Euthyphro and Socrates
discuss Piety or Holiness
or
Setting the Stage:
Why is Euthyphro at
court?
Serving as Prosecutor
Bringing Charges
Saturday Night on Naxos
Saturday Night on Naxos
An island renowned for its wine production.
Estates are large, and vineyards are
profitable. They require a large amount of hands in order for the operations to function.
It’s hard work in the Greek sun. Very hard work.
At the end of the week the work force (primarily slaves) has time off, and likes to blow off steam. How do you suppose they do this?
Boozing it up, of course.
Which invariably lead to problems with…
Likes to fight guy becomes belligerent when he drinks, and picks fights because.. well, he is likes-to-fight-guy..
This, unsurprisingly, had been an ongoing
Not knowing what exactly to do, the master of the estate tied up Likes-To-Fight-Guy and threw him into an
irrigation ditch while he sent someone to Athens asking for advice.
No food, no water, and exposure to
swings in temperature. Cold nights, hot
days..
Even as tough a guy as
Likes-To-Fight-Guy isn’t going to last long in that
situation.
He eventually died before the courier
could return from Athens with the
Euthyphro is pressing charges of
Negligent Homicide against the Master
of the Estate.
The Master should have known to
So, Who is
this estate
master that
you are
pressing
Oh. Sorry I
didn’t say
earlier,
but…
He’s my
dad.
Socrates
Euthyphro
Socrates is not at all sure that
Euthyphro is doing the right thing, or that his prosecution of pops is
“pious.” After all, this is Euthyphro’s dad we are talking about. Might the Gods consider this undertaking
•Euthyphro is confident
•He claims to know what piety or holiness is
•Just underneath the surface this is a discussion of moral good
•So, what is the pious or the good?
Define it.
•Prosecuting wrongdoers?
•Not general enough. other things are
pious or good that have nothing to do with prosecuting wrongdoers.
•Need the common element all good,
pious or holy things have
•A definition!
•Example: Define shape. It’s what
Euthyphro’s definition of moral good:
•
The Good, Pious or Holy things
are those things which are
•loved by
•dear to
•approved by
•
THE GODS
This has some logical corollaries:
The bad, or impious things are those things..?
Euthyphro’s definition of moral good:
•
The Good, Pious or Holy things
are those things which are
•loved by
•dear to
•approved by
•
THE GODS
This has some logical corollaries:
The bad, or impious things are those things..
•that are hated by, repulsive to, or disapproved by THE GODS
The things that are neither good nor bad are those things..
Euthyphro’s definition of moral good:
•The Good, Pious or Holy things are those things which are
•loved by
•dear to
•approved by
•THE GODS
This has some logical corollaries:
The bad, or impious things are those things.?
•that are hated by, repulsive to, or disapproved by THE GODS
The things that are neither good nor bad are those things.?
• toward which THE GODS have none of the above attitudes
Socrates examines logical consequences of this definition. He notes that Euthyphro’s situation parallels one in the divine realm that was very common knowledge in Greece. Euthyphro would have been very familiar with this tale from Greek mythology:
The story of Zeus
and
Euthyphro’s definition of moral good:
•The Good, Pious or Holy things are those things which are
•loved by
•dear to
•approved by
•THE GODS
This has some logical corollaries:
The bad, or impious things are those things.?
•that are hated by, repulsive to, or disapproved by THE GODS
The things that are neither good nor bad are those things.?
• toward which THE GODS have none of the above attitudes
Cronos was King. It’s good to be king. So, naturally he was jealous of his power, and wished to retain it.
However, he found out via prophecy, that one of his kids would overthrow him. So, he made contingency plans:
The story of Zeus
and
Euthyphro’s definition of moral good:
•The Good, Pious or Holy things are those things which are
•loved by
•dear to
•approved by
•THE GODS
This has some logical corollaries:
The bad, or impious things are those things.?
•that are hated by, repulsive to, or disapproved by THE GODS
The things that are neither good nor bad are those things.?
• toward which THE GODS have none of the above attitudes
Cronos made his wife (Rhea) promise to turn over each of his children as they were born. She dutifully turned over Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Hades and Poseidon. Cronos ate them. Now, you can’t kill Gods, but you can apparently confine them in this way !
The story of Zeus
and
Euthyphro’s definition of moral good:
•The Good, Pious or Holy things are those things which are
•loved by
•dear to
•approved by
•THE GODS
This has some logical corollaries:
The bad, or impious things are those things.?
•that are hated by, repulsive to, or disapproved by THE GODS
The things that are neither good nor bad are those things.?
• toward which THE GODS have none of the above attitudes
But, by the time Zeus was conceived, Rhea had simply had enough. She wrapped an appropriately sized stone in
swaddling clothes and turned it over to Cronos. Trusting her, he popped the stone, wrapping and all, like an
oversized tic-tac.
The story of Zeus
and
Euthyphro’s definition of moral good:
•The Good, Pious or Holy things are those things which are
•loved by
•dear to
•approved by
•THE GODS
This has some logical corollaries:
The bad, or impious things are those things.?
•that are hated by, repulsive to, or disapproved by THE GODS
The things that are neither good nor bad are those things.?
• toward which THE GODS have none of the above attitudes
She sent Zeus to Crete. Zeus grew up, learned of his
father’s less than stellar behavior, enlisted help from the Titans, overthrew Cronos and took over the kingship as prophesied. [Later, he would essentially repeat the crimes of his dad. Some kids
never learn.]
The story of Zeus
and
Now, if divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine
attitudes differ?
Love
It! Hate it!
If divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine attitudes differ?
Applying the definition we have: •One god loves Euthyphro’s actions •One god hates Euthyphro’s actions •By the definition what he is doing is..
Both morally
good
and
morally
bad
at the exact
same time!
Is this how we normally think of things?
For instance: Can the act of rescuing a
helpless infant be anything other than morally good? Is it
If divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine attitudes
differ?
If we believe it’s not
possible for acts to be both
morally good
and morally
bad
at the exact same time,
we need to make some
modifications to the
definition!
Perhaps Euthyphro meant to
say that all the Gods must
approve or disapprove in
order for an act to be morally
good or morally bad.
Well, OF COURSE that’s what I meant. All the Godsapprove of me prosecuting dear old Dad. Of that I
If divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine attitudes
differ? Interesting solution, for if
Socrates is right about these two Gods:
•We do not have all the Gods
approving.
•We do not have all the Gods
disapproving
•Logically, what follows?
The act must be neither good nor bad.
You know that the Gods are constantly bickering and
If divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine attitudes differ?
•
Euthyphro insists though,
that all the Gods DO agree
on this matter, despite
Socrates’ skepticism.
•
Assume he is correct.
•
If all the Gods concur in
their approval, then what
he is doing is morally
If divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine attitudes differ?
And, if there is only one
God whose attitudes we
have to worry about, that
too would seem to solve
the problem
If divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine attitudes differ?
With either of these
solutions, we still
have nagging
questions: Couldn’t
the multitude of
Gods have failed to
concur? Couldn’t
the one God have
had a different
attitude toward the
act in question?
What logically
follows?
•If so, then even when an act is, as a matter of fact good, it COULD HAVE
BEEN bad (and vice versa).
• IT COULD HAVE
BEEN neither good nor bad.
•All of this holds
even though nothing about the act, and its circumstances would have been different.
•And this would be
so, for every act.
Euthyphro Dilemma 1
• Is an action good because
God approves of it?
• Or
If divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine attitudes differ?
Rescuing innocent
babies from harm
could have been
bad, even though it
is good?!
Does that sound
correct?
•In given
circumstances an act is necessarily good, bad or morally
neutral, and cannot be one of the other two options UNLESS the circumstances change.
•This is a sort of “modal status” for moral properties. Like a square
necessarily having four sides, rescuing innocent babies from
harm is necessarily
good.
This points out a feature we believe acts have with
If divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine attitudes differ?
In order to account for this modal invariance, we would have to claim that divine attitudes
never change, and could not have been different even in the past.
If divine attitude is necessary and sufficient for having moral properties, then what can we deduce when divine attitudes differ?
In answering these questions, we give an
account, a reason, for the divine attitudes, and begin to move into the realm of ethics, a
reasoned exploration of moral matters. If you were to explain
why it is God
approves of rescuing innocent babies from harm, how would you start?