judges to preside in the Province of Cavite, the cities of Cavite and Tagaytay. Following the rule on jurisdiction, the court of the place where the property is located should take cognizance over the registration of property therefore upon the creation of Tagaytay City branch of court, the application should have been transferred from Cavite to Tagaytay branch. Retaining the venue of the application in Cavite however is in order since venue is merely procedural not jurisdictional and may be waived in lieu of convenience to the parties. The petitioner’s assailing the jurisdiction of the Cavite branch rendering decision in favor of the respondent’s title over the property located in Tagaytay cannot be sustained by the court.

DENR et al VS. YAP et al

G.R. No. 167707

October 8, 2008

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and

peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President

Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

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Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that

Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that

respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

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On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court,

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions

ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

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Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines

apublic forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be

alienated.Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had neverbeen expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is

required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a

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possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land

subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in

Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

NOTES:

1. Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make

corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the President,

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or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the

authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.

2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are

agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land

must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the

Constitutionclassifying lands of the public domain into “agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks,” do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestryis particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other

farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other

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trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

There is a big difference between “forest” as defined in a dictionary and “forest or timber land” as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable

agricultural land.

3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not

necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their

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original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain

requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives.

R E P U B L I C O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S , P e t i t i o n e r, v s . J E R E M I A S A N D D A V I D HERBIETO,Respondents.

[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005] Facts:

This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the CA, affirming the decision of theMTC granting the application for land registration of

the respondents.Respondents fi led a single application for two parcel of lands located at Cabangahan,C o n s o l a c i o n , C e b u . T h e y c l a i m t o b e t h e o w n e r o f s a i d l o t s b y v i r t u e o f i t s p u rc h a s e

f ro m respondents’ parents. They also submitted pertinent documents to prove their claim and withemphasis on the Certifi cations by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offi ce(CENRO) of the DENR on its fi nding that the Subject Lots are alienable and

disposable, byvirtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963.An initial hearing was set on Sept. 3, 1999 and notifications were posted in conspicuous places on the subject lots and on the municipal hall. The notice was also published in the officialgazette on Aug. 2 1999 and on the Freeman and Banat news on Dec. 19,

1999.M TC re n d e re d a d e c i s i o n g r a n t i n g t i t l e t o t h e re s p o n d e n t s . Pe t i t i o n e r a s s a i l e d s a i d decision on the grounds of: 1.) Jurisdiction, since there was a procedural defect in the filing of asingle application for two parcels of land; 2.) Respondents failed to establish that they and

their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the SubjectLots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Issue:

1.)Does the MTC have the jurisdiction? 2.)

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Did the respondents had open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lotsin the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Held: 1.)

On Jurisdiction

– the procedural defect or the misjoinder, wherein two or more distinctor contradicting rights or demands are joined, does not remove the court’s jurisdiction.HOWEVER, in the case at hand there was indeed a lack of jurisdiction not because of them i s j o i n d e r b u t b e c a u s e o f:

a . ) T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T F O R P U B L I C AT I O N , i t i s mandatory that the publication be made in the offi cial gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation before the initial hearing. As we can notice the publication on theFreeman and the Banat News was only done 3 months after the hearing which rendersinutile the intention of the mandatory publication.

2.)

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the SubjectLots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.

The said lots are public lands classified as alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963and the respondents were seeking for a confi rmation of imperfect or incomplete titlethrough judicial legalization. Under Sec.48 of the Public Land Act, which is the rulinglaw in this case, Respondents were not able to prove their continuous ownership of theland since June 12, 1945 or earlier, because said lands were only classifi ed as alienableand disposable only on June 25, 1963.Application for land registration was dismissed

Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915 Posted by Pius Morados on November 27, 2011

(Land Titles and Deeds – Purpose of the Torrens System of Registration) Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands. Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?

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Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the

possibility of losing his land.

The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, vs HONORABLEMARIANO UMALI, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 23, Trece Martires City, REMEDIOS,MICLAT, JUAN PULIDO, ROSALINA NAVAL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE

FACTS:In 1992, a land situated in Tanza, Cavite was assigned to Martina, Maria and Gregorioall surnamed Cenizal by

the land’s original owner, Florentina Bobadilla who purchased

the same from the government on July 1, 1910. These three signed a joint affidavit in1971 which was filed with the Bureau of Lands. A Deed of Sale was executed onSeptember 10, 1971 by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources while TCT No

55044 (replacing Boadilla’s OCT 180) was issued by the register of deeds on October 13,

1971. The land went through several transfers until its registered owners became JuanPulido, Rosalina, Enrique and Luz Naval, Remedios Miclat. The government asked for thereturn of the property after discovering that the sale was tainted with forgery as Gregorio Cenizal died on February 25, 1943, making it impossible for him to have also signed the joint affidavit in 1971.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land can be reverted back to the government after discovering such defect on the deed of sale. Or whether or not the sale be considered null and void from the start, making all the titles derived therefrom ineffectual.

RULING: NO. The present possessors and owners are innocent transferees for value. Theyall believed that the certificate of title that fell into their hands

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are free from allencumbrances, except as those indicated on the face of the certificate, and that thecertificate is clean and not tainted with fraud. For that, they are entitled to theprotection of Sec 39 of the Land Registration Act, which affords a title holder thestoppage of any question of the legality of their title over their land. The acts of their predecessors, even if proven as fraudulent, did not affect their own titles because they are presumed transferees in good faith and for value of the subject property

Pino vs. CA G.R. No. 94114 June 19, 1991

FACTS: The decision of the CA affirming in toto the decision of the RTC of Echague, Isabela is now being assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.

Lot 6 was acquired by the spouses Juan Gaffud and Rafaela Donato. Juan Gaffud died in 1936. On Jan. 11, 1938, Lot 6 was originally registered (OTC No. 4340) in the Registration Book of the Office of the RD in the names of Rafaela, Raymundo and Cicero Gaffud (sons of spouses) as co-owners, . The said lot was sold to Rafaela Donato through a Deed of Transfer which

cancelled OTC NO. 4340 and in lieu thereof a TCT was issued in the name of Rafaela alone.

On Feb. 1967, Rafaela sold a portion of Lot 6 in favor in Fortunato Pascua. The aforesaid sale caused the subdivision of the said lot into 6-A and Lot-6-B. Upon registration of said sale in favor of Pascua, TCT No. T-32683 was issued in the name of Rafaela Donato on March 2, 1967 covering the land designated as Lot 6-B.

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On Jun. 10, 1970, Rafaela Donato sold to petitioner Felicisima Pino said Lot-6-B as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which was duly notarized. Rafaela undertook to register said Deed with the RD of Isabela and on July 13, 1970, the sale was inscribed therein and a TCT was issued in the name of Felicisima Pino.

On Sept. 1980, Cicero Gaffud died survived by his wife Demetrian and sons Romulo and Adolfo, private respondents herein.

On March 9, 1982, private respondents filed a complaint for nullity of sale andreconveyance against petitioner — Felicisima Pino. (During the

pendency of the case before the trial court, Rafaela Donato, who was not a party to the case, died on November her 26, 1982.)

The RTC ruled and this was sustained by respondent CA that petitioner Pino is not a purchaser in good faith, so (a) the Deed of Absolute Sale made by Rafaela in favor of Pino null and void insofar as the shares of Cicero and Raymundo are concerned, (b) cancellation of TCT No. 49380 in the name of Pino and (c) reconvey one-half of Lot-6-B to plaintiffs withing 10 days.

ISSUE:

1. 1. WON Felicisima Pino is a purchaser in good faith

2. 2. WON the filing of an action for reconveyance has already prescribed HELD:

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1. The rule applicable to this controversy is well-settled. Where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record discloses that when petitioner purchased the subject property on June 10, 1970, the title was in the name of her vendor Rafaela Donato alone.

There was no allegation, and much less any evidence, that the transfer of the subject property from the original owners (Rafaela, Cicero and Raymundo) to Rafaela Donato was fraudulent.

3. TCT No. T-32683 was issued in the name of Rafaela Donato on March 2, 1967. The present action for reconveyance was filed only on March 9, 1982. Clearly then, the action has already prescribed because it was filed fifteen (15) years after the issuance of TCT No. T-32683

If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is to bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud or were

instrumental in depriving him of the property. And it is now well-settled that such action prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property. (Armerol v. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396, 407; Caro v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401, 407; Walstron v. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431, 442).

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Heirs of Labanon v. Heirs of Labanon | GR 160711 | August 14,2004 | J. Velasco, Jr.FACTS

: Constancio Labanon settled upon a piece of alienable anddisposable public agricultural land situated in Kidapawan, Cotabato.

Hecultivated the said lot and introduced permanent improvements.C onstancio asked his brother, Maximo, who was better educated to filea public land application under the express agreement that they willdivide the said lot as soon as it would be feasible for them to do so. During the time of the application it was Constancio who continued tocultivate the said lot. The Homestead Application was approved and an Original Certificate of Title over said lot was issued in favor of MaximoLabanon. Maximo Labanon executed a document denominated as “Assignmentof Rights and Ownership” to

safeguard the ownership and interest of his brother Constancio Labanon. Later on, Maximo executed a swornstatement reiterating his desire that his elder brother Constancio, hisheirs and assigns shall own the eastern portion of the Lot.After the death of Constancio, his heirs executed an

[e]xtra-judicialsettlement of estate with simultaneous sale over the aforesaid easternportion of the lot in favor of Alberto Makilang, the husband of VisitacionLabanon, one of the children of Constancio. Subsequently, the parcelof land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Alberto. Thedefendants heirs of Maximo caused to be cancelled from the records

of t h e d e f e n d a n t Pro v i n c i a l A s s e s s o r o f C o t a b a t o t h e a f o re s a i d t a x declaration and the latter, without fi rst verifying the legality of thebasis for said cancellation, cancelled the same. The heirs

of Constanciodemanded the owner’s copy of the certifi cate

of title covering theaforesaid Lot to be surrendered to the Register of Deeds. ISSUES

:1. W/N the OCT issued the name of MAXIMO LABANON benow considered indefeasible and conclusive; and 2. W/N the Trust Agreement allegedly made by ConstancioLabanon and Maximo Labanon prescribed

HELD:

1.No. Section 32 of PD 1529 does not totally deprive a party of anyremedy to recover the property fraudulently registered in the nameof another. It merely precludes the reopening of the registrationproceedings for titles covered by the Torrens System, but does notforeclose other remedies for the reconveyance of the property to itsrightful owner. While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 providesthat the decree of registration

becomes incontrovertible after ayear, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedyin law. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real

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owners. The actionfor Recovery of Ownership before the RTC is indeed the appropriateremedy.2.No. Maximo Labanon maintained the title over the property whileacknowledging the true ownership of Constancio Labanon over theeastern portion of the land. The existence of an express trustcannot be doubted nor disputed. In the case at bar, Maximo

neverrepudiated the express trust instituted between him and Constancio.And after Maximo’s death, the trust could no longer be

renounced;thus, respondents’ right to enforce the trust agreement can

nolonger be restricted nor prejudiced by prescription. In addition,p e t i t i o n e r s c a n n o l o n g e r q u e s t i o n t h e va l i d i t y o f t h e p o s i t i v e decl aration of Maximo Labanon in the

Assignment of Rights andO w n e r s h i p i n f a v o r o f t h e l a t e C o n s t a n c i o L a b a n o n , a s t h e agreement was not impugned during the

former’s lifetime and therecognition of his brother’s rights over the eastern portion of the

lotw a s f u r t h e r a ffi rm e d a n d c o n fi rm e d i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t S w o rn Statement.

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979 LEPANTO vs. DUMYUNG

Facts: The director of lands filed a criminal case against the defendants on theground of misrepresentation and false data and information. The

defendantsin the three cases filed an amended joint answer with

counterclaim to thecomplaint in intervention. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the sameon the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirementsin the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged

falsification of public documents.

Issue:W/N the defendants are entitled to ownership of the land.Held: Yes. The Defendants are entitled to ownership of the land in question.Section 44 of the Land Act in its second paragraph states:A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously occupiedand cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, atract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall beentitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section:PROVIDED, that at the time he files his free patent application, he is not theowner of any real

property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law.It is for this reason — that is, to give these national cultural minorities whowere

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driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain.

References

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