STO. TOMAS V. SALAC
G.R. No. 152642, 152710, 167590, 182978-79, 184298-99 November 13, 2012
CRUZ DOCTRINE:
The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.
FACTS:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted R.A 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government's policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.
I. G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710 (Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042) --- Respondents Rey Salac filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with TRO and preliminary injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA Secretary-General before the RTC of Quezon City. Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10) and POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rules and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042. RTC granted Salac, et al.'s petition and ordered the government agencies mentioned to deregulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs. The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15, and all other orders, circulars and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of deregulation under R.A. 8042. The government officials concerned filed the present petition in G.R. 152642 and G. R 152710 seeking to annul the RTC's decision and have the same enjoined pending action on the petition. The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. and CALEA (The Confederated Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated) intervened claiming that the RTC March 20, 2002 Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed the
deployment abroad of OFWs and performing artists. A TRO was issued enjoining RTC-QC from enforcing its decision.
Later, Sec. 29 and 30 of R.A 8042 was expressly repealed by R.A 9422. This law was signed by Pres. Gloria Arroyo. Respondents Salac, et al. told the Court that they agree with the Republic's view that the repeal of Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 renders the issues they raised by their action moot and academic.
II. G.R. 167590 on Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 --- respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional. Section 6 defines the crime of "illegal recruitment" and enumerates the acts constituting the same. Section 7 provides the penalties for prohibited acts. Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising from "illegal recruitment" before the RTC of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on the ground that its definition of "illegal recruitment" is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters and for that reason gives undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate with government licenses or authorities. (Take note: Actually, "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC's finding, actually makes a distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers" without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
Section 7 was also declared unconstitutional on the ground that its sweeping application of the penalties failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the application of the penalty imposed on such violation.
Section 9 of R.A. 8042 was also invalidated on the ground that allowing the offended parties to file the criminal case in their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of criminal cases which is the place where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing
of criminal actions at the place of residence of the offended parties violates their right to due process. (Take Note: there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows exceptions provided by laws.)||
III. G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99 (Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)--- Respondent spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas) filed a claim for death and insurance benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) and White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) for the death of their daughter Jasmin Cuaresma while working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. LA dismissed the claim but NLRC found petitioners Becmen and Falcon jointly and severally liable for the death, ordering them to pay $113,000.00 as actual damages. Jasmine died of criminal violence and rape. Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the CA. CA held Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally liable with their Saudi Arabian employer for actual damages, with Becmen having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon appealed the CA Decision to this Court.
The Court found Jasmin's death not work-related or work-connected since her rape and death did not occur while she was on duty at the hospital or doing acts incidental to her employment. The Court deleted the award of actual damages but ruled that Becmen's corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with their company for its failure to investigate the true nature of her death. Becmen and White Falcon abandoned their legal, moral, and social duty to assist the Cuaresmas in obtaining justice for their daughter.
Now,the corporate directors and officers of Becmen, namely, Gumabay, et al.. questioned the constitutionality of the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042 which holds the corporate directors, officers and partners jointly and solidarily liable with their company for money claims filed by OFWs against their employers and the recruitment firms.
ISSUE:
WON R.A 8042 is constitutional. HELD:
I. As to the constitutionality of Sec. 29 and Sec 30. It was rendered moot and academic. R.A 9422 adopted the policy of close government regulation of the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It states among others that POEA, in addition to its powers, to inform migrant not only their rights as
workers but their rights as human beings. It also provides that deployment of migrant workers shall only be available to countries where the Philippines has concluded bilateral agreements or arrangements.
II. As to Sec 6, 7, and 9, all are rendered constitutional. (those “take note” in parenthesis on the facts above explains why it is constitutional)
The court said, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section 6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor, and deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in July 2010 with the enactment of R.A. 10022 which increased even more the duration of the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission of the acts listed under Section 7.
What is the spirit behind the law? Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside the country's borders and beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless individuals within its jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out without clear assurance that their contracted principals would treat such OFWs fairly and humanely.
III. The Court HOLDS the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional.
The Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities. In the case of Becmen and White Falcon, while there is evidence that these companies were at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmin's death, there is no mention of any evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al., Becmen's corporate officers and directors, were personally involved in their company's particular actions or omissions in Jasmin's case.
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.
New York Times vs US 403 U.S. 713 (1971) DOCTRINE:
Any system of prior restraint comes to this court bears a heavy presumption AGAINST its constitutional validity. The government thus carry a heavy burden of showing a justification for the imposition of such a restraint.
FACTS:
Over the years the Supreme Court has disagreed on the limits that can be placed on the 1st Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press. In 1971, the Court faced these issues again in a case brought by the New York Times. The newspaper had obtained a copy of documents known as “The Pentagon Papers”—an internal Defense Department report that detailed government deception with regard to the Vietnam War. The Pentagon Papers surfaced at a time when the American people were deeply divided on the question of United States involvement in the war. The New York Times fought for the right to publish the papers under the umbrella of the 1st Amendment.
The Pentagon Papers, officially known as “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy,” were illegally copied and then leaked to the press. The New York Times and the Washington Post had obtained the documents. Acting at the Government's request, the United States district court in New York issued a temporary injunction—a court order—that directed the New York Times not to publish the documents. The Government claimed that the publication of the papers would endanger the security of the United States. The New York Times appealed the order to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that prior restraint— preventing publication—violated the 1st Amendment.
From June 12 to 14, 1971, the New York Times published a series of articles about the origins of the Vietnam War. The articles were based on a forty-seven-volume Defense Department study covering the years 1945 to 1968, which had been leaked to the Times by Daniel Ellsberg, a former Defense Department analyst. Although the study contained only information regarding events that occurred before 1968, the government contended that the study contained "secret" and "top secret" information. Further, the government alleged that publication of the information could prolong the Vietnam War and threaten the safe return of U.S. prisoners of war. On June 15, 1971, the government sued in New York federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting the Times from continuing to publish information from the Pentagon Papers. Soon after, the Washington Post began publishing material from the study; accordingly, the
government sought a similar injunction against the Post in the District of Columbia.
It was the Nixon Administration that attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. Contentions:
For the New York Times: The 1st Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press protects the newspaper in the publication of these documents. One of the few restraints on executive power in matters of national defense is a knowledgeable population. The press must be free to inform the American people. In addition, the Government has failed to show that publication of the Pentagon Papers would endanger national security. For the United States: The 1st Amendment does not guarantee an absolute freedom of the press, especially when the nation's security is involved. The Court must strike a balance between the fundamentally important right to a free press and the equally important duty of the Government to protect the nation. Allowing the publication of these documents would establish a dangerous precedent for future cases involving national security.
ISSUE:
WON prior restraint of publication constitutes violation of the first amendment
HELD:
Yes. Any system of prior restraint comes to this court bearing a heavy presumption AGAINST its constitutionality. The government, thus carry a heavy burden of showing a justification for the imposition of such a restraint. In this case, the government has not MET that burden.
The Supreme Court decided on a 6-3 vote that a prior restraint could not be imposed on publication of the Pentagon Papers. The whole Court noted that the government "carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint" and stated that the government had failed to meet that burden. The Court could not agree on a precise standard for determining when the government may impose a prior restraint on free speech, or even whether the government could ever impose a prior restraint.
The scope of the judicial function in passing upon activities of the Executive Branch in the field of foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted. This view is dictated by the doctrine of Separation of Powers. The doctrine prohibiting prior restraints does not prevent the courts from maintaining status quo long enough to act responsibly. The First Amendment is only part of the Constitution. The cases should be remanded to be developed expeditiously.
Concurrence. To find that the President has “inherent power” to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment of the United States Constitution [Constitution]. The First Amendment of the Constitution leaves no room for governmental restraint on the press. There is, moreover, no statute barring the publication by the press of the material that the Times and Post seek to publish.
The First Amendment of the Constitution tolerates no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result. Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support the issuance of an interim restraining order.
Unless and until the Government has clearly made its case, the First Amendment of the Constitution commands that no injunction be issued. The responsibility must be where the power is. The Executive must have the large duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise its power effectively. The Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents here, but disclosure of any of them will not result in irreparable danger to the public.
Additional Info: What is this first amendment? When the constitution of US was drafted in 1789, many people opposed this document because of the absence of bill of rights to safeguard certain basic freedom. They feared that this absence would allow the central government to curtail the freedom of the press, assembly and speech. In response to this clamor, James Madison, proposed series of amendment to their constitution to satisfy US citizens that these liberties is beyond government abridge. Later on, this amendment was called the First Amendment. It has three parts. a.) civil rights shall not be abridged on account of religious belief, b.) people shall not be restrained to peaceably assemble, and c.) people shall not be deprived of their right to speak, to write, or publish their sentiments, and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks shall be inviolable.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC. V. COMELEC G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995
GATACELO DOCTRINE:
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9).
No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec.
FACTS:
Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 which allowed Comelec to procure free print space of not less than 1/2 page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as 'Comelec Space' (Section 2). The 'Comelec Space' shall be allocated, through lottery, by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government – in short, dissemination of vital election information.
Furthermore, the resolution stated that no newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publication that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest (Section 8). Comelec directed several newspapers, which previously gave 2 pages during the 1992 elections, to
provide free print space of not less than 1/2 page for use as 'Comelec Space'.
Petitioner’s contention: Resolution No. 2772 was unconstitutional and void; they claimed that there was taking of private property for public use without just compensation. It also constituted impositions of involuntary
servitude. And that the resolution violated freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
Respondent’s contention: SolGen claims that Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon any obligation as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. And even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State.
ISSUE:
WON the Comelec, through the subject resolution, validly exercised its power of eminent domain and police power.
HELD: No.
Re eminent domain: To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The resolution failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation": only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether the Resolution is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as the Resolution attempts to suggest. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. The resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.|||
Thus, public funds, not publishers solely, should bear costs for public information of electoral processes. The economic costs of informing the general public about the qualifications and programs of those seeking elective office are most appropriately distributed as widely as possible throughout our society by the utilization of public funds, especially funds raised by taxation, rather than cast solely on one small sector of society, i.e., print media enterprises. The benefits which flow from a heightened level of information on and the awareness of the electoral process are commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be allocated on the same basis.
Re police power: Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power — essentially a power of legislation — has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. Section 2 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
NB. Re freedom of speech etc.: The distinction between paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts. At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to be raised — whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution is not ripe
for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987 DOCTRINE:
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. "It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation'." Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power.
FACTS:
PD No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia: SEC. 134. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
The rationale relates to: 1) the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms that have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least 40% and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues; 2) videogram establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year; 3) proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and 500,00 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore distribution of videograms; 4) the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social being; etc.
Tio claimed that Section 10 was unconstitutional because the tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, etc.
ISSUE:
WON the power of taxation was validly exercised. HELD:
Yes. It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogramoperators. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. "It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation'." Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.
Ortigas vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000 GOMEZ
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.
FACTS:
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila. The contract of sale provided that the lot be used exclusively for residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential building will be constructed thereon; the BUYER shall not erect any sign or billboard on the roof for advertising purposes; no single-family residential building shall be erected until the building plans, specification have been approved by the SELLER; restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate.These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located. On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the RTC of Pasig. The complaint sought the demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Petitioner asked for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC- granted the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Ortigas. CA- ruled in favor of Mathay. It held that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 effectively nullified the restrictions allowing only residential use of the property in question. CA- denied Ortigas’ motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in ruling that a contractual right is automatically discarded once it conflicts with police power (MMC Ordinance No. 81-01)
HELD:
The SC noted that in issuing the disputed writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court observed that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976, while the zoning ordinance was enacted only in March 1981. The trial court reasoned that since private respondent had failed to show that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect, said ordinance should be given prospective application only, citing Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 390 (1988).
In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.
Following the SC ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene “law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” Otherwise such stipulations would be
deemed null and void. Respondent court correctly found that the trial court committed in this case a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to treat Ordinance No. 81-01 as applicable to Civil Case No. 64931.
Chavez vs. Romulo
G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004 DOCTRINE:
In a number of cases, the SC laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
FACTS:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). This was prompted by the latest killing of former NPA leader Rolly Kintanar.
Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power
HELD:
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All property
in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New People’s Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power. In State vs. Reams, it was held that the legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power.
MMDA vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION GR. NO. 135962; MARCH 27, 2000
DOCTRINE:
MMDA is not vested with police power. Its functions are merely administrative in nature.
FACTS:
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road beside Bel-Air Village.||| Respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.||| On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court for injunction. After due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street 3 and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's proposed action. The appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to order the opening of Neptune Street and the demolition of the perimeter wall pursuant to its alleged police power. HELD:
No. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
The scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune
Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
Moreover, the MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system, but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC) vs. DE GUZMAN G.R. No. 144681. JUNE 21, 2004
DOCTRINE:
The Professional Regulation Commission, pursuant to the exercise of its police power, has the authority to regulate the medical profession.
FACTS:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. The Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination. the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees
gained early access to the test questions. Respondents then filed a special civil action for mandamus with the RTC of Manila.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for mandamus will lie. HELD:
No. The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for
the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician's license, or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. VS. CA G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996
MUÑEZ DOCTRINE:
No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the State particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. FACTS:
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28 creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC) which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.
Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system which include, among others:
Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests. Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right . . . to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court but which later denied petitioner’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
WON the Artist Record Book requirement and the other Department Orders were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
HELD:
YES. The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs," this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high-risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills
from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers. The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary. They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations. On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security
of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas
workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 18.The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.
We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a "property right," protected by the due process clause. We find this contention untenable.
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the State particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate
range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained
or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
Petition is DISMISSED. DELA CRUZ VS. PARAS
G.R. Nos. L-42571-72. July 25, 1983 DOCTRINE:
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
FACTS:
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
The Ordinance is known as the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. Sec. 3 and 4 provide:
Section 3. — Prohibition in the Issuance and Renewal of Licenses, Permits. — Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on this community as explained above, no operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments shall include prohibition in the renewal thereof.
Section 4.— Revocation of Permits and Licenses.— The licenses and permits issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are now in operation including permits issued to professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked upon the expiration of the thirty-day period given them as provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth, the operation of these establishments within the jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal.
On January 15, 1976 the decision was rendered upholding the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE:
WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses.
HELD:
NO. This Court holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make
regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make
such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States v. Abendan 12 "is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid."
In another case penned by Justice Malcolm where the present Administrative Code provision was applied, it was stated by this Court: "The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this class we are not here directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
